The Rasa Theory and the Darśanas

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handarkar Oriental Research Institute

THE RASA THEORY AND THE DARŚANASAuthor(s): K. S. ArjunwadkarSource: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. 65, No. 1/4 (1984), pp. 81-100Published by: Bhandarkar Oriental Research InstituteStable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/41693108 .Accessed: 14/02/2015 16:23

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THE RASA THEORYAND THE DARŠANASBY

K. S. Arjunwadkar

TheRasa-sütraof Bharata1hasservedas a fountain-headf all laterdiscussionsn rasa. Bharata treats f the rasa complexs a resultant f itscorrelativesonsisting f somemental nd somephysicalphenomena. Themental

phenomenare bhävas dividednto

permanent sthãyinsand

visiting( samcãrins);nd the physicalphenomenare thehang-ons r the objectsofthe sthãyins ãlambana-vibhãvas, thecontributories uddipana-vibhãvas,and the manifestations anubhãvas with their collaboratorsclassed assättvikabhävas Theyareall comrades na jointoperation riginating romthe personhousing hesthãyin nd extendingo theperson/objecthesthãyinhangson, contributed yconditions avourableo thishanging-on, roducingphysical,visible ffects n rhepersonhousing hesthãyinwhichmanifest heinvisible thãyin. Thesthãyins the vyabhicãrinsthesättvikas nd theanu

bhävas are housedn or emanate from he sameperson andthe twotypesof vibhãvas are exteriorto him. This operationpresented n the stagein the form of a drama and watchedby the spectators the rasikas)9results n anexperience,herasa,which herasikas relish nd cherish.Bharatacompares hisprocesswith hat of the preparationof food with ngredientsofdifferentastes rasas- relished y theeater,2which,ncidentally,ndicatesthe source from whichthe term rasa is borrowed. Whiledetailingthisapparatusof therasa Bharata enumeratesight nine, as viewedby somerasascorrespondingoeight or nine) sthãyins thirty-three yabhicãrinsnd

eight ättvikas. He also dividesrasas into two groups four s thecausesof the remaining our. What Bharataexpoundedas relatingto drama isextended to poetry nd other arts. Therasa theory, herefore, orms henucleusof the aesthetic eliberationsn Sanskrit hrough enturies.

Fromthe outline f Bharata' rasatheory, t is evident hat t is origi-nal in most of the concepts, heir lassificationnd the metalanguageeusesto expoundt. No work n the Sanskrit iterature, ontemporaryr prior othe Nãtyasãstraof Bharata,attempts reatment f similar opicsn a wayor

1 I Nãtyasãstra,VI,between erse 1 nd 32.8 ít SSRI: '3^1?-3WI|

loc.CÌ(.Il [AnnalsBORI]


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82 AnnalsBORI, LXV( 1984

by a method omparableothat ofBharata. Thecreditdoesnot, of course,goto Bharataalonebut s sharedbyhimwithhis predecessorsn the subjectwhom hehasfrequently uoted. Asa probablesourcea referencemay bemadeto workson Ayurvedawhich,while treating f their materiamedica,speak of the rasa víry , vipãkaand prabhâvaof thematerialdescribed.3Onewouldexpectan analysisof the facultiesof mind n the YogaSystemwhichBharatamight have made use of but little s found n that ystemwhichhaseven a remote esemblancewithwhatBharata haspresented. TheSãmkhyaystem, kin to the Yoga, saysittle ifferent rom ts sister-systemon thiscount. Even Kãmasutrahavingrati as its specialfield,disappointedmein myattempts o find likeness f Bharata'sanalysisof mentalfaculties.Surprisinglynough, and it maybe a purecoincidence, there sa strikingresemblancebetweenBharata's theory of rasa and Carvaka's theory ofcaitanya consciousness,qualityof thebodynot present ndividuallyn thefour elements theearth, the water, the fire and the air that combine tomakethebody but evolvingfrom combination hereof.4Thesamemaybesaid ofrasaand itscorrelatives.

Thistheory, ufficiently etailed o far as its mechanisms concerned,presented roblemswhichgenerationsf critics offered o solvein their wnright. The problemsare varied, nter-related nd soperplexing hat, evenafter ongdiscussions,he onlysatisfaction ne is likely oderive s that foralmost every question there is a counter-question.And above all, anjrsolutionhasto be reconciledwith what Bharatamightor mightnot havesaidhereor elsewhere. If the criticsweregiven he choiceof pickingup thebestradicalof Bharata and keeping onsistentwith t without ny responsi^bilityof defendinghis stand elsewhere,one feelshopefulthat somethingmorecoherentwould havecome out of the hair-splittingiscussionsof thecommentators.

Theproblemstart with the very fundamental uestion s to wheredoesrasaabide- in thecharacter, n the actoror in the spectator Everyone of these lternatives as itsown difficulties.Thisbreedsthe next ques-tion What is the nature of the experiencethat is called the rasa? Is itinferencer'perception r somethinglse? Thisquestionnevitablyeadstothe determination f the relation f the sthayin with he rasa Are theyidentical r different Andhow does Bharataforget omakea reference o

3 Astahga-hrdayautra. . 14etc.4 Cp.3^ xRčnfi; I

^•4: m IlììcTWÌt i Sarva-darsana-samgrahaCãrvãka.




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ÁRJUNWADKARThe RasaTheorynd the Daršanas 83

thesthyãyinn his famousrasa-sütra What relation doesrasa have withits correlatives What is theoutcomeof rasaexperienceall pleasure nd nopain, or pleasurefrom some rasas and pain from others If painis theoutcome ofsomerasa how is the connoisseur nterestedn it ? These arethebasicquestionson whichcriticshavewrangledfor centuries. Not allcriticshaveattempted ll questions. They probably presumed,as was thepracticen a higher university xaminationome yearsback, that they hadto attempt not more than three four questions Wehavethen no waybut to value their nswers collectively as wasalsothepractice f the exa-miners hat wenthandin handwiththe ťnot more than allowance.

The earliest candidateon record who appearedfor this exam wasLollatawhoprefered oseek aid from hiscommon sense rather than fromanyestablisheddogma. For him, rasa which is substantiallyhe sthãyincreatedby the vibhãvas,evealedbyanubhãvasnd nourished y the vyabhi-cãrinsybidedprimarily n the character n the play ikeRáma, and secon-darily n theactorwho enactedthe character.5 His outlook will be clearwhenweimagine flowerwhich ventuallywithers waygiving iseto a tinyfruit hatdevelopsand ripensunderfavorable nutritive nd climaticcondi-tions.

Thisexplanation,simple s it sounds, createsmoreproblemsthan itsolves. It is not a fact with all sthyãyins hat they are nourished as thetime dvances.Sthãyins ikeangerandsurprisewane withthe time. Theywouldnever reach the stage of rasa if we accept Lollata's explanation.Ramaisnot, then, oanyreasonabledegree,etalone theprimary, herecep-tacleof rasa Nourishmentf a sthãyinikerati s possiblen therealRamaat the sight f the real Síta,bothof whomare no more at the time of the

staging f a play. Alltalk of the production, evelationnd nourishment ftherasaas Lollatavisualisest is, likethat of the fruit f a treebeyond hereachof a consumer, uerile.

For Šankukawhothusfinds aultwith ollata'sview, heactorhimself,whois à contemporaryf the spectators nd isnot far removedfrom themasarecharactersike Rama whomhe imitates,s the receptaclef rasa whichis an imitationof the sthãyin n the real character like Rama. Thissthãyinn theactor s a matter f inferencerrived t from his acting. Boththe sthãyinand its correlatives re thus unreal and henceare named by

8 ifa w- 1 č^Ner; i H iAbhinãvbfiorati n the Rasa-sûtra,Page124 in Rasa-

bhãvavicãraby Prof. .P. Kangle, ombay, 973,ereaftereferredo as Kang,followedypagenumbers.




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84 AnnalsBORI, LXV( 1984)

Bharatabyartificial erms ike vibhãva6 How can suchan unreal apparatusleadto a realenjoyment f a rasa? - *Asdoesthepicture f a horse leadtothecognition f a real horse, ( citra~turaga-nyãya7 says Šaňkuka;deemsit samvadi-bhramaand quotesDharmakirti, heBuddhistphilosopher, s asupport. magine personwho seesraysof light t a distance,thinks hat tis a jewel,rushes osecure t, reaches he spot and, to his disappointment,findsa lampthere. Imaginealso anotherpersonwhoseesrays of a jewel( and not the ewel ifself, t being too small andtoo far fromhim , thinksthat t is a jewel, similarlyeaches hespot and finds jewel. In fact, bothare mistakennasmuch s

theytakeas a

jewelsomethingther han a

jewel.But thisfalseknowledge bhrama produces realaction n them, with heonly difference hat one of the two is rewarded with what he sought( samvadi-bhramawhilethe other s not visamvãdi-bhrama.8

Thisis how Šaňkukaargues, concedingthat the inferred thãyin nthe actorandits apparatus re unreal. Personallyhe thinks hat the cogni-tionof the sthãyinn theactor defies efinition, annotbe included nanyofthe knownvarieties f cognition,but, at the same time,cannotbe deniedasit is a matter f first-hand xperienceoreveryrasi/ca.9

It is customary odeem Šaňkukaa Naiyäyikaon thestrength f hisview that rasa, that s the sthãyin mitated, s inferred. do not subscribeto this view for Nyãya is a systemwhichexpoundsin detail all the fourmeansof knowledgeof which inference s one, andnothing ypical f theNyãyasystem s involved n this view. A farmer does not need to studyNyãyato infer hat t would rain before ong when he seesheavyclouds nthe sky. f Šaňkuka'stheory f inferencesadequatetodeem him Naiyãyika,

6 3C-ÍIR.. srdtaftw:-rrätxT íÇf: Kaiig.29-30

7 Thisxpression,issingntheAbhinavabhãratiuthintedt by ometherwords(acow,nsteadf a horse used yAbhinavaurthern Kang.45, is first oundusedbyMammatan hisKãvyaprakãsaUlläsaV , whileepresentingaskukaVview.0/>.it.p.134.

8 IPramana-varttika2.57.

This s alludedoin Sankuka's iewbythewords 'Kang.130.9 srfôïnicréšfét T i

gřFqi ^ Il Kang.30.




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hisreference o Dharmakirti an beregarded sufficientround odeemhima Buddhist I wouldconsider he econdclaimas moreplausible,s theversequotedfromDharmakirtis closelyrelated o thetheory f knowledgef theBuddhistswho deny he existence f the objectiveworld. This sortof n'áivetagging n a flimsy round would beof little consequencen a serious tudy.

Šaňkukas attacked orholding hisviewbyboth BhattaTauta and hisdisciple,Abhinavagupta.' You call rasa an imitation;okay. But fromwhosepointof view ? From that of the spectator r of the actor? ' interro*gates Tauta, and bringsout the fallacyin áañkuka'sstand from ach ofthem. To knowsomethings imitation, he audience must know the imi-tated. (Just as to appreciate parody,youmust know the original. Batnone hasseena character ike the real Rãma.10 Aid even if it werenot acharacter ike Rãma far removed n time from the spectator,cognitionofimitation s possibleonlyof things erceptible,nd not of a sthãyinwhich sbeyond he reachof sense-organsnd is only nferred. And even as inferred,thesthãyinscognizedas a sthãyin nd not as an imitation f a sthãyin. t isridiculous o believethat an imitation f the hetu smoke-likemist leads tothe nferencef an imitation f the ãdhya fire-likelower .11Theimitationtheory oes not holdgoodevenfrom hepointof viewof the actor who hasnot seen the real Rãma; anda sthãyin n anotherpersonis as imperceptibleto the actor as to the spectator. How can and would an actorimitate hesorrow f Rãma? Rãma wassorry theactor isnot. Theactorcan at hisbest shed tears s did Rãma whenhe wassorry. But sheddingtears is notthe same asbeingsorry. And howcansheddingears,which s commontoall normalpeople includingheactorwhenthey re sorry, e an imitation fRãma alone?12 Needlessto say that áañkuka'sanalogyof thehorse n apicture s beside the point, as both the imitation nd the imitated n thiscase areperceptible. Moreover,a picture s createdby means of coloursa sthãyin,whichalreadyexists, is only revealed,never created. Whilecontrovertingañkuka'stheory hatthe cognition f thesthãyin n the actordefiesdefinition, auta introducesn important deathat what we see asRãma in a playis Rãma thegeneral, nd not Rãmatheparticular; and thisis corroboratedwhen an actor enactingRãma is substituted y anotherwithout ny problem o the spectator.13

10^ ÇKá


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86 ArmaisBORI,LXV( Í984)

Followingn the footsteps f his preceptor,Abhinavaguptapicks upspmemore holesin the theory offered y Saňkuka. Imitationby its verynature, rguesAbbinava,breeds aughter as, for nstance, oes a parodyamongthe third arty pectators, nd angeramongthose that re imitated.14Dramacan neverbe an imitation;for mitation s a relation that can existbetween two particularentities. When it is clear that the actor cannotimitate he realRãma,the only alternativeeft s thathe makes actionsthatallnormalpeopledo undercomparableconditions.If this is imitation,wearrive t the funny onclusion hattheactor s imitating imself In other

words,what s

generalannotbe

regardedas imitation.16What is

drama,then It is a kind of anuvyavasãyare-cognitionhat s a repeat experience,a typical wareness f a cognitionn which spectator evels.

Šaňkukathusstandsdiscredited.The next ritic sBhattaNãyaka,theauthorof Hrdaya-darpananowlost,andknownthrough uotations , whichattempts o refute Ã nandavar hana's theory of dhvani. Nãyaka should,chronologically, igure fter Ãnandavardhana whoseexplanationof rasa isupheldby Abhinava. But Nãyakais usheredn by Abbinava,forhis view

is finally obe refuted y him nd the view of Ãnanda-Abhinava choolto beintroduceds the siddhãnta Nãyakastarts with the denial of rasa as anobjectof cognition,production r suggestion as Ananda-Abhinava claim.Is it the pectator r the character ike Rãma that s the receptaclef rasa ?Ia thefirst lternative, hespectatorwould haveto be sorrywhenhe cognizespathos, nd wouldnot care to havethe sameexperience gain;forwhowouldlike tobe sorry f one can helpit? But he is not,forheis innowayrelated oSitawhoseseparation mightmake himsorry. He is likely obesorry f heiffin similar ondition. But, what f he isnot, and if hehas hisbelovedby

his side whilewatching he play? He is likelytobe sorry f he identifieshimselfwithRãma. But how can an ordinaryperson dentify imselfwithsuchsuperhuman ersonalitiess Rãma? In the secondalternative, hat s,if'Rärna s the receptacleof rasa, is the spectator's ognition f rasa of thenature f memory, erbalknowledger inference All theseoptionswhichimply ny ndirect ognition f rasamilitate gainstthe spectator's xperiencethat he is havinga direct experiencef rasa. If a rasa like Ôrngãra scognizedby the spectatoras based in other persons,wouldhe not feel

14 •••* sfàsci •••afe sfài; Wlffl;;... çPTCFlFlt Î^rcyTfoî( I AbhinavabhãratimTHãtyasãstra(Gaekwareries 936• 107.SWFWHfWÎ I toccit*




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Arjunwadkar : TheRasaTheorynd theDaršanas Š7

embarrassedo watch man and a womanin privacy, provided, f course,he is a gentleman16

Nãyaka would,therefore, ike to explainrata as a jointoutcomeoftwooperations ' bhãvakatvaand ' bhojakatva Bythefirst e meanstheprocessof ' sãdhãr ril ar na ' or generalisation,.e. shearingrasa and itscorrelatives f their particular pace-time-personontext and makingthema ' commonwealth - a stateproducedbyfourfold cting n a playandgunãlamkãrasin poetry. Thus generalisedrasa is relishedbythe spectator ybhojakatvaa uniqueprocessof theminddistinct rom hecommonlyecog-nisedmeansof cognition uch as perception,memory nd others. Thoughmadeup of threeprimevalqualities,the Sattva the Rajas and the Tamasit is dominated y the Sattva as a result of which this experiencerests intheconsciousnesscaitanya full of light and happiness,- much hesameway as in the realizationof the SupremeBrahman Para-Brahmãsvãdasavidha). Nãyakaconceivesbhãvakatvand bhojakatvas processesexclu-sivelyoperating n the field of poetry and drama and distinct rom heabhidhäprocesswhich s common opoetry nd other iterature,17-andatory( Vedaetc. and advisory( Itihãsa Purãnaetc. .18 The chief purposeofpoetry s,therefore, ure oy, and,onlysecondarily, idactic.

Evena hurried urvey f Nayaka'sviewwould revealthat n formu-lating his theory he has drawn substantially n Mímãmsã( as Abhinavaunderstandshim , Sãmkhyaand, most of all, Vedãnta and exemplifieswhatan imaginative,discriminatingmanof wide knowledgean contributeto the expositionf a theory. For his bhãvakatvaoncept,he is indebted oMimämsa( as Abhinava understandshim ; for theconstitution f the rasaexperience,oSamkhya{alsoabsorbedn Vedãnta);andfor he dea ofover-whelming,otalabsorptionn theexperience,o Vedãnta.Nãyakais the fiťst

18 # * SRfact, îflfîïsïpqà f| îTÇÎiïïf WT. ^ ^ îiï

f| srčfči ^íRSčwafňwraj ... qwãí g sráltr Kang.47.

Kang.147.is 5i5^5in=ri?qqri^lTRTfff I

sqrqf^qp-TFÌi IIHrdaya-darpanaasquotednDhyanyalokf-locanaKavyamãlãdition,. 27.




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88 ArmaisBORI,LXV( 1984

critic ocomparepoeticexperienceto that of theBrahmanwhich he ndiantradition egardss the highest oalof life. All subsequentwriters n poeticsare indebtedto him for his brilliant onception. Even Abhinavawhohasrejectedhiscontentionhat rasa is not a cognition nd that bhavakatvas aspecific rocessn poetic experience,18oncedeshisdescription f the poeticexperiences ona parwith hespiritual xperience,nd hisbhojakatvarocessas identicalwith Ananda'svyarijanã. As monisticSaivagamaof whichAbhinavais the chiefexponent, s basicallynot different rom hemonisticVedãnta indebtednessf the rasa expositiono Úaivãgamaneedsno specialreference.

Thetwosalientpoints n Nayaka'sinterpretation hichAbhinavahaspassedunderfire re ( i ) rasa is not a cognition, nd ( ii bhavakatvasaspecialpoeticprocesswhichbringsabout thesãdhãranlkararta Aboutthefirst, Abhinavaremarks hat it is self-contradictoryo callrasaa bhogapleasure, nd at the sametime o deny hat t is a prati i- cognition. Whatis pleasureif not a form of awarenessor cognition Abhinavahas noobjectionto single t out from hecommon forms f cognition r awareness;but to call it no cognition s equivalentto makeit unfit oranydefinition,- like a ghost 19 As for the bhavakatvaAbhinavatakes it as another elf-contradiction ãyakahascommitted; or t militates gainsthis view hatrasais not produced.Bhavakatva sthe ame as bhãvanãof the Mímãmsakas andbhãvanãs conceivedas a mentalprocessof a personthat causes a thing ocomeintobeing. It operates hroughwomedia the word and the meaning;and isaccordinglyamed&abdi%nd ãrthi as illustratedbythe statements( i ) «someonedesiresmeto do this , and( ii 41mustdo this. Mímãmsakasbelieve hat t is through hisprocessthat performers inducedby the Vedato perform ritual, hen will is created in hismind to do it which,even-

tually, s translated nto the actual performance f the ritual. In matterssecular, t is some personin commandwhoplays heroleof the Veda n thecitedexample.20

LocanaonDhvanyalokaith alapriya(Com., Bañaras 1940, p. 187.

80 ^ sfar mti çfò mm wwra:s^qfrm I * ?

WPEČíH, čRWflřU ^ ,


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Arjunwadkar : TheRasaTheorynd the Daršanas 89

With due respect oAbhinava, Tbegto differ rom him n his inter-pretationof Nãyakaon the point of bhãvakatva It is in the contextofsãdhãraníkaranathat Nãyakaushers n thebhãvakatvawhich,when under-stood in the proper spirit, meanselimination f the element f specificityfrom the apparatusof rasa by the spectatoron the strength f his will-power, something n a par with ' willinguspensionf disbelief'. It is aunique powerof the human mind to infuse a lifelessmatterwith life, toassociate athing with or dissociate itfrom omething, oequate somethingwithagreeableor disagreeableomplexof qualities. A lifelesspictureorimage,a book, a souvenir,a word, a flower, smell,a colour, a pieceof

furniture, n apparel, - in short, anything,howsoeverinsignificant rompthers'pointof view,canmean a lot for personwho infusest withfeelingsby hiswillpower. It is a symbolfor him of somethingwhich xists n theworldof his mind. Thispowerof symbolism,whichmandiscoveredirst nthe formation f languageand extended it subsequentlyo other countlessareas, is perhaps he one phenomenonthat pervadesheentire human life.Allarts, lays,games, ntertainments,eligious,ocialorpolitical onventions,metalanguagend notations n all studiesare nothing ut manifestationsfthe powerof symbolism ackedby individual r socialwillpower. Bereftof this power, man wouldbe a poor creature ikeanyother. Thisis man'sbhãvanãšakti which thinkNãyaka implieswhenhe speaksof bhãvakatvaAbhinava'scriticism f himon thispoint s, therefore, nfair r an outcomeof misunderstanding. ven if Abhinavais supposedto be right n takingbhãvakatvas equivalentobhãvanãit deserves obenoted hatwhatNãyakarelates oit snot rasabut only ãdhãraníkarana,which, y commonconsent,canbe granted s produced.

Ona closeexaminationof the rasa theory s understood y Nãyakaand by Abhinava,onecannot help feeling hatthe atter essentiallymbibedthe former'sviewand developedit to a form ne can logicallyrrive t, -

excepton thepoint of bhãvakatvaon whichAbhinavahas misunderstoodhim, and bhojakatvawhich,for Abhinava, s a cognitionnot different romvyanjanã- i.e.a matter f differencen terminology.

As detailedby Abhinava,rasa isdifferent romsthãyin nasmuchsthe former an abideonlytemporarilynd only n a connoisseursahrdaya ,whilethe latter existsdormantly nd permanentlyn everybeingfrom hemomenthe is born. In other words, rasa existsonly n drama or otherarts), sthãyins xistonly n actuallife. Rasa existsonly as long as theactof carvanã relishing continues and carvanã continuesnlyas longas the

rasa apparatus vibhãvaetc.-

is in view.21That is the reason why the21 ^ | Kang. 54. I tTčf|

èflfìr: I Kang.67. ^ 1V&T3 ÇsníífàsSTTTčf 1Kang.74.'2 [AnnalsBORI]




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90 AnnalsBORI LXV ( 1984)

correlativesf rasa cannot be regarded s having causal relationwith helatter; becausean effect ikea pot exists independentlyf the potterwhomakes t, once it has come into being. This leads usto the nevitableon-clusionthat the experienceof rasa has no parallelin actual life and hencemustbe regarded s alaukika uncommon.22The relationbetween asa anditscorrelativessexplainedon the analogyof thepot and the amp,- ghatapradípa-nyãya23and iscalledvyanjanà.Thepot is revealed,not produced,bythe nearby lamp only as longas the amp emits ight. Rasatoo, whichalready xists in the form sthãyin n the mind of thespectator, s likewiserevealedohim

byits correlatives hen t assumestheform f a rasa Before

this stage s reached,the sthãyinundergoesa metamorphosisshornof itsspacetime-personontext, t is generalised, this s sãdhãraníkarana Asaresult, t is experiencedythespectator otas hisown,norashisopponent's,nor of a third party person, leavingthus no scopefor such relations asembarrassment,ngeror indifference.24hisexperienceoesnot partakeofthecharacter f memoryfor it is not produced hrough hemedium f senseorgans, or inference for t is relished,25 though,of course,the facultyof inferencen the spectator s he utilizes t in worldlyffairs aysthefounda-

tionfor the

experienceof rasa Hence it is a

unique,pure experience#uninterrupedy anyother ognition nd unpolluted y any worldlymotive'verymuch like the experienceof the supremeBrahmannd, likewise,con-stituted f purehappiness. Themost ogicalconcluion ofthis view s that,theoretically, asa is only one( Brahmãsvãdadoes not havevarieties, - athread, not taken noticeof by othersbut taken up lateron byBhojaandelaborated oits fullest xtent.

22 m ^ črgt^mirsfqîR Teff:, ñ ?

q^rrq I Kang.74.23 T| sGfcraft ^ tosrtči;

Im? ft ^ srétasraRÌlfaéà «qpj*îTrfcïï 1 .. TOWRRfr35 I Dhvanynlokaprosender .33,Bãlapriyãditionp.421,31.

24 ... qt


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For theconceptof vyañjanaalsocalleddhvanifound n an elaborateform or hefirst ime n theworkDhvanyãlokaÄnanda hasacknowledgedhis debtto grammarians hofirst nunciated hisprinciplen the context fsphota a typical emanticconceptof thePãninianschool. For Pãniniansthe audiblewordconsistingf soundscoming ne after he other, the earlieronedisappearingefore headventof the next ne, and, hence,incapableofforming unitedwhole,cannotconvey hemeaning. Theyhavesurmountedthis difficulty y conceivingan eternal form of the word, the sphotawhich being partless,encounters no problem in conveying he meaningwhich heaudible,perishableworddoes. But howcomewe

getat theeternal

wordfrom he udible,perishable ne? ťThrough process alledvyañjana'say the grammarians. The transitory ounds leave their impressionson the mind of the istener efore heydisappear;and the ast sound of theword togetherwith the impressions f the earlier ones revealsthroughvyañjanaheeternalword, sphota which n its turn onveysthe meaning.26Thisprocessof vyañjanas conceivedby the grammarians as not a verysignificantoleto playin thecorpusof the formalgrammar. Thanks to theacumenof Änandawhorealizedthat this concept ancontribute ubstanti-

allyto thecriticism f

poetrynd

elaboratedt

in a systematicmanner;andit changedthewholeoutlook of Sanskrit riticismn the years hatfollowed.

What Nãyaka callsbhojakatva only in the contextof rasa) andAnanda-Abhinava schoolvyañjana in a wider contexteven outsidethespan of rasa is controverted y Jayanta Bhattasummarily, nd MahimaBhatta in detail,who have upheldthe claim of inference s the rightfuloperant in areas wherevyañjana is supposedto operate.27Mahimahasdone this more systematicallynd in sufficient etails than Jayanta. For

themthe

apparatusof rasa ( vibhãvaetc. is as much a cognitivetool(jñapaka-hetu of thesthãyinjrasas is smoke,of fire. Theyseeno reasonwhy there houldbe a discriminationetweenthe two and why heformer

26 ^ífirõ^Fq:3^3^: ' Sarva-darsana-saihgrahatPãnini-darsana.

Vakyapadiya1.85.2TCf. Vyakti-vivekaTrivandrum909, 1.26,2,53. Mahimaallsthis

processKãvyãnumiti1.25todistinguisht from henon-poeticnference.or him, smay e ogicallyxpected,t s the nferencehat perates ven n thearea ofthesphotaof the grammarians.ee also Ayayci-munjciviKsishTarůskrtaeries,1936, p.45,where ayantaisparagesnandaspanditammanyaTheviewhatinferencean dispensewithvyanjanãexistedven at the timeof Änandawho haspresentedndrefutedt inhis wnway. SeeDhvanyãlokander . 33.




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92 AnnalsBORI, LJSTF1984

begiven VIP treatment. f course,of thetwocritics f vyañjana,Jayantais candidenoughto concedethat, after ll is said and done, this s the fieldof the critics f poetry nd too profound orthe ogicianstopassa judgmenton.28 Mahima is not that liberal. He not only argues out the case ofinferencegainst vyañjanabut also slashes Anandafor ack of carefulnessin the wordingof his statements. In a small verse by Ãnanda in theearlypart of his work whichdefinesdhavni,Mahima haspicked upas manyas ten errors nd, in a sneering-cum-ridiculinganner, presented t in arecomposedorm y correctingheerrors 29

Mammata,n his Kavyaprakaša,assquarelydealtwith heargumentsof Mahima. Inference s a meansof right knowledge has as its basis aninvariableoncomitancevyãpti of the hetuwith hesãdhya.In the bsenceof such a vyãpti,any inference rawn is open to prove fallacious. Nosuchvyãpti anbeestablished between hevyañjakaand the vyaňgya andhencethe verbaloperationlike vyañjanais inevitableto accountfor thepoetic experience.30Mammata has alsorecordedviewsof otherrivalschoolsopposingvyañjana suh as inclusion hereof n laksanã, the dîrgha-abhidhâviewetc. ; but as the topicunderdiscussion sprimarily he rasa theory nits relation o the philosophical ystems,oing nto the detailsof Mammafa'arguments n favour of vyañjana,howsoevernteresting, ould be out ofplace.

As stated arlier, hethread n Abhinava'sexpositionf rasa that theo-reticallyt is one was later taken up and elaboratedby Bhoja. Bhojadoesnot subscribe o the traditional view that there are eight r nine rasas indrama or poetry. It is a myth, andeddownfromgeneration o generationand followedblindlyikea belief hat certain ree s inhabited y a ghost S1Whatarepopularly alled rasasare no more than bhãvas generatedfromtherasa,andtheyneednot be limited to the sacred numbereight or nine;they re as many s fortynine Why houldonlya fewof thembepromotedto the status of rasa? We find ne logicalend in Rudrata'sanswer o thisquestion that there an be as many rasas as there are bhãvas,. e. 49.82

28 JTtgqi f%í 13: I loc. cit. Thisstatementf Jayantasgenerallyverlooked.29 Vyakti-viveka,.23,25.

80 Kavyaprakaša,lläsa .«i ^ mrafè: rasi fsflsfq i drhgara-prakãía,ötfO«SeeRäghavan'sBhõjas Šrngara rakãsa Bombay940.

82 IKavyãlankara12.3,4.




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The other nd is found n Bhoja'spositionthat none of the 49candidates,who play alternatelyhe principal nd the subordinaterole* n relation tooneanother, eserves obe elected s rasa, which s abovethem ll.33Bhojanamesthisonerasa variouslys abhimãna ahamkãra and šrňgara ( whichmustnotbeconfusedwith ts namesaken Bharata's exposition). Rasa iswhat s relished, s the subjectof ãsvãda. Andwhat is it that we reallyrelish «Our ownego sayshe;andexplainst as self-love.34Whateversliked, disliked, oved, hated, welcomed,avoided,is the subjectof anger,sorrowor surprise, all that has an invariablereference o one'sown self.This

principlef

egois so

overwhelminghat t can convert ven

paininto

pleasure nd viceversa A younggirlfeelspleasure t the scratchesmadebyher over's nailson her bosom; why Heregois theanswer.35 It is plainthat everymanis happyor sorry ortheprofit emakesor the ossheincurs.Evenwhenheishappyor sorry or notherman'sprofit r loss,it is for him-self nan indirectway. That a man makesa sacrificeor nother salso forhimself for thesatisfaction e obtains therefrom. That he weepsfor ano-ther s also forhimself. It is the self-love hat s the sourceof all a mandoesor doesnot. EvenYajñavalkyaand Manu do not think otherwise;86

and,aboveall,no

one candeny ne'sownexperience.Thisegois a qualityof thesoul;and,hence,whosoeverhas a soulhasalsoan ego. Its refinement hichmakesthe rasikais the achievementf tscultivationduringa seriesofpastlives.37Theego, accordingothe Samkhya theory, s constituted f sattva rajas and tamas. It developsintorasa whentheelement f sattvareigns. Bhojaconceives tin three stagesthefirst, ureego;the second,where he49bhãvasget a scopeto be enriched

33 3T?qcïïrçqlfa q^qt3 sqfÌRTflifft stsfò artft q^rf^T:, ^ çqifïp:| Bhoja'sárhgõra

Prakasap.517.84 W 9 I •Qrhgaraprakasa,ntro.

Sarasvati-kanthábharana.185 # fèrgì spirç ^ I

SFJIWT IIBhoja'sér'ngara rakãsa p.516;Seealsopp.465-66,84, 27.

Brhadãranyaka%4.5.6.Sfêjfêi IIManusmrti,. 4.ČR3^ 3fl?ïR: ^čcRJcT 3flč*n... äiföfldt




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94 AnnalsBORULXV ( 1984

by their respectivevibhãva etc. whenthey are calledrasa in a secondarysense; the third, the fullydeveloped stagewherethe bhãvasenriched nthe secondstage merge into one singleawareness self-love.Bhojahasopenlyacknowledgedisdebtto the Sãmkhyasystem.38But there are inhis expositionof rasa as he understands t conceptsikekarman väsanäpunarjanmawhich are commonly hared by almost all Indian philosophi-calsystems nd are drawnupon tacitly r with acknowledgements muchbyBhojaas by other xpounders f rasalikeAbhinava.

Jagannãthas the astdoyenof the Sanskrit radition f criticism. He

hasenlistedas

manyas eleven views onrasa

includinghosediscussed

byAbhinava. Onlythe first our f these views aregivenby him in detail,whilethe rest re coveredn a few ines,the ast five receiving ardly a lineeach.39Theobviousdifferencen Jagannatha's reatment f rasa is that hepresents ismaterialmostly n a stylecultivated y the Navya Nyayaandadoptedbythe post-Gaňgešaworks on Vedãnta. Followingthe ancients,he first ronounces he character of rasa as the sthäyin qualifiedby un-coveredconsciousnessand later rectifieshe statement y sayingthat 4infact, rasa is uncovered consciousnessengulfedby the sthäyin'40 Thediffe-

rencebetweenthese statements s like that betweenťthe colouredglassilluminatedy the unlight and *the unlight ilteredhrough he coloured

glass.* Asa true cientist, emakes tcategoricallylearthat theexperienceof rasa engulfedby objects such as vibhãvais quite distinct from theexperiencef the Brahmann meditation.41Asa true vedãntin hehas tracedrasa to a Šrutipassage,the oldestpossibleauthority espected yall devouttraditionists. n the third nterpretation e has ascribedto 'moderns', hepresentsrasa on a par with the appearanceof silveron a shell shiningin the Sun,- both causedby imperfections n cognitiveconditions,and

equallyanirvacanïyaindeterminate.42 thers wouldlike to call themboth

•ftW*îcf Bhojas Šrhgara rak sa,pp. 464, 65.88 s ... ^ 5JžřK:Rf. aflfàfofà,ï 3 I Op.cit.

p.465, 91.Cp.

WMHH ^ IlSãmkhyakãrikã.89 Rasa-gahgãdhara, pages 4-74nR.B. Athavale'sditionPoona 1953. Vol. .

feraci w i ...' ^ Ì h:, lè ' çicf fô: .. I op.Cit.p.55.41 I loc. it.42 qsqrcg .. ...

SgčKWWÍSČ&FÍte.. | Op.cit,pp.56-57.




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ArJUNWADKARTheRasaTheorynd theDaršanas 97

conclusions priorifrom hem and not questionthem a posteriori n thestrength f our personalexperiencesn total ignornaceof the scientificmethod»47

It is perfectlyegitimate osaythat oneshouldmakean earnest ffortto understandhe view ofan interpreternd acquaintoneselfwith he ystem,if necessary,from wh ch he draws his material. But to deny he right fquestioninghe nterpretation is-à-visne'sownexperiences not onlydoinginjustice o the questionerbutalsoto thespirit f the tradition. Thesurestconfirmationf a hypothesis sconsidered tobe the agreementf its results

with ctualexperience.WhatAlmighty xperience ictates s, wewillobey,*proclaimsJayantaBhatta,48 he learned uthor of the NyãyaManjar/, andwhat s it, f not experience, hich s heldas thetouchstone y the traditionalcritics of the interpretationsn refuting iewsthey do not subscribeto?Could therebea stronger efence f experiencehan that by áamkarãcãrya,thedoyenof Indianphilosophers,whenhe remarks 4Evena hundredŠrutipassagescannot be acceptedf they ellus that the fire scooland devoidoflight'?49 The most astoundingfact s that the Mímãmsakasseek sanctionfor their enets rom ommonworldly xperience,50nd Subhedarhutsdoorsto the atter n favour f the former Subhedar'sarguments re basedon thepresumptionhat here s an uninterrupted,niform radition f the nterpreta-tionsof the Rasa-sütraeachings far as Jhalkikar, . e., almostto our owntimes.Against hisbackground,t s amusingofind ubhedar urprisedt thefactthat, n a longperiodof oneanda half millenniainceBharata,Jagan-nãthawasthefirst o cite passagefrom the TaittiriyaUpanisadn supportof the so-calledVedãnticviewof Rasa-sütra51 Thisis equivalentto sayingthat therewas noVedãntatradition s suchof the nterpretation f theRasa-sutra and that t wasJagannãtha irst o think of utilising edãntic onceptsand terminology or the interpretationf the sütra And what whenthereare two

opinionsn the tradition tself n

relatingn

interpreterooneor the

other ystem,52r when n interpreter orrows rommore hanonesystems58

47 SeeNatya-darsanaBombay981, pp.36-54. ee alsoRasa-vicara aniPracinaDarsanakãrabyMM.YajñesvaraãstrI asture, yderabad957.

4:8 ïpïï : I NyayaManjarì(Benares936),Pramâna..285.

49 * í| Sprat l Gltã-bhà.çya8.66.co Cf.Mïmamsa-Nyaya-PrakasaIntroductionyMM.Vasudeva hastribhyankarp. 2i.

Natya-darsana.53.52 BhattaNãyakaegardeds a Simkhyas blamedyAbhinavaorhavingoundedhis heoryn theMlmãmsãonceptfbhãvanã.SeeNote 0above.63 BhattaNãyaka, gain. Regardeds a Sämkhya,ewas the first o comparerasasvãdatoBrahma vãdaof theVedãntins.Whatshis dentity ASamkhya,a VedãntinraMimamaka(cf.Note52)?




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98 AnnalsBORI, LXV ( 1984

Thisbrings s to the next mportant oint. Theso-called Mïmarôsakaetc.viewsof the Rasa-sütra reno more than a utilization f someMímãmsãetc.principlesor n issue outsidethe urisdiction f thesystem oncernedfthey re thought obeconduciveoa better nderstandingf the issue.Whatinterest s a philosophicalsystem ikelyto havein offering solution to aproblemt doesnot consider ts own? Wemay andin an unsurmountabledifficultyf wewereto think hat system asa view bout everying nder hesun. If a Mïmâmsakacarrieshis owntheorieswhenhe turns o Rasa-sütrawhat wouldhe do when he turns o Vedãntaor Vaišesika? Couldtherebeanythingikea Mïmâmsakaviewof the Vedãnta r the Vaišesika? Whatweactually ind s that an author having ommandover several ystems r disci-plines likeVãcaspatiMišra is a SãmkhyawhenheexpoundsSãmkhya,aVedãntinwhen he expoundsVedãntaand so on. If Sãmkhya enets igure;in the nterpretationf theRasa-sütrait meansthe nterpreters a critic f therasa theoryhas borrowedsome Sãmkhyatenetsfor his convenience.Theadvantagehe derives y doingso isthat t is the Sãmkhya,and not he, whois answerableorthe tenets reliedupon.

More discrepanciesre disclosedwhen we go into the details ofSubhedar'stheory. Lollatais a Mïmâmsaka,he maintains.Why Becausethe role the actor plays in a drama is comparableothat of the sacrificerin theVedicritual, uggests ubhedar. There s nothing n the interpretationof Lollatato provethat he had this in his mind when he propoundedhistheory. Evenif weignore his, thebasicquestionis how can comparisonfrom he Vedicritualberegarded part of the Mímãmsãsystemwhich isessentiallyhe scienceof interpretation. hat this scienceexpoundsts tenetswith he Vedicritual n view s no reasonwhythe twoshouldbe treated s

one, and Lollataas a Mïmâmsaka. If Subhedars supposedto bs right nreading hemindof Lollata,Lollatacan at thebestbe regarded s a ritualist,not a Mïmâmsaka.

Equallyuntenable sthe viewthat Šaůkuka isa Naiyãyika on theground hatheregards asaas inferable.Nyãyais a system hatexpoundsndetail all the four meansof knowledgeof which nferences one. Whenáañkuka maintiains hat rasa is inferred,what typically yãyaideais in-volvedin it which makeshima Naiyãyika Do I need to bea Naiyãyikawhen I infer r say that my missing hoes kept outside the house havebeenstolenbysomeonewhile wasengagednside If áañkuka'stheory finferencesadequateto deemhima Naiyãyika,his reference o Dharmaklrtican beregarded sufficientroundfordeeminghim a Buddhist In supportof his contention hat Bhatta Nãyaka was a Sãràkhya,Subhedarquotes




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ÁrjunwadkAR : ŤheRasaTheorynd theDaršanas 99

the Sãmkhyaerminologye employs,convenientlygnoring hecomparisonof the rasa experiencehe makeswith the experienceof the Brahman. Ido not knowof a Sãmkhyasystemwhichsharesthe VedänticconceptofBrahmanand its experience.If BhattaNãyakais a SãmkhyabecauseheemploysomeSãmkhyaonceptsn expoundinghe Rasa-siitrawhy she nota Vedäntistbecause heemploysomeVedäntic oncepts AndMïmamsaka,too, because,as interpreted y Abhinava,he implies he bhãvanãconceptof the Mimãmsakaswhenhe talksof the bhãvakatvaprocess?

Subhedar'sstand becomesall the more unconvincingwhen he in-troduces lamkãra viewof the Rasa-sutra s the viewof the grammariansnthe strength f the clichéthat poeticss the ťtail of thegrammar,

' Pucchamheremeans,for him, a respectabler dignifiedequelasillustrated n the Vedic passage,' srfêfàT But unlikeMarathi,Sanskritdoesnot use the word ' srfàgT in this ense. Pratisthã nSanskritmeans*position, upport,basis Nowhere n hisexposition,ubhedar eemsto be awareof this. This s funbasedon a confusion.

Subhedarhas introducedAbhinava'snterpretations onerepresentingthe viewof the grammar hemeansthe Pãninianschool,andJagannatha'sas one of the Vedãntins. Elsewherein his expositionof thistopic, he hasattempted o show howthe twoschoolsare veryclose intheir iewof thecreation f the world. Whatis Brahman o the the Vedãntins,the ultimatecauseandreality, s the šabda-BrahmanoGrammarians, ays he, and takestheconcept s farback asPanini andPatañjali.Now,there sno evidenceoprovethatPaniniandPatañjalihad this oncept n theirmind. Thefirstworkthat expoundsthis conceptis the Vãkyapadíyaof Bhartrhari 6th .A.D.);andthere re reasons o believethat he,too,meant t n a metaphorical,atherthana metaphysical,ense. NãgojiBhatta 18th ent. A.D.), therenownedexponent f the Pãninianschool,understandsheŠabda-Brahmans produc-ed,and hence the apara%and not the ťpara Brahman.54If, however,Subhedarbelievesthat the two systems re almost identicaln their meta-physical iew, t is not easy to understandwhyhetreats hem eparatelyntheir iewsof the Rasa-sütra which re weddedto their metaphysicaliews,as Subhedarmaintains. Subhedarbelievesthat it is the influence f themonisticdeaof the Brahman hat ed Jagannãthadefinepoetry s ťŠabda*

in preference o the conventional áabdãrthau which involvesdualism.

SeeVaiyakaranaSiddhanta-Laghu-Manjusat... (Chowkharabadition,.172)




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Jagannãtha oes notseemto beaware ofthis; for he ustifies is definition ya referenceo suchcommomxpressionss «thepoetry s recited loud M

We haveno meansto guesswhat Subhedarthinksof Bhoja'sinter-pretation f rasa. Is Bhojaa Sãmkhya r a Vedãntin Tneither lternative,how is Subhedargoingto account formorethanoneinterpretationsrom hesameschooland reconcilehissituationwithhisbelief hat he various nter-pretations f the rasa theory ave come down to usthrough uniform, nbro-ken tradition We are, therefore, orced o concludethat there s no suchthing s oficialinterpretationsf the Rasa-sUtrayphilosophical ystemsikeMimãmsã that ll thosewho offered o interpret he Rasa-süíradid so ascritics f drama and/or oery; that they ought aid from the philosophicalsystemsn varying egreesn thehopeof solving roblems elated o the issueat hand; and, last but not the east, theydid so withan eye on the actualexperiencef the connoisseur s a touchstone or he orrectness r otherwiseof the theory. Abhinava has succeeded indrawing hebestfrom hisprede-cessorsto formulaten interpretation hich is least susceptibleoinconsis-tency ut has itsown limitations.

ifRr+rrcft.' 3^5^: qatfčí,•íjčisqî fTRT:,'(Í^JSRÍ^^itRd: Sčjfl IRasa-gahgãdharadefinitionf hekãvya.

Documents

The Rasa Theory and the Darśanas