AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF COMMAND:

A LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

by

Thomas A. Santoro Jr., Lt Col, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

17 February 2010

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

i

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect

the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance

with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States

government.

ii

Contents

Certificate…………………………………………………………………………………... i

Contents………………………………………………………………………………….... ii

Illustrations………………………………………………………………………………… iii

Biography………………………………………………………………………………...... iv

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….… .. 1

Background………………………………………...………..………………………….….. 3

Air Force Expectations of Command…………………………………………........ 3

Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720..…..…………………………………........... 6

Methodology……………………………………………………………………………...... 10

Henry Mintzberg: ―The Nature of Managerial Work‖.……………………………. 10

Development of the Commander‘s Time Survey…...…………………………....... 14

Analysis……………………………………………………………………………………. 16

Recommendations………………………….……………………………………….……... 24

Structured Observation Study………………………………………….........…….. 25

Squadron Commander Advocate………..…..…………………………………...... 26

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………. 27

Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………… 29

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………...... 31

iii

Illustrations

Page

Figure 1: Combined Airmen‘s Time Assessment Survey results for 2008 and 2009…………....9

Figure 2: Manager‘s Time Distribution within the Chronology Record Work Activity Categories

from Henry Mintzberg‘s ―The Nature of Managerial Work.‖…………………………………...12

Figure 3: Manager‘s Time Distribution within the Chronology Record Work Activity Categories

from Irving Choran‘s Study.……………………………………………..………………………13

Figure 4: Commanders‘ Time Distribution Time within Work Activity Categories – All

Commanders.……………………………………………..…………………………………...…16

Figure 5: Commanders‘ Time Distribution Time within Work Activity Categories – Rated vs.

Non-rated Commanders...…………………………….…..…………………………………...…17

Figure 6: Commanders‘ Time Distribution Time within Work Activity Categories – Operations

vs. Support Squadrons……………………………….…..…………………………………....…18

Figure 7: Commanders‘ Actual Time Distribution among the Categories of Mission, People, and

Administration.…..………………………………….…..…….……………………….……...…19

Figure 8: Commanders‘ Desired Time Distribution among the Categories of Mission, People,

and Administration..………………………………….…..…….……………………………...…20

Figure 9: Commanders‘ Most Time Consuming Activities Ranked #1, #2, or #3………………21

Figure 10: Rated Commanders‘ Most Time Consuming Activities Ranked #1, #2, or #3………22

Figure 11: Non-rated Commanders‘ Most Time Consuming Activities Ranked #1, #2, or #3….22

Figure 12: Operations Squadron Commanders‘ Most Time Consuming Activities Ranked #1, #2,

or #3…………...…………………………………………………………………………………23

Figure 13: Support Squadron Commanders‘ Most Time Consuming Activities Ranked #1, #2, or

#3………………..………………………………………………………………………….…….23

iv

Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Santoro was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and was commissioned

through the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps in June 1988, entering the Air Force as an

aircraft maintenance officer in March 1989. He subsequently attended pilot training and has had

a variety of assignments as a pilot, instructor pilot, and evaluator pilot in the C-130, as well as a

staff tour at Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. He also

commanded the 816th Global Mobility Readiness Squadron, McGuire Air Force Base, N.J., the

Air Force‘s first-ever GMRS, leading the unit from initial to full operational capability. A

command pilot with over 2,800 flying hours, including 155 combat hours, he is a veteran of

Operations PROVIDE PROMISE, JOINT ENDEAVOR, and IRAQI FREEDOM. Lieutenant

Colonel Santoro holds a bachelor‘s degree in electrical engineering from Drexel University and a

master‘s degree in mechanical engineering from Boston University.

1

Introduction

―You‘re the commander—get out and lead!‖1 – Gen (retired) John L. Piotrowski, USAF

The prevailing perception of squadron command tends to highlight the classical view of

the commander‘s role as a leader. When people envision the day they‘ll take command, their

thoughts often drift to how they will implement their vision, inspiring their people to

successfully accomplish the mission. This timeless picture of the commander as the heroic

leader is continually reinforced through an endless collection of leadership literature. Air Force

Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, Leadership and Force Development drives the commander‘s

focus by identifying mission and people as the fundamental elements of leadership: ―The

leader‘s primary responsibility is to motivate and direct people to carry out the unit‘s mission

successfully.‖2

While almost no one would argue against these ideals of leadership, another aspect of

command is often ignored. In executing these responsibilities there is a significant

administrative burden with which the commander must contend. Much is due to the myriad of

commander‘s programs and stovepipe functional initiatives that continually add to the

commander‘s plate. While all organizations need administrative processes, it seems intuitive

there is an impact on the commander‘s ability to serve as a leader. How much time do these

functions take away from commanders‘ attention on mission and people?

1 Gen John L. Piotrowski, ―A Perspective on Effective Leadership.‖ Air University (AU) Document 24, Concepts

for Air Force Leadership, 515. Gen Piotrowski was formerly the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense

Command and United States Space Command. 2 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, 1.

2

In August 2007, a B-52 flew from Minot Air Force Base (AFB), North Dakota to

Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, inadvertently loaded with six missiles containing actual nuclear

warheads.3 This incident led to inquiries into the Air Force‘s nuclear enterprise and multiple

commanders lost their jobs. One investigation was conducted by the Secretary of Defense Task

Force on Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Management chaired by James Schlesinger.

The task force identified many underlying issues, and while it was just one factor, their

September 2008 report specifically cited ―the removal of all personnelists from squadron-level

organizations has imposed a significant administrative burden on unit commanders. The

workload once shouldered by dedicated personnel assigned to each unit must now be

accomplished by leadership and competes with the nuclear mission for attention, adding

additional risk.‖4 There is perhaps no more alarming example administrative functions are

impacting commanders‘ ability to keep their eye on the ball.

The purpose of this study is to investigate what commanders really do—that is, what

activities actually consume a commander‘s time. Initially, this effort involves the Air Force‘s

expectations of the focus of squadron commander activities, developed by reviewing Air Force

leadership doctrine and other guidance. Next, the study will examine some initiatives that grew

out of Program Budget Decision 720 and have contributed to commanders‘ administrative

burden. A methodology to analyze activities that consume commanders‘ time will then be

developed based on Henry Mintzberg‘s seminal work ―The Nature of Managerial Work.‖ With

Mintzberg‘s study as a framework, a survey will be created to collect data to provide insight into

and allow for analysis of commanders‘ activities. Finally, recommendations will be presented

for protecting commanders‘ most precious commodity—time.

3 Michael Hoffman, ―Nuclear Safety Slipped for Years Before Minot.‖ Air Force Times, 1.

4 James R. Schlesinger, et al, Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, 42.

3

Background

There are many aspects of leadership, but command is unique in that the authorities

vested in commanders go well beyond those of civilian leaders. There is no civilian equivalent

for ordering men into battle or taking Uniform Code of Military Justice actions against those

who do not meet standards. The perspective of the commander as a heroic leader predominates

in military culture. Where does it come from? Air Force guidance perpetuates that picture, but

do senior leaders contradict themselves with initiatives that add to the commander‘s ever-

increasing administrative burden?

Air Force Expectations of Command

Many sources offer senior leaders‘ perspective on expectations of squadron command,

but to provide scope, this study is limited to reviewing Air Force leadership doctrine and other

Air Force publications. As mentioned, our most current leadership doctrine places commanders‘

focus squarely on mission and people. However, an interesting aspect of AFDD 1-1 is how little

of it actually centers on commander responsibilities. It mentions ―Leadership does not equal

command, but all commanders should be leaders,‖5 but the document dwells at a much higher

level, presenting general elements of leadership, with almost no discussion of specific

responsibilities. According to Mr. Robert Christensen, AFDD 1-1 point of contact at the LeMay

Center for Doctrine, it was determined command is such a policy driven aspect of leadership it

should not play a major role in doctrine. The next iteration, AFDD 1-0, is projected to address

some command responsibilities, but will not provide an extended discussion of command

separate from leadership.6

5 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, 1.

6 Stephen J. Miller, Maj Gen, USAF, Memorandum For Record: ―Program Directive for AFDD 1-0, Leadership and

Force Development‖, 2. AFDD 1-1 is being re-designated as 1-0 to correlate with joint doctrine.

4

Historically, Air Force doctrine placed greater emphasis on command responsibilities.

The first leadership doctrine document, Air Force Manual (AFM) 35-15, Air Force Leadership,

published in 1948, concentrated more heavily on the concept of command. Chapter 4,

Responsibility of Command, specifically addresses commanders‘ responsibilities. It highlights

the primacy of mission—―…the common denominator for your entire effort—THE MISSION,‖

while discussion of taking care of people falls below responsibilities to higher headquarters and

collateral units.7 In addition, Chapter 4 contains sections on administrative and management

responsibilities and clearly states ―You are responsible for efficient administration of your unit.‖8

AFM 50-3, Air Force Leadership, appeared in 1964 and was primarily a rehash of its

predecessor, with updated vignettes and more focus on the nuclear and space missions. In some

aspects it infers the need for more business-like leadership, stating the ―professional officer of

today must develop more and more skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and

leaders.‖9 But much of AFM 50-3 is verbatim to AFM 35-15 and was, in effect, the last update

to leadership doctrine until 2004‘s AFDD 1-1. Meanwhile, Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 35-49,

Air Force Leadership, though not formal doctrine, put the spotlight clearly on mission and

people as the fundamental elements of leadership. Published in 1985, AFP 35-49 discusses

leadership in general and hardly mentions command; it seems to have been the basis for AFDD

1-1.

Along with formal doctrine, the Air Force produces other guidance for leaders, primarily

under the auspices of Air University (AU). AU-24, Concepts for Air Force Leadership provides

7 Air Force Manual (AFM) 35-15, Air Force Leadership, 10-11.

8 Ibid., 13. AFM 35-15 also contains a short checklist for the responsibility of command in Annex A.

9 Air Force Manual (AFM) 50-3, Air Force Leadership, 3.

5

over 100 vignettes on leadership, yet very few directly address command.10

While AU-24

approaches leadership from a general perspective, AU Press publishes three books specifically

on command responsibilities. AU-2, Guidelines for Command is an excellent resource on over

100 different aspects of command ranging from taking command, leading and developing

Airmen, commander‘s programs, standards and discipline, Airmen and family assistance, and

others. Commanding an Air Force Squadron in the Twenty-First Century, by Jeffry F. Smith and

Sharing Success—Owning Failure: Preparing to Command in the Twenty-First Century, by

David L. Goldfein, provide a wealth of information on topics germane to command. While these

products clearly hint at the administrative burden awaiting commanders, the underlying theme

that comes through loud and clear is mission and people. Former Air Force Chief of Staff

(CSAF) Gen T. Michael Moseley sets the tone in AU-2: ―Command is about accomplishing the

mission and taking care of your Airmen.‖11

Of all the advice in these resources, one tenet that appears repeatedly is the need for

―leadership by walking around.‖ In AU-2, Gen Moseley asserts, ―It is essential to get out of your

office and connect with your Airmen wherever their duties take them.‖12

In Smith‘s book,

former CSAF Gen John P. Jumper declares, ―Leadership is not accomplished from behind the

desk or by way of E-mail; rather, effective leadership requires you to lead from out front.‖13

No

doubt, 100 percent of commanders would agree, and the number of times this precept appears in

10

In AU-24, Gen (retired) Michael Loh (―The Responsibility of Leadership in Command‖) provides a number of

application principles that tend toward heroic leader actions and Gen (retired) John L. Piotrowski (―A Perspective on

Effective Leadership‖) provides similar broad counsel, but very few articles address command specifically or the

administrative burden commanders face. Gen (retired) Bryce Poe II (―Leadership as a Function of Experience ―)

offers this interesting insight: ―I sometimes feel that we are a bit embarrassed to equate ‗leadership‘ with the routine,

the matter of course, the customary. This is a pity, since it is by a commander‘s performance in such matters that he

is often most judged by both superiors and subordinates.‖ 11

Air University (AU) Handbook 2, Guidelines for Command: A Handbook on the Leadership of Airmen for Air

Force Squadron Commanders, vii. 12

Ibid., vii. 13

Jeffry F. Smith, Commanding an Air Force Squadron in the Twenty-First Century, vii.

6

print leads one to believe it should take the preponderance of commanders‘ time. But is this

reality? As Smith mentions, there are ―many pulls on a squadron commander‘s time during the

day,‖ although he says most units have administrative personnel to aid the commander with

time-draining tasks. 14

Do commanders have sufficient staffs, allowing them to focus on mission

and people and to lead from the front?

Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720

In December 2005 the Air Force produced PBD 720, the basis for a Congress-approved

program to use projected savings from reduced manpower authorizations and aircraft retirements

to finance recapitalization and modernization of aircraft, missile, and space systems. The goal:

reduce the force by 40,000 Airmen over three years (to an end-strength of 315,000 by FY09) and

reinvest the expected six billion dollars in savings into the recapitalization effort.15

In a 2007

statement to Congress, then Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne and Gen Moseley

foreshadowed the unit-level impact: ―…commanders are assessing how they can operate base

support functions more efficiently given fewer resources. Inevitably, commanders may be

required to consolidate capabilities on some bases to maintain services to our people.‖16

Because leadership believed information technologies could be leveraged to automate

administrative functions, career fields such as finance, personnel, and information management

experienced large cuts under PBD 720. To meet those mandated cuts, functionals implemented

stovepipe initiatives to make up for lost manpower, such as the Base Level Service Delivery

Model (BLSDM), the personnel community‘s reaction to a 39 percent force reduction. BLSDM

resulted in removal of Commander‘s Support Staff (CSS) personnel from most squadrons and

14

Jeffry F. Smith, Commanding an Air Force Squadron in the Twenty-First Century, 119. 15

―Force Shaping– Explaining the Numbers,‖ Roll Call, 1. 16

, Michael W. Wynne and Gen T. Michael Moseley, Department of the Air Force Presentation to the Armed

Services Committee United States House of Representatives, 4.

7

consolidation of the majority of those authorizations within the Military Personnel Element

(MPE) of Force Support Squadrons. The expectation was most personnel tasks previously

completed by the CSS would be accomplished by the MPE. Plus, commanders would now have

to retrieve personnel products and conduct other actions via the ―Commander‘s Dashboard,‖ an

information technology (IT) tool, with full implementation expected by mid-2009.17

BLSDM and other stovepipe initiatives were implemented without true understanding of

the impact on squadrons or commanders. Blow back from the field was almost immediate. At a

January 2008 conference at Andrews AFB, Maryland, commanders and first sergeants ―provided

outspoken feedback in areas such as administrative support‖ to Gen Moseley.18

Besides the lack

of personnel/administrative support, a second-order effect had not been considered. As CMSgt

Jerry Plohocky of the Air Force Material Command A1 staff stated, ―Over the years CSS

personnel have taken on additional duties inherent to command positions that were not core

personnel duties. While these are often important tasks, the fact remains that with the recent

manpower cuts, the personnel career field can no longer support these additional duties.‖19

Many of these tasks would now fall directly on commanders or personnel pulled from core

mission duties. According to senior leaders, ―new technologies allow one Airman to do the work

of many Airmen.‖20

Unfortunately, it appears that one Airman was the squadron commander.

Senior leadership is well aware of the problem. In 2008, Gen Moseley commissioned his

Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel, and Services (AF/A1) to study the numerous

strains on Airmen‘s time. The Plans and Integration Directorate (AF/A1X) led the Airmen‘s

Time Assessment team on ten base visits in August 2008 to investigate programs, duties and

17

Capt Bob Everdeen, ―Workforce Cuts Drive Shift in Personnel Services Delivery,‖ Air Force Print News, 1. 18

―Squadron Commanders, First Sergeants Meet Senior Leaders.‖ Air Force Print News, 1. 19

Capt Bob Everdeen, ―Workforce Cuts Drive Shift in Personnel Services Delivery,‖ Air Force Print News, 1. 20

―PBD 720 and Force Shaping,‖ Roll Call, 1.

8

issues usurping commanders‘ and Airmen‘s time. The findings were not surprising. According

to the team, ―The centralization of information managers and personnelists unveiled a significant

amount of administrative workload with managing squadron programs. The absorption of this

workload has impacted squadron leadership‘s ability to lead/mentor…‖21

The report noted

despite the loss of personnel under PBD 720, there was no reduction in mission or additional

duty requirements, and commanders were concerned their ability to ―lead by walking around‖

was adversely impacted. One recommendation clearly showed the effect on commanders‘ time:

―…we likely need to consider manpower solutions to enable commanders to regain the

considerable time they currently spend tracking and following up on personnel and

administrative matters.‖22

AF/A1X conducted a follow-up study in August 2009 and found many of the same

concerns still existed. The October 2009 report cited IT solutions such as the Commander‘s

Dashboard were not providing expected efficiencies and recommended a study of CSS workload

to ―measure and document workload left behind after the respective centralization/transformation

efforts and now being accomplished by commanders, first sergeants, etc.‖23

The report noted 71

Air Force-directed additional duties are levied on commanders and their units.24

In addition to

base visits, AF/A1X conducted surveys on programs taking time from primary duties for

commanders, first sergeants, superintendents, and Airmen. Results appear in Figure 1:

21

Airmen’s Time Assessment Team After Action Report, 1. 22

Ibid., 2. 23

2009 Airmen’s Time Assessment (ATA) After Action Report, 6. 24

Ibid., 9.

9

Figure 1: Combined Airmen’s Time Assessment Survey results for 2008 and 200925

While these data are telling, it does not provide a true picture of the impact on

commanders and first sergeants, because most survey respondents did not fall in these

categories.26

To gain more insight into commanders‘ time, a more focused study is required.

25

2009 Airmen’s Time Assessment (ATA) After Action Report, 25. 26

The 2008 survey had 1,784 participants (Airmen’s Time Assessment Team After Action Report, 24), but only 30

percent were at the commander/director level and only 9.4 percent were first sergeants (Airmen’s Time Survey, 5).

The 2009 survey was wider in scope with 5,836 respondents, but even less representative of the impact on squadron

leadership because only eight percent of respondents were commanders and only two percent were first sergeants.

(2009 Airmen’s Time Assessment (ATA) After Action Report, 24).

10

Methodology

In order to develop a more meaningful perspective of the activities that dominate a

squadron commander‘s attention, a methodology had to be developed. To provide a theoretical

basis for the effort, Henry Mintzberg‘s managerial study was used as a framework to build a

survey instrument to collect data from graduated squadron commanders. The goal was to

investigate from several aspects what commanders really do—that is, what activities actually

consume a commander‘s time.

Henry Mintzberg: “The Nature of Managerial Work”

In 1973, Henry Mintzberg published ―The Nature of Managerial Work‖ based on his

1968 doctoral work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The genesis of his dissertation

was a simple question he asked as a six-year old imagining what his father did at the office27

—

―what do managers do?‖28

This query grew into a complex study of the roles managers fill and

the activities that constitute their work. In Mintzberg‘s mind, if one did not know exactly the

activities that consume a manager‘s time, ―how can we design useful management information

systems or planning systems for him? If we do not know what managers do how can we claim to

teach management to students in business schools?‖29

While there are many descriptions, Mintzberg defined the manager as ―that person in

charge of a formal organization or one of its subunits,‖ which means the individual has formal

authority over his organization, much as a military commander.

30 Five chief executive officers

(CEOs) who presided over large and successful organizations in very different fields of endeavor

27

Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, viii. Mintzberg‘s dissertation was entitled ―The Manager at

Work—Determining his Activities, Roles, and Programs by Structured Observation.‖ 28

Ibid., 1. 29

Ibid., 3. 30

Ibid., 166.

11

were the subjects of his study.31

Mintzberg chose structured observation as his methodology

because it offered a blend of open-ended observation with the rigorous systematic recording of

structured data. It allowed for the characterization of each observed event with the flexibility to

develop the categories both during and after the observation.32

Mintzberg shadowed each CEO

for one week, recording their every activity. He broke out his observations into three records:

the chronology record (activity patterns); the mail record (incoming and outgoing

correspondence); and the contact record (every verbal contact for the CEO).33

The chronology record provides the most useful framework for studying commander‘s

activities, so those results are presented here. After scrutinizing his data, Mintzberg determined

managers‘ activities could be broken into five categories: desk work, telephone calls, scheduled

meetings, unscheduled meetings, and tours. Desk work refers to the time spent doing work in

the office, while telephone calls were categorized separately and are self-explanatory. Scheduled

meetings consisted of formal meetings or ceremonial events while unscheduled meetings were

impromptu gatherings or ―drop-ins.‖ Tours were random observation without prearrangement;

in more familiar terms: ―leadership by walking around.‖34

Figure 2 depicts Mintzberg‘s findings

on the distribution of the manager‘s time:

31

Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, 239-240. 32

Ibid., 231. 33

Ibid., 232. 34

Ibid., 235.

12

Figure 2: Manager’s Time Distribution within the Chronology Record Work Activity Categories

from Henry Mintzberg’s “The Nature of Managerial Work.”35

The two extremes are probably the most notable of these results. While 59 percent of the

CEOs‘ time was spent in scheduled meetings, this becomes less surprising when one considers

that managers of large organizations are strategic level leaders. These events provide CEOs

opportunities to meet with large groups of people both inside and outside the organization. In

regard to tours, Mintzberg noted although the CEOs were well aware of the value of the activity

in discovering a wealth of information about the organization, ―the surprising feature about this

powerful tool is that it is used so infrequently,‖ accounting for only three percent of the CEOs‘

time.36

In an intriguing comparison, Mintzberg cited Irving Choran‘s 1969 study that mirrored

his own methodology. Choran observed three presidents of small companies for two days each.

These results (presented in Figure 3) are likely more representative of a commander‘s time study

35

Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, 105. 36

Ibid., 44.

13

because as Mintzberg highlights, leaders of small organizations ―engage in fewer formal

activities but are much more concerned with the operating work of their organizations.‖37

Figure 3: Manager’s Time Distribution within the Chronology Record Work Activity Categories

from Irving Choran’s Study.38

Only a portion of Mintzberg‘s quest to discover what managers really do is presented,

and not all of his work is applicable to the task at hand. But in his observation that the

manager‘s ―work pace is unrelenting and his work activities are characterized by brevity, variety,

and fragmentation,‖39

Mintzberg could easily have been describing the squadron commander‘s

job. Thus, his study provides an excellent starting point to design a methodology to investigate

the activities that consume a commander‘s time.

37

Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, 104. While Mintzberg does not define the size of these

organizations, one can infer they were closer in dimension to an Air Force squadron than those in Mintzberg‘s work. 38

Ibid., 105. 39

Ibid., 5.

14

Development of the Commander’s Time Survey

A structured observation study would be the most accurate method to record and

categorize activities that consume a commander‘s time. However, resource and time constraints

precluded such a study so a survey instrument was developed. While Mintzberg felt surveys

were not the best tool for this type of work because of evidence that managers are not always

effective at estimating their own activities, he did believe they were useful in examining

―managers‘ perceptions of their own jobs.‖40

The survey was created in conjunction with the

Office of Program Assessment (ESS/XA) at the Spaatz Center for Officer Education at Maxwell

AFB, Alabama. The target audience was 105 active duty Air Force graduated squadron

commanders within the 2010 Air War College (AWC) class. The AWC commander approved

the survey and its distribution and it was administered by ESS/XA from 29 October to 10

November 2009 via a targeted e-mail providing a hyperlink to the web-based instrument.

Responses were confidential and the researcher had no access to any personal information. The

survey appears in Appendix A.

The initial portion of the survey collected preliminary data on the nature of the

commander‘s squadron. In addition, commanders were requested to base their responses on a

typical work week in garrison and to provide how many hours they worked in an average week

to allow for percentage answers to be converted into hours. Because a commander‘s job is so

complex, there are a myriad of angles from which data on activities could be collected. To

provide scope, the survey was limited to three perspectives of the use of commanders‘ time. The

first major section of the survey mirrored Mintzberg‘s five work activity categories: desk work,

telephone calls, scheduled meetings, unscheduled meetings, and tours. However, an additional

category was added to account for specific personal training required to maintain mission

40

Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, 222.

15

capabilities or currency requirements (for example, a pilot flying training sorties) for which no

civilian equivalent exists in Mintzberg‘s work.

The survey‘s second section was designed to examine commanders‘ work from the

perspective of the two fundamental doctrinal elements of Air Force leadership, mission and

people, along with the often ignored administrative aspect of the job. Commanders were asked

to indicate via percentage how their time was distributed between activities in the categories of

mission, people, and administration. In addition, commanders were then asked to provide their

ideal time distribution among those three activity categories. The purpose was to gain broad

insight into how much the commanders felt they were able to focus on mission and people in

light of their administrative burden.

The object of the third section was to hone in on more specific activities and their impact

on commander‘s time. Commanders were asked to identify the activities that consumed the

majority of their time. To limit the scope of this exercise, a list of nine activities were provided

and commanders were asked to rank them from #1 to #9, with #1 consuming the most time and

#9 consuming the least time. The break out of commander responsibilities in AU-2 was used as

a loose framework from which to build this list. The activities included: mission training and

execution; strategic/long term planning; ―leadership by walking around‖; standards and

discipline; Airmen and family assistance; leading/developing Airmen; meetings; commander

programs oversight; and administrative functions/IT tools management. As previously

discussed, the complexity of the commander‘s job could easily lead to a more detailed list of

specific activities, but it was necessary to structure this task to receive any useful bounded data.

One minor additional section asked commanders directly if the consolidation of support

functions had forced them to personally take on administrative tasks or to use personnel ―out of

16

hide‖ to perform non-mission related duties. Commanders were also offered the opportunity to

make any comments concerning issues related to commander‘s time.

Analysis

While the scope of the survey was limited, the results provide several useful perspectives

on the impact of administrative burden on the commander‘s time. Of the 105 commanders

contacted, 69 completed the survey. An analysis was conducted to determine if any of the

variables (squadron size, work hours, operations vs. support squadron, etc.) had a significant

impact on the data collected. While there was quite a bit of variation in the responses, it was

determined to be random and not variable-specific. However, for the reader‘s interest, some

results are presented with a breakout based on variables.

Figure 4 presents the results of the portion of the survey mirroring Mintzberg‘s work:

Figure 4: Commanders’ Time Distribution Time within Work Activity Categories – All

Commanders

17

The commanders responded almost one-third of their time was spent doing desk work,

while over half of their time was spent in the office or in scheduled meetings. 16 percent of their

time was spent touring, significantly more than the 3 percent for Mintzberg‘s CEOs. While there

is quite a disparity with Mintzberg‘s results, that can be expected because his CEOs operated at

the strategic level. Interestingly, the commanders‘ results are very similar to those in Choran‘s

study of small companies, which helps add credence to their validity. For the reader‘s interest,

comparisons of rated vs. non-rated commanders and operations squadron vs. support squadron

commanders are presented in Figures 5 and 6 respectively:

Figure 5: Commanders’ Time Distribution Time within Work Activity Categories – Rated vs. Non-rated

Commanders

18

Figure 6: Commanders’ Time Distribution Time within Work Activity Categories – Operations vs. Support

Squadrons

When one considers the distribution among mission, people, and administration, it

appears from the commanders‘ perspective their time is split almost evenly between the three,

with approximately one-third in each category. The results for all commanders combined are

presented (along with a comparison to several variables) in Figure 7:

19

Figure 7: Commanders’ Actual Time Distribution among the Categories of Mission, People, and

Administration.

However, based on their responses, commanders felt this picture should be significantly

different. They believed the amount of time they spent on administration should be cut by more

than half, from 32 percent to 14 percent. They think 41 percent of their time should be afforded

to the mission, while 45 percent should be focused on people. The results for all commanders

combined are presented (along with a comparison to several variables) in Figure 8:

20

Figure 8: Commanders’ Desired Time Distribution among the Categories of Mission, People, and

Administration.

In judging these results, one must consider activities that fall within each category are

subject to interpretation by the individual commander. Plus, there is probably overlap of

activities between different categories (e.g., tracking of performance reports could be considered

administration, while writing them could be considered taking care of people). But at the very

least, this exercise provides the commanders‘ perspective of where they believe their attention is

focused.

The most telling results are commanders‘ rankings of time consuming activities. Their

responses clearly show administrative functions (administration/IT tools, commander‘s

programs, meetings) take the most time. Administrative functions and IT tools management

were ranked in the top three most often by commanders, with meetings following closely behind.

Results are presented in Figure 9:

21

Figure 9: Commanders’ Most Time Consuming Activities Ranked #1, #2, or #3

There was some difference between the responses of rated vs. non-rated commanders and

operations vs. support squadron commanders. The most signification variation was that nonrated

commanders spent almost twice as much time on the administrative functions than their rated

counterparts. These results are presented in Figures 10 through 13:

22

Figure 10: Rated Commanders’ Most Time Consuming Activities Ranked #1, #2, or #3

Figure 11: Non-rated Commanders’ Most Time Consuming Activities Ranked #1, #2, or #3

23

Figure 12: Operations Squadron Commanders’ Most Time Consuming Activities Ranked #1, #2, or #3

Figure 13: Support Squadron Commanders’ Most Time Consuming Activities Ranked #1, #2, or #3

24

Over 75 percent of commanders responded they personally assumed administrative tasks

due to consolidation of support personnel outside the squadron, and on average these tasks

consumed 19 percent of their time. In addition, over 82 percent had to use personnel ―out of

hide‖ to perform non-mission related duties. Many of the commanders lamented the

administrative burden in no uncertain terms:

― I have commanded three squadrons in the past ten years. During this time I watched

first hand the amount of time I spent on administrative requirements double and at times

triple.‖

―Squadron commanders may be becoming more of an administrator than a commander.‖

―I felt like an action officer on G-series orders…not like a commander.‖

―We have become a culture which values administrative competence over developing

leaders/warriors.‖

While these statements are anecdotal, they add to the collection of evidence the commanders‘

administrative burden is taking away from their ability to focus on mission and people. The Air

Force must takes steps to reverse this trend.

Recommendations

As evidenced by the Airmen‘s Time Assessments (ATAs), the Air Force is aware of the

problem and is considering actions to improve the situation. For example, 1,200 civilian Unit

Program Coordinator authorizations are planned for FY10 to partially make up for the loss of

CSS in larger squadrons.41

More manpower will help, but another root cause of the problem is

the sheer amount of administrative requirements on squadrons and commanders; more must be

done along those lines. Two recommendations are provided here.

41

2009 Airmen’s Time Assessment (ATA) After Action Report, 1.

25

Structured Observation Study

The 2009 ATA report recommends a manpower study to determine the CSS workload

left behind following consolidation of those functions.42

However, the Air Force should conduct

a structured observation study of squadron commanders to unequivocally determine the activities

consuming their time. The most cost effective way to alleviate the commander‘s time problem is

to reduce unnecessary requirements versus adding manpower to perform tasks that add no value

to accomplishing the mission or taking care of people.

While surveys are a valuable tool to provide perspective, they are dependent on the

estimating skills of individual respondents. A structured observation study would provide

detailed systematic data on every activity a commander performs as well as the types of

information they process, and is the only method that offers true accountability for time. This

information would prove beneficial for several uses. It could identify activities that should be

eliminated altogether. If not eliminated, some activities could be targeted for value stream

analysis to lean out underlying processes. In addition, as the Air Force continues to move

towards IT solutions, these data would prove invaluable for designing and implementing systems

that actually meet commanders‘ needs.

The Air Force Manpower Agency Performance Management Branch (AFMA/MAPP)

should be the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for this study with the AFMA Management

Engineering Branch and AF/A1X in support. AFMA/MAPP personnel psychologists have the

academic credentials to conduct such a study and could use Mintzberg‘s work as a basis to

design it. AFMA/MAPP would need to determine a representative group of commanders to

study across missions, major commands, and Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) to ensure

42

2009 Airmen’s Time Assessment (ATA) After Action Report, 6.

26

proper breadth and depth. The study would be time and resource intensive, but the outcome

could benefit all future commanders and their squadrons.

Squadron Commander Advocate

The squadron commander needs an advocate at the highest levels of the Air Force. There

appears to be no protection of commanders from the impact of stovepipe functional initiatives.

The Air Force is taking a step to alleviate this problem. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 38-206 is

currently under development and will establish a ―gatekeeper‖ process to vet and approve new

additional duty requirements to ensure any workload levied at the unit level is appropriate.43

But

no timetable is available for the AFI‘s publication.

While any reduction in additional duties would help, many initiatives are implemented

apparently without regard for second- and third-order effects on commanders. Any number of

actions can directly impact commanders‘ time: manpower reductions under PBD 720, changes

to the assignment or evaluation systems, and new travel order and voucher processing systems

are just a few examples. Some actions are unavoidable, but senior leadership must be aware of

the consequences their decisions have on the commander‘s ability to accomplish the mission

while taking care of people.

The Air Force should create a council of squadron commanders that can vet Air Force

initiatives prior to design and implementation to provide senior leaders perspective on the impact

at the grass roots level. The Vice CSAF (VCSAF) should be designated as the squadron

commander‘s advocate and OPR for the council. The council would consist of 12-20 sitting and

recently graduated squadron commanders from an appropriate mix of missions, major

commands, and AFSCs that would be rotated annually. The council could meet 2-4 times a year

either in person or via video teleconferences. While these duties would add a burden to those on

43

2009 Airmen’s Time Assessment (ATA) After Action Report, 10.

27

the council, the results could ultimately benefit all commanders, and the VCSAF would provide

an advocate at the highest levels to guard against attempts to usurp commanders‘ time.

Conclusion

Ultimately, everything falls on the commander‘s head. That is not in dispute, and few

who have served on G-series orders would have it any other way. Is it possible to say how much

of an administrative burden is too much? No—every situation is different and every commander

is unique. Commanders will continue to make the mission happen because of their dedication to

their people and the organization, but that does not mean the Air Force should not do its best to

make things better.

Based on this study one can conclude commanders believe their administrative burden

must be reduced. Air Force doctrine and guidance calls for commanders to focus on mission and

people, but manning cuts due to PBD 720 and stovepipe functional inititiatives relying on IT

solutions have made that more difficult than ever. The results of AF/A1X‘s ATAs and this

study‘s Commander‘s Time Survey clearly show the administrative burden is out of alignment

with Air Force expectations on where commanders should direct their efforts. The Air Force

should continue to study the problem and provide an advocate to defend the commander‘s

interests.

In this resource-constrained environment, leadership makes the difference in a squadron

that is just getting by and one that is thriving. But as the Schlesinger report states, ―The Air

Force owes its commanders sufficient and effective manning—accountability in the absence of

appropriate resourcing undermines success.‖ 44

The Air Force must give its commanders a

44

James R. Schlesinger, et al, Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, 42.

28

fighting chance by reducing the overwhelming administrative burden, allowing them the

opportunity to lead by protecting their most precious commodity—time.

29

Appendix A

30

31

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