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The puzzle of Arctic cooperation: the role of self-
image and social culture in Arctic cooperation
Master Thesis in
International and European Relations
Author: Malin Frisk
29 October 2012
Department of Management and Engineering
Division of Political Science, Master in International and European Relations
Supervisor: Per Janson
1
ABSTRACT
The attention to the Arctic is increasing in international relations. There are fears raised by
various commentators as regards a ‘race for the Arctic’, where climate change has revealed
new opportunities for trade routes and resource development. In contrast to the Antarctic, the
Arctic is frozen sea where the adjacent coastal waters are territories of states, with unsettled
disputes over continental shelf delimitation as well as sea and land disputes. At the same time
there is evidence that cooperation in the region are starting to expand and formalise in light of
these developments, as are specific Arctic policies of states.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze how characteristics of the Arctic policies of the eight
Arctic states can influence cooperation in the region. The focus is on the use of language as to
determine the characteristics based on self-image, the view of the Arctic and the image of
other state actors in the region. The basis for characterising the relations rests on Alexander
Wendt’s social cultures and a constructivist perspective.
The analysis reveals that the images of the selves and others are ambiguous where some
relations can be termed as more cooperative, whereas there are still uncertainties regarding
others. This in extension gives a rather reserved view on the overall cooperation in the region.
Key words: Arctic cooperation, Arctic policies, self-image, image of others, social cultures,
constructivism
Word count: 25 785
2
ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY
A5 Arctic five, the five coastal states which signed the Ilulissat declaration,
namely, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the USA
AC The Arctic Council
AEPS Arctic Environment Protection Strategy
BEAC Barents Euro- Arctic Council
BRC Barents Euro-Arctic Region
CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
EEZ Exclusive economic zone
EU European Union
IBS International Barents Secretariat
Ilulissat declaration Declaration signed in Ilulissat, Greenland in 2008 as a proclamation of
the commitment of the Arctic coastal states to solve disputes regarding
the Arctic Ocean in accordance to international law.
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCM Nordic Council of Ministers, member states are the Nordic countries,
namely Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden
Northern Dimension (ND) A common policy between the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia
with the objective to develop dialogue, strengthening stability and
cooperation on economic issues and a sustainable development in
Northern Europe. Geographically the ND stretches between the
European Arctic and Sub-Arctic to the south of the Baltic Sea.
SAR Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Agreement
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
3
Table of content
The puzzle of Arctic cooperation: the role of self-image and social culture in Arctic
cooperation ...................................................................................................................................... 0
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 The puzzle of Arctic cooperation .................................................................................... 4
1.2 The missing pieces for a rational explanation to Arctic cooperation ........................... 6
1.3 Thesis aim and research questions .................................................................................. 8
2. Theoretical points of departure ................................................................................................ 10
2.1 Regimes in International cooperation ........................................................................... 10
2.2. The influence of norms, self-image and social culture in international cooperation 13
3. Methodology, Method and Material ........................................................................................ 20
3.1 Methodology and Method ............................................................................................. 20
3.2 Material........................................................................................................................... 23
3.3 Limitations ..................................................................................................................... 23
4. The Arctic as an international region....................................................................................... 25
4.1. Arctic relations - an empirical background ...................................................................... 25
4.2 Governing bodies and regimes ........................................................................................... 27
5. Arctic state actors and their present Arctic Policies ............................................................... 33
5.1 Empirical analysis of the Arctic policies ........................................................................... 33
5.1.2 Canada .......................................................................................................................... 35
5.1.3 Denmark/ Greenland .................................................................................................... 40
5.1.4 Finland .......................................................................................................................... 46
5.1.5 Iceland ........................................................................................................................... 51
5.1.6 Norway.......................................................................................................................... 56
5.1.7 Russia ............................................................................................................................ 63
5.1.8 Sweden .......................................................................................................................... 68
5.1.9 United States of America ............................................................................................. 73
6. Analytical discussion ................................................................................................................ 79
7. Concluding remarks and further research................................................................................ 86
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 88
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................... 97
Map of the Arctic ...................................................................................................................... 97
4
1. Introduction
1.1 The puzzle of Arctic cooperation
This thesis will examine how Arctic states view the region, themselves as well as other
actors. In extension the study will analyze what implication these views can have in shaping
cooperation. Cooperation here refers to relations between states, subject to collective action.
Such action can admittedly take many different forms and contain various issues.
The Arctic is a region often portrayed as an exotic inhospitable wilderness of vast
icecaps. However it is also part of the Arctic states, namely Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark
(through Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the
USA. In the midst of the climate change debate and the melting of Arctic icecaps,1 not only
problems but also opportunities arise,2 such as access to resources and trade routes, earlier
embedded in the hostile Arctic environment. These as well environmental issues affect all
states and require collective action to be solved.
A more formalized cooperation is taking shape in the Arctic. The Arctic Council,
which has mainly worked through a monitoring mandate with recommendations rather than
decisions or strong agreements, got its first legally binding agreement on Aeronautical and
Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in April 20113 and a process has been started to establish
a more permanent secretariat in Tromsø.4 The region has since the end of the Cold War lost
its imminent strategic importance emphasized by Oran Young,5 and has even been referred to
as a terra incognita.6 Even though the Arctic cooperation been less prominent than
cooperation in other regions of the world, it does not mean that the Arctic is lawless. It is still
governed by regimes such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
1 Arctic sea and ice news, National Snow and Ice Data Center, , retrieved 12 December 2011,
http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/ 2 Arctic Human Development Report, Akureyri, 2004, Stefansson Arctic Institute
3 Agreement on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue, Arctic Council, retrieved 15 November 2011,
http://arctic-council.npolar.no/Arctic Councilcms/export/sites/default/en/meetings/2011-nuuk-
ministerial/docs/Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011.pdf 4Senior Arctic Officials met in Stockholm, Arctic Council, General News, retrieved 10 April 2012
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/general-news-archive/421-senior-arctic-officials-met-in-
stockholm
5 O Young Arctic politics- conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north, University Press of New England,
Hannover NH, 1992, p. 190-213 6 G Flikke” Norway and the Arctic-between multilateral governance and geopolitics” in J Kraska (ed.), Arctic
security in an age of climate change, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011 .p.68
5
(UNCLOS) and the Ilulissat declaration.7 Both are proof that the littoral states publicly show a
willingness to cooperate on matters like territorial disputes and soft security threats, such as
search and rescue missions. The Ilulissat declaration affirms the intention of the five Arctic
coastal states to collaborate regarding issues relating to the Arctic Ocean, in particular
regarding continental shelf delimitation.
However there are skeptics regarding this type of cooperation. One who paints a rather
grim picture of the situation for cooperation in this region is Scott Borgerson. He emphasizes
what he sees to be a scramble for territory and resources, unsolved border disputes, limited
governing frameworks and moreover a lack of leadership in the region by the USA.8 Though
not neglected as a possible scenario in the Arctic, many authors and state officials emphasize
that these anxieties are highly exaggerated.9 Borgerson’s article was published in 2008 and
since then cooperative activities in the Arctic have increased. A-40-year-old dispute have
been settled between Norway and Russia,10
the Ilulissat declaration has been acknowledged
and all states now have an official Arctic Strategy. Further, all Arctic states have been
affected in different ways by the financial crisis of 2008, still haunting national economies at
the time of this thesis.
There are several international organizations working within the Arctic. Such
organizations are a mix of civil society and intergovernmental organizations. The Arctic states
are not all members of the same organizations and the existing organizations range between
dealing with isolated sub-regions to focusing on specific issues. Moreover Arctic states are
members of the EU, NATO, none or both. Hence there may be various questions sprung from
these memberships, allegiance to various authorities as well as strategies to be adhered to and
norms to be followed depending on just this divided membership. Further, Schram Stokke
emphasizes that there are many Arctic institutions targeting similar or the same issues, and
7 Ilulissat declaration Arctic Ocean conference Ilulissat, Greenland, 27 – 29 May 2008, retrieved 15 November
2011, http://www.oceanlaw.org/index.php?module=News&func=display&sid=77 8 S G Borgerson “Arctic Meltdown”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87 no 2, 2008, p.p.63-77
9 O Young, “Foreword” in Arctic security in an age of climate change, J Kraska (ed.), Cambridge University
Press, New York 2011 p. xxvi, F Griffiths “Arctic security: the indirect approach” in Arctic security in an age
of climate change, Kraska J (ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York 2011, p. 3-4, N Petersen “The Arctic
challenge to Danish foreign and security policy”- in Arctic security in an age of climate change, Kraska J (ed.),
Cambridge University Press, New York 2011, p198
10 R Tamnes,” Arctic security and Norway” in Arctic security in an age of climate change, Kraska J (ed.),
Cambridge University Press, New York 2011, p.61
6
such issues may also be targeted by other international bodies.11
The cooperation patterns are
complex, to say the least. But it is obvious that there is present cooperation in the region and
increased activities will bid for cooperation in the future.
This study will focus on the whole of the Arctic, not just regions or specific issues
within it. Cooperation is hence viewed through the overall Arctic strategy of the region’s
states, as presented in their official policy documents, where the language of the policy is
central, rather than what the various organizations do. The emphasis is on comprehensive
cooperation in an arena where the appearance of cooperation may be conceived as particularly
unlikely, since the Arctic was long dominated by the Cold War dichotomy.12
1.2 The missing pieces for a rational explanation to Arctic cooperation
At the time of writing this thesis, twenty years have passed since the publication of
Oran Young’s book Arctic Politics- Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North
(1992). In the book he predicted that the Arctic during the 1990s would become a testing
ground for new ways of international cooperation. This due to an increased focus, by
particularly the rim states, towards the region. Young saw increasing activities in the Arctic in
need of coordinated action and innovative political thinking and effective leadership.13 Fact
remains that there is still no treaty governing the Arctic region, in contrast to the long standing
treaty of the Antarctic,14
and according to some authors there is no willingness by the Arctic
states for such or a similar treaty.15
Since the majority of the Arctic is in reality frozen ocean, the Law of the seas
(UNCLOS) might be the obvious governing source, still there are and has been enduring
disputes for decades between Arctic states concerning territorial waters.16
International Relations have long been dominated by a realist approach of national
interest and international cooperation has often been researched in the setting of established
11
O Stokke Schram “Examining the consequences of Arctic institutions” in O Stokke Schram & G Hønneland
(eds.) International cooperation and Arctic governance- regime effectiveness and northern region building ,
Routledge, Abingdon, 2007, p. 13 12
Young Arctic politics- conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north, p.190-213 13
O Young Arctic politics- conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north, University Press of New
England, Hannover NH, 1992, p.189 14
Ibid., p.184 15
A Worm “Arctic security- a Greenlandic perspective” in Arctic security in an age of climate change, Kraska J
(ed.) Cambridge University Press, 2011, New York p.171 16
Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region, Durham University, International Boundaries
Research Unit, retrieved 12 December 2011, www.durham.ac.uk/ibru
7
organizations such as EU or the UN. Keohane claims that: “Cooperation remains scarce
relative to discord”17
and cooperation is hence in this view an extraordinarily occurrence
rather than an obvious consequence of the anarchy embodying the international arena.
A pure realist rationalist approach to cooperation would mean that the most powerful
Arctic state(s), in the sense of having a large part of the territorial land and resources in the
region,18
would not be willing to give up sovereignty and hence not cooperate on matters
concerning governance of these resources, with other states.19
In the rationalist tradition there
is a notion of conflicting interests within international relations, where battles fought can be
military, economic or politically normative. Hence there are always winners and losers.20
One
example of a winner here could be Russia, who has the largest territory in the Arctic, and has
the vast majority of natural resources, in particular natural gas.21
Russia may not have much to
gain from cooperating in the Arctic. Still they do so.
Another explanation might turn to the interdependent character of the issues as hand,
and claim that the challenges of environmental and economic issues cannot be solved
individually and therefore requires cooperation. The main problem with this explanation is
that regardless what the motives may be for cooperation in the Arctic, states are not identical
and neither are their interests and reasons for cooperation. This leads us to look deeper into
how state or national interests are formed in the region, where a purely rationalist approach
falls short of such explanations. The Arctic cooperation puzzle needs a different approach as
to why cooperation occurs and how it can be characterized. Here, this puzzle will be viewed
through the lens of constructivism, with a focus on how national interest is formed, with a
particular focus on the Arctic identity and self-image of the individual states.
17
R Keohane, After hegemony-cooperation and discord in the world political economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p.5 18
J Scott, Power, Blackwell Publishers Inc, Oxford , 2004, p.71 19
K E Jørgensen International Relations Theory- a new introduction, London, 2010, Palgrave Macmillan p.78 20
Ibid., p. 50-51 21
Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, U.S.
Geological Survey, USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049, retrieved 12 December 2011,
pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf
8
1.3 Thesis aim and research questions
The Arctic as a case of international cooperation is chosen because it has long been
neglected in the international arena and as a region has spurred due to climatic changes and
the attention paid to climate change in the international debate. Even though the interest in the
Arctic has risen in recent years, much research in the international relations sphere has dealt
with the Arctic in a geopolitical framework. The aim here is to take a different approach based
on constructivism and self image rather than material interests.
Given the intensified interest in the Arctic, it is interesting to look at international
cooperation in this region. Consequences of climate change may range from increased
shipping due to melting ice caps, resource exploitation or environmental degradation which
might have negative impacts on flora and fauna as well as indigenous peoples and cultures.
For others this may instead result in an improved prospect for agriculture and farming and can
rather be seen as opportunities than as threats.
The future impacts that cooperation might have for international relations and for the
inhabitants of the Arctic are therefore interesting, as is the development of the relations
between the actors here. The Arctic cooperation is interesting further since it has seen a rapid
development in recent years. From primarily focusing on environmental assessments the
Arctic Council is moving to a more formalized cooperation with emerging binding
agreements in a region where national governance may seem a more obvious rationale than
international cooperation. A recent comparative study of Arctic policies was made by Lassi
Heininen,22
however this thesis will focus more in depth on the role of self-image and identity
than on material content of the policies or strategies of the Arctic states’ policies.
Since the Arctic states are diverse, both in geographical as well as political terms, the
aim of this thesis is to analyze what role identity and self-image play in furthering or
maintaining international cooperation and cooperative behavior in the Arctic. The point of
departure is that self-image and identity will shape norms and a state’s view of itself and
others in international cooperation, based on a notion that states operate in a social context in
international relations. It will in part be a descriptive thesis in characterizing the self-images,
identities and cooperation seen in the region. The initial influence for this is Alexander
22
L Heininen , Arctic Strategies and Policies- Inventory and Comparative Study, April 2012, retrieved 22 May
2012, http://www.nrf.is/images/stories/Hveragerdi/Arctic_strategies_7th_draft_New_20120428.pdf
9
Wendt’s statement: “anarchy is what states make of it”23 which will be extended here to the
phrasing Arctic cooperation is what states make of it. The intention is not to explain in a
positivist way the reality of the Arctic cooperation, rather the thesis aims to give a better
understanding of how self-image and images of other actors can have influence on foreign
policy and in extension international cooperation in the Arctic, where the finding are subject
to the author’s interpretations of the policies.
Given its strategically military importance during the cold war, emphasized by Oran
Young,24
the prospect for increased trade and resource utilization, there is reason to believe
that cooperation in the region is driven by a will to achieve stable and consistent cooperation,
even though running the risk of inflicting on state sovereignty.
My research questions are as follows:
What characterize the policies of Arctic states, in terms of defining the region,
other actors and the self?
How can these characteristics influence cooperation in the Arctic as an
international region?
23
A Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics” International
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425, p. 424-425 24
Young Arctic politics- conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north, p.190–213
10
2. Theoretical points of departure
This chapter will deal with two subcategories of theory. Firstly there will be an introduction to
the research on regimes and their relevance for cooperation. Following this will be a subchapter on the
impact of norms on self-image and identity and the relevance of culture for international cooperation.
2.1 Regimes in International cooperation
The thesis will not primarily concern the effectiveness or legitimacy of regimes,
though aware that these issues can be relevant in Arctic cooperation and it might be necessary
to consider criteria for legitimacy and effectiveness while researching the significance of
norms and identity for cooperation. The background on regimes theories are here used to put
cooperation in its present context.
Cooperation is according to various authors, such as Zürn, Schram Stokke &
Hønneland, Newman and Stein, built to achieve common preferred results.25
With this view
effectiveness and legitimacy of the cooperation and the interdependence of the two is crucial.
Still there is agreement that for this to be achievable cooperation needs to rest on common
interests and values. For some, like Stein common interests and values is however only a first
step towards a common action.26
Ends and means are equally important for a functional
cooperation to survive political change within the concerned states.27
The importance of common and shared principles on values and rules is highlighted by
for example Beritmeier and Newman, which claims that these must have a character which
encourages compliance to sustain cooperation.28
Resources to enforce compliance commonly
imply that there are means to punish non-compliance to common rules and norms. On this
note Keohane stresses the importance of legitimacy in the sense of inclusion of relevant actors
and determination of the cooperative form, in order for states to dare to commit to
cooperation, states must have influence to cooperate,29
whereas Caporaso claims that
25
M Zürn, ”Assessing State Preferences and Explaining Institutional Choice: The Case of Intra-German Trade ”
International Studies Quarterly, 41, 1997, 295-320: 295, O Schram Stokke p.16, E Newman, A crisis in Global institutions-multilateralism and international security, Routledge, Abingdon 2007, p.140, A.A Stein “Incentive
compatibility and Global governance- existential multilateralism, a weakly confederal world, and Hegemony”, in
Can the world be governed- possibilities for effective multilateralism , A S Alexandroff (ed.), Wilfrid Laurier
University Press , Waterloo, Ontario, 2008, p.55-56 26
Stein p.56 27
Ibid., p.58-64 28
H Breitmeier The legitimacy of International Regimes, Ashgate, Farnham ,2008, p.99, Newman p. 140, 142 29
R Keohane, “The contingent legitimacy of multilateralism “ in Multilateralism under challenge?-power,
international order and structural change, Newman E, Thakur R, Tirman J (eds.) p.57,R Keohane
International institutions and state power- essays in international relations theory, Westview Press, Boulder
1989, p.136, 146-147
11
inclusion or gaining a common identity can be a reward in itself for states30
and therefore
cooperation can be an end in itself.31
Even though cooperation can be a rational act in these
terms, such rationality can also be commonly beneficial if it socializes states into the
international community32
. With the approach that national interest is socially constructed and
may change depending on the view of the surrounding world33
, the possibility of enhanced
cooperation can also change depending on the view of the other members of the cooperative
forum34
. However as Kahler highlight, the inability of the former superpowers to agree (in the
light of differing national interest based on historical relations) can be an underlying problem
of today’s cooperation.35
Given that both these powers are part of the Arctic cooperation and
given their different identity and self-image and historical relations there might be difficulties
to find common values and for them to identify as part of a common “we” in the Arctic. But
being part of a group or community can also mean that this group grows stronger in the
auspices of a common threat, in the Arctic case, non-arctic actors impinging on the Arctic
sphere.
International organizations can also be seen as coalition builders, where states and
other actors can push for preferred strategies and hence influence state interests in a
bureaucratic way.36
This may be done on an issue basis to create assurance that national
interest is not infringed upon,37
where national interests may be deemed important. According
to Schram Stokke the Arctic Council has the potential for this due to its cognitive niche rather
than a normative one by “influencing actors awareness about certain problems and how they
are affected by them, or their knowledge about ways in which problems can be mitigated”.38
30
J A Caporaso “International Relations Theory” in Multilateralism matters- the theory and praxis of an
institutional form, G J Ruggie (ed.) Columbia University Press, New York 1993, chapter 2 31
Ibid., p. 56 32
M Finnemore, Martha & K Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, International
Organization, 1998 , Vol. 52, No. 4, p.p. 887-917, p.902 33
Weldes Jutta, Constructing national interests : the United States and the Cuban missile crisis, University of
Minnesota Press cop., Minneapolis, 1999, p.97-119 34
Ibid., 35
M Kahler “Multilateralism with small and large numbers” in Multilateralism matters- the theory and praxis of
an institutional form, G J Ruggie (ed.), Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p.321 36
M Barnett & M Finnemore, Rules for the world-international organizations in global politics, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca & London, 2004, p. 162-3, M A Levy ,P M Haas , R Keohane (eds.): Institutions for
the earth- sources of effective international environmental protection: MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts,
1995, p. 410 37
Schram Stokke & Hønneland: 167, 85 38
Ibid., p.15, 166
12
There is scholarly evidence that institutions and international organizations can create
new patterns of politics through norm building39
and facilitate agreements through issue
specific concerns rather than typical national realist conflicts.40
This can be done by orienting
action and create a social reality41
as well as to facilitate a shift of interests and concerns42
based on common knowledge, hence socializing states into cooperation.
With this in mind, the following chapter will look at the role norms can have in the
self-image of states and how this may influence cooperative behavior.
39
Finnemore & Sikkink p.891 40
Levy et al, p.409 41
Barnett & Finnemore, p.6 42
Levy et al, p.399, Schram Stokke & Hønneland p. 22
13
2.2. The influence of norms, self-image and social culture in international
cooperation
Applying a constructivist view in international cooperation is appropriate to determine
how the actors within the cooperation identify and relate to themselves and others. One way
of doing so is to apply political psychology which emphasizes the role of leaders and their
perceptions of reality in shaping a nation’s self-image and identity.43
Another with less focus
on the individuals is the importance of social structures or cultures as defined by Wendt.44
The self-image and identity of a nation and its relations with other states and nations will
ultimately affect cooperation, since cooperation means to as Vertzberger phrase it, “operate
within a social context”45
which Wendt claims is also true for states. This chapter give an
introduction to the application and views that here is assumed to create and shape self-image
and identity in the Arctic context and will be used as a background to put the Arctic policies
in context. I share Wendt’s definition of the anarchical international society, in the sense of
lacking a central authority and his argument that structure should be used in social terms, not
purely material, in the sense that states take each other into consideration, while choosing
their actions, grounded in the ideas about the self and the other.46
To understand and be able to analyze what role norms may play for self-image in
international cooperation, it is appropriate to start by defining what norms are. Certainly the
definition will depend on the purpose of analyzing norms and here the ontological references
of the scholar matter.47
Katzenstein defines norms as “collective expectations for the proper
behavior of actors within a given identity” and “can have constitutive effects”.48
Norms can
regulate behavior as well as be constitutive of actor identity and regulate behavior.49
43
Y Y. I Vertzberger The world in their minds- information processing, cognition and perception in foreign
strategy decision making, Stanford, University Press, Stanford 1990, p. 346, V Shannon “Norms are what
states make of them: the political psychology of norm violation”. International studies quarterly 2000 vol. 44,
p.p.293-316, p.308, 312
44 A Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, chapter 6
45 Vertzberger, p.346
46 Ibid., p.249
47 Finnemore & Sikkink, p. 912
48 P J Katzenstein , “Alternative Perspectives on National Security” in The culture of national security- norms
and identity in world politics, R Jepperson, A Wendt and P J Katzenstein (eds.) Columbia University Press,
New York, 1996, p.5 49
P J Katzenstein Peter J, p.54, Finnemore & Sikkink p.891
14
Decisions can be either influenced by rational behavior in the self-centric sense, or by social
constraints like norms, or both.50
Finnemore and Sikkink differ between norms and institutions and claim that they can
be distinguished by “aggregation: the norm definition isolates single standards of behavior,
whereas institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are structured together and
interrelate”.51
Political psychology scholars claims that the information individuals have, correct or
incorrect, will shape our judgment of other actors regardless of the accuracy of this
information. Decisions one make in a given situation, shape ones present and future
perception of the other, regardless of whoever is seen as the other.52
Further such perceptions
are historically bound in the sense that judgments are made based on prior experiences and
beliefs53
and the longer misconceptions about other actors stay uncorrected the more difficult
they are to change.54
This is something that is also constituting Wendt’s argument but he
focuses the state in describing this relationship, not on individuals, since the roles in
cooperation are there and present regardless who fills the roles within cooperation.55
Given
this reasoning the Cold War dichotomy can have a negative impact on Arctic cooperation but
it may well be that the social context of cooperation changes an actors’ self-image and
identity in as well as how one identifies with cooperative partners, it can help create a unity or
a “we”.56
Hence socialization can help re-shape images of the self and the other, since such
images are not static. Even though I claim that the self-image has psychological context it
should be apparent that that the way a state “thinks”, and how it perceive itself and others is
constructed through the culture to which it is part. This will influence policies and actions.
Some authors claim that power and rationality play a part in norm adherence or
violation, hence it may not be rational to violate norms if there are repercussions for doing
so.57
This is a matter of fundamental national interest in classic IR theory framing, that what is
50
Finnemore & Sikkink p.910, 914, J G March G & J P Olsen “The Institutional Dynamics of International
Political Orders”, International Organization, Vol. 52 No 4 1998, pp.943-969, p.952 51
Finnemore & Sikkink p. 891 52
Vertzberger., p. 348-362 53
Ibid.,p.348, Shannon p. 299 54
Vertzberger, p. 347 55
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p.251 56
A Wendt,” Identity and structural change in International Politics” in The return of culture and identity in IR
theory, Y Lapid Y & F Kratochwil F (eds.), Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado, 1996, p.57 57
Shannon, p.311, G Goertz & P F Diehl, “Toward a theory of international norms-some conceptual and
measurement issues” The journal of conflict resolution, vol. 36 No 4, 1992, p.p. 634-664, p.635
15
thought of as norm coherence may be driven by self-interest.58
However this reasoning does
not give an explanation to how such interests are formed. There is therefore a need to look
beneath this and investigate what influences such interests. One explanation is that
compliance occurs for reasons relating to identities as members of an international society,
and there is evidence that if many states in a region adopt new norms, others are likely to
follow.59
According to Axelrod this is due to a “psychological need to be part of a group”.60
This reasoning is further applicable to the Arctic strategies. Can we see an indication of
willingness to be part of this specific group of Arctic cooperative states? According to the
reasoning of Goertz and Diehl, the evolution of norms is often shaped and determined by the
powerful groups in a society.61
But this can also change over time, since norms are dynamic62
not static in a social context. Finnemore and Sikkink claims that norms are subject to the
influence of norm entrepreneurs, which lobby states and other groups in the international
society to adopt certain norms and values, the effects of which depending on available
platforms for furthering norms.63
Another factor influencing norms are international
organizations, their structures and bureaucratic setting,64
bureaucrats and officials can also be
norm entrepreneurs. Using this reasoning one can claim that the working groups of the Arctic
Council and Senior Arctic Officials as well as permanent participants can influence Arctic
cooperation by their mandates, as well as individual states. Regardless of whether an actor
signs and ratifies treaties, norms and socialization can still lead to compliance with the
underlying norms. One such case is the USA not ratifying the UNCLOS for example, but still
adhering to its rules in the Arctic by complying with it in terms of customary law.65
Moreover some states can be claimed to be more relevant than others for the adoption
of norms. Finnemore and Sikkink write of critical states which are those that are crucial to
adhere to the norm and without which the goal of the norm cannot be achieved.66
With this in
mind, in the Arctic case such critical states could be for example Russia because of its
geopolitical influence, high stakes and mere geographical space in the Arctic, the USA due to
58
Goertz and Diehl, p. 637 59
Finnemore & Sikkink, p. 902-903 60
R Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4
(December, 1986), pp. 1095-1111, p.1105 61
Ibid., 639 62
Finnemore & Sikkink, p. 892, Goertz and Diehl, p.646 63
Finnemore and Sikkink p.896 64
V Rittberger, B Zangl , M Staisch, International Organization- Polity, Politics and policies, Palgrave
Macmillan, Basingstoke 2006, p.90-92, Barnett & Finnemore , p. 899-901 65
B Baker, “Law, science and the continental shelf: the Russian federation and the promise of Arctic
cooperation”, American University International Law Review, 2010, Vol. 25 No 2, p.p.251-281, p 271-272 66
Finnemore & Sikkink, p. 901
16
its major influence in International politics in general, or the normative influence of EU
member states.
By the reasoning above, a parallel can be drawn with Wendt’s theory about
international relations as resting on a culture of the social groups of states. The main focus of
this study is international relations, while recognizing that the image of the self also has a
strong connotation to the domestic sphere. The term culture in this thesis is inspired by
Wendt’s definition and categorization into cultures in the anarchy of International Relations
as Hobbesian (characterized by enmity and force), Lockean (characterized by rivalry and self-
interest) and Kantian (characterized by friendship and the legitimacy of norms),67
where only
the Hobbesian structure can be classified as a strictly self-help system.68
In this thesis these
categories will be applied to the culture of the relations in the Arctic. Whether the culture is
one of conflict or cooperation does not matter since a war against all is as much a cultural
form as collective security. Cultural practices are formed by the shared ideas, shared
knowledge about the relations and get taken for granted,69
where cultures have their own
representations of the self toward the other.70
The Hobbesian social structure is one of enmity.71
This means that the other has no
recognized right to exist and violence between the self and the other is limited exclusively in a
lack of military capability or external constraint, whether enemy images are justified or not.
An enemy in turn is responded to in terms of enmity, since the culture is based on a worst
case scenario, kill or be killed. The state can use the knowledge of the enemy’s capabilities to
predict its behavior. The self has to be mirrored in the other’s enmity. This according to
Wendt will be a self-fulfilling prophecy since the beliefs will generate actions that confirm the
beliefs.72 It is a competitive culture due to the attributed intentions of the other but enmity can
serve a purpose or value in itself to bolster a group’s self-esteem by mobilizing a “we” and
“them” dynamic.73
With this logic there should be a tendency towards empire building,
survival of the fittest and a concentration of power to a few large entities.74
This is not seen in
international relations today.
67
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics , chapter 6 and p. 250 68
Ibid., p.247 69
Ibid., p.310-311 70
Ibid., p.258 71
Ibid., p.267 72
Ibid., p.262-263 73
Ibid., p.276 74
Ibid., p.264-265
17
In the Lockean culture the actors are rivals. Sovereignty is recognized as a right,
which leads states refrain from conquering or dominate others. However, disputes can still be
settled by force and violence75
but this violence will be self- limiting due to other’s right to
exist. This could explain the survival and sovereignty of weak states.76
Self-restraint may be
either out of self-interest or a perceived legitimacy of norms.77
The right of sovereignty is
conferred by others through social capacities78
which can result in a status quo approach
towards each other’s sovereignty because threats are not existential.79
This situation is upheld
because it serves another purpose and is a strategy rather than an interest. Norms can be
upheld due to self-interest, not necessarily because they see the norm as an end in itself.80
Though adherence to norms for this reason is not excluded. According to Wendt states will
make assumptions about the other rather based on the system than the knowledge about the
other as an actor. From this will follow that the system gets a logic of its own.81 In the rivalry
culture, states will survive not for material reasons but for social ones since others let them
survive. The weak are protected by the system.82
The Kantian culture is an idealist one with non- violence and team play as the norm.83
Its trait is friendship which is difficult to combine with a rationalist view since it does not
assume that relations are solely built on self-interest and utility maximizing.84
The actors
within this culture expect each other to adhere to solving disputes by non-violence and
collaborate if one actor is threatened by a third party. These prerequisites must be filled for
the culture to be termed friendship85
and the actors’ help each other even though there is no
immediate return. Furthermore collective security is neither time nor threat specific and
military capabilities are not a threat within the culture rather an asset to all.86
According to
Wendt this friendship “need not spill over into other issue areas”. However friends differ
from allies, since friendships are expected to last indefinitely regardless of disagreement,
whereas an alliance is temporary and can be found also in cultures constituted by rivalry. The
75
Ibid., p.279 76
Ibid., p.262-263
77 Ibid., p.280
78 Ibid., p.281
79 Ibid., p.282
80 Ibid., p.288
81 Ibid., p. 283
82 Ibid., p.284
83 Ibid., p.297
84 Ibid., p.298
85 Ibid., p.298–301
86 Ibid., p.300-301
18
continuation of friendship is embedded in the shared knowledge of peaceful intentions and a
behavior of solving disagreements by negotiation or arbitration not violence.87
Take note that
the behavior here and the adherence to the norms or culture is the shared knowledge of the
internal relations, within the group of actors. This does not exclude that actors act differently
towards states that is not part of the culture.
Both in Lockean and Kantian cultures the cost of violating norms is taken into
calculation and depending on the degree of internalization of the norms in the Kantian culture,
norms can be merely a strategy to obtain benefits for the self.88 However here the actors still
acts as friends when security is threatened with the expectation that this pattern is indefinite. It
is only when the highest degree of internalization is achieved that states identify with each
other and an identification that generate collective interests, which in turn means that
international interests become part of the national interest,89
a willingness to do sacrifices for
the sake of the other. Identification with the other is rarely total and does not exclude egoism
which may result in free-riding arguments and burden sharing which if left unresolved can
lead to undermine the collective identity. Actors are further capable to have several identities
at once, or to quote Wendt “multiple group identification”.90
Although Wendt’s cultures are based on security cooperation, there are no obvious reasons
why they cannot be applicable also to other types of cooperation. Admittedly Wendt does not
make explicit whether security must be the basis for a culture. This can limit the analytical use
of the cultures. In this thesis cultures will be used in its entirety even on topics which are not
solely security related. Hence rivalry regarding resources will also be placed within a Lockean
culture. In this way the cultures will be used here in analyzing Arctic cooperation. This
however does not exclude the possibility that Arctic relations cannot have security
characteristics and cooperate on security. Further threats should not be limited to physical
threats in a military sense. Also threats to existence of political systems may be seen as a
threat of survival and considered a national interest.
This thesis does not reject the notion or role of national interests but national interest
have to resonate with self-image Also important to remember is that identification and
87
Ibid., p.299-300 88
Ibid., p. 304 89
Ibid., p.305 90
Ibid., p. 306
19
perceptions varies by both issue and other91
but that states learn about appropriate behavior
from other states in cooperation, contributing to the perception both of self and others and
rests on the assumption that states have the need for social approval, being part of a group.92
These perceptions can be said to be guided by both domestic and international norms. Since
Arctic cooperation is a diverse group of states with varying relations, the socialization of
cooperation is further interesting to study and the Arctic strategies ought to give indications as
to how states see each other in the Arctic setting.
To conclude the reasoning in this chapter, norms are reflections of the self-image and identity
of the actor, since the view one have of oneself and others will guide the actions one take or
the norms one keep in relations to others. The relationship between the actors is what gives
the international system its meaning, where the distributions of ideas are social structures and
shared ideas become this structure or cultures.93
Applying these points of departure to the policies will bring a greater understanding to
the Arctic cooperation. What role the region plays for the self-image of the state is likely to
determine the importance of the Arctic in the states’ international relations and foreign policy.
If there is neglect for the region, its resources and inhabitants in the self-image of the state, the
importance of the Arctic may lessen in its broader foreign relations. If, on the other hand,
there is a strong Arctic identity for the state and its sense of self, this region might be more
relevant in terms of international goals and policies for such a state.
91
Wendt “Identity and structural change in International Politics”, p.52, Shannon, p. 302-303 92
Shannon, p. 301 93
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 309
20
3. Methodology, Method and Material
3.1 Methodology and Method
In order to answer the research questions above and analyze the influence of identity and self-
image in Arctic cooperation, the Arctic strategies will be studied. These strategies or policies
are textual documents published by government ministries of the respective Arctic states.
The thesis will be a qualitative study of the Arctic strategies with a focus on the Arctic
identities of states. By this token the thesis will intend a content analysis, with the purpose of
looking at the specific discourse of the Arctic in the mentioned strategies. In order to structure
the analysis, it will be divided into two parts; one that identifies what topics are brought to the
fore in the policies focusing on national interests and self-image and a second part centring on
how these topics are spoken of. From this a discourse ought to be able to be traced. Discourse
in this thesis refers to the communicative language found in texts, not to the theoretical
concept of discourse analysis.
Focus will be on tracing the communicative language of the Arctic within the national
policies and in extension compare them to the other policies in order to find common and
different views of the region and the identity and self-image as well as the image of the other
Arctic states, which in turn can be claimed to constitute a culture in the Arctic cooperation.
The textual analysis is made by studying the policy documents and the language with a
focus on the framing of the Arctic as part of the national identity of the Arctic states, as well
as the image of, or framing of others.94
Others in this thesis refer to actors such as states, and
organizations that are not phrased by the state actor in question, to be part of the self. Others
can therefore be enemies, rivals, friends or insignificant others.
The empirical data presented is based on the content of the policies and quotes used as
empery are selected on the basis that they refer to a general language of the policy, as regards
the Arctic, the self, other actors and cooperation. The quotes cited represent the images of the
aforementioned and are subject to interpretation. The interpretation of the quotes is subjective
in the sense that they are chosen on the basis that the author of this thesis believes that these
quotes show the language and images of the particular state. The intention is not to explain in
94
G Bergström & K Boréus (eds.) Textens mening och makt- metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text- och
diskursanalys, Studentlitteratur, Lund , 2005, p.321-323, 327-328
21
a positivist way the reality of the Arctic cooperation, rather the thesis aims to give a better
understanding of how self-image and images of other actors can have influence on foreign
policy and in extension international cooperation in the Arctic. Since the policies are
documents concerning the Arctic in general and not cooperation in particular, there is suffice
material regarding details on how projects and problems will be tackled also on a domestic
level, but as mentioned this study is not issue specific hence, much material in the policies are
redundant and not used in the analysis and empirical data here. The study of Arctic strategies
aims at clarifying the content and visual identity in the strategies.95
From this, conclusions can
be drawn as to what the main relations are in the Arctic context and make a prediction of what
consequences these can have for the cooperation in the region. The analysis of the documents
will be open in the sense that there will be no preconditions or search for quantifiable data, in
terms of specific words used, but rather the framing and language concerning the Arctic, the
self and others.
Apart from the relations and images of others and the self, this thesis will also look at the
discourse of the Arctic “space” in relation to identity and how they see their own roles and the
role of other actors in the region. Another image relevant here is that of cooperation which
can be constituted by the example of international organizations, bilateral or multilateral
cooperation in the Arctic. Given that the case of international cooperation has a focus on the
Arctic, it is assumed that the state actors involved has a particular relation to the region which
will determine how and in what terms the actors relate to cooperation here and its relations
with other actors. The focus will be on the language used in the strategies and foremost to
describe the discourse, not constructing it.96
The discourse will then be used to analyze what
implications this has for the prospects of Arctic cooperation.
This case shall not be seen as subject for generalization, but rather an in depth case study
of identity through foreign policy in a narrow context of a specific region, and the actors’ self-
image in the same. Care will be taken to ask questions such as how the text can be
characterized and what assumptions it makes, the frame and context the text is situated in as
well as what is excluded or included in the text.97
Studying the discourse of the states identity
with the Arctic is used here in order to look at how the framing helps shape the “reality” of
95
Ibid., p. 210-226 96
Ibid., p. 329 97
Ibid., p. 323-324, P Esaiasson, M Gilljam, H Oscarsson , L Wängnerud, Metodpraktikan-konsten att studera
samhälle, individ och marknad, Nordstedts Juridik, Stockholm 2012 , p.210-214
22
Arctic relations,98
with a point of departure that the language is important in shaping
relationships. The identity or self-image in relation to the Arctic region cannot be assumed to
be the same for all states and may vary depending on different points of recognition and
circumstances specific to the individual states. Given these variations in the image of a nation
in Arctic terms, the link to identity in cooperation is not far-fetched.
The operationalization of constructivist theory is admittedly not done with ease, but the
base of this thesis is the assumption that the relationships and thereby the cooperation in the
Arctic will depend on the self-image and the image of other actors. From this the following
assumptions can be made:
The norms, values and priorities embodied in the strategies or policies are derived
from the self-image of the individual states involved in the cooperation.
The actors involved in cooperation are no strangers to each other and have historical
relationships with one another in a variety of settings and will from these prior
relations form their views of others.
The cooperation in the Arctic is inherently dependent on trust and commitment
between the actors involved.
The above assumptions will be evaluated by analyzing the language used and the issues
brought to light in the Arctic context within the different policies. The character of
cooperation will be evaluated on how the states refer to themselves, the Arctic and the other
actors involved in the region.
Utterances of self-image or identity must be separated from what can be termed as
branding or disguised or intended threats. Self-image or identity can hence be seen in this
context as statements or utterances where there is an unintended visibility of ideology in the
sense that things are obvious or preconceived by the authors or dispatcher of the policy. The
framing of the policies or strategies is likely to differ depending on who is aimed to be the
receiver, which may be multiple. Therefore will likely have traces aimed at both the own
people (the self), enemies, rivals and friends.
98
Ibid., p.305
23
3.2 Material
The strategies are used in this thesis as the main material for examining the values and
self-images and images of others as perceived by the Arctic states. They serve as a source of
Arctic identification and domestic relation with the region, what part the actor’s believe they
play and how they perceive Arctic cooperation. The Arctic strategies can tell us how the
individual states see this region both in a domestic setting but also in how it is portrayed in
international terms. Aware of the linguistic difficulty that comes with the various languages
used in the individual Arctic strategies, written originally in the native tongue of the authors
and then in most cases translated into primarily English, I still find it useful to use the English
versions to get a general validity and reliability in my material. The Russian strategy is only
available in English as a translation in an online journal. But the content of the same has been
compared by a Russian speaker for my purpose with the Russian original version, and the
content has been “validated” this way.
The official Arctic strategies might give at hand only that what the states want to present
in an international setting, hence it cannot be known the true intention of the states, however
in this type of study, if in any type of analysis, the minds and thoughts of an individual
representative of a state cannot be known. Heininen and Nicol, made an overview in 2007 of
the Northern Dimensions, and the policies of selected Arctic states. 99
Since then some states
have revised their policies and many of the states were not included in the study.
3.3 Limitations
The culture of cooperation can be analyzed in more depth, in terms of its influence by
self-image and identity by not investigating specific norms as examples of how cooperation is
functional or not. It cannot be excluded that a different result would follow had a different
type of method been used, such as for example interviews with government officials or
bureaucrats in the Arctic Council working groups. Moreover it is probable that specific norms
would be in focus in interviews would be made, as would be the case studying other
stakeholders in the Arctic. One limitation to the presented Arctic strategies is a lack of
previous comprehensive strategies for comparable purposes in time. Hence a historical
comparison cannot be made, but well a comparison as to the present differences between the
99
Heininen Lassi, Nicol Heather, “The Importance of Northern Dimension Foreign Policies in the Geopolitics of
the Circumpolar North”, Geopolitics, 12:133–165, 2007
24
Arctic identity and self-image of the states in question. Aware that other methods can indicate
a differing discourse, the limited availability of access to officials and bureaucrats for this
purpose excludes them in this thesis. A deeper analysis has proven fruitful in other studies,
such as for example Annika E Nilsson’s work on the relation between strategy and science for
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment100
. Such access and insights in the Arctic political
sphere however demands a different scope and timeframe than this thesis can provide.
The focus lies not on cooperation on particular issues; but rather on the “culture” of
cooperation as depending on norms and self-image. Here, the culture and role of images in
international cooperation is the problem discussed, hence there is no room to analyze all
possible issues or norms that might play a role in the Arctic cooperation. Moreover the focus
in this thesis will be on state actors, not on other stakeholders in Arctic. It is likely that these
stakeholders have different self-images, norms and interests than the state actors, but studying
those and how they contribute to the Arctic cooperation is a question for an entirely different
and additional paper. Further this thesis is limited to a time frame that stretches from the first
published Arctic strategy since the increased focus of climate change and its effect on the
Arctic on the international agenda. This timeframe spans between 2006 and 2011 and the
documents analyzed will be limited in the sense that they are all foreign policy or strategy
documents with a clear focus on the Arctic region, or as defined by Norway ‘The High
North’. The phrases Arctic and the High North is used interchangeably in the literature on the
region and for simplicity, will be used so in this thesis as well. All Arctic states have their
own policies at the same time as the EU has a Northern Dimension and an Arctic policy in the
making, regarding different as well as overlapping issue areas and geographical spaces. This
thesis will be limited to the cooperation of the individual states rather than international
organizations.
100
A E Nilsson “A Changing Arctic Climate – science and policy in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment”,
retrieved 14 March 2012, Linköping University Electronic Press, 2007
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-8517
25
4. The Arctic as an international region
The following chapter is dedicated to an introduction to the Arctic arena, presenting a
background to Arctic relations as well as a short presentation of the organizations and regimes
governing the region.
4.1. Arctic relations - an empirical background
The literature on the Arctic deals to great extents with the situation of indigenous
peoples, environmental issues, international law or the strategic importance of the Arctic
during the cold war.101
According to Heininen and Nicol, the Arctic or High North are two
concepts that are used interchangeably in the literature on the region, definitions are based on
geography and nature.102
Keskitalo claims in her research on region building in the Arctic,
that the Arctic has been artificially constructed by the environmental aspects of the region and
that there is a lack of common regional identity amongst its inhabitants.103
The formation of
the Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS), the forerunner to the Arctic Council is
clear evidence of the environmental focus and a rather “soft” cooperation. This study will be
made of cooperation in an arena where the appearance of cooperation may be conceived as
particularly unlikely since the Arctic was long dominated by the Cold War dichotomy,104
and
where some spectators still claim that there is cause for concern and possibly even anxiety of
conflict and war due to what has been termed “the race for the North pole” by media and
certain scholars.105
On the other hand the acts or language of state representatives gives a
different picture. Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt said at the meeting of the Standing
Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region in Stockholm on 14 February 2012 that:
"In many ways we are facing tremendous challenges in the Arctic. Despite the challenges,
cooperation between the Arctic states remains pragmatic and low-key and produces solid
101
For further reading see e.g. Young: 1992, Chaturvedi Sanjay: The polar regions – A political Geography,
John Wiley & Sons: Chichester (1996), Arctic Human Development Report, (2004 Akureyri) Stefansson Arctic
Institute 102
Heininen and, Nicol 2007: 137, 157 103
Keskitalo E.C.H, Negotiating the Arctic- the construction of an International Region, (2004, London)
Routledge:.175-177 104
Young Arctic politics- conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north, p.190-213 105
N Petersen p.150, Borgerson p.63-77
26
results. This is a great success in a world where not all multilateral organizations are
working as well as we would hope" .106
It has further been highlighted that the region is strongly dependent on developments
in the rest of the world.107
If norms have a role to play in international cooperation and
depending on what that role might be, other relations in the world will indeed contribute,
influence and shape also the Arctic cooperation.
Young stresses in the foreword to Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, that
recent changes in the Arctic have caused changes that “tightens the link between global forces
and regional processes”.108
This according to the same, has resulted in renewed interest in
the region as regards influence and this mainly due to the enforced position of the A5 rather
than the A8 constellation, due to what Young claims to be a stronger focus on the Arctic
Ocean in regional affairs. According to Young there has been a trend of the Arctic five to
“enhance their ability to dominate Arctic policy”,109
and excluding the non littoral states and
neglecting concerns of the permanent participants in the Arctic Council, relating this to the
increased interests from other non-arctic actors’ in Arctic issues, such as China, Japan, South
Korea, India, Singapore as well as the EU.110
106
Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt speech from meeting of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of
the Arctic Region, Stockholm 14 February 2012, retrieved 23 February 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15777/a/186366 107
K Zysk “Military Aspects of Russia’s Arctic Policy: Hard Power and Natural resources”- in Arctic security in
an age of climate change, Kraska J (ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York 2011 p.105 108
O Young “foreword” Arctic security in an age of climate change, Kraska J (ed.), Cambridge University Press
(2011) New York: xxii 109
Ibid., xxiv 110
Ibid.,
27
4.2 Governing bodies and regimes
There is a variety of international organizations active in the Arctic with a diverse
focus and varied relationships. Membership might be influenced by and influence the norms
and values of the forums as well as impact on issues dealt with in such constellations. What
the actors do and how they act in different forums and with whom, can influence their
behavior and norm-building transcending into other forums for Arctic affairs. The bodies
brought up here are listed in alphabetical order and not by the weight or power of influence
and is further not an exhaustive list of cooperative forums in the Arctic.
The BEAR and the AC are examples of what Young termed ‘innovative political
thinking’ and includes civil society groups for indigenous peoples, as consulting groups for
the Arctic Council agenda and in the BEAR having a representative in the regional council
and the regional committee as full members.111
Even though they do not act as full members
they still have a voice in the region they inhabit.
The Arctic Council is a high level forum founded on the initiative of Canada in 1996
through the Ottawa declaration, but did not come into its full being until 1998.112
It is also the
only organization that includes all the Arctic states as full members.
The Arctic Council has a forerunner in the AEPS (Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy) an initiative of the government of Finland in 1989113
and consists of the eight Arctic
states, between which the chairmanship rotates biannually.114
Further it has permanent
participants consisting of various indigenous groups.115
It works primarily through six working groups supported by a secretariat, with a
separate chair and management board of representatives from national governmental agencies
and the permanent participants. Their mandate is given by the Arctic Council ministers.116
The working groups are mainly research oriented and there is only one legally binding
111
O Schram Stokke , p. 5-6 112
About the Arctic Council, retrieved 3 October 2012, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about, 113
Arctic Council History, retrieved 3 October 2012 http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/history 114
Arctic Council members retrieved 3 October 2012 http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-
us/members 115
Permanent Participants to the Arctic Council, retrieved 3 October 2012 http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanentparticipants 116
Working groups of the Arctic Council, retrieved 3 October 2012 http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups
28
agreement in the AC, the SAR, 117
the ACs first a step in the direction to a more formal
organization.
There are several states and organizations with observer status to the Council, which
can attend working group meetings and participate in specific projects as can invite guest or
experts. However “All decisions of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies are by
consensus of the eight Arctic Member States”.118
The AC gives priority to states before non-
governmental groups even though such are permanent participants, according to Keskitalo.119
Schram Stokke emphasizes that what makes the Arctic Council special is what Stokke calls
“participatory heterogeneity”, referring to the variety of representatives which according to
him participate more than as experts and observers.120
Stokke highlights that western
participant states contributes financially a “disproportionate share of the costs of the Arctic
collaborative endeavors”, this he explains being due to, the aim and hope of a stable and
secure region.121
Issues range much broader than the high seas, which can explain why the
remaining members have the same right to consensus as the rim states. In the future though if
the council has a broader mandate, it is not impossible that there will be a special sub-council
dealing with oceanic related issues, still as with other issues there is a risk that this would be
subordinate to the already established bodies under for example The Law of the Sea.
Barents Euro Arctic Council The Barents Euro-Arctic Region which was initiated in
1993, works on an intergovernmental level (BEAC) and on an interregional level (BRC), The
overall objective is sustainable development. 122
Its members are Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden and the European Commission. But the chair of the BEAC rotates
biannually between Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden. The premise of the Barents
cooperation is one of long term political stability and aims to reduce tension within the region.
The focus is on closer contact among the people of the 13 counties in the Barents region,
117
SAR agreement 2011, retrieved 3 October 2012 http://arctic-council.npolar.no/Arctic
Councilcms/export/sites/default/en/meetings/2011-nuuk-
ministerial/docs/Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011.pdf 118
Working Groups of the Arctic Council retrieved 3 October 2012http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups 119
Keskitalo E.C.H, Negotiating the Arctic- the construction of an International Region, Routledge, London,
2004, p. 91
120 Schram Stokke “International Institutions and Arctic governance” in Schram Stokke & Hønneland p.165
121 Ibid.,
122 Barents Euro Arctic Council, Introduction , retrieved 18 September 2012,
http://www.beac.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Introduction.iw3
29
implemented mainly by cross-border projects.123
Indigenous peoples in the region have an
advisory role in both levels of cooperation and a special working group considers indigenous
issues.124
Issues that are dealt with vary with examples such as rescue services, infrastructure,
customs, culture and social health issues. BEAC cooperates with the NCM and the EU’s
Northern Dimension. At least one parliamentarian conference is held within a chairmanship
period. Further there is since 2008 an International Barents Secretariat (IBS) in Kirkenes, Norway,
with the purpose of making the cooperation more coherent and effective.125
The European Union is increasingly more engaged in the Arctic region, from the
Northern Dimension to the on-going process of formalising an Arctic policy. Out of the Arctic
states Sweden, Denmark and Finland are members of the EU126
.
The main argument for an Arctic policy is the EU’s commitment to environmental
protection and the fight against climate change but the there is also a focus on opportunities of
new transport lanes and the exploitation of natural resources. The EU states that it has “an
important role to play in supporting this successful cooperation and in helping to meet the
challenges that now confront the region”. 127
The European Union contributes a substantial amount of financial aid to developing
“the economic, social and environmental potential of the Arctic regions of the EU and
neighbouring areas” as well as research. It impacts through being a large receiver of exports
economic activities from the Arctic, not only through the common market but also of other
Arctic states and discusses Arctic issues in the accession talks with Iceland. The latest
document on the forthcoming EU policy on the Arctic states state it wants to develop its
Arctic policy in cooperation with its Arctic member states as well as neighbours and other
123
Barents Euro Arctic Council , Introduction , retrieved 18 September 2012 http://www.beac.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Introduction.iw3 124
Barents Euro Arctic Council , Introduction, retrieved 18 September 2012
http://www.beac.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Introduction.iw3 125
Barents Euro Arctic Council , Introduction, retrieved 18 September 2012
http://www.beac.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council/Introduction.iw3 , 126
European Union Member states retrieved 18 September 2012 http://europa.eu/about-
eu/countries/index_en.htm 127
The European Union official webpage, Maritime Affairs, Sea basin strategy: Arctic Ocean, , retrieved 18
September 2012 http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/sea_basins/arctic_ocean/index_en.htm
30
Arctic states. Through the Commission, EU has applied to become a permanent observer to
the AC as a compliment to the engagement through BEAC and the Northern Dimension.128
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
There are not many specific entries to be found about the Arctic on the official
webpage of NATO, and not a specific body focusing on the area and even though there are
only 28 members of NATO, 5 of them are Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway,
and the United States.
There is however a concern in NATO of the pace of melting ice in the Arctic, and the
organization admit that this can have security implications in the region. These are narrated in
terms of border insecurities and ownership disputes when it comes to natural resources.
Further according to the official webpage, there are concerns in NATO as to the endurance of
the current state of cooperation.129
However NATO is not responding to a specific threat but
rather a change and how to adapt to possible changing circumstances in the region. Issues at
the table for NATO are claimed to be more in line with relief operations, search and rescue
and serving as a discussion forum as well as “utilizing the opportunities inherent to the
NATO-Russia Council” .130
Nordic Council of Ministers
The Nordic Council of Ministers (NMC) is the forum for Nordic governmental
cooperation, where Prime Ministers have the overall responsibility. Founded in 1971, the
NCM is structured in such a way that ministers for specific policy areas meet a few times a
year with decision making based on unanimity, where each country have one vote.131 There is
an annual rotation of chairmanship between the five Nordic Countries, with a new program
for every chairmanship period. Issues are delegated through committees of senior officials
128
The European Union official webpage, Maritime Affairs, Arctic policy , retrieved 18 September 2012 http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/sea_basins/arctic_ocean/index_en.htm 129
NATO review 2009: The Arctic: too hot to ignore? Paul King, retrieved 3 October 2012
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/0901/EN/index.htm
130 NATO newsroom, NATO discusses security prospects in the High North, The Seminar on Security Prospects
in the High North published 29 January 2009, retrieved 3 October 2010,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_49745.htm?selectedLocale=en
131 About the Nordic Council of Ministers, retrieved 3 October 2012, http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-
of-ministers/the-nordic-council-of-ministers/about-the-nordic-council-of-ministers
31
made up of civil servants from t he different member states. Prime Minister meetings are held
every year and with additional meeting before EU summit meetings.132
In addition to the Nordic states, Greenland, the Faeroe Islands and Åland have
increased their representation and position in the Nordic Council of Ministers. They now have
the same representation as the state members and decisions taken in the Council is binding
also for the autonomous areas to the degree that they are compatible with the self-government
decrees133
.
The purpose of the Nordic Council of Ministers is to take advantage of synergies and
empower relatively small Nordic powers to make a stronger impact at both European and the
global level. Issues for the Nordic Council range from environment and climate to
education/research and freedom of movement.134
Further the cooperation between the NCM
and Northwest Russia, focuses on programs that “enable Russian politicians, civil servants,
entrepreneurs and journalists to study democracy and institutions in the Nordic Region”. 135
There are two bodies of the United Nations which are particularly relevant in the
Arctic context relating to border disputes and management of the vast oceans in the region;
The Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a convention to which all
Arctic states are parties but the USA. However the USA respects it as part of customary law.
The convention is a body of the UN in place since 1982, with the purpose to regulate and
bring a stable order to all aspects of the resources of the sea and uses of the ocean. With the
convention came a definition of territorial sea, exclusive economic zones (200- nautical miles
off shore)136
, a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, and the right to conduct scientific marine
research by international law. The UNCLOS has a tribunal (International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea) with competence to settle ocean related disputes in conjunction with the
132
About the Nordic Council of Ministers, retrieved 3 October 2012http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-
of-ministers/the-nordic-council-of-ministers/about-the-nordic-council-of-ministers 133
Member states of the Nordic Council of Ministers retrieved 3 October 2012, http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/the-nordic-council-of-ministers/member-countries-and-
territories 134
Member states of the Nordic Council of Ministers retrieved 3 October
2012http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/the-nordic-council-of-ministers/member-countries-
and-territories 135
Member states of the Nordic Council of Ministers retrieved 3 October
2012http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/the-nordic-council-of-ministers/member-countries-
and-territories 136
About 87 per cent of all known and estimated hydrocarbon reserves under the sea fall under some national
jurisdiction, Historical perspective on the UNCLOS , retrieved 3 October 2012
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Key provisions
32
application or interpretation of the Convention. Compliance with the UNCLOS is today part
of customary law but in order to contribute and have a say in the decisions made, party-ship is
necessary, meaning this is a forum where the USA cannot influence the convention today and
cannot make claims. Disputes over issues covered by the convention are arbitrated by an 11-
member Seabed Disputes Chamber, within the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea137
.
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf facilitates the
implementation of the UNCLOS by establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf
beyond the EEZ where claims are made by a coastal state.138
The CLCS review the data
presented by the state and recommendations. Its recommendations and actions shall not judge
on boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, but review whether or not the
claims are reasonable in relation to the already established territory and adjacent sea.139
Further the CLCS provide scientific and technical advice. Limits established by a coastal state
on the basis of these recommendations should be binding. The CLCS consist of twenty-one
experts in the field of geology, geophysics or hydrography, elected by states who are parties
to the UNLCOS with equitable geographical representation but serving in their capacities as
experts.140
137
Historical perspective on the UNCLOS , retrieved 3 October 2012,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Key provisions 138
About the CLCS, retrieved 18 September 2012, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm 139
About the CLCS, retrieved 18 September 2012, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm 140
About the Members of the Commission of the CLCS, retrieved 18 September
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_members.htm#Members
33
5. Arctic state actors and their present Arctic Policies
This chapter will present other authors views on the role of the individual Arctic states
as is complemented by the empirical findings from the Arctic policies, this presentation is
made in alphabetical order. Firstly though there is a general discussion regarding to the Arctic
policies.
5.1 Empirical analysis of the Arctic policies
The Arctic policies have been presented in the recent 2000s ranging from 2006 to
2011. This may have relevance for the content presented by the different states. For example
Sweden was the last and latest country to publish its Arctic policy and hence had the benefit
to relate it to the policies of other states. The Ilulissat declaration can be claimed as a
milestone in littoral state cooperation and hence the policies or strategies published before this
declaration in 2008 did not have the information acquired that those publishing their policies
after this declaration. This situation is true for all events and circumstances surrounding
foreign policy making and must be taken into consideration in the analysis. The discourse of
the Arctic as a region, the Arctic identity, the image of other Arctic states as well as their view
concerning Arctic cooperation will be traced.
The strategies and policies varies both in content and size and under which
government ministry or page they are located, for most non English native countries there are
two versions one in the official language of the country and one in English. To analyze the
policies in English is a choice which in extent already selects to look at documents with a
specific receiver, namely the international society or other involved states one might gather.
However the content that there are some policies that regardless of native language still aims
at directing the policy to more than one type of receiver. The Russian policy is not available
in English other than unofficial translations but is still aimed at a larger scope of receivers
than might be expected to have knowledge of the Russian language. The exceptions are
Norway, which have one English and one Russian translation, the Russian policy has no
official English translation and the Canadian policy is published as one document but in three
languages interchangeably, English, French and Inuit.
Iceland, the USA and Russia have policies that are straight forward and written in
strict administrative language, while the other five Arctic states present their policy or
strategy in a more ‘commercial’ way. By this is here meant that they are created rather as a
34
booklet or brochure and has introductory chapters by government officials explaining the
background to the documents and feature pictures of sunny skies over an exotic landscape and
pictures featuring indigenous peoples, polar bears and dog sledges and beautiful landscapes.
The analysis is structured into two parts, identifying what issues are brought to the
fore in terms of national interests, and images of the self and other actors and analysing how
these topics are spoken of. From traits of a social culture can be drawn. Emphasis will be to
compare the policies and their language in order to find common and different views of the
region, the self-image and the image of the other Arctic states.
Questions which will be addressed while analysing are: How is the Arctic talked
about? What terms are prominent, and how are other actors and opportunities and challenges
talked about? Are there traces of normative stances or is the language more rationalistic in its
wording? In what context is the national interests framed?
35
5.1.2 Canada
Background
The Arctic has historically been a rather difficult region to access, it was long left out
of focus by the international community. This made Canada one of few states which were
able to position the Arctic and the north as truly valuable for Canada historically as a nation
and for it to niche into a proper Arctic state.141
This is agreed by Keskitalo who claims that the
Arctic long has been in the Canadian focus, both in domestic policy and as part of the national
identity.142
Despite Keskitalo’s claims that Canada is seen as having been a driving force in
international region building in the Arctic,143
Canada and has recently been anxious about the
increased international interest in the region where interests may be diverging from those of
Canada., according to Huebert.144
He further claims that Canada “seldom found it necessary
to allocate significant resources to consolidate its policies.”145
For Canada, Arctic sovereignty is according to Hubert linked to national security, both
militarily and non-traditional security and has been an important issue in Canada’s
international relations146
. Lackenbauer further suggest that for Canada the case of the North
West Passage has a special position and is seen as a part of Canada itself147
. According to
Huebert the state faces no true challenges to its sovereignty over maritime regions of its
Arctic domain148
. However according to Lackenbauer there seems to be a nationalist myth in
Canada that the USA has the intention to abate its sovereignty149
.
Summary of Canada’s Arctic policy:
Canada has two policy documents regarding the Arctic; the Northern Strategy and
Statement on Canada’s Foreign policy on the Arctic. The first is larger in scope, concerning
both domestic and international issues, containing forty-eight pages, including a lengthy
foreword. The long document is written in, English, French and Inuit. The second is only an
141
R Huebert – “Canada and the newly emerging international Arctic security regime” in Arctic security in an
age of climate change, Kraska J (ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011, p.193-194,198 142
Keskitalo p. 127 143
Ibid., p. 154 144
R Huebert – p.193-194,198 145
Ibid.,p.198-199, 146
Ibid., p.194, 196, 198 147
W P Lackenbauer “Polar race or Polar saga -Canada and the circumpolar world”, in Arctic security in an age
of climate change, Kraska J (ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York 2011, p.238 148
R Huebert p. 195 149
Ibid., p.226
36
eight pages long summary of the foreign policy in English. Both are written in the style of a
booklet or brochure. The priority areas of the Canadian policy are:
Exercising its sovereignty is to be done by maintaining a Canadian presence in the
North, defining its domain and advancing its knowledge in the Arctic. This includes
increasing military capabilities in the Canadian waters, airspace and lands.
Promoting social and economic development is to be done in order to make use of the
Arctic resources and including the population in decision making which in extension will give
the people of the north the opportunity to benefit from local or regional economic activities,
such as mining. Further the development of infrastructure in the Canadian north is
highlighted, including for example health.
Governance of the northern regions is to be inclusive. Local authorities are to be
involved and get to partake in decisions regarding the local and regional communities and
increased funding and greater self governance of the territories, particularly as regards
resource management.
Protecting the Arctic environment: Here the fragility of the Arctic environment is
brought to the fore and in order to protect the same, not least for the sake of Arctic
inhabitants. Canada will increase funding on research mainly on climate change and
adaptation to a changing environment.
The long document has both a domestic and an international audience in mind, where
wants to show that Canada is to be a model for local governance in the Arctic but at the same
time has a strong focus on international governance of the region at large. This can be
interpreted as its proclaimed roles as a steward
The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy
The Arctic is outlined in strong terms of sovereignty and in need of protection. This is
accentuated largely with a focus on the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples.
However there is also a focus on facilitating the region as a source for resource extraction and
the enabling of such resources to sustain and improve the lives of the people living in the
Canadian Arctic. The claim that Canada positioned itself as a true Arctic state which
emphasizes that the north is an integral part of itself is strengthened in the Arctic policy where
37
the national identity as being grounded in the Canadian north is accentuated in multiple
quotes of outspoken willingness to show this affiliation, following are two examples of this:
Canada is a northern nation. The North is a fundamental part of our heritage and our
national identity, and it is vital to our future.150
Few countries are more directly affected by changes in the Arctic – as Canada.151
Few other Arctic states use as strong language as Canada while speaking about their relation
to the Arctic. The strong affiliation with the Canadian Arctic is reflected in the particular
focus on the peoples of the north, both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. One word that
is recurring in the Canadian policy is that of stewardship. This word is however never defined
and it is rather difficult to grasp what the Canadian policy really mean with stewardship, but it
might be related to its aim to advance its role “as a responsible Arctic nation”152.
The image of others
“…effective Canadian stewardship of our sovereign territory and the active
promotion of Canadian interests internationally are more important than ever before”.153
This statement draw attention to the importance of sovereignty and the language exemplifies
an apprehension about the developments in the region. Such claims might indicate that there
is a perceived threat to sovereignty or interests, and this inclines that other actors in the region
could be the source of such threats, not likely in enemy terms but well by rivals. Given this
there are many indications in the language used that despite this apprehension the relations in
the Arctic are good. Despite disagreements between Canada and other Arctic states and fears
raised by commentators and the media that there is a race for the Arctic are untrue. The
following statement can be interpreted as a critique to these claims:
150
Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians, Ottawa 2009, retrieved 25 January
2012 http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp (foreword) 151
Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians, Ottawa 2009, retrieved 25 January
2012 http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp p.8 152
Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians, Ottawa 2009, retrieved 25 January
2012 http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp p. 33 153
Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians, Ottawa 2009, retrieved 25 January
2012 http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp p.33
38
All of these disagreements are well managed and pose no sovereignty or defence
challenges to Canada. In fact they have had no impact on Canada’s ability to work
collaboratively and cooperatively with the United States, Denmark or other Arctic neighbours
on issues of real significance and importance154.
This can be read as though Canada finds discussion of these issues as overrated, overstated or
purely irrelevant. This type of language can easily aggravate other states, since it appears to
mitigate the severity of disagreements on territorial claims, which is the context of this
statement. Statements like these and what it says about the Canadian view of disputes and
how disputes are talked about in literature or the media is in a matter a response to contentions
that Canada as well as other states would not be sophisticated enough to adhere to
international law. Canada’s statement shows a willingness to solve disputes and verging on
arrogance in language, in order either to convince the international society that these disputes
will not cause violence and that Canada is not violently inclined.
The United States is claimed to “an exceptionally valuable partner”, with whom
Canada share many common interests in the region.155
Concerning Norway, Denmark,
Sweden, Finland and Iceland it is said that Canada also shares common interests. However
Russia is left out in the context of shared interests but included in the phrasing “will work
closely with” 156 regarding Arctic issues in general. This can be seen as evidence that there is a
stronger connection between Canada and the other western states but also shows a willingness
to include Russia in cooperation. However the exceptional value of the US is not reflected in
the Arctic policy of the USA, where mentioning of Canada is scarce in comparison.
The view on cooperation:
Regarding cooperation the Arctic Council is in focus and cooperation on Arctic issues rather
than the Ilulissat declaration which shows that the Arctic agenda of Canada is broader than
settling territorial boundaries and governing the oceans. This can be viewed as another
reflection of the importance of the Arctic peoples since the AC is one of few international
forums where indigenous peoples included. Canada is said to want to strengthen the Arctic
154
Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians, Ottawa 2009, retrieved 25 January
2012 http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp p.13 155
Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians, Ottawa 2009, retrieved 25 January
2012 http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp p. 34 156
Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians, Ottawa 2009, retrieved 25 January
2012.http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp p.33
39
Council, both financially and in scope.157
And it is viewed as something more than a high
level discussion forum, namely
The Arctic Council is an important venue for deepening global understanding of the
Arctic and has played a key role in developing a common agenda among Arctic states… We
are committed to ensuring the Arctic Council has the necessary strength, resources and
influence to respond effectively to emerging challenges affecting the Arctic and its
inhabitants.158
Despite this importance given to the AC and the rather relaxed approach to resolution of
disputes there are still statements in the policy which can be attributed a lack of trust in other
actors but also in extension towards cooperation as such.
Canada’s vision for the Arctic is of a stable, rules-based region with clearly defined
boundaries, dynamic economic growth and trade, vibrant Northern communities, and healthy
and productive ecosystems.159
This vision or these goals contains an anxiety that this might not be the case in the future
where it can be interpreted as though Canada sees the other states as threats to its sovereignty
where international regulations are prerequisites for orderly cooperation in the region and
respect for such is a key interest of Canada in order for it to pursue other policy goals. Yet the
statement may well be a visualisation of the faith in international law and the commitments
made through the Ilulissat declaration.
157
Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2010, retrieved 25
January 2012 http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf
158Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians, Ottawa 2009, retrieved 25 January
2012 http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp p. 36 159
Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2010, retrieved 25
January 2012 http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf
40
5.1.3 Denmark/ Greenland
Background
Denmark owes its presence in the Arctic mainly to Greenland a part of the Danish
realm which since June 2009 has self-government status.160
The self-government has
authority rights to Greenland’s underground riches, including the off-shore seabed. However,
defense, foreign policy, sovereignty control are key responsibilities remaining under Danish
control. The physical, human and political-diplomatic resources are not sufficient in
Greenland if the Arctic indeed does become an important economic and political region in the
future.161
Hence according to Petersen, if there is need for these competences, Denmark´s
presence in the Arctic may well increase rather than diminish.162
Climate change with rising
air temperature will benefit Greenland in the sense that it may expand the possibility for
agriculture and in combination with possible oil and gas extraction, improve its possibility to
self-sustaining economy, rather than as now a high reliance on Danish financial grants.163
According to Worm Greenland’s budget depends to around 57 percent and 30 percent of the
GDP on financing through a block grant from Denmark.164
According to Petersen the
Greenlandic government has abandoned its protection of traditional income sources such as
hunting and small scale fishing and aims instead for economic transformation, by focusing on
utilizing mineral and possible hydrocarbon reserves instead.165
Even though the USA has a military air base in Greenland, Thule, this base has not
had an active defense since 1965,166
still Greenland’s defense is managed under a military
security umbrella of Denmark, the USA and NATO.
Summary of Denmark’s Arctic policy
Denmark’s Arctic policy is a fifty eight long document in the style of a booklet with
multiple pictures with both a preface and an introduction. The document is a collective policy
signed by representatives from Denmark, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands. The objectives as
160
A Worm “Arctic security- a Greenlandic perspective” in Arctic security in an age of climate change, Kraska J
(ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York 2011, p.166 161
N Petersen “The Arctic challenge to Danish foreign and security policy” in Arctic security in an age of
climate change, Kraska J (ed.), Cambridge University Press (2011) New York:147-148, A Worm p.166 162
N Petersen p.148 163
Ibid., 149 164
A Worm p. 167 165
N Petersen p. 164 166
N Petersen p.158
41
presented in the policy are based on aiding the development of Greenland and maintaining the
role of the Kingdom of Denmark as in the Arctic.
The Development of Greenland is high in the agenda and should be implemented
while preserving the environment but at the same time by facilitating a self-sustaining growth
through exploration of minerals, renewable energy and living resources. Other priorities that
is brought up is the focus on peace and stability and international cooperation, where both
bilateral and multilateral cooperation are in focus.
The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy
The policy is published as a joint document by the three parts of the Kingdom of
Denmark, namely Denmark, the Faeroe Islands and Greenland. Denmark’s Arctic policy is to
a large extent focused on the parts of the realm which is located in the Arctic, and foremost
Greenland. The document emphasizes that the policy goal is to include all parts of the realm
in decisions relating to Arctic issues. Throughout the policy there is a strong focus on
empowering the Arctic population rather than fulfilling specific foreign policy goals and
given that Greenland’s population is to great extent indigenous this also transpires to inclusion
of indigenous peoples in international forums. The following statements highlight the
language used and the purpose of the Danish Arctic policy:
A strategy for the Arctic region is first and foremost a strategy for a development that
benefits the inhabitants of the Arctic- involving common interests relating to for example
international agreements, and regional and global issues. The Kingdom will promote and
protect indigenous peoples’ rights167
The Kingdom will actively contribute to the shaping of EU policies relevant to the
Arctic and Arctic challenges, and in this context seeks to ensure the Arctic peoples’ rights and
interests168
.
Even though there might be diverging views between the different parts of the realm
the immediately effected will have strong influence on policies, in forums where they are
included in decision making but also that their views on issues concerning them will be
167
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 51
168 Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 52
42
represented even in forums where the Arctic population does not have a seat at the table. In
this way Denmark identifies itself as an Arctic state through the interests of its Arctic peoples.
As seen above the peoples of the Arctic takes a prominent role in Denmark’s policy,
yet another prominent feature is that Denmark aims to strengthen the global role of the
Kingdom in the Arctic169
and to play a key role in future cooperation170
to be able to exercise
its policy in international relations. The Arctic can hence be seen as an arena for Denmark to
enhance its strength also in international relations in general.
The image of others
Denmark recognises that the region must be characterised by peace and cooperation and that
the A5 cooperation is close, but at the same time the policy highlights the need to enforce the
Kingdom’s sovereignty in light of increased activities in the region.171
These wordings show
an uncertainty about the relationships in the Arctic, where cooperation is promoted but
Denmark is not sure it can trust the other states. The following statement enforces the image
that relations between the actors are not one of trust, but that Denmark’s intentions are to
strengthen the relations with other states, implying that they see the possibility to do so:
The Kingdom will reinforce confidence-building in cooperation with other Arctic
states to maintain the Arctic as a region characterized by cooperation and good
neighbourliness172.
This statement however can be seen as a reflection of an eagerness for relations to be mirrored
by existing relations of good neighbourliness or a lack of confidence in present cooperation
with a stance that international regulation is needed.
169
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 11, 55 170
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen , Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 10, 50 171
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 20 172
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 21
43
The relations with other Nordic countries is interestingly not made in the same strong terms,
as in the Finnish and Swedish policies, and not showing the same unity between the Nordic
countries. Rather other Arctic states are in focus even though mentioning the other Nordic
states., as seen in the following quote:
We will maintain close contact with Finland and Sweden on Arctic issues, In addition,
the Kingdom also wants to further expand and develop cooperation with Russia, which has
been increasingly engaged in international cooperation in the Arctic173.
This might reflect an preconception about the relations with the other Nordic states, however
close contact is not a phrasing which imply a close relationship. As mentioned in the
Canadian policy there are disputes between the Arctic states. Regarding Denmark and
Canada, the main dispute is over Hans Island. Canada spoke of disputes in rather nonchalant
terms. Denmark is more pragmatic but the content is closely related:
Pending a permanent solution to the issue, the dispute will be handled professionally
as would be expected between two neighbouring countries and close allies.174
This indicates no reason for distrust and that it is unfounded to think that these types of
disputes will lead to violent conflicts.
Further the Danish policy emphasise that apart from other Arctic states is also intends to
organise cooperation with other actors which are stakeholders with interests in the region175
.
There is an importance placed on the role of the EU as an actor in region, but its involvement
must be on the terms of the Arctic population176
. This is also said about other external actors
173
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 54 174
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen , Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p.15 175
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p.10 176
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012,.http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx, p.52
44
where China, Japan and South Korea177
, are seen as important in the Arctic context. The
Danish policy states that:
It is encouraging that the three Northeast Asian countries are joining the consensus
among the coastal states that the UNCLOS must be the central foundation for the legal
regulation in the Arctic. The Kingdom supports their respective wishes for observer status in
the Arctic Council178
…the new actors will be integrated into the norms and values that the Kingdom and
other coastal states in the Arctic Ocean believe should apply to the Arctic.179
This indicates that the Kingdom sees itself and its relations with other Arctic states as a model
for international cooperation and intends to socialize external actors into these norm patterns.
The view on cooperation:
Regarding cooperation the Danish strategy states the relevance of transparency180
and
understanding in Arctic cooperation181
as well as the importance of legal frameworks182.
Cooperation rests according to the policy on the following:
Ensuring a stable peaceful and secure region characterized by dialogue, negotiation
and cooperation.183
177
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 54 178
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 54 179
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 55 180
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx preface 181
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx preface 182
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 13 183
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
45
Avoiding the militarization of the Arctic, and actively helping to preserve the Arctic as
a region characterized by trust, cooperation and mutually beneficial partnerships.184
This implies that Denmark wants to show that it has low military intentions and given that
there has been no direct military tension since the Cold War, either this can reflect an anxiety
that such tension will increase of just reaffirming Denmark’s own intentions.
Denmark wants to retain the importance of the A5185
constellation, but focuses, like Sweden
and Iceland to increase the impact of the Arctic Council, which in contrast to many other
organizations, have representation by indigenous peoples. The policy states in strong words
its intention for the Arctic Council to be:
…reinforced as the only relevant political organization that has all Arctic states and
peoples as members.186
and
Evolve from a decision shaping to a decision making organisation.187
Here again are traits of the Danish identification with the Arctic through its Greenlandic
population, while referring to Arctic cooperation. Further this shows a strong faith in
cooperation and that the region can be evolved and that cooperation on a broader mandate is
possible and desired.
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx, preface 184
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 10 185
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen , Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012,.http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 52 186
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012,http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 52 187
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen ,
Department of Foreign Affairs Nuuk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Torshavn, August 2011, retrieved 9 April
2012, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx p. 52
46
5.1.4 Finland
Background
According to Rob Huebert, Finland has been more involved in circumpolar affairs
than for example Sweden, and before presenting its Arctic policy, Finland influenced
cooperation mainly through policies of the EU and played an influential role in proposing the
EU’s Northern Dimension188
. Finland’s geographic closeness to Russia has according to
Keskitalo had a major impact on its foreign policy, also in the Arctic setting and the Nordic
Council and has influenced Finland’s neutrality and the scope of its international actions189
.
Finland’s ability to act has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War and its
policies has since focused on “nearing itself to the west”190
. Huebert further emphasizes
Finland’s vulnerability in terms of its extended border to Russia which is also portrayed as the
main reason for Finland’s unwillingness to join NATO191
.
Summary of Finland’s Arctic policy
The Finnish policy is written in strict administrative language and contains 56 pages
starting by introducing the Arctic and reflections on other Arctic state policies. It concludes
with proposals for action and funding for the policy. Further the policy includes two chapters
concerning policy tools and the EU respectively. The main objectives of the Finnish policy
are:
Regarding the environment, Finland attempts to draw attention in international
cooperation to the specifics of Arctic environmental issues and risks. The environment is to be
attended through increased research and nuclear safety.
Economic activities are highlighted in terms of Finnish know-how, where the
opportunities for Finnish companies and Finnish experience in winter shipping is in focus.
Further natural resources of the Arctic are put into a Finnish-European market and export
perspective, where the closeness to Russia is in focus as an asset.
Transport and infrastructure is seen in the perspective that there needs to an
improvement in these areas in order to improve business activities and also regarding
188
R Huebert p. 206 189
Keskitalo p.59-61 190
Keskitalo p.61 191
R Huebert p. 206
47
harmonization of international regulations concerning safety and protection in the Arctic
region.
Indigenous peoples are framed through the perspective of inclusion and participation.
The focus is both on the Finnish indigenous peoples Sámi as well as Finland’s role
internationally in contributing to increase the rights of indigenous peoples in general.
Objectives for the EU and Arctic policy tools focuses on enhancing the role of the
Arctic Council, strengthen Finland’s representation in Russia and an improved role for the EU
in the Arctic cooperation.
The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy
Finland’s Arctic policy focuses mainly on facilitation of opportunities in the Arctic
region, where the Sámi people and Finnish industry takes precedence.
Regarding the self-image the policy focuses to claiming its rights in the region, as
demonstrated by the following statement:
“As an Arctic country, Finland has a natural interest in Arctic affairs…seen as a whole,
Finland is one of the northern most countries in the world”192.
This implies that this role has to be asserted and the statement can be seen as a manifestation
of an attempt to convince other actors in the region of its role.
The image of others and cooperation
Regarding other actors, the other Arctic states are mainly mentioned in a Nordic context and
even though Finland states its principal support for including other actors in the cooperation
in the region this however has to benefit the cooperation on the terms of the states and the
Arctic Council. Finland is open to new observers:
“… provided that they are committed to acting towards achieving the Council’s
goals.”193
192
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications August 2010, retrieved 22 April
2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 8
193 Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications, August 2010, retrieved 22
April 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 38
48
This can be interpreted as a way to make sure Finland gets to be an important actor in the
Council and not be excluded, as in the case of the Ilulissat declaration as well as a way to
exclude actors with differing interests.
While referring to international relations there is often reference to what the Nordic countries
have done, not specifically Finland. The following quotes are examples of this:
The Nordic countries recognise the right of indigenous peoples to participate in
decision-making in matters pertaining to them.194
Among Arctic states, the Nordic countries voted for the adoption of the declaration.195
These statements are made in a context where Finland also promotes itself, however, they can
be seen as a way to show that the Nordic countries are a coherent group of states with a
common agenda, where Finland sees itself as part of a group of states rather than a single unit.
Further this is also proof of Keskitalo’s reference to Finland’s attempts to become closer to
the West, in this case the other Nordic countries.
Finland shares the anxiety related to the exclusive cooperation between the coastal states, with
Iceland and Sweden. Testament to this are the following statements regarding the importance
of the Arctic Council:
“…strengthening the Arctic Council as the only cooperation structure in the
Arctic region formed by the eight Arctic states, and admitting new observers”.196
These statements when taken into account with the ones regarding the Arctic Council in the
Swedish and Icelandic policies, shows that giving the Council a more prominent role can
mitigate an exclusive club of A5 collaboration and secure the role of the non-coastal states.
This would in extension give greater weight to states such as Finland which are now
excluded. Further there seems to be a anxiety for increased tension in the Arctic, where other
actors play the role which can jeopardize stability and the coastal states are held responsible
for this in the Finnish policy:
194
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications August 2010, retrieved 22 April
2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 30 195
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications August 2010, retrieved 22 April
2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 31 196
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications August 2010, retrieved 22 April
2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 38
49
The coastal states have also stepped up their operating potential in the region197
It is in Finland’s interest to maintain stability and continue cooperation in the region
and to keep the security situation predictable198
In addition to the Nordic states Russia plays a role in the Finnish policy199
but this
mainly appears in the context of protecting the environment where the following is stated:
Russia’s active participation in measures contributing to common goals is of special
importance for Finland.200
In the Barents region, cooperation with Norway and Russia is important to Finland.
Finland plans on strengthening its representation especially in Russia’s northern regions.201
This can be interpreted as an outreach to Russia as well as an acknowledgement of the
willingness to include Russia and bring the neighbours closer together. However Russia is
more prominent in some other Arctic policies than in the Finnish one. This is interesting since
it has above been highlighted to play a large role in Finland’s foreign policy historically.
Even though Finland is an EU member, the EU is spoken of in terms of an external actor. Its
role s important however in the Finnish policy 202
but rather in terms of an enabler to bring
benefits to the Arctic states as seen below:
Within its jurisdiction, the EU can look after and support the member states interests
as efficiently as possible when Arctic issues arise in various international organisations.203
197
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications , August 2010, retrieved 22
April 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 11 198
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications, August 2010, retrieved 22
April 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 10 199
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications , August 2010, retrieved 22
April 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 48 200
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications, August 2010, retrieved 22 April 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 14 201
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications, August 2010, retrieved 22
April 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 41 202
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications, August 2010, retrieved 22
April 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 9 203
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications, August 2010, retrieved 22
April 2012, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-
34EA16C26D07} p. 45
50
The language used implies that Arctic issues are under the mandate of the Arctic states and
EU is there are a enabler to get the Arctic states a stronger voice in forums in which its own
influence is not as strong as the EU unit.
51
5.1.5 Iceland
Background
Iceland is not a littoral state but it is the only Arctic state that is wholly surrounded by
the North Atlantic. Its exclusive economic zone extends to the Greenland Sea, and bordering
the Arctic Ocean.
Iceland has a strategic location, but makes no territorial or resources based claims in
the Arctic. It is hence not involved in any disputes with other Arctic states over jurisdiction
or access to the same. Still it is investigating oil exploration possibilities in the Dragon Zone
in Jan Mayen, which is part of its exclusive economic zone, and hence according to
Ingimundarson, Iceland is claiming a stakeholder role in the Arctic due to its geographical
location and historical rights.204
He further states that Iceland has been a firm opponent of
what is perceived as the development of hegemony of the Arctic littoral states and has insisted
on the relevance of the Arctic Council, including all eight states.205
However Iceland
promoted itself as the natural center for future trade routes in the Arctic and has according to
Ingimundarson shown a willingness to accommodate outside actors in the region.206
Until the
fall of 2008 Russian bombers flew frequently near the Icelandic borders, but never violated
Icelandic airspace. These flights were however strongly criticized by Iceland, but criticism
has settled since the economic crisis hit Iceland which is also around the same time as these
flights subsided.207
Russia offered Iceland a large loan after Iceland had been turned down
emergency aid by its western allies. The Russian loan never became reality but criticism was
raised both from Iceland towards its western allies for not aiding it in its financial difficulties
and Iceland’s allies in the west criticized it for being too eager to accept Russian aid and
accused Iceland of being anti western hinting that Iceland’s economic difficulties was used by
Russia for strategic oil and gas purposes.208
Iceland is a non-armed NATO country. Iceland
has no military services at its disposal since the USA closed its base at Keflavik in 2006.
204
Valur Ingimundarson “Territorial discourses and identity politics: Iceland’s role in the Arctic” in Arctic
security in an age of climate change, Kraska J (ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York 2011, p.175 205
Ibid., p.175-176 206
Ibid., p 176, 207
Ibid., 179-180 208
Ibid.,
52
Summary of Iceland’s Arctic policy
Iceland’s Arctic policy is a resolution approved by Althingi, the Icelandic parliament.
The document is eleven pages long, stipulating twelve principles for Iceland’s Arctic policy.
Two and a half pages contain the principles whereas the rest of the document is commentary
to the principles. The principles cover Iceland’s position in the Arctic, where influence,
cooperation and resolution of disputes are prominent. Icelandic influence is to be strengthened
by promoting an extended definition of the Arctic, strengthening of the Arctic Council and
implementation of the UNCLOS, where issues regarding fisheries are prominent. The
collaboration between all the Arctic states are emphasized and there is strong opposition to an
extension of mandate for the A5 constellation. However cooperation within other minor
constellations are highlighted. Further emphasized is the need for increased knowledge and
the protection of indigenous peoples rights, which is framed in a way that Iceland, as a small
nation have an interest in promoting inclusion., The need to include external actors mainly
through trade is stressed and so is the need to maintain security and stability in the region.
The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy
Iceland’s policy is one which makes rather harsh proclamations and much of the
language is filtered through alleged injustices not least in its exclusion of the Ilulissat
declaration, the common definition of the Arctic and the concept of what constitutes a coastal
state. This is illustrated by the following statements:
The Arctic should not be limited to a narrow geographical definition but rather be
viewed as an extensive area when it comes to ecological, economic, political and security
matters. The Arctic region should therefore be regarded as a single vast area in an
ecological, political, economic and security related sense, but not in a narrow geographical
sense with the Arctic Circle, tree line or a temperature of 10 degrees centigrade in July as a
reference point.209
Iceland is geographically located by the Arctic Circle and is therefore within the
Arctic. It is of vital importance that Iceland secures its position as a costal state among other
coastal states in the region210.
209
A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, May 5 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution, principle 3
210 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, May 5 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution principle 2
53
Iceland as well as other Arctic states seems to struggle with its status as an Arctic state and it
may seem as though Iceland uses language to assure other actors as well as themselves that
they are indeed part of the Arctic. Iceland is not regarded officially as a littoral state but seems
to view itself as such:
The image of others
In common with Finland and Sweden one can read an anxiety of exclusion in Iceland’s view
of other actors. This appears in the policy mainly towards the constellation of the five Arctic
coastal states after the Ilulissat declaration:
If consultation by the five states (A5), develops into a formal platform for regional
issues, it can be asserted that solidarity between the eight Arctic states will be dissolved and
the Arctic Council considerably weakened.211
Individual member states must be prevented from joining forces to exclude other
member states from important decisions, which would undermine the Arctic Council and
other Arctic states, including Iceland.212
These statements indicate a lack of trust for other Arctic states in the regional cooperation.
Iceland continues this critical language throughout its policy where other actors are positioned
against the normative stances of Iceland, where it sees itself as a model, democratic state with
its small population as an example of an inclusive society where participation in decision-
making is key. Iceland uses rather inconsiderate language in its Arctic policy and might be
accused of trying to shaming other Arctic states by positioning itself against others as a state
of high normative stances. This following quote is an example:
Experience shows that powerful countries have a tendency to overlook issues
involving indigenous peoples and trivialise them. Such attitudes must be countered in
partnership with indigenous peoples’ organisations under the auspices of the Arctic Council
and through other international platforms where indigenous peoples’ issues are discussed.213
This critique against powerful countries might not be aimed towards other Nordic
states, even though they are bigger than Iceland, they might not be considered as
211
A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, May 5 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution (general) 212
A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, May 5 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution principle 1 213
A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, May 5 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012 ,
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution principle 6
54
internationally powerful states. There is however little noticed paid to the Nordic states
overall in the policy. Further, though on a different topic this normative stance appears again,
and though there has not yet been military conflicts in the region, there is a fear and
condemnation of such activities:
Although there are few indicators that the Arctic will be an area of conflict in the near
future, it cannot be ruled out that disputes arising from continental claims will compromise
relations between the Arctic states.214
Individual Arctic states, such as Russia, Canada and the United states have not ruled
out taking unilateral action to protect their sovereign interests.215
This may well be another example of a real or perceived anxiety of a small state with
no military means at its disposal surrounded by the other actors who does.
The view on cooperation
This critical language emphasized in the section on Iceland’s image of others give
witness to a willingness to align within the original group of the Arctic Council, in which
Iceland has a role to play. This may interpreted either as anxiety of being left out in the cold
when decision are made that might indeed affect other states in the region. Another
interpretation could claim that Iceland threatens the A5 in the sense to be less cooperative on
other issues in order to retaliate this exclusion. Iceland is a small state and lacks any military
means of retaliation, still the Arctic Council is the main cooperation forum on other issues and
works on the principle of unanimity and hence even a small state can hinder cooperation and
future legal agreements.
The Icelandic policy stresses as seen above, the cooperation in terms of the Arctic
Council and it states that:
The role of the Arctic Council as the most important forum for international
cooperation on Arctic issues need to be enhanced.216
If the statements above are read rather in anxiety terms than as threats this anxiety in
further highlighted by statements that there needs to be further cooperation within smaller
214
A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, May 5 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution (general) 215
A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, May 5 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution principle 4 216
A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, May 5 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf to Parliamentary resolution principle 1
55
constellations of Arctic or Nordic states where Iceland promotes increased cooperation
between the west Nordic countries, in order to reinforce the strength of smaller states in
economic and political and security issues217
. Overall Iceland sees a need for cooperation in
the Arctic region, and is critical towards constellations of powerful states in issues that might
have an effect on Iceland, but where it has no say on such matters. Moreover it still promotes
new constellations where it takes part in order to strengthen the position of smaller states and
autonomous areas in Arctic cooperation.
217
A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, May 5 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf commentary to Parliamentary resolution principle 5, 9
56
5.1.6 Norway
Background
According to Flikke, Norway is dependent on the continuation of a European security
regime and is a member of NATO. Even though Norway is a stark proponent of
multilateralism above self-help in international cooperation on other issues it is protecting the
status quo in Arctic cooperation on legal and security and resist institutional advance in these
areas according to the same.218
.Norway’s position in most international conflicts is according
to Flikke unique since it is often perceived as a non-stakeholder,219
however in terms of its
High North, Norway has since 2003, framed it in terms of strategic interest.220
Tamnes further
augment this image by claiming that Norway’s comparably strong economy has contributed
to an increased presence both military and non-military in the Norwegian Arctic compared to
other Arctic states.221
Historically Norway and Russia has had a number of territorial disputes,
however since a 40 year old dispute regarding maritime delimitation on the Barents Sea and
the Arctic Ocean, only the legal status of Svalbard remains to be settled.222
However the legal
status of Norwegian territorial waters surrounding Svalbard is contested not only by Russia.223
Summary of Norway’s High North policy
The High North is defined as mainly the northern parts of Norway but the strategy
extends to implicate the other Arctic states as well as Nordic and other regional cooperation.
The Norwegian policy is seventy three pages long and published as a booklet. It contains
foreword, summary and concluding with suggestions to follow up the High North strategy.
The relations with Russia are highlighted in almost all parts of the strategy where the main
objectives are defined in nine parts namely;
A new dimension of Norwegian Foreign policy emphasizes sovereignty, military
presence, climate change and cooperation.
218
G Flikke p.66, 70 219
Ibid.,:73 220
Ibid., 65 221
R Tamnes p.60 222
Ibid., p.61 223
Ibid., p.61-62
57
Knowledge generation and competence building, is phrased in terms of climate change
and seizing opportunities and utilizing resources in the Arctic. Where allocation means to
research and research cooperation is in focus, both in domestic and international terms.
Issues relating to indigenous peoples, is in focus as a source of knowledge regarding
climate and environment as well as cultural values. Further the rights of the Sámi are
emphasized in trade and resource extraction and so is the need for common international
standards regarding indigenous peoples.
People to people cooperation, is highlighted as an opportunity to improve relations
between the Arctic countries in terms of common standards and retaining population rate in
the High North. Focus is on youth enablement, health and cultural cooperation across borders.
The environment, the government intends to set high environmental standards for all
activities in the High North. Further Norway wants to be a leading nation concerning
environmental policy, where in particular the preservation of the wilderness of Svalbard is
stressed as along with cooperation on environment and nuclear safety with Russia.
The management and utilization of marine resources, sound fisheries policies is
important for Norway, based on research and regulations. Access to international fishing
zones is emphasized as well as is the prevention of illegal fishing.
Petroleum activities are to be increased through opening up of new petroleum fields
but with a focus on safekeeping the environment. Further such increased developments are
framed as important for sustainable social development and retaining Norway’s population in
the north.
Maritime transport is important in terms of setting high safety standards, where
cooperation and increased surveillance are highlighted, both for safety of shipping but also the
preservation of the environment.
Business development and economic development for Norway in the High North,
where cross-border cooperation, a well-functioning labor market and value creation is
emphasized in order to maintain Norwegian settlements in the north. This entails
strengthening education, research and tourism in its High North.
58
The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy
Arctic, Norway’s policy is focused on what is termed as the High North, referring mainly to
its own territory in the Arctic but as stated, this policy overlaps with both the Nordic
cooperation, the EU and with the other Arctic states.224
It is characterised both by the own
north and development of the same, as well as by international relations. The policy is
claimed to be neither purely a domestic nor foreign policy but rather:
It is a question of our ability to continue our tradition of responsible management of
resources, predictable exercise of sovereignty and close cooperation with our neighbours,
partners and allies. The Norwegian-Russian cooperation in the high north has developed into
an important channel for European dialogue.225
There is an obvious identification with the High North and it is seen as an integral part
of Norway, rather than a far away wilderness.
Svalbard is given much attention and focus lies on the Norwegian sovereignty in the
archipelago by legality and in a peaceful manner,226
even though the High North policy also
emphasize the importance of exercising sovereignty by retaining the presence of its armed
forces in the North.227
As well as an orderly situation in the region as stated in the quote
below:
Although there are sometimes differences of opinion on certain legal questions and
points of international law, Norway has been commended for its stewardship in the north, and
this is something we will continue to build on.228
This statement shows the general language in the Norwegian policy that there is an orderly
relationship in the Arctic at least in the view of Norway and there is a feeling that despite the
differences of opinion Norway identifies as being a good representation for Arctic relations.
224
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 13 225
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April 2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 5 (foreword) 226
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 14 227
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 19 228
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 16
59
There is a language which inclines that Norway, as a democratic state with significant
territories in the High North and a widespread economic development, ought to be considered
a model as a responsible state
The image of others
Norway position itself against other states in the Arctic and the language inclines a disregard
towards states which questions Norway’s legal rights to territorial waters, especially
concerning Svalbard. This is apparent in the following statement:
We expect other actors to comply with national and international rules and
regulations. The High North is at the top of our foreign policy agenda, and we will seek the
support of our allies and partners to ensure that Norway is able to address the real
challenges we are facing in the high North.229
This language is one which can be seen to be rather harsh coming from Norway. Even so it
shows the importance of the region and firmness towards other states. Regarding international
law Norway uses the strongest language amongst the states, since it is the only one who
places expectations on other states, rather than simply committing itself to international law.
This strong language can be interpreted as the language of a leading nation, were faith in
international cooperation might not be the dominant trait but rather some form of force.
There is an overall strong focus on Norwegian-Russian relations. In most chapters
there is a special section on the implications and relations of the policy areas concerning
Russia in particular. According to the policy the Arctic region has since the Cold War been
dominated by a broad international cooperation230
and further highlighting that:
Even during the tension of the cold war, relations between the countries of the north
were orderly and correct231 and Our relations with Russia form the central bilateral
dimension of Norway’s High North policy.232
229
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April 2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 17 230
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 14 231
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 16 232
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 17
60
The focus on Russia is interesting even though it is a recurring theme in most other Arctic
policies. This centrality of Russia is to be seen only in the Norwegian policy. It is admittedly
the closest costal neighbour and has shared disputes with Russia for a long time, and the
language used about this relationship is ambiguous given that the policy states the importance
of cooperation with Russia to Norway in the High North, but at the same time there are
obvious traces of suspicion towards Russia. There are even statements shaming Russia on
issues such as the environment, as well as questioning its intentions in the Arctic. This is
illustrated by the following quotes from the Norwegian policy:
We can only ensure sustainable use of resources and sound environmental
management in the Barents Sea with Russia’s engagement and Norwegian-Russian
cooperation.233 Heavy industry on the Kola Peninsula is still the most important source of
pollution in eastern parts of Finnmark, and inputs from various sources in Russia are
contributing to the high levels of environmentally hazardous substances in the High North.234
Russian membership of the WTO and subsequent membership of the OECD is
important in order to create a transparent and predictable framework for economic
activity.235
After decades of authoritarian rule and isolationism, Russia is now finding its place in
the European cooperation between democratic states…It is however, still unclear how Russia
will develop in a number of areas of interest to the surrounding world. This applies
particularly to key issues such as the rule of law, freedom of expression and human rights.236
We will maintain a candid dialogue with Russia and will be clear about Norway’s
views on human rights, the principles of the rule of law and political right.237
In these statements there is ambivalence, since Russia is seen as an important partner
at the same time as cooperation seems to be valid only on Norwegian terms. However these
statements might be directed as to set standards for cooperation as well as showing other
recipients of the policy that Norway takes a firm normative stance towards Russia in this
233
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 18 234
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April 2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 47 235
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 71 236
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 18 237
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 18
61
setting and avoid the risk of being accused of being anti western by others. Further it can be a
tactic in the effort to socialize Russia into western norms and values and in this way bring the
Arctic cooperation closer. The following statement can be seen as proof of this reasoning.
The government will seek to maintain our allies’ and partners’ interest in the north,
and will encourage increased participation in military exercises and training in the region.
Defence cooperation between Norway and Russia is also building mutual trust and increasing
our capacity for joint problem solving.238
This implies that Norway feels a responsibility towards other states, possibly even a
“we” even though expressed in guardian terms which give the impression that Norway is a
leading nation regarding protection of the rights of all Arctic states. And other actors than
Russia are also raised in the Arctic policy where:
The other Arctic Council member states-the Nordic countries, Russia, the US and
Canada- and key EU countries are some of our most important cooperation partners. The
Government also wishes to establish closer cooperation with other countries, including
Japan, India and China. However Russia is in a special position as cooperation partner in the
High North.239
However the interests and specification of the allies and partners are not nearly as
prominent as the role of Russia in the Arctic context.
The view on cooperation
Despite the focus on the Norwegian civil, industrial and militarily presence in the High
North,240
the Norwegian policy also highlight the importance of international and in particular
regional cooperation, be it on a bilateral or multilateral basis. There is an impression that the
Arctic cooperation is not necessarily a closed forum for inaugurated members, and there is not
as strong focus on Nordic cooperation as in the policies of some other Nordic states. In light
of the focus on Russia and the domestic emphasis shows that bilateral cooperation is the main
feature for Norway.
238
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 20 239
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012,http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-plans-
and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 32 240
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697 p. 63
62
Remark:
The absence of the Arctic Council and the A5 constellation in the Norwegian policy might be
a consequence of the early publication date. As discussed before the setting of the policies has
an impact on the content. The Norwegian policy was published in 2006, which is two years
before the Ilulissat declaration and hence a positioning in relation to this is not possible.
Admittedly there are more recent added documents to extend the Norwegian policy, and it is
possible that including these might answer questions regarding the A5 and the Arctic Council
and a more explicit view on cooperation, however this is evidence of the rapid developments
in the region.
63
5.1.7 Russia
Background
Russia was the first of the Arctic states to submit its claims to the CLCS in 2001,
however the claim was not accepted by the CLCS and additional information was needed.241
Russia’s Arctic policy is seen by Zysk as having a great impact on the strategic atmosphere in
the Arctic, both because of Russia’s vast geographical scope and the central role ascribed to
region in Russian strategic thinking as well as in its defense policy.242
A previous harsh rhetoric has declined with the presidency of Medvedev according to
Zysk and according to Antrim, Russia has stated that the Arctic is to be a region of
cooperation and peace,243
although an expanded role in the Arctic by NATO is still stated to
be unacceptable.244
Russia may, as highlighted by Caitlyn Antrim, be depended in many ways
on the west245
yet this harsh rhetoric is something to take note of since according to Geir
Flikke, Russia sees international affairs not only as dominated by the west but by western
institutions which has according to Flikke contributed to a change in its foreign policy away
from a status quo and into a zero-sum game and interaction simply in terms of relative
gains.246
However Zysk states that “Above all the leadership seeks to ensure that Russia s
voice is heard when the rules of the game and the region s future are defined”.247
Further Huebert claims that Russia’s power capabilities or at least its possibility to
show off strength into the Arctic has increased in recent years248
as the least developed
country in the Arctic, Russia may as claimed by Antrim to have more at stake in the Arctic
than any other Arctic state.249
Further, Russia has according to Zysk been seen as “the wild
card” in Arctic strategic calculations due to its increased military activity which coincided
with an increased “rhetorical hostility toward the West”.250
Caitlyn Antrim explains this as
being due to the fact that the Kremlin worldview is indeed different from that of most western
241
C L Antrim “The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-First century” in Arctic security in an age of climate change, Kraska J (ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011, p.120 242
K Zysk “Hard power and natural resources” in Arctic security in an age of climate change, Kraska J (ed.),
Cambridge University Press , New York, 2011, p.85-86 243
C L Antrim p. 121 244
K Zysk p.99 245
C L Antrim p.140 246
G Flikke p. 80-81 247
K Zysk p.106 248
R Huebert p.210 249
C L Antrim p.137-138 250
K Zysk p.85-86, 88
64
states’.251
For president Medvedev the Arctic has been claimed to be of vital importance and
announced it as the key source of economic revitalization for Russia.252
Summary of Russia’s Arctic policy
The Arctic policy used here is a unofficial translation of the document posted on the
governmental page of the Russian Federation and translated into Russia’s Arctic Policy to
2020 and Beyond. The printed document is 12 pages long divided into five sections each with
a number of objectives. The sections are specified as follows:
General Provisions define the Arctic Zone geographically within the Russian
Federation and the special feature of the Arctic zone as extreme and vulnerable natural and
climatic conditions, limited commercial development, remote with low population density but
as a rich resource base.
National interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic are stated to be the
utilization of resources to develop the social and economic development in Russia. Further the
interests are framed to be peace and cooperation, safeguard the environment and develop and
integrate the Northern Sea Route to improve national transport and communications.
Main objectives and strategic priorities of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the
Arctic, to realise the interests Russia attempts to expand the Arctic resource base, maintain
and improve the military forces for mainly border protection, ensure to minimize
environmental impacts of economic activity, developments in technology and scientific
research. Further the objectives are to improve regional and legal cooperation in the Arctic.
Basic problems and means for the realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy
in the Arctic, are to ensure the territorial borders and confirm resource reserves and modernize
and develop technological and infrastructural needs, including military and coast guard
security for exploration of resources with a long term perspective.
Main mechanisms for the realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the
Arctic are to be realised through coordinated activities between federal agencies, local
governments, commercial and non-profits organizations as well as cooperation with foreign
states and international organizations. Cooperation will be under terms of international law
and international commitments.
251
C L Antrim p.137. 252
Dmitri Medvedev cited by G Flikke p.79
65
The realization of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic will be made in
three stages expanding international cooperation and formalizing the Federations outer
borders as part of the first stage and increasing the zone’s competitiveness as the long term
goal.
The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy
Even though there are references to the Arctic region in military terms, the main aim seems to
be protection and usage of its natural resources in order of:
...allowing for the solution of problems of socio-economic development253
The Russian policy lacks the harsh rhetoric mentioned above. Rather the policy focuses on
stating the Russian objectives for the region in a rather neutral language. Yet a goal for
Russia is:
to retain its role as the leading Arctic power254 and according to the policy this aim
will be achieved by:
Mass media coverage of issues relating to Russia’s national interests in the Arctic,
including the organization of exhibitions “round tables” devoted to the history of Arctic
exploration by Russian explorers, in order to form a positive image of Russia.255
These statements show that Russia is aware that other states in the Arctic and in international
arena might be hesitating as to Russia’s role and intentions in the Arctic. Possibly the self-
image of Russia is based on its lack of international posture in the past few decades. Here
there is a possibility that Russia wants to show its willingness to cooperate but also as various
other Arctic states, to prove that it has the right to the Arctic region. Another focus of the
Russian Arctic policy is that of the aim to show the Russian position in the Arctic, but neither
this is termed in a harsh rhetoric, Russia’s aim is phrased as follows:
to strengthen Russia’s position in the Arctic, consolidate international security, and
promote peace and stability in the Arctic region.256
253
Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and Beyond, National Interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic: 4(a)
retrieved 7 May 2012, http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 254
Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond, policy in the Arctic Main mechanisms for the realization of the
Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic 11 (c), retrieved 7 May 2012,
http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 255
Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond, Main mechanisms for the realization of the Russian Federation’s
state policy in the Arctic 10 (d) retrieved 7 May 2012, http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-
arctic-policy/#more-225
66
The image of others
Most other Arctic states have some mentioning of Russia in their policies, in contrast
the Russian Arctic policy has very few references to other particular state actors in the Arctic.
One of the few such times is the reference to Spitsbergen (Svalbard) where the policy states
that Russia wants to ensure:
the mutually beneficial presence of Russia on the Spitsbergen Archipelago.257
Even so, there is no mentioning of the Norwegian presence in Spitsbergen, yet it
shows readiness to acknowledge the rights of other actors to their claim in the region as well
as an intention to solve matters by common efforts.
The view on cooperation
A notable absence in the Russian policy is that of military and security, where it is
mentioned, it is directed in terms of education and border control. The main focus in the
sphere of military security Russia aims to secure:
defence and safekeeping of the state borders of the Russian Federation located in the
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation258
The main focus lies with economic development in the region and in terminology the
safeguarding of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation has higher priority, than
security. This lack of focus may however be a consequence of the fact that the Russian
Federation has a specific strategy for Security and Defence in the Arctic region, which give
many answers to questions raised here about its relative absence. However it is interesting to
note here since Russia is the only state which has such a specific strategy for the Arctic,
whilst other states have the region integrated in more general Security and Defence
documents on a national level but even so taking it into regard in their overall Arctic policies.
The Russian policy emphasises cooperation and peace which shows non-military
intention and a wish to change the image of hostility. This might be in order to be able to
256
Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond , Main mechanisms for the realization of the Russian Federation’s
state policy in the Arctic 11 (c), retrieved 7 May 2012, http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-
arctic-policy/#more-225 257
Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond, Main objectives and strategic priorities of the Russian
Federation‘s state policy in the Arctic: 7 (F ) retrieved 7 May 2012,
http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 258
Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond, Main objectives and strategic priorities of the Russian Federation
‘s state policy in the Arctic 6 (B), retrieved 7 May 2012, http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-
arctic-policy/#more-225
67
contribute, take a larger role in Arctic cooperation and get an international recognition for
Russia’s role as an Arctic actor.
Even though cooperation seems to be based on the national interest of Russia there are
signs of willingness to cooperate with other Arctic states, which is highlighted through the
following statements:
An expansion of opportunities for international cooperation, including for the effective
management of the natural resources of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.259
Implementation of active cooperation between the Russian Federation and Arctic
states for the purposes of delimitation of maritime borders on the basis of international law
and mutual agreements with consideration for the Russian Federation’s national interests, as
well as addressing the issues relating to the international legal basis for the outer borders of
the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.260
This shows a willingness to comply with the Ilulissat declaration and cooperate on
matters on a mutual basis even though cooperation is mentioned in issue-specific terms and
do not specifically emphasize a broader scope of cooperation.
There is however, throughout the Russian policy a strong reference to International
treaties and agreements.261
Strengthening, on a bilateral basis and through regional organisations- including the
Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, good relations between Russia and
Arctic states, the implementation of joint economic, scientific-technical and cultural
programs, as well as cross border cooperation.262
This shows that there might be a lack of trust towards other Arctic states and a
statement that Russia will only comply with agreements on its own terms. This can also be
interpreted so that issues to which there is no agreement, should be left out of discussion in
international cooperation. Nevertheless it is an invitation to cooperate within the Arctic
region.
259
Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond Main mechanisms for the realization of the Russian Federation’s
state policy in the Arctic 11 (A) , retrieved 7 May 2012, .http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-
arctic-policy/#more-225 260
Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and Beyond, Main objectives and strategic priorities of the Russian
Federation’s state policy in the Arctic, 7 (a) retrieved 7 May 2012,
http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225
261 Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and Beyond, Policy in the Arctic 6 (f), Main mechanisms for the realization
of the Russian Federation’s state policy in the Arctic 10 (a), retrieved 7 May 2012,
http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225 262
Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond, Policy in the Arctic 7 (c) retrieved 7 May 2012,
http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225
68
5.1.8 Sweden
Background
According to Huebert, Sweden is the Arctic state that has been least engaged in Arctic
issues, at least in terms of security, but has had a stronger engagement in circumpolar
organizations such as the Nordic Council, BEAC and the EU.263 Sweden, as all Nordic
Countries according to Keskitalo does not refer to the north in international relations in the
same way as other Arctic states but the northern mainland are referred to in a context of
northern interstate cooperation and not connected to the Arctic as a concept.264 The
North/south divide in national terms are in all the Nordic states of a different nature than those
of other Arctic states, since there is according to Keskitalo a larger integration with
indigenous peoples and main issues are financial and the distance to governing centers, rather
than differentiation of cultures. Indigenous peoples are a small minority amongst the
inhabitants of the north.265
Summary of Sweden’s Arctic policy
Sweden has the advantage of being the latest and last of the Arctic states to produce an
Arctic policy. By this token, Sweden can relate its policy in the frame of what other state
policies have stated, and it does so in a way in a section of commentary regarding the other
Arctic policies. The Swedish policy is published as a booklet with a summary and
introduction, containing reasons for formalizing an Arctic policy, reflections on other state’s
policies and a definition of the region. The policy is 50 pages long and is divided into three
chapter as follows:
Sweden and the Arctic is divided into subchapters explaining the Swedish ties with the
Arctic where historical research and the contemporary competences of Swedish Arctic
research is emphasized. Security is framed in a Nordic cooperation, EU and dependency
terms. Concerning economy the policy stresses the expertise of Swedish business as well as
traditional Sámi trades. Climate and environment are highlighted as a hazard to the Swedish
north, whereas culture is spoken of in consideration of preserving the traditional Sámi cultures
in all states with a Sámi population.
263
R Huebert p.212
264 Keskitalo p.145
265 Keskitalo p.145-148
69
Objectives and implementation in Arctic cooperation are divided into the different
levels of cooperation with subsections regarding the AC, EU, Nordic cooperation, Barents
cooperation, the UN, the A5 and Sámi cooperation. The overall objective is to guarantee that
the Arctic is spared from political tension, where the AC is the main venue for Arctic
cooperation. Further Sweden wants to coordinate the actions and take advantage of synergies
within these various forums.
Swedish priorities are specified into climate and environment, economic development,
education and research and the human dimension. The opportunities presented due to climate
change should be managed through a broad concept of security including human security and
where sustainable development and cooperation are priorities. Here Sweden intends to be
driving force specifically in protecting the Arctic environment and indigenous peoples rights
to exercise their cultures.
The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy
Sweden’s Arctic policy relies heavily on its claim to be an Arctic state with numerous
references to historical rights and scientific achievements, by which it is assert its right as an
Arctic state266. The following statement gathers these claims:
Sweden is an Arctic country with interests in the region and has an important role to
play in both multilateral and bilateral discussions.267 The Sámi people form the link between
Sweden and the Arctic.268
Even though claiming that it has an important role to play, this role is not specified,
and can be seen as rather a statement to gain respect as an Arctic state, with reference to
Sweden’s prior lack of involvement in Arctic specific issues.
The image of others
What is apparent from the policy is that Sweden identifies with Finland, whilst
showing that there is more to be desired in terms of the US policy and its commitment to
Arctic issues.269
266
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 7 (introduction), 12, 13 267
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 7 (introduction) 268
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 17
70
Given the subtleness accredited to the US policy the statement below might seem as one of
insecurity concerning the future situation in the Arctic, being dependent on states which of
one is not straightforward in its commitment:
the overall security policy climate in the Arctic is very much dependent on the
relationship between Russia and the United States270
However Sweden emphasise that security challenges are not necessarily of a military
nature271 and also stresses that the Arctic is rather characterized by cooperation than of
conflict272
Further Sweden is a “neutral” state and promotes the use of civil rather than military
means to solve disputes. However the policy shows a readiness to partake more in the future
international security arena, where an increased interdependence is in focus:
Sweden’s security policy position based on security in cooperation means that the
security policies of the EU member states and Nordic countries will strongly influence
Swedish security policy273 and becoming even more closely interwoven with the
political priorities of the other Nordic countries274.
The importance of Nordic cooperation in prominent in the Swedish policy and it further
emphasizes its declaration of solidarity towards the other Nordic countries.275
Also in other aspects than security it highlights the Nordic cooperation and these statements
can reflect a wish to emphasise the good relations and allegiance between Sweden and other
Nordic states in particular.
The Nordic region is an important part in the Arctic and it is also important that there
is a forum for discussion on how the Nordic countries can jointly contribute to its
development276
269
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.10 (introduction, section listing other Arctic state policies) 270
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012, http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.14 271
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 23 272
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 14, 37 273
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.14-15 274
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.15 275
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.15
71
Cooperation across national borders in the North also helps to maintain good
relations in the High North277
Here the Nordic Council takes prominence even though the role of the Arctic Council is also
important. This indicate that the group of Nordic states are seen as the closest to friends in
Swedish considerations and a group of ‘we’ within the Arctic which is possibly exclusive
towards other Arctic states. Sweden shows the strongest identification with the Nordic states
as concerning its policy in the Arctic, where it highlights that:
Finland’s position as an Arctic country in the Nordic region is very similar to
Sweden’s278
It is important for Finland, Iceland and Sweden to be able to participate in decision-
making in cases where they have legitimate interests and that the status of the Arctic Council
is maintained279
As seen above Sweden shares with Iceland and Finland an anxiety of being ousted in
cooperation by the A5 and expose a willingness to strengthen the Arctic Council for the
reason that:
An energised Arctic Council could reduce the need for the coastal states to drive
forward issues in the Arctic Five format280
These statements can be seen as a way for Sweden to strengthen the validity of its own
position, but “speaking” also on behalf of others may be a sign that cooperation and relations
are strong in the Nordic relations and both Finland and Iceland do acknowledge this common
concern in their respective policies.
The view on cooperation
Sweden also highlights the need for enhanced cooperation in the Arctic in general,
with a focus on international law, which may indicate a lack of trust or a step in the direction
of closer relationships between the Arctic states. The following quote enhances this
276
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.20
277 Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.40 278
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.9 (introduction, section presenting other Arctic state
policies) 279
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 4 August 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.22 280
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.22
72
uncertainty since it indicates despite the statement of cooperation, a need to enhance
confidence it the region, demonstrating an anxiety that there might already or in the future a
possibility that conflict will increase.
Dialogue, transparency, confidence-building measures and cooperation in line with
international law form the starting point for Sweden’s approach to security concerning the
Arctic.281 Arctic cooperation is characterised by a low level of conflict and broad consensus.282
It is in Sweden’s interest that new emerging activities are governed by common and
robust regulatory frameworks and above all that they focus on environmental sustainability.283
An enhanced role for the EU in Arctic cooperation is highlighted284
but the focus on
cooperation in the Arctic is on the existing regional forums such as the Nordic Council and
the Arctic Council and stress that the role of the Arctic Council should be strengthened and its
mandate broadened.285
This can be seen in light of the image of others above and may be
interpreted as apprehension that other states might not be as keen to cooperate in the region
and this emphasis on regulation of the Arctic relations can further be seen generally in the
Arctic policy. Further given that the Nordic states are all members of the Arctic Council and
since it is governed through unanimity the strengthening of the same can be seen as an
extension to the relations between the Nordic countries and as a wish to further the patterns of
good cooperation in the Nordic Council to socialize other Arctic states into the same culture.
281
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.19 282
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.19 283
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.4 (summary) 284
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p.5 (summary), 18, 20 285
Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 p. 4 (summary), 19
73
5.1.9 United States of America
Background
The USA is an Arctic state that has shown relatively little interest in the region. This
is explained by Kraska as being due to the fact that the American people as well as the
Congress views the Arctic as peripheral in contrast to more urgent domestic and foreign
policy needs286 and he predicts that the aftermath to the financial crisis will contribute to
sustain this stance towards the Arctic will remain for some time.287 This lack of interest is
concurred by Heininen and Nicol who highlights the disinclination of American policy
makers to promote formal relationships in the region and a lack of willingness to take a
broader perspective outside of issue specific cooperation.288 Authors such as Campbell
emphasizes that “the identity and role of the United States in the postwar world” can be
understood as “a struggle over identity” that is not isolated to military threats but rather a
moral one and an idea that the US was a key player and necessary actor in any international
action289
and according to Flikke the Arctic is still sensitive to shifts in US-Russian
relations.290
According to Kraska the only real national interest of the USA in the Arctic is that
concerning freedom of navigation over which there are disputes in particular regarding the
Northwest Passage and anxieties in the USA that if the freedom of navigation is infringed
upon this can have consequences for the freedom of navigation globally291. USA was
according to Kraska after China, the least preferred partner in the Arctic by people in the
Arctic in 2011.292
Summary of the US Arctic policy
The Arctic policy of the USA is presented as a presidential directive on national and
homeland security. It is ten pages in scope and written as a memorandum for various
secretaries, administrators and directors. Hence the text is formal and divided into sections of
286
J Kraska “The New Arctic Geography and U.S. Strategy” in Arctic security in an age of climate change,
Kraska J (ed.), Cambridge University Press , New York 2011 p.256-257 287
Ibid., p.256-258 288
L Heininen & H Nicol “The Importance of Northern Dimension Foreign Policies in the Geopolitics of the
Circumpolar North”, Geopolitics, 12 , 2007, p.p.133–165, p.150-151 289
D Campbell “Violent performances: identity, sovereignty, responsibility” in The return of culture and
identity in IR theory, Y Lapid Y & Kratochwil F (eds.) (Boulder Colorado 1996) Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.
163 290
G Flikke p.:69 291
J Kraska p. 259-262 292
Ibid., p. 257-258
74
purpose, background and policy. The purpose refers to which directives this policy supersedes
and will not be addressed here. The background and policy are presented below:
The background to the Arctic policy claims that the USA has an undeniable interests
in the Arctic by the virtue of it being an Arctic nation and that the increased interest in Arctic
resources, the visual change in climate and the work of the AC the region, must alter the
national-, homeland and defense policies of the USA.
The policy is divided in to:
National security and Homeland security interests in the Arctic, which emphasize that
the USA will operate independently or in conjunction with other states in military terms
increasing its military capabilities and presence in the Arctic. Freedom of the seas is a
prominent feature but the policy also encourage disputes to be resolved by peaceful means.
International governance where the policy states that the AC should remain under its
mandate and not be transformed into a formal international organization, but does not exclude
other forums to be extended or new arrangements to be considered. This regards in particular
the UNCLOS which the policy encourages accession to.
Extended continental shelf and boundary issues are highlighted in terms of defining
the areas to which the USA can claim sovereignty and take measure to resolve existing
disputes with Canada and Russia.
The promoting international scientific cooperation, considers access to the Arctic
Ocean and sharing of research platforms in the Arctic and the policy stresses better
coordination with in particular Russia. USA further want to be a leader in Arctic research.
Maritime transportation in the Arctic region, is framed in terms of safety and
environmentally sound commerce and the need for well functioning infrastructure by working
through international established forums on the matter.
Economic issues including energy will be developed with stake-holders but with
concern for the environment and indigenous peoples and in cooperation with other Arctic
states in extraction of resources. However protection of the interests of the USA is key.
75
Environmental protection and conservation of natural resources is according to the
policy still in need of further research and efforts in this area should be increased in order to
mitigate impacts on the Arctic environment.
The framing of the Arctic and the reflection of self-image in the Arctic policy
The Arctic policy of the USA is mainly centered on its own national interest. This may
be the case for all Arctic states, however the language of the American policy is one with a
national focus, and it may be claimed to be directed mainly at a domestic audience.
Sovereignty and interest of a military and resource character has a strong emphasis. One of
the chronological top priorities is to:
develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect United States air,
land and sea borders in the Arctic region293
and
to assert a more active and influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests
and to project sea power throughout the region294
The policy concur that the freedom of the seas is stated to be a top national priority.295
Preserving rights in the Arctic is seen as a prerequisite for the ability of the USA to maintain
this right in other vital and strategic straits globally.296 Such words gives the impression that
there is an imminent threat to these interests, rather than just a precaution for a possible
scenario in the Arctic.
The image of others
The Arctic policy of the USA does not refer specifically to other actors in the region hence
there is a lack of language to analyze to some extent. On the other hand the exclusion of
references to other actors can indicate that the USA misses the identification to the Arctic and
293
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25, National Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 6 a, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 294
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25, National
Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 3, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 295
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25, National
Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 5, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 296
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25, National
Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 5, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf
76
its actors in this context that can be found in the policies of other Arctic states. The policy is
largely issue specific as regards cooperation but does not exclude international cooperation, in
fact it “encourages peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region”.297 Admittedly this
does not say much about the view of others specifically but it gives an indication that other
actors are capable to solve disputes in a peaceful way. At the same time it point to the
possibility that other actors are not necessarily viewed as peaceful regarding disputes in the
region.
The view on cooperation
The policy states that the USA is “prepared to operate either independently or in
conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests”,298
referring to national security
interests.
Even though the policy highlights that cooperative institutions in the Arctic should be
strengthened it is one of few Arctic states who wishes the Arctic Council to remain a high-
level forum under its current mandate and that it should not be granted to evolve “into a
formal international organisation…with asserted contributions”.299 Cooperation in the US
Arctic policy is discussed in terms of achieving national interests by “coordination with the
Russian Federation”300
“consult with other Arctic nations” and “facilitating access to” the
Arctic Ocean or natural resources.301 However it also sees “the value and effectiveness of
297
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25,
National Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 6 e, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 298
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25, National Security and Homeland Interests in the Arctic region: B 1 , retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 299
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25,
International Governance C 2, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 300
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25,
Promoting International Scientific Cooperation E 1, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 301
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25,
Promoting International Scientific Cooperation E 1 retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf
77
existing fora, such as the Arctic Council”302 and emphasizes that it aims “to continuing to
work closely with other Arctic nations”.303
This may seem as a rather indistinct policy by the statements above, however in its full
context it is clear that cooperation mechanisms are to be used only in event of mutual
concerns, possible disputes or in order to pursue national interests that are subject to differing
opinions in international relations.304 In spite of this disregard for formalisation of the Arctic
Council the Arctic policy encourages the senate in terms of accession on the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea.305 This encouragement is however termed in the context of gaining
access and to “have a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are
debated and interpreted”.306 Again the cooperation is phrased in terms which imply
cooperation out of necessity, not a will for coordinated policies and general cooperation.
302
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25,
Economic issues, including energy G 3, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf
303 National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25,
Economic issues, including energy G 2, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 304
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25,
Environmental protection and conservation of natural resources: H 6 e, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 305
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25,
International Governance C 4, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 306
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25,
International Governance C 4, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf
78
General conclusions on patterns of the Arctic policies:
There is a recurring notion that the Arctic needs to be regulated by international
treaties, hence one can read into this that there is a lack of comprehensive trust within the
cooperation, in the sense that relations needs treaties in order to be regulated. Further this
expose a staggering faith in the power of international treaties as a base for cooperation. This
is peculiar given that the sole regulative body at present is the UNCLOS. However it also
indicates that there is a trust that such agreements will be adhered to by the parties.
No evidence can be seen that there are outspoken threats in the policies, and another
recurring jargon is that the region is one of peace, stability and cooperation. Yet focusing on
security and the individual interests to bring security onto the agenda or having an opinion on
the situation of Arctic security, sends a message to other actors that the self “come in peace”
but also recognizes that there is a possibility that others might not. Further this can be seen as
a way of trying to convince others that there should be no violence in the region, a sort of
promotion of peace and stability as an order in the Arctic region. This does not exclude that
states are unwilling to defend sovereignty with military means. Moreover all states are
compellingly promoting their own interests in the region and show an inclination to represent
their own interests and the way they deal with international relations to be the model way to
go about Arctic affairs.
Moreover some states are more inclined to speak in terms of common values and close
cooperation than others and there are differences in the views of cooperative structures. What
this means in terms of the culture of the Arctic relations and the possibilities of cooperation
will be analysed in the following chapter.
79
6. Analytical discussion
In this section there will be an extended analysis of the findings from the Arctic policies in
relation to the theoretical background. The analysis will be divided under the headings of my
research questions. The analytical discussion and the conclusions drawn are subject to the
authors’ own interpretations of the policies. This is a consequence of the constructivist stance
taken in this thesis.
What characterize the policies of Arctic states, in terms of defining the region, other
actors and the self?
It seems that some countries are still struggling to claim their role and right to be an
actor in the Arctic, by giving examples of why it is and should be a legitimate actor. This may
reflect power relations in international relations in general since all states implies that there is
to be an increased focus on the Arctic in the future. Sweden and Finland seems to have a lack
of confidence as Arctic states307
, however this can be a consequence of the routine of referring
to its north in terms not particularly as Arctic. Iceland is confident that it is an Arctic state
while struggling to be recognised by others as a coastal state and wanting to bring forth an
Arctic concept more suitable for its own self-image.308
Denmark is a state which recognizes
itself as an Arctic state even though this relies on parts of the realm which is gaining ever
more independence from the central authority, but Denmark is aware of the Kingdoms
responsibilities regarding matters in forums where for example Greenland has no voice, and
indeed shows an Arctic identity in matters regarding regional issues.309
Canada gives the
image of a strong identification with the region with a focus on the peoples living in the
north310
. The limited interests of the USA in the Arctic, resting mainly on protection of border
sovereignty and resources, give the perception that USA has limited cooperation interests in
307
Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region, retrieved 22 April 2012,
http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID={C92863F7-1188-4975-9CC8-34EA16C26D07}, Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region, retrieved 8 April 2012,
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15912/a/186169 308
A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, May 5 2011, retrieved 8 April 2012
http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf 309
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, retrieved 9 April 2012,
http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomArctic
Councily/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx 310
Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians, Ottawa 2009, retrieved 25 January
2012 http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp
80
the region.311
It is also an indication that the USA is the state which has the least identification
with the Arctic and that the region has a very limited part in its self-image. The protectionism
seen in the policy of the USA verges in a way to that of a state under threat, or a victim.
Russia identifies with the region in economic terms, and the specific Arctic policy does not
give at hand that it feels threatened or any signs of aggression.312
Norway takes an integrated
approach to its High North, but where focus is mainly domestic and with strong references to
Russia’s role in Arctic management.313
Finland, Iceland and Sweden share the image of the A5 as a group constituted to
exclude them in important Arctic decisions. However they along with Denmark and Norway
share to some extent common grounds in the Nordic cooperation and identifies themselves as
a “we”, even though Sweden, Finland and Iceland shows this in stronger terms relating to
Arctic issues than do Denmark and Norway. The Ilulissat declaration is welcomed however in
the sense that common solutions and the adherence to international law is encouraged,
however the anxiety lies in the possibility that there will be a broadened scope of the A5
cooperation leading to a neglect for other forums where the membership stretches further.
Russia is the actor which all the other states mention in sceptical terms but at the same
time it is still seen as a vital actor to incorporate in Arctic issues. Hence there is a ‘we’ and
‘them’ division between the west and Russia, even though the USA frames this division in
nationalistic terms. In cooperation terms, USA and to a lesser extent Russia are the states
which are least inclined to use a language which indicates restricted cooperation whereas the
Nordic states and Canada speaks in more debt about enhancing and broadening the scope of
cooperation. There is in none of the policies an outspoken willingness to completely stay
outside of cooperation in all areas, but all emphasise the importance to protect sovereignty
and the need for security measures in the region, implying that there is a fear that other actors
might act in aggressive means regarding the protection of their sovereignty.
The assumption that the region is driven by a will to achieve stable and consistent
cooperation even though risking an infliction on state sovereignty is true to some extent. All
but Russia and the USA show willingness to strengthen the cooperation in terms that will
311
National security presidential directive/nspd- 66, Homeland security presidential directive/hspd- 25, retrieved
8 April 2012, http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf 312
Russia’s Arctic Policy to 2020 and beyond, retrieved 7 May 2012, ,
http://www.perunconsulting.com/2010/11/25/russias-arctic-policy/#more-225
313
The Norwegian Government’s High North strategy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved 8 April
2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-ACtion-and-plans/ACtion-
plans-and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697
81
ultimately limit the role of individual national interests, adhering to norms such as the value
of cooperation for the sake of peace and stability, However sovereignty and national interests
are still prominent in each of the policies, yet there is evidence that certain national interests
coincides with the interests of others and hence pose relatively little threat to sovereignty.
This framing of cooperation can be seen to some extent in a rational way, however
there are many traits to the individual policies which cannot be explained by rationality, such
as the ‘we’ sense in the Nordic policies as well as strengthening the scope of the Arctic
Council, which if given stronger mandate will take on issues that might infringe on national
decision-making. It might be rational to solve problems collectively but giving up sovereignty
on issues which are subject to national interests is not. The fact that most states show
willingness to cooperate and give precedence and funding to Arctic cooperation forums shows
friendly intent and inclusive relations, which can contribute to future perceptions of the same
in line with Wendt’s cultures314
. The Arctic policy of the USA might indeed be perceived as
an unwillingness to cooperate and might reduce its chances to gain assurance from other
states, whereas Russia’s seemingly straightforward intentions can contribute to stability in the
region and assurance of peaceful resolution of disputes.
The assumption that there might be stronger ties between certain countries and
evidence of friendship relations, can to some extent be confirmed, however this relationship is
more explicitly expressed by certain actors than others. Canada for example shows that the
USA is its most important partner in Arctic relations whereas the USA focuses mainly on
itself and the own interests in the Arctic policy. Admittedly the Arctic policies cannot reflect
all shades in the relations, however the lack of acknowledgement of the relationships in the
Arctic makes analysis of overall relations less transparent. The situation is the same in the
Nordic relations, where Sweden, Iceland and Finland are the states which focus the most on
Nordic relations, whereas it is also mentioned by Denmark and Norway, still other actors are
highlighted more and even though Denmark intends to strengthen the Arctic Council, the A5
is still an important forum. Further Norway places strong weight as do Finland on the
involvement of Russia in the cooperation, at the same time Russia does not give any of the
western countries particular weight in its Arctic policy. This may reflect different things in the
relationship between the Arctic countries. Both Norway and Finland criticise Russia on a
normative basis of human rights and environmental terms, yet they want to incorporate Russia
into their own normative framework.
314
Wendt Social Theory of International Politics chapter 6
82
How can these characteristics influence cooperation in the Arctic as an
international region?
Norms can play a part, when influencing the images of states depending on how deep
the culture is embedded within the relations, according to Wendt.315
Some norms are
prominent in the Arctic polices and all states project their own norms, mainly in terms of
environment, human rights and a faith in and importance of international agreements. All
these are influencing the possibility for cooperation and the norms of the individual states
shine through in the language of the policies. In particular the collective expectations for
proper behaviour, as emphasized by Katzenstein316
can be seen in the Arctic policies, such as
adherence to international agreements. Vertzberger’s stance that decisions about others are
historically bound317
can serve as an explanation to why other states are anxious about Russia,
this is particularly true for the US policy, which projects a strong stance on security. However
many statements also indicate an active persuasion language in the sense of contributing in
trying to change prior images accentuated by Wendt,318
both regarding the own view of others
as well as other’s view of the self. This illustrates an attempt to socialize other actors into
cooperation on friendly terms in the Arctic.
Part of the theoretical departure in this thesis is that enduring cooperation needs to rest
on common interests and values as well as end and means of the same.319
If only common
interests are present in a rational sense then there is little prospect for a satisfactory outcome
and future cooperation. For a functional cooperation on a long term basis inclusion of relevant
actors and determination of cooperative form is equally important as highlighted by
Keohane.320
Presently there is a fear of exclusion by certain states in the Arctic cooperation,
namely as a result of the Ilulissat declaration, and an unwillingness by the USA to enhance the
role of the Arctic Council. Further there are no signs that the A5 constellation will be
dissolved once the aim of the Ilulissat declaration is resolved. Moreover even lacking the
support of the USA, the structure and organization of the Arctic Council has become more
strongly asserted, through not least the permanent secretariat, which might indicate that other
actors than the USA, holds the position of being critical states in the sense which Finnemore
315
Wendt Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University chapter 6 316
P J Katzenstein , “Alternative Perspectives on National Security” p.5 317
Vertzberger, p. 347 318
Wendt,” Identity and structural change in International Politics”, p.57 319
Breitmeier p.99, Newman p. 140-142, Stein p.56 320
Keohane, “The contingent legitimacy of multilateralism p.57, Keohane International institutions and state
power- essays in international relations theory, p.136, 146-147
83
and Sikkink emphasize.321
As some authors mention above Russia sees international relations
as dominated by the west and western institutions and viewing international relations in a
different way than the west, simply want to have its voice heard in international relations.322
In the policies of mainly the Nordic states there are signs to invite Russia to take a more
prominent part in cooperation, however as it seems, on western terms. Even so, Russia seems
to be striving to gain a friendlier image in Arctic relations, which here is interpreted as a step
towards better inclusion and possibly acceptance for western values and in the long term this
may be a way to socialize Russia into the norms and values of the other Arctic states if it is
indeed included and socialized into gaining a common Arctic identity. This however is
something that is missing overall in the Arctic cooperation. Hence a stronger unity is
presently lacking, when looking at the group of Arctic states as a whole. The outreach to
Russia is important given the inclusion of the relevant actors in cooperation mentioned above.
This however does not exclude that other states may also be influenced by Russian values, yet
it is unlike that western states will change their self-image regarding democracy, human rights
and environmental values.
As seen here there is not currently a cohesive picture of what constitute Arctic
cooperation as a whole. This uncertainty in light of the theoretical departures would indicate
that cooperation might fail in the future. On the other hand reluctant states can be socialized
into the view of the majority,323
and then the Arctic Council could become a more prominent
and stable form for overall, stronger influence in the region. Presently the common threat to
be seen in the Arctic policies is that of environmental degradation, even so not all see climate
change as being a menace and the same is true for external actors impinging on the Arctic
sphere.
Concerning the Arctic cooperation in terms of Wendtian cultures, it would be
thoughtless to place all relations within the same culture. The various states have different
relations towards different actors, hence there might be relationships between certain actors
that fit in one culture whereas this is not true for all, and hence we cannot put the whole
cooperation culture in the Arctic within one of these categories. Rather there might be layers
within these cultures where some are more dominant than other traits. The strong focus on
international law or legal agreements can be an utterance to adhere and adapt to a larger
321
Finnemore & Sikkink, p. 901 322
Antrim p.137, Flikke p.80-81, Zysk p.106 323
Baker, p. 271-272, Wendt ,” Identity and structural change in International Politics” p.57, Finnemore &
Sikkink, p. 902-903
84
international society or a way to make sure that other actors which may act in a threatening
way will not harm self or its interests. All states imply the willingness for a peaceful and
stable region on the prerequisites that their own sovereignty is kept intact, this both regarding
territory as well as resources. The need to vocalise this in the policies shall not simply be seen
as a anxiety of military violence in the region, however it cannot simply be boiled down to a
rhetoric of good intentions. If there was a pure friendship relationship within Arctic
cooperation there would be no need to state the obvious, a peaceful relationship. But
reinforcing character of the social cultures can strengthen cooperation324
where such is
already initiated and this can in extension enforce stronger relations in the region.
There are no straightforward Hobbesian traits in any of the policies and even though
there are sections of proof for a “we” and ”them” language, these are not in terms of
eliminating an enemy, rather the we and them constellations show more Lockean traits, in
terms of rivals for normative stances, political influence and natural resources. The emphasis
to include for example Russia in cooperation shows that perhaps a notion that Russia would
be a threat if it is not included and including all actors in the region will eliminate the
possibility for Hobbesian conditions.
The Lockean traits are numerous in the Arctic policies, where the sense of rule of law
is prominent and conflicts are not immediately resolved by violence. Given this, violence is
condemned by all, in statements that the region should be one of peace and stability.
Nevertheless there is a build -up of military capabilities, this however may be seen as a typical
rivalry trait, since the recognition of sovereignty is not threatened, 325
even though there are
statements that claims that states will protect sovereignty and interests. These interests can be
seen as in need of protection rather in a sense of deter intrusion. Further some states claim that
the military presence is due to protect resources and for search and rescue missions. Hence
military presence is for protection, not aggression. This, however give at hand an anxiety or
distrust amongst the Arctic states but not on the verge of enmity in Hobbesian terms. Norm
abiding can be seen in the policies as a strategy to formalise stronger cooperation and stability
in order to face the opportunities and human security threats in the region.
In terms of a Kantian culture there are traces to be found in particular for the relations
between the Nordic states. Even though Iceland felt rejected by its fellow Nordic states during
its difficulties in the financial crises, there is no hostility towards the group as such in its
324
Wendt Social Theory of International Politics p.262-263 325
Ibid., p.282
85
Arctic policy, but neither is there a prominent we stance. The sense of exclusion is rather on a
broader scope. The friendship between the Nordic states is there and there in some Nordic
states’ policy but a general ‘we’ sense between them in not apparent in the Arctic policies.
This trait is clearest in the Swedish policy where the unilateral solidarity is present. But also
in Norway’s statement to aim to protect the interest of its allies and partners in the region.
Solidarity is typical for a Kantian culture326
and as seen this solidarity is only directed towards
other Nordic states. Since there is a Nordic cluster with historical and political ties, this may
imply that it might be difficult for other states to gain access to be part of this exclusive group
and this may hinder the development of an overall Kantian culture in the Arctic cooperation.
There is evidence that the states in particular amongst the Nordic and EU states of what
Wendt call multiple group identification, with diverse allegiances to different constellations of
cooperation but as seen above there are still strong interests which can be regarded as
exclusively egoistic. Even though not purely in utility maximizing terms.
Since all states highlight the importance of negotiation and arbitration through
international law, it might be suggested that there is a culture of friendship in the Arctic.
However, the tone of sovereignty and military presence, does not suggest that collaboration
on threats from third parties in terms of non-arctic states, are not the most prominent. Hence
Arctic relations do not fully align with the friendship criteria. Further there is rivalry between
the actors, even though most prominently this rivalry regards resources, science and which
country is the best model for development.
Given all this is safe to say that there is not one single culture represented in the Arctic
cooperation. Rather it is a combination of Lockean and Kantian cultures, where relations can
be seen as layered both between actors but also between the issues at hand. International
relations can be said to be dependent of regional relations. The relations in the Arctic are
unlikely to develop into violent conflict based on the language in the policies studied. If
Arctic cooperation is managed in accordance with the policies there will be an orderly
situation in the Arctic region, which will not implicate wider international conflicts or military
involvement. Rather it may strengthen international law adherence which could spill over
onto different areas of international cooperation.
326
Ibid., p.298–301
86
7. Concluding remarks and further research
The general conclusion of this thesis is that Arctic cooperation cannot with ease be
sorted into one specific relations pattern. It is rather subject to different cultures which reflect
the various relations and ties between the involved states. There are prominent layers of both
Kantian and Lockean traits in the Arctic cooperation. No obvious Hobbesian characteristics
are present, which bodes for good prospects of cooperation, however cooperation, with rivalry
elements. The Kantian traits are most prominent in terms of relations within the Nordic
countries and overall Lockean traits can be found in terms of the emphasis of references to
international agreements found in the policy documents. There are however signs of anxiety
as to the development in the region in all policies.
The reflections of different relations within the Arctic results in slightly ambiguous views of
the overall cooperation in the region, in terms of images. USA and Russia are the states which
are least expressive as regards their relations to the Arctic and within Arctic cooperation. This
can be explanation to this ambiguity due to their respective influence on international
relations.
There are individual policy goals of the states which often coincide, however there is
an uncertainty as regards the implementation of these goals as in terms of collective action, as
well as the formulations of cooperation in the Arctic. There is not currently a cohesive picture
of what constitute Arctic cooperative relations as a whole. This uncertainty could indicate that
cooperation might fail in the future. However there is a language in all policies which
emphasize a will to cooperate in the region. In light of this there are prospects for a functional
cooperation. Moreover a will to socialize other actors into a cooperative and even friendly
culture, which seems to be in progress in the Arctic relations, can mean a more stable and
predictable situation in the Arctic given the background that being part of a social structure
reinforces relations into self-fulfilling prophecies which could influence also other spheres of
international relations. This self-fulfilling prophecy is difficult to measure in this type of study
since it needs a comparison through time and possibly in different forums. However the self-
images found in the language of the policies here indicate that these cultures are present with
prospects to develop. As stated in the chapter on thesis aim, this study does not intend to
reveal a positivist truth and hence the above is merely one interpretation of the Arctic
relations.
87
Relevant topics for further research could be a study on the developments over time of
the perceptions of others and the self in the Arctic region, as well as the influence of other
actors such as non-Arctic states and other stakeholders in the region. Further as the EU policy
on the Arctic is formalized the role and influence of the Arctic states on this policy and their
contributions to the policy could shed a new light on the cooperation in the Arctic. Other traits
which was not possible to include in this thesis but might be of interest in the field is that of
the discourse within the bureaucracy of the various cooperation forums working on Arctic
issues, as well as the influence of norm entrepreneurs in Arctic relations, in its various
spheres.
88
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97
APPENDIX
Map of the Arctic
The map illustrates the Arctic Ocean with surrounding states.
Copyright: Brad Cole Geology.com, http://geology.com/world/arctic-ocean-map.shtml
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