Multi-organizational Fields andSocial Movement Organization Frame Content:

The Religious Pro-Choice Movement*

FORTHCOMING: Sociological Inquiry 1997

John H. EvansDepartment of Sociology

2-N-2 Green HallPrinceton UniversityPrinceton, NJ 08544

Abstract:

As an explanatory method in studies of social movements, analyses of collectiveaction frames have generally focused on the variable efficacy of the frames of socialmovement organizations (SMOs)in the mobilization of potential participants. However,this work has for practical reasons used the acknowledged analytic simplification thatSMOs only target potential participants--and not opponents, elite decision makers or themedia--when constructing their frames. To incorporate multiple targets into futurestudies of SMO frame construction, this paper expands on the idea of a multi-organizational field. I propose that the characteristics of the targets in the field and thesocial structural and cognitive boundaries between them determine SMO frames. Thisperspective is demonstrated by analyzing changes in the collective action frames of SMOsin the religious pro-choice movement from 1967 to 1992. I argue that this perspectivemay explain findings where frames fail to "resonate" with potential participants--the framemay not have been created with them in mind.

Multi-organizational Fields and Social Movement Organization Frame Content:The Religious Pro-Choice Movement

As an explanatory method in studies of social movements, analyses of collectiveaction frames (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986) have generally focused on thevariable efficacy of the frames of social movement organizations (SMOs). Oneexplanation of why frame content fails in mobilization is that the contents do not"resonate" with the target group’s "cultural narrations" (Snow and Benford 1988).Another is that the three "core tasks" of the frame--the diagnosis, prognosis andmotivation for solving the problem--remain unfulfilled (Snow and Benford 1988; Gerhardsand Rucht 1992).

However, while these analyses explicitly acknowledge the reality of the multipletargets of SMOs--adherents, constituents, bystander publics, the media, potential allies,antagonists and elite decision makers--they have pragmatically limited their analysis toadherents, constituents and bystander publics. Although recent research has examined therelations between SMOs and antagonists (Benford and Hunt 1994) and how the identitiesof the possible targets are constructed (Hunt, Benford and Snow 1994), the effect onframing processes of SMOs considering the perceived characteristics of more than onetarget remains unexamined.

A multi-target perspective of the frame construction of SMOs may help to betterexplain the success or failure of frames in mobilizing collective action. For example, theframing needs of the different targets may be different, or even contradictory, andconstrain and shape the framing effort toward potential participants. This may thenexplain the greatest reason for the failure of a frame to "resonate" with potentialparticipants: it may not have been constructed to maximize this target's participation, butrather with some other target in mind.

The key question is how the frame of an SMO is determined. I expand upon theidea of a “multi-organizational field” to analyze the multiple targets that influence thecreation of an SMO’s frame and apply these ideas by examining the framing efforts of theSMOs in the religious pro-choice movement1 from 1967 to 1992.

AN ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONTENT OF SMO FRAMES

Frame Alignment and Counter-framing with Multiple Targets

Klandermans has recently reintroduced the insight of the "multi-organizationalfield," defined as all of the groups in a society with which an SMO may establish a link, asa heuristic for understanding the targets of an SMO (1992; also see Curtis and Zurcher1973). Groups can be broad categorizations of people who may never meet but areassumed to share characteristics (e.g. Southern Baptists) or smaller groups (e.g. FirstBaptist Church).

2

Furthermore, from the perspective of the SMO actors who create frames, thegroups in the field can be split into an alliance system of supporters, a conflict system ofopponents, and a neutral sector which contains the organizations and groups that both thealliance and conflict systems try to recruit. "The boundaries between the two systems arefluid and may change in the course of events" (Klandermans 1992, p. 95).

Adherents and constituents--the focus of previous research (but see Gitlin [1980])-- are targets which are clearly part of the alliance system; bystander publics, media andpotential allies are neutral and are being courted by the alliance and conflict sectors; andantagonists/counter-movements are in the conflict sector. Elite decision makers could bein any of the fields, depending on the circumstances. In the case presented below, the elitedecision makers (legislators and judges) were perceived to be in the neutral field and wereextensively targeted by the pro-choice and pro-life movements.

The frame literature identifies two distinct types of frame processes directedtoward targets: frame alignment and counter-framing. Frame alignment processes attemptto link the interpretive orientations of the SMO with those of the target group (Snow et al.1986). Secondly, the SMO attempts to undermine their opponents' attempts at framealignment with contested targets through "counter-framing"--attempts to "rebut,undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths, versions of reality, or interpretiveframework" (Benford 1987 p. 75). If left unchallenged, the SMO's opponents' frames willeventually carry away even the targets in the SMO's alliance system (Klandermans 1992).In the multi-organizational field context then, the alliance and neutral systems of an SMOare targeted through "frame alignment processes, and the antagonists in the conflict sectorare targeted through "counter-framing.” For most SMOs these framing efforts towardmultiple targets are not sequential, but simultaneous (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988,p. 726).

Determining Important Targets for Alignment and Counter-framing Efforts

Faced with the impossibility of attempting to align or counter-frame with all of thetargets in the multi-organizational field, the actors who create the organizational frameonly consider some of the potentially thousands of groups in the SMO's field as warrantingtargeting efforts. The first determinant for deciding the importance of a potential targetfor the SMO is its perceived influence on the goal of the organization as constructed bythe current organizational frame. Positive or negative influence may include material,human and symbolic resources, or the coercive power of the state.

The second determinant of importance is the strength of the boundaries in themulti-organizational field. Stronger boundaries will make the group a less importanttarget. There are two locations of boundaries: the boundaries between the SMO and itspossible targets in the alliance and neutral sectors, and the boundaries between thepossible targets in these sectors and the SMO's antagonists.

3

These boundaries have two components--social structural and cognitive. Socialstructural boundaries can be thought of in network terms. Some groups, due togeography, occupations and various life experiences are unlikely to interact due to the lackof network links (e.g. Boston Episcopalian priests and rural Alabama Baptist pastors)making targeting unnecessary.

A cognitive boundary consists of the degree of difference between the "culturalnarrations" of groups. Since a frame designed to resonate with a particular group'scultural narrative may not resonate with another group's narrative (Snow and Benford1988) a strong cognitive boundary located between the members of an SMO and a targetgroup will lessen the probability that one frame could resonate with both groups, makingtargeting unnecessary and unlikely. Similarly, a strong cognitive boundary locatedbetween a potential target in the SMO's alliance or neutral sector and an SMO's antagonistmakes counter-framing efforts against the antagonist unnecessary as the antagonists'framing efforts are unlikely to succeed.

These two distinctions--perceived influence of the group on the goals of theorganization and boundary strength--suggest how the SMO actors decide which of thepotentially thousands of targets are worthy of their efforts. This addition to the multi-organizational field perspective offers the framework for understanding how SMO actorscreate an organizational frame.

The Organizational Frame

A frame can be analytically segmented into three parts: "(1) a diagnosis of someevent or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration; (2) a proposedsolution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done; and (3) a call toarms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action" (Snow and Benford1988, p. 199)(my emphasis).

Traditional studies of SMOs, as well as the recent frame literature, have implicitlyor explicitly assumed that SMOs have one identifiable governing ideology and generalgoal, which I am explicitly expanding upon and defining as an "organizational frame."SMOs are traditionally defined by their "goals" (Zald and Ash 1966), "causes" or "aims"(McAdam, McCarthy, Zald 1988, pp. 716-717). Note that goals, causes, or aims of theSMO are included as the "proposed solution" component of the organizational frame asdefined above. SMOs also have distinctive ideologies (Staggenborg 1986, Benford 1993)which are akin to the diagnosis and proposed solution components of the frame. Bynaming this implicit group ideology and goals an "organizational frame" I am making theseassumptions explicit, and simultaneously creating a perspective on the creation, changeand effect of this aspect of SMOs.

Why would we expect SMO activists to generally have only one organizationalframe? The first reason is that, to the degree that collective identity formation (Taylor and

4

Whittier 1992) is a tactic and not a goal, and if collective identities result from framingprocesses (Hunt, Benford and Snow 1994), then for a collective identity to form, a unifiedframe would tend to be required. Highly related to this is the common sense notion thatan individual will not join or support an SMO unless they think they know what it standsfor.

A second force that encourages an SMO to create a unified organizational frame isthe imprecise communications methods commonly utilized in SMOs for their framingactivity, such as the media and printed literature. Instead of simply creating the bestcollective action frame for each target, imprecise communication channels means thatcommunication toward one target reaches a number of different targets simultaneously.For example, a coalition of groups studied by Benford agreed that "the movement shouldstrive to maintain consistency across proffered frames" because their frames would becarried by the media to the movement’s various targets (1993, p. 692). Knowing thatmore than one target may receive the frame thus encourages groups to create a frame thatwill resonate with all groups--albeit not maximally with any one group.

A final force driving the creation of a single organizational frame is that theseframes act as a general script which compensates for people's cognitive limitations. Thisperspective, originally formulated by the Carnegie school of organization theory (Marchand Simon 1958), and further developed by neo-institutional theorists (DiMaggio andPowell 1991), suggests that humans develop various shortcuts for solving problems tocompensate for the impossibility of considering every event as unique. Any SMO workeror activist who utilizes frames will develop a limited repertoire of cognitive scripts thatthey use to "satisfice"--they apply the same scripts to the myriad targets they encounter,regardless of whether or not it is the most effective response. This suggests thatmaximizing the resonance of each target with a unique frame is not possible because SMOactors will tend to respond in similar ways to the myriad targets and situations theyencounter--they lack the cognitive ability (as well as time and information) to invent amaximizing frame out of whole cloth for every target and situation.

Given the tendency for an SMO to create an organizational frame, how do theydecide the actual symbolic content which in turn shapes the content of the messages sentto each target? McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, summarizing previous research, state that"SMOs typically weigh the anticipated responses of these various groups and seek throughtheir choices to balance the conflicting demands of the organizational environment inwhich they are embedded" (1988, p. 726). Thus, the content which would "align" bestwith the alliance and neutral targets, and the content which would most effectivelycounter-frame against the antagonist targets in the conflict system, are balanced accordingto the importance attributed to each considered target.

The primary importance of an organizational frame in the analysis of an SMO isthat because the field is considered in their construction, the characteristics of one targetaffects framing toward another. This constraint is exemplified by an event in the history ofthe primary SMO in the case study below, where one of its state affiliates attempted topublish an advertisement that framed the upcoming visit of the Pope in a controversial

5

manner in order to mobilize potential participants. The national office, concerned that theadvertisement (and the frame it was derived from) would also be received by other targetgroups such as the press and elected officials, forced the state affiliate to remove theadvertisement on the grounds that it was incongruent with the existing organizationalframe of the SMO. The national SMO subsequently required that it approve all stateaffiliate printed material to "ensure that the beliefs of a member group... are not violatedby an affiliate" (State Affiliate Manual, n.d., RCAR Papers).

In sum, the structure of the multi-organizational field, the characteristics of thegroups in the field, and the social structural and cognitive boundaries between the groupsin the field combined to shape the organizational frame. The result of this process is thatframing efforts toward one target affect another, through the organizational frame.

METHOD

I will demonstrate this process of organizational frame construction by examininghow activists' perceptions of different constellations of targets--and their importance--inthe multi-organizational field of religious pro-choice SMOs resulted in particularorganizational frame changes. Following the perspective outlined above, theseorganizational frame changes occurred when the field changed to such a degree that a neworganizational frame was perceived to more effectively balance the targets. Theseorganizations offer great clarity in the illustration of this process because theorganizational frame did not change often and was explicitly reconstructed only aftercomplaints that the current organizational frame was limiting. As will become apparent,potential participants, although always a target, were often a secondary consideration inframe construction.

The data presented below are archival. All board minutes, program planningdocuments, literature, annual reports of the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights(RCAR) from 1973-1992 were obtained and correspondence of the executive director andstaff examined (RCAR Papers). Data for the Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion(CCSA) are from other sociologists' analyses and from published descriptions of themovement from participants. The creation of organizational frames were identified byfinding situations where the main message of the organization was debated. With RCARthis happened at board and program planning meetings. Field pressures were determinedby following references to concerns/motivations in the debates back to their originsthrough archival research.

These data are a part of a broader project that examines changes in publicdiscourse about bioethical issues from the mid-1960's to present. Readers should beaware that I was a program director of RCAR from 1990 to 1992. Although this mayraise unresolvable epistemological questions for some readers, it has also given me aninsider’s knowledge not generally available to other scholars.

6

THE RELIGIOUS PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: 1967 TO 1992

For heuristic purposes I will break the organizational frames in the religious pro-choice movement into three periods of analysis; 1967-1973, 1973-1980, 1980-1992. Ineach era I give a short description of the organizational form of the SMO, followed by adescription of the change in the organizational frame from the previous era. Thisdescription is followed by a summary of changes the activists perceived in the SMO multi-organizational field and how this led to a frame change.

The Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion (CCSA), 1967-1973

By late 1960's, many liberal Protestant and reform Jewish clergy had becomeaware of the extent of women's suffering due to illegal abortion (Garrow 1994; Luker1984). In early 1967, a group of clergy in New York City, led by American Baptist PastorHoward Moody, set up a referral system to connect women with safe yet illegal abortionproviders named the CCSA (Carmen and Moody 1973). Similar groups soon appeared inother states, led by the New York group, eventually involving 1400 clergy. These clergyprimarily referred women to illegal abortion providers in other states and countriesprevious to 1970, and to New York after its laws were essentially repealed in 1970(Garrow 1994; Gourney 1989).

The primary impetus in this SMO for creating a unifying organizational frame wastheir perceived inability to limit the framing activity to particular targets. Knowing thatthey had to publicly announce the formation, goals and rationale of the CCSA, theactivists "were apprehensive about the reaction this announcement might bring from... thepublic at large,... law enforcement agencies," their own congregations, state legislators,other clergy, and particularly the women they were trying to help (Carmen and Moody1973, pp. 33-35).

The Selected Organizational Frame

The selected organizational frame, announced on the front page of the New YorkTimes (Fiske 1967), was credited by the activists as "responsible for setting the tone" forthe CCSA (Carmen and Moody 1973, p. 34). Its diagnosis was that the unavailability ofabortion was causing health problems and death among poor women. The primarysolution was to refer women to illegal yet safe abortion providers. The rationale for actionwas that if the actor does not mobilize, women will die. The announcement in the NewYork Times, which painted a grim picture, is worth quoting at length:

The present abortion laws require over a million women in the United States eachyear to seek illegal abortions which often cause severe mental anguish, physical

7

suffering, and unnecessary death of women... [and] compel the birth of unwanted,unloved, and often deformed children... Therefore we pledge ourselves asclergymen to a continuing effort to educate and inform the public to the end that amore liberal abortion law in this state and throughout the nation be enacted. In themeantime women are [facing] the underworld of criminality or the dangerouspractice of self-induced abortion... Therefore, believing as clergymen that there arehigher laws and moral obligations transcending legal codes, we believe that it isour pastoral responsibility and religious duty to give aid and assistance to allwomen with problem pregnancies (Carmen and Moody 1973, pp. 30-31).

Field Configuration Effects on Organizational Frame Construction

In this "reform" stage of the broader pro-choice movement, restrictive abortionlaws were only considered a problem because they resulted in a public health crisis (Luker1984; Lader 1973), not because they violated rights. It is not surprising that the CCSAframe was highly influenced by the emerging pro-choice groups in CCSA’s alliance sector,with which the CCSA was highly integrated. Although there were many potentialorganizational frames that would have been consistent with the social justice "culturalnarrations" of the members of the CCSA, some of these being later adopted by themovement, this frame was selected at that time due to the structure and characteristics ofthe remainder of the multi-organizational field.

Beyond the nascent pro-choice organizations, the alliance system of the CCSAconsisted of only the clergy networks, although some denominational agencies weresupportive (Staggenborg 1991). The most important potential participant targets duringthis era were liberal Protestant and Jewish clergy who could provide local reference to anabortion provider. State legislators, elites who could legislatively enact the goals of theCCSA, were secondary targets to their "chief goal" of referring women (Moody 1971, p.30). An organizational frame was needed to convince women to use the service,legislators to change the law, and religious leaders to break the law by making referrals.Yet, it needed to be broadly resonant with the "secular" movement and could notendanger their goals with regard to public opinion or the police.2

Framing considerations could be focused on these targets due to the strongboundaries located between the antagonist and the CCSA target groups, which madecounter-framing less important. The strong boundary located between the main antagonistto abortion reform, the Roman Catholic Church, and the religious pro-choice movement'stargets--liberal Protestants and Jews-- was the result of differing social networks anddifferent cultural narrations regarding women's roles and sexuality.

Although evangelical Protestant clergy satisfied the first determinant of importancein assessing possible alliance targets because they could have referred women fromSouthern states and rural areas (where liberal Protestants and Rabbis were rare),evangelicals at this time had separate institutions from liberals and little interaction. Thus,

8

the social structural boundaries limited the chances of sharing the frame. The cognitiveboundary was even stronger--activists probably never considered evangelical clergy astargets because they knew that evangelical cultural narrations about women's roles andsexuality were incompatible with theirs. The liberal religious clergy that were targeted bythese activists (e.g. Northern Baptist college chaplains) had a similar ability to influencethe goals of the SMO, but shared social structural space with the activists (ecumenicalcouncils, etc.) and, perhaps more important, had similar understandings of women's rolesand sexuality.

Faced with the framing challenges of mobilizing reluctant groups of potentialparticipants, convincing state legislators, educating the public and avoiding the police, therationale for action of the organizational frame of the CCSA was selected which wouldresonate most powerfully with the targeted groups. The rationale of saving women fromsuffering and death resonated powerfully with targeted liberal Protestant and Jewish clergyand was also perceived as the best justified "extension of pastoral responsibility" bothlegally and in the public's mind (Carmen and Moody 1973, p. 35). Most important, thediagnosis and solution components of the organizational frame needed to encourage the"frame transformation" (Snow et al. 1986) of pregnant women who, the CCSA activistsperceived, believed that "the role of clergy... would have been to talk them into having thebaby" (Carmen and Moody 1973, p. 23). Although the assembled organizational framewas well suited for these targets, future shifts in the multi-organizational field wouldrequire changing the organizational frame during the next phase of the religious pro-choicemovement.

The Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights, 1973-1980

The Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton cases, decided in January of 1973, declaredabortion to be constitutionally protected based on a woman's right to privacy. Theresponse by the Roman Catholic Church, the primary organized opponent of abortion, wasrapid and strong, "calling for complete and total rejection of the decision" (Epstein andKobylka 1992, p. 209). The Catholic Church hierarchy and the organizations it hadcreated (e.g. the National Right to Life Committee) made passing a constitutionalamendment to overturn Roe the "focus of their utmost attention" (Epstein and Kobylka1992, p. 210).

The national leaders of the liberal to mainline Protestant denominations and Jewishorganizations, which had adopted widely varying statements of support for abortion lawreform or repeal, perceived that if any of the proposed constitutional amendments passed,women's reproductive decisions based on their religious teachings would be illegal (RCARBoard Minutes, 1973). In response, they created RCAR to coordinate and unite theactivity of the denominations against these amendments.3

9

Changes in the Organizational Frame

Despite the apparent effectiveness of the CCSA organizational frame in facilitatingthe growth of the clergy movement, a change in the composition of the multi-organizational field necessitated that it not be used. In an amicus brief to the Roe case in1971, a few of the religious organizations that would later found RCAR argued thatrestrictive abortion laws were unconstitutional because they established one religiousviewpoint of when a fetus becomes a person into public law--violating the establishmentclause of the First Amendment (Epstein and Kobylka 1992, p. 176). This was the firstarticulation of what would become the "first amendment religious liberty" organizationalframe of RCAR (later expanded to include a free exercise clause claim as well).

The diagnosis of the previous era, the risk to women's health, largely disappearedfrom the discourse of the SMO, despite its continuing relevance if Roe were to beoverturned. The diagnosed problem for RCAR was the efforts to overturn the Roedecision (Board Minutes 9/13/73, RCAR Papers). The solution was simply to defeat theconstitutional amendments circulating in congress. The dramatic shift in the rationale foraction component of the organizational frame from that of the CCSA is clear in the initialRCAR "rationale" statement. While raising the specter of criminal abortion as amotivating force like the CCSA, note that criminal abortion was now a motivatingproblem not because it destroyed women's health but because criminal abortion impingedon women's religious liberty:

All those concerned with religious liberty can join in opposing any attempt byconstitutional amendment or legislation to take us back to the era of criminalabortion which legally denied to all, but in practice particularly denied to the poor,the right and responsibility to make their own decisions. (My emphasis) (BoardMinutes 9/13/73, RCAR Papers).

This organizational frame strongly influenced framing efforts toward all specifictargets. For example, in testimony before the Congress regarding the constitutionalamendments in 1976, both representatives of RCAR (a Methodist Minister and a ReformRabbi) began by reading the religion clauses of the first amendment and generally linkingtheir sub-arguments to this theme (U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary 1976). In thatsame year, of RCAR’s eight publications that were sent to all targets, one was called“Abortion and Religious Freedom” and another “Religious Freedom and the AbortionControversy” (RCAR Papers). Finally, the placards used at press conferences,denominational meetings, congressional briefings and rallies contained the condensationsymbol phrase "Religious Freedom."

Field Configuration Effects on Organizational Frame Construction

This new organizational frame was the result of perceived shifts in the multi-organizational field. The board members during this time were employees of their

10

denominations and were supposed to represent the position of the denomination toRCAR. An organizational frame could clearly not be at odds with any of these positions.Therefore, any organizational frame would have a diagnosis and prognosis that resonatedwith this group's reason for organizing--they believed that Roe was threatened (diagnosis)and that they must defeat these threats (prognosis). Furthermore, from the beginning,RCAR worked closely with secular pro-choice groups in its alliance sector. Thesegroups’ emphasis on the rights and autonomy of women (Luker 1984; Staggenborg 1991)clearly set the tone for the broader movement of which RCAR was a part. However,within the constraints of aligning with the board members and the broader movement, therationale component of the frame was a function of the character of the remainder of themulti-organizational field.

The official abortion policy statements of the denominations represented on theboard during the creation of the frame generally reflect a social justice theology "culturalnarration" similar to that of the CCSA advocates. The documents reveal a wealth ofpossible rationales that could have been incorporated into the organizational frame,including the women's health justification, women's freedom of conscience, overpopulationconcerns, the suffering of unwanted children and justice for the poor who can't go to othercountries for safe abortions ("How We Stand" 1974, RCAR Papers). Although somestatements mentioned women's freedom of conscience, this was not connected to firstamendment constitutional rights as in the selected frame. In the weighing process whichcreates the organizational frame, potential participants were still considered in theirdeliberations, but they were clearly no longer the primary target.

In the debates at the first RCAR meetings concerning the content of theorganizational frame it is clear that the Congress was perceived to be the most critical newtarget. The group seemed to agree with the Methodist representative who saw the group'sdeliberations about RCAR’s statement of purpose as actually about their "strategy... topersuade more than one third of the Senators and Congressmen" to vote against aConstitutional amendment (Board Minutes 8/9/73, RCAR Papers). The group,acknowledging the power of the "rights" arguments, seemed to feel the need for their own“rights” claim for the upcoming Congressional debates.

While the activists needed a "rights" argument to align with the secularcomponents of the alliance sector and for Congressional debates, they also needed tocounter-frame against the conflict sector target--the Roman Catholic Church. By the early1970's, the Roman Catholic Church began to counter-mobilize, helping to overturn theliberalized New York abortion law in the legislature and blocking repeal efforts in otherstates (Lader 1973). RCAR did not need to be concerned that the Catholic Church wouldsteal away contested potential participant target groups--the boundaries were still strong.However, the Roman Catholic Church was framing toward targeted elites in Congress toencourage the passage of a constitutional amendment. The potential for the success ofthis framing effort was high because the Congress has constitutionally guaranteedpermeable boundaries through the right of citizens to lobby and vote.

Although RCAR could have used the privacy rights arguments articulated in Roe

11

and by secular groups, the best way to counter-frame against the Catholic church was toframe their effort in Congress as another attempt to tear down the wall of church and stateand violate individuals' religious liberty. This had been effective in previous debates overstate aid to parochial schools (Carmen and Moody 1973) as well as efforts to legalizecontraception decades earlier (Garrow 1994). RCAR’s initial organizing statement wasthat "in a pluralistic society the state should not embody in law one particular religious ormoral viewpoint”(Board Minutes 9/13/73, RCAR Papers). It is unambiguously theCatholic Church who is advocating for that one viewpoint. Similarly, in testimony beforeCongress in 1974, Bishop Armstrong of the United Methodist Church, representingRCAR, stated that "we [the nation] are being asked to write the views of that particularreligious community [the Roman Catholic] into the laws of the land. That is not what ourforefathers envisioned as they defined a 'wall of separation' between Church and State”(U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1974, p. 256). Finally, the group thoughtthat to mobilize diverse target groups of potential participants around a common causerequired an organizational frame that would resonate with the different potentialparticipant groups simultaneously. The "first amendment religious liberty" organizationalframe could successfully unite the groups, each of which had different “culturalnarrations” about abortion, but with the same solution to the problem. The frame wasdesigned so that the morality of particular abortion decisions was not to be part of publiclaw and each denomination would be legally free to teach its adherents their own abortiontheology:

While recognizing that each religious body has its own perspectives andperceptions concerning this issue, [RCAR] seeks to maximize the effectiveness ofthose religious groups which support the common purpose of the coalition bycoordinating their efforts to safeguard the legal option of abortion (Board Minutes9/13/73, RCAR Papers).

The unifying function of this organizational frame is exemplified by an earlyattempt to promote a separate (and more effective) framing effort toward a particulartarget group. At the third meeting of the organization, the United Presbyterian Churchrepresentative suggested developing a group theological position on abortion in order tohelp mobilization efforts: "some sort of a policy" regarding the "dilemma of conscience asopposed to the civil liberties aspect of abortion." After a warning from the Rabbirepresenting the Reform Movement that "involving the differing theologies represented inthe RCAR could fragment the group" the idea was dropped and the religious freedomframe reasserted (Board Minutes 8/28/73, RCAR Papers).

Analysis of RCAR’s first meetings suggests that the "first amendment religiousliberty" organizational frame was created by RCAR to simultaneously meet the diverseframing needs of 1) aligning with the secular pro-choice groups; 2) making a "rights"claim for Congress; 3) counter-framing against the antagonist target--the Catholic Church,and; 4) mobilizing a number of disparate potential participant groups. This organizationalframe, which shaped all framing activity, was clearly not designed to mobilize a particulargroup of potential participants (e.g. United Methodist Women).

12

Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights (RCAR), 1980-1992

Changes in the Organizational Frame

The diagnosis and solution components of the organizational frame during this eracarry over from the 1970's. However, beginning in the early 1980's, the rationalecomponent began a slow, subtle transformation. The 1970's rationale, where abortionshould be legal to protect a woman's right to make moral and theological decisions,changed to a rationale where the right to make moral and theological decisions which sheis capable of doing responsibly is emphasized.4

This slow shift is evident in RCAR program planning documents. From 1977 to1981 each plan included the goal of:

[Educating] the general public on the importance of maintaining everywoman's right to choose abortion, giving particular emphasis to its significance inthe preservation of religious freedom (RCAR Papers).

In 1982 the goal was amended to:

[Educating] the religious community and the general public on the importance ofmaintaining the right to choose abortion, giving particular emphasis on thepreservation of religious freedom and the right of individual moral decision-making(my emphasis)(RCAR Papers).

In 1986 a new goal appeared in the program planning process, which was:

To promote a climate within the religious community which affirms women asmoral decision--makers; which preserves the First Amendment guarantee ofreligious freedom; and which assures equal access to comprehensive reproductivehealth care for all women (my emphasis)(RCAR Papers).

By 1992, the previously emphasized religious liberty rationale of the organizationalframe had fallen back to third mention, and women were not only capable of wisedecisions, but the decision to have an abortion could be morally correct:

RCAR speaks for millions of Americans, Americans who, while diverse in theirfaiths, are united in three beliefs; abortion can be a moral choice; individual womenare capable of making that decision, informed by their own faiths and supported bytheir families, doctors, and clergy; because each religion has its own position onabortion, legislation dictating reproductive decisions threatens religious freedom.This is the message that... underlies all of RCAR's work (my emphasis)(AnnualReport 1992, RCAR Papers).5

13

The overall trend is clear. The rationale component of the organizational framethat a woman had the right to make abortion decisions due to her religious liberty, shiftedto a rationale--specifically targeted at religious groups--where a woman's ability to makethese decisions wisely and responsibly is emphasized. This new organizational frameinfluenced framing activity toward all of the targets. For example, there was a change inthe RCAR literature away from pieces that reference religious liberty toward titles such as"How Good Women Make Wise Choices" and "Respecting the Moral Agency of Women"(RCAR Papers). The placards used at public events are again instructive. Beginning in1990, the "religious freedom" phrase was replaced by "prayerfully pro-choice," reflectingthe new emphasis on the moral reflection of women and abortion rights advocates.

Field Configuration Effects on Organizational Frame Construction

The potential participants of RCAR, and the secular pro-choice organizations inthe alliance sector, generally remained the same as the previous era. Although theCongress, and to a growing extent state legislators, remained the primary target, perceivedshifts in the antagonist sector of the field resulted in regular reassessments of theorganizational frame.

Previous to the late 1970's, evangelical Protestants, while more opposed toabortion than the remainder of the population, were largely uninvolved with politics.Beginning in the late 1970's, evangelical Protestant groups and denominations becameinvolved in American politics over social and moral issues such as abortion (Wuthnow1988), eventually joining Roman Catholic groups in the pro-life movement. For example,the Southern Baptist Convention, whose Washington representative had assisted infounding RCAR in 1973 and which had a position supporting abortion law liberalizationduring the early 1970's, took a conservative turn in 1980 by passing a resolution calling fora constitutional amendment to ban abortion (Melton 1989). The Moral Majority and otherevangelical and fundamentalist organizations also brought great attention to the newinvolvement of conservative Protestants in the issue (Program Plan 1979, RCAR Papers).

It was not only denominations and organizations traditionally associated withAmerican evangelicalism that began advocating against abortion. Liberal and mainlinedenominations that were members of RCAR, never homogeneous in their political ortheological views (Wuthnow 1988), had many "evangelically oriented" congregations,regional governing bodies and nonofficial associations within them. With the rise inactivism of evangelicals, many evangelicals in liberal and mainline denominations began tochallenge the pro-choice positions of their denominations--and particularly theirmembership in RCAR--by either founding new organizations or reinvigorating old ones.These organizations, all separate from the institutional denominations they attempted toinfluence, included: The National Organization of Episcopalians for Life, the Good News(United Methodist), Methodist Task Force on Abortion and Sexuality, the PresbyterianLay Committee, Disciples for Life, United Church People for Biblical Witness,Presbyterians Pro-life, and Baptists for Life (RCAR Papers).

14

The evangelical groups were perceived to be important targets for counter-framingbecause the boundary located between the evangelical groups in the conflict sector and themainliners in the alliance and neutral sectors was very permeable compared to the strongboundary that existed between the mainliners and the Roman Catholic church. Thispermeability was a function of two factors. First, the cognitive boundary located betweenthese new antagonists and RCAR's potential participant targets was very weak--theyshared similar "cultural narrations.” For example, unlike Catholic natural law speaking toa Protestant theology which rejects such arguments, both evangelical pro-life Methodistsand liberal pro-choice Methodists use the same Wesleyan theological heritage.

Second, the social network overlap between the mainliners and the evangelicals,through ministerial associations, seminaries and ecumenical councils, was high in manyparts of the country. For example, Baptist churches along the American north-southdivide have "dually aligned status"--that is, they are members of both the American BaptistChurches U.S.A. and the Southern Baptist Convention (pro-choice and pro-life,respectively, in this era). Perhaps more important, evangelicals within the mainlinedenominations had an even tighter interaction with non-evangelical mainliners throughattending the same meetings, setting up organizations within the denominations, andgaining access to existing networks to disseminate their frames.

For the first time, RCAR’s framing toward what it considered its constituency, thereligious groups in its alliance system and in the "neutral" system, were being targeted byframing efforts of evangelical groups in the pro-life movement. Program planningdocuments for RCAR make clear that in only a few years the group realized that, inKlandermans' words, their target groups were "being carried away by the stream ofcounter-arguments" (1992, p. 90) due to the newly permeable nature of the borders in themulti-organizational field.6 The American Baptist Churches (an RCAR founding member)ended its membership in 1985. Numerous votes at national meetings during the mid-1980's challenging the pro-choice positions of the United Methodist Church, EpiscopalChurch, Presbyterian Church, and Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)--some of themvery close-- emphasized the framing task for the RCAR activists.

Given that the remainder of the field remained the same, the changes in RCAR’sorganizational frame were largely determined by the content of the newly successfulevangelical frames which needed to be framed against. Unlike the more abstractarguments about the definition of human life used by RCAR’s Roman Catholic adversariesof the 1970's, the frames of the Evangelicals were focused on what most personsconsidered immoral abortion decisions by women: abortion for "convenience,” genderselection, "birth control" and during the third trimester (RCAR Papers).

The existing rationale component of the RCAR organizational frame--which wasintentionally designed to not discuss the moral justifications of particular abortiondecisions--allowed pro-life advocates to define the moral problem as women not beingresponsible decision makers. Under pressure from antagonists, statements which RCARperceived as questioning women's ability to be responsible were inserted into the officialabortion policy statements of three of the most important denominations in RCAR's

15

"neutral field" (including the Methodists who helped found RCAR)--essentially writing theconflict field's frame into all denominational publications on the subject. Seeing theirtargets accepting their opponents frames, a new frame was called for that addressed themorality that was clearly central to most people's understanding of abortion.

At a board retreat in 1982 designed to assess the need for changes in theorganization in light of the above developments, most member groups reported that theissue of third trimester abortions was becoming "a big problem" within their groups, andthat the current organizational frame was hampering efforts. It was felt that in order to"enable the groups to move forward politically" RCAR had to "focus more on educatingthe faith groups on the moral aspects" of abortion (Board minutes 3/5/82, RCAR Papers).By 1986, RCAR was training denominational activists--armed with the new frame--tocounter "anti-abortion attacks from within" (Program Plan 1986, RCAR Papers).

In sum, in the 1980's RCAR's field changed as evangelical Protestants entered theirconflict system and began framing efforts toward RCAR's member groups. Faced withthis new constellation of targets and opponents, RCAR created a new frame that posed acounter-frame to the evangelical efforts while attempting to maintain alignment with thealliance sector. Contrary to the evangelical frame, abortion decisions were framed--placedin a "schemata of interpretation"--where difficult abortion decisions are made byresponsible and wise women. This organizational frame, generally the basis for specifictarget frames, while not incompatible with the alliance system targets, was not entirelydesigned with their resonance in mind.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The SMOs in the religious pro-choice movement demonstrate that SMOs createorganizational frames through weighing the alignment and counter-framing needs of thetargets they perceive to be important in their multi-organizational fields. Perceivedimportance is a function of the strength of the social structural and cognitive boundaries ofthe field. These organizational frames, which influenced all of the framing activity towardparticular groups, were only in the beginning optimally designed for alignment withpotential participants. After this point, alignment and counter-framing needs of othertargets drove the creation of new organizational frames--although potential participantswere still targeted.

This perspective offers an elaboration of the multi-organizational field perspectivethat may increase its analytical power. In its original exposition, like-minded organizationsin the multi-organizational field were linked through a presumably preexisting and staticideology which then led to mobilization opportunities through the links (Curtis andZurcher 1973). Klandermans added opponents to the analysis and suggested that thestructure of the field will affect the construction of meaning--but does not suggest whichcharacteristics of the field should have which effects (1992). The perspective outlined inthis paper offers a number of field characteristic variables that affect this construction of

16

meaning.

As stated at the onset, much of the framing literature has been concerned withassessing the mobilization capacity of frames and, by extension, the mobilization capacityof SMOs. The above perspective not only clarifies this task by stressing the question ofwhich target’s mobilization should be measured, but could also lead to some hypothesesregarding how structural preconditions in the multi-organizational field constrain orencourage mobilization. For example, the failure or weakness of an SMO may bepartially due to the heterogeneity of targets it considers important in its multi-organizational field leading to a necessary balance that resonates poorly with all targets.Attention to these structural factors of SMOs may help further our understanding of theircultural processes which have been so fruitful for recent analyses.

17

Endnotes

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the AmericanSociological Association in Los Angeles, August, 1994. I am grateful for advice given byGene Burns, Paul DiMaggio, Michael Moody, Michele Lamont, Rob Benford, RhysWilliams, Bob Ratner, Ronnee Schreiber, Erin Kelly, Paul Lichterman and anonymousreviewers. 1. The self-identified titles of the opposing abortion movements are "condensing symbols"for their organizational frames (Edelman 1988, 22). Since these frames and titles havechanged over the period under study, I will use the terms pro-choice and pro-life,acknowledging that these terms somewhat obscure these changes.

2. Participation in the CCSA was perceived as risky to a cleric’s career. Although onlytwo clergy members were actually arrested, fear of arrest--and of a disapprovingcongregation--was ubiquitous (Carmen and Moody 1973; Gourney 1989). In 1967 thesefears were justified as activist Bill Baird had recently been imprisoned for distributingcontraception (Garrow 1994).

3. The CCSA disbanded shortly after the Roe decision and many of the clergy activistsjoined RCAR, founding many state chapters. The early members of RCAR were thesocial action agencies of the United Methodist Church, United Church of Christ (UCC),Presbyterian Church in the U.S., United Presbyterian Church, American Baptist Churches,Episcopal Church, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Unitarian UniversalistAssociation (UUA), Conservative and Reform Jewish Organizations and Humanistorganizations ("How We Stand" 1974, RCAR Papers). From 1973 forward, only theUUA, UCC and the Jewish groups had enough consensus to be considered part of thealliance system. The other member groups, despite RCAR’s efforts and their own officialabortion rights policies, never reached enough consensus for consistent mobilization, andare considered part of the neutral field. RCAR is one of only two single purpose abortionrights organizations that have existed from 1973 to 1992. Its budget was approximately athird of a million dollars in the late 1970's, 1.4 million in 1992 (Annual Reports, RCARPapers).

4. Societal attitudes regarding women’s roles liberalized dramatically during thisperiod(DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson Forthcoming). Thus, we should expect that theorganizational frames of the religious pro-choice movement would become moresupportive of liberalized gender roles because the "cultural narration" of every group inthe field has changed. More specific changes in the field explain the specific content of theorganizational frame, beyond the general changes.

5. The primary mission changed in 1993 to making “clear that abortion can be a morally,ethically, and religiously responsible decision" (RCAReporter, 10/20/93,RCAR Papers).

6. The effect of this is reported by DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (Forthcoming) who findthat liberal religious groups become more internally polarized over abortion between 1977

18

and 1994.

19

References

Benford, Robert D. 1993. "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement."Social Forces 71 (3): 677-701.

------. 1987. "Framing Activity, Meaning, and Social Movement Participation: TheNuclear Disarmament Movement.” Unpublished Dissertation. University ofTexas-Austin.

Benford, Robert D. and Scott A. Hunt. 1994. "Social Movement Counterframing andReframing: Repairing and Sustaining Collective Identity Claims.” Paper presentedat the Midwest Sociological Society, St. Louis, MO, March 12, 1994.

Carmen, Arlene and Howard Moody. 1973. Abortion Counseling and Social Change.Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press.

Curtis, Russell L. and Louis A Zurcher. 1973. "Stable Resources of Protest Movements:The Multi-organizational Field." Social Forces 52: 53-61.

DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter Powell. 1991. The New Institutionalism in OrganizationalAnalysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

DiMaggio, Paul, John H. Evans and Bethany Bryson. Forthcoming. "Have Americans'Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?" American Journal of Sociology.

Edelman, Murray. 1988. Constructing the Political Spectacle. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.

Epstein, Lee and Joseph F. Kobylka. 1992. The Supreme Court and Legal Change.Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Fiske, Edward. 1967. "Clergymen Offer Abortion Advice.” New York Times. 22 May,sec. A, p. 1.

Garrow, David J. 1994. Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making ofRoe v. Wade. New York: Macmillan/Lisa Drew.

Gerhards, Jurgen and Dieter Rucht. 1992. "Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing inTwo Protest Campaigns in West Germany.” American Journal of Sociology 98:555-595.

Gitlin, Todd. 1980. The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making andUnmaking of the New Left. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Gourney, Cynthia. 1989. "Abortion, Once Upon a Time in America.” Washington Post26 April, sec. D, p.1.

Hunt, Scott A., Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow. 1994. "Identity Fields: Framing

20

Processes and the Social Construction of Movement Identities." Pp. 185-208 inNew Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, edited by Enrique Larana,Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Klandermans, Bert. 1992. "The Social Construction of Protest and MultiorganizationalFields.” Pp. 77-103 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by AldonMorris and Carol McClurg Mueller. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lader, Lawrence. 1973. Abortion II. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Luker, Kristin. 1984. Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood. Berkeley, CA: Universityof California Press.

March, James G. and Herbert A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. New York: Wiley.

McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. 1988. "Social Movements" Pp.695-737 in Handbook of Sociology, edited by Neil Smelser. Newbury Park, CA:Sage Publications.

Melton, J. Gordon. 1989. The Churches Speak on Abortion: Official Statements fromReligious Bodies and Ecumenical Organizations. Detroit, MI: Gale Research, Inc.

Moody, Howard. 1973. "Church, State and the Rights of Conscience.” Christianity andCrisis 8 January, 292-94.

------. 1971. "Abortion: Woman's Right and Legal Problem.” Christianity and Crisis 8March, 27-32.

Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights Papers. Social Action Collection. StateHistorical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford.1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and MovementParticipation.” American Sociological Review 51: 464-481.

Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, andParticipant Mobilization.” Pp. 197-217 in International Social MovementResearch. Vol. 1, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hans Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow.Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1991. The Pro-Choice Movement. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

------. 1986. "Coalition Work in the Pro-Choice Movement: Organizational andEnvironmental Opportunities and Obstacles.” Social Problems 33: 374-90.

Taylor, Verta and Nancy E. Whittier. 1992. "Collective Identity in Social Movement

21

Communities.” Pp. 104-129 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited byAldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller. New Haven: Yale University Press.

U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary. Proposed Constitutional Amendments onAbortion. 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 March 1976.

U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Abortion-Part 1. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 7 March1974.

Wuthnow, Robert. 1988. The Restructuring of American Religion. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.

Zald, Mayer N. and Roberta Ash. 1966. "Social Movement Organizations: Growth,Decay and Change.” Social Forces 44: 327-341.