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THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

SAN FERNANDO

Claim No. CV 2014-00608

BETWEEN

INDRA SAMUEL

Claimant

AND

PC ALI

(Regimental Number 16167)

First Defendant

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Second Defendant

Before: Madam Justice Eleanor J. Donaldson-Honeywell

Appearances:

Mr. Subhas Panday, Attorney-at-Law for the Claimant

Ms. Leah Thompson and Mr. Brent James, Attorneys-at-Law for the Defendants

Delivered on February 23, 2016

JUDGMENT

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Introduction:

1. Indra Samuel, [“the Claimant”] a thirty year old housewife, was taken from her home

by the First Defendant and two other Police Officers on May 7, 2010. The First

Defendant was acting on information that the Claimant had been involved in a bar

brawl in July, 2009 in which she inflicted a wound on a bar employee. The Claimant

was arrested on a Saturday morning while preparing the midday meal for her three

children. She was taken to the St. Madelaine, Mon Repos and San Fernando Police

Stations where she was kept in cells that she found to be filthy, foul smelling and

infested with vermin. Furthermore she was handcuffed to another person she

describes as a violent vagrant and afforded neither toilet facilities nor drinking water.

She remained imprisoned in these alleged conditions for three days without ever being

put on an ID Parade. Thereafter, on May 10, 2010 she was released with no

explanation.

2. The present claim seeks damages for the alleged wrongful arrest and false

imprisonment of the Claimant. The Claimant filed a Statement of Case on 18th

February 2014 against both the First Defendant and the State pursuant to the State

Liability and Proceedings Act Chap. 8:02 (“Second Defendant”). The Defendants’

defence was filed on 2nd

September, 2014.

Factual Background:

3. On 19th

July, 2009 the First Defendant received a report via telephone of a fight at the

Train Stop Restaurant and Bar. The First Defendant visited the scene and observed a

wounded man named Marvin Branker on the ground. The First Defendant

interviewed witnesses at the scene including Mr. Branker and the proprietor of the

bar, one Rawle Kubran, who said he knew the Claimant and her husband and saw

them both dealing blows to Mr. Branker. Marvin Branker was taken to the hospital

and a written statement was recorded from him on September 10, 2009 in which he

named the Claimant’s husband Rodney Samuel and identified “a woman” as being

involved in the fight.

4. On 24th

November, 2009 Rodney Samuel came in to the First Defendant’s police

station to give him a statement regarding the fight and on 1st December, 2009 the

Claimant gave a statement of the fight. Statements were also taken from other

witnesses in early 2010 including one from a June Garcia who said she saw a person

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she knew as Rodney Samuel’s wife take a beer bottle, break it and stab the back of

Mr. Branker’s head during the fight.

5. On 7th

May 2010 a party of police officers arrived at the Claimant’s house in order to

arrest her and to place her on an ID parade. The manner in which she was arrested is

in dispute. The Claimant claims that they entered her house and arrested her in front

of her children, giving her no time to change her clothes. She further claims that they

neither identified themselves nor gave the reason for her arrest. The First Defendant

claims that they remained outside the door and gave her forty-five minutes to shower

and get ready to leave. He claims that the party identified themselves and informed

the Claimant of the reason for her arrest.

6. The Claimant was taken to the St Madeleine Police Station from thence to the San

Fernando Police Station and back to St Madeleine. The Claimant says she was

spoken to in a hostile manner and forced to sign a statement without being informed

of its contents. The said statement was, in fact, a station diary entry which contained

details of the procedure that was followed upon her arrest and an indication that she

had not objected to the police officers’ intention that she be placed on an ID Parade.

The Claimant further alleges that she was denied a telephone call and her right of

access to an attorney. The Defendants deny this. The Claimant remained in St

Madeleine until approximately midnight on that day when she was transported back to

San Fernando. She was then taken to Mon Repos Police Station where she remained

until the following day when she was taken back to San Fernando.

7. The Defendants pleaded at paragraph 14 of the Defence that persons matching the

Claimant’s description could not be located for the identification parade and she was

therefore released that afternoon. No admissible evidence was however presented to

the Court to support that explanation. The First Defendant’s evidence at paragraph 26

of his witness statement was that he did not “know the details of what happened after

the Claimant was taken to the San Fernando Police Station”. His last involvement in

the matter he says was when, on the day of her arrest, he went to San Fernando Police

Station to make entries in the ID Parade Register. He expected that officers at the

station would arrange the ID Parade.

8. There is some dispute as to the times of the Claimant’s movements between each of

the stations. However, there is no dispute as to the approximate length of time she

was imprisoned in both accounts.

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9. The Claimant has described the conditions in which she was imprisoned as extremely

inhumane. She claims she was unable to use the bathroom as it was just a hole in the

ground filled with foul smelling matter. She states that she was denied toilet paper

and that her drinking water was taken away from her by a fellow prisoner. According

to the Claimant this prisoner was a violent person who appeared to be an insane

vagrant. She feared for her safety and remained the entire night in a protective

crouched position. She also alleges that the cells were infested with cockroaches and

that officers at the station shouted at her to stop crying.

10. Based upon these facts, the Claimant makes her claim for damages for wrongful arrest

and false imprisonment including aggravated and/or exemplary damages.

Issues:

11. The issues to be determined are as follows:

a. Whether the Claimant was wrongfully arrested;

b. Whether the Claimant was falsely imprisoned upon her arrest; and

c. Whether her continued detention amounted to false imprisonment.

The Evidence:

12. The evidence comprised witness statements of the Claimant and her husband as well

as witness statements of the First Defendant and supporting witness WPC Magferr

Pierre for the State. Based on evidential objections filed by the Claimant, parts of the

First Defendant’s witness statement were struck out as hearsay prior to the start of the

trial. This left no evidence before the Court to provide an explanation for the

extended period of the Claimant’s imprisonment after the First Defendant left her at

the San Fernando Police Station on the first day of her detention. My finding,

therefore, is that on the un-contradicted evidence of the Claimant, she was only

released on the third day when an Inspector came and inquired about the reason for

her detention for such a long period without being charged. I further accept as

fact,the allegation that the said inspector spoke to the officers in charge and said what

they were doing was nonsense and ordered her immediate release.

13. In all other respects the evidence for the State as presented by the First Defendant was

cogent and compelling in explaining the grounds for the arrest of the Claimant. It was

also my finding that the First Defendant presented as a witness of truth since his

testimony was unshaken under cross-examination. In particular I accepted as truthful

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his account that on meeting the Claimant at her home on the day of the arrest he

informed her that she was a suspect with regard to the wounding report concerning

Marvin Branker arising from the bar brawl on July 19, 2009. He also informed her

that she was going to be arrested and placed on an ID Parade. She was informed of

her legal rights and privileges and given time to bathe and change her clothes. In

certain respects his testimony was corroborated by the Woman Police Officer who

was his supporting witness.

14. On the other hand the Claimant, while standing her ground on certain areas of her

case, including the horrendous conditions she endured in the police lock-up, was not

as convincing in her testimony that the First Defendant’s actions were arbitrary,

unconstitutional and aggressive in carrying out the arrest. More specifically, she

changed her testimony with regard to the treatment meted out to her by the First

Defendant. Initially in her witness statement she had said that the First Defendant

threatened her violently to force her to sign a statement. However, under cross-

examination it became clear that her concern was with his tone when he asked her to

sign the contents of the Station Diary.

15. I found the Claimant to be a witness of truth in other respects. It was obvious, from

her intermittent weeping and forthright testimony during cross-examination on that

aspect of the case, that she had suffered distress and mental anguish as a result of the

deplorable conditions she was subjected to in the cells. The attempts of the Attorneys

for the Defendants to cast doubt by cross-examining the Claimant on the

unsatisfactory state of the station cells were rendered futile by her obvious distress.

16. Much was made, by Counsel for the Defence, of the fact that the Claimant did not in

her witness statement say that she had previously met the First Defendant when she

gave him a statement about the bar brawl. This, however, did not unduly affect her

credibility as she made it clear that at no time did she connect that interview with her

arrest since at that time she felt she was giving a statement in relation to a matter

being investigated against her husband.

17. The fact that she had this prior meeting with the First Defendant and gave no

complaint about any oppressive conduct on his part lends credibility, on the other

hand, to his account that he did not conduct himself in an aggressive manner when he

later arrested the Claimant. Furthermore, there was uncontroverted evidence at

paragraph 16 of the First Defendant’s witness statement that the Claimant’s husband

had turned to him for assistance in an unrelated matter sometime after the bar brawl.

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The Claimant’s husband had given the First Defendant his phone number and the First

Defendant tried to call him before coming to arrest his wife. It is my finding that the

Claimant wholly misinterpreted and exaggerated her impression of the First

Defendant having treated her with aggression during the arrest.

Law and Analysis:

False Imprisonment

18. Section 3(4) of the Criminal Law Act Ch. 10:04 provides:

“Where a police officer, with reasonable cause suspects that an arrestable

offence has been committed, he may arrest without warrant anyone whom he,

with reasonable cause, suspects to be guilty of the offence”.

19. According to the Halsbury’s Laws of England1:

“A claim of false imprisonment lies at the suit of a person unlawfully

imprisoned against the person who causes the imprisonment. Any total

restraint of the liberty of the person, for however short a time, by the use or

threat of force or by confinement, is an imprisonment.”

20. It further states2:

“The defendant in a claim for false imprisonment is entitled to succeed if he

pleads and proves that the imprisonment was legally justified”.

21. In the case of Neptune v AG3, Des Vignes J, citing Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 19

th

Edition at paras. 15-23, distilled the factors establishing false imprisonment as

follows:

“a. The fact of the imprisonment.

b. The absence of lawful authority to justify the imprisonment.”

22. The Privy Council in the case of Ramsingh v The Attorney General of Trinidad

and Tobago4, set out the principles governing the tort of false imprisonment as

follows:

I. “The detention of a person is prima facie tortious and an infringement

of section 4(a) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago;\

1 Police and Investigatory Powers (Vol. 84 (2013)) [435]

2 Tort (Vol. 97 (2015) [554]

3 CV 2008-03386

4 [2012] UKPC 16 at [8]

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II. It is for the arrester to justify the arrest; that is the Defendant in this

case;

III. A police officer may arrest a person if with reasonable cause he

suspects that the person concerned has committed an arrestable

offence;

IV. Thus the officer must subjectively suspect that the person has

committed such an offence; and

V. The officer’s belief must have been on reasonable grounds or as some

of the cases put it, there must have been reasonable and probable

cause to make the arrest;

VI. Any continued detention after arrest must also be justified by the

detainer.”

23. It is therefore for the Defendants in the present case to justify the imprisonment of the

Claimant. To do so, they must show reasonable grounds for the arrest. The test for

reasonable and probable cause has a subjective as well as an objective element. This

is further examined in the judgment of Narine JA in Lashley v AG5. Citing Dallison

v Caffrey (1964) 2 All ER 610 at 619 and O’Hara v Chief Constable (1977) 2

WLR 1, where the learned Justice of Appeal states at para 14:

“The test for reasonable and probable cause has a subjective as well as an

objective element. The arresting officer must have an honest belief or

suspicion that the suspect had committed an offence and this belief or

suspicion must be based on the existence of objective circumstances, which

can reasonably justify the belief or suspicion. A police officer need not have

evidence amounting to a prima facie case. Hearsay information including

information from other officer may be sufficient to create reasonable grounds

for arrest as long as that information is within the knowledge of the arresting

officer”.

24. At paragraph 22 Narine J further expanded on the powers of the police officer by

underscoring that:

“It is well settled that a police officer is entitled to arrest a suspect and

conduct further enquiries in order to see whether or not his suspicions are

supported by further evidence. As long as these enquiries are reasonable they

5 CV 2011-00267

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are an important adjunct of the administration of justice: Dallison v Caffrey

supra at 617 B-D per Lord Denning M.R.”

25. Further, according to the House of Lords decision of Herniman v Smith (1983) AC

305, a police officer is not required to test every relevant factor or to ascertain

whether there is a defence before an arrest is made.

26. In the present case, therefore, it must be determined whether the Defendants have

sufficiently justified the arrest by satisfying the court that there was reasonable and

probable cause for the arrest. The determination turns on whether the First Defendant

subjectively suspected that the Claimant had committed the offence and whether his

belief was based on objectively reasonable grounds.

27. In the Court of Appeal decision of Barcoo v AG6 cited by the Claimant in her

submissions the test was further examined and determined to be divided into four

main questions:

a. “Did the officer honestly have the requisite suspicion or belief?

b. Did the officer, when exercising the power, honestly believe in the existence of

the “objective” circumstances which he now relies on as the basis for that

suspicion or belief?

c. Was his belief in the existence of the circumstances based on reasonable

grounds?

d. Did these circumstances constitute reasonable grounds for the requisite

suspicion or belief?”

28. In the circumstances of this case there is nothing in the background facts and evidence

to indicate that the First Defendant did not honestly believe in the guilt of the

Claimant. Therefore, it only remains to be determined whether the grounds of the

arrest were sufficient to be considered reasonable grounds.

29. The grounds outlined by the Defendants in their submissions were:

a. That at the scene of the offence interviews had been conducted and statements

taken from the victim of the alleged assault as well as from witnesses to the

event;

b. That the Claimant and her husband both gave statements regarding the

incident which were considered; and

6 HCA 1388 of 1989

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c. That the written statements, taken later on at the Police Station from the victim

and the other witnesses to the bar brawl, not only identified an East Indian

woman of medium build and black hair as having inflicted the injury but

spoke to personal knowledge of the Claimant as the wife of Rodney Samuel

and that she was the woman involved in the wounding.

30. These factors comprised reasonable grounds for suspicion of guilt and as outlined in

Dallison (above), an officer is entitled to arrest a person under suspicion in order to

conduct further enquiries into their guilt. The conduct of an ID Parade would fall

under the ambit of “further enquiries”. The circumstances following the arrest, such

as whether the Claimant was given time to shower and whether the First Defendant

was hostile to the Claimant, are not relevant in determining whether the Claimant was

unlawfully arrested. It is my conclusion that the First Defendant did honestly believe

in the information that formed the basis for his suspicion and that the information

constituted reasonable grounds for that suspicion.

31. As it relates to the determination on lawfulness of the arrest there is an additional

relevant issue raised in the Claimant’s Statement of Case as to whether she was

informed of the reason for her arrest. According to the Halsbury’s, a person must be

informed as soon as practicable of the reason for his arrest7.

32. It was explained in Christie v Leachinsky8 that:

“It is a condition of lawful arrest that the party arrested should know on what

charge or on suspicion of what crime he is arrested: and, therefore, just as a

private person arresting on suspicion must acquaint the party with the cause

of his arrest, so must a policeman arresting without warrant on suspicion state

at the time (unless the party is already acquainted with it), on what charge the

arrest is being made or at least inform him of the facts which are said to

constitute a crime on his part. Even if circumstances exist which may excuse

this, it is still his duty to give the information at the first reasonable

opportunity after the arrest.”

7 Tort (Vol. 97 (2015) [545]

8 [1947] A.C. 573

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33. Further, Lewis v Chief Constable of the South Wales Constabulary9 determined

that:

“an arrest which was unlawful for that reason became a lawful arrest from

the moment reasons for the arrest were given.”

34. The length of time between the giving of the statement by the Claimant and her

subsequent arrest is too long for it to be considered reasonable for the First Defendant

to have inferred that the Claimant already knew the grounds of her arrest. Several

months had elapsed since the incident and for the arrest to have been properly

executed the First Defendant was required to inform the Claimant of the reason for

same. However, on the basis of the oral evidence of the witnesses under cross-

examination it is my finding that the Claimant was not a witness of truth in her

testimony that she was not so informed. From his written and oral testimony it is

evident that the First Defendant displayed knowledge of the standard procedures to be

followed on an arrest and gave cogent evidence of having carried out all necessary

steps in the arrest process. There was no compelling evidence to support the

contention that he omitted to give the Claimant reason for the arrest. Therefore, the

arrest could not be unlawful on grounds of failure to provide reasons.

Continued Detention:

35. Although the Claimant was not unlawfully arrested, the circumstances of the duration

of her detention thereafter must be considered in determining whether by virtue of the

extended detention she was falsely imprisoned. Counsel for the Defendants in closing

submissions cited the decision of Mr. (Ag) Justice Avory Sinanan as he then was in

HCA No 1903 of 1997 Alphonsus Mondesir v AG where at page 27 he underscored

that “although an initial arrest may be lawful, the detention of the arrested person

consequent thereon may be unlawful if the length of that detention is unreasonable or

excessive.”

36. The key question to be answered in deciding whether the continued detention

rendered the initially lawful arrest a false imprisonment is whether the length of it was

unreasonable or excessive. The answer to that question turns on what matters any

reasonable investigator would be taking into account in determining whether to

continue to detain the Claimant10

.

9 [1991] 1 All ER 206

10 Per Rajkumar J. in Claim No. CV 2014-04553 Andrew Bruce v The Attorney General at paragraph 26

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37. In the instant case there is no evidence before the Court as to what matters, if any,

were being taken into account in determining how long to keep the Claimant in

custody. It does appear from the oral evidence that initially attempts were made by

the First Defendant on the first day of her detention to organize an identification

parade. The transporting of the Claimant from station to station was in an effort to do

so.

38. However, there is no first hand evidence as to why no identification parade was ever

held. There was no justification for the Claimant’s custody for three days without a

charge being made against her. After her initial arrest on the Friday, the First

Defendant should have arranged the ID Parade for the following day and/or followed

up to ensure that it was done. Even prior to the arrest, arrangements should have been

put in place if the purpose of the arrest was for identification of the Claimant as a

suspect. Therefore, it is my finding that the arrest became unlawful during the second

day of imprisonment since from then on there is no evidence before the Court to

explain why the Claimant was kept imprisoned.

39. The time spent in custody from midday on the second day to the third day amounted

to approximately twenty-seven hours if the Claimant was released at 3 p.m.

Damages:

40. Though not relevant as to proving the arrest was unlawful, the conditions the

Claimant endured in the cells are relevant to the assessment of damages for her

unreasonably extended period of detention which amounted to a false imprisonment.

41. In a claim for false imprisonment the Claimant is entitled to recover general damages

for the imprisonment and any physical or mental injury which results directly from it

as well as Damages for the loss of liberty itself should reflect the length of the

unlawful detention: See Halsbury’s Laws of England11

. To determine the award to

be made certain cases with similar lengths of detention should be looked at.

42. There were no cases on similar awards cited in the closing submissions for the

Claimant. The defendant, though denying liability, usefully provided authority for the

quantum of damages that would be appropriate in the event that the Court found

against them. They cited the case of Emraan Ali v the Attorney General of

Trinidad and Tobago CV 2012-02695 delivered on March 20, 2014. In that case the

Claimant was arrested and detained for approximately two days and three nights. His

11

Tort (Vol. 97 (2015) [556]

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detention was justified and there was no explanation as to why he was only taken to

appear before a Magistrate on Tuesday and not Monday afternoon. The Claimant was

awarded Forty-five Thousand Dollars ($45,000.00).

43. In the case of Wayne Clement v AG12

the Claimant was awarded Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50,000.00) for false imprisonment of seventeen hours in circumstances

where the Claimant was arrested for obstructing a police officer in execution of his

duty where a search was being conducted on the Claimant’s property and the address

on the search warrant was in fact incorrect. The police officer assaulted the Claimant

and arrested him in underwear only without affording him the opportunity to dress.

The award therefore included aggravated damages.

44. In Rajpath v AG13

an award of Thirty-five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) was made

in an instance where the police officer mistakenly believed that the Claimant had not

paid a fine. A receipt was produced to him the following day and the Claimant was

released after fifteen hours of imprisonment. This award was also made inclusive of

aggravated damages.

45. It is only in certain categories of cases that an award can be made for aggravated

damages. Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard14

set out the categories as follows:

a. Cases of oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the

Government;

b. Cases where the Defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a

profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the

Plaintiff; and

c. Cases in which exemplary damages are expressly authorized by statute.

46. The present case clearly does not fall into the latter two categories and could only fall

into the first if there is sufficient evidence on a balance of probabilities. Although I

have found that there was no aggressive treatment of the Claimant by the First

Defendant, in light of the inhumane cell conditions she experienced during her

detention, it is my determination that an award of aggravated damages is justified.

The conditions in the cell as described by the Claimant were sufficient to be

considered oppressive.

12

CV 2008-02218 13

CV 2007-01245 14

[1964] 1 All ER 367

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Decision:

47. The Defendants have discharged the burden of justifying the initial arrest and

detention of the Claimant as it is clear from the evidence that there was reasonable

and probable cause for the arrest. However, it is also my finding that the continued

detention of the Claimant for a period of approximately twenty-seven hours and her

subsequent release without placing her upon an ID Parade amounted to an unlawful

continuation of her detention.

48. Therefore, the Claimant should be compensated by an award of damages for false

imprisonment for the period spent in the cell from around midday on the 8th

May,

2010 to the time of her release on the 10th

May, 2010. Having considered cases with

similar periods of detention, it is my determination that damages in the sum of Forty-

five Thousand Dollars ($45,000.00) inclusive of aggravated damages for false

imprisonment is to be awarded to the Claimant.

Order:

It is the order of this court that the Defendants do pay to the Claimant:

a. General damages for false imprisonment in the sum of Forty-five Thousand

Dollars ($45,000.00) inclusive of aggravated damages with interest at the rate

of 6% per annum from the 18th

day of February, 2014 to the 23rd

day of

February, 2016.

b. Costs on the prescribed scale in the amount of Fourteen Thousand Dollars

($14,000.00).

…………………………………………….

Eleanor Joye Donaldson-Honeywell

Judge

Assisted by: Christie Borely

Judicial Research Counsel I