U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGESTRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

The Red Sea

Dr. Carol V. Evans

Disclaimer

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily

reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army,

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Red Sea Agenda

• Geography of the Red Sea and its Environs• Trans Regional Dynamics • Arena for Foreign Power Competition

• Multilateral efforts to combat non-traditional security threats

• Increased involvement of Mid East (ME) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in the region

• Red Sea integration into the Indo-Pacific

• Geostrategic Implications for U.S. foreign policy

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Geography –Opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 transformed the Red Sea

France’s gift of the Statue of Liberty was originally intended for Egypt

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Red Sea: the “Interstate 95” of the planet

• Red Sea narrow 20 mile wide corridor

• Critical for SLOC/freedom of navigation – links the Med to the Indian and Pacific Oceans

• $700 billion of seaborne commerce annually

• Suez Canal accounts 8 percent of world’s total trade

• Bab Al-Mandab is a key geostrategic chokepoint

• 4 million barrels of oil/refined petroleum products pass daily

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Trans Regional Dynamics-Post Cold War

• Civil Wars – Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen

• Interstate conflict – Ethiopia & Eritrea, Djibouti & Eritrea, Yemen & Eritrea

• Insurgency – Ethiopia/Ogaden ONLF• Natural Resource competition – Egypt, Ethiopia

and Sudan over the use of the Nile river• Focus on internationally sanctioned

humanitarian interventions and multilateral peacekeeping missions

• “Somalia syndrome”/”African solutions to African problems”

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Combating non-traditional security threats in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

Safeguarding the Red Sea against threats to its security: terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, illegal migration, smuggling of arms and missiles, sanctions evasion, illegal fishing

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Counter-Terrorism• 1998 East Africa embassy

bombings• Maritime Attacks• Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), ISIS

• Strategic focal point in the war against terrorism

• CJTF-HOA• Djibouti/Camp Lemonnier

• U.S. CT operations in coordination with multilateral security missions – African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 8

Counter-Piracy

• 2009 hijacking of the U.S.-owned Maersk Alabama container ship by Somali pirates

• Deemed national security threat to the SLOC from Red Sea-Gulf of Aden- Indian Ocean

• Piracy has been on the decline

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Combined U.S. & European Naval Forces• CJTF-HOA

• Security force assistance• Force protection• Training & Exercises

• Three international naval task forces operating in the region:

• 2004 CTF 152 (maritime security)

• 2008 EU Naval Force Atalanta (Somali piracy)

• 2009 CTF 151 (counter-piracy)

• Build up of foreign military bases in Djibouti 10

Increased involvement of Mid East (ME) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in the regionPolitical fragmentation in the Middle East and within GCC states have resulted in competition for regional supremacy

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Key Drivers: Iran• Iranian efforts to project

influence, access and force into the region

• Iran sought access to ports in Eritrea and Sudan to support the deployment of naval forces to the region

• 2011 onwards Iranian naval deployments in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea and through the Suez Canal to the Med

• Red Sea conduit to supply weapons to Hezbollah & Hamas

• Smuggling of weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen and to Somalia

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Key Drivers: 2015 Yemen Civil War

• Yemeni civil war has acted as a catalyst for GCC intervention

• Saudi Arabia-UAE led coalition to protect Western flank against Iran backed Houthi rebels

• African ports new geostrategic significance –

• UAE using Eritrea’s Assab port facilities & air base to besiege and bomb Yemen’s crucial ports of Hodeida & Aden

• Saudi Arabia negotiating for basing facilities in Djibouti

UAE port expansion13

Key Drivers: Geopolitical Tug of War

• 2017 GCC crisis -- Saudi Arabia and the UAE sever relations with Qatar

• Saudi Arabia, UAE & Egypt vs. Qatar & Turkey

• Somalia• Turkey & Qatar support to the federal

government• UAE basing in breakaway states of

Puntland and Somaliland• Regional rivalry between Turkey &

Egypt• Saudi Arabian financial and

military support to new regime in Sudan to dent Qatar and Turkey’s influence

Berenice Military Base, Egypt

Turkish Military Bases

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Key Drivers: Geoeconomic Competition• Strategic positioning along East-

West trade corridor from Red Sea to Indo-Pacific

• Chinese investments in the region as part of the Belt & Road initiative

• Ethiopia’s economic growth stimulating ports and infrastructure development along African side of the Red Sea

• Race for port access & development• UAE largest GCC trader in Africa• The development of these

commercial ports has entailed significant military and strategic ramifications.

• Use of geostrategic instruments to compete for regional influence

• UAE $1 billion emergency loan to Ethiopia

• Saudi Arabia financial assistance to Eritrea & Ethiopia to resolve conflict

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Red Sea integration into Indo-Pacific driving foreign power competition 16

China’s goal is to obtain “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global pre-eminence in the future.”

U.S. 2017 National Security Strategy

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China’s Expansion into Red Sea/Indo Pacific• Driven by Chinese energy & natural

resource & supply chain requirements

• Expanded presence in the Indian Ocean

• Anti-Piracy• Protection of SLOC

• Malacca Dilemma• 80% of PRC’s oil supplies transit

the IO through the Malacca Straits

• Since 2008 the PLAN has deployed surface vessels in the AOR

• 2013 the PLAN initiated patrols of its attack submarines. According to Beijing, these naval patrols were deployed to support anti-piracy and HADR missions.

Beijing’s 2019 defense white paper cites protecting its “maritime rights and interests” and safeguarding its “overseas interests”.

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China’s Expansion into Red Sea & Indo Pacific• Launched in 2013 China’s

Belt and Road Initiative is Xi Jinping’s one trillion dollar infrastructure program involving an estimated 80 countries.

• Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

• Strategy to secure China’s energy, natural resource and trade routes in the maritime and overland

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China-Pakistan Axis• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

(CPEC) –Gwadar port• A $600 billion BRI project consisting of

transportation, telecommunications and energy infrastructure and refining projects

• Designed to mitigate PRC’s “Malacca Dilemma”

• Facilitate China trade and ensure energy supplies from the Middle East and Africa

• PRC likely to use Gwadar as a military base to project naval power and enhance military capabilities in the Arabian Sea, in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf

• PRC augmenting Pakistan’s naval capabilities to counter India

• Sale/leasing of naval ships, submarines, fighter jets capable of projecting maritime power at key Gulf and Red Sea Choke points Two PLAN submarines (diesel and

nuclear powered) docked in Karachi, May 2015

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China’s Rising Hegemony• Establish control of vital

strategic maritime chokepoints, arteries and ports.

• Berthing agreements in Malaysia near the Strait of Malacca

• Port agreements in Gwadar, Pakistan

• Port operations in Colombo & Hambantota in Sri Lanka

• PRC force modernization & power projection capabilities

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Chinese Debt Trap Diplomacy• AFRICOM 2019

posture statement:“China has most successfully employed this model in Djibouti, holding eighty percent of the Government of Djibouti debt where access through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal remains a US strategic imperative.”General Thomas Waldhauser, Commander, AFRICOM

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Foreign Naval Power Projection• India

• Major investments in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities

• Naval modernization• Russia

• Establishment of a logistics center in Sudan to support the Russian Navy operating in the region and possible creation of a Russian Red Sea military base in the country

• Intention to build a naval logistics center in Eritrea

• France• 2009 permanent military

presence in UAE• Increase naval

cooperation with India• Longstanding military

presence in Djibouti• United Kingdom

• Focused on basing agreements with Bahrain, Oman & Qatar

• Will deploy Queen Elizabeth-class carrier strike group in 2021 as part of US-UK effort to reassert power projection capabilities in Indo-Pacific AOR

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Implications & Impacts on U.S. Foreign PolicyFor the United States to be relevant in the region we need to replace the narrative of withdrawal with more active diplomacy and engagement with states on both sides of the Red Sea.Zach Vertin, “Red Sea Geopolitics: Six plotlines to watch”

“The challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific extend beyond what any single country can address alone.” U.S. Department of Defense, 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

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Red Sea: “A Global Hinge”• Downsizing AFRICOM

with rebalance on Indo-Pacific and near peer competition with China

• Transregional dynamics challenge U.S foreign policy institutions

• Red Sea is a “seam” between three of the U.S. military’s Combatant Commands

• Need more “Indo” in Indo-Pacific

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Diplomacy: A Red Sea “Forum”• Need for a collective forum that could address issues

affecting the region: • trade & infrastructure development, maritime security,

migration, environmental protection, natural resource competition, and conflict management

• African Union mandate and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development calls for building a collaborative forum to “formulate shared norms” and develop “common goals” on Red Sea agenda

• U.S. withdrawal from the region has created a vacuum• African solutions are being marginalized by the external

powers• Saudi Arabia-led “Arab and African Coastal States of

the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” initiative

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Multilateral Maritime Cooperation• Work with allies to counter

expansion of China & Russia in the Red Sea/Indian Ocean

• Quad & Five Eye allies can provide real-time monitoring and tracking of surface, sub-surface and air operations by both China, Pakistan and Russia – as well as rogue Chinese, Russian and North Korean spy ships and those clandestine merchant ships conducting covert ops.

• Prepare Indian Navy for Chinese Surface Action Group (SAG) incursions in the Gulf of Aden & Indian Ocean

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U.S. & Allied Countervailing Power

• “We should be exercising together and we should be turning those exercises into coordinated operations.”

Admiral Harry Harris, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

• Expand U.S.-led multilateral naval exercises

• Enlarge current Pacific-focused Malabar exercise AOR to include Gulf of Aden

• Conduct major exercises with India, U.K, France, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. 28

Questions & Discussion

Contact Information:Dr. Carol V. Evans, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War Collegecarol.v.evans.civ@mail.mil Mobile: +1 540.270.6679

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