인문논총‧제51집‧2020.02. ISSN 2005-6222 / eISSN 2713-7511pp.3~37

The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement

in modern China, 1925-1942

JUNHYUNG CHAE

Assistant Professor, Department of History Education, Incheon National University; jhchae@inu.ac.kr

Abstract: This paper examines how did the nationalists and the communist revolutionaries tried to

transform local Chinese peasants into modern Chinese nation with the case of the Red Spears, a local self-defensive and religious society of Republican period. It demonstrates how did the various political

powers in Chinese territory, including Japanese Imperial forces during the Sino-Japanese war, competing

with each other to appeal to Chinese common population. By doing so, the paper explores several issues: how did Chinese peasants develop their local identities into national ones; what was the role of religious

doctrines and secular features in the transformation. The paper argues that, regardless of religious beliefs,

the secular regulations strongly influenced by Confucian teachings of the Red Spears also should be regarded as an important factor in the lives of the Red Spear Society’s members. It also deserves to note that local

commoners’ engagement with the Red Spears resulted not just from their religious transformation, but also

from their practical needs for using the Society’s doctrines and organization to resist government’s excessive extraction. It also demonstrates that there were little difference between the Chinese communists’ strategic

approach to the Red Spears and that of other political powers, especially Japanese imperial forces, in

mobilizing the peasant forces of the Red Spear Society. During the Sino-Japanese War. They both acknowledged the important role of hybrid religious belief of the Red Spears as a core factor in sustaining

their solidarity. In utilizing the forces of the Red Spear Society, Japanese imperialist and Chinese communist

policy makers tried to avoid provoking the Society with attacking their “superstitious” beliefs.

Key words: the Red Spears, popular religion, state making, secularization, Sino-Japanese War, Chinese mass movement, Chinese secret societies

I. Introduction

In early May of 1926, the Chinese Communist Party’s bulletin, The Guidance

Weekly, reported the bloody situations in Henan, which resulted from the armed clash

between Wu Peifu’s army and a local peasants’ group, the Red Spears. The group of peas-

4 Junhyung Chae

ants against Wu’s army was, according to the reporter, Xiao Xiang, indoctrinated by the

superstition of invulnerability and opposed to the warlord’s oppressive exploitation. With

this situation in Henan, the party leader, Chen Duxiu, argued that, despite their super-

stitious beliefs, the Red Spears struggle against the warlords shows the traditional pattern

of peasants’ uprising against oppressive rule of noble class in the two thousands years of

Chinese history. And he also argued that it is an urgent and momentous question for

China to choose whether to leave the peasants’ uprising alone as a natural thing or to give

the peasants a guidance to join under the banner of revolution against imperialism and

warlordism (Xiao, 1926, pp.1545-1546).

One of the most important issues for the modern Chinese revolutionaries, regardless of

political inclination, was to make the common people to join the revolution. From the ex-

citement of the mass movement of 1919, the question, how to make the mass transform

into the revolutionary force, was at the heart of Chinese revolutionaries. However, the

question was not easy to give proper answer. In this paper, I want to investigate how did

the nationalists and the communist revolutionaries tried to transform local Chinese peas-

ants into modern Chinese nation with the case of the Red Spears, a local self-defensive and

religious society of Republican period. And I will try to understand how did the various

political powers in Chinese territory, including Japanese Imperial forces during the

Sino-Japanese war, competing with each other to appeal to Chinese common population.

By doing so, I hope to answer several questions: how did Chinese peasants develop their

local identities into national ones; what was the role of religious doctrines and secular fea-

tures in the transformation; how they engaged in the communist revolution and the

struggle against Japanese Imperialism?

These questions could lead broader questions in nation formation in China. Etienne

Balibar argued that in order for a nation-state to exist, it must produce its citizens. The

state has to transform its citizens from people who happen to be born within their boun-

daries into people who conceive of themselves and behave in the domains of economics,

politics and religion as citizens of a nation. Religion is important because theological dis-

5The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

course has provided models for the idealization of the nation and its sacralization (Balibar,

1996, pp.137-140). Despite his notable implications on the analogy of religion and na-

tionalism, it seems to me a question still remains: can his arguments be applied to explain

experience of China having different religious tradition from the West?

A number of researches contributed to unveil the Red Spear’s activities and religious

doctrines. Dai Xuanzhi opened the way for general understanding of the society. Dai

carefully investigated origins of the society in Chinese traditional popular religion, special

features of Red Spears’ religious beliefs, and hierarchical formation. For the superstitious

religious elements in the Society, Dai argued that these superstitious elements in govern-

ing common people have long tradition in China’s history. According to him, the legiti-

macy of the Chinese rulers was often represented as deific figures. And such traditional

thinking was inherited even to Republican period. Though he gave plentiful historical ex-

amples and impressive investigations, it seems inadequate for him to conclude the activity

of the Red Spears as examples of Chinese nationality or heroic spirit of Chinese people

(Dai, 1985, pp.115-118).

Baba Takeshi investigated the ideological and organizational dimension of the Red

Society and one of its branches, the Heavenly Gate Society. According to his argument,

the ideological dimension, that is religious beliefs and ritual served as a medium to bring

the peasant’s daily life into the extraordinary mental state for uprisings. Yet, the Red

Spear Society as well as its branches was so confined to the communal interest that it

failed to confront the social situations that was brought by the invasion of imperialism

and the feudal social relations. He pointed out that overcoming the limitations of the Red

Spear movement was left for the communists (Baba, 1976, pp.81-82).

Mitani Takashi also investigated peasant uprisings by the Red Spears in 1920s. He ar-

gued that, as a complex organization of local peasants’ self-defensive militia and religious

secret sects, the Red Spears played important role in struggling with the repressive war-

lords in Henan. Besides, the leadership of the society consisted of local gentry and wealth

farmers. Mitani grasped the decline of the Red Spear movement in late 1920 was due not

6 Junhyung Chae

only to the reconstruction of government’s local administrative system after the Northern

Expedition, but also to solidification of peasants’ self-governing system by the local gen-

try and the wealthy farmers. In this transformation, it was clearly revealed, according to

his argument, that the weaknesses of the Red Spars―dispersion of political power by lo-

calism and sectarianism interrupted emancipation of peasants who participated in the Red

Spear movement (Mitani, 1974, pp.281-283).

Elizabeth Perry’s research focusing on the rebellions of the Nien and the Red Spears in

the Huaibei region concerned with the importance of the local environment in inducing

rural chronic unrest. She challenged to the arguments that suggested universal cause of

peasants’ revolt―invasion of global capitalism. Instead, she argued with the Huaibei re-

gion’s cases that the chronic rebellion was “a rational extension of ongoing modes of re-

source competition, shaped by the natural and social composition of the area” (Perry,

1980, pp.248-249). According to her argument, despite mediating role between state

and peasantry, the Red Spear movement like other rural protective movements had cer-

tain inherent limitations that undermined the possibility of transition to a more revolu-

tionary mode of collective action (Perry, 1980, p.206).

Baba, Mitani, and Perry share an assumption that to be emancipated from local con-

nections, the peasant movements had to await expansion of communist movement. They

argued that the communist movement was successful by taking a new approach to mobi-

lize the peasants for the war against Japan and the communist revolution. They assumed

that the real changes in resolving contradictory situations in Chinese rural society by the

communist movement. I do not intend to completely deny the role of the communist

movement in social revolution in 1920s and 1930s of China. However, it seems that it is

not so much important to evaluate which one of the policies was effective in mobilizing

the masses. On the other hand, I will trace how the methods to utilize the general pop-

ulation for various political intentions emerged in China with case of the Red Spears. By

doing so I hope to answer several questions: did the communists and other political pow-

ers show explicit ideological differences in treating peasants’ spontaneous movements?

7The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

What was the role of the leaders of the Red Spear Society? What kind of policy did the

various political powers take when they try to get support from the Red Spears?

It seems to me that the ideological attitudes in the policy toward the Red Spears of

both the nationalists and Japanese imperialists could not be clearly distinguished. The

point that the nationalists and the communists shared ideological similarity is able to

serve to explain chronic rural rebellions in Modern Chinese society. It seems to me that

the ideological analogies between the revolutionaries and the local elites served to resolve

the ephemeral tensions between the rulers and the ruled. Yet, the compromise could not

bring real solutions for the contradictions in rural social relations and the lives of the peas-

ants in the firs half century of Chinese rural society. This seems one of the important fac-

tors for the successive peasants’ rebellions. But, this argument does not necessarily mean

that the Chinese society was in stagnation or had no progression.

The case of Red Spear Society in the first half of twentieth century seems to be a good

example to prove my hypothesis. To support my argument, I will investigate, first of all,

the important religious and organizational features of the Red Spears. By doing so, I ex-

pect to answer such questions as what was the operating mechanism of the Society and

the uprisings, and what was the role of the local gentry and the rich peasants that made

possible for the Red Spears take conservative position. Then, I will examine the discourses

around the Red Spears revealed in scattered sources by the nationalists and the

communists. By doing so, I expect to show how the Chinese revolutionary elites made use

of peasants for their political purpose.

II. Historical Overview of the Red Spears

The Red Spear Society was a self-defensive and religious organization of northern

Chinese peasants during the early twentieth century. Especially, it was proliferated in

Henan and Shandong province in which damages were great by the wars and tyranny of

warlords and local bandits (Suemitsu, 1932, p.114). No one gave a definitive answer to

8 Junhyung Chae

the question of the origin of the Red Spears. Some sources indicated that the origin of the

Red Spears could be traced to the Eight Trigrams of Qing times (Cai, 1996, p. 159).

Others argued that they inherited the tradition of the Boxers of late nineteenth century.

According to Dai Xuanzhi, this society can be considered the legitimate offspring of the

Boxers and the heirs of China’s village militia (Dai, 1985, p.1). Yet, many of scholars

agree that the Red Spears were well underway in early 1920s, in opposition to a host of

bandit armies then plundering across the North China (Perry, 1980, p.154).

One of the most notable armed uprisings by the Red Spears was its opposition to re-

pressive rule by the military governor of Henan, Yue Weijun, and his successor Wou

Peifu. After the occupation of Henan by invasion from Shaanxi, Yue had made numerous

demands on the peasantry (Dai, 1985, pp.17-21). The burdens on peasantry by Yue who

was supported by Feng Yuxiang provoked armed uprisings of Red Spear in almost every

county in Henan province. Wu took advantage of the peasantry’s rebellion against Yue.

In early 1926, Wu saw an alliance with one of the Red Spears branch as his key to take

over of the province. Promising high military rank to Lu Baixun, the branch’s leader and

a three year tax holiday to Lu’s followers, Wu was able to obtain crucial Red Spear assis-

tance in defeating the forces of Yue Weijun and assuming control of Henan province. But

having taken power, Wu turned against his former allies. Fourteen Red Spear leaders

were shot to death and the society was ordered to disarm. By this event, the Red Spears

was able to become a center of attention of Chinese peasant movement.

The “dramatic decline” of the Red Spears from late 1920s to early 1930s had close rela-

tion with the Nationalist government’s policy on the Red Spear Society (Perry, 1980,

pp.177-186). After the success of the Northern Expedition, the Nationalist government

took two methods to deal with the local militia. One was to make these local militia into

official military forces of the Nationalist government (Cai, 1996, p.175). Another was fo-

cused on attacking the religious beliefs of them (Mitani, 1978). From the nationalists’

perspective, in Balibar’s term, it was dual application of both Machiavellian way and

Gramscian way―“force” and “education”―for transforming common people into national

9The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

subjects (Balibar, 1996, p.139). Though the Red Spears Society regenerated with the in-

vasion of Japanese forces, Red Spear Society slowly faded away and disappeared as the war

with Japan came to a close and the between the Communists and Nationalists started up.

A combination of factors worked together to bring an end to what was once powerful and

popular peasant organization (Cai, 1996, pp.176-177).

Most of literature deals with the Red Spear Society are focusing on its struggle with re-

pressive warlord rulers in 1920s. According to an investigation, however, the Red Spears

already spread to Northern China and Manchuria in late 1920s. One of report on Chinese

secret society done by Japanese military agents in northern China shows the total number

of the Red Spears in three provinces of Northern China (Hebei, Shandong, and Henan)

was 775,000 (Rikugunshō, 1939). Sino-Japanese conflict form 1931 and later Sino-

Japanese War probably caused the proliferation of the Red Spears in Northern China and

Manchuria. However, the activities of the Red Spears during the Sino-Japanese War did

not attract much attention from the researchers.

III. Religious beliefs and political activities of the Red Spear Society in 1920s

The bloody scene captured by a communist reporter in 1926, was one of the notable

events in Chinese peasants movements not just for communist party members, but also

for Chinese elites in general. It provoked a sort of sentiment that the Chinese peasants fi-

nally displayed ability to join the revolution. Deng Yanda, one of prominent nationalist

leader, believed that “the demands of the Red Spears was a revolutionary demand, and it

is possible for the Red Spear Society to be transformed into a revolutionary organization”

(Deng, 1984, p.119).

Many of Chinese scholarship show that the peasant movement, which was led mostly

by the communist party members, was able to be, in some degree, successful in that

project. However, in my perspective, it should have more emphasis on the relation be-

10 Junhyung Chae

tween the Red Spears and the state formation in late 1920s, and on the competitions be-

tween different social groups to lure the Red Spears for their own political purposes.

According to Meyer and Rowan's observation, formal organization emerges because

“rational formal structures are assumed to be the most effective way to coordinate and

control the complex relational networks” in social life and production (Meyer and Rowan,

1991, p.17). In late 1920s’ Henan province, the rational formal structure of power as well

as in other provinces did not properly function as a controlling post. As a result, the in-

formal organizations like the Red Spear Society took this function in place of provincial

government or central government. I argue that, in this political scene, it is not so much

important to realize which one was dominant―informal organization or formal organ-

ization as to realize how this dominance took place and what was the meaning of this

domination. Besides, the warlords, tried to use the peasant movement instigated by the

Red Spears’ military activities to support their own purpose to obtain controlling power in

provincial level.

On the other hand, local elites also tried to take advantage of the power of this peas-

ants’ organization to enhance their own status and power in county level. As Li Dazhao

pointed out, “the warlords tried to use local landed proprietors, and the local proprietors

tried to use local peasants” . Yet, Li himself was also deeply interested in guiding the Red

Spear to the “bright way.” That is, in terms of “utilizing (liyong)” the Red Spears, it seems

there were no significant difference among various competitors of mid 1920s’s Chinese

political scene (Li, 1999, pp.670-671).

In this section, I will investigate the organizational features of the Red Spear Society,

especially ideological dimension and controlling mechanism of the Society. This will nec-

essarily lead to answer such questions as how did the leaders of the Red Spears make deci-

sions? Who were the leaders of Red Spears? What’s the relation between the Red Spears

and governmental power in different levels? And then, I will investigate what was the

similarity or the difference between the approaches of the communists and the nationalist

provincial government. By doing so, it seems to be able to show how did confronting

11The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

these two ruling political forces compete with each other in the process of state formation

for gaining legitimacy from their supposed-to-be ruled.

(1) Religious beliefs and organization of the Red Spear Society

My main questions for this part are what was the relation between the “superstitious

beliefs” and the local interests, and how did the local elites who led the Red Spear Society

compromise with the state apparatus. By answering these questions, it seems possible to

argue as follows. There existed dual dimensions in the Red Spears’ ideology―the

“superstitious beliefs” and secular interests regarding, especially, tax problem. The reli-

gious doctrines, as Baba Takeshi argued, played an important role in the formation of

communal solidarity among members of the Red Spear Society. And these religious ele-

ments served to strengthen the political authority of the Society’s leadership. Engaged

with other larger social relations with, such as warlords’ military forces, provincial gov-

ernment, and nationalist central government, the local gentry who led the Red Spear

Society concerned the practical matters and the secular nature of the Society came to be

revealed more explicitly.

As Magagna observes, the Red Spears used “community ritual as a focus of community

solidarity.” These rituals “drew boundaries between insiders and outsiders” and “focused

the consciousness of participants” on their group solidarity (Magagna, 1991, p.263). It

deserves, at this point, to investigate the Red Spears’ religious doctrines and the society’s

organization with more detail. Due to the extreme hybridism and the lack of records, it is

hard to trace the religious doctrines of the Red Spears to its origin with certainty. Yet, of

course, there exist several explanations for the origins of the Red Spears’ religion. In these

several explanations, it is largely regarded that two explanations seem reasonable. One is

that the Red Spears originated from the tradition of the Eight Diagrams which was prolif-

erated in late Qing. With the tradition of the Eight Diagrams, the Red Spears inherited

the Boxers’ tradition which was most explicitly expressed in the teaching of

invulnerability.

12 Junhyung Chae

Obviously, many of Chinese religious traditions appear in the religious doctrines of the

Red Spears. Generally speaking, the religious elements in the Red Spear Society were

based on syncretism of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and other popular cults. The

main gods they believed were included Confucius, Duke of Zhou, Jade Emperor, Guandi

and even famous characters in popular stories such as The Investiture of the Gods,

Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and Journey to the West (Baba, 2001, p.32). Yet, it is

important to remember that there did not existed coherent religious doctrines. On the

other hand, the religious faith was expressed through the ritual performances or the mili-

tary actions.

When one was approved to be admitted as a member to the Society, the rite was given

for the newly admitted member. The Society is organized in such a way that a Fragrance

Hall (xiangtang), meaning Fragrant Hall, is the local unit. Each Xiangtang has a master,

called Teacher (laoshi), and groups of members meet in the hall to receive instruction.

Formerly there were at least two large and one small Xiangtang in every village, the size

of each Tang being unlimited. In the northern part of Anhui there were Tang ranging

from 10 to 100 members. The master of each Tang is a veteran member of the Society,

well versed in the arts of self-defense and sorcery.

The process of initiation into the Society is known as the “Entrance Through the Red

Door” (ru hongmen), and an application for admission requires the recommendation of a

member. When a novice attends the Xiangtang for the first time he is required to bring a

huge stick of incense to be burned in the hall, a custom which explains the name

“Fragrant Hall” given to units of the organization. Upon entering the hall the novice

kneels before the master, and after many prostrations proceeds to take an oath, solemnly

pledging himself not to betray the secrets of the Society to outsiders, even to his parents,

wife, or children. Violation of this oath constitutes an act of treachery which means imme-

diate expulsion. The oath being taken, the new member requests the master to recite the

commandments to him, an act called “begging for mercy”. The most important com-

mandments are the following: “you shall not commit adultery”; “you shall not burn hous-

13The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

es”; “you shall not kill the innocent”; and “you shall not loot or plunder”. All these com-

mandments he must obey at the risk of severe punishment. This “begging for mercy” con-

cludes on the oral formalities of initiation.

Being formally admitted to the Society, the initiate must do as the other new members

usually do. He is obliged to go to the “Fragrant Hall” to burn incense twice a day, in the

morning and evening. This ritual, which is called “doing work,” is conducted behind

closed doors and in complete secrecy. Before incense is burned every member must wash

his hands and mouth by the way of demonstrating the purity of his heart. Then he go

down upon his knees and remains in that position as long as the incense continues to burn.

The object of worship is supposed to be Guandi, one of the three heroes of the period of

the Three Kingdoms (AD 221-264), who is generally deified under the name of

Guanggong, the God of War, and the personification of loyalty to sworn brothers.

One of the most important features in Red Spears’ beliefs was the practice of invulner-

ability to swords and bullets (dao qiang bu ru). Initiation rites and magic potions might

not confer the anticipated invulnerability, but they could provide the courage in turn ter-

rified bandits and soldiers, to the point where they would refuse to engage in so “unequal”

a battle. Given the mental attitudes and technical capabilities of both sides, in other

words, archaic customs and beliefs were not wholly lacking in effectiveness as tools of

peasant defense (Chesneaux, 1972, p.219). Baba Takeshi argued the gradual acquisition

of modern weapons by Red Spear units was not accompanied by any diminution or dis-

appearance of the invulnerability cult. Baba interpreted the belief, not as a rationalization

for military weakness, but as a powerful ideology capable of overcoming village parochial-

ism and imbuing peasants with the sense of entering a new life (Baba, 2001, pp.30-40).

Another important task for novices in the arts of magic is “kneeling during the night”.

At dead of night he and his followers guided by the master, are marched to some desolate

place which the local peasantry rarely visit. Here the new members, holding each other’s

hands, stand in a circles and the kneel down remaining in this position with eyes closed

and making no noise, for two or three hours. This disciplinary training is intended to en-

14 Junhyung Chae

hance the courage and adventurous spirit of members. Two or three weeks later the nov-

ice is given different work. He has to stand perfectly still and repeat time and again the in-

cantations he has been taught, after which the master beats him from head to foot, but in

spite of the pain the victim must not show any sign of distress or weakness. Some days lat-

er, he is called upon to perform a much more vigorous penance. With the upper part of his

body completely naked, he is beaten by the master with a sharp sword, he pretending to

be immune from pain or injury inflicted upon him. Having passed these stages of train-

ing, he is supposed to possess both the moral courage and strength essential to a great

fighter.

In that capacity, the new member is worth of being rewarded with a red spear, the rec-

ognized weapon of the Society, but seldom used in modern fighting. Before the spear is

presented, the master gives his disciple three magic formulae written on three pieces of

yellow paper―the first is to be burned, the second is to be kept in his pocket, and the third

is to be swallowed. In the final testing of his courage, the new member has to stand, un-

flinching and unarmed, while his master tries to shoot him from a distance of a few yards.

If he is quick of hearing and keen of vision, it is believed he can evade the projectiles dis-

charged in his directions, but many have met their death during this final test of discipline

and efficiency.

The Red Spear leaders were generally respected and seen as community leaders, often

being local landlords, rich peasants, and clan leaders. This meant that Red Spear leader

wielded a great deal of power, in fact edicts from a Red Spear leader could carry more

weight than one from a corrupt or inefficient governor (Dai, 1985, p.8). This also means

that the Red Spears leadership was often well educated. They were not only literate but

also knew the working of government and had some idea of the political situation in

which the Red Spears operated. This enabled the Red Spears to negotiate with soldiers

and bandits as equal, and to draft agreement with them. It also enabled the Red Spears to

pass on accurate information between different branches about bandit and soldier activ-

ities in the area. At the same time, the majority of the rank and file Red Spear members

15The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

were primarily poor and middle peasants who only took up arms when threatened (Dai,

1985, pp.33-34).

So far, I have investigated the rituals and important physical trainings that were re-

garded as an essential part of the Red Spears’ doctrines. One of the notable point is that

during the practice of the invulnerability, it was possible to have unexpected victims.

According to a recollection of, Zhang Jieshi, a CCP member who was responsible for or-

ganizing a branch of CCP’s Peasant Association in Longping county of southern Hebei

province, the Red Spear’s practice or the performance of the invulnerability against bul-

lets of their enemies were deceitful. He recalled that the Red Spear teachers manipulated

the operation of the guns that were supposed to be used during the invulnerability prac-

tice before hand (Zhang, 1984, p.139). If the teachers were failed to properly handle the

operation, it was disastrous. According to several available records, when the victims died,

in most of the cases, it was justified that the victim broke the Red Spears’ religious

precepts. Sometimes, the gathered members of the Red Spear beat the teacher who was

responsible to the practice of invulnerability to death (Cai, 1996, p.172). But, those trag-

edies seldom brought the crisis of the Red Spears’ religious doctrines to its adherents.

Then, despite these accidents or possible skepticism on the beliefs, why the members

of the Red Spear Society did not take those accidents as a tool to counter argue against the

religious beliefs of the Society? Of course, it is probable that those accidents did not neces-

sarily led to crisis of beliefs in the Red Spears’ religious doctrines. However, it seems more

probable that major portion of the Red Spear members agreed with the preservation of

the members’ solidarity despite defectiveness of the Red Spears religious doctrines. The

local commoners’ need for the Red Spear beliefs and the Red Spear Society itself was driv-

en from the need to resolve practical contradictions in their own communities.

In the Longping county where Zhang served as a Peasant Association organizer, there

was a serious dispute over the land ownership between local commoners and the county

magistrate who was dispatched to the county by Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian warlord

faction. In early 1927, the county magistrate, Sun Xiaohu, tried to make some un-

16 Junhyung Chae

registered land into registered one and into public property of county government. The

problem was that the land had been occupied and cultivated by many of Longping peas-

ants who had no idea about the registration and thought that the land was their own pri-

vate property inherited from their ancestors long time ago. Though this clash was a good

chance for Zhang to organize the masses, it seems that Zhang and CCP’s ability were not

enough to organize the peasants of Longping county by themselve. Several local leaders

and Zhang agreed that the dispute could not be resolved by legal methods. So, they de-

cided to invite Red Spear teachers from Quzhou and Daming county where the Red Spear

Societies already fought for reducing tax burden against government officials (Zhang,

1984, pp.138-139).

Though small as it is, the event in Longping county in 1927 shows that the adoption of

the Red Spear teachings by the local commoners in Longping county was due not to the

religious transformation or spiritual sympathy, but to the commoners’ practical need for

the struggle against the government (Duara, 1988, p.129). Making a connection with the

Red Spears, according to Zhang’s recollection, was just an alternative to collective peti-

tion which was declined by the representatives of villages in Longping county. The repre-

sentatives thought that having armed ability by engaging with the Red Spears Society

would be a more effective way to give pressure to the county magistrate. As a result,

though some people concerned the religious doctrines and practices of the Red Spears as

superstition, the local leaders and even CCP agents like Zhang, consented to invite two

Red Spear teachers from other counties.

(2) The Red Spears leadership and engagement with secular power

Though religious dimensions, as Baba Takeshi and other scholars argued, played an

important role in formation of the Society’s solidarity, it seems to me that what ruled the

members’ everyday mode of practice was its secular regulations. The regulation of the Red

Spear Society compiled by one of Manchukuo police officer, Suemitsu Takayoshi, shows

that there are hardly any religious elements in regulation itself. On the other hand, this

17The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

regulation including twenty articles can be said a complex of Confucian moral ethic, or-

ganizational discipline, and other practical matters (Suemitsu, 1932, p.124).

Then, who were the leaders of the Red Spears, on what kind of basis did the Red Spear

Society operate, and the collective actions of the Red Spears are made? In this section, I

will try to answer these questions. Answering these questions could provide us with sev-

eral implications regarding the relation between the Red Spears and the various political

powers. And one step further, it will be possible to mention the competitions between

these various parties who had different political visions to utilize the Red Spears for their

own purposes.

As mentioned in previous section, the Red Doctrines was originated from various reli-

gious and popular traditions of Chinese culture. And it was largely regarded as prominent

heir of the Boxers. In this perspective, it would be possible to understand that, in the ini-

tial stage of the Society’s formation, it should have been the mysterious religious masters

led the organization in each village of Henan province.

Along with the growth of the organization itself and the demand for collective action

against unreasonably repressive rule of local warlords, it was needed for the Red Spear

Society to consolidate the solidarity of the Society and the organization itself by regulat-

ing the mode of everyday practices. One of the most explicit features of their regulations

was the influence from Confucian ideology (Suemitsu, 1932, pp.127-129). With the

adoption of Confucian ideology which was regarded as an effective tool to manage the

large scale organization and collective action of the members, the local elites, the gentry

and the rich landowners who had political power in rural villages among the commoners

started to take over leading positions of the Red Spears.

However, it is very hard to give clear answer to the question: who were these leaders of

the Red Spears? None of Chinese sources on the Red Spears clearly show the backgrounds

of these leaders. Xin Zhang argues that the leader of the Red Spear were minor elites who

had more to lose than ordinary peasants, and at the same time, were excluded from the

protection of official protection from the government (Zhang, 2000, pp.58-59). Yet, as

18 Junhyung Chae

Jean Chesnaeux noted these minor elites utilized the Red Spears to enhance their own sta-

tus in negotiating with higher authorities. By doing so, some leaders of secret society lead-

ers joined in warlord factions (Chesneaux, 1973, p.16-18).

The case of Li Taihe who was a leader of the Red Spears in western Shandong province

deserves to understand the leadership of the Red Spears. According to Shen Zhongming’s

recollection, Li was born in Liaocheng county in western Shandong province. He passed

the official examination in late Qing, and held the low degree of Xiucai. After the collapse

of Qing, he earned his living by teaching in Linqing county. But, he was a popular figure

in his native place because he originally was fond of resolving social disputes in his own

hometown. He was economical in everyway, and always showed mercy to the poor.

In the winter of 1925, coming back to his home from Linqing, he witnessed the miser-

able livelihood of the peasants under the severe tax burden. Therefore, he decided to do

something for the miserable peasants. He organized the Red Spear Society in home coun-

ty with his several relatives. The Red Spear organization leaded by Li and his relatives rap-

idly expanded to other counties near Liaocheng. In February 1926, the total number of

this organization was counted eight thousand people. It is notable that he was a tradition-

ally educated minor intellectual. At the same time, his decision to do something valuable

to the peasants was derived not from religious inspiration but from a sort of sense of duty

as an intellectual that was explicitly stated in Confucian texts and traditional historiog-

raphies that he had studied.

According to Shen’s recollection, Li took an agent role in negotiating the tax

reduction. He represented the peasants, specifically, the members of the Red Spear of

Liaocheng county, and negotiated with the magistrate of Liaocheng county, Lu

Chunyuan who was under the rule of Zhang Zongchang. But, the negotiation between Li

and Lu was not so successful for the Red Spears to get satisfactory reduction of the tax

payment. After the negotiation ended in a rupture, Li led his Red Spear forces to attack

the county seat. But, he was killed by the local bandits who were hired by the county

magistrate when Li tried to get into the county seat. As a result, the uprising by the

19The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

Liaocheng Red Spear was ended in vain (Shen, 1984, pp.77-79).

The case of Lou Baixun, one of prominent Red Spear leader in late 1920s’ Henan prov-

ince also seems to be able to show how the Red Spear leader performed the agent role be-

tween higher state apparatus and lower commoners. Lou was a local traditional medicine

in Tongxu county of eastern Henan. He was respected for his benevolent service for the

local commoners, and for sincere participation to social affairs of Tongxu county. He

seemed to establish notable social networks and power in local political scene. Finally, Lou

became a headman of the Red Spears’ in Tongxu in early 1920s. According to remaining

records, he first emerged as a prominent military leader of the Red Spears in 1925. From

then on, he was in active as a negotiator or a representative for the local interest, partic-

ularly for the tax cut. At the same time he started to engage with higher political di-

mensions, specifically the warlords and the Peasants’ Association Movement by the com-

munists (Chen, 2000, pp.55-56).

From then on, Lou played like an agent to negotiate with various political powers. As

a leader of “Lou tuan (Lou’s corps),” he negotiated with Wu Peifu over the question that

Lou and his fellow Red Spears to support Wu’s army in the war between Zhili faction and

Feng Yuxiang’s Guominjun. Wu tried to use the Red Spears of eastern Henan for their al-

liance force by guaranteeing the Red Spars under Lou’s leadership for reduction of irra-

tional tax. Wu and Lu reached to the agreement of mutual support. After the victory over

the Guominjun, however, Wu Peifu did not put in practice the agreement of reducing the

tax. On the other hand, as a new ruler of Henan province, he was threatened by the ex-

istence of Lou and his fellow Red Spears, because the Red Spears could be easily trans-

formed into the banditry against Wu’s rule of Henan. The unilateral termination of

agreement by Wu brought bloody massacre of the Red Spears in eastern Henan by the

Wu’s forces (Chenbao, 1926.5.19.; Shanghai minguo ribao, 1926.5.21.; Jifan, 1984,

pp.30-31).

This is just one example of the local elites who took the leadership of the Red Spear

Society. There would be other forms of the Red Spears leadership with vast variety. Yet,

20 Junhyung Chae

Lou Baixun’s case clearly shows that one of role that the leader of the Society had some-

thing to do with negotiating the higher authorities which were connected the local com-

moners with the higher authorities.

On the other hand, the various higher authorities, such as provincial government, the

CCP, the GMD, Beijing government, and later unified Nationalist government, tried to

control over the peasant forces of the Red Spears. Yet, their methods were slightly differ-

ent with each other. Directly after the establishment of Henan provincial government in

June 1927 by Feng Yuxiang and his fellow nationalists, the provincial leaders tried to re-

organize the Red Spears and other self-defensive organizations into the ‘Citizen’s Corps

(Mintuan)’ which should be under the direct control of the provincial government

(Henansheng zhengfu, 1984, p.147).

However, the notable thing is that Feng still emphasized the role of influential figures

in local level to persuade and to guide the Red Spars in reorganizing them into the

Citizen’s Corps. That is, the nationalists still acknowledged the agent role of local leader

some of whom were the leaders of the Red Spears as well in some degree. In September 30

1927, he declared, “These societies―the Red Spear Society, the Heavenly Gate Society,

and so on―still wish that impartial men in the local appear to persuade and guide them.

If the impartial men rightly reorganize these societies and establish Citizen’s Corps by let-

ting these societies do not get into the incorrect way, and fight with the official troops,

that would be a great luck for the local and the general citizens” (Wen and Qiao, 2001,

pp.75-77; Qiao, 2001, pp.47-48).

At this point, it needs to investigate communists’ approach toward the Red Spears and

other religious sects in general. From the establishment of the United Front in 1924, the

revolutionaries, especially the CCP members, tried to organize local peasants and to es-

tablish peasant movement. The communists’ efforts were derived from the belief that, as

mentioned above, peasants were ready to be a revolutionary force for they had already be

possessed of class-consciousness. The CCP leaders like Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao saw

these rural self-defensive groups with superstitious beliefs could be effective alliance for

21The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

the revolution. Yet, the superstitious beliefs had to be eradicated.

The Red Spears’ struggle against repressive warlord rule explicitly revealed in several

bloody events provoked Chinese communists’ attention to this autogenously established

peasant organization. Along with communist elites’ individual comments on the Red

Spear movement, the Chinese Communist Party officially proclaimed a resolution on the

Red Spears movement.

The communists shared the common interest with Feng Yuxiang’s idea in controlling

over the peasants’ forces of the Red Spears. Especially, they both opposed to the super-

stitious doctrines of the Red Spears. And they also thought that they should guide the

masses of these societies with proper methods. Yet, the communists’ idea was quite differ-

ent from that of Feng’s provincial government. In September 1926, the third central ex-

ecutive committee of the CCP officially proclaimed the Resolution on the Red Spears’

Movement. In this resolution, the Party showed its antagonism to the warlords, the local

landed proprietors, and the oppressive local gentry. The primary purpose of the procla-

mation of this resolution was to oppose these groups’ utilization of the Red Spears’ power

for their own interest, and to provide the Party members with proper indications to guide

the Red Spears not to be utilized as a tool for these groups. By giving the Red Spears

“proper guidance,” CCP insisted that the Red Spear Society should be reorganized as mili-

tary power of the Party’s peasant movement (Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu, 1980,

pp.614-616).

The reason for providing the Red Spears with the “proper guidance” was that despite

revolutionary character of the Society, it also possessed reactionary elements such as su-

perstitions, organizational looseness, and lack of constructiveness, which would bring fail-

ure of revolutionary movement. The resolution suggested several steps that should be

adopted for the guidance. First, the CCP should establish a communication institution,

which would be in charge of bringing somewhat independent Red Spear branches

together. This communication institution should be developed into a guiding institution

for future. The second step was to produce a unified peasant organization by bringing var-

22 Junhyung Chae

ious secret societies and autogenously produced peasants’ organizations in each local area.

After proclaiming the Resolution on the Red Spears in 1926, the CCP had produced

another resolution on the Peasants’ Religious and Half-Religious Armed Organizations in

August 1928. In this Resolution the Chinese Communists insisted that it was required to

separate the peasants from the leaders of various peasants’ religious armed organizations

under the slogan of “democratization”. At the same time, by separating the peasant mass-

es, the communists tried to put the leaders of theses societies into isolate status. With this

process, according to the Resolution, the Party should transform and reorganize the mass-

es into a part of the regular Red Army (Yiming, 1984, p.14).

As revealed in several articles by the revolutionary leaders, mostly CCP members, saw

the armed protest of Red Spears as a possible alliance for the reunification and strengthen-

ing China against warlordism and imperialism. They recognized that voluntary establish-

ment local peasants militia was a product of complex of class-consciousness and sentiment

of native place. Li Dazhao, for example, argued in his essay written in August 8 1926 that

Red Spears’ struggle against warlords and local bandits in Shangdong, Henan, and

Shaanxi proved that Chinese peasants were already awakened. He continued that peas-

ant’s local notion rather comprises some elements of their awareness of their own class. So,

if the peasants do not forget their native place, it is possible to say that they do not forget

their class (Li, 1999, pp.670-679).

During the 1920s, it seems possible to say that the Red Spears and the revolutionaries

at times worked toward the same ends, especially anti-warlords. However, there still ex-

isted ideological detachment between them. According to Odoric Wou, most of scholars

studying millenarian movements have repeatedly pointed out that transforming sectarian

into a revolutionary force is never a simple task (Wou, 1994, pp.51-52). The conversation

below between Zhu Qihua, a CCP member who engaged with the party’s peasant move-

ment in late 1927 (A), and a member of the Red Spear Society (B) to recognize this epis-

temological detachment toward nationalist revolution:

23The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

A: I like the Red Spear Society, but I don’t know much about it. What will you do after

joining the society?

B: First of all, we have to defeat the Army from Shaanxi (Laoshaan).

A: Will you also overthrow us, the Revolutionary Army?

B: I have heard that you, the South Army, are not so bad as much as the Army from

Shaanxi.

A: We are not the South Army, but the Revolutionary Army. We have, of course, peo-

ple from the South, but we also have people from the North and even from the

Shaanxi in our Revolutionary Army. We are never trying to make fool of you. We

just want to stand with your side and to help you.

B: That’s good.

A: Do you agree with political assertions of the Revolutionary Army?

B: We are......(He hesitated for a while and said.) If the Son of Heaven who holds the

Authentic Mandatory of Heaven do not appear to the World, it cannot be good after

all.

A: The Son of Heaven who holds the Authentic Mandatory of Heaven cannot be

existed. That is the word to deceive the public. All of the individuals are the Sons of

Heaven who hold the Authentic Mandatory of Heaven.

B: What? You are wrong (He shook his head and said again clearly). But the Son of

Heaven who holds the Authentic Mandatory of Heaven already appeared to the

Under the Heaven. The World will be stable soon.

A: How can you tell?

B: According to the Guanlaoye (Guandi), the Star of the Lord of Heaven already de-

scended to the world. And it is in Jinan of Shandong Province now.

A: What a stupid story!

B: (He glared me with fierce eyes and tried to challenge to me.) What?! (Zhu, 1933,

pp.142-144)

24 Junhyung Chae

Above conversation between a CCP member and a member of the Red Spears show

that, despite mutual cooperation against corrupted warlords, there existed a wide cleav-

age of worldview between the revolutionaries and the Red Spears. For the revolutionaries

who participated in the Northern Expedition, the Red Spears’ worldview was just a kind

of superstition. Conversely, for the Red Spear peasants, the Revolution Army was just a

kind of another Army from ‘the South.’ So, it was also possible for the Red Spears to rebel

against the revolutionaries if their local interests were invaded. It also indicates that, de-

spite the efforts by revolutionaries, it was hard to transform this self-defensive and reli-

gious local organization into ‘modern’ peasant organization that would serve to the

revolution.

IV. The revival of the Red Spears during the Sino-Japanese War

The revival of the Red Spear society in 1930s closely related to the political instability

caused by the tensions between Republic of China and Japanese Empire. Yet, before the

outbreak of the Manchurian incident in 1931, the Red Spear society already spread even

to North Eastern part of the Republic (Laomei, 1984, p.99). Japanese invasion to

Manchuria and Northern China provoked the revival and expansion of the Red Spear

Society as well as other peasant armed groups in 1930s.

However, it is still extremely hard to draw a clear picture of the activity of the Red

Spears in northern and central China. The reason seems that the activities of the Red

Spear were very complex in this time period and spaces. It is largely due not only to the

defensive nature of the Society, but also to the policies on the Red Spears by the Japanese

Empire, Manchukou, and the Republic of China. Each political force tried to use the Red

Spear society for their own purpose―establishment of public security in occupied region

and struggle against Japanese Imperialism. In addition, one of the important features of

the proliferation of the local peasants’ self-defensive groups in 1930s was that the activ-

ities of peasants’ organizations were not only products of the Red Spear movement but al-

25The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

so many other peasants groups.

In this section I will focus on the perceptions and policies to the Red Spears and other

peasants movements of the Japanese Empire and Chinese Communist Party. That will

help to understand several questions; how the Red Spears and other peasant organizations

engaged with the invasion of Japanese Imperialism, how did the Japanese try to establish

public security of occupied territory, and what was the relationship between Chinese state

and the Red Spears? To answer these questions, I will demonstrate, first of all, the activ-

ities of Red Spears and the security policy of Japanese occupation troops and then,

Chinese strategies to enroll the Red Spears into anti-Japanese battlefront. The revival of

the Red Spears in 1930s remarkable in North China and Manchuria, and then, as

Japanese invasion expanded, it became conspicuous in other part of China. Therefore, I

would like to mention, firs of all, the Red Spears activity in Manchuria and North China

with relation to Japanese Imperialism. And then by investigating Communists’ recog-

nitions and policies for these groups, I will show how these two counter parts competed to

gain public support during the period of Sino-Japanese conflict.

Japanese imperial forces in Manchuria and North China recognized the problem of the

Red Spear type self-organizations as a matter of public security and popular support. But,

for Japanese authorities, the peasant organizations, especially the Red Spear Society and

Big Sword Society, had ambivalent meaning. Because most of the members of these soci-

ety were the peasants who were rebellious against almost all kinds―especially economic―

of repressive interventions from the governmental authorities. Moreover, they could be

immediately turned into the guerilla groups against Manchukou and Japanese rule.

However, at the same time, they were also the taxpaying citizens of Manchukou, the allay

state of Japan, and had to be collaborated supporters in Northern China. As a result, the

policies on these peasants’ groups had to take two ways: one was to pacify the peasants

and use them as a tool to secure local societies, and another was to eradicate the rebellious

peasants groups with superior military power.

In June 1932, Tachibana Shiraki, one of the designers of Manchukou, wrote a preface

26 Junhyung Chae

for Suemitsu Takayoshi’s book on Chinese secret societies and charity societies, Shina no

Himitsu Kessha to Jizen Kessha. In this writing, “the Local Bandits and the Gangs,”

Tachibana posed a question how to achieve political stability in Manchukou which was

being disturbed by local banditry in Dongbei region.

His argument was relied on Japanese colonial experts, especially Yanaihara Tadao,

Takekoshi Yosaburō, and Mochiji Rokusaburō’s analysis of the case in Taiwan.

According to Tachibana’s argument, at the first stage of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan,

Japanese colonial authorities experienced the same problem of local banditry as in 1932’s

Manchuria. It took almost eight years from 1896 to 1903 to accomplish complete sup-

pression of Taiwanese local banditry (Tachibana, 1932, pp.5-6). What he wanted to

point out was that the role of police system and expansion of capitalism driven by

Japanese government in suppressing the insurgents.

Tachibana believed that the experiences in colonial Taiwan could be applied to man-

aging the problem of local bandits in Manchukou and northern China. He pointed out,

first of all, that the “miracle” in colonial Taiwan was largely due to the strengthening of

modern police system as well as supplementing it by reviving traditional baojia system

and local self-defensive organizations. Indiscriminate eradication of local rebellion only

with superior military forces could not improve the instable situation in local areas.

Alternating Governor-general of Nogi Mareske with Kodama Gentarō was a kind sign

that the Japanese central government realized the ineffectiveness of exclusive devotion to

the military power in dealing with the situation. Goto Shinpei, the director of the Civil

Administration Bureau under Governor-general Kodama took the lead in coordinating

the policy. And it was successful (Tachibana, 1932, p.6).

Another factor that led successful achieving local stability was the expansion of capi-

talism in the colony. In this argument, he referred Yanaihara’s analysis of colonial policy

in Taiwan. Yanaihara argued that, as Japanese capitalism was in its initial stage, it was

impossible for Japanese private capitalists to invest in the colony without Japanese gov-

ernment’s support. Yanaihara argued that, at the initial stage of colonial rule in Taiwan,

27The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

Japanese government took active role not only to provoke Japanese private capitalists’ in-

vestment, but also to make direct investment by itself (Tachibana, 1932, p.7). Tachibana

pointed out that the expansion of capitalism brought industrial development in the col-

ony and industrial development would make in possible to absorb large number of labor

power in rural areas into industrialized urban areas. With this process, he argues, the local

insurgents could not but to be under control of the colonial authority (Tachibana, 1932,

p.8). His basic assumption was that Japanese authority should take account of what made

the successful suppression of local banditry and achievement of stable colonial rule in

Taiwan, and apply these experiences to the situations in Manchuria.

Tachibana’s idea seems to be largely shared by Japanese military authorities in north-

ern China. They got the idea for how to deal with the local insurgents in Manchuria and

northern China from the experiences in colonial Taiwan. In 22 December 1937, the head-

quarter of Japanese forces in northern China issued “Essentials for Implementing Security

in the Military Occupied Zone (Gun senryō chiiki chian jisshi yōryō),” which was focused

on how to achieve public security in occupied region. In this guideline, the headquarter

insisted the importance of revival of traditional self-defensive organizations by Chinese ci-

vilians and separation of communists from the civilians (Bōei kenshūjo, 1968, pp.53-57).

In April 23 1939, the Headquarter of Japanese forces in Northern China issued the

Essential Principles for Public Security and Purification. According to this document

which regulated general principles of maintaining public security in occupied regions, the

public security should rely on the “revival of self-defensive organizations,” and “expansion

of baojia system.” To accomplish public security mission according to these principles, it

was desperately needed to contrive to win local self-defensive organizations into the

Empire’s domain. For this purpose, giving proper guidance to the local peasants groups

became an important project for Japanese authorities and Chinese collaborators (Bōei

kenshūjo, 1968, p.120).

Excluding suppression by military power, almost all of Japanese policies could be in-

cluded in the Pacification Project. Japanese basic policy on public security in occupied re-

28 Junhyung Chae

gion indicated that local self-defensive organizations should be used as a basis for public

security. According to a report by Manchukou government, there were several an-

ti-Japanese and anti-Manchukou guerilla groups. From Japanese perspective, the various

sorts of armed groups which were threatening public security of Manchuria and Huabei

region, could be classified into three categories―political bandits, communist bandits,

and local bandits (Yamata, 1962). It is notable that, in this categorization, the Japanese

tried to make a separation of the communist guerillas from other armed anti-Japanese

groups. According to the main causes of anti-Japanese activities, Japanese authority had

to make triple―political, ideological, and economic approaches to guarantee public se-

curity in occupied zones.

Along with the effort for maintenance of public security in occupied areas of North

China, especially Hebei and Shandong provinces, Japanese Imperial army and secret in-

telligence services organized the New Citizen’s Society of Republic of China (Zhonghua

minguo xinminhui) in December 23, 1937 for transforming Chinese population into

more civilized and obedient supporters for Japanese rule. Because the primary purpose of

establishment of this civil organization was to produce new type of citizens who were will-

ing to support Japanese rule and the new order in East Asia, its activities were focused on

the cultural dimensions. For example, one of the most important tasks for the New

Citizen Society was pro-Japanese education in elementary and secondary educational

stage. Moreover, establishment of schools in rural area was also important activities for

the Society. By doing so, the members of the New Citizen Society most of whom were

Chinese collaborators and Japanese occupation forces expected to induce Chinese peas-

antry into their domain of the New Order in East Asia.

In September 1942, Ikegami Tomeyoshi issued an article titled “A Consideration on

Guidance of the Red Spear Society.” The purpose of this article was to suggest proper

ways to entangle the Red Spears into the “New Citizen Movement” by the Japanese au-

thorities and Chinese collaborators. Ikegami argued that two important features of the

Red Spears should be understood. One is its organizational feature, and another is how or-

29The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

ganizational feature engaged with its function for peasant mobilization. According to his

argument, the emergence of the Red Spears was largely due to the failure of state system

of China. Ikegami suggested to make the Red Spears a core group of self-defensive organ-

izations using the Society’s above-mentioned features. The luring the Red Spears into

Japanese Empire’s domain could be possible by enhancing standard of living of local peas-

ants and by encouraging economic activities of local villages. By doing so, he argued, it

would be possible to establish new type of local autonomy and to construct civilized soci-

ety in China (Perry, 1980, pp.175-188).

For Chinese Communist Party, the primary concern was to mobilize all of possible re-

sources including the Red Spears in resisting Japanese forces. As mentioned in previous

chapter, the Resolution on the Red Spears movement in 1926 showed principles on the

Red Spear movement. But, these principles were prescribed by the CCP’s general princi-

ples of the peasant movement. That is, the CCP recognized the Red Spears as one of the

forms of their peasant mobilization.

At this point, it needs to investigate revolutionaries’ approaches toward the Red Spears

and other religious sects in general. From the establishment of the United Front in 1924,

the revolutionaries, especially the CCP members, tried to organize local peasants and to

establish peasant movement. The revolutionary efforts were derived from the belief that,

as mentioned above, peasants were ready to be a revolutionary force for they had already

be possessed of class-consciousness. The CCP leaders like Chen Duxiu and Li Dazho saw

these rural self-defensive groups with superstitious beliefs could be effective alliance for

the revolution. Yet, the superstitious beliefs had to be eradicated.

This basic perception for the Red Spears and other religious armed local organizations

had been preserved until 1937. However, from the outbreak of Sino-Japanese war in

1937, CCP’s attitude toward these groups had been changed. In 1938, Liu Shaoqi, the

head of CCP’s northern bureau, pointed out secular nature of these local self-defensive

groups. He argued that the real objective of these groups was only to prevent their local

communities from getting into disturbances, which caused by Japanese army, Chinese

30 Junhyung Chae

remnants, and local bandits. He understood that, though religious beliefs played a role in

solidifying communal identity, the superstitious religion of these societies had a relatively

minor function in their self-defensive action and local politics.

Peng Zhen basically shared common understanding of the Red Spears Society with

that of Liu’s. Peng made a more detailed suggestion to deal with the Red Spears. He men-

tioned several policies that the party could follow: reducing tax burden, improving the re-

lationship between Red Army and the peasantry, and education of the peasants. He sug-

gested that, if the CCP wanted to mobilize the Red Spears against Japanese invasion, the

Party should provoke national consciousness and spontaneous actions of the Red Spears

by propagandizing brutality of Japanese forces, and solidify the relation with the Red

Spears by respecting the Society’s own traditions and their superstitious religions (Peng,

1984, pp.14-17).

Comparing Ikegami and Peng’s arguments, though they represented two different

competing political perspectives, they shared two points in common regarding peasant’s

self-defensive organizations, especially the Red Spear Society. One is that they both ac-

knowledged the religious aspects of the Society as a kernel of members’ solidarity.

Another is that they did not want to provoke the Red Spears by penetrating the Society’s

peculiar inner composition or denying the role of “superstitions,” but tried to use the or-

ganization’s solidarity based on the “superstitions” as an effective tool to sustain the

Society’s power, and to utilize it to reinforce their own political purposes.

Then, how these two counterparts’ policies and ideas were carried out in practice? The

case of Yongqing county, Hebei province shows the different situations that they con-

fronted when they tried to put these policies and ideas into practice at local level.

Yongqing county is located in 70 miles south from Beijing. In one day of May 1938,

Dong Zhenming, a CCP’s agent of this region was dispatched to a newly organized bat-

talion as an instructor (Dong, 1994). Dong’s two superior officers, Cui Wenbing and Liu

Bingyan told him that this battalion was somewhat different from other troops because

all of the soldiers of the battalion were the Red Spears. During his short-term experience

31The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

with the Red Spear soldiers, Dong’ did not have any major trouble with them. And he

even succeeded to enlist two young members of the Red Spears in the Party.

In late 1942, Japanese forces were also engaging with the Red Spear at Yongqing

county, the same place in which Dong served as a CCP agent in 1938. Despite Japanese

efforts to pacify the various secret societies, their engagement with the Red Spears

showed, contrary to the Dong’s experience, the failure of Japanese policy. From late 1942,

Japanese troops tried to repress the local disturbance instigated by the Red Spear organ-

izations in Yongqing county area (Bōei kenshūjo, 1971, pp.234-236). According to the

history of Japanese regiment which participated in suppressing the Red Spears in

Yongqing county, in 1943, the disturbance of the county seemed to be appeased. Yet, the

collision between Japanese troops and the Red Spears was intensified from March 1943,

and it brought death of several Japanese officials. In this situation, Japanese troops cap-

tured several leaders of the Red Spars of the county and let them persuade their fellow

members to surrender. At the same time, they mobilized the regiment’s main units into

Yongqing county in 21 March 1943 for possible armed collision with the Yongqing Red

Spears. Along with the Japanese response to their attack, some Red Spear members

surrendered. But some others declined Japanese persuasion and tried to connect with the

communist partisan units. As Yongqing’s experience showed, if we can take account of

the primary question left for Japanese security authority was how to make voluntary col-

laborate to Japanese rule in occupied area, Japanese attempts to make the Red Spears

their alliances for maintaining public security in occupied areas seems not so successful.

Japanese direct invasion of China started in July 7 1937 was a form of direct pene-

tration of imperialism into the Chinese territory. As Frederick Cooper argued, colo-

nization process designed to dominate was not a coherent practice, but a series of

“hegemonic projects” that often involved winning the acquiescence of conquered pop-

ulations (Cooper, 1997, p.409). Japanese imperial forces could conquer Chinese territory

with relative ease in such a short time. However, they failed to win the CCP in the com-

petition for winning over public support. At the first stage of the pacification project,

32 Junhyung Chae

even inside of the Japanese agents, there existed a kind of skepticism over the pacification

project in occupied zone. A report by one of the Japanese agents who was responsible for

the project in local level reveals the antagonism of Japanese occupiers:

The peasants are ignorant. But they are not so ignorant as unable to understand why

they cannot but to live in poverty. The communists are trying to take advantage of this

point in getting support from the masses. The peasants seldom recklessly follow the com-

munists if the communists try to persuade them with emotional appeals which are un-

realistic to the peasants’ practical lives. On the other hand, if the communists persuade

the peasants with the practical matters within their own livelihood, there would be nu-

merous rebellions. This phenomenon reflected the trend of the Red Spears’ movement in

the Eastern Dao. The construction of collective villages, continuous starvation and des-

olation of land, and remarkable decrease in population were the favorable indications for

the communists’ propaganda. Who is able to guarantee that the peasants who are not

provoked by the ideological instigations with the slogans such as ‘let’s construct commu-

nist society,’ and ‘let’s protect the Soviet Russia, the motherland of the peasants and the

laborers,’ will not be instigated by the wretched circumstances before their own eyes? The

point that we should concern is not communists’ propaganda, but the fact that the in-

gredients for that propaganda still exist in the peasants’ actual livelihood (Ishigaki, 1939,

p.39).

V. Conclusion

The Red Spear Society was one of the most influential local self-defensive peasants’ or-

ganizations with religious beliefs during the Republican period of China. In this paper, I

have tried to investigate this organization’s formation, religious beliefs, secular regu-

lations, and the relations with various political powers such as Chinese nationalists, com-

munists and Japanese imperials forces. By doing so, I tried to grasp how the Red Spears

were regarded as a subject of ruling powers, and how those various political powers com-

33The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

pete each other to utilize the Society for their own political purposes.

What I want to make it clear is, firs of all, the role of religious beliefs and secular regu-

lations of the society. Many of precedent researchers agreed with the role of syncretic reli-

gious beliefs, which were composed of various Chinese religious traditions and popular

culture, as an intermediary that entailed communal solidarity of Chinese rural societies.

Yet, it also deserves to question to what extent did these syncretic religious beliefs exert

influence on the Red Spears’ activities in 1920s and 1930s. I have argued that, regardless

of religious beliefs, the secular regulations strongly influenced by Confucian teachings of

the Red Spears also should be regarded as an important factor in the lives of the Red Spear

Society’s members. It also deserves to note that local commoners’ engagement with the

Red Spears resulted not just from their religious transformation, but also from their prac-

tical needs for using the Society’s doctrines and organization to resist government’s ex-

cessive extraction.

Secondly, in the narratives of many of Chinese Communist leaders, one of central issue

was that it should not be allowed the Red Spears to “be utilized” by other political powers

including Japanese imperial forces. At the same time, they continuously argued the

Chinese Communist Party should “guide them to take the glorious way.” However, as I

have showed, there were no serious differences between the Chinese communists’ strate-

gic approach to the Red Spears and that of other political powers, especially Japanese im-

perial forces, in luring the peasant forces of the Red Spear Society. During the

Sino-Japanese conflict which became explicit from early 1930s, Japanese approach to the

Red Spears was to provide public security in the occupied area. Japanese authorities tried

to apply the experience in the colonial Taiwan in handling rebellions by various secret

societies. Japanese imperialists’ approach to the Red Spears shared two points with the

communists. They both acknowledged the important role of hybrid religious belief of the

Red Spears as a core factor in sustaining their solidarity. In utilizing the forces of the Red

Spear Society, Japanese imperialist and Chinese communist policy makers tried to avoid

provoking the Society with attacking their “superstitious” beliefs.

34 Junhyung Chae

With the case of the Red Spear Society, a religious armed local organization, I have

tried to argue that their leaders and Japanese invasion prescribed the state’s penetration to

local level and its direct control over the common population who were belonged to rural

secret society during 1920s and 1930s’ northern China. It seems to me that the full scale

state penetration into the rural society became possible after 1949 when the Chinese

Communist Party won the political hegemony in the territory and, then, as Prasenjit

Duara argued traditional modes of elite leadership were replaced by the socialist mode of

class domination and revolutionary party commandeerism by the state’s penetration into

agrarian local society under communist party. But the case of Red Spears shows that

Chinese local commoners’ local identity seldom transformed into national one by easy

ways in such a short time. From its emergence as a prominent local power in Henan in

mid 1920s, many of communist leaders believed that the Red Spears mostly consisted of

the peasants soon came to be indoctrinated by class consciousness and to be revolu-

tionized and to be an influential alliance for the revolution and, later, national protection.

Local interest was one of the most important factors in operating mechanism of the Red

Spears. In propelling local interests, hybrid religious doctrines and teachings of invulner-

ability were used in sustaining members’ solidarity, and mobilizing the masses. The con-

junction of the local society and the Red Spear teachings was largely due to the failure of

official governmental institutions which were supposed to resolve the conflicts of interests

between local societies and higher state apparatus. The fact that there existed so many

other transcendental religious societies other than the Red Spears Society in 1920s and

1930s’ China implies the arbitrariness of the conjunction of transcendental religious

teachings and the masses. It requires more sophisticated research to clarify the specific

role of Chinese popular religion in the modern state making in general (Duara, 1988,

pp.155-157).

35The role of popular religion in the Red Spears Movement in modern China, 1925-1942

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Received: December 31, 2019; Revised: February 10, 2020; Accepted: February 10, 2020