THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

GWB AND LATIN AMERICA

1. Lack of high-level attention

2. Abandonment of negotiations with Mexico for immigration reform

3. Overriding concern with support for anti-terrorist campaign (not democracy)

4. Hubs, spokes, and FTAs

5. Politicization of drug war

6. Awaiting Fidel’s demise

7. Opposition to Chávez and the Pink Tide

PROBLEM!

• Democracy and U.S.-Latin American relations

• The rise of the “pink tide”

• Context: Bush’s Second Inaugural Address

THE PINK TIDE: ORIGINS

• Economic—lack of growth (through 2003), poverty and inequality, frustration with Washington Consensus

• Political—weakness of representative institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of corruption

• International—war in Iraq, opposition to Bush policies and growing distaste for American society

THE PINK TIDE: MEMBERSHIP• Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006)• Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006)• Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina (2003,

2007)• Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005)• Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006)• Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006)• Fernando Lugo, Paraguay (2008)• Mauricio Funes, El Salvador (2009)Near-Misses:• Ollanta Humala, Peru (2006)• Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006)

CLARIFICATIONS #1

• Differentiation: right/center/left

• Contending leaders in/for Latin America:

– Felipe Calderón (Mexico)– Lula (Brazil)– Hugo Chávez (Venezuela)

CLARIFICATIONS #2

• Disenchanted masses in Latin America ≠• Voters for pink tide candidates ≠• Leftist candidates for office ≠• Leftist winners of presidential elections ≠• Pro-Chávez chief executives ≠• Hugo Chávez• Notes:

– Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized

– Rivalries and defections

THE PINK TIDE: GOALS

• Domestic—winning power, rearranging electoral alignments; overturning status quo, possibly through institutional reform; changing policy direction

• Hemispheric—gaining support throughout Latin America (invoking “Bolivarian dream”), reducing U.S. hegemony

• Global—challenging international order, forging alliances with developing world and non-aligned nations

THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO

• Uses language of the street (including the Arab street)—e.g., the “devil” speech

• Sits atop petroleum • Puts money where his mouth is• Breaks established rules of the game• Plays off resentment of Bush, U.S. power• Challenges Washington Consensus and FTAA• Goes for high stakes• Seeks rearrangement of prevailing world order

THE ODD COUPLE: HUGO AND JORGE

• George’s “gifts” to Hugo:– discourse on democracy (e.g., Second Inaugural)– caricature of “ugly American”– unpopularity of foreign policies– inattention to Latin America

• And Hugo’s reciprocation:– exaggerated rhetoric– potential threats to neighboring countries– authoritarian tendencies

• Q1: What does Hugo do without George?• • Q2: What about oil?

CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS

• The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy

• The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena

• Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield

• The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

GWB AND THE PINK TIDE

• Strategy of “inoculation”• Circumvention through FTAs • Cultivation (and cooptation?) of Lula• The presidential tour (March 2007):

– Carefully selected sites—Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico

– Rhetoric of social concern– Only deliverable: ethanol agreement– The Chávez “counter-tour”

VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA:GWB AND USA

• Democratic—with tilt to right or center-right

• Prosperous—with commitment to free-market policies and ties to United States

• Unified—under U.S. leadership

• Peaceful—in view of unanimity

• Deferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

REALITY CHECK #1

• Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right”

• Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA

• Ideology = diversity rather than unity• Outlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong and

growing among large share of population• Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and

rules of the game

REALITY CHECK #2

Not everyone wants the same thing…!

GWB and Latin America: Comparative and Historical Perspective

_________Latin America as Priority___________ ______ Low _______ _______ High _____

Operational Mode for U.S. ____

Unilateral Ad hoc Systematic imposition intervention (Bush 2001-04) (Reagan 1981-89)

_______ _________________ __________________ Intermittent, Consistent, Multilateral low-level high-level

diplomacy engagement (Clinton 1993-2000) (Kennedy 1961-63)

____________________________________________________________

Rank-Order Preferences for U.S. Policy

___Partners___ __Targets___

U.S. Policy (Mexico, (Cuba, __Rivals___ ___Bystanders__ __Configuration__ _Bush II__ __Colombia)__ __Venezuela)__ __(Brazil?)__ ___(Others)____

Low priority 1 4 2 1 4 + Unilateral

Low priority 2 3 1 2 2 + Multilateral

High priority 3 1 4 4 3 + Unilateral

High priority 4 2 3 3 1 + Multilateral

Note: As presented here, ordinal rankings mean that 1 stands for the first-place (most preferable) choice, 2 for the second-place choice, 3 for the third-place choice, and 4 for the fourth-place (least preferable) choice.

The End.