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The Qualities That Make a GreatCollection Management OfficerJoseph W. Wippl & Donna D'AndreaPublished online: 06 Aug 2014.

To cite this article: Joseph W. Wippl & Donna D'Andrea (2014) The Qualities That Make a GreatCollection Management Officer, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27:4,806-814, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2014.924821

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JOSEPH W. WIPPL and DONNA D’ANDREA

The Qualities That Make a GreatCollection Management Officer

The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Website states, in part, thata Collection Management Officer (CMO) will:

oversee and facilitate the collection, evaluation, classification, anddissemination of foreign intelligence collected from clandestine sources.CMOs play a critical role in ensuring that foreign intelligence collectedby clandestine sources is relevant, timely, and addresses the highest

Joseph W. Wippl became Professor of the Practice at Boston University inMay 2011 after serving as a Senior Lecturer in the School’s Department ofInternational Relations. During his 30-year career with the CentralIntelligence Agency’s (CIA) National Clandestine Service (NCS) he servedas an operations officer and manager in Bonn, West Germany; GuatemalaCity; Luxembourg; Madrid; Mexico City; Vienna; and Berlin. Onassignments at the CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, he was DeputyChief of Human Resources; Senior NCS representative to the Aldrich AmesDamage Assessment Team; Chief of the Agency’s Europe Division; and theCIA’s Director of Congressional Affairs. Prior to his arrival at BostonUniversity as a CIA Officer in Residence, he occupied the Richard HelmsChair for Intelligence Collection in the NCS training program.

Donna D’Andrea retired from the Central Intelligence Agency after 25 years asan intelligence collector with the National Clandestine Service and itspredecessor organization, the Directorate of Operations (DO), spending overa decade overseas in Latin America and Europe. As a senior CollectionManagement Officer (CMO), she met with individuals with access to viralforeign intelligence, and conceptualized and generated intelligence reportingprograms to meet U.S. government requirements. Ms. D’Andrea is currentlyChief Operating Officer of the Crumpton Group, Arlington, Virginia.

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27: 806–814, 2014

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0885-0607 print=1521-0561 online

DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2014.924821

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foreign policy and national security needs of the nation. CMOs aresubstantive experts in their area of specialty, have a comprehensiveknowledge of how National Clandestine Service operations areconducted, and an in depth understanding of overseas operatingenvironments as well as current and looming international issues.

While serving overseas as a CIA operations officer, I was required to takea trip back to CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. After a week discussingvarious issues with the headquarters desk personnel, the chief of the groupcalled me into his office. There, he lightly reprimanded me for spending somuch time with the desk’s CMOs (called reports officers at the time) andnot enough time with the operational elements of the desk. I had spent allthat time with the CMOs because they were the ones interested in thesubstance of what I was reporting. They were the ones interested in theaccess of the agents collecting intelligence. They were the ones interested inpassing on the intelligence to the policymaker. At the end of my touroverseas, the chief of division reports called me into his office and told memy reporting had made a difference in the formulation of American policy.During my very long career, I was given no greater compliment than onthat day.Since the establishment of the CIA in 1947, the CMO core has changed the

most. It was once pretty much the intermediary between the operationsofficer in the field and headquarters and at headquarters the intermediarywith Directorate of Intelligence analysts. Since then, the talents andtraining described here have resulted in CMO opportunities within thewider scope of duties within the National Clandestine Service (NCS).Numerous senior staff positions are and have been filled by CMOs. I haveserved with a number of great CMOs, including my co-author, DonnaD’Andrea. I have not met anyone who could put various pieces ofinformation into a coherent whole for dissemination as she could. Othervery capable CMOs are etched into my memory: Bill M., John M.,Walter R., John E., Jim I., Steve D., Bill A., Patricia M., Penny K.,Pierce S., naming just a few.

AT THE CENTER OF THINGS

Someone who can be classified as a great CMO knows that his=her job is atthe core of the intelligence collection process. The written intelligence reportis the National Clandestine Service’s product—it must be timely, accurate,and address critical intelligence gaps. The great CMO not only collectsintelligence but interfaces with other NCS collectors, the analyticcommunity, the policymakers, other consumers of intelligence, subjectmatter experts, in the field or at Headquarters—anyone who can enhanceand focus clandestine collection. The CMO is the ‘‘air traffic controller’’ of

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intelligence collection and must, without fail, provide value added toclandestine operations. Because every act of espionage carries with it anelement of risk, a key responsibility for the CMO is to make sure thatclandestine resources are used for only the hardest intelligence questions.Why send a CIA officer out onto the street at night in an unstable countryto meet with a third country national who is committing espionage if thesame information can be estimated through other, less risky, channels? TheCMO has the critical job, and often not one very well understood, inmaking that determination.The CMO also is unique to the CIA. Other foreign and even U.S. domestic

intelligence organizations may claim the profession by name, but thosepersonnel are usually taken from operational elements and all too brieflyassigned as CMOs. Regarding one of these foreign intelligence services,one competent in recruiting Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources, arepresentative of another foreign intelligence service told me its reporting isuntrustworthy as compared to the CIA because it has no professionalfilter. In fact, many foreign intelligence services have now taken note ofthis CIA career track and are envious of the agency because of it.Before addressing further characteristics of a great CMO, we consider it

important to note that CMOs are not editors. They are not put throughextensive operational training to catch a run-on sentence. They are not the‘‘punctuation police,’’ and they are not hired to proofread reports or totype them from another officer’s notes. They do not re-craft poorlypresented intelligence—but they do send an inadequate report back to itsauthor who has the responsibility to deliver a professional product. Mostimportantly, CMOs are not ‘‘second class citizens’’ to NCS operationsofficers. The CMO is a highly-trained intelligence professional working onU.S. national security issues, enhancing the collecting and advancing of theintelligence dialogue.

NECESSARY QUALITIES FOR EXCELLENCE

What then makes a great CMO? In addition to the core characteristicsrequired of every CIA officer—integrity, keen intelligence, globalawareness, and excellent oral and written communications, capability—patience, personality, and the ability to listen come immediately to mind.But several other qualities stand out with respect to some of the bestCMOs in the CIA.

Insatiable Curiosity

The CMO must exercise genuine and unbridled desire to learn more aboutthe case in which he or she is involved. That includes details related to the

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foreign contact (asset), as well as the actual information provided by thatasset. The CMO’s value added here is multifold, with the most importantbeing subject matter expertise and the distance from actual contact withthe asset. Distance is critically important because of the intimate nature ofespionage. Developing, recruiting, and handling assets is an art that can beemotional and almost primal. As the asset’s association with the CIAdeepens, his=her relationship with the handling officer becomes complex.The handling officer forms an understandable perspective of the asset,ranging from a genuine affinity to perhaps a distaste for the person due toclashing personalities, motivations, or behavior. While the handling officer istrained to maintain a professional perspective, the CMO can provide a moreindependent appraisal of the asset and that person’s relationship with the CIA.The CMOmust wonder what makes this individual tick. Is the asset who he=

she claims to be, what motivates that person, does the explanation for why theasset is working with CIAmake sense, does the contact have plausible access tothe information as being claimed, do unexplained changes occur in the asset’sbehavior or information, and perhaps more delicately, is the relationshipbetween the asset and the case officer on solid ground—who is controllingwhom? In my long experience overseas as a case officer and operationsmanager, every asset who proved to be a fabricator was uncovered by agreat CMO. (A fabricator is terribly embarrassing and time-consuming forthe CIA because the withdrawal of all the fabricator’s disseminated reportsis then required.) The CMO can look dispassionately at the human behaviordriving the intelligence operation and validate its trajectory or nudge it in amore productive direction. This review is ongoing during the life of theoperation, and the CMO’s curiosity about people and their behavior is critical.The need for curiosity extends beyond the human to the substance of a case

as well. Whether reporting on the geopolitics of a particular country or themilitary application of nanotechnology, the CMOs need to constantlywonder about what is important and what comes next. The CMOs mustread, listen, and think. They have to ask the questions others do not thinkto ask—and sometimes the questions no one wants to ask. They have tobe genuinely interested in the future of warfare, what information wouldrealistically come out of a country’s economic ministry, what questions thepolicymakers have not asked that they should, in fact, be focused on. EachCMO needs to read, network, educate, weigh, and evaluate. The CMOneeds to wonder what is similar about reporting, what is different, whatused to happen, what is happening now—and ask why. The CMO needs toask all the ‘‘what if’s’’ that come to mind. This substantive curiosity is asimportant in case management as it is in expanding and improvingcollection to answer today’s questions and to anticipate what will be ofintelligence interest in the future. Curiosity allows the great CMO toprepare and preempt rather than simply react.

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Courage of Convictions—Without Being Righteous or Stubborn

The CMO is the conduit between the operation and those external to it, andat times that is a tough place to be. Numerous pressures are generallybrought to bear on an intelligence collection effort and not all of them arecompatible. For example, at some point, within the operation the CMO islikely to play a pivotal role in asset validation, determining if the asset andthe proffered information are plausible, clandestine, and meeting U.S.national security requirements. Regardless of the answer, the CMO muststand behind his=her determinations by being able to point out, with factsor inconsistencies, why the judgment was rendered. Others, including thecase officer, may vigorously disagree with that judgment. If the CMObelieves certain issues must be addressed—that the asset seems to beinflating his access to enhance his sense of self or appear more valuable tothe case officer, for example—the CMO must be able to dispassionatelyand clearly walk through the points that led to that belief. In all of theseexamples, the CMO must articulate his or her viewpoint with confidenceand professionalism, and not fall victim to the bureaucratic tendencyto ‘‘go along to get along.’’ The challenge is not about being ‘‘right’’ or‘‘wrong.’’ It’s about exercising keen judgment and having the courage tostand behind it.The CIA’s reporting more often faces challenges external to the

Clandestine Service. Here, the CMO is responsible for the NCS productand acts as a gatekeeper for the use of clandestine resources. In thoseroles, the CMO is often pressured to take a particular action that may runcounter to NCS standards. A common example occurs when informationcomes in for review from a clandestine asset prior to release to theIntelligence Community (IC). The CMO is responsible for determiningwhether it is accurate, unique, authoritative, and appropriate fordistribution as an NSC intelligence report. Consumers who see it in draftform may wish to have it prematurely released to fill a gap in a report, toadd credibility to an analytic thesis, or even to avoid having to askanother collector to obtain it outside clandestine channels. If theinformation is substandard, the CMO must deflect these requests. Becauseonce disseminated, the reporting may generate a ‘‘healthy debate’’ amongconsumers. In the foreign relations field, for example, an ambassador andhis counselors may challenge the CMO on a given report or reportingstream. These exchanges are usually professional, but at times CMOs havefaced angry, frustrated, or opinionated embassy officials. The best CMOshold to the principles of clandestine collection and navigate thesesituations to a reasonable outcome. But considerable courage is oftenneeded to stand up for intelligence, especially in the face of more senior orforceful interlocutors.

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More egregious is the attempted politicization of intelligence. Entire bookshave been devoted to the pressure that policymakers can bring to bear onintelligence professionals to tailor or nuance information to make it morecompatible with a desired political trajectory. This constitutes a breach oftrust between the IC and its political leaders, and while it may not happenoften, the CMO and anyone else responsible for that intelligence product isduty bound to stand by the reporting as provided. Resisting the pressureto ‘‘tweak’’ a piece of information to fit it more neatly into policy views orto bury the inconvenient data point is difficult. But the CMO is trained tomake the most professional decisions possible, and the really great CMOhas the backbone to do the right thing up and down the chain of command.One big note of caution: all that laudatory courage goes straight out the

window the minute a CMO—or anyone in the NCS—argues that he=she is‘‘right’’ above all others or refuses to listen to reasonable arguments. Therighteous and stubborn have no place in the CIA. The issue is not aboutspeaking ‘‘truth to power,’’ having the connotation of ‘‘I have the truthand you do not,’’ but rather presenting the facts to power as best ashumans know them, defined by time and place.

Ability to Connect Scraps of Information

Intelligence does not come neatly tied up in a bow. In today’s complex world,reporting comes from multiple sources, at different levels of seniority, fromdifferent parts of the world, collected by any number of reporting sourcesand methods across a time continuum—sometimes spanning years. Themost successful CMOs are voracious readers, able to compartmentalizeand retrieve volumes of information for later application to fieldintelligence operations.At a basic level, bits of incomplete but related information collected

through NCS operations can form a multi-sourced report, each tidbithelping to create a more complete intelligence picture. Without a goodCMO putting these pieces together, the information would be lost to theIC. With respect to asset validation, the ability to connect scraps ofinformation has allowed the IC to confirm or refute asset reporting andidentify changes in an asset’s behavior or access over time—all havingcounterintelligence implications. A top-notch CMO will recall where apiece of fragmentary information has come up before—possibly a namethat appeared in multiple different places or countries. Or it could be anactivity that occurred previously that might seem meaningless as a singularevent but may in fact form a pattern of interest. Thus, the CMO advancesthe intelligence process by having access to, and making use of, every scrapof information possible.

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High Capacity for Work

In most jobs, the pace of business is brisk and the demands on time many.The intelligence sector is no different, but the stakes can be higher. Thegood CMO can never be ‘‘too busy’’ to perform an assigned job. He=shehas to remain focused and look at things carefully. An anomaly inreporting or asset behavior cannot wait or go unaddressed because of timeconstraints. Similarly, no CMO has the option of asserting ‘‘That’s not myjob.’’ Anything related to a human intelligence operation really is theCMO’s job. To do it, oversee it, review it, handle it, collect it, disseminateit, and question it. And then do it all again. The questions to consider areendless and seem sometimes overwhelming. What is of most criticalintelligence importance? Where do clandestine resources need to beapplied? What is ‘‘need to know’’ vs. ‘‘nice to know’’? Why has an asset’susually predictable pattern begun to vary over the last six months? Whyare we beginning to see increased surveillance of the officer that handlesthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs asset? These are examples of existentialoperational issues that cannot be deferred, no matter how busy an officermight be. The best CMOs focus on the job, step through it quickly, anddon’t put boundaries around their activities.

Comfortable with Ambiguity

There’s no playbook for intelligence operations. It’s not as simple as ‘‘InsertTab A into Slot B.’’ So the CMO has to be reasonably comfortable withuncertainty and ambiguity. At the beginning of an intelligence operation,no one is absolutely sure why an asset is working with the CIA, if he orshe is a ‘‘good’’ asset, or how the offered intelligence will play out. Andsometimes an asset’s situation just does not make sense. The CMO willpatiently sort through all that ambiguity to see where some clarity can beachieved. Unanswered questions do not necessarily mean an operation isbad—they do mean that the team handling the case will have to monitor,question, and continually weigh that they might expose the asset and theCIA officer to unacceptable risk. The great CMO will be able to look atthe landscape and plot a rough course to the desired end state. Forexample, if the National Security Council needs intelligence on the plansand intentions of a foreign government in an area not currently beingcovered by clandestine collection, the CMO has to map out a way tocollect it. The course will most certainly not be linear and could lead tomany dead ends. Usually, only about one in ten contacts will turn into arecruited asset, so knowing exactly how to obtain the required informationis impossible. The best CMOs thrive on the ambiguity of intelligenceoperations and the challenges it poses to their skills. Curiosity, the capacityto work, and the ability to deal with uncertainty will win out. Collecting

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intelligence that a CMO never thought possible and has a real impact on U.S.security is quite thrilling. That excitement is one of the best payoffs of the job.

Ability to Network and Be Part of a Team

The ability to network and gain the assistance and support of subject matterexperts and others inside and outside the CIA is a prerequisite for thesuccessful CMO. Building a solid body of contacts is not that difficult.Recognizing and respecting someone’s expertise is the easiest path to alifelong connection. Paying attention to the analyst who covers a veryesoteric subject or one trying to build a new collection program workswonders. Even tolerating the self-important contact in order to get what isneeded to meet intelligence requirements is a special talent. Building andsustaining these networks can require a little give and take—such asoffering the helpful analyst as much information as possible about anoperation without violating core compartmentation principles or givingsomeone a heads-up when some important reporting is coming in. Then,when the CMO needs a quick turnaround, the analyst will oblige becauseit’s a two-way street. Great CMOs often have personalities primed forinteraction with others.Working as a team within the NCS is also critical. When a good CMO

works closely with a solid recruiting case officer, amazing things result.The CMO can point the case officer to targets of interest, enhance theverbal exchange, deepen and broaden intelligence collection, and acceleratethe recruitment process. This pairing is powerful and effective. Thateveryone wins by collaborating and building these strong teams becomesclear very quickly. What I always loved about the great CMOs with whomI worked (most especially including Ms. D’Andrea) was they were neversatisfied. They prepared me for every meeting in detail. They constantlyprodded me to ask the right questions and when I failed, they remindedme that I had not done so. Obviously, CIA officers are highly dedicated tothe mission and eager to help. The best CMOs are able to turn to manydifferent people, in a lot of different places, performing many differentjobs, in order to improve the NCS product.

THE CREDIBILITY FACTOR

No one would dismiss the argument that several other characteristics areimportant in a CMO—patience, personality, and the ability to listen, toname but a few. Regardless, a successful CMO understands his or her rolein the intelligence operation, whether as a collector or in evaluatingintelligence and developing new requirements. As traditional andsymmetrical threats to national security increase, the CMO cannot remain

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static. The CMO must deepen reporting and explore new areas for collection.The CMO must provide meaningful feedback to better focus and improvecollection—sometimes redirecting efforts to fill knowledge gaps, othertimes recommending termination of an operation to make optimum use ofclandestine resources. All efforts must be focused on addressing thetoughest national security questions. To avoid being a mere step in aprocess, the CMO must be at the center of the intelligence cycle, drivingcollection and finding new sources to fill knowledge gaps. The best CMOsin the CIA’s history have been true intellectual authors of, and participantsin, highly successful operations. Although heavily involved in the CIA’smany hidden intelligence successes, these officers are often unsung andunassuming. The CMO’s uniqueness is in providing quality and credibilityto CIA reporting. That’s why the CIA’s reporting is the best there is.

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