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8/10/2019 The Role of Aid in Korea's Development
1/19
BUILDING A CREATIVE ECONOMY - 7
THE ROLE OF AID IN KOREAS DEVELOPMENT
By Lee Kye Woo, KDI School
Abstract
Text here.
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Introduction
Korea was a success case of development. A country with
no signicant natural resources devastated by the Korean
War for three years, it rose from the ashes of the war as a
basket case with a per capita income under $100 in 1962
to over $10,000 in 1995 at an average annual GDP growth
of 10 percent. The Nobel laureate Professor Robert Lucas,
Jr. called it a miracle.1Currently, Korea is the 13th largestproducer of goods and services, and the 8th largest trader
in the world with a per capita income of more than $25,000,
and is actively engaged in global development cooperation
as a member of OECD and its Development Assistance
Committee (DAC). In the 1960s, there were about 60
developing countries, including Korea, whose per capita
income was less than $300. Among these countries, Korea
was the only country that attained a per capita income of
more than $10,000 by 1995. Only three countries, including
Brazil, attained between $3,000 and $10,000 in per capita
income. Aside from the Asian nancial crisis period, Korea
was also the rst country to graduate from the multilateral
development banks lending program and did so in the
shortest time period after Singapore.
Various attempts have been made to explore the sources of
Koreas remarkable growth. For example, some scholars
pointed to the human capital accumulation as the source of
growth. However, its contribution to the growth path was
less than 10 percent.2Undoubtedly, education, training and
knowledge dissemination must have played an important
role in the development process of Korea. However, during
1962-1994, the government of Korea did not spend more of
its GDP on education than other developing countries atthe same level of per capita income.3
Since the Korean economys spectacular growth rates were
fueled by annual investment rates exceeding 30 percent of
GDP, with a substantial part nanced by ofcial foreign
assistance, this paper will examine the history of ofcial
aid to Korea and draw lessons relevant to donors and
recipients of ofcial aid. This paper argues that Koreas
economic miracle was supported not so much by the type
or amount of aid received, but rather by the efcient
sectoral targeting and application of that aid by donors
and the Korean government.
to Korea
Scale and Type of Ofcial Foreign Assistance
In the course of Koreas social and economic development
(1945-1999), total ofcial foreign assistance amounts to
about $44 billion in current prices. This amount includes
public development grants of about $7 billion and public
development loans of about $37 billion. The total loan
amount can be divided into ODA (ofcial development
assistance) type loans of about $6 billion (with a grant
element higher than 25 percent) and OOA (other ofcial
assistance) type loans of about $31 billion (with a grant
element lower than 25 percent). Therefore, total ODA
(grants plus ODA-type loans) was about $13 billion.
Fund Total Grant Loan
ODA(grant element 25percent +)
12.8 7.0 5.8
OOA(grant element 25percent -)
31.2 0 31.2
Total 44.0 7.0 37.0
Donor Total Bilateral Multilateral
ODA(grant element 25percent +)
12.8 11.8 1.0
OOA(grant element 25percent -)
31.2 11.0 20.2
Total 44.0 22.8 21.2
Source: Author on the basis of data from KOICA (2004) andLee, J.S. (2013)
Ofcial Foreign Assistance: 1945-1999($ billion in current prices)
Table 1-1
When the ODA received by Korea during 1965-1995 was
compared with that of the other 59 developing countries
that had per capita incomes of less than $300 during the
1960s, Korea belongs to the 10-country group that received
ODA of less than 2 percent of GDP on an average annual
basis. The other 50 countries received more aid than Korea
did, and as many as 15 countries received more than 10
percent of GDP a year on average. Therefore, we cannot
attribute the Korean economys faster growth to the amount
of aid Korea received.
Ofcial development grants ($7 billion) accounted for only
16 percent of total ofcial capital inows ($44 billion) from
1945 to 1999. The rest (84 percent) were public development
loans ($37 billion), especially OOA-type loans ($31 billion).
During 1959-1999, when the ofcial development loans
were actively disbursed, OOA-type loans made up 84
percent of total ofcial development loans. Ofcial grants
were scarcely available since 1975. This contrasts sharply
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BUILDING A CREATIVE ECONOMY - 9
with recent OECD/DAC development assistance, which is
composed of mainly grants. Therefore, to the extent that
ofcial foreign assistance contributed to Koreas successful
industrialization and fast economic growth during 1962-
1995, public development loans, especially OOA-type loans,
rather than ofcial development grants, deserve credit.
Donors of Ofcial Foreign Assistance
The major bilateral ODA donors were the United States
and Japan, followed by Germany. The major multilateral
donors were UN/CRIK and UN/UNKRA, followed by the
World Bank Groups IDA.
Among the public development loans of $37 billion, about
$5.8 billion or 16 percent were loans with a grant element
higher than 25 percent, which therefore belong to the ODA
category. The other $31.2 billion or 84 percent were loans
with a grant element lower than 25 percent (OOA-type
loans). Total public development loans of $37 billion can
also be divided into multilateral loans of $20.5 billion (55
percent) and bilateral loans of $16.5 billion (45 percent).
ODA-type multilateral loans were only $0.3 billion (0.8
percent) of total public development loans, and ODA-type
bilateral loans were $5.5 billion (15 percent). OOA-type
multilateral loans were about $20.2 billion (54 percent) of
total public development loans, and OOA-type bilateral
loans were 11.0 billion (30 percent).
Sectoral Allocation of AidSince the grants were mostly allocated to foodstuffs and
emergency consumption goods, and the public development
loans accounted for 84 percent of total ofcial foreign
assistance, the actual sectoral application of the public
development loans reects the Korean governments
strategy for allocating aid. If the emergency structural
adjustment loans received in the wake of the 1997 Asian
nancial crisis are excluded, the government prioritized the
economic infrastructure sector (51 percent), followed by the
production sectors (24 percent). The social infrastructure
sector was allocated about 12 percent.
Bilateral Multilateral
Donor Amount Donor Amount
1. U.S 5,542.35 1. CRIK 457.40
2. Japan 5,051.81 2. UNKRA 122.10
3. Germany 834.93 3. IDA 102.59
4. Saudi Arabia 123.54 4. 98.50
5. France 101.46 5. UNDP 69.12
6. Austria 52.77 6. 40.00
7. Netherlands 17.76 7. UNTA 32.40
8. Australia 14.01 8. UNICEF 14.30
9. Denmark 10.46 9. UNFPA 7.69
10. 10.15 10. 6.80
11. U.K 9.68 11. ADF 6.34
12. Canada 8.07 12. UNHCR 1.87
13. 7.74 13. Other UN Organizations 7.69
14. Italy 6.31 14. Other 1.86
15. 4.87 15.
16. 4.53 16.
17. 3.36 17.
18. Other 4.18 18.
Total 11,808.00 Total 968.31
Donors of Ofcial Development Assistance (ODA): 1945-1999 (Unit: $ million in current prices)Table 1-2
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This pattern of sectoral aid allocation was almost the
inverse of that pursued by average OECD/DAC donors
in recent years. OECD/DAC donors prioritize social and
administrative infrastructure and services (49 percent),
and give about 24 percent to the economic infrastructure
and production sectors.4
However, OECD/DAC aidrecipient countries have not duplicated Koreas economic
performance. Therefore, to the extent that ofcial foreign
assistance contributed to Koreas faster growth and
industrialization, we can attribute them to the Korean
governments sectoral aid distribution policies and
practices, which were quite different from those of currentOECD/DAC assistance donors and recipients.
Donors of Public Development Loans: 1959-1999 (Unit: $ million in current prices; as a %)Table 1-3
ODA-Type Loans(Grant Element 25 percent+)
OOA-Type Loans(Grant Element 25 percent-)
Total
Multilateral Loans 300.1 (1.6) 20,235.0 (98.4) 20,535.1 (100)
IDA 115.6 (100.0) - 115.6 (100)
147.0 (1.0) 14,671.9 (99.0) 14,818.9 (100)
37.5 (0.7) 5,555.7 (99.3) 5,593.2 (100)
EC - 7.4 (100.0) 7.4 (100)
Bilateral Loans 5,528.4 (33.5) 10,959.6 (66.5) 16,488.0 (100)
Japan 2,861.3 (46.7) 3,262.8 (53.3) 6,124.1 (100)
US 1,958.8 (37.8) 3,221.2 (62.2) 5,180.0 (100)
France - 3,488.8 (100.0) 3,488.8 (100)
Canada 0.7 (0.2) 460.4 (99.8) 461.1 (100)
Germany 305.5 (81.0) 71.5 (19.0) 377.0 (100)
- 231.4 (100.0) 231.4 (100)
- 160.8 (100.0) 160.8 (100)
Saudi Arabia 96.6 (100.0) - 96.6 (100)
UK - 62.7 (100.0) 62.7 (100)
Denmark 2.8 (100.0) - 2.8 (100)
Netherlands 1.7 (100.0) - 1.7 (100)
Hong Kong 1.0 (100.0) - 1.0 (100)
Others* 300.0 (100.0) 300.0 (100)
Total 5,828.5 (15.7) 31,194.6 (84.3) 37,023.1 (100)
*Includes statistical errors
Source: Author based on KOICA (2004) and Lee, J.S. (2013)
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Evolution of Ofcial Foreign Assistance for Korea
The history of ofcial foreign assistance to Korea evolved
over several stages in accordance with political, economic
and social development processes: rst, the 1945-1949
period under the U.S. military government and the Korean
government established in August 1948; second, the 1950-
1959 period covering the Korean War (1950-53) and
rehabilitation period; third, the 1960-1979 period featuring
active industrialization and fast growth; and fourth, the
1980-1999 period characterized by economic and political
stabilization and liberalization. Each of these periods will
be studied in detail in the ensuing sections, with specialemphasis placed on the role of different objectives and types
of aid, as well as sectoral aid allocation policies and practices.
SectorAmount
(withdrawn)Percent
Percent excludingstructural
adjustmentduring the 1990s
Social Infrastructure and Services 3,001.5 8.1 12
1. Education 1,251.8 3.4
2. Health/ Population 428.0 1.2
1,321.7 3.5
Economic Infrastructure 12,682.1 34.3 51
1. Transportation 5,321.8 14.4
2. Communication 1,287.5 3.5
3. Electric Energy 6,072.8 16.4
Production 6,145.2 16.6 24
1. Agriculture/ Fishery 828.2 2.2
2. Manufacturing/ Mining 5,278.5 14.3
3. Construction/ Trade/ Tourism 38.5 0.1
Multi-Sector 1,421.2 3.8 6
613.5 1.7
2. Area Development 807.7 2.1
Goods Program 13,473.1 36.4 7
1. Grain Goods 1,736.3 4.7
11,736.8 31.7
Statistical error 300.0 0.8
Total 37,023.1 100.0 100
Source: KOICA (2004) and OECD (2012)
Sectoral Distribution of Public Development Loans: 1959-1999(Unit: $ million in current prices; as a %)
Table 1-4
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Background
In the wake of World War II, Korea was liberated from
Japanese colonial rule on August 15, 1945. After the
peninsula was divided between U.S. and Soviet spheres of
inuence, social, economic and political chaos in the South
exacerbated humanitarian crises brought on by Japanese
colonization and World War II. Such was the context inwhich foreign assistance arrived in Korea.
Objective, Donor, and Content of Assistance
Assistance provided to the Korean Peninsula during
1945-49 was not for economic rehabilitation and
reconstruction, but primarily for emergency humanitarian
relief from the traumas the country had suffered under the
Japanese colonization and during World War II, and for
macroeconomic stabilization.
During the period, ofcial foreign assistance was provided
mainly by the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea,and the Economic Cooperative Administration (ECA), a
U.S. government foreign assistance agency. The U.S. Army
Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) provided
emergency relief and humanitarian assistance under the
program called Government Appropriations for Relief in
Occupied Areas (GARIOA) and rehabilitation assistance
under the Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas
(EROA) program. However, the majority of assistance
came from GARIOA.
U.S./AMGIK
(1945-49)
U.S.ECA/SEC(1948-52)
Total(1945-52)
$ %
Reconstruction 69.8 6.0 75.8 11
Education
7.9 7.9 1Housing/ Health
materials416.8 196.0 612.8 87
TechnicalAssistance (TA)
7.7 NA 7.7 1
Total 502.2 202.0 704.2 100Source: Author based on KOICA (2004)
Ofcial Foreign Assistance to Korea:1945-1952 (Unit: $ million incurrent prices)
Table 2
The emergency assistance provided much-needed
humanitarian relief, staving off widespread starvation,
disease, and social unrest through the provision of basic
necessities including foodstuffs and agricultural supplies,
which accounted for 35 percent and 24 percent, respectively,
of total GARIOA assistance. Indeed, by 1947, foreign grain
totaled 44 percent of Koreas total grain supply, while the
large amount of fertilizer supplied to Korea led to huge
Period Objective of Aid Scale and Type of Aid Major Donors
1945-1949 -lished Korean governments
colonization
All grants
$0.7 billion
US/AMGIK/ECA
1950-1959 rehabilitation
Rehabilitation and reconstruction
Mostly grants $2.3 billion
US/ECA/FOA/ ICA UN/CRIK/ UNKRA
1960-1979
industrialization
$6 billion (1962-78)
Japan and US
Multilateraldevelopment banks
1980-1999Stabilization andliberalization
All loans, especially OOA-
$33 billion (1979-99)
Multilateraldevelopment banks
Japan and U.S.
Evolution of Ofcial Foreign Assistance for Korea (Unit: $ billion in current prices)Table 1-5
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BUILDING A CREATIVE ECONOMY - 13
increases in agricultural production. Assistance for
reconstruction accounted for only 14 percent of the total aid
provided by GARIOA ($502,155) during the same period.
Efforts were made to implement a longer-term sustainable
economic development strategy under the ECA. Although
the ECA essentially operated like GARIOA, focusing on the
provision of essential supplies and commodities, its aid was
conditional on the implementation of macro stabilization
and scal austerity policies.
In 1948, when the government of the Republic of Korea
(ROK) led by Syngman Rhee was established, the policy
objectives of the U.S. aid program were formalized under
the ROK-U.S. Agreement on Aid. The U.S. imposed a strict
set of controls to ensure that aid funds were allocated and
used efciently to achieve the policy objectives. The Korean
government agreed to stabilize prices, privatize properties
formerly owned by the Japanese, and liberalize markets, i.e.,
implement fair foreign exchange rate.
The exchange rate provision was a cause of often
acrimonious donor-recipient conicts over stabilization
policy. The Rhee government was intent on maximizing
foreign aid receipts when in use by keeping an ofcially
overvalued currency against the dollar.5 A Counterpart
Fund account had to be established at the central bank
where the proceeds of U.S. goods provided under the
assistance program and sold in the marketplace were to
be deposited. The allocation and uses of the Counterpart
Fund had to be mutually agreed on by both governments.
The stabilization program suffered from policy
inconsistencies and lack of support from the Korean
government at the outset. Ultimately, however, themacro stabilization and scal austerity measures had real
positive effects in checking hyperination and shoring up
Koreas scal budget, as well as laying the groundwork for
development. Consumer prices which had increased by as
much as 86 percent in 1947 rose by only 4 percent in 1949.6
Early in Koreas development, a considerable amount of aid
went into the education sector, resulting in a sharp reduction
in illiteracy rates. During Japanese colonial rule, education
was largely restricted to a few Koreans, who received
a Japanese education. Schools under the U.S. Military
Government (1945-48) had clearly dened political andeconomic purposes: to convert Korean youths and adults to
American-style democracy and provide basic skills training.
The U.S. Military Government established civic schools for
literacy and basic education of older students who were no
longer qualied for compulsory primary education. Indeed,
civic schools for adults that taught basic reading, writing
and math were critical in sharply reducing the adult illiteracy
rate within a very short time. By 1948, nearly 15,400 civic
schools were established and more than one million adults
were enrolled. About 15 million textbooks were printed
and distributed for about three million children enrolled in
primary education. The Korean language of Hangeulwas
formally reintroduced in the curriculum, and any elements
of Japanese educational tradition were discarded.7
In step with the U.S. policy initiative on civic schools, the
Education Act was passed by the newly established Koreangovernment in December 1949, which gave civic schools
a statutory status. Essentially, the Korean government
implemented the same policy on adult education through
such schools as the U.S. Military Government did. From
the summer of 1946, adult education started eradicating
illiteracy as well as fostering people to become democratic
citizens. The Adult Education Bureau took charge of
training leaders who would in turn visit cities and rural
counties to train local leaders, who would then teach
illiterate adults in neighborhoods and villages. The illiteracy
rate fell from 78 percent in 1945 to 22 percent in 1949, and
ultimately to below 10 percent in 1968.8
Background
Soon after the Korean governments proposal to use a
massive amount of aid for economic reconstruction through
a ve-year economic development plan was rejected by the
U.S. Congress, the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950.
The cease-re in 1953 left the Korean Peninsula war-torn,
divided, and devastated again. South Korea suffered massivesocial and economic damage: civilian casualties totaled
nearly 1.5 million while the destruction of properties was
estimated at about $3.1 billion, leaving nearly 43 percent of
residential homes and industrial facilities damaged.
Scale and Donor of Assistance
Korea received about $2.3 billion in ofcial foreign assistance
for emergency relief and reconstruction efforts during the
1950s. The economy and public nance system depended
heavily on foreign aid. For example, aid accounted for about
74 percent of total government revenues and 85 percent oftotal imports during the period 1953-61. As in the 1940s, the
major donor was the U.S. government. Multilateral efforts
failed to result in a large assistance package under the UN
ag, with the only exceptions being the UN-sponsored
Civil Relief in Korea (CRIK) and United Nations Korea
Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), which together
accounted for about 21 percent ($479 million) of total
ofcial assistance granted during the 1950s.
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Objective and Sectoral Application of Assistance
The nature of aid was again emergency humanitarian
relief, although some reconstruction assistance wasprovided by UNKRA and the U.S. Foreign Operations
Administration (FOA)/International Cooperative Agency
(ICA) during the latter half of the 1950s. During the
1950s as a whole, reconstruction assistance accounted
for less than 30 percent of the total aid granted, with
emphasis placed on physical infrastructure, industries,
and education/health. As the majority of assistance came
in the form of food, raw materials, and other consumable
commodities (77 percent), the economy was sustained by
consumption goods supplied as aid. Also, the government
policy to keep the local currency overvalued to maximize
proceeds of assistance and imports discouraged export-oriented industrialization and contributed to creating a
chronic balance-of-payments decit.
Although foodstuffs, raw materials and other consumption
goods accounted for about 77 percent of total ofcial
aid, the Counterpart Fund, created from the proceeds of
consumption goods donated as part of aid and sold in the
domestic market, contributed about 30 percent - 53 percent
of total government revenues during 1954-60. During
the same period, about 32 percent of the Counterpart
Fund (about 103.4 billion won) was used for the defense
budget, and 45 percent went for public investment in
xed assets and nancial operations. The Counterpart
Fund constituted about 70 percent of total public
investment and nancial operations, contributing to the
inception of capital formation in Korea. Therefore, the
sectoral distribution of ofcial aid, taking into account
the disbursement from the Counterpart Fund, shows 54
percent for infrastructure and production sectors and 46
percent for social and government general services. This
US/AMGIK
(1945-49)
USECA/SEC(1948-52)
UN/CRIK(1951-56)
UN/UNKRA
(1951-59)
US/FOA(1953-55)
US/ICA(1955-59)
US/PL480
(1955-61)
Total(1945-61)
$ %
Agriculture/Fishery
8.1 1.3 40.4 49.8 1.7
Mining 12.80.9 59.6 100.3 3.4
Manufacturing 27.0
PhysicalInfrastructure
8.9 48.5 219.5 276.9 9.3
Otherreconstruction
69.8 6.0 47.9 NA 1.2 19.6 144.5 4.9
Education 9.6
17.4
14.0
106.6 3.6Housing/Health 7.9* 16.2 11.5 30.0
Food/Rawmaterials
416.8 196.0 393.3 36.2 136.0 891.0 202.6 2,271.9 76.6
TA 7.7 NA NA 7.8 NA NA NA 15.5 0.5
Total 502.2 202.0 457.4 121.9 205.3 1,274.1 202.6 2,965.5 100.0Source: Author based on KOICA (2004) and Kim (2012)
Ofcial Foreign Assistance to Korea (1945-61) (Unit: $ million in current prices; as a %)Table 3-1
SectorAid toKorea
OECD/DACRecipients
1945-61 2011
Infrastructure 49 17
Manufacturing + Agriculture 5 7
Social + Technical Assistance 449
General Government 42
Ofcial Foreign Assistance to Koreaand OECD/DAC Assistance (as a %)
Table 3-2
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BUILDING A CREATIVE ECONOMY - 15
pattern of sectoral aid distribution contrasts sharply with
the pattern of OECD/DAC assistance, which allocates
only 24 percent for infrastructure and production sectors
and 49 percent for social and government services.
UN/CRIK Aid
The U.N.s Civil Relief in Korea (CRIK) provided
multilateral assistance of $457 million, of which all but a
fraction came from the U.S., as part of wartime relief efforts
during 1951-56. Much of the assistance came in the form of
foodstuffs, and textiles and clothing, representing 40 percent
and 24 percent, respectively, of total assistance granted.
The UN relief efforts were crucial in relieving widespread
starvation and disease in Korea during this time.
UN/UNKRA Aid
The United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency
(UNKRA) provided signicant assistance ($122 million)
in support of the reconstruction of Koreas economy:
repairing devastated properties, providing rehabilitationsupplies, transport, and services for Korean industry. One
salient feature of UNKRA aid was that the proportion of
aid that went toward building up the productive capacity
of the economy was 70 percent, leaving 30 percent for
consumption. This ratio was exactly the reverse of aid
efforts under AMGIK and ECA during the 1940s and
under CRIK and the FOA/ICA during the 1950s.
Since UNKRA sought to facilitate reconstruction, its aid
was used to import equipment and construct new factories
(glass, cement, paper, etc.). UNKRA aid was also used to
rehabilitate damaged industries (smelting factories, large-
scale textile factories, and coal mines). Some UNKRA aid
was used to fund policy loans for SMEs in manufacturing
and mining industries through the Bank of Korea (BOK),
which made loans based on recommendations by the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry.9However, UNKRA
aid was only 4 percent of total ofcial aid during 1945-61
and could not inuence the sectoral distribution pattern of
total aid.
U.S. /FOA and ICA Aid
Consumption
The U.S. FOA (Foreign Operations Administration) (1953-
55) and ICA (International Cooperation Agency) (1955-
59) insisted on pursuing stabilization before development,
placing priority on reining in hyperination caused by
the expansion of debt to nance the war, and on securing
a minimum subsistence level of living. Thus, foreign aid
was focused on increasing the supply of consumer and
intermediate goods to curb ination. FOA provided a total
of $205 million, and its sequel agency, ICA, $1.3 billion.
About 70 percent of their aid was for consumption goods,
supplies and raw materials, such as fertilizer, wheat and
energy (non-project assistance).10In particular, since 1954, a
large quantity of wheat our was given to Korea under the
Title I of Public Law 480 (Food for Peace Program), which
was used as compensation for workers mobilized under
public works programs, such as soil reclamation projects for
reforestation. During 1955-74, food assistance given under
PL 480 was equivalent to 37 percent of total U.S. aid ($4.4billion). The large quantity of food aid distorted food prices
and incentives for farmers.11
Reconstruction
While maintaining their emphasis on consumption goods
(70 percent of total aid), FOA (1953-55) and later ICA
(1955-59) in particular provided signicant aid for economic
reconstruction toward the end of the 1950s. Project
assistance to increase the economys productive capacity
accounted for 30 percent of total aid, of which nearly 37
percent was used to construct railways. Some of the projectassistance was used to invest in manufacturing (including
fertilizer, electric wire, pesticide, rubber recycling, and tire
factories). In addition, about $78 million in ICA project
assistance was used to build 44 new small-sized plants.
Project assistance was also used to reconstruct power plants.
By the end of the 1950s, much of Koreas infrastructure,
including railways, roads, and harbors damaged during the
war, were rehabilitated back to nearly pre-war levels, thanks
to foreign aid. However, reconstruction efforts faced a major
challenge in supplying adequate electric power to meet
social and economic demand, since much of the electricity
had been supplied from power plants in the North beforethe Korean War.12
Education
Besides physical infrastructure and productive industries
(mining and manufacturing), education was an aid
allocation priority. In absolute terms, the amount of aid that
went toward education during the 1950s was only about $30
million or 1.5 percent of total ofcial assistance received.
However, the priority given to this sector by both the donor
and recipient governments was clear. Assistance efforts after
the Korean War centered on: classroom construction forbasic education, secondary vocational education, teacher
training, and higher education. During the Korean War, the
nation lost the use of almost 70 percent of its classrooms.
As such, UNESCO and UNKRA developed a ve-year
program for the development of Koreas education system
and provided $11 million, or nearly eight percent of total
aid by UNKRA, for education assistance, one half of which
was used to repair schools destroyed during the Korean
War. Once infrastructure reconstruction efforts were fully
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under way, the focus of education assistance shifted toward
providing material aid, including a textbook printing factory
for primary and secondary education, as well as increasing
investments in higher education.13
Contrary to common belief, U.S. assistance in support of
the Korean education system was not as sizeable as that
given for infrastructure and productive industries. During
1954-61, FOA/ICA devoted only about one percent of
their total assistance ($20 million) to the education sector.
However, the assistance addressed the most keenly felt
shortages of technical and professional human resources,
which were essential for economic development. About
half of the education assistance was invested in higher
education, in particular Seoul National University (SNU),
with another 20 percent in teacher training, and the rest in
secondary vocational education.
Prior to Koreas liberation from Japan, access to higher
education remained largely limited. Moreover, Korea
suffered a huge shortage of skilled workers and technicians
after the departure of the Japanese, who held most ofthe skilled jobs during their occupation. As such, a top
aid priority was bolstering Korean higher education and
research, and secondary vocational education to support
Koreas economic development. To build up Koreas
technical capacity, a considerable amount of nancial
and technical assistance went into upgrading Korean
secondary vocational education, as well as institutions of
higher learning.
To staff primary schools left vacant by the repatriation
of Japanese teachers, who accounted for 40 percent of
all teachers, eight new teacher training institutes wereestablished with the help of U.S. assistance by 1951. As a
result, enrollment in primary schools nearly doubled from
1.4 million in 1945 to 2.5 million in 1947. Thanks to the
expansion of teacher education programs, Korea eventually
achieved universal primary education in the late 1950s, while
making all primary schools coeducational.14
Another unique feature of the U.S. education assistance was
that investment in facilities, equipment, and materials did
not dominate, and technical assistance accounted for about
40 percent of the total. For example, a teacher education
program was carried out in cooperation with the GeorgePeabody College of Teachers in the United States. The aim
of this cooperative program was to signicantly modernize
the education system and its curriculum. This program
beneted several universities, including SNU, Korean
teacher-training institutes, junior colleges, and lower-
level schooling programs. Under the Peabody Technical
Assistance Program carried out between 1956 and 1962,
about 40 Peabody faculty members were sent to Korea to
train Korean educators in Western-style education methods.
The Korean educators were trained in educational theory,
curriculum development, and teaching practices through on-
site technical assistance at various educational institutions
in Korea. In addition, nearly 80 Korean teachers were sent
to the U.S. to receive training in higher education.15
Another example of technical assistance is the Minnesota
Program. The ICA offered a signicant amount of
technical assistance for about 40 developing countries under
university contracts, which enlisted U.S. universities and
technical institutions to facilitate the sharing of professional
knowledge and skills. The basic objectives of the technical
cooperation program were: expansion of education in the
elds of engineering, medicine, agriculture, and public or
business administration; support of specic services or
industries; expansion of research; and training of technical
manpower. In Korea, the Minnesota Program provided
technical and material assistance to SNU from 1954 to 1961,
for the Colleges of Agriculture, Engineering, and Medicine.
Later on, the program was expanded to include the elds
of nursing, veterinary medicine, and public administration.Through spillover effects, the program successfully
contributed to nationwide training of professionals and
academics in the coveredelds and modernization of related
industries and services in Korea.16
Background
The 1960s witnessed sharp changes in both domestic and
international arenas. Domestically, a new government
was established through a bloodless military coup in1961. The new government embarked on industrialization
of the Korean economy through successive ve-year
economic development plans, starting in 1962. The plans
aimed to enable the Korean economy to take off through
industrialization: initially in export-oriented labor-intensive
light industries in the 1960s, followed by export-oriented
heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s.
To mobilize capital needed to implement the Five-Year
Economic Development Plans, the new government
initiated a series of reforms. First, it strengthened the
Foreign Capital Promotion Law in 1962 to encourageforeign direct investment and promote private sector
borrowing overseas supported by government guarantees.
It also launched negotiations with the Japanese government
in 1962 for rapprochement and reparation. The government
anticipated that domestic savings would be insufcient to
nance the Plans ambitious investment programs, and
made all-out efforts to mobilize foreign savings (grants,
loans, and foreign direct investment, etc.). Second, the
government made a drastic tax reform in 1965 to increase
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BUILDING A CREATIVE ECONOMY - 17
revenues and eradicate corruption. Third, in that same year,
the government also pursued interest rate reform, raising
the one-year savings account interest rate from 15 percent
to 30 percent, to encourage domestic savings.
Externally, the Organization of European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) and its Development Assistance
Group (DAG) were reorganized in 1962 as the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) with
the participation of other major economies like the U.S.,
Japan, and Australia. This reorganization reected the full
recovery of the European economies from World War II
and aimed to further economic growth through expansion
of economic relations (trade, investment, aid, etc.) with
developing countries. The UN designated the 1960s as
the First Development Decade for economic growth of
developing countries to promote economic cooperation
and liberalization. Besides the traditional loan window
(with interest at concessional rates) of the IBRD, the World
Bank Group created a credit window (soft loan without
interest) for low-income countries (IDA) in 1960. The U.S.,
which served as the major donor for the rehabilitation and
recovery of the Korean economy in the 1950s, also made a
strong commitment to the economic growth of developing
countries through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The
Kennedy Administration, however, shifted the focus of its
assistance policy from grants to loans, emphasizing the
responsibilities of recipient countries, and combined its two
major aid agencies, the International Cooperation Agency
(ICA) and Development Loan Fund (DLF), into one
agency called the Agency for International Development
(AID). Several European countries also established their
own bilateral aid agencies.
In the academic arena, the traditional Harrod-Domar
growth theory, which emphasized physical capital
accumulation as the main source of growth, was challenged
by the neoclassical growth modeling of Robert Solow
and the human capital theories of Theodore Schultz
and Gary Becker, which emphasized population growth,
technological progress, and human capital accumulation
as major sources of growth.
Objectives of Aid
The 1960s marked the turning point in the history of ofcial
foreign assistance in Korea. The scale of aid increased
compared with the 1950s. The objective of aid shifted from
rehabilitation and reconstruction in the wake of the Korean
War to economic growth through industrialization and
exports. The aid was not for emergency relief or subsistence
consumption, but for investment and economic growth to
attain higher living standards. Compared with the 1950s,
when donors took initiatives for identifying where the aid
funds were needed and applying them to different sectors,
the government of Korea took the initiative in this period,
basing its assistance requests on its successive ve-year
economic development plans, starting in 1962.
Scale and Type of Aid
During the development decades (1962-1992), total capital
inows to Korea amounted to about $82 billion, of which
1945-61 1962-65 1966-72 1973-78 1962-78 1979-85 1986-92 1979-92
Public Grants 3,117 739 763 - 1,502 (9.2) - - -
Public Loans 5 62 1,130 3,431 4,623 (28.3) 10,105 4,688 14,79 (22.6)
CommercialLoans 71
1,950 5,858 7,866 (48.1) 7,937 5,206 13,143 (20.1)
FinancialInstitutions
Borrowings
- 205 1,226 1,431 (8.7) 14,881 10,296 25,177 (38.6)
Private SectorBonds
- - - - 834 4,515 5,349 (8.2)
Foreign DirectInvestment
13 227 704 937 (5.7) 1,157 5,684 6,841 (10.5)
Total 3,122 886 4,275 11,219 16,359 (100) 34,914 30,389 65,303 (100)
Source: Lee, J.S. (2013)
Capital Inows to Korea: 1945-1992 (Unit: $ million in current prices; as a %)Table 4-1
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public capital inows, i.e., public development grants and
loans, amounted to only $21 billion, or about 26 percent
of the total capital inows. The rest consisted of private
capital inows, such as commercial loans, nancial
institutions borrowing, private sector bonds, and foreign
direct investment. However, public capital inows played
an important initial role in leading Korean economic
development. As development progressed, the importance
of public capital inows declined, and private capital inowstook over the leading role. The share of ofcial foreign
assistance declined from 38 percent of total capital inows
during the rst half of the development decades (1962-78)
to 22 percent during the second half (1979-1992), due to the
rising share of private capital inows. Increases in public
capital inows and investment at the initial stage of the
development decades played the role of crowding in private
capital inows and investment at the later stage. This is one
of the unique features of Korean economic development.
Throughout the whole development decades (1962-1992),
public grants ($1.5 billion) accounted for only 1.8 percentof total capital inows. This is another unique feature of
the Korean economic development. Koreas high growth
and successful industrialization took place with public
development loans rather than public grants. This is also the
reason why some studies of Korean economic development
demonstrate that public development loans made greater
contributions to high economic growth rate than grants
did.17 However, loans were not particularly more effective
in promoting economic growth; rather, loans were the
main source of development nances, and few grants were
available during the development decades.
Another feature of the capital inows in Korean economic
development is that loans (public and private) dominated
capital inows ($67 billion or 82 percent of total), compared
with foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI amounted to only
$7.8 billion (10 percent of total) during the development
decades (1962-1992). Many development studies show that
FDI made greater contributions to economic growth than
loans did.18However, in the case of Korea, fast economic
growth and industrialization was attained mainly with loans.
Therefore, for fast economic growth and industrialization,
the key seems to be efciency in the application of foreign
capital, rather than the type of capital, i.e., whether thecapital is grants, FDI, or loans.
Public capital inows (ofcial foreign assistance) can be
divided into public grants and public loans. The latter can
be further disaggregated into ODA-type loans (ofcial
development assistance loans with a grant element greater
than 25 percent of the total loan amount) and OOA-type
loans (other ofcial assistance development loans with a
grant element smaller than 25 percent).
During 1960-1990, while public grants decreased from 99
percent during the previous period (1945-60) to only 13
percent ($2.7 billion) of the total public capital inows
($21.3 billion), ODA-type loans increased sharply to $4.7
billion, accounting for 22 percent of the total public capital
inows. Consequently, total ODA (grants plus ODA-type
loans) of $7.4 billion accounted for only 35 percent of the
total public capital inows. This means that the OOA-type
loans of $13.9 billion (65 percent) dominated the totalpublic capital inows (ofcial foreign assistance) during
the same period. This is because in 1975, Korea had to
graduate from the World Bank Groups IDA loans, which
were Koreas main source for soft loans (i.e., ODA-type
loans). Therefore, among the ofcial foreign assistance
ows, Koreas economic development took place mainly
with the OOA-type loans (with a grant element less than
25 percent). This is another unique feature of the capital
inows in Koreas economic development processes.
During 1962-1982, the Korean economy grew an average
8.2 percent per year. Studies show that about 3.3 percentagepoints or about 40 percent of the high growth rate can
be attributed to the higher level of foreign capital inows
including ofcial foreign assistance, especially OOA-type
loans with a grant element smaller than 25 percent.19 In
fact, the GDP growth rate during 1945-1959, when foreign
capital inows were much lower, averaged only 4.4 percent
per year. Moreover, the grant element of the OOA-type
loans provided during 1962-1982 contrasts sharply with the
current practice of DAC members, which provide ofcial
development assistance (ODA) mainly with a grant element
higher than 86 percent.20
Type 1945-1960 1960-1990 1991-1999 Total
ODAGrants
3.0 2.7 1.3 7.0
ODALoans
0.0 4.7 1.0 5.8
OOALoans
- 13.9 17.3 31.2
Total 3.0 21.3 19.6 44.0
Public Capital Inows: 1960-1990(Unit: $ billion in current prices)
Table 4-2
During the 1960s, general government revenues still
depended heavily on ofcial foreign aid, and almost half of
total investment was nanced by foreign savings, i.e., net
transfers from public development grants and loans. Even
during the 1970s, when scal dependence on foreign
assistance declined, total investment still depended on
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BUILDING A CREATIVE ECONOMY - 19
public development loans, especially on OOA-type loans,
since domestic saving rates were much lower than total
investment rates.21The gap was lled by public development
loans and other types of foreign capital inows. For example,
during 1974, while total investment was about 32 percent of
GDP, the domestic savings rate was only 21 percent of GDP,
leaving a gap of about 11 percent of GDP. This investment
gap had to be nanced by foreign savings, especially OOA-
type loans.22 Domestic savings rates were not yet high
enough, and grants or soft loans were no longer available in
large amounts at that time. Only after 1986 were domestic
savings rates high enough to cover total investment rates.
The government played an active role in mobilizing
assistance funds in a sustainable manner and coordinating
donors offers systematically. One mechanism that proved
effective was the annual or bi-annual meetings of the
International Economic Consultative Group for Korea
(IECOK), which was established on Korean governments
initiative in 1966. These meetings, chaired by the World
Bank, briefed bilateral and multilateral donors on the
Korean governments development strategy and investment
programs. The meetings identied needs for future
assistance and described the implementation progress of
existing investment projects nanced by foreign assistance.
This mechanism was used until the beginning of the 1980s
and was replicated by the World Bank for many other
developing countries.23Koreas experience contrasts sharply
with the OECD/DAC-organized Paris Declaration for Aid
Effectiveness, which emphasizes aid coordination not by
recipient, but by donors.
Major Donors of Aid
Although the U.S. continued to be a major aid provider, as it
was during the 1940s and 1950s, other developed countries,
especially Japan, began to play an equally important role as
major donors during the development decades (1962-1992).
Moreover, multilateral banks, such as the IDA (International
Development Association) and IBRD (International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development) of the World Bank
Group and the ADB (Asian Development Bank), also
became a major assistance source. During 1961-1999, the
IDA and IBRD nanced more than 120 investment projects
and structural adjustment programs with a total of $14.9
billion loans and credits. The ADB supplemented with $5.6
billion loans during the period. Consequently, aid funds
during the period were concentrated on credits (no-interest
loans) or loans (with interest), rather than grants. The U.S.
government also shifted its aid from grants to loans underthe initiative of President Kennedys Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961.
By 1960, U.S. aid, mostly in the form of grants, was declining
from its 1957 peak. The U.S. and Japan each had provided
more or less the same amount of ODA (grants and ODA-
type loans) of $3.0 billion during 1961-1990. While the U.S.
played a dominant role (64 percent) during the rst half of
the development decades (1961-1975), Japan played a more
active role (58 percent) during the second half (1976-1990).
Moreover, during the 1959 to 1999 period, when all public
development loans were actively disbursed, Japan provideda somewhat larger amount of public development loans (a
total of $6.1 billion ODA and OOA loans) than the U.S.
lent ($5.2 billion). Besides the U.S. and Japan, France was a
major bilateral donor, providing solely public development
loans ($3.5 billion) and no grants.
Aid from Japan during the rst half of the development
decades (1961-1975) was given through the Reparation
Fund, which was agreed to by both governments in 1965.
This fund was composed of $300 million in grants and $200
million in public concessional loans at a 3.5 percent annual
interest rate with a 20-year repayment period includingseven years grace. In addition, $300 million in commercial
loans were also promised. These loans were to be disbursed
equally over a ten-year period starting from 1965. Therefore,
Japanese development loans accounted for about half the
total development loans during this period (1965-1975).
Also, total grants and loans, including commercial loans
from Japan, during the period were more than a third of
total capital inows, including commercial loans, and were
equivalent to about 23 percent of Koreas total exports.
1962-66 1966-72 1973-78 1979-85 1986-92
Gross Investment Rate 15.4 24.8 28.8 31.1 35.7
Domestic Savings Rate 6.4 14.8 23.4 24.8 34.6
Foreign Savings Rate 8.2 9.2 4.8 6.3 1.3
Statistical Errors 0.8 0.8 0.6 0 -0.2
Source: Lee, J.S. (2013)
Aid Dependency: 1962-1992 (Unit: as a % of GDP)Table 4-3
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Sectoral Distribution of Assistance
During 1945-1961, most aid was provided in the form of
food, materials and other consumable goods. Since most of
them were sold in the domestic market and converted into
cash and deposited into the Counterpart Fund, which was
used mainly for general scal expenditures and partly for
the special investment and nance account, it is difcult to
see the specic sectoral allocation of the aid fund. The aid
fund allocated to specic investment projects was a rather
minor part of the total aid fund. However, since 1962, the
general scal accounts aid dependency gradually declined,
and most assistance was provided in the form of loans.
Therefore, ofcial foreign assistance tended to be earmarked
for specic investment projects of a certain sector.
The overall trend of the governments emphasis on economic
infrastructure and production sectors in allocating aid funds
accentuated as the implementation of the development
plans progressed. During the rst half of the development
decades (1962-1978), economic infrastructure (and service)
and manufacturing sectors accounted for 73 percent of total
public development loans, and the agricultural sector for
26 percent. The Japanese Reparation Fund was originally
intended for the agricultural/rural sector. However, as
the pressure for nancing manufacturing and economic
infrastructure investment mounted, a major part of the
fund was devoted to economic infrastructure investment,
including construction of roads, power plants, the POSCO
steel factory and the Seoul-Busan Expressway. Moreover,
during the second half of the development decades
(1979-1992), economic infrastructure (and service) and
manufacturing sectors accounted for 94 percent of total
public development loans, and the agricultural sector foronly 6 percent. Compared with the 1945-1959 period, the
higher growth rates and more successful industrialization of
Korea during the development decades (1962-1992) could
be attributed to this sectoral allocation pattern of public
development loan funds.
Such sectoral allocation of public development loans
during the development decades in Korea differs sharply
from the average OECD/DAC members. In 2010, DAC
members ODA funds were allocated on a priority basis
to the social and administrative infrastructure and
service sectors by about 49 percent, while economic
infrastructure and productive sectors received about
First Half(1961-1975)
Second Half(1976-1990)
Scale 3,941.4 (100.0) 3,510.8 (100.0)
Donor
U.S 2,506.2 (63.6) 512.0 (14.6)
Japan 1,080.0 (27.4) 2,014.3 (57.4)
Others 355.2 (9.0) 984.5 (28.0)
Type
Grants 1,999.0 (50.7)
Loans 1,942.4 (49.3) 3,510.8 (100.0)
Donors of ODA during 1961-1990(Unit: $ million in current prices;as a %)
Table 4-4
1966-72 1973-78 1966-78 1979-85 1986-92 1979-92
US 685 867 1,552 (36) 2,660 75 2,735 (19)
Japan 256 516 772 (17) 896 1,252 2,148 (15)
InternationalOrganization
152 1,605 1,757 (38) 4,114 2,582 6,696 (45)
Germany 25 122 147 (3) 71 46 117 (2)UK 1 105 106 (2) 376 1 377 (3)
France 6 22 28 (1) 643 668 1,311 (9)
Canada 5 145 150 (3) 436 - 436 (3)
Hong Kong 42 42 (1) 404 - 404 (3)
Others 7 7 (0) 505 64 569 (4)
Total 1,130 3,431 4,561 (100) 10,105 4,688 14,793 (100)
Public Development Loans by Donor: 1966-1992 (Unit: $ million in current prices; as a %)Table 4-5
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BUILDING A CREATIVE ECONOMY - 21
24 percent24 (Table 3-2). This pattern of aid allocation,
by neglecting the economic infrastructure and productive
sectors, may have contributed to the sharply lower speed
of economic growth and industrialization in otherdeveloping countries and to the running debate on DAC
aid effectiveness in academic circles.25It was shown that aid
applied to infrastructure and production sectors promotes
economic growth much more than aid applied to social and
administrative sectors in the short and medium terms.26
Moreover, recent studies show that even the reduction in
poverty under the Millennium Development Goals (1990-
2015) owes more to economic growth than to redressing
inequity by a two to one ratio.27
The governments emphasis on the economic infrastructure
and service sectors should not mask the importanceaccorded to the education, training, and science/technology
sectors. In particular, during the rst half of the development
decades (1962-1978), when industrialization programs were
launched, the government allocated a substantial amount
of ofcial foreign assistance, especially grant funds, to these
sectors in the form of free-standing technical assistance
projects. For example, the Korea Institute of Science and
Technology (KIST 1966-70: US/AID $9.1 million), the
Central Vocational Training Center (1968-81: UNDP/ILO
$2.6 million), the Korea-Germany Vocational Training
Center (1970-75: Germany 16 million DEM), the Keum-
Oh Industrial High School (1970-76: Japan1.1 billionyen),
the Dae-Jun Vocational Training Center (1976-83: Japan
$2 million), and the Korea-Belgium Vocational Training
Center (1976-80: Belgium $6 million). These technical
assistance projects laid the foundation for Koreas science
and technology development and technical workforce
development at the inception of the industrialization
programs. Favoring the infrastructure and production
sectors helped promote industrialization and economic
growth, shifting a much greater share of total employment
toward high value-added sectors, i.e., the manufacturing
and service sectors, and resulting in the improvement of
living standards.
Implementation of Aid-Financed Investment
The government of Korea paid special attention to the
implementation of aid-nanced investment projects and
programs. In 1961, the government appointed a Planning
and Coordination Ofcer in the Prime Ministers Ofce
with responsibility for monitoring and evaluating all
important government policies and projects. In 1965,
the Professors Group for Evaluation was commissioned
to reinforce the system. This Group was responsible for
monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the ve-
year economic development plans, a substantial portion ofwhich were nanced with ofcial foreign assistance. Since
then, the external and semi-independent group assisted
with monitoring and evaluating all important government
policies and investment projects; the results were reported
at meetings attended by the president, cabinet members,
heads of decentralized public agencies, public enterprises,
and key members of the National Assembly four times a
year. Initially, the Professors Group for Evaluation had only
15 members; however, when the group was transferred from
the Prime Ministers ofce to the Economic Planning Board
in 1981, its membership reached 107 professors.28
Background
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Koreas economic
condition deteriorated substantially. The economy
registered a negative growth rate in 1980 for the rst time
since the Korean War, and the ination rate approached
1962-66 1966-72 1973-78 1962-78 1979-85 1986-92 1979-92
Agriculture, For, Fish 512 696 1,208 (26) 889 59 948 (6)
Mining 10 - 10 (0) 37 - 37 (0)
Manufacturing 115 150 265 (6) 588 518 1,106 (8)
EconomicInfrastructure+Services
493 2,585 3,078 (67) 8,591 4,109 12,700 (86)
Others 65* 65 (1)
Total 65* 1,130 3,431 4,626 (100) 10.105 4,686 14,791 (100)Source: Lee, J.S. (2013)
* Data on sectoral allocation is unavailable.
Public Development Loans by Sector: 1962-1992 (Unit: $ million in current prices; as a %)Table 4-6
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30 percent per annum. Amid concerns that high ination
and overinvestment in the heavy and chemical industries
might weaken the international competitiveness of Korean
industries, the second oil crisis in the late 1970s precipitated
the Korean economy into crisis.
The Korean government concluded that the crisis was
not a temporary one, but rooted deeply in the structural
problems that grew out of the government-led economic
growth strategy adopted in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, the
Korean government attempted to revise its growth strategy,
switching from a government-led approach to a market-
led one and adopting comprehensive policy measures for
economic stabilization. These policy measures were reected
in the fth Five-year Economic and Social Development
Plan, which began in 1982. The Development Plan aimed to
achieve optimal economic growth in harmony with stability,
efciency, and balance. The stability and balance goals were
to be attained by government actions to address imbalances
in income, region, sector, and enterprise size. Government
expenditures were curtailed sharply, small and medium
enterprises were granted more assistance, and social security
systems were expanded. Growth and efciency goals were to
be attained not by government-led strategy, but by market
forces and liberalization policies, which permeated all
sectors of the economy, including trade, nance and even
education, especially at the higher education level.
Thanks to the weak dollar, low oil prices and low
international interest rates, Koreas exports increased
dramatically, and the economic growth rate returned to
a high level. Consequently, the current account turned to
surplus for the rst time in history, domestic savings rates
surpassed investment rates, and foreign debts began to
decrease in 1986. The opening of Korean capital markets
to foreign investors began in earnest in 1992, and when
Korea joined the OECD in 1996, the liberalization policy
advanced more. Consequently, with a massive volume of
foreign capital owing into Korea, the amount of foreign
debts, especially short-term debts, substantially increased,
leaving the economy vulnerable to a sudden foreign capital
outow. The bankruptcy of some major conglomerates in
1997 led to panic among foreign investors, and a massive
foreign capital outow followed, resulting in currency and
nancial crises during the latter part of 1997.
Objectives of Aid
The objective of assistance at this time was to nance
investment for economic growth, in contrast to the
rehabilitation and reconstruction that was observed during
the 1950s in the aftermath of the Korean War, and as such
was more similar to that of the 1960s and the 1970s. During
Figure 1 Shares of Employment by Industry (Unit: %)
Miracle to Maturity: The Growth of the Korean Economy, HarvardUniversity Asia Center, Cambridge and London.
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BUILDING A CREATIVE ECONOMY - 23
the 1980s and the 1990s, however, ofcial foreign assistance
had additional objectives. It also aimed to nance the goals
of the new economic and social development plans, that is,
promoting efciency and equity by supporting liberalization,
innovation, and welfare/balancing programs. After 1995, it
also aimed to facilitate emergency economic restructuring
in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.
Scale of Aid
During the second half of the development decades (1979-
1992), total capital inows to Korea increased sharply to
$65.3 billion, compared with only $16.4 billion during
the rst half (1962-1978). The increase was mainly in
private capital inows, especially in commercial loans and
borrowings by nancial institutions. The public capital
inows rose as well from $4.6 billion during the rst
half of the development decades to $14.8 billion during
the second half. However, the increase in public capital
inows was entirely in the form of public development
loans, without public grants. Moreover, the majority of
the public development loans were also not ODA-type
(with a grant element higher than 25 percent), but OOA-
type (with a grant element lower than 25 percent). As
mentioned already, this is a unique feature of the ofcial
foreign assistance ows into Korea, if compared with the
current DAC-provided ODA with a grant element higher
than 86 percent for all developing countries.
Traditionally, public capital inows, especially in the form
of public grants and ODA-type loans, were for lling the
gap between the total investment rate and the domestic
savings rate. During the second half of the development
decades (1979-92), however, the domestic savings rate rose
steadily, and after 1986 savings rates were high enough to
cover the total investment rate, reducing the need for public
development loans. Therefore, Korea was asked to graduate
from the ADB (Asian Development Bank) list of borrowers
in 1988 and from the World Bank list of borrowers in 1995.
The resumption of public capital inows during the 1997-
1999 period was mostly for emergency economic adjustment
purposes in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
Korea is one of the few countries that graduated from the
international organizations credit/loan programs early and
in a short period (after Singapore).29
Major Donors of Aid
During the latter half of the development decades (1976-
1990), Japan played a more active role in providing ODA
to Korea. While during the rst half of the development
decades (1961-1975), the U.S. provided 64 percent of total
ODA (grants and ODA-type loans), during the second half
of the development decades (1976-1990) Japan came to
assume 58 percent of the total ODA. In addition, during
the second half, Japan increased public development
loans three times from $772 million to $2,148 million.
During the 1990s, Japan provided a much larger amount
of public development loans than the U.S. did. During
the entire period of 1960-1999 when Korea received public
development loans, Japan provided a larger amount of
loans ($6.1 billion) than the U.S. offered ($5.6 billion).
However, international organizations, especially the World
Bank (IBRD), played the most dominant role during thelatter half of the development decades. In particular during
1991-1999, when international organizations provided 65
percent of total public development loans, including the
emergency restructuring loans in the wake of the Asian
Financial Crisis, Japan provided only 21 percent of the total
(Tables 1-2 and 1-3).
Sectoral Allocation of Aid
As mentioned already, as Koreas development plans
progressed, the governments emphasis on economic
infrastructure and production sectors grew when allocatingaid funds. This trend was particularly clear during the 1980s
and 1990s, and it contrasts sharply with DAC members
current practice of sectoral ODA allocation.
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
This paper has reviewed the role that ofcial foreign
assistance played at different stages of Koreas economic and
social development (1945-1995), which has been praised as
a miracle. From this review, we can draw some conclusions
and lessons for the benet of current and future donors and
recipients of ofcial foreign assistance.
1. Provision of consumption goods (foods, clothes, raw
materials and supplies) after WWII and liberation
from Japanese colonial rule was effective in staving
off starvation and disease, and controlling ination
in Korea. However, it did not stimulate growth.
Foreign assistance would have been more effective if
the emergency relief had ended earlier, and aid funds
had been provided for investment, supplementing
Koreas low domestic savings. This point is relevant to
many developing countries in conicts and vulnerable
situations today.
2. As part of emergency relief and humanitarian
assistance, Korea received a fair amount of assistance
funds on a priority basis for education, especially
basic education and technical/professional education
(teachers education, secondary vocational education,
and professional higher education in agriculture,
engineering, medicine and nursing, public/business
administration). Funding for materials and facilities
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24 - KOREAS ECONOMY 2014
did not crowd out funding for technical assistance.
Such assistance programs helped achieve universal
primary education in the late 1950s, relieved technical
and professional human resources constraints
on an emergency basis, and laid a foundation for
industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s.
3. The active industrialization and fast growth of the
Korean economy during the development decades
(1962-1995) was made possible by a large amount of
foreign capital inows, especially ofcial and private
loans, to ll the signicant gap between the total
investment and domestic savings rates. Foreign capital
inows, especially ofcial development assistance, also
made up a signicant portion of scal decits prior to
the development decades.
4. Among the capital inows, public capital inows,
i.e., ofcial foreign assistance ows, played a pivotal
role during the earlier stages of Koreas development.
However, as industrialization and economic growth
proceeded, private capital ows played a much
more dominant role in promoting development of
the Korean economy during the second half of the
development decades. Earlier ofcial foreign assistance
had crowd-in effects on private capital inows, which
sustained industrialization and economic growth
during the later stages.
5. However, the amount of ofcial foreign assistance
ows was not as important as the sectors in which the
capital was applied. Among 60 countries, which were
at a similar level of per capita income as Korea during
the 1960s, Korea received the least amount of ODA
as a ratio of GDP during 1965-1995 (1.4 percent), but
achieved the fastest industrialization and economic
growth. The sectoral application of aid seems to have
been more important than the absolute level of aid for
industrialization and economic growth.
6. Grants were only a very small portion of total and
ofcial capital inows in Korea. During the development
decades (1960s-1990s) when industrialization and
economic growth took place in Korea, grants were
scarce. Therefore, Koreas fast industrialization and
growth was attributable to loans. This experiencepresents a case contrary to development literature,
which shows that foreign direct investment (FDI)
made greater contributions to growth than loans in
many developing countries. This Korean experience
also contrasts sharply with the current OECD/DAC-
provided assistance, in which grants dominate more
than 90 percent of ofcial development assistance
(ODA). Moreover, the Korean economy industrialized
and grew quickly not with ODA-type loans (with a
grant element higher than 25 percent), but more with
OOA-type loans (with a grant element lower than
25 percent), especially during the second half of the
development decades. Therefore, the type of foreign
capital inows or ofcial foreign assistance may not be
so important as the effective allocation and application
of foreign capital inows.
7. Public capital inows or ofcial foreign assistance
ows during the development decades were applied
to the economic infrastructure sectors on a priority
basis, followed by the production sectors. This sectoral
allocation of ofcial aid stimulated investment and
growth in the private sectors. Such sectoral allocation
of foreign assistance ows is sharply different from that
of the average DAC members ofcial development
assistance ows, which place much greater emphasis
on the social and administrative infrastructure and
service sectors and neglect the economic infrastructure
and production sectors. The slower growth of DAC aidrecipients indicates that the successful industrialization
and fast growth of the Korean economy can be attributed
to its unique sectoral allocation and application of
ofcial foreign assistance ows, irrespective of their
type. The impact of the sectoral aid allocation pattern
on economic growth is well documented on the basis of
cross-country and time series panel data,30which found
that the foreign assistance ows applied to infrastructure
and production sectors promoted economic growth at a
much higher rate than other sectors in the short and
medium terms. This nding also has implications for
poverty reduction as well. Recent studies show that the
poverty reduction effect of economic growth during the
Millennium Development Era (1990-2010) was twice as
great as that of the reduction in inequity.31This sectoral
aid allocation pattern should not, however, mask the
priority given to the social sectors, especially education
and health, and the science and technology sectors at
the inception of the industrialization programs.
8. The government of Korea played an active role in
mobilizing aid ows in a sustainable manner and
coordinating donors offers in a systematic way. One
effective mechanism was the International Economic
Consultative Group for Korea (IECOK) meetings,
which began in 1966. These annual or bi-annual
meetings, chaired by the World Bank, briefed bilateral
and multilateral donors on the Korean governments
development strategy and investment programs; they
identied assistance needs and Koreas progress in
implementing investment projectsnanced by aid. This
mechanism had been used until the beginning of the
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1980s and was replicated by the World Bank for many
other developing countries. Aid coordination was done
by the aid recipient, not by donors or donors group.
9. The Korean government established a special
arrangement for managing public development loans.
For careful review and approval of the proposals for
public and private development loans, it established a
special inter-ministerial committee, rather than leaving
the process in the hands of a sole minister. This system
contributed to a careful and non-political selection of
efcient investment projects and programs.
10. The government paid special attention to results-
oriented monitoring and evaluation of key government
policies and projects, including aid-nanced investment
projects and programs. For this purpose, it established
the Planning and Coordination Ofcer in the Prime
Ministers Ofce and commissioned the Evaluation
Professors Group, an external and semi-independent
group, to monitor and evaluate the implementation of
the ve-year economic development plans, a substantial
part of which was nanced by ofcial foreign assistance.
The results of their work were reported at meetings
attended by the president, cabinet members, heads of
decentralized public agencies and public enterprises,
and key members of the National Assembly four times a
year, contributing to the effectiveness of the investment
and aid programs.
Lee Kye Woo is an economics professor and had served as
Managing Director of the Development Education and
Research Network of the KDI School of Public Policy
and Management in Seoul, Korea. The author gratefully
acknowledges the KDI Schools research grant in support of
this study and Professor Jungho Yoos comments on an earlier
draft. The author is solely responsible for any remaining errors.
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2 Lee, Kye Woo, Borrowing from the World Bank for Education: Lessons from
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(2010): 49-71.
3 Lee, Suk Min, Impacts of the Changes in Policy Evaluation Systems on Evidence-
Based Policy Management: Literature and Contents Analysis Approach,Journal of
Policy Analysis and Evaluation Association 22, no. 4 (2012): 35-68 (in Korean).4 OECD Development Cooperation Report, Paris (2012).
5 Krueger, Anne O, The Development Role of the Foreign Sector and Aid(Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1982).
6 Kim, Joon Kyung,Impact of Foreign Aid on Koreas Development, Ministry of
Strategy and Finance and KDI School, Seoul (2012).
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Development Assistance and Cooperation for Korea, Korea International Cooperation
Agency (KOICA), Seoul (2004), (in Korean).
12 Kim, Joon Kyung,Impact of Foreign Aid on Koreas Development, Ministry of
Strategy and Finance and KDI School, Seoul (2012).13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Lee, Jae Woo, Effectiveness of Grants and Loans in the Development Processes
of Korea, Overseas Economy, Korea Export and Import Bank, Seoul (2006),
(in Korean).
18
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19 White Paper on Foreign Debt, Economic Planning Board (1986): p.101 (in Korean).
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22 Kim, Joon Kyung,Impact of Foreign Aid on Koreas Development, Ministry of
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23 Development Assistance and Cooperation for Korea, Korea International
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24 OECD Development Cooperation Report, Paris (2012).
25 Radelet, Steven et al, Aid and Growth,Development and Finance42(3), IMF,
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Policy Analysis and Evaluation Association22, no. 4 (2012): 35-68 (in Korean).
29 Development Assistance and Cooperation for Korea, Korea International
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31 Ravallion, M.,How long will it take to lift one billion people out of poverty?PRWP
6325, World Bank, Washington, DC (2013). Chandy, L., et al.
prospects for ending extreme poverty by 2030, Policy paper 2013-04, Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C. (2013).