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87|RSCVolume11,Issue3,September2019
THEREPUBLICOFNORTHMACEDONIA-A'NEW'COUNTRYINTHEWESTERNBALKANS
MiraŠorovićUniversityofMontenegro,MontenegroE-mail:[email protected]
Abstract:Thearticletriestoexplainanddefinepoliticalprocessesandchangestrhoughhistoryofthe 'new'WesternBalkanscountry-theRepublicofNorthMacedonia.It iswordaboutanalysisofthepoliticaldisputebetweenFormerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia(FYROM)andGreece,fromitsbiginningsuntilthepresentday.ThispaperwilltrytogivetherealpictureofpoliticalareaintheBalkansandexploredeeperrootsofthe'MacedonianQuestion'controversy.Also,itwillgivetheexplinationsoftheresolutionof27-yeardispute,(betweenthetwoneighborcountries),bysigningthePrespaAgreement.Hence,leavingbysidenationalidentityandhistory,theNorthMacedoniawillbeabletojointheEuropeanUnionandNATO.Thus,inshortperiodoftime,a'new'countryintheWesternBalkanshasputtedinthecenteroftheregionalpolitics,withclearpurpose:promotingethnicandculturalheritanceintheedgeoftheEuropeancontinent.
Key-words: NorthMacedonia, Greece, the 'Macedonian Question', the nameissue,thePrespaAgreement,identity,theWesternBalkans,theEuropeanandEuro-Atlanticintegration.
1.IntroductionInrecenttime,NorthMacedoniahasholdattentionontheregionalpoliticalsceneoftheBalkans,asa'geopoliticalfaultline'(Armakolasetal.2019,1).Nearlythreedecades,the'MacedonianQuestion'hasbeensubjectofmany
round-tablediscussions,descriptivearticlesandmanyanalysesfromdiverseperspectives.Becauseoftheimportanceofthisuniquepoliticalconflictintheinternationalrelations,itsimplicationshavevariousnatures(fromhistorical,linguistic, political and legal, to ethnological and psychological)(Dzuvalekovskaetal.2013).DespitealotofdescriptivearticlesontheNorthMacedonianameissuewithGreece,intheliteraturethereisnotheoretically
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informedanalysisofthiscomplexQuestion,fromtherootstilltheresolutionofthisnamedispute-conflict.Thegoalofthisresearchpaperistofurtherexplore:thepoliticalrelations
betweenNorthMacedoniaandGreece,historicalrootsofthisnamedispute;pragmatic dimensions and (political, historical and cultural) factorscontributingtotheresolutionofthisneighborconflict,withaspecialfocusonNorthMacedonia(West-East)relations,whichrepresentagoodbasisforthefurtherNorthMacedonianEuropeanandEuro-Atlanticintegration.Also,thisarticle tries to explain how the international community has reacted andrespondedtotheresolutionofthe'MacedonianQuestion'.Finally,thearticleincludesconclusionswhichareinrelationwiththepossiblescenariosatthepoliticalBalkansscenes,includingtheratificationandimplementationofthePrespaAgreement inNorthMacedonia. In that light, itwillbea fewwordsaboutthenextNorthMacedonia'sstepstotheEUandNATOaccession.Hence, it is important to mention that 'the dispute about name of the
Republic ofMacedonia constitutes just one dimension of a broader latentconflict,onethattouchessomuchuponthefundamentalsofthetwosocietiesinvolved' (Sofos2013, 226). In thatway,NorthMacedonia left by side itssocial identity, history of Macedonians and its own statehood, althoughGreece claimed the virtual ownership of the term 'Macedonia' and itsconnectionwiththenameofAlexandertheGreatandhisEmpire.On February 12, 2019, SFR Macedonia officially changed name in the
Republic ofNorthMacedoniaorNorthMacedonia for short. It changed itsnametoavoidtheconfusionwithGreeknorthern-countryregion,alsocalledMacedonia. Thus, neighbors’ countries ended a 27-year name row. Inaccordance with it, North Macedonia, in short period of time is makingsignificantprogressonitspathtotheEuropeanandEuro-Atlanticintegrationprocess in the region. In accordancewith it,NorthMacedonia signsNATOAccessionProtocolonFebruary6,2019.The resolution of this intense neighbor' conflict - the 'Macedonian
Question', in future will bring better conditions for the Western Balkanscountries,whichmeanspromotingethnic,religiousandculturalheritanceintheedgeoftheEuropeancontinent.Researchhypothesis is: 'TheResolutionof the 'MacedonianQuestion' is
finishedwiththesigningofthePrespaAgreementbythetwocountries,Greeceand North Macedonia, which represents good basis for investing in thestability,security,prosperityandneighborrelationsoftheWesternBalkans'(despite the fact that majority of citizens in both countries opposed theAgreement).Hence,mytheoreticalframeworkisbasedonrealisttheorywithmany historical facts, which seems the most appropriate to analyze The
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RepublicofNorthMacedonia-a'new'countryintheWesternBalkans.Takingall these aspects into account, after 27 years, it is ended political (name)disputebetweentwoneighbors’countries.Inthatway,NorthMacedoniawillbeinpositiontojointheEuropeanUnion(EU)andNATO.Also,afterFebruary12,2019,MacedoniawasofficiallychangedthenametotheRepublicoftheNorthMacedonia(NorthMacedonia).
2.HistoricalbackgroundoftheconflictNorthMacedonia is theWesternBalkans country. It representsa complexborder country between West and East, Europe and Asia. Hence, it isimportant to underline that during the history, today's territory of NorthMacedoniawasinterestingareaforconquers.Hence, Dr. Bozhidar Dimitrov in his book 'Macedonia–Holy Bulgarian
Land'presentstwoopponenthistoricalpointsofview:theMacedonianandtheBulgarian1.Thus,inthisarticle,withspecialattention,ItrytodigestonlyMacedonian view overMacedonian country history. In accordancewith it,Macedoniancountrydatedfromtheancienttimes,whenMacedonianslivedintheir(Bulgarian)lands.TheyareancestorsoftheAlexandertheGreat-theAncientMacedonians2. Since that time, they have been oppressed by: theByzantineEmpire,BulgariaandOttomanEmpire.Furthermore,in9thcentury,duringtheruleofBulgaria,twoMacedonian
brothers,CyrilandMethodiusinventedtheGlagoliticAlphabet,latermodifiedby Cyrillic Alphabet by St. Clement of Ohrid. In the end of 10th century,Macedonianseceded fromtheBulgarianEmpireandestablished their firstandtheonlycountryinmedievaltimesledbyMacedoniansTsarSamuil.After
1AccordingtoBulgarianhistory,Macedonians,MacedoniancultureandMacedonianlanguage didn't exist. Hence, different points of view are defined as a historicalconflictbetweenBulgariaandFYROM.Furthermore,laterversionofthisconflictisformalizedasofficialworldhistoryandrecognizedbyBulgaria,GreeceandserioushistoricaldealingwiththeBalkanshistory(Damyanov,n.d.).2TheMacedonianshaveledaveryperipheralexistenceandtheyhadsmallpartakeinintellectual,culturalandsocialprogressofSouthernGreece.However,thegoldenperiod of the Kingdom of Macedonia was under Philip II. During his reign, theKingdomwaspoliticallyandmilitarystrong,withitsenlargementthroughaseriesofsuccessful military campaigns, Philip II included a large part of Southern BalkanPeninsula. After dead of Philip II, his son Alexander the Great has establishedenormousEmpireinEurope,AsiaandAfrica.Inthatway,hewasspreadingmilitaryandideologicalcrusadeagainstthePersians(Floudas,n.d.).
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theTsar's reign,Macedonianwas ruledbyByzantineEmpire3 (Damyanov,n.d.).AndthelastruleroverMacedoniawasOttomanEmpire.Therefore,many
BalkanscountrieswereunderOttomanEmpire,from14thupuntilearly20thcentury, in some parts of this region (Šorović 2018). In accordance withcrucialsphereofinfluenceandregionalpoliticalorder,OttomanscontrolledtheBalkansterritory,includingMacedonia4,tilltheendoftheBalkanWars5,afterwhichMacedoniawasdividedamong:Bulgaria,SerbiaandGreece.But,beforetheBalkanWars,from1903to1908,theMacedonianfreedomfighters,Damyan Gruev and Georgi Delchev established the organization – VMRO,whichmainaimwasstruggleandpoliticalindependenceofMacedoniafromOttomans(Damyanov,n.d.).
2.1.YugoslaviaanditsdissolutionYugoslaviawasapoliticalcreationofgreatpowers.Itwasestablishedattheend ofWorldWar I. In that period of time, Slovenian, Bosnian and Croatterritories(asapartoftheAustro-HungarianEmpire)unitedwiththeSerbianKingdom. But, this creation did not exist for long. During World War II(WWII),thecountrybrokeupunderthe(Nazi)occupation.Thus,Nazi-alliescreatedindependentCroatstate,whichwasreunifiedattheendofWar,whencommunistsliberatedthecountry.After WWII, one of main political priority of the U.S. Government was
Yugoslavianunity.Hence, it isimportanttopointoutthatYugoslaviamadechangesinpoliticalsphereofinfluence.Although,itwascommunistcountry:in1948Yugoslaviabrokeaway fromSovietsphereof influence, in1961 itbecomeafoundingmemberofNon-AlignedMovementandduringtheColdWaritadoptedlessrepressiveandmoredecentralizedformofgovernment–
3DuringtheByzantineandlaterOttomanEmpire,theterm'Macedonia' isusedingeographic sense, because it was covered the boundaries of the former Romanadministrative regions of Macedonia. This region was larger than 'historicMacedonia',thecoredomainoftheMacedonianKingdomin4thcenturyB.C.ItwasinhabitedbydifferentBalkanethnicgroups(Floudas,n.d.).4DuringWorldWarI,theSerbiansegmentofMacedoniawasincorporatedintotheKingdomofSerbs,CroatsandSlovenes(after1929itwascalledYugoslavia).AfterWorldWarII,theSerbiansegmentofMacedoniawasincorporatedintotheFederalPeople'sRepublicofYugoslavia(later,theSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia)(Danforth2019).5TheBalkanWarsconsistedoftwoconflicts,from1912to1913.Also,theyareknownaswarsforindependenceoftheBalkansagainstOttomanEmpireoccupation.
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comparedwithothercommunistcountriesofEastEurope(TheBreakupofYugoslavia1990-1992,n.d.).It is important to mention that in 1944, Tito, the Yugoslavian leader,
created a new federal state (consisting of six republics). He renamed thesouthernmost province, previously known as Vardarska Banovina (i.e.District ofVardarRiver).ThenewcountrynamewasPeople'sRepublic ofMacedonia6(Floudas,n.d.).FocusingontheEasternEurope,therewerewidespectersofreasonsfor
the Yugoslavia's breakup, ranged from religious and cultural divisionsbetweenethnicgroups.'However,aseriesofmajorpoliticaleventsservedasthe catalyst for exacerbating inherent tensions in the Yugoslav republic.Following the death of Tito in 1980, provisions of the 1974 constitutionprovidedfortheeffectivedevolutionofallrealpowerawayfromthefederalgovernment to the republics and autonomous provinces in Serbia byestablishing a collective presidency of the eightprovincial representativesand a federal government with little control over economic, cultural, andpoliticalpolicy.Externalfactorsalsohadasignificantimpact.ThecollapseofcommunisminEasternEuropein1989,theunificationofGermanyoneyearlater, and the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union all served to erodeYugoslavia’spoliticalstability.AsEasternEuropeanstatesmovedawayfromcommunistgovernmentandtowardfreeelectionsandmarketeconomies,theWest’s attention focused away from Yugoslavia and undermined theextensiveeconomicandfinancialsupportnecessarytopreserveaYugoslaveconomy already close to collapse. The absence of a Soviet threat to theintegrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its constituent parts meant that apowerfulincentiveforunityandcooperationwasremoved'(TheBreakupofYugoslavia1990-1992,n.d.,1).Forgreatpowers,especiallyduringandafterdissolutionofYugoslavia,the
Balkans region has become the 'playground' for their strategicaccomplishmentofdiverseinterestsofseveralactors(Šorović2018).Daybyday, ethnic tensions and political misunderstandings, led to idea ofYugoslavia's dissolution and politics independence of every Yugoslavianrepublic.Furthermore,'onDecember23,1990areferenduminSloveniasupporting
independencetriggeredoffthechainofeventsthatledtothedissolutionofthe Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. In similar referendum on
6ThisRepublicwasconstitutivepartoffederalYugoslavia.The'titularnation'namewasMakedontsi (Macedonians),while, theirMacedonian language become one ofYugoslavia'sofficiallanguages(Floudas,n.d.).
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September8,1991,alargemajorityintheYugoslavRepublicofMacedoniavotedinfavorofindependenceandtheRepublicdulydeclareditssovereigntyon September 17, 1991. At the same time, it started seeking internationalrecognitionasthe'RepublicMacedonia''(Floudas,n.d.,3).
2.2.PathtotheEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticintegrationThedeclarationofindependenceofRepublicofMacedonia'sin1991wascrucial for establishment of the new country and its recognition on theinternationallevel.Moreprecisely,GreecedelayedMacedonianrecognitionby international community and its accession to the UnitedNations (UN).Mainreasonwastheinclusionoftheterm'Macedonia'inthedeclarationofindependencein1991.Also,thereweretwovitalproblemswhichfacingthenewlycountryatpoliticalscene. Itwasensuring forAlbanianminorityrights(forfullycitizenship)andgaininginternationalrecognitionunderitsconstitutionalname,whatwasunderlinedwithMacedonianmembershipininternationalorganizations.Hence, neighbor countries find compromise formula - 'the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' (FYROM). It was used as provisionalreference,ratherthananofficialcountryname.Accordingtoit,inApril1993,Macedonia became part of the UN. Following existing practice of thisprestigioussupranationalorganization,theinternationalorganizations(suchas, the InternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorldBank)adopted theUNterminology, and with that action, a large number of countries in theinternational community recognized the country as the FYROM. However,Greece was not satisfied with that political decision. It initially refuses torecognizeFYROMatall.Hence,itimposedthetradeembargoonit,until1995.TheembargoaffectedonMacedonianeconomyanddamagedit.InthecontextofA1995InterimAccord,neithercountrywasmentioned
byname,what led to thestabilizationofrelationsin theWesternBalkans.Moreprecisely,with this treatyweredefined fundamental frameworks forestablishing diplomatic relations between neighbor countries, FYROM andGreece.Inthatcontext,FYROMchangeditsflat(droppingtheVerginaSun7), 7ThepredominanttheoryoftheVerginaSunrepresentsasimplifiedsymbol,notonlyfortheastral,alsointhereligioussystemoftheAncientGreeksandtheMacedonians.Thissymbolusuallyhad8,12or16'rays',whileinthecenterwasa'rodakas').Forbetterunderstanding,itisimportanttomentionthat'rodakas'means'flower'anditrepresentedadecorativemotif.IthadparticularimportanceintheAncientGreece.OnthesymboloftheVerginaSun,a'rodakas'isputtedinthecenteranditsymbolizedtheEarthonwhichallthespiritualandmaterialgoodsarefertilized.Ontheotherside, thenumber16wassymbolof completenessand totality.Moreprecisely, the
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madeamendmenttoitsConstitutionandtheyspecificallydeniedanyclaimson the Greek territory. On the other side, Greece agreed not to blockMacedonianaccessiontotheinternationalorganizationsanditprovidedthatMacedonia would accede in international community under the name of'FormerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia'.Fromthatmoment,Greecebecameclose economic partner and one of the main foreign investor Macedonia(Macedonia'sdisputewithGreece2019).Also,relationsbetweenthetwocountriesareimprovedbetween1995and
2008.Becauseoftheirintensifiedcollaboration,itwasmarkedanincreasedtrade and influxofGreekdirect investments to theRepublic ofMacedonia(Dzuvalekovskaetal.2013).'TheStabilizationandAssociationAgreementrepresentsaframework
documentforthefurtherpathoftheBalkancountries'ontheEUintegrationprogress.Duringthenegotiations, itisnecessarytoabidealldeadlinesandconditionswhichthecountryneedstofulfillinordertobecomethefullEUMemberState.Also,thisdocumentdefinesguidelines-generalprinciplesfor:politicaldialogue,internationalcooperation,freemovementofpeople,goodsand capital, harmonization of domestic legislation with EU directives,improvement ofmarket competition, cooperationpolicy, etc. Hence, everycountrythatstrivestobecometheEUMemberStateneedstocomplywiththerulesandregulationsoftheEU.Inaddition,itisimportanttopointoutthatafterthesummitinThessaloniki,theEUsendsaclearmessagethat,,therearenoshortcutstotheEU”(Đurović2012,335)andthattheaccessionprocessisquite complex and ,,it requires a lot of engagement of all key segments ofsociety inone country” (Đurović2012, 335).ThisAgreement confirms thestatusofapotentialcandidateformembershipintheEuropeanCommunity,butwithoutapreciselydefined thedateofentry into theEU. Inshort, theAgreement represents a ,,waiting room” for country's entry into the EU.Hence,fullmembershipintheEUisbasedontheindividualcapacityofthecountry to accept European criteria and standards, which derive from itsaffiliatedmembership'(Đurović2012,quotedinŠorović2018,85-86).It is important to underline that on April 9, 2001, the Republic of
Macedoniawas the first country from theWestern Balkanswho signed a
completeVerginaSunsetsymbolconsistsofthefourelements(thatconstitutedtheworldintheAncienttime):theEarth,theOcean,theAirandtheFire,whilethefourquadrants(createdbyverticalaxes)areplacedthe12gods.Those symbols, the archeologists have discovered on Hellenistic coins, vases, etc.However,after1977,thesymboloftheVerginaSunwasconnectedwiththeDynastyofPhilipIIandhisson,AlexandertheGreat(LATO,n.d.).
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StabilisationandAssociationAgreementwiththeEuropeanUnion,inlightoftheworryinglyriseoftheethnictensionsbetweentheAlbanianminorityandSlavicmajority in the country.Thisdocument granted theRepublic ofMacedoniathecandidatestatusfortheEUmembershipin2005,butitstilliswaitingforstartingtheaccessionprocess(Cvijic2009).'The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for aim has
stabilization and regional cooperation between countries of the WesternBalkans. The first phase of the SAP begins with the establishment of adialogue,intheformoftheregularmeetingsbetweenrepresentativesoftheEuropeanCommissionandthepotentialcandidatefortheEUMemberState,andfinisheswiththepublicationoftheFeasibilityStudy(bythesideoftheEuropeanCommission,whichrepresentsthereadinessandtheabilityofthecountry to fulfill the necessary conditions arising from the Agreement onStabilization and Association). Therefore, this Agreement represents aninternational agreement between the EU and country, which is the legalframeworkformutualcooperation,aswellasapproximationtoEUvaluesandstandards.ByconcludingthisAgreement,thecountryconfirmsthestatusofa potential candidate for EU membership, without defining whether thecountrymayjointheEU:starttheinstitutionalizationrelationsofthecountrywiththeEU'(Mihanović2005,quotedinŠorović2018,86).The Ohrid Framework Agreement represents a key instrument for
maintaining inter-ethnicharmony inFRYOM.Moreprecisely, theAlbanianminority conflict is resolved by constitutional changes led by manyinternational organizations: the EU, NATO, OSCE and the United States(Damyanov,n.d.).ItwassignedonAugust13,2001,'andendedMacedonia'sarmed conflict between Albanian rebels and Macedonian security forces'(European Stability Initiative, n.d., 1). ThisAgreement wasmain pillar forcountryprogressonpath tobecomingamulti-ethnic,multi-cultural,multi-religiousandstabilesociety,towardsitsgoalintheEUandNATOintegrationprocess.Hence,withtheOhridFrameworkAgreement,FYROMisstabilizeditspoliticalinstitutions,passedlegislationreformsandcreatetheroomformoreequitable ethnic representation inpublic institutions(Ibid.).However, 'theOhrid Framework which came out as a solution and compromise betweenMacedoniansandAlbanianscouldbeveryusefulandserveasaguidingtoolwhich gives hope that any current ethnic conflict between Bulgaria andFYROM could be resolved and any future conflict could be preventedpreservingandsustainingtheethnicalpeaceandgoodneighborlyrelations'(Damyanov,n.d.,32-33).In2003,TheEuropeanCounciladoptedTheThessalonikiAgendaforthe
Western Balkans: Moving towards European integration at the
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Thessaloniki Summit, where it was announced that 'the future of theBalkans lies in the EU' (The Thessaloniki agenda for theWestern Balkans2003, quoted in Šorović 2018, 85). 'At this summit, the countries of theWestern Balkans have been given the promise that with their certainprogressesandreformsprocess,thosecountrieswillbecometheEUMemberStates'(Šorović2018,85).At the NATO summit in Bucharest, in April 2008, Macedonian
government and UN mediator, Matthew Nimetz presented proposals –includingthename'RepublicofMacedonia(Skopje)'.But,GreecerejectedallproposalsandvetoedtheMacedonianaccessiontoEuro-Atlanticintegration.Hence,theGreekvetowasclearexampleofbreachofthe1995InterimAccord(Office of the Historians, Bureau of Public Affairs). This Greek politicaldecision presented the deterioration in mutual neighbor trust. Moreprecisely,with thatstand,Greecewasdrawingofred lines innegotiations,which for itspurposehaddeniedof theMacedonia’snational, culturalandlinguistic identity. After this summit, Macedonia filed an application for arulingby the InternationalCourtof Justice(ICJ)on the legalityofactionofGreece,attheBucharestsummit.Hence,inDecember2011,theICJconfirmedthat Greece had breached the Interim Accord by blocking Macedonia’smembershipofNATO.ItisimportanttomentionthatthetermsoftheInterimAccordobligedGreecenottoobstructtheintegrationprocessofRepublicofMacedoniawithin the international organizations, because the provisionalreference are established in the aforementioned UN Resolution(Dzuvalekovskaetal.2013).TheBerlinProcessisasummitdedicatedtotheWesternBalkans,'whose
main goal was to reach a common agreement on strengthening regionalcooperationintheWesternBalkansandestablishingafouryearframework(2014-2018)forresolvingalltheremainingoutstandingissuesintheregion'(Berlinskiproces2016,quotedinŠorović2018,85).ThePrespaAgreementisthemostimportantdocumentforestablishing
the 'new'country in theWesternBalkans. Itwassignedbeside thePrespaLake, on June 17, 2018, between the two neighbor's countries, NorthMacedoniaandGreece.Hence,thisAgreementisratifiedbytheMacedonia'sandGreece'sparliament,onJanuary25,2019andwentintoforceonFebruary12, 2019. Following that fact, on this date, the name of the country waschanged from the Republic of Macedonia to the Republic of NorthMacedonia (North Macedonia). Citizens of North Macedonia are called'Macedonians/citizensof theRepublicofNorthMacedonia'who speak'Macedonian'language(familyofSouthSlaviclanguages).Furthermore,this
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AgreementreplacedA1995InterimAccord,followingonthatwaytheNATOAccessionProtocolonFebruary6,2019(Danforth2019).By thisAgreement are précised anddefined the terms 'Macedonia' and
'Macedonian' in historical and cultural heritage context. Thus, NorthMacedonia left by side the disassociation with the Ancient Helleniccivilization, developed in historical Macedonia. Also, North MacedoniareviseditsConstitution,inaimtoensurefulldomesticallyapplicationoftheAgreementandinthesametimetorevise/eliminateallpassagesthatcouldbetakentoimplyaspirationstowardsGreeceandGreeknation(Tzifakis2019).However,politicalsysteminGreecehasputtedbysidethesocialcohesion
andqualityofdemocracy.Theresolutionofthenameissuerepresentsamainpositive development in the Western Balkans, bringing consolidation andstability intheregionandadvancement in theEuropeanandEuro-Atlanticintegration.Becauseof that, the resolutionof theAgreementhadaseriousparadox.TherewerehugediscrepancybetweenthepoliticalviewsofGreeksociety (against any compromise on the matter) and its electedrepresentativesintheParliamentandmostpoliticalpartiesontheotherside.Inthatorder,politicalpartieshaveusedtheresolutionoftheconflictasanopportunity to adjust their tactics and score points at the parliamentaryelections.On thatway,combinationofthenamedisputewith theelectoralconsiderationhasestablishedpolarizationofpoliticsinGreece(dichotomies:'patriots-traitors' and 'pragmatists-ultranationalists'). Taking all theseaspectsintoaccount,the'MacedonianQuestion'hasbeenlatentconflictforalmostthreedecades.But,despiteofthat,therehasneverbeenanyseriouscountry debate in order to inform the people about real state, just strongemotional arguments connected with the self-determined accountestablished in historical origins of the Ancient Macedonia. Also, long andexistedeconomiccrisisincountryinfluencedthatGreeksfeelliketheyhavealreadypaidtooheavyprice(materiallyandsymbolically).Inthisregard,theNATO partners have unequivocally supported the resolution, by which isaffirmedandservedtheinternationaloverGreekinterests(Ibid.).3.The'MacedonianQuestion'Itisthefactthattheconflictaboutanameisverysensitiveand,inthesametime,aquitedifficultquestion.But,therightofself-determinationofanationisundisputedforeverycountryintheworldanditiscorroboratedbyawholeseriesoflegalacts,fromtheUNtotheCouncilofEurope.However,itisreallydifficult to negotiate if myths, the Balkans nationalist legends and thecontroversialhistoryareinvolvedinit.Besidesofallthat,somuchbloodand
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younglifewerespilledinthispartoftheBalkans,fromthebeginningofthe19thcentury,throughtheBalkanandWorldsWars,untiltheCivilWarfrom1946to1949,whichwasrunmainlyinGreekMacedonia.Hence,itisalmostimpossible to conduct political talks, if it is word about the negotiationprocess on identity issues (which are themost delicate for each country,especiallyfortheWesternBalkansregion)(Lukač2016).However,the'MacedonianQuestion'becomesthelongestlastingdispute
at the political scene in the recent history. 'The issue was easily beingdismissedas theproductof the intransigenceof twotypicallynationalisticBalkan countries' (Kolozova 2019, 1). In addition, one of the best givenexplicationsofthenamedisputeisonthebestwaydefinedandexplainedbythestatementonthewebsiteoftheGreekMinistryofForeignAffairs(nowistaken down): 'the use of the name expresses claims on Greek culturalheritage, history, and, hence, identity and this in itself constitutes"irredentism".Thatis,thedisputewasabouthistoryandidentity,andnottheterritory'(Kolozova2019,1).Historically,“thegeographicalterm'Macedonia'isaGreekwordand
was used in antiquity to designate the area inhabited by theMacedonians,'thetallones',apparentlyonaccountofthedistinguishingphysicalheightofthistribe”(Floudas,n.d.,1).Also,thistermrepresentstheculture of Ancient Macedonians which is connected with the Hellenisticnation, as a part of the Greek-historical heritage. The term 'Macedonia'geographically refers the wider region of several Balkan countries - thelargest part is in Greece, where 2.5 million Greeks for centuries live asMacedonians.Therefore,theGreekgovernmenthasidentifiedthreeissuesforthe alleged Macedonian aspiration for expansion: the country name ofMacedonia,thenationalflagcontainstheVerginaSunandtheConstitutionofNovember17,1991,whichinArticle49requiredtheprotectionofminoritiesandtheculturalpromotionofMacedoniansabroad(Lukač2016).TheFormerPrimeMinisterofGreeceKonstantinosMitsotakisandmany
nationallyorientedGreeksconsideredthatterm'Macedonia'hadalwaysbeenGreekanditisrelatedtotheterritoryofGreece.Besidesthat,theVerginaSunwiththesixteenrays,whichorigindatedfromthehistoricalemblemoftheAncientMacedonianRoyalfamilyPhilipII,fatherofAlexandertheGreat.Ontheotherside,thecriticsoftheGreekpositionclaimedthatitisunlikelythattheFRYOMwithonly twomillion inhabitants and10,000modestly armedsoldierswouldattackawell-equippedGreekarmyof122.000soldiers.Also,theypointedout that theGreekConstitution, inArticle108prescribes theAthenscareabouttheGreekdiaspora.Inaccordancewithit,Macedonia, in
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thesameway,justlikeGreece,wantstotakecareofitspeoplewhodonotlivewithinthebordersofMacedonia(Lukač2016).ThedisputeoverMacedonia'sconstitutionalnamedatesfrom1991,after
the collapse of Yugoslavia and the peacefullydeclare independence of theRepublic of Macedonia, on September 17, 1991. Despite that fact, thebreakthrough in the Greek-Macedonian relationship was achieved onSeptember 13, 1995, thanks to the Provisional Agreement. This bilateralproblemwassolvedthankstothefactthatMacedoniachangeditsstateflaginawaythattheSunwithsixteenrayswasreplacedbytheSunwitheightrays.Asacounteroffensive,Greeceabolishedaone-sidedeconomicblockade.The two neighbor countries have agreed on mutual recognition of theirsovereignty,territorialintegrityandpoliticalindependence(Ibid.).In December 2016, at the parliamentary elections, pro-Western
government ledbyZoranZaev came topower.His governmentwanted toMacedonia made progress at the path of European and Euro-Atlanticintegration, leavinghistorybysideandfindingsolutionforbetterfutureofMacedonian society. In accordance with it, North Macedonia signed withGreecethePrespaAgreement,onJune172018.Themainaimofthispoliticalagreementwasresolving,nearlythirtyyearsstandingnamedisputebetweenthetwoBalkansnations.ThePrespaAgreementrepresentstheenduringattractionofEuropeanand
Euro-AtlanticintegrationoftheWesternBalkanscountries.Moreprecisely,Prime Minister of North Macedonia Zoran Zaev, Foreign minister NikolaDimitrov and Macedonian government have embarked on a compromisesolution, in order to secure the entry of their country into NATO andeventually theEU,under thecompromisename 'NorthMacedonia'.On theGreeksidewerePrimeMinisterofGreeceAlexisTsiprasandForeignministerNikosKotzias(Armakolasetal.2019).The two neighbor countries had obligation to recognize each other's
concerns,intheordertoaddressthem.TheGreeksidewasunderlinethattheterm'Macedonia'laidaclaimontheHellenisticnation,asapartoftheGreek-historical heritageand its identity.TheMacedonian sidehad justified fear,that,withthechangeofthenameofthecountry,itwoulddeleteandthrowawayitsnationalhistory, identityandlanguage(Kolozova2019).Hence,inArticle7of thePrespaAgreement,NorthMacedoniaandGreeceaddressedtheseissuesrecognizingthattheterm'Macedonian'couldhavetwodifferentmeaning at the same time: 'for theMacedonian side, itmeans nationality,ethnicbelongingandaSouthSlaviclanguage,whereas,fortheGreekside,itreferstotheculturalheritageofAncientGreeceandthelegacyoftheKingdomofPhillipandAlexanderofMacedon'(Kolozova2019,1).
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Moreprecisely,inthePrespaAgreement,inArticle8isdefinedthat'withinsixmonthsfollowingtheentryintoforceofthisAgreement'(FinalAgreementfor the settlement of the differences as described in the United NationsSecurityCouncilResolutions817(1993)and845(1993),theterminationoftheInterimAccordof1995,andtheestablishmentofaStrategicpartnershipbetweentheParties2018,10)NorthMacedonia 'shall reviewthestatusofmonuments,publicbuildingsandinfrastructureonitsterritory,andinsofaras they refer in any way to ancient Hellenic history and civilizationconstitutinganintegralcomponentofthehistoricorculturalpatrimony'oftheGreece'shalltakeappropriatecorrectiveactiontoeffectivelyaddresstheissueandensurerespectofthesaidpatrimony'(Ibid).Also,thesimilarstoryiswiththesymbolformerlydisplayedonMacedonianformernationalflag,whichneedstobechanged.InaccordancewiththerecommendationsoftheUN Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names, the twocountriesshallabidetousetheofficialgeographicalnamesandtoponymsintheterritoryoftheothercountry.Additionally,afteronemonthofthesigningofthisAgreement,thetwocountries'shallestablishajointInter-DisciplinaryCommitteeofExpertsonhistoric,archaeologicalandeducationalmatters,toconsidertheobjective,scientificinterpretationofhistoricaleventsbasedonauthentic, evidence-based and scientifically sound historical sources andarchaeological findings' (Ibid. 2018, 10). In that way, they will revisetextbooks, atlases, teaching guides, official documents, maps etc., inaccordancewiththeaimsandmainprinciplesofUNESCOandtheCouncilofEurope. Thus, the Committee shall set specific timetables for the ensuringcountriesthatwillnotbeingusedanymaterialthatcontainsanyrevisionistreferences.Also,atleasttwotimesperyear,theCommitteeshallsubmitanAnnualReportonitsactivitiesandrecommendations,approvedbytheHigh-LevelCooperationCouncil.Ontheotherhand,betweenAthensandSkopjeisintensifiedcooperationindifferentarea:inthecontextoftheinternationaland regional organizations, political and societal cooperation, economiccooperation,cooperationonthefieldsofeducation,science,culture,research,technology,healthandsports,policeandcivilprotectioncooperation,defensecooperation,etc.(Ibid.2018,10-16).Besides the factthat thePrespaAgreementundermines theMacedonian
identity, in Greece, between 60 and 70% of population is against thisAgreement.Furthermore,eventhoughthisdispute,'NorthMacedoniahashadavirtualmonopolyonitforatleastthepast27years.ThereisasenseinGreeksocietythattheagreementwasimposedbyforeignplayers,specifically“theWest”,andthatthenamewas“givenaway”,withGreecegettingessentiallynothinginreturn'(Filis2019,1).Becauseofthatpoliticaldissatisfaction,the
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Greekscreatedanexpression'painfulnationalcompromise'(Filis2019,1),inorder torepresent thegeneraldisappointment.However, in long term, thePrespaAgreementcouldbe'acatalystforconvergencebetweenthetwosides,withGreeceinfluencinginapositivewayitsnorthernneighbor’sengagementwiththeWest,whichmaygraduallyrestrainnationalistdynamicsinNorthMacedonia'(Ibid.).Also, with this Agreement, the principle of the Macedonia's self-
determinationisreaffirmed.Inthesametime,itwasnegotiatedtheinclusionof the Slavic and Hellenic signifiers. In order to achieve the Agreementbetweentwoconflictsides,itwasusedsensitiverhetoricandredoubleeffort,in a way which was delicate to their political cultures, history, nationalidentity and concerns. And, in the end, the Prime Ministers have beennominatedforaNobelPeacePrize,becausethisAgreementprovidesstabilityandprosperity inNorthMacedoniaandGreece,what is goodbasis for thesecurityoftheWesternBalkansandthewholeEurope.Hence,thisresolutionofnamedispute(betweenneighborcountries),willbedefinedintheirhistoryasagreatvisionandhugesenseofresponsibilityofthetwoPrimeMinisters(Kolozova2019).Itisimportanttomentionthatthe'MacedonianQuestion'againenteredat
thepoliticalsceneinthesecondhalfof2017.TheoppositionpartiesleadingbyNewDemocracypartytriedtolinkNovartisscandal8withthenegotiationson theopenednamedispute, stating in thatway that rulingparty SYRIZAretailednationalinterestinordertoremaininpower.Inthislight,nationalistadopteduncompromisingattitudesonthisemotionalissue,asaresultofthePrimeMinisterTsiprasandSYRIZAgovernment(Armakolasetal.2019).Early phase of negotiations was very pessimistic. There were many
reasonsforit.PublicdebateinGreecewasverylimited,('fororagainst'thename solution) because of that,most of Greek population considered thissolution as an unacceptable. Also, in recent years, the importance andinfluence of 'mainstream' media radically reduced. Last, but not leastimportant is the regional dimension of opposition to the name dispute.Opinion polls presented that a majority across entire country opposescompromisesolution(Ibid.).'However,attitudesaremuchmorehardenedinNorthernGreece(Thessaloniki,GreekMacedoniaregions,Thrace,andpartsof central Greece). Conservatism and nationalism are more salient inNorthernGreeceasaresultofdevelopmentsinthelastcentury,andespecially
8 For more information about Novartis scandal, see for example here:http://www.politico.eu/article/greece-politics-novartis-scandal-pharmaceutical-whistleblower/
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thetraumaticexperienceoftheGreekcivilwar(1940s)duringwhichmanySlavic speaking inhabitants sidedwith the rebelCommunistArmy,amovewidelyseeninGreeceasaneffortforaviolentcarve-upofGreekMacedonia'(Ibid.2019,5).Attheendof2018,afterrallies(inThessalonikiandAthens),thingsare
lookedmoreoptimistic.4.InternationalcommunityInrecentyears,NorthMacedoniahascommandedattentiontopoliticalsceneof theWestern Balkans. Thus,with special attention, I try to analyze howinternational community (the EU, Russia and the Western Balkans) hasimpact on the new Balkans country andmentionmain neighbor conflictsconnectedtoitspreviouspoliticalestablishment.4.1.TheEuropeanUnionItisthefactthattheEuropeanUnion(EU)hasbeenfacedbyasuccessionofcrisesinlastfewyears:theaftershocksoftheglobalfinancialmeltdownin2008,whichaffectedontheEurozone'sfoundations;Russiaasageopoliticalchallenge;warinSyria–theMigrationCrisisandasylumseekersin2015–2016andBrexitasthespecialUnionquestion.Hence,theEuropeancommunityisnotyetcompletelysecuretodealwith
the daunting problem – task of international consolidation. Besides allprevioustheEUtasks,Skopje-AthensnegotiationovernamedisputereachedinJune2018.Inaccordancewithit,theEUandNATOmadecrucialdecisionontheEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticintegrationofNorthMacedonia:theEU'sGeneralAffairsCouncil,onJune26,putNorthMacedoniaonthepathtowardopeningaccessionnegotiationsin2019,while,onJuly11,NATOinvitedNorthMacedoniatostartwithaccessionnegotiations.Moreprecisely,bothpoliticaldecisionswerebasedonrewardingNorthMacedoniaforsigningthePrespaAgreement,onJune16.Also,countryhaschangedpoliticalregimewhotookplacein2017anditputsNorthMacedoniaintodemocratictransformation,afteradecadeofcountrycaptureofVMRO-DPMNE(ruling)party.Germany as important player on political scene has supported North
Macedonia's European and Euro-Atlantic integration process in WesternBalkans.Thus,GermanyputseffortsontheEUandtheWesttomanagethe2015-2017politicalcrisesinthiscountry(Armakolasetal.2019). Afterawhile,theskepticismabouttheEUenlargementisleftbyside,thus,
Germanywasapprovedtheopeningof theEUaccessionnegotiationswithNorth Macedonia, 'but that the opening of the first negotiation chapters
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shouldbeconditionaloftheimplementationofcertainreforms(intheareasofjusticeandpublicadministrationreforms,thefightagainstcorruptionandorganizedcrime)(Ibid.2019,10).However,Francehashadvalidreasonsforitsskepticism(Albanianissue).
Inmid-June2018,at traditionalbiannual intergovernmental talksbetweenGermany and France at Marseberg, French President Emmanuel Macron'insistedthereshouldbenofurtherstepstowardEUenlargementbeforetheMay2019electionsfortheEuropeanParliament'(Ibid.2019,11).From the establishment of the EU, the EU enlargementwas trademark
policy. Following the previous Unionpractice, 'the EU needs to remain aninterestingCommunitythatwouldattractEasterncountries,fromtheedgeofthe continent, without enlargement fatigue' (Šorović 2018, 2). With thatconcept,therewouldbespaceforeverycountrytospreadandsharecommonUnion'svaluesandfreedoms,buildingtiesbetweentheEUandtheWesternBalkanscountries.4.2.RussiaDuringthecenturies,RussiahashadintereststocontroltheBalkansregion,asimportantcounterbalanceareatotheWest.Throughdiplomaticchannelsandwithmediationrole,Russiatriestoremainanimportantplayerwhoisfightingforpost-Sovietspace.ObstructionismofRussiahasafunctioninconfrontationwiththeUnited
StatesandtheEU.Theculminationofthis'clashesofcivilization'istriggeredbyCrimea'sannexation.Thus,relationsbetweentheWesterncountriesandRussia in South Eastern Europe weren't completely based on zero-sumconception. There are evident overlapping interests in this area (throughenergy infrastructure). Inrecent time,SouthMacedonia is 'playground' forgreatpowers.Followingtheprevious,between2015and2017,somepoliticalanalysts
have described the Macedonian political crisis 'as a continuation of thestandoff between Vladimir Putin's Russia and the West'(Armakolas et al.2019,1).ThepreviousPrimeMinisterofNorthMacedoniaNikolaGruevski'remainedrhetoricallycommittedtotheEuropeanUnionandNATO,heputconsiderable effort into building up ties with the Russians. For instance,SkopjeandMoscowdevelopedplanstosupplythecountrywithgas.Russiancompanies have invested in otherparts of energy sector' (Ibid. 2019, 13).WheniswordaboutthePrespaAgreement,Russianattitudeaboutithasbeenambivalent,although,theForeignMinistryofRussiaSergeyLavrovwelcomedthe compromise. On the other hand, Russia continues to express itsoppositiontoNorthMacedonia'sentrancetoNATO.Becauseofthat,Russia's
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soft power is used indisinformation campaigns andproactivemeasures toboostnationalisminbothcountry,NorthMacedoniaandGreece,and,inthesametime,itisinaccordancewithitspolicyofpushingbackagainsttheWest.Inthisscenario,NorthMacedoniaasmemberofNATOisfinishedpolitical
'business' dating back to 1990s. For the West, this information is greatpoliticalvictory,inwaytocontainRussiaawayfromthepost-Yugoslavspace.Also,itisimportanttounderlinethatNATOwouldbe'bridge'betweentheethnicdivideinNorthMacedonia,aswellassupra-nationalorganizationwithaimtoboostandsecureinternalandexternalsecurity(Ibid.2019).4.3.TheWesternBalkansTheimplementationofthePrespaAgreementwassuccessful.Inaccordancewithit,thecountriesoftheBalkansregionwillincreasepressuretoresolveallbilateralissues(primaryrelationsbetweenSerbiaandKosovo).During thepreviousyear,Bulgariaquestionedthedistinctivenessofthe
Macedonian language and nation. Thus, this 'neighbor problem' has rootsdown deep in the history of those two nations and the ethnical origin oftoday's North Macedonians. Hence, 'Bulgarians claim Macedonians areBulgariansandhaveBulgarianhistorywhileMacedoniansdenyitandclaimtheyareMacedonianswiththeirownhistory'(Damyanov,n.d.,6).BetweenBulgaria andNorthMacedoniawas signedand ratification the
Treaty on friendship, goodneighborly relations and cooperation.During theBulgarianpresidencyof theEU theTreaty came into force.Thanks to thisTreaty,bothcountriesrecognizedterritorialintegrity,ledbysidethedifferentviews on history and focused on cooperation in economy, culture andinfrastructure.Hence,AgreementisabasisforBulgarianpoliticalactionandneighborcountrysupporttojoinNATOandtheEU.Hence,inshortperiodoftime, Bulgaria changed its external policy (from suspicious neighbor to astrongsupporterandpromoterofNorthMacedonia'sEuropeanandEuro-Atlantic integration. On the other side, Serbia took five years to recognizeNorthMacedoniaasanindependentcountry.However,theSerbianOrthodoxChurchdidn'taccepttheindependenceoftheMacedonianOrthodoxChurch.Relations between North Macedonia and Serbia become tense since
changeofgovernmentinSkopje.Moreprecisely,previousPrimeMinisterofNorthMacedoniaNikola Gruevski enjoyed strong support from the PrimeMinisterofSerbiaAleksandarVučićandhisrulingparty.However,withcomeintopowernewgovernmentinSkopje,relationsbetweenthosetwocountriesarechanged.NewgovernmentofNorthMacedoniaisdefinedasacreationofa 'Great Albania' who plays into the Albanians hands, in favor of thedissolutionofNorthMacedonia(Armakolasetal.2019).
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5.ConclusionThe identity dispute is not supposed to be happening on the Europeancontinent, especially in 21st century. Because of that, the 'MacedonianQuestion'shouldbeusedasa'potentreminderoftheconsiderableinfluencethatnationalisticdivideshavealwaysexertedintheBalkanregion'(Floudas,n.d.,1).The dispute resolution is a historic achievement and represents 'new
chapter'intherelationsoftwoneighborcountries.Although,thisemotionalissue was a previously latent conflict that has touched so deep in thefundamental pillars of the two nations. The claim of Greece to a 'virtual'ownership of the name 'Macedonia' was very irritating, but history andnumbersprovetheirpointofview.GreekMacedoniaisthelargestcountryregion,withalargepopulationandtheelectoralweightbigenoughtomakethe'MacedonianQuestion'importantmatterinGreekpolitics(Liaras2018).Onthepresidentialelections,onMay5,2019,NorthMacedoniaelectedthe
pro-Western candidate, Stevo Pendarovski, supported by the ruling SocialDemocrats. The result of the elections is defined as a victory of the pro-EuropeanandEuro-Atlanticintegrationprocess(withthe51,66%inarun-offvote), and in the President's words it was characterized as ‘our ticket toEurope' (Smith 2019, 1). Now, the new government, leading by PresidentPendarovski, has enormous responsibility in order to fully implement theAgreement.Itisasensitiveareaandbecauseofthathecouldmaketurnoverin the North Macedonia's domestic and international politics, putting indanger,onthatway,thepreviousAgreementratification.Thepoliticsistheartofpossible.Hence,thetimewillgiveusalltheanswers.Although,NorthMacedoniahadneededtofacewiththelossofidentity,the
resolution of the 'Macedonia Question' is an excellent example for theWestern Balkan region and it represents an excellentmodel for resolvingother difficult disputes that still exist in the political (international)community. The resolution of the name dispute between the two Balkanscountriessendsclearmassageintheworld–'nationalismisdefeated'.Inthatorder,itisevidentthat27-yearconflictisresolvedthroughpoliticaldialogueandbordercollaboration,usinghistoryasalecture,notasamistakefromthepast. In that way, ‘the powder keg of Europe' is presented as a friendlypolitical area which by joint action neighbor countries invest in future,promotingtheregionalstability,security,prosperityandneighborrelationsoftheWesternBalkans'.The 'MacedonianQuestion' finishedwith theprovocative fearonGreek
side, overcoming the obstacles, imposed by wrong information andmanymisunderstandings,which for themainpurposehavewrongperceptionof
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name'Macedonia',establishedinhistoricalandgeographicalclaims,rootedinpossibleterritorialdemandsoverGreece.Hence,thePrespaAgreementwillnormalizetherelationsbetweentwocountrieswithwin-winoutcome.Onthatway,NorthMacedoniaandGreecewillimproveregionalstability,echoingtheviewoftheWesterncountriesthatseeNATOandtheEUmembershipasthebestwayofpreservingpeaceandstabilityintheBalkanregion.Inaccordancewith the previous, the summer of 2019 will be marked in internationalcommunityasNorthMacedonia'stheEuropeanandEuro-Atlanticintegrationprocess.Moreprecisely,NATOwillwelcomeits30thmemberstate,whiletheEUwill expect to start with NorthMacedonianmembership negotiations.Also,itistimethatNorthMacedoniaprovesasanimportantpartneroftheEUwhohelpsinreducingtheextentoftheMigrationCrisis-asylumseekersfromtheMiddleEast(becauseofpopularityoftheBalkansmigrantroute).ReferencesArmakolas Ioannis,Bandovic Igor,BechevDimitar andWeberBodo. 2019.NorthMacedonia:What'snext?Publication.Brussels:OpenSociety,EuropeanPolicyInstitute.http://opensocietyfoundations.org.AccessedApril15,2019.Berlinskiproces.2016.http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/spoljna-politika/eu/regionalna-saradnja/2016-11-04-09-04-26?lang=lat.AccessedApril12,2018.Casule,MircelaDzuvalekovska,Lozanoska,Jana,Kaczorowski,Maciej,Tasev,Donče,Rušev,TrajčeandAntonov,Dragan.2013.ThenameDisputeRevisited.Skopje:MacedonianInformationCentre.Cvijic, Srdjan. 2009. Macedonia: what's in a name – and behind it?CommentaryundertheauspicesoftheEPC'sBalkanForum.EuropeanPolicyCentre.http://www.epc.eu.AccessedMay2,2019.Damyanov, Hristo. N.d. “The conflict for the name 'Macedonia' betweenGreece and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in regards to theapplicationofFYROMtobecomeaMemberStateoftheEuropeanUnion.”Anr.292595.Danforth, Loring. 2019. “North Macedonia.” Encyclopedia Britannica.http://www.britannica.com.AccessedMay8,2019.
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Đurović, Gordana. 2012. “Evropska unija i Crna Gora–politika proširenja.”Podgorica:UniverzitetCrneGore–Ekonomskifakultet,319-320.European Stability Initiative. 2012. “Macedonia's dispute with Greece.”Berlin-Brussels-Istanbul.http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=562. Accessed April 22,2019.European Stability Initiative, N.d. The Ohrid Agreement and itsimplementation.Berlin-Brussels-Istanbul.http://www.esiweb.org.AccessedMay8,2019.Final Agreement for the settlement of the differences as described in theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolutions817(1993)and845(1993),thetermination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the establishment of aStrategicpartnershipbetweentheParties.2018.http://www.ekathimerini.com.AccessedMay8,2019.Filis, Constantinos. 2019. After Prespa: Could the North Macedonia nameagreement fall apart? European Council on Foreign Relations. Commentry.https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_after_prespa_could_the_north_macedonia_name_agreement_fall_apart.AccessedApril28,2019.Kolozova, Katerina. 2019. “How the Balkans solved a Balkan problem.”Aljazeera.https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/balkans-solved-balkan-problem-190220144133934.html.AccessedApril3,2019.LATO.N.d.ThesymbolofVergina:theunknownsymbolismsbehindtheraysofamuch-discussed‘Sun’.https://griekse-les.nl/the-symbol-of-vergina-the-unknown-symbolisms-behind-the-rays-of-a-much-discussed-sun/.AccessedMay7,2019.Liaras, Evangelos. 2018. The Last Chapter Of The Macedonian Question?https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-last-chapter-of-the-macedonian-question.AccessedMay4,2019.Lukač, Afrodita. 2016. Izazovi procesa pristupanja zemalja kandidata začlanstvouEUnaprimjerimaTurskeiMakedonije.Magistarskirad.Podgorica:UniverzitetCrneGore–Fakultetpolitičkihnauka.
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Mihanović,Dino. 2005. “Granice (EU)rope.” Političkamisao,Vol. XLII, br. 3,141-155.Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs United States. N.d. TheBreakupofYugoslavia1990-1992.https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia.AccessedMarch3,2019.Smith, Helena. 2019. “Our ticket to Europe': North Macedonia elects pro-westernpresident.”TheGuardian.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/06/north-macedonia-elects-pro-western-president.AccessedMay5,2019.Sofos, Spiros. 2013. “Beyond the Intractability of the Greek-MacedonianDispute.”InTheNameDisputeRevisited,editedbyM.Casule,223-239.Skopje:MacedonianInformationCenter.Šorović,Mira.2018.“ImportanceandRoleofTurkeyintheWesternBalkans.”ResearchinSocialChange10(2):83-104.Tzifakis, Nikolaos. 2019. “What the ratification of the Prespa Agreementmeans for Greek politics?” The London School of Economics and PoliticalScience.https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/01/30/what-the-ratification-of-the-prespa-agreement-means-for-greek-politics/.AccessedAugust8,2019.