ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

The Relationships BetweenMass Media, PublicOpinion, and ForeignPolicy: Toward aTheoretical SynthesisMatthew A. Baum1 and Philip B.K. Potter2

1John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge,Massachusetts 02138; email: matthew baum@harvard.edu2Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles,California 90095-1472; email: ppotter@ucla.edu

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008. 11:39–65

First published online as a Review in Advance onNovember 7, 2007

The Annual Review of Political Science is online athttp://polisci.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060406.214132

Copyright c© 2008 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

1094-2939/08/0615-0039$20.00

Key Words

media and foreign policy, public opinion and foreign policy, mediaand public opinion, media and politics, media effects, publicopinion and war

AbstractDemocracy requires that citizens’ opinions play some role in shapingpolicy outcomes, including in foreign policy. Yet, although the liter-ature on public opinion and foreign policy has made great progressin recent decades, scholars have reached no consensus concerningwhat the public thinks, or thinks about, with respect to foreign pol-icy; how it comes to hold those opinions; or whether those opinionsinfluence (or even should influence) foreign policy. In this article,we first review the extensive gains in scholarly knowledge in the areaof public opinion and foreign policy over the past several decades,emphasizing relatively recent work. We then suggest a framework,based on the concept of market equilibrium, aimed at synthesizingthe disparate research programs that constitute the literature on pub-lic opinion and foreign policy. To do so, in addition to consideringthe relationship between leaders and the public, we incorporate athird strategic actor, the mass media, which we believe plays a criti-cal role alongside citizens and elites in shaping the public’s attitudesabout, and influence on, foreign policy. Our goal is to clarify themultifaceted relationships between these actors and foreign policyoutcomes.

39

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

INTRODUCTIONFollowing the invasion of Iraq in March2003, members of Congress from both par-ties, and the Bush administration, complainedthat biased media coverage was turning publicopinion against the war. Congressman JamesMarshall (D–GA) opined that reporters werepainting a “falsely bleak picture” that “weak-ens our national resolve” (Marshall 2003).President Bush struck a similar chord, claim-ing, “We’re making good progress in Iraq.Sometimes it’s hard to tell when you listento the filter [media]” (Bush 2003). DefenseSecretary Donald Rumsfeld added that “thenews media seem to want to carry the nega-tive” (Rumsfeld 2005). These statements re-flect two assumptions widely shared by deci-sion makers of all political perspectives: First,that the mass media often fail to deliver themessages policy makers think they shouldconvey, and second, that the media shape pub-lic opinion about foreign policy.

Yet, although political leaders routinely as-sume that the media wield independent in-fluence on public opinion and policy, mostpolitical science scholarship reduces the me-dia’s role to a “conveyor belt” that passivelytransports elite views (e.g., Jentleson 1992,Brody 1991)—particularly the views of themost powerful elites (Zaller & Chiu 2000,Bennett et al. 2006)—to the public. In con-trast, a parallel literature in political commu-nication (Kuypers 1997, Graber 2002, Paletz2002) details the processes by which the mediashape political opinions. This literature doesnot consistently link the relationship betweenmedia coverage and public opinion to policyoutcomes.

There is, however, an emerging recogni-tion among scholars who study the interac-tions of the public, leaders, and the media thatthese actors are interdependent and that ex-clusive attention to one or two of the threemay distort theoretical predictions and em-pirical findings (Entman 2000, Nacos et al.2000, Holsti 2004).

In this article, we first review the exten-sive gains in scholarly knowledge in this area

over the past several decades, with emphasison relatively recent work. We then begin tosynthesize into a more coherent frameworkthe disparate research programs that consti-tute the literature on public opinion and for-eign policy. Our goal is to clarify the mul-tifaceted relationships between these actorsand link them to foreign policy outcomes. Al-though many of the insights from this liter-ature are intended to be general, until quiterecently scholarship—and especially empiri-cal research—has largely focused on the UScase. Hence, this is our primary, albeit not ourexclusive, focus.

The key to such a synthesis lies in deter-mining how to fit the mass media into thiscomplex set of interrelationships. Are the me-dia a causal or a caused variable, an interven-ing variable between public opinion and for-eign policy, or primarily a conveyor belt formessages from the elite to the public, as thepolitical science literature often implies?1

In our view, the media are engaged in aconstant process of framing the news in re-sponse to the often competing requirementsof leaders and the public. Consequently—although, consistent with indexing theories(e.g., Hallin 1986, Bennett 1990, Zaller &Chiu 2000), political elites clearly influencenews media content—we believe the mass me-dia are nonetheless more accurately character-ized as a discrete strategic actor. As such, themedia’s framing of elite rhetoric has an inde-pendent causal effect on public perceptions ofconflict characteristics, and through this pro-cess, on foreign policy.

Indeed, we argue that the media influ-ence nearly every aspect of the relationshipbetween public opinion and foreign policy.Hence, any comprehensive theoretical frame-work attempting to account for either publicopinion regarding foreign policy or the effects

1To enhance analytic traction, we treat the media—analytically, but not grammatically—as a unitary actor.Of course, we recognize that the mass media consist ofa diverse array of distinct actors with varying incentives.(In the conclusion, we consider the implications of relax-ing this assumption.)

40 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

of public opinion on foreign policy requires aninterdisciplinary approach that incorporatespublic opinion, elite preferences, and the massmedia as independent strategic actors withdistinct preferences and incentives.

The literature outlines a dizzying array ofinteractions between the public, leaders, andthe media, the complexity of which is evi-dent in Figure 1. Even this highly stylizedrepresentation of the literature reveals studiesmaintaining that the media influence publicopinion, public opinion influences the media,public opinion influences decision makers, de-cision makers influence public opinion, deci-sion makers influence the media, foreign pol-

icy influences public opinion, decision mak-ers influence events, and the media influenceforeign policy. This is further complicated byfeedback from both foreign actors and theemerging “facts on the ground.” In short,scholars have investigated every conceivablecausal link between the public, decision mak-ers (foreign and domestic), and the media. Webelieve this web of causal arrows has becomeso dense that further investigation into thesenarrow individual pathways is likely to pro-duce diminishing returns.

The early stages of many research pro-grams are characterized by scholarly empha-sis on delineating causal pathways among the

Mass media

Public opinion

Foreign policy

Decision makers

Events

1

2

12

6

8

5

3

4

10

13

9

11

1) Paletz 2002, Graber 2002, Reese 2001, Baum 2003 9) Hermann & Hermann 1989, Mintz 2004, Kolodziej 19812) Hamilton 2003, Zaller unpublished manuscript 10) Gartner 2004, Graber 1997, Tifft & Jones 19993) Cohen 1963, Sigal 1973, Bennett 1990, Brody 1991 11) Behr & Iyengar 1985, Andrade & Young 19964) Powlick 1995, Denham 1997, Merril 1995, Malek 1996 12) Manheim & Albritton 1984, Zhang & Cameron 20035) Powlick 1991, Eisinger 2003, Meuller 1995 13) Sharkey 1993, Wolfsfeld 2004, Stetch 1994, Rotberg & Weiss 1996 6) Zaller 1992, Lewis 2001, Brody 2001, Jentleson 1992 14) DeRound & Peake 2000, Clark 2003, James & Oneal 1991, Meernik 2004

1002 yasmaR & lluK ,4002vehctnalS ,3791 relleuM ,4002ipleG &revaeF )513991 mantuP & ,nosbocaJ ,snavE )78) Finel & Lord 1999

Foreign actors7

14

15

Figure 1Prior specifications of causality in relationship(s) between the mass media, public opinion, and foreignpolicy. The citations associated with each arrow are illustrative rather than exhaustive. They representsimplifications of the authors’ arguments, intended to highlight the absence of a clear causal chain acrossthe broader system.

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 41

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

Leader’sinformation level

t1 t2t0Early inconflict

Late inconflict

Vo

lum

e o

f in

form

atio

n

TimeConflictinitiation

IGt1

IGt2

Publicinformation

level

Public-leadershipinformation gap (IG)

Figure 2Information gap between leaders and the public, over time during a military conflict.

constituent elements within a broader the-oretical framework. This is frequently howknowledge accumulates. Eventually, enoughof the linear relationships become illuminatedthat the proverbial “hidden face within thepicture” emerges. However, that face can alsobe obscured by the very foundational researchaimed at revealing it. Some scholars have ob-served such a pattern in the scientific studyof public opinion and foreign policy (e.g.,Robinson 2000, Entman 2003).

We argue that a clearer understandingof the media–opinion–foreign policy nexusemerges when, rather than exploring staticsnapshots of bilateral relationships betweenforeign policy actors, we consider them to-gether as coequal players within a market thatproduces foreign policy outcomes throughdynamic interaction.2 The circularity of the

2In a similar argument, Hamilton (2003, p. 19) asserts that“newsworthiness” is a “function of the number of con-sumers and their value in the marketplace.”

relationships between leaders, the media, andpublic opinion in the foreign policy arena is inmany respects analogous to the classical eco-nomic notions of supply and demand, and ofproducers and consumers in a marketplace.This foreign policy marketplace is driven pri-marily by the distribution of the key mar-ket commodity—information—among thesethree actors. Typically, information favorsleadership; however, certain dynamics canlead the public to overcome its informationaldisadvantage, producing different short- andlong-term equilibria. This distinction guidesmuch of the discussion that follows.

Figure 2 illustrates the process throughwhich differing short- and long-term equilib-ria can arise. It traces the typical path of theforeign policy information gap, that is, the in-formational advantage that leaders enjoy overthe public. As the primary traders of infor-mation in the marketplace—simultaneouslybeholden to leaders for their supply ofthis key commodity and to the public for

42 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

demand—the media play a central role in nar-rowing this information gap over time.

Typically, public attention to foreign pol-icy (and consequently demand for foreignpolicy news) is very low, resulting in an equi-librium favorable to leaders. This is espe-cially true in the early stages of a militaryconflict, where, in Figure 2, IGt1 representsthe relatively large information gap at timet1. However, several factors—including casu-alties, elite discord, and evidence that lead-ers have “spun” the facts beyond credulity (aconcept we term the elasticity of reality)—can prompt the public to increase its demandfor information from the media, thereby nar-rowing the information gap. This becomesmore likely as a conflict drags on, representedin Figure 2 by the smaller information gap(IGt2) at time t2. The media play a crucial rolebecause they produce this dynamism. If therewere no third actor controlling the flow of in-formation, or if such an actor were merely apassive conveyor belt, leaders would have lessincentive to respond to changes in the public’sdemand for information (except perhaps nearan election).

Economists rarely ask whether supplycauses demand or whether consumers causeproducers. Rather, in attempting to under-stand markets, scholars focus on the conceptof equilibrium—how to identify it and deter-mine when it is likely to shift. We believethis is also a useful way to conceptualizethe process of foreign policy formulation.Present knowledge about the relationshipsbetween actors in the foreign policy market-place emerges from static snapshots. Yet, eachof these snapshots suggests a common, andperhaps interesting, market equilibrium. Forexample, in the “rally round the flag” litera-ture (discussed below), the well-documentedshort-term market equilibrium (time t1 inFigure 2) favors leaders. However, the lit-erature on the public’s response to casualties(also discussed below) implies the presenceof another long-term equilibrium (time t2 inFigure 2) where public opinion can shape, orat least constrain, policy.

These contrasting findings have provendifficult to unify within a single conceptualframework. In fact, with a few exceptions(e.g., Baum & Groeling 2007), prior researchtends to focus on the former (Baker & Oneal2001, Brody 1991, Baum 2002) or the latter(Gartner & Segura 2000, Feaver & Gelpi2004), but not both. By viewing these dis-tinct equilibria through a dynamic rather thanstatic lens, derived from a broader under-standing of the marketplace that producesthem, it becomes possible to synthesize theseand other previously disparate literatures intoa single coherent framework.

This is the task we undertake in this ar-ticle. We begin with a review of the state ofknowledge concerning the three main actorsin the foreign policy marketplace: the public,their leaders, and the media.

THE ACTORS

The Public

The public’s capacity to gather and retain in-formation, and to use it to formulate coherentopinions, is arguably integral to the function-ing of democracy. Madison, Hamilton, andother like-minded federalists were suspiciousof the public’s capacity to contribute construc-tively to political decision making, especiallyin foreign policy. In contrast, a long liberaltradition—with origins in the work of Kant,Rousseau, Bentham, and Mill, and more re-cently manifested in the vast literature on thedemocratic peace (e.g., Doyle 1986, Russett& Oneal 2001)—views citizen engagement ascrucial to well-considered policy and peacefulinternational relations. Contemporary demo-cratic theorists (e.g., Habermas 1996) alsoconsider responsiveness to the public to be acornerstone of democratic governance. How-ever, despite the theoretical importance of thepublic’s engagement with foreign policy, so-cial scientists have struggled to consistentlycharacterize the public’s actual role in the for-eign policy process.

The prevailing scholarly consensus inthis area has steadily evolved. Early work

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 43

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

suggested that public opinion was volatileand lacked a coherent structure (Lippmann& Merz 1920, Almond 1950), or that thepublic naively follows elite leadership (Lipset1966, Verba et al. 1967). Over time, a rebuttalemerged from scholars who, while recogniz-ing that typical individuals do not know muchabout politics or foreign policy (Delli-Carpini& Keeter 1996, Holsti 2004), argued that thepublic’s individual and collective behavior wasnonetheless efficient and rational ( Jentleson1992, Page & Shapiro 1992, Popkin 1994).Still, a widespread perception persisted that,most of the time, the public was fundamen-tally incidental to the foreign policy process(Mueller 1973, Holsti & Rosenau 1984, Zaller1994b, Jacobs & Shapiro 2000, Katz 2000).

More recently, however, some scholarshave begun to characterize public opinionas a relatively stable and consistent coun-terweight that policy makers must, or atleast should, take into consideration (Page &Bouton 2006). This scholarly evolution beganwith a revolution—originating in the cogni-tive sciences—in our understanding of whenand how citizens gather, retain, and retrieveinformation, as well as the degree to whichelites are responsive to their preferences.

Scholars have long doubted the electorate’sability to gather and process information ormanifest consistent opinions (Campbell et al.1960, Zaller 1992), especially with respectto foreign affairs (Holsti 2004). An unin-formed public cannot independently evaluatea president’s claims. However, they may over-come this limitation through reliance on in-formational shortcuts (Sniderman et al. 1991,Popkin 1993), most notably the opinions oftrusted political elites, and primarily as re-flected in the mass media (Iyengar & Kinder1987, Krosnick & Kinder 1990, Larson 2000).Nonetheless, some scholars have counteredthat the public can and does remain informedand active in the foreign policy arena (Aldrichet al. 1989, Destler 2001).

Aldrich et al. (2006) assess the overallscholarly understanding of public opinion inthe context of foreign policy in hopes of re-

solving the debate concerning public compe-tence. They conclude that a consensus hasemerged that the public is able to develop andhold coherent views on foreign policy, that cit-izens can and do apply their attitudes to theirelectoral decisions, and that this leads politi-cians to consider the electoral implications oftheir overseas activities.

The question of the public’s informationalcapacity is a crucial foundation underlying ourunderstanding of the foreign policy market-place. Research suggests a consensus aroundtwo key points: (a) Citizens are typically at asignificant informational disadvantage vis-a-vis leadership elites, and (b) they compensateby employing heuristic cues that allow them tomake reasoned judgments with small amountsof information.

Most scholars draw a clear distinction be-tween public opinion on foreign policy in gen-eral, on the one hand, and public opinion inrelation to conflicts or crises, on the other.Whereas the public is typically not closely at-tuned to the details of international politics,crises often appear to attract public attention.This has prompted scholars to ask what role,if any, public opinion actually plays in spe-cific American foreign policy crises. For in-stance, some research suggests public opin-ion influenced US policy toward Nicaragua(Sobel 2001), Somalia (Klarevas 2002), andIraq (Larson & Savych 2005).

As noted, there is a conceptual divide be-tween studies emphasizing short- versus long-term opinion dynamics. In the near term,the public tends to rally behind presidentialforeign policy initiatives, thereby givingpresidents considerable influence over publicopinion (Mueller 1973, Brody 1991); overthe longer term, a separate body of research(Sobel 2001, Baum 2004a, Canes-Wrone2006) suggests that public opinion canconstrain foreign policy. We argue that thesepreviously distinct literatures can be unifiedwithin a market framework. After all, thelonger a conflict lasts, the greater the oppor-tunity for the public to accumulate sufficientinformation to overcome—or at least

44 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

reduce—its informational disadvantage. Toclarify this relationship, we next considershort- and long-term opinion dynamics.

The rally-round-the-flag phenomenon.Political observers have long noted that thepublic often responds positively in the shortterm to military engagements abroad, anda voluminous literature has investigated thevalidity and magnitude of the rally phe-nomenon. Lee (1977, p. 253) notes, “the av-erage man’s reaction [to engagement abroad]will include a feeling of patriotism in sup-porting presidential actions.” Most empiricalupdates and tests confirm the existence of ashort-term rally effect to a greater or lesserextent, and under at least some circumstances( James & Oneal 1991, Oneal & Bryan 1995).Others, however, counter that rallies tend tobe infrequent and ephemeral and thus rarelyof political consequence (Stoll 1984; Onealet al. 1996).

For instance, Baker & Oneal (2001) findno significant evidence of a consistent rallyeffect across 193 US militarized interstate dis-putes (MIDs) between 1933 and 1992. Theydo, however, find evidence of rallies when theUnited States either initiates a dispute or be-haves in an openly revisionist manner. Theyalso find a significant rally effect in full-blownwars and MIDs featured prominently in theNew York Times. They conclude that the sizeof the rally effect depends on how a dispute ispresented, the presence of bipartisan support,and White House spin—findings that fore-shadow our discussion below regarding lead-ership and the media.

Chapman & Reiter (2004) further ex-plore whether the rally effect is more nu-anced than a simple reaction to the use offorce abroad. They find that United Nationsbacking significantly increased the size of therally effect during MIDs between 1945 and2001, suggesting that the public can maintainlongstanding policy preferences—includinga preference for multilateralism. This alsodemonstrates that the public can employ in-formation shortcuts—in this case the “costly”

signal by the typically cautious Security Coun-cil to endorse a military engagement—in as-sessing the wisdom of a foreign policy ac-tion. Interestingly, using the same data, Lai& Reiter (2005) find no evidence of such apreference in Great Britain.

Further demonstrating the importance ofperceived common interests in determiningindividual responses to the use of force, Baum(2002), in a study of major US uses of force be-tween 1953 and 1998, finds stark differencesin individuals’ rally responses depending ontheir party affiliations and the partisan con-figuration of government. He finds that ralliesare mostly limited to opposition party identi-fiers and Independents. The reason is that typ-ically a president’s fellow partisans already ap-prove of his performance prior to a rally event,so they cannot re-evaluate the president’s per-formance upwards. Just such a rally patternemerged following 9/11; nearly all of GeorgeW. Bush’s record 36-point gain in approvalratings occurred among Democrats and In-dependents, majorities of whom had disap-proved of his performance prior to 9/11.

The presence of a rally effect seems to sug-gest a “knee-jerk” public reaction to the use offorce abroad. How can we reconcile this withthe view of public opinion as largely rationaland coherent? The likely answer, reinforcedby an emerging body of research, is that ral-lies, or the absence thereof, may be rationalresponses to the interaction of pre-existing in-dividual preferences with the information en-vironment. For example, Colaresi (2007) de-velops a signaling model to demonstrate thatthe probability of eventual verification andpunishment enhances the credibility of lead-ers’ choices and transmits information aboutthe benefits of a military engagement to thevoting public. This formalizes a longstand-ing insight (Mueller 1973, Lee 1977, Brody1991) that rallies tend to recede in the pres-ence of information that contradicts the ad-ministration’s preferred message, or of signif-icant elite debate on the merits of a policy.In particular, typical individuals look to elitesfrom their own party, whom they consider

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 45

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

most credible—owing to an assumption ofshared preferences—in determining whetherto support the president (Rahn 1993, Lupia &McCubbins 1998, Baum & Groeling 2007).

This suggests that in the face of a signif-icant informational disadvantage, the publicuses elite positions—and particularly those offellow-partisan elites—as a critical cognitiveshortcut. However, they do so only absentevidence undercutting the reliability of thisshortcut. The rally effect results from a mar-ket equilibrium characterized by highly in-formed leaders and a public at a significantinformational disadvantage.

Casualty aversion. In contrast to the rallyliterature, research on the longer-term re-lationship between public opinion and for-eign policy primarily explores the character-istics of the conflicts themselves, particularlythe casualties they engender (Mueller 1973,Gartner & Segura 2000) or public percep-tions regarding their relative success (Feaver& Gelpi 2004, Gelpi et al. 2005; Eichenberg2005). Yet, competing ideas have emergedabout how such relationships might oper-ate. One view holds that the public reactsnegatively to casualties under most circum-stances and that this hampers a consistentand well-considered foreign policy (Mueller1973). Another perspective—somewhat morecompatible with the foreign policy mar-ket framework—holds that the public turnsagainst a conflict if information comes to lightindicating that their delegation of responsi-bility for foreign policy to decision-makingelites is not going well (Larson 2000, Kull &Ramsey 2001).

Mueller (1973) famously argues that publictolerance for casualties follows a roughly log-arithmic function in which small numbers ofcasualties produce large drops in support earlyin a conflict, whereas the public might toler-ate even large numbers of casualties later in aconflict. Recent variants of Mueller’s hypoth-esis suggest that the key factor in determiningthe influence of casualties on public supportis not the raw number of casualties but either

their rate (Slantchev 2004) or trend (Gartner2006).

In one form or another, Mueller’s casualty-aversion hypothesis underlies a recent strandof research on the differences between demo-cratic and autocratic performance in wars. Forinstance, some research suggests that sensi-tivity to negative public reactions to the costsof war—especially casualties—causes demo-cratic leaders to be more cautious than theirautocratic counterparts in initiating militaryconflicts and less credible in their threats touse force in high-risk situations (Filson &Werner 2004). The empirical effect appearsto be that democracies are more likely thanautocracies to win the wars they fight, atleast when such conflicts are relatively brief(Bennett & Stam 1998). It is not, however,clear whether this is because democracies self-select, only entering conflicts they are likely towin (Reiter & Stam 2002), or because they areselected into such conflicts by risk-acceptantadversaries (Filson & Werner 2004).

Scholars have offered a variety of cri-tiques of the casualty-aversion hypothesis.Berinsky (2007) contends that typical indi-viduals are not particularly knowledgeableabout foreign policy events even in wartime.Hence, they tend not to incorporate much fac-tual knowledge—such as casualty levels—intotheir summary judgments about a given event.Rather, he asserts that citizens respond pri-marily to cues from trusted elites regardingthe wisdom of a given foreign policy action(see also Baum & Groeling 2007). Casualtylevels, rates, or trends, in turn, may or maynot significantly influence elite rhetoric.

Jentleson (1992) offers a different critique(see also Jentleson & Britton 1998). The criti-cal factor for Jentleson is not the cost in bloodor treasure, but rather the nature of the mis-sion itself—that is, the “principal policy objec-tive.” He argues that the public will supportconflicts involving traditional military tasks(such as using force to coerce an adversary en-gaged in aggressive action against the UnitedStates or its allies) even at significant cost butwill support more aggressive or less traditional

46 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

missions (such as efforts to depose foreignleaders or humanitarian interventions) only ifthe costs remain low. Larson (2000) supportsJentleson’s central claim that public respon-siveness to casualties is contextual. However,similar to Brody’s (1991) “elite debate” expla-nation for short-term opinion rallies, Larson’scontention hinges on the degree of elite con-sensus surrounding a particular conflict. Ifconsensus is high, public support will remainhigh in the face of casualties; otherwise, pub-lic support may collapse in response to even afew casualties.

Echoing Chapman & Reiter (2004), Kull& Ramsey (2001) argue that the public willsupport a conflict despite casualties if it ob-serves other countries supporting the policy.Feaver & Gelpi (2004) assert that public tol-erance for casualties is a function of the ex-pected probability of success. Evidence fromother studies supports this conclusion, bothwith respect to the war in Iraq (Gelpi et al.2005) and more broadly (Eichenberg 2005).

As Berinsky (2007) and Baum & Groeling(2007) observe, the above studies treat pub-lic opinion largely, if not entirely, as an undif-ferentiated mass. Important variations emergewhen one recognizes that public opinion is notuniform. Gartner & Segura (1998, 2000), forinstance, consider the effects of race in theirinvestigation of public opinion and VietnamWar casualties. They find that the numberof casualties from respondents’ home regionsdisproportionately influenced attitudes aboutthe war. However, although support for thewar declined faster among African Americansthan among whites, the authors find no evi-dence that the racial composition of the casu-alties influences attitudes.

Recent research on framing effects ad-dresses the heterogeneity of public opinion ingreater detail. Druckman (2001) and othersreport that politically sophisticated individu-als are more resistant than political novicesto elites’ efforts to frame information. Oth-ers have considered whether heterogeneity inpublic opinion varies over time. For example,Jacobson (2006) explores the fragmentation

of public opinion during the George W. Bushadministration. He concludes that PresidentBush created historic levels of partisan polar-ization in the electorate, especially vis-a-visIraq. Taken together, these findings suggestthat different segments of the public enter the“market” with differing informational disad-vantages and, consequently, varying propen-sities to “buy” the frames attached by elitesto the messages distributed by the media. Al-though our framework treats public opinion asunitary, these and other related studies high-light the fact that this is merely a simplifyingassumption—intended to enhance conceptualclarity—rather than a faithful representationof reality.

Prior findings on the public’s reaction tocasualties are consistent with our conceptionof foreign policy formulation as a market pro-cess centered on the exchange of information.As we have seen, the public appears to tol-erate casualties more readily in the presenceof elite consensus, multilateral support, andtraditional missions—all clear informationalcues indicating that a mission is likely to beworthwhile. The reciprocal circumstance isequally suggestive: Public support tends tobe more fragile when the public has less ex-perience with the mission and thus requiresgreater information to assess it. In such cases,the public may react quickly and negativelyto the information produced by elite discord,while being especially responsive to the higherinformation content of local casualties.

The missing link between the rally andcasualty-aversion literatures lies in the realiza-tion that the various actors in our marketplacegather information in different ways and, evenmore significantly, at different rates. As wehave seen, the public’s informational disad-vantage makes it susceptible to the framingof information by elites. However, if this dis-advantage wanes, as in a protracted conflict,tolerance for the framing preferred by elitesbegins to break down, and the public assertsitself in the foreign policy arena.

This is, of course, a highly stylized rep-resentation of a vastly complex reality. Yet,

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 47

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

we argue that, in part because of its sim-plicity, it better captures the dynamics of theforeign policy marketplace than the staticsnapshots that have previously dominatedresearch.

Decision Makers

We have considered the dynamics of publicbehavior in the foreign policy marketplaceand found that outcomes are driven, in part,by the supply of and demand for information.The public’s influence on foreign policy ap-pears to be lowest when it is informationallyweakest (typically in early stages of conflicts)but somewhat higher in longer conflicts as theinformation gap dissipates. We next considerhow leaders respond to these market dynam-ics and constraints.

The diversionary use of force. Leaders’ ex-pectations complicate the short-term rela-tionship between public opinion and foreignpolicy. Ample evidence suggests leaders rec-ognize their informational advantage early inconflicts. This recognition can produce anincentive—especially in democracies—to useconflict to manipulate public opinion. This isthe key insight of the diversionary-war liter-ature. The link to the rally phenomenon isclear; a diversionary war aimed at distractingattention from domestic problems or bolster-ing electoral prospects—popularly known asa “wag the dog” scenario—is only likely totempt a leader who anticipates a rally responsefrom the electorate (Baum 2004a). If leadersact on such expectations in systematic ways,this effectively reverses the causal relationshipbetween public opinion and foreign policy.

The internal logic of the diversionary ar-gument is compelling and theoretically wellsupported. For example, Hess & Orphanides(1995) use a principle-agent model to demon-strate that information asymmetry favoringthe president can lead to significant incen-tives for a diversionary use of force. Yet, thecorresponding empirical evidence is decid-edly mixed (Levy 1989). For instance, some

studies have found evidence of politically mo-tivated uses of force by the United States( James & Oneal 1991, Clark 2003, Howell &Pevehouse 2005), but others have not (Moore& Lanoue 2003, Meernik 2004, Potter 2007).Some scholars (e.g., Ostrom & Job 1986,Fordham 1998) report evidence that US pres-idents are more prone to use force abroadwhen their approval ratings are falling. Others(e.g., DeRouen & Peake 2002) suggest thatthe use of force can divert public attentionfrom a bad economy. There is also supportfor ancillary hypotheses derived from the di-versionary argument, again mostly limited tothe US case. Morgan & Bickers (1992) arguethat presidents sometimes respond forcefullyabroad to domestic discontent among theirfellow-partisan constituents. Fordham (2005),in turn, finds that other states moderate theirconflict behavior toward the United Stateswhen US domestic conditions make a diver-sionary use of force more likely.

Nonetheless, clear evidence of a general-ized, cross-national tendency for leaders toemploy diversionary uses of force remainselusive. Scholars have largely failed to findconsistent evidence—particularly in large-N cross-national studies—of leaders outsidethe United States systematically manipulatingpublic opinion by engaging in military activ-ities abroad. For example, although Oneal &Russett (1997) originally reported that sloweconomic growth increased the likelihood ofMIDs in all regime types, subsequent workwith a more complete dataset (Russett &Oneal 2001) fails to replicate this finding.

The discrepancy between the US case andcross-national studies may arise from the pre-viously mentioned short-term nature of therally effect and the uneven distribution of ca-pacity in the international system. Few coun-tries beyond the United States can use force inways visible enough to engender a rally with-out a serious risk of war or prohibitively costlyretaliation.

Conversely, some research suggests thatthe public desire for economic growth may in-duce leaders to avoid military endeavors they

48 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

believe will hinder economic performance(Gelpi & Grieco 2008). Based on a large-N,instrumental variable analysis, Chiozza &Goemans (2004) find that leaders who are in-secure about their reelection prospects are ac-tually less likely to initiate a conflict. Theyargue that some previous work reporting ev-idence of diversionary uses of force suffersfrom a variety of theoretical and methodolog-ical flaws.

Other scholars have raised methodolog-ical critiques of some negative findings inthe diversionary-war literature. For instance,Fordham & Sarver (2001) note that manycross-national studies that fail to find evi-dence for diversionary war (particularly thoseutilizing MIDs as a dependent variable) in-clude Germany and Japan—countries withinstitutional restrictions on using force—intheir analyses, and some even include Iceland,which has no military at all.

Others question whether diversionaryforce is really a threat to democracy or stabil-ity, even if leaders are occasionally tempted toresort to it. Sobel (2001) explores, through aseries of case studies, whether public opinioninfluences US foreign policy. He concludesthat opinion constrains policy but does notdictate it. Oneal & Tir (2006), in turn, ex-plore whether diversionary war poses a sig-nificant threat to the democratic peace. Theyfind that economic conditions—that is, verylow rates of growth—do influence the likeli-hood that a democracy, but not an autocracy,will initiate a MID (including against otherdemocracies). However, as the authors note,the “trigger” growth rates are so low that thepractical significance of this potential motiva-tion is dubious.

In our conception of the foreign policymarketplace, the diversionary argument is themirror image of the rally phenomenon. Theprospect of a short war may occasionallytempt leaders who gamble that the conflictwill not outlast the rally. However, the ever-present possibility that a conflict may drag onmakes using force particularly risky, in partbecause the public may respond negatively

to the casualties such extended conflicts fre-quently engender.

We suspect that the mixed evidence re-garding the diversionary use of force stemsfrom some of the market mechanisms dis-cussed above. Conflict tends to narrow theinformation gap between the public and theirleaders unless it can be concluded rapidly (of-ten an elusive goal). The nontraditional, ag-gressive, or unilateral missions leaders mightinitiate to “wag the dog,” in turn, are the verytypes of conflict most likely to provide cues(such as partisan elite discord) that tend toturn the public against a military engagement.In short, the discrepancy between the em-pirically well-documented rally effect and theambiguous empirical evidence regarding the(logically compelling) diversionary war theorybecomes less puzzling when both are consid-ered within the broader context of a foreignpolicy marketplace.

Still, our picture of this marketplace is notyet complete. How do these informationalcues travel from leaders to the public? How doleaders monitor public opinion? Such ques-tions appear to open a window for the massmedia to mediate the relationship betweenpublic opinion and foreign policy leadershipas a discrete third actor in the foreign policymarketplace.

Mass Media

We have outlined how information asym-metry largely dictates the dynamics betweenthe public and its leaders in the foreign pol-icy marketplace—specifically the degree towhich the public is informationally disadvan-taged, thereby allowing leaders to sustain theirpreferred frames on information. The mediaplay the crucial role of collecting, framing,and distributing information—the key marketcommodity.

Without question, leaders place greatvalue on controlling this commodity. BryanG. Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Media Operations, observed withrespect to the Pentagon’s policy of embedding

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 49

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

reporters within US combat units in Iraq in2003, “Our goal was to dominate the infor-mation market . . .” (Carr 2003).

The traditional view of the media—especially in political science—as a mostly ac-commodating conduit for elite messages isbuilt on a simplifying assumption that the me-dia serve primarily as a linkage mechanismrather than as an independent, strategic ac-tor in the policy-making process (Malek 1996,Brody 1991, Bloch & Lehman-Wilzig 2002).The best-known variant of this perspectiveholds that the media “index” their coverageto elite rhetoric in Washington (Hallin 1986,Bennett 1990, Bennett et al. 2006). Some re-search from outside political science, how-ever, suggests that the media may be moreproactive than indexing theories suggest. Forexample, the political communication “gate-keeper” literature (White 1950, Galtung &Ruge 1965, Patterson 1993) shows that jour-nalists shape news by determining the news-worthiness of stories. This suggests the mediamay well present an unrepresentative sampleof elite rhetoric. This potential for bias in-creases with the heightened prominence ofmore-partisan “new” media outlets (Baum &Groeling, unpublished manuscript).

The indexing hypothesis has provendurable in part because media do frequentlytransmit elite messages with largely intactframes. As noted, the public is typically ill-informed and so unmotivated to object. Thus,the information equilibrium tends to favorleaders, and, hence, the media are more re-sponsive to leaders’ preferences than to thoseof the public. Consequently, although index-ing theories are well-supported when the cri-terion for evaluation is the frequency withwhich the media transmit elite messages, thisoverlooks the market dynamic through whichthe prevailing equilibrium can shift from onefavoring leaders to one favoring the public.

In contrast to the passive-media assump-tion implicit in much of the indexing litera-ture, in the foreign policy market the mediaplay a critical role in these shifts when theyoccur. In fact, as the primary link between

leaders and the public, the media are a cen-tral actor in the foreign policy marketplace.The nature of this link is not well captured bythe conveyor-belt analogy. Within the marketframework, the media are more aptly charac-terized as a middleman or trader of informa-tion, simultaneously beholden to two actorswhose interests often conflict: leaders and thepublic. The media primarily rely on leadersfor access to information, that is, for their sup-ply of the key market commodity. However,this information usually comes prepackagedin a frame that leaders would prefer that themedia retain.

Of course, the media are equally relianton the demand of the public as the ultimateconsumers of this information. In their roleas democratic citizens, members of the publichave an interest in obtaining unframed (i.e.,objective) information. Understanding howthe media respond to these competing marketpressures is the key to unlocking the foreignpolicy process as a dynamic phenomenon.

As when we sought to account for short-and long-term public opinion, we argue thatthe market framework can account for boththe relatively passive media that seem to pre-dominate under many circumstances and themore proactive media that sometimes emerge.The equilibrium between leaders and the pub-lic in the foreign policy marketplace accountsfor this variance.

Despite a widely held belief in the me-dia’s mission to inform (e.g., Bennett 1997,Patterson 2000), they do not consistently actto remedy the informational inequities in theforeign policy marketplace. Rather, they re-act in ways that tend to exacerbate the pre-vailing trend. Early in conflicts—and espe-cially major conflicts (Baker & Oneal 2001,Chapman & Reiter 2004)—when the public isinformationally disadvantaged and thus mostinclined to rally ’round the flag, the media areleast likely to naysay; to the contrary, the me-dia provide what the market equilibrium dic-tates. The public is sold the rally message it ispredisposed to buy, while the media preservetheir relationship with leaders who prefer that

50 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

they retain the rally frame. In this light,the market framework seems consistent withZaller & Chiu’s (2000) finding that the me-dia often rally along with the public whenconflicts arise because of their dependenceon authoritative sources for information—primarily the White House and executiveagencies. Similarly, the market frameworkseems consonant with Entman’s (2003) argu-ment that the media are most likely to inde-pendently influence foreign policy when lead-ers debate over what he terms contestableframes for a given policy action—that is, cul-turally ambiguous frames subject to multipleinterpretations (e.g., whether the Iraq Warand its aftermath constitute liberation or oc-cupation). In contrast, the media are leastlikely to exert independent influence whenleaders employ culturally congruent frames—that is, frames congruent with schemas habit-ually employed by most citizens. An exampleis President Bush’s post-9/11 characterizationof Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda as “evil do-ers.” Such culturally congruent frames are ex-tremely difficult for the media to challenge(Entman 2003).

When leaders employ culturally congruentframes, the public’s information disadvantageis exacerbated by the one-dimensional toneof media coverage. The media provide whatthe market demands: coverage consonant witha dominant and culturally congruent frameoffered by the administration. In contrast,when leaders debate over contestable frames,the media hasten the dissipation of the pub-lic’s informational disadvantage, as the “fram-ing war” (i.e., elite debate) exposes citizensto more and more varied information. Inthe absence of a clear market demand for asingle, dominant frame, the media offer mul-tiple frames to satisfy diverse consumer pref-erences. In doing so, they narrow the infor-mation gap between leaders and the public,thereby increasing the potential for the pub-lic to influence policy. This understanding ofthe media’s role makes it possible to synthe-size a variety of literatures on the media withinone coherent conceptual framework.

The notion of a media responsive to mar-ket pressures emanating from public opinionconflicts with the widely held belief that themedia in a democracy should fulfill a “watch-dog” function (Patterson 2000). However, thecapacity of the media to fulfill this role is sub-ject to debate (Baum 2003; Hamilton 2003;Zaller, unpublished manuscript). Most earlywork, representing the intellectual precur-sor of contemporary indexing theories, arguesthat the media’s reliance on official sourcesleads them to essentially parrot the infor-mation obtained from decision-making elites(Cohen 1963). Reporters who spend years asWhite House correspondents become cap-tured by the institution and beholden to theadministration for the high levels of accessgranted to them. More recent observers havenoted the media’s reliance on packaged news,particularly in the form of pictures or videofootage, which the White House Press Of-fice is uniquely able to provide and thereby“spin” (Iyengar & Reeves 1997, Graber 2002).Others, however, counter that media relianceon elite framing has declined in recent years.Livingston & Bennett (2003), for instance, as-sess whether new technology renders newsproducers less dependent on government of-ficials to cue and frame political content; theyfind technology has led to a rise in event-driven news stories, although official sourcesremain important to media coverage.

The CNN effect. Some scholars and jour-nalists have argued that recent technicalchanges, culminating in the 24-hour newscycle, have fundamentally altered the rela-tionship between public opinion and foreignpolicy—a phenomenon commonly referredto as the “CNN effect” (Gilboa 2005).3 Ac-cording to early proponents of this perspec-tive (Sharkey 1993, Maren 1994), citizens,shocked by dramatic, real-time television

3The term “CNN effect” emerged before competing 24-hour news networks (e.g., FOX, MSNBC) appeared. Re-cent studies use it as shorthand to refer to a wide array ofnews outlets.

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 51

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

images of suffering and hardship, may demandthat their leaders “do something” to alleviatethe problem, thereby pressuring politiciansto act in circumstances where they otherwisewould not. A closely related corollary holdsthat the 24-hour news cycle pressures leadersto react more rapidly to events than in prioreras, in order to appear responsive to the pub-lic and in control of the situation (Robinson2000, 2001). Such pressures could compro-mise traditional diplomacy, especially in situ-ations where deliberate, or “quiet,” diplomacyis most crucial (Wolfsfeld 2004).

Integral to this argument is the belief thatthe 24-hour news cycle is fundamentally dif-ferent from previous formats because it trans-mits dramatic, vivid images to consumers innear-real time. In the context of the mar-ket framework, scholars were concerned thatthe CNN effect might fundamentally alterthe market equilibrium; however, the realityseems not to have proven so stark.

In theory, the CNN effect could be ex-pected to shift the market equilibrium in favorof the public by more rapidly providing in-formation, thereby undermining elite frames.Thus, the duration and magnitude of the pub-lic’s informational disadvantage—during pe-riods when the media primarily transmit offi-cially framed information—could be expectedto shrink as the speed and volume of newsincreases. Similarly, the need to fill airtimewith varied content might lead the media tomove beyond government-framed informa-tion more quickly.

The literature notes several cases in whichwe might expect the CNN effect to play arole, but that fail to either prove or disprovethe thesis. For example, Moeller (1999) con-cludes in the case of Rwanda that the mediadid not function in the way that the CNNeffect would seem to suggest that it shouldhave. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia isoften cited as the quintessential example of theCNN effect. Yet Mermin (1997) and others(Livingston & Eachus 1995–1996, Robinson2001, Baum 2004b) found that in the So-malia intervention the media took their cue

from political leaders, rather than the otherway around. These scholars attribute the in-tervention to pressure from decision-makingelites, including key members of Congressand officials within the administration itself.Robinson (2001, p. 941) describes the Soma-lia case as representing an “illusion of a newsdriven media intervention.”

Elsewhere, Robinson (2000) argues thatmedia-driven interventions are generally im-probable. In subsequent research (Robinson2002), he refines the original CNN-effect the-sis, arguing that sympathetic news coverageat key moments in foreign crises can influ-ence the response of western governments.Gilboa’s (2005) comprehensive review of theconsiderable body of theoretical and empiri-cal work in this area finds that “scholarly andprofessional studies of the CNN effect presentmixed, contradictory, and confusing results”(p. 34), and no theory has satisfactorily speci-fied its parameters or properties.

For those seeking to precisely define andmeasure a CNN effect, the major challengelies not in determining whether the rela-tionship between media and policy is chang-ing (most agree that it is), but in elucidatingthe nature of the change and in determiningwhether the 24-hour news cycle is respon-sible for it. A number of other changes inthe international system are discussed as com-peting candidate explanations. Entman (2003)argues that the relationship between decision-making elites and the media has changed con-siderably since the end of the Cold War.Others have suggested that 9/11 produced asimilar transition (Zelizer & Allan 2002).

Hindman (2004) applies “media system de-pendency theory” to the analysis of publicopinion regarding the performance of boththe media and the president before and af-ter 9/11. He finds that partisan differencesbecome stronger predictors of presidentialapproval after terrorist attacks. Hutchesonet al. (2004) find that following 9/11, govern-ing elites articulated particularly nationalis-tic themes. They suggest that this emphasiswas explicitly aimed at uniting public opinion

52 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

behind the war on terror. Similarly, Robinson(2005) argues that current events (e.g., the waron terror and the war in Iraq), combined withstrengthened media management by the gov-ernment, have undermined the CNN effectand reinstated some of the media deferencethat characterized the Cold War.

The implication seems to be that the CNNeffect, to the extent it ever existed, was a tem-porary phenomenon made possible by the co-incidental confluence of new technology andthe absence of a coherent geopolitical threat.These arguments likely combine to explainwhy the CNN effect seems to have had a sig-nificantly less transformative effect than earlyscholarship anticipated.

Elite media and media as an elite. Severalauthors have suggested a distinction betweenthe elite and the popular media, which may re-spond in different ways to the forces outlinedabove (Paletz 2002, Baum 2003). It is perhapsunsurprising that there might be a divisionin the media along this faultline, given thesometimes wide opinion gaps between elitesand the public (Page & Barabas 2000, Page& Bouton 2006). Such a possibility compli-cates the stylized market framework, whichtreats the media as unitary. However, relaxingthis assumption might help further accountfor the media’s tendency toward deference toelites, at least under many circumstances.

Elite media are thought to play a more ac-tive role in the shaping of elite opinion and,through it, foreign policy. For example, Tifft& Jones (1999) find that leaders often lack in-dependent access to news and information andso rely on the media to inform them of impor-tant emerging events (see also Powlick 1995).More directly, the editorial content of elitepublications such as the Wall Street Journaland Foreign Affairs influences the thinking ofleaders about foreign policy issues. Decisionmakers rely on these sources for factual in-formation as well as informed opinion (Ferre1980, Malek 1996).

The records of former presidents are re-plete with examples of media shaping the in-

formation and opinions of leaders. We see thisin the extensive newspaper clippings found inarchives of past decision makers as well as inmore direct correspondence. For instance, atthe height of the 1956 Suez Crisis, MerrillMueller, an NBC correspondent and host,wrote the following to President Eisenhower:

Because I feel the attached [notes froman interview with British Foreign SecretarySelwyn Lloyd] is so important to our govern-ment at this time, I send you herewith one ofmy own copies of a report of mine that is nowbeing distributed . . . . [W]henever I stumbleon anything as critical as the attached youwill hear from me. (Mueller 1956)

Mueller’s letter illustrates how the me-dia can, at least sometimes, directly influencethe information available to and hence opin-ions of leadership, even at the highest level.It also suggests that the distinction betweendecision-making and media elites is less clearthan most theoretical models imply. In theabove-cited letter, Mueller is clearly nominat-ing himself for a position in the administra-tion, and although he himself did not makethis leap, others have. A prominent recent ex-ample is Tony Snow, who left his position as ananchor on the FOX News Channel to becomeWhite House Press Secretary. The academicliterature has noted this cross-fertilization andits implications for the capacity of the mediato function as the “fourth estate” (Holsti &Rosenau 1984, Reilly 1995).

The mass news audience demands localhuman-interest stories, political stories thatcan be framed as a “horserace,” and so-called“soft news” (Baum 2003, Hamilton 2003);the general public does not typically demandto be informed about foreign policy. How-ever, as noted, scholars (e.g., Patterson 2000)have long argued that the media has a partlyself-imposed, but also constitutionally pre-scribed, mission to inform the public. Whenthis mission complements the ability to sell,the media are likely to use the salable story aspeg to inform. However, the degree to which

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 53

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

informing and selling coincide dependslargely on whether the media are able to framethe news in a way that appeals to its buyers:the public.

Hallin (1986) suggests that the media donot report on items on which there is near uni-versal agreement; nor do they report on ideasthat lie beyond the “sphere of legitimate con-troversy.” Others have suggested that an issueis likely to resonate with the public if largesegments of the citizenry perceive it as affect-ing them. Neuman et al. (1992) find that theelectorate’s relative lack of interest in foreignrelations results from the perceived distancebetween overseas events and their day-to-daylives.

Some of the lessons learned in the commu-nication literature about public preferencesin media coverage help explain why the pub-lic occasionally takes interest in a given for-eign policy issue and why the media period-ically begin to report on it. For example, asdiscussed above, casualties may both attractpeople’s attention to foreign policy and turnthem sharply against it. The mechanisms bywhich this occurs remain somewhat unclear,but viewing the media as an actor in a broaderforeign policy market clarifies some of them.For instance, the media tend to frame ca-sualties in terms of local losses, flag-drapedcaskets, and grieving American families. Inshort, casualties transform a foreign engage-ment into a domestic issue, making foreigncrises seem close to home and to local com-munities (Aldrich et al. 1989). This attentionthen acts as a peg on which the media canhang more general stories on the conflict thathad previously seemed distant to the public,thereby priming the public to assess whetheran engagement is worth the cost.

SYNTHESIS: DEFINING THEFOREIGN POLICY MARKET

Our market formulation builds on other re-cent work that incorporates the interactionsof the media, leadership, and public opin-ion into a single model. Examples include

“activation” models of public opinion(Powlick & Katz 1998) and “cascade” models(Entman 2003). In this section, we argue thatgaining additional insight into foreign policyformulation requires moving from episodicto consistent incorporation of the role ofmedia into our theoretical models.

Previous Attempts at Synthesis

As we have seen, absent the market frame-work or some other unifying concept, it isdifficult to delineate clear relationships be-tween leadership, the media, and public opin-ion. The seeming circularity of these inter-actions has inspired work questioning, “Wholeads whom?” For instance, Canes-Wrone(2006) argues that presidents typically appealto public opinion on issues the public is likelyto support, but do so primarily when theythemselves advocate such issues. Presidentsaim such appeals at gaining leverage vis-a-visCongress. She sees this as a benign process bywhich both the public interest and the presi-dent’s policy preferences become law, at leastwhen the two coincide. Domke et al. (2006)explore the role of “going public” in the pas-sage of the Patriot Act. They argue that po-litical elites’ capacity to manipulate the mediamessages that reach the public is greatest intimes of national crisis or upheaval.

In perhaps the most comprehensive anal-ysis of the dynamic interactions between theactors in the foreign policy market, Entman’s(2003) cascade model attempts to clarify howelites pass information to the media, and sub-sequently to the public, and the inevitablepushback that occurs in the process. Entmanobserves that much of the literature incorpo-rates an implicit model, along the followinglines: (1) government interacts with the me-dia; (2) the media tell people what to believe;and (3) people provide minor feedback to themedia.

However, he argues that reality does not fitthese stylized assumptions well. Historically,the media have varied from lapdog to watch-dog with some regularity. The traditional

54 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

model has difficulty explaining these tran-sitions. Entman’s more complex model at-tempts to account for the interactions be-tween the White House, the rhetoric thatreaches the media, the media’s framing of thisrhetoric, and the public response. All this isfurther complicated by feedback loops andinteractions.

Entman shows that the present alignmentbetween the media, the public, and the admin-istration is far less reliable and stable than themore rigid framework of the Cold War. Heargues that variations in cultural congruence,power, strategy, and motivation imply a con-tinuum in the media-administration relation-ship, ranging from instances where the me-dia essentially distribute the administration’smessage, at one end, to cases where they arequite critical and emphasize a contrary frame,at the other. This overall assessment is notreassuring for those who believe public opin-ion can or should positively influence foreignpolicy. In Entman’s (2003) model, elite fram-ing and spin remain dominant despite recentevents and advances in technology that somesuggest have favored the public (see above).

Entman’s work builds on Powlick & Katz’s(1998) activation model of the American pub-lic opinion/foreign policy nexus. Powlick &Katz argue that public opinion is typically la-tent and inactive, leaving leaders a free hand inmost circumstances to conduct policy as theysee fit. However, they suggest that, under lim-ited circumstances, foreign policy issues may“activate” public attention; a process typicallyprompted by elite debate and major mediacoverage emphasizing frames compatible withstanding public interests (in Entman’s terms,“culturally congruent” frames).

Powlick & Katz suggest that the processof activation begins when expert commenta-tors deviate from the government’s positionon foreign policy. This forces the governmentto engage the public in order to enlist supporton the issue. If this defection spreads to a widerarray of credible elites, then the governmentmay lose its ability to effectively manage pub-lic opinion.

These studies have taken important stepstoward synthesizing the interrelated litera-tures we consider here, and are therefore inmany respects the forebears of our marketframework.4 For example, in order to under-score the empirical observation that the me-dia only occasionally assert an independentframe on administration rhetoric, and do soonly under a fairly restrictive set of condi-tions, Entman (2003) models the media as aperiodic actor in his cascade. Our dynamicmarket framework takes this arrangement asa starting point. However, by incorporatingthe role of information in determining marketequilibria, it captures the media’s ubiquitouspresence in the foreign policy process—eitheras lapdog or watchdog. In short, the marketframework builds on prior research, offeringadditional insight into the dynamic nature offoreign policy process by introducing the con-cept of market equilibrium and thereby ac-counting for the seemingly contrasting rolesof leaders, the public, and the media identifiedby previous scholars.

This approach is informed by a long-standing scholarly literature (e.g., Key 1961,Rosenau 1961, Zaller 1994a)—highlighted byPowlick & Katz (1998)—that suggests latent(or “prospective”) public opinion exerts a con-stant influence as leaders anticipate potentialfuture public reactions to their current poli-cies. To the extent democratic leaders alwaysconsider whether and how the public is likelyto react to their policies over the longer-term,we believe public opinion—the “big club be-hind the door” (Weingast 1984)—will nearlyalways influence foreign policy decision

4However, it is important to bear in mind exactly whateach attempt at synthesis is attempting to accomplish.Entman’s (2003) cascade model more closely approaches afully formed theory than our conceptual framework, whichdoes not make any specific claims of cause and effect. (In-deed, we argue that causality is typically multi-directional.)Powlick & Katz (1998) also do not propose a theory ofcause and effect, but rather a framework for understand-ing media activation in the opinion-policy relationship. Inthis regard, our enterprise more closely resembles that ofPowlick & Katz.

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 55

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

making, albeit to varying degrees and oftenindirectly. More significantly, we view foreignpolicy as the equilibrium outcome of a marketprocess.

The Foreign Policy Marketplace

As noted, much of the difficulty in developinga coherent model of the foreign policy pro-cess results from conceptualizing leadership,public opinion, or the media independentlyfrom the broader context of the foreign pol-icy marketplace. The difficulty increases whenwe try to model these relationships as sequen-tial actions. Doing so blurs a dynamic charac-terized by expectations, anticipated reactions,and constant updating. Consequently, we haveoutlined some of the ways in which the foreignpolicy process shares important elements incommon with marketplaces as we understandthem in the study of economics. Both con-texts involve the convergence of actors andinformation on points of equilibrium, ratherthan linear causal chains. We have traced therough outline of how this market might work;we now offer a more concise summation.

Of the three primary actors in the foreignpolicy marketplace, two—the public and itsleaders—are interested in creating policy thatsuits their interests and preferences, whichare sometimes at odds. When these interestsare at odds, the ability to influence policyvaries with the relative amount of informa-tion (again, the primary market commodity)held by each actor. In a democracy, the elec-torate holds fundamental power. Yet, in in-ternational affairs, leaders typically enjoy asubstantial informational advantage. In manycases, this allows them to effectively dictateforeign policy.

As the third actor in the marketplace, themedia act as traders of information. On thesupply side, they are beholden to leaders formuch of the content of the news (their prod-uct) and therefore are under pressure to pre-serve elites’ preferred framing of informa-tion. However, on the demand side, they areequally beholden to the public as the con-

sumers of this information, and the public’sinterest frequently lies in seeing beyond thesevery frames. Thus, the media walk a fine line—paying enough deference to elite frames tomaintain access, while deviating enough togenerate and maintain public interest in thenews. Foreign policy outcomes result fromthe delicate equilibrium that emerges betweenthese competing forces. In theory, we shouldbe able to understand and scientifically ana-lyze these equilibria—just as we do the equi-libria between supply and demand in tradi-tional economic markets—by observing therelative distribution of information among theprimary market actors.

Such a market formulation of the for-eign policy process accounts for the fact thatdecision-making elites and the media are mo-tivated by goals other than the dispassion-ate transmission of objective information tothe electorate. Many communication scholars(e.g., Bennett 1997, Patterson 2000) view suchtransmission as a key ingredient of a functionaldemocracy, and the political science litera-ture (e.g., Jentleson 1992, Zaller 1992, Brody1991) often assumes such a function. Yet, thegovernment has little political or institutionalincentive to provide “unframed” information,and because news content is determined bythe vicissitudes of the marketplace, the newsmedia are arguably not well suited for this role(Hamilton 2003; Zaller 2003 and unpublishedmanuscript).

Nonetheless, elite messages are necessar-ily about something. Hence, on some level,and to at least some degree, objective real-ity or facts must enter the marketplace. Ofcourse, in the interaction between the eliteswho supply framed messages and the mediathat transmit them, the precise nature of real-ity is nearly always subject to debate. We re-fer to this as the elasticity of reality, which wedefine as the range within which events canbe spun, or framed, without inducing a sig-nificant backlash from the public. Similarly,Rosenau (1961, p. 36) writes of the “outer lim-its within which decisionmakers and opinionmakers feel constrained to operate.”

56 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

The public is typically slow to demand ac-countability on foreign policy issues (Rosenau1961, Zaller 1994a), but when it finds that re-ality has been stretched too far, the reactioncan be swift and severe. The costs are veryhigh for leaders who provide, and the mediathat transmit, messages that overstretch theelasticity of reality. This does not imply that,over time, reality trumps framing. The pub-lic rarely observes reality directly, especially inthe realm of foreign affairs. Rather, the publicobserves and responds to a framed represen-tation of reality, in both the short and longerterm (Baum & Groeling 2007).

In the initial stages of a foreign policyevent, when elites have a substantial informa-tional advantage, the public’s perception ofreality is very elastic. This frequently allowsa president to dominate the so-called “fram-ing war.” Over time, as events unfold and thepublic gathers more information, the degreeof elasticity diminishes, opening a space foralternative frames to influence public opin-ion. If some entrepreneurs (e.g., journalists)elect to proffer an alternative frame, it standsa better chance of competing with the presi-dent’s preferred frame, so long as it does notstray beyond the ever-shrinking elasticity ofreality.

Events surrounding the conflict in Iraqprovide a case in point. Whatever the “truth,”the public, over time, arrived at a seem-ingly firm conviction that the Bush admin-istration’s justifications for the war exceededthe elasticity of reality. The resulting fallouttook the form of plummeting approval ratingsfor President Bush and the loss by his partyof the Congress in the 2006 midterm elec-tion. Evidence of a preemptive media effortto prevent a comparable antimedia backlashcan be seen in the New York Times’ wave ofintrospection—following the revelation thatthere were no weapons of mass destructionin Iraq—concerning how and why it had ac-cepted the administration’s preferred framesso uncritically.

Slantchev (2006) shows why the ever-present and implicit threat of public back-

lash might consistently, rather than sporad-ically, influence the behavior of leaders viaanticipation of public reactions. His formalmodel links the electorate’s theoretical capac-ity to sanction leaders (given full informa-tion) to the logic of domestic audience costs(Fearon 1994). Slantchev (2006) argues thatbecause an independent media can functionas a relatively unbiased, and hence credible,information source, it can facilitate publicmonitoring—the ultimate source of audiencecosts (Schultz 2001, Baum 2004a)—of leaders’foreign policy actions. This makes it easier todetermine when a leader should be punishedfor a policy failure. In other words, a free pressnarrows the information gap between leadersand the public.

Slantchev’s theory represents an importantcontribution to the process of delineating themechanisms underlying our hypothesized for-eign policy market. However, additional the-oretical and empirical work remains to firstconcretely establish and then fully explicatethe functions and policy implications of thismarket process.

CONCLUSION

The next important scholarly step forwardin explicating the relationship between pub-lic opinion and foreign policy requires an im-portant conceptual refinement. Models of thepolicy formulation process must elevate themass media from the role of a conveyor beltto that of an independent, strategic actor (assome of the communications literature does).Additionally, rather than continuing to rep-resent this process through standard linearmodels that (with relatively few exceptions)predominate in the literature, we believe amarket equilibrium approach is more concep-tually faithful and thus will ultimately provemore empirically fruitful.

In the early stages of research on the re-lationships between the public, leaders, andthe media in the foreign policy arena, schol-ars concentrated on delineating the causalpathways among these actors. This approach

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 57

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

yielded many important insights, but thebroader theoretical framework remained ob-scured. We believe this framework is bestcharacterized as a marketplace in which therelative distribution of information amongthese three actors in large part determinestheir relative influence on foreign policy.The market framework allows us to synthe-size many disparate findings in the literature,thereby revealing the proverbial “hidden facein the picture.”

However, this synthesis represents only apreliminary step. A number of avenues forfuture research remain. For example, to en-hance analytic traction, we treated the mediaas a unitary actor. This is obviously not de-scriptively accurate, and especially not in thecontemporary era of 24-hour cable news net-works, Internet blogs, and soft news (Baum2003; Hamilton 2003; Baum & Groeling, un-published manuscript). Yet, as noted, most re-search on public opinion and foreign policytreats “the mass media” as precisely that: anundifferentiated mass.

A potentially fruitful avenue for futureresearch would thus entail unpacking thisunitary-actor assumption, to consider the im-plications, only briefly alluded to herein, ofincreasingly niche-oriented and sometimesovertly partisan new media outlets. For in-stance, media fragmentation increasingly al-lows citizens to primarily expose themselves toinformation that reinforces their pre-existingbeliefs. In an unpublished manuscript, Baum& Groeling conjecture that self-selection bycitizens into ideologically “friendly” mediaenvironments may complicate future presi-dents’ efforts to forge sustainable bipartisanconsensus behind their foreign policy ini-tiatives. In the context of the foreign pol-icy marketplace, such selective exposure mayslow the narrowing of the information gapbetween leaders and the public, and hencealso slow the tightening of the elasticity ofreality.

This review has primarily focused on theUnited States, largely because the literatureis centered on the American context. How-

ever, the dynamics we describe have obvi-ous implications for the relationship betweenthe media, public opinion, and foreign pol-icy in other nations. In fact, comparative re-search in this area is rapidly proliferating (e.g.,Risse-Kappen 1991, Arian et al. 1992, Cohen1995, Morgan & Anderson 1999, Isernia et al.2002). Such an extension is long overdue, asit will enhance our understanding of foreignpolicy in other countries and provide a moregeneralized conceptualization of the ways inwhich media interact with public opinion toproduce foreign policy in democracies.

Also along comparative lines, there is muchroom for additional research on the rela-tionship between the foreign policy formu-lation process within and across regime types.Research within regime types might explorethe implications of different democratic in-stitutional forms (e.g., Risse-Kappen 1991)or of different media systems (e.g., Hallin &Mancini 2004) for the media-opinion-policyconnection. For instance, some research sug-gests a positive relationship between the num-ber of political parties in a democracy andboth the extent and diversity of public af-fairs content in the media (Moosbrugger, un-published manuscript), and, consequently, inthe public’s level of political sophistication(Schmitt-Beck 2003). The implication is that,due in significant measure to the enhancedrole of the media as political information bro-kers, electoral systems that typically producelarger numbers of parties (i.e., proportionalrepresentation systems) tend to be associatedwith greater public constraint on governmentpolicy making.

Comparisons across regime types mightinvestigate how the foreign policy market-places of democracies and autocracies dif-fer, and with what implications. We are onlybeginning to understand the marketplace indemocracies; extending this framework to au-tocracies may reveal important links betweenthe literatures addressed herein and the ex-pansive democratic peace literature. Earlyresearch in this area indicates that mediaopenness may play an important role in the

58 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

“Kantian” peace (Choi & James 2006; Baum,unpublished manuscript). Scholars have paidcomparatively little attention to the role of themedia in autocracies. Yet some recent research(Stein, unpublished manuscript) suggests that,at least under some circumstances, the mediacan play an important role in the public policyprocess even in autocracies.

In another potential avenue for future re-search suggested by our market framework,recent real-world cases indicate that the in-formation gap between the public and its lead-ers can narrow at very different rates depend-ing (presumably) on the nature of the crisisand the rhetoric that surrounds it. We haveidentified some potential cues that might af-fect this rate (e.g., casualties and elite discord).More work is needed, however, to explicatethe relationship between these factors and this

narrowing process. What motivates the pub-lic to acquire and incorporate new informa-tion across a broad range of foreign policysituations?

Scholars have learned a great deal aboutthe interrelationship between the mass me-dia, public opinion, and elite decision makers.Yet, as we have described, the daunting—andin some respects perhaps impossible—task ofdelineating clear causal pathways has con-strained this advance. Recent research (e.g.,Entman 2003, Powlick & Katz 1998) hasbegun to move beyond the limitations im-posed by linear causal frameworks. Our pro-posed market framework is aimed at break-ing through this conceptual wall once and forall, in the hope of facilitating a new avenue ofresearch in this critically important aspect ofdemocratic politics.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The authors are not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity ofthis review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors thank the following individuals for valuable comments and suggestions on earlydrafts of this manuscript: Alyssa Barrett, Jeffrey Cohen, Ben Fordham, Scott Gartner, PatrickJames, and an anonymous referee. We are solely responsible for any remaining errors oromissions.

LITERATURE CITED

Aldrich JH, Gelpi C, Feaver P, Reifler J, Sharp KT. 2006. Foreign policy and the electoralconnection. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 9:477–502

Aldrich JH, Sullivan JL, Borgida E. 1989. Foreign affairs and issue voting: Do presidentialcandidates ‘waltz before a blind audience’? Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83(1):123–41

Almond GA. 1950. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Harcourt BraceArian A, Shamir M, Venura R. 1992. Public opinion and political change—Israel and the

Intifada. Comp. Polit. 24(3):317–34Baker WD, Oneal JR. 2001. Patriotism or opinion leadership?: The nature and origins of the

“rally ’round the flag” effect. J. Confl. Resolut. 44(5):661–87Baum MA. 2002. The constituent foundations of the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon. Int.

Stud. Q. 46:263–98Baum MA. 2003. Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New

Media Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 59

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

Baum MA. 2004a. Going private: presidential rhetoric, public opinion, and the domestic politicsof audience costs in U.S. foreign policy crises. J. Confl. Resolut. 48:603–31

Baum MA. 2004b. How public opinion constrains the use of force: the case of OperationRestore Hope. Pres. Stud. Q. 34:187–226

Baum MA. 2006. Getting the message: information transparency and the domestic politics of militarizeddisputes. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Polit. Sci. Assoc., Philadelphia, PA

Baum MA, Groeling T. 2007. Crossing the water’s edge: elite rhetoric, media coverage and the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon, 1979–2003. John F. Kennedy School Gov. Faculty Res. Work.Pap. Ser. #RWP07–013

Baum MA, Groeling T. Shot by the messenger: an experimental examination of the effects of partycues on public opinion regarding national security and war. Unpubl. ms.

Bennett WL. 1990. Toward a theory of press-state relations in the United States. J. Commun.40:103–25

Bennett WL. 1997. News: The Politics of Illusion. New York: Longman. 3rd ed.Bennett WL, Lawrence RG, Livingston S. 2006. None dare call it torture: indexing and the

limits of press independence in the Abu Ghraib scandal. J. Commun. 56:467–85Bennett DS, Stam AC III. 1998. The declining advantage of democracy: a combined model of

war outcomes and duration. J. Confl. Resolut. 42(3):344–66Berinsky A. 2007. Assuming the costs of war: events, elites, and American public support for

military conflict. J. Polit. 69: In pressBloch Y, Lehman-Wilzig S. 2002. An exploratory model of media-government relations. In

Media and Conflict, ed. E Gilboa, pp. 153–69. New York: TransnationalBrody RA. 1991. Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support. Stanford,

CA: Stanford Univ. PressBush GW. 2003. President Bush, Kenyan President Kibaki discuss state visit. White House

press availability. Transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031006-3.html

Campbell A, Converse PE, Miller WE, Stokes DE. 1960. The American Voter. New York: Wiley.573 pp.

Canes-Wrone B. 2006. Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public. Chicago: Univ.Chicago Press

Carr D. 2003. War news from MTV and People magazine. NY Times March 27, p. B14Chapman TL, Reiter D. 2004. The United Nations Security Council and the rally ’round the

flag effect. J. Confl. Resolut. 48:886–909Chiozza G, Goemans HE. 2004. International conflict and the tenure of leaders: Is war still ex

post inefficient? Am. J. Polit. Sci. 48(3):604–19Choi SW, James P. 2006. Media openness, democracy and militarized interstate disputes: an

empirical analysis. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 37:23–46Clark DH. 2003. Can strategic interaction divert diversionary behavior? A model of U.S.

conflict propensity. J. Polit. 65:1013–39Cohen BC. 1963. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. PressCohen BC. 1995. Democracies and Foreign Policy: Public Participation in the United States and the

Netherlands. Madison: Univ. Wisc. PressColaresi M. 2007. The benefit of the doubt. Int. Organ. 61(1):99–143Delli-Carpini M, Keeter S. 1996. What Americans Know About Politics and Why it Matters. New

Haven, CT: Yale Univ. PressDeRouen K, Peake J. 2002. The dynamics of diversion: the domestic implications of presidential

use of force. Int. Interact. 28:191–211

60 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

Destler IM. 2001. The reasonable public and the polarized policy process. In The Real andthe Ideal: Essays on International Relations in Honor of Richard H. Ullman, ed. A Lake, DOchmanek, pp. 75–90. New York: Rowman & Littlefield

Domke D, Graham ES, Coe K, John SL, Coopman T. 2006. Going public as political strategy:the Bush administration, an echoing press, and passage of the Patriot Act. Polit. Commun.23(3):291–312

Doyle MW. 1986. Liberalism and world politics. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 80:1151–69Druckman JN. 2001. The implications of framing effects for citizen competence. Polit. Behav.

23:225–56Eichenberg RC. 2005. Victory has many friends: U.S. public opinion and the use of military

force. Int. Secur. 30:140–77Entman RM. 2000. Media and political conflict: news from the Middle East. Am. Polit. Sci.

Rev. 94(2):521–22Entman RM. 2003. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy.

Chicago: Univ. Chicago PressFearon JD. 1994. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes.

Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 88:577–92Feaver PD, Gelpi C. 2004. Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use

of Force. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. PressFerre JP. 1980. Denominational biases in the American press. Rev. Relig. Res. 21:276–83Filson D, Werner S. 2004. Bargaining and fighting: the impact of regime type on war onset,

duration, and outcomes. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 48(2):296–313Fordham BO. 1998. The politics of threat perception and the use of force: a political economy

model of U.S. uses of force, 1949–1994. Int. Stud. Q. 42:567–90Fordham BO. 2005. Strategic conflict avoidance and the diversionary use of force. J. Polit.

67:132–53Fordham BO, Sarver CC. 2001. Militarized interstate disputes and United States uses of force.

Int. Stud. Q. 45:455–66Galtung J, Ruge MH. 1965. The structure of foreign news. J. Peace Res. 2:64–91Gartner S. 2006. Casualties and public support: an experimental analysis. Presented at Annu. Meet.

Am. Polit. Sci. Assoc., Philadelphia, PAGartner S, Segura GM. 1998. Race, casualties, and opinion in the Vietnam War. J. Polit.

62(1):115–46Gartner S, Segura GM. 2000. War, casualties and public opinion. J. Confl. Resolut. 42(3):278–

300Gelpi C, Feaver PD, Reifler J. 2005. Success matters—casualty sensitivity and the war in Iraq.

Int. Secur. 30(3):7–46Gelpi C, Grieco J. 2008. Democracy, interdependence and the sources of the liberal peace.

J. Peace Res. In pressGilboa E. 2005. The CNN effect: the search for a communication theory of international

relations. Polit. Commun. 22(1):27–44Graber DA. 2002. Mass Media and American Politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 6th ed.Habermas J. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and

Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT PressHallin DC. 1986. The “Uncensored War”. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. PressHallin D, Mancini P. 2004. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. PressHamilton JT. 2003. All the News That’s Fit to Sell: How the Market Transforms Information into

News. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 61

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

Hess GD, Orphanides A. 1995. War politics—an economic, rational-voter framework. Am.Econ. Rev. 85:828–46

Hindman DB. 2004. Media system dependency and public support for the press and president.Mass Comm. Soc. 7:29–42

Holsti OR. 2004. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. PressHolsti OR, Rosenau J. 1984. American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown

of Consensus. Boston: Allen & UnwinHowell WG, Pevehouse JC. 2005. Presidents, congress, and the use of force. Int. Org. 59:209–

32Hutcheson J, Domke D, Billeaudeaux A, Garland P. 2004. U.S. national identity, political

elites, and a patriotic press following September 11. Polit. Commun. 21:27–50Isernia P, Juhasz Z, Rattinger H. 2002. Foreign policy and the rational public in comparative

perspective. J. Confl. Resolut. 46(2):201–24Iyengar S, Kinder DR. 1987. News that Matters: Television and American Opinion. Chicago: Univ.

Chicago PressIyengar S, Reeves R. 1997. Do The Media Govern: Politicians, Voters, and Reporters in America.

Thousand Oaks, CA: SageJacobs LR, Shapiro RY. 2000. Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of

Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago: Univ. Chicago PressJacobson G. 2006. A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People. New York:

LongmanJames P, Oneal JR. 1991. The influence of domestic and international politics on the president’s

use of force. J. Confl. Resolut. 35:307–32Jentleson BW. 1992. The pretty prudent public—post post-Vietnam American opinion on the

use of military force. Int. Stud. Q. 36(1):49–74Jentleson BW, Britton RL. 1998. Still pretty prudent: post-Cold War American public opinion

on the use of military force. J. Confl. Resolut. 42:395–417Katz AZ. 2000. Public opinion and the contradictions of Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy. Pres.

Stud. Q. 4(30):662–87Key VO. 1961. Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: KnopfKlarevas L. 2002. The ‘‘essential domino’’ of military operations: American public opinion and

the use of force. Int. Stud. Persp. 3:417–37Krosnick JA, Kinder DR. 1990. Altering the foundations of support for the president through

priming. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 84:497–512Kull S, Ramsey C. 2001. The myth of the reactive public. In Public Opinion and the International

Use of Force, ed. PP Everts, P Isernia, pp. 205–28. London: RoutledgeKuypers JA. 1997. Presidential Crisis Rhetoric and the Press in the Post-Cold War World. Westport,

CT: PraegerLai B, Reiter D. 2005. Rally ’round the Union Jack? Public opinion and the use of force in the

United Kingdom, 1948–2001. Int. Stud. Q. 49(2):255–72Larson EV. 2000. Putting theory to work: diagnosing public opinion on the US intervention

in Bosnia. In Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory, ed. M Nincic,J Lepgold, pp. 174–233. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press

Larson EV, Savych B. 2005. American Public Support for US Military Operations from Mogadishuto Baghdad: Technical Appendixes. Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Lee JR. 1977. Rallying around the flag. Pres. Stud. Q. 2:252–56Levy JS. 1989. The diversionary theory of war: a critique. In Handbook of War Studies, ed. MI

Midlarsky, pp. 259–88. New York: Unwin-Hyman

62 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

Lippmann W, Merz C. 1920. A Test of the News. New York: New RepublicLipset SM. 1966. The president, the polls, and Vietnam. Transactions 3:20–22Livingston S, Bennett L. 2003. Gatekeeping, indexing, and live-event news: Is technology

altering the construction of news? Polit. Commun. 20:363–80Livingston S, Eachus T. 1995–1996. Humanitarian crises and U.S. foreign policy: Somalia and

the CNN effect reconsidered. Polit. Commun. WinterLupia A, McCubbins MD. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need

to Know? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. PressMalek A. 1996. New York Times editorial position and US foreign policy: the case of Iran

revisited. In News Media and Foreign Relations, ed. A Malek, pp. 224–45. Norwood, NJ:Ablex

Maren M. 1994. Feeding a famine. Forbes Media Critic 2.1(Fall):30–38Marshall J. 2003. Falsely bleak reports reduce our chance for success in Iraq. Atlanta Journal-

Constitution, Sep. 22, p. 11A.Meernik J. 2004. The Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy. Aldershot, UK: AshgateMermin J. 1997. Television news and American intervention in Somalia: the myth of a media-

driven foreign policy. Polit. Sci. Q. 112(Fall):385–404Moeller S. 1999. Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death. New

York: RoutledgeMoore WH, Lanoue DJ. 2003. Domestic politics and US foreign policy: a study of Cold War

conflict behavior. J. Polit. 65:376–96Moosbrugger L. Institutions, information, and political sophistication: a causal model. Unpubl. ms.Morgan TC, Anderson CJ. 1999. Domestic support and diversionary external conflict in Great

Britain, 1950–1992. J. Polit. 61:799–814Morgan TC, Bickers KN. 1992. Domestic discontent and the use of force. J. Confl. Resolut.

36:25–52Mueller JE. 1973. War Presidents and Public Opinion. New York: WileyMueller M. 1956. Letter from Merrill Mueller of NBC to Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower Presi-

dential Library, Central Files, Suez Crisis Folder Box 5 11/16/1956Nacos BL, Shapiro RY, Isernia P. 2000. Decisionmaking in a Glass House. New York: Rowman

& LittlefieldNeuman R, Just MR, Crigler AN. 1992. Common Knowledge: News and the Construction of Political

Meaning. Chicago: Univ. Chicago PressOneal JR, Bryan AL. 1995. The rally ’round the flag effect in U.S. foreign policy crises, 1950–

1985. Polit. Behav. 17(4):379–401Oneal JR, Lian B, Joyner JH. 1996. Are the American people ‘‘pretty prudent’’? Public re-

sponses to US uses of force, 1950–1988. Int. Stud. Q. 40(2):261–79Oneal JR, Russett BM. 1997. The classical liberals were right: democracy, interdependence,

and conflict, 1950–1985. Int. Stud. Q. 41(2):267–93Oneal JR, Tir J. 2006. Does the diversionary use of force threaten the democratic peace?

Assessing the effect of economic growth on interstate conflict, 1921–2001. Int. Stud. Q.50:755–79

Ostrom CW, Job BL. 1986. The president and the political use of force. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.80(2):541–66

Page BI, Barabas J. 2000. Foreign policy gaps between citizens and leaders. Int. Stud. Q.44(3):339–64

Page BI, Bouton MM. 2006. The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from OurLeaders But Don’t Get. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 63

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

Page BI, Shapiro R. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in American Policy. Chicago:Univ. Chicago Press

Paletz DL. 2002. The Media in American Politics. New York: LongmanPatterson TE. 1993. Out of Order. New York: KnopfPatterson TE. 2000. The United States: news in a free-market society. In Democracy and the

Media: A Comparative Perspective, ed. A Mughan, pp. 241–65. Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniv. Press

Popkin SL. 1993. Information shortcuts and the reasoning voter. In Information, Participation,and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective, ed. B Grofman, pp. 17–35. AnnArbor: Univ. Mich. Press

Popkin SL. 1994. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns.Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press

Potter PBK. 2007. Does experience matter? American presidential experience, age, and inter-national conflict. J. Confl. Resolut. 51(3):351–78

Powlick PJ. 1995. The sources of public opinion for American foreign-policy officials. Int.Stud. Q. 39:427–51

Powlick P, Katz AZ. 1998. Defining the American public opinion/foreign policy nexus. Int.Stud. Q. 42:29–61

Rahn WM. 1993. The role of partisan stereotypes in information processing about politicalcandidates. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 37:472–96

Reilly J. 1995. American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy. Chicago: Chicago Counc. For.Relat.

Reiter D, Stam AC III. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. PressRisse-Kappen T. 1991. Public opinion, domestic structure, and foreign policy in liberal democ-

racies. World Polit. 43(4):479–512Robinson P. 2000. The policy-media interaction model: measuring media power during hu-

manitarian crisis. J. Peace Res. 37(5):613–33Robinson P. 2001. Operation Restore Hope and the illusion of a news media driven interven-

tion. Polit. Stud. 49(5):941–56Robinson P. 2002. The CNN Effect: The Myth of News Media, Foreign Policy and Intervention.

London: RoutledgeRobinson P. 2005. The CNN effect revisited. Crit. Stud. Mass Commun. 22:344–49Rosenau JN. 1961. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. New York: Random HouseRumsfeld D. 2005. Interview with Jerry Agar, KMBZ News Radio 980. Transcript available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3246Russett BM, Oneal JR. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International

Organizations. New York: WW NortonSchmitt-Beck R. 2003. Mass communication, personal communication and vote choice: the

filter hypothesis of media influence in comparative perspective. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 33:233–59Schultz KA. 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. PressSharkey J. 1993. When pictures drive foreign policy. Am. J. Rev. 15(10):14–19Slantchev B. 2004. How initiators end their wars: the duration of warfare and the terms of

peace. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 48(4):813–29Slantchev B. 2006. Politicians, the media, and domestic audience costs. Int. Stud. Q. 50(2):445–

77Sniderman PM, Brody RA, Tetlock PE. 1991. Reasoning and Choice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

Univ. PressSobel R. 2001. The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam. New York:

Oxford Univ. Press

64 Baum · Potter

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

ANRV344-PL11-03 ARI 2 May 2008 20:0

Stein E. The dynamic relationship of elites, media and public opinion in authoritarian Brazil. Unpubl.ms.

Stoll RJ. 1984. The guns of November: presidential reelections and the use of force, 1947–1982.J. Confl. Resolut. 28:231–46

Tifft SE, Jones AS. 1999. The Trust: The Private and Powerful Family behind the New York Times.Boston: Little Brown & Co

Verba S, Brody RA, Parker EB, Nie NH, Polsby NW, et al. 1967. Public opinion and war inVietnam. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 61(2):317–33

Weingast BR. 1984. The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (withapplications to the SEC). Public Choice 44(1):147–91

White DM. 1950. The gatekeeper. A case study in the selection of news. Journalism Q. 27:383–90

Wolfsfeld G. 2004. Media and the Path to Peace. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. PressZaller J. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge Univ. PressZaller J. 1994a. Positive constructs of public opinion. Crit. Stud. Mass Commun. 11:276–87Zaller J. 1994b. Elite leadership of mass opinion: new evidence from the Gulf War. In Taken by

Storm: The Media, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, ed. LW Bennett,DL Paletz, pp. 186–209. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press

Zaller J. 2003. A new standard of news quality: burglar alarms for the monitorial citizen. Polit.Commun. 20:109–30

Zaller J. A Theory of Media Politics: How the Interests of Politicians, Journalists, and Citizens Shapethe News. Unpublished manuscript

Zaller J, Chiu D. 2000. Government’s little helper: U.S. press coverage of foreign policy crises,1946–1999. In Decisionmaking in a Glass House, ed. BL Nacos, RY Shapiro, P Isernia,pp. 61–84. New York: Rowman & Littlefield

Zelizer B, Allan S. 2002. Journalism after September 11. New York: Routledge

www.annualreviews.org • Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy 65

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

AR344-FM ARI 8 April 2008 18:44

Annual Review ofPolitical Science

Volume 11, 2008Contents

State FailureRobert H. Bates � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1

The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic OrganizationJohan P. Olsen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 13

The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and ForeignPolicy: Toward a Theoretical SynthesisMatthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 39

What the Ancient Greeks Can Tell Us About DemocracyJosiah Ober � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 67

The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political CourtsRan Hirschl � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 93

Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and EconomicDevelopment: Theory, History, and FindingsStanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �119

The Role of Politics in Economic DevelopmentPeter Gourevitch � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �137

Does Electoral System Reform Work? Electoral System Lessons fromReforms of the 1990sEthan Scheiner � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �161

The New Empirical BiopoliticsJohn R. Alford and John R. Hibbing � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �183

The Rule of Law and Economic DevelopmentStephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �205

Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics and the Carceral StateMarie Gottschalk � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �235

Private Global Business RegulationDavid Vogel � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �261

Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping LiteratureVirginia Page Fortna and Lise Morje Howard � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �283

v

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.

AR344-FM ARI 8 April 2008 18:44

Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideasand DiscourseVivien A. Schmidt � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �303

The Mobilization of Opposition to Economic LiberalizationKenneth M. Roberts � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �327

CoalitionsMacartan Humphreys � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �351

The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic TheoryNadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �387

What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, If Anything?Peter Nannestad � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �413

Convenience VotingPaul Gronke, Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, Peter A. Miller, and Daniel Toffey � � � � � � � � �437

Race, Immigration, and the Identity-to-Politics LinkTaeku Lee � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �457

Work and Power: The Connection Between Female Labor ForceParticipation and Female Political RepresentationTorben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �479

Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political ScienceDennis F. Thompson � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �497

Is Deliberative Democracy a Falsifiable Theory?Diana C. Mutz � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �521

The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation ofSocial NetworksElisabeth Jean Wood � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �539

Political Polarization in the American PublicMorris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �563

Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 7–11 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �589

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 7–11 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �591

Errata

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Political Science articles may be foundat http://polisci.annualreviews.org/

vi Contents

Ann

u. R

ev. P

olit.

Sci

. 200

8.11

:39-

65. D

ownl

oade

d fr

om a

rjou

rnal

s.an

nual

revi

ews.

org

by U

nive

rsity

of

Cal

ifor

nia

- L

os A

ngel

es o

n 06

/18/

08. F

or p

erso

nal u

se o

nly.