IS ‘REAYA’ SO DIFFERENT FROM THE ‘SERF’?

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND FEUDAL EUROPE

Melda Yaman ÖZTÜRK*

Nuray Ertürk KESKİN**

Paper presented atThird European Congress on World and Global History,

London School of Economics and Political Science,14-17 Nisan 2011, London.

Abstract

Most of the studies dealing with the relations of production in the Ottoman society compare

the “Tımar System” with the feudal mode of production and focus on the status of the

“Reaya”. It is generally claimed that the status of Reaya was much more different –in fact

better- than the serfs of the Western feudalism. This implies that the Ottoman society was

not feudal and had some ‘sui generis’ characteristics. Some proponents of this idea even

claim that there was a distinct “Ottomon mode of production” with its own dynamics.

In our paper we will argue that despite some differences, status of the Reaya was in fact

similar to the serfs, especially in terms of property relations and surplus appropration.

Moreover, it is difficult to claim that the Ottoman society was a sui generis one. Like every

concrete formation, the Ottoman society had some specificities also, but this does

absolutely not mean that these were enough to define a distinct mode of production.

Introduction

Present studies on Ottoman history usually focus on micro level analysis or are restricted with

specific periods. In addition to these studies, we think that macro-scale researches are also

necessary. Relations of production in the Ottoman society had been hotly debated in the

academia and intellectual area during the 1960s and 70s. Several arguments were put forward

in the debate, and the Ottoman society was claimed to be patrimonial, Asiatic, sui generis or

feudal by different writers. These different approaches can be grouped in basically two

categories, with respect to their class content. In this regard, while approaches that conceive

* Assist. Prof., Ondokuz Mayis University-Turkey (myozturk@omu.edu.tr)** Assist. Prof., Ondokuz Mayis University-Turkey (nekeskin@omu.edu.tr)

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the Ottoman mode of production as patrimonial or Asiatic or sui generis usually ignore the

class character of the Ottoman society, the feudalism argument asserts the class nature of its

object.

Although it has lost significance, we find this debate still important to clarify the present. We

claim that this two-poled approach in the studies analyzing the Ottoman society forms the

basis for statements about today’s Turkish society.

According to the first approach the Ottoman society was rather a classless one. Reaya had

better conditions or has different characteristics compared to serf, as it did not constitute a

class. The conclusion of this approach is that the Ottoman society was unlike European

feudalism and had a “sui generis” or “static” character. The proponents of this view take the

centralised, powerful and organized structure of the Ottoman Empire as a basis. The “strong

state”-centered studies and centre/periphery dichotomy that are trying to define today’s

Turkish society appear to be an extension of this view. This argument which has become

generally accepted by liberal approaches hides the fundamental contradictions of the society

hence working in favor of the ruling classes.

According to the second approach, Ottoman is a class society like all other societies. This

view is based on the conceptualisation of the Marxist mode of production and relations of

production. According to this view Ottoman is a feudal society. Using class-based method to

analyze the structure of today’s society is the present point of this view.

We have two main questions in this study:

1. Is reaya, as the direct producer group in the Ottoman society, similar to the serf in the

feudal society?

2. Is Ottoman a feudal society?

We search the answers of these questions in the context of the relation of appropriation of

surplus product, various taxes, land dependence and we compare reaya with the serf in terms

of position in the relations of production.

The territorial organization of the Ottoman Empire was consisting of four models during the

period of classical age: Ottoman provinces, annual taxed provinces, self-governing provinces,

autonomous units named as “yurtluk-ocaklık” and “hukumet sancaks” (İnalcık, 2003: 109). In

this study we are focusing on the classical Ottoman provinces. There were some

administrative units (sancaks) within these provinces that the tımar system was carried out

and they were established in the territories of Anatolia and Rumeli. State revenues had been

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allocated to some people in return for some tasks in these provinces. The lands were owned

by the state, private indiviuals or foundations. The peasants that were living in the state

territories were called “reaya” and the peasants living in the private or foundation lands were

called “ortakçı kul”.

1. The Similarities Between Reaya and the Serf

Ömer Lütfü Barkan suggested these two arguments in his article titled “Was There Servage in

Turkey?” (Barkan, 1956: 239):

1. Some of the farmers in the Ottoman Empire are completely similar to the serf. They

are a minority.

2. Reaya consists of free people who constitute a separate category from the serfs in

terms of legal conditions.

According to Barkan, Ottoman society can provide important information to understand the

emergence of servage system and its forms as a research field. The Ottoman archieves offer

the opportunity to review the emergence and development of servage in the fifteenth century.

It also constitutes a rich and important resource for comparative history of servage (Barkan,

1956: 239).

It is possible to accept the serf as a slave that was settled to the land to work as a separate

farmer with his family. Slaves can be employed as masses in large production units or they

can be provided with small farms. In the latter case it is possible to get the slaves of some

villages into a small farm plant. In this case the former slaves that will be settled to the land,

will plant the lands of their lord with the vehicles of their lord and they shall be compelled to

give a significant portion of the product to their lords. In this system even if the former slave

gained some freedom in the economic and social aspects, the legal character of his slavery

continue along through the generations by transferring to his children. The serfs;

1) They can not marry with the person they want.

2) The heritage of them can not be transferred to their heirs.

3) They can not choose another job and can not change their place.

4) They are obliged to angary works for their lords.

5) The right to prosecution, trial and punishment authority belongs to their lords.

6) Serfs are not allowed to become a member of the clergy.

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The producers called as “ortakçı kul” are the peasants that were originated from slavery. They

are almost in the same condition as serfs. It is known that there are two sources of “ortakçı

kul”s: Some rich and powerful persons were settling the slaves that they buyed from captive

markets in their farms (private lands) to establish separate plants during the 15th and 16th

centuries. The creation of a fixture and a permanent labour on these lands increased their

worth. And it is known that the owners were selling the lands with the peasants. On the other

hand, sultans or commanders were establishing some villages on their lands by leading the

captives with their families that were captured during the war. The majority of private

property established in this way and the system pervaded since the end of the 16th century

(İnalcık, 2003: 117). “Ortakçı kul”s have similar characters with the peasants that are named

“serf” in the medieval age in the Western European countries:

1) These can marry only among themselves, marrying from the outside is forbidden.

2) In case of death the plant were passing to the adult male son to prevent the separation

of the plant and some measures were taken to protect the grown children.

Nevertheless, there is some right of inheritance.

3) They can not choose their job freely.

4) All kinds of angary are compulsory.

5) Civil servants are not allowed to the villages of the “ortakçı kul”s for tax collection,

judicial proceedings and to imprisonment.

Barkan’s comparison between the “serf”s and “ortakçı kul”s shall be extended to all of the

peasants that were called reaya in the Ottoman Empire. Thus reaya is not completely free.

First of all, reaya is attached to the land. If the peasant has some land that is registered to him

in the offical documents he can not leave the farm, can not go anywhere or find another job.

Otherwise he has to pay compensation to his owner who is a “sipahi” or a foundation. If he

escapes, he will be followed and brought by force to his farm.

We will search the position of reaya on the basis of Barkan’s article and several studies that

analyze the structure of Ottoman society.

1.1. “Tımar System”: A Mode of Appropriation of Surplus Labour

In all pre-capitalist societies based on settled agriculture the creation of such a mechanism is

essential: Providing ruling classes to take away a part of production from agricultural

producers, the appropriation of agricultural surplus and to feed the army with a part of this

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surplus. Thus the use of money is limited in these societies, it is difficult to collect the surplus

from producers directly in cash that is in the form of land rent or tax. On the other hand

transportation and communication facilities are also limited. Therefore collecting the surplus

as product, moving the surplus to market, cashing it and then distributing it to the soldiers as a

salary is equally difficult. Every society and ruling class that has these conditions tried to

solve this problem within the framework of its structure and historical features. The solution

of this problem within the original conditions of the Ottoman society is the ‘tımar’ system.

However it can not be said that the tımar system is developed entirely by the Ottoman

Empire. Historical origins of the tımar system were based on the land regimes of Iran, Seljuk

and Byzantine periods. Ottoman land regime is a complex combination of these civilizations.

Tımar system is a form of savings and property that sipahi and peasants have some rights on

the land at the same time (Genç, 2007: 45-47). Peasant has the right of saving, planting and

utilization of the land. The family that has a pair of oxen is considered as a plant unit and this

unit forms the basis of the economy which is called “raiyyet farm” (the farm of reaya).

Between 60 and 150 acres of land allocated to these family plants according to the yield and

the protection of these family plants is the main objective. The right of land tenure was left to

reaya passing from father to son in demesne (miri lands), but the farmers of these lands were

obliged to pay some taxes. Therefore the peasant family is a tax unit, as well as it forms the

basis of the economy. According to the tımar system these taxes were left to “sipahi”s who

were responsible for the protection of reaya farms. The peasant rights on the land passes only

from father to son, however peasant has no right to sell or donate the land or transfer the land

to someone else without permission. Thus the disintegration of the family plants into small

pieces or the transformation of the family plants into large farms with the addition of new

land had been prevented. The farmers are not allowed to keep the land without planting, to

leave the land and to migrate other regions. Reaya can not leave his land, terminate the

contract, or go to and settle where he wants. Sipahi had the right to bring the reaya who left

his land back in ten years. If reaya died, sipahi might bring his son back. If the land were still

empty after a decade passed, sipahi would have the right to demand a compensation from the

reaya which was called “çiftbozan” tax. If this reaya engaged in farming in where he went,

then “aşar” could be taken instead of çiftbozan tax from him (Üçok, 1944a: 546).

1.2. Duties

Reaya was supposed to pay various taxes to the state and the owner of the tımar (sipahi) in the

Ottoman Empire. These taxes are similar to the taxes of European feudalism. To obtain the

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tenure right of the land and to transfer this right from father to son is subjected to a specific

tax. In addition there are taxes that vary from 10 percent to 50 percent that is taken over from

the product. There are some extraordinary taxes collected by the state called “avarız-ı

divaniye” or “avarız”. Previously, these taxes were collected in times of war and aimed to

satisfy needs of the military in the frontiers. These taxes were collected in the form of

ingredients needed or cash in specific amounts from a village, not per family. When the war

and military burden increased on central government in the second half of the sixteenth

century, “avarız” began to be collected more frequently and in cash, thus it lost its

extraordinary character (Pamuk, 1988: 55).

One of the taxes that was collected from reaya is called “çift-resmi”. This is a kind of land

rent. 60-140 acre land is accepted a “çift” in Ottoman Empire. The amount of this tax per

“çift” is 22 Ottoman “akçe” during Mehmet II and it was 33 “akçe” in 1487. Reaya is obliged

to pay this tax every year. If reaya dies, sipahi has to give the land to his son. This process

takes place after the payment of the land tax by the reaya’s son that is determined in the legal

documantaries called as “kanunname”.

The basic tax of the product is called “aşar” (or “öşür). The meaning of the word is 1/10, and

this tax shows great differences between regions. In generally these taxes are taken from

grapes, fruit, vegetables, honey, silk, cotton and fish products.1 As an extension of öşür there

is another tax called “salariye”, that is taken as 1/40 over the agricultural product. This tax is

completely an extension of feudalism as seniors’ right (Kılıçbay, 1985). By “öşür” applied to

Muslim people, the product tax that was collected from the non-Muslim people is called

“haraç.” In addition to these there are some taxes that are collected over animals: The taxes of

sheep (ağnam), grassland (otlak), slaughtered animal (zebiha), pig (hınzır).

Using of wheat mill, spinning mill by reaya are taxable in the Ottoman society as in many

parts of feudal Europe. There are also some trade end customs taxes. Reaya pays a nuptial tax

(resm-i arus) which is an extension of “the right of first night” (jus primae noctis) as a feudal

relic. All of the sipahis (seniors) whose daughters are married pay this tax. In addition a tax is

collected from those who have committed a crime. The amount of taxes that may vary each

year in the Ottoman Empire as nuptial tax, land tax, crime and murder tax are called “free

taxes” (badiheva).

1 The grape taxes taken from non-Muslims are higher, since they produce wine. A feature of this tax reveals that sipahi has same characterictics with feudal senior. Sipahi holded on the one-tenth of wine production and provided income from wine sales. By sealing the wine vats in his region, sipahi would prepare the terms of the sale of its own wines. No one could buy or drink any other wine for a while. This had created a monopoly for the sale of wine (Üçok, 1944b: 76).

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There have been angary tasks for reaya also. The lack of angary obligations for reaya is one of

the main arguments of historians who claim that Ottoman Empire is different from feudal

Europe. Indeed comparing with serf, the angary burden for reaya is less. However, reaya is

obliged to do some angary works once a year. Reaya had to build a storage for his senior and

had to move the product to the castle. If the castle is at a distance farther than one day, the

cost of transport will be paid by castle (Üçok, 1944b: 76). If sipahi (the owner of the tımar)

demands, reaya has to carry the product to the market. If the sipahi came to visit reaya’s

village, reaya had to host him up to three days.

2. Is Ottoman Society a Class Society?

Recalling the Modes of Production Debate

The debate on the prevailing mode of production in the Ottoman Empire took off during the

early 1960s. Several arguments were put forward in the debate, and the Ottoman society was

claimed to be patrimonial, Asiatic, sui generis or feudal by different writers. These different

approaches can be grouped in basically two categories, with respect to their class content. In

this regard, while approaches that conceive the Ottoman mode of production as patrimonial or

Asiatic or sui generis usually ignore the class character of the Ottoman society, the feudalism

argument asserts the class nature of its object.

Max Weber’s concept of the patrimonial state has been widely employed in studies on the

Ottoman social structure. This concept is used not only to describe the Ottoman state but also

to point to the continuity of the Turkish Republic with the Ottoman tradition (Mardin, 1969;

Heper, 1973; Sunar, 1974; Mardin, 1992). Also called as “sultanism” by Weber,

patrimonialism is a type of government where arbitrariness is the rule. Weber remarks that

this regime can take rigid forms in which entire land is appropriated and all the people are

enslaved. Most definitions used to describe the Ottoman society, such as the centre/periphery

dichotomy, static social structure, classless society or the despotic state, are basically

developed by Weberian approaches.

However, this hegemonic thought contains two basic methodological problems. Both of them

arise from the method of comparison of the Ottoman society with Western Europe. Firstly, it

is concluded that the Ottoman society is not feudal since there are no exact one-to-one

correspondences between Ottoman institutions and feudal characteristics such as the serf, the

vassal, and loyality to the feudal lord. Secondly, the Ottoman society is usually compared

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with Western Europe without any clear periodization of the former. As a result, the Ottoman

society is compared with the feudal, absolutist and even the capitalist periods of Europe, but

supposedly keeping its patrimonial nature intact in each case. Accordingly, Ottoman history is

thought to be homogenous throughout its 600 years. Hence, in Weberian explanations, the

Ottoman society is characterised by a static social structure and an all-powerful despotic state.

The second approach claims that the classical period of Ottoman society (15th-16th centuries)

is based on the Asiatic mode of production (Berkes, 1972; Divitçioğlu, 1971). The proponents

of this idea do not question the evolution of social structure in the following centuries. Niyazi

Berkes describes the Ottoman society as a ‘military-bureaucratic despotism’ which is ‘neither

feudal nor capitalist’ but based on a ‘pre-capitalist commodity economy’. Sencer Divitçioğlu

claims that the Ottoman society is similar to the Asiatic mode of production. Although he

admits that land-dependent and subordinate classes have already been formed in the Ottoman

society, he nevertheless claims that the Ottoman case is very different from Western Europe

in terms of class relations and class components (1971: 137). According to Divitçioğlu, while

there were personal ties of dependency in Western feudalism, the dependency was from the

state to the society in the Ottoman Empire (1971: 140).

It seems that Weberian approaches converge with Asiatic-based explanations in their attempt

to prove that the Ottoman society was not feudal. However, if we describe feudalism as a

society consisting of peasants who cultivate their own land and have immediate relations with

their means of survival and whose surplus product is appropriated by particular social groups,

then, almost all pre-industrial societies fit to this description (Faroqhi, 2001: 18).

The third approach asserts that the Ottoman society is not feudal and has some “sui generis”

characteristics (Barkan, 1956; Üçok, 1944; İnalcık, 2003). Some proponents of this idea even

claim that there is a distinct “Ottoman mode of production” with its own dynamics (Pamuk,

1988). This idea is supported by master historians such as Ömer Lütfi Barkan and Halil

Inalcik and it is argued that their works constitute a ground for the Asiatic mode of production

based approaches, as well (Oyan, 1998: 131). Halil Inalcik defines the economic and social

organisation which is carried out in the frame of demesne (miri arazi) regime as double

domicile system. He says that this production organisation should be seen as an independent-

sui generis mode of production (İnalcık, 1989: 5-6). Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay (1985) defines the

Ottoman mode of production as a tributary mode of production. According to Kılıçbay feudal

rent has some basic characteristics: Surplus is appropriated through forced labour (angary);

surplus product differs from the necessary product in terms of space and time, and the amount

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of surplus labour is equal to necessary labour. Hence the feudal rent equals to the total surplus

product. However, in the tributary mode, as in Ottoman society, taxes consist of only a part of

the surplus product (Kılıçbay, 1985: 210).

According to the sui generis society argument, the Ottoman society is neither Asiatic nor

feudal. This argument is based on some characteristics of the Ottoman society, such as the

central state structure, state ownership on land, and lack of aristocratic hierarchy. In this

approach, “Tımarlı” is thought to be similar to civil servants and “reaya” to independent

peasants.

Since every social structure has some specific characteristics, it is natural to emphasize these

specificities. However, historical knowledge reveals that all social formations have some

common dynamics and tendencies. This of course does not mean that every community has

the same characteristics. But it means that, while forms can (and in fact do) change, societies

display some basic and abstract categorial similarities that describe their modes of production.

In both the Asiatic and sui generis society approaches, the “Ottoman is not feudal” idea is

derived from a comparison of Ottoman society with the medieval age of Europe. That is,

feudalism is explicitly or implicitly equated with the medieval period of Western Europe

(Berktay, 1989: 294). Depending on the Marxist periodization of history, capitalism is

thought to follow feudalism, as in Western Europe. Hence, only Europe is accepted as feudal,

and other parts of the world are thought to be non-feudal since there was no autonomous

transition to capitalism there (Keyder, 1996: 93-106).

Historians that define the Ottoman society as non-feudal focus to the relatively stable and

mature period between the mid-15th and late 16th centuries. However, while dealing with

Western Europe, they arbitrarily choose some characteristics taken from the long period

between the 8th and 14th centuries. As Oğuz Oyan emphasizes, it is imposible to see whole

stages and phases of a mode of production in all types of concrete societies which are thought

to have a common substance. Concrete historical categories which are in fact the conditions of

existence of a society are formed according to inner dynamics of this society, as well as to its

relations with other societies (Oyan, 1998: 4).

Some historians assert that although Ottoman society has some feudal characteristics, it is not

a completely feudal one (Timur, 1979; Timur, 1989; Akşin, 1997). For example, Sina Akşin

claims that the classical period of Ottoman history can be defined as a peasant mode of

production in order to indicate that it includes characteristics of both the feudal and Asiatic

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modes of production. According to Akşin, Ottoman social structure has started to “resemble

feudalism” in the 17th century (1997: 35-36). Taner Timur thinks that the classical Ottoman

society was in transition to feudalism (protofeudal society) on the base of its inner dynamics,

and has become feudal in the following periods. Timur defines the prevailing mode of

production in the Ottoman society as communal-patriarchal and claims that this structure has

been maintained till the 20th century. The Ottoman state was a central despotic one according

to Timur also.

In addition to these approaches, there are also arguments supporting the feudalism thesis for

the Ottoman Empire. The sociologist Behice Boran (1962) thinks that Western feudalism and

the Ottoman social order are two variants of feudal societies. Despite minor differences

between the two, the Ottoman society is also a feudal one. Boran defines the Ottoman social

order as a central feudalism that has not been able to eliminate local feudalism. According to

Boran, the difference between the “personal dependency” of the serf and the “freedom” of the

reaya is in fact not as big as it is thought. Both of them are labouring classes attached to land

and that is the main characteristic of feudal society. Although Sipahi do not have legal title to

land, they benefit from land labourer’s products as if they were the landowner.

Although Barkan and Inalcik claim that the Ottoman society is a sui generis one, they accept

the feudalism thesis for both the establishment and the post-17th century transformation

periods. According to Oyan, this contradiction comes out because they define feudalism on

the basis of political/legal configurations but ignore the decisiveness of economic relations.

Conclusion: Ottoman Society is a Feudal Society and“Reaya” is not So Different From the “Serf”

Different modes of production correspond to different modes of material forces and relations

of production. A mode of production is an abstraction derived from common characteristics of

several concrete societies (Berktay, 1989: 37-39).

In order to analyze the Ottoman society, we use the concept of mode of production developed

by Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst. According to Hindess and Hirst, a mode of production is

an articulated combination of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance

of the relations of production. Relations of production define two basic characteristics (1975:

9-10):

a. a specific mode of appropriation of surplus-labour,

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b. the specific form of social distribution of the means of production corresponding to

that mode of appropriation of surplus-labour.

Hindess and Hirst give capitalism as an example. Capitalist relations of production define a

mode of appropriation of surplus-labour in the form of surplus-value, and a social distribution

of the means of production so that these are the property of capitalists, while labour-power

takes the form of a commodity. Members of the class of labourers are forced to sell to

members of the class of non-labourers (1975: 10).

As for the feudal mode of production, it specifies that surplus-labour is appropriated in the

form of rent (Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 12). The concept of the feudal mode of production

defines the forms of rent, in the form of money or labour. The concept of the feudal mode as

an articulated combination of relations of production and forces of production ensures that

this variation has definite conditions and effects in the structure of the mode of production

(Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 12). From this conceptualizing, the mode of production of the

Ottoman society can be defined as feudal. Tımar system is a form of appropriation of surplus

labour from reaya. The surplus product of immediate producers (reaya) is appropriated

through tithe (aşar) and other duties.

This does not mean that the Ottoman and Western societies are the same. In fact, there are lots

of differences between Western societies as well. Hence, to conceptualize the common

characteristics of similiar societies does not exclude the attempt to understand the specific

historical and political conditions of each society.

As a result we assert two main arguments:

1. Ottoman society is a class society and Ottoman relations of production are feudal in

character. In each stage of the Ottoman Empire, feudal rent is distributed in a different way.

Tımar system is one of them.

2. Feudal mode of production specifies the way of surplus-labour appropriation. There is no

difference between tımar and fief; because the mode of production and the social structure are

defined by the relations of exploitation (the relations between immediate producers and

appropriators), not by the identity of appropriators (state, tımarlı sipahi, feodal lord, king,

vassal). Despite minor differences, reaya, as the immediate producer in Ottoman society, is

similiar to the serf of Western feudalism in terms of relations of appropriation, attachment to

land and several duties.

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