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The Psychology of TerrorismMO Police Chiefs Command College; January 2020

Dr. Zarse

Nancy Zarse, Psy.D.

• Education:

– Undergrad: BA, psychology (Creighton University)

– Grad: Psy.D. (The Chicago School of Professional Psychology)

• Experience

– Federal Bureau of Prisons: 10 years, 3 prisons

– USDB: maximum security military prison, 2.5 years

– Professor: 13 years, The Chicago School

– Contract: FBI Countering Violent Extremism Unit

– Consulting practice: Zarse Psychological Services, LLC

• Background

– National: psychology, law enforcement, training, terrorism

– International: training, Israel program, negotiation

Terrorism

• “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

– Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

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Common Elements of Terrorism

• Violence

• Force

• Threats

• Fear, with emphasis on terror

• Intentional, planned, and systematic

• Discrepancy between target and victim

• Political

Fear:

Critical Element of Terrorism

• Do not necessarily need mass destruction

• Less costly, restrained terrorism has enormous

consequences, generating fear and alarm

• Terrorists choose tactics based on success

Tactic: Suicide Terrorism

• Inexpensive and effective

• Guarantee media coverage

• Ultimate smart bomb, able to adjust on-the-spot

• Tears at the fabric of society

• On average, kill 4 times as many people as

other terrorist acts

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The Terror of Terrorism

• Unpredictability

• Gravity of consequences

• Sense of uncontrollability

• Combined with malevolent intent

Effects of Terrorism

• Undermine public confidence

• Create a climate of fear and intimidation

• Fundamentally changed behavior patterns

• Revisit site of previous attack to heighten fear

• Fear by contagion, immobilizing, and subjugating

The Psychology of Terrorism

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Terrorism and Psychopathy

• Conventional wisdom explains such brutal

violence as psychopathic

– Assuming, surely that they lack empathy and remorse

• But – there is little support for psychopathy

• Most serious researchers agree terrorists are

essentially normal

– If not, they lack clinical evidence and personal contact

– Not to say no pathology but at similar rate to controls

• For the most part, politically motivated killers tend

to be normal in intelligence and mental stability

– BUT are without remorse because rationalized

it’s for a cause

Evidence for “normality”

Terrorism and Psychosis, cont.

• Psychotic individual

– Out of touch with reality

– Responds to internal stimuli

– Is unreliable and unpredictable

– Has difficulties maintaining relationships

• Terrorists must be reality-based

• Would terrorists recruit or admit psychotic?

– But can be an HVE, like the Unabomber

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Social Identification

and Marginalization

• Need to belong to section of society which shares

aims, grievances, and ambitions

– Joining terrorist group, for them, like joining the military

• Within a marginalized group, always some who

are receptive to a radical ideology

• Within the radical group, with continuing

discrimination, some will advocate violence

Group Influence

• A group gives people a sense of belonging

• A group gives people an identity

• A group gains power and cohesion by isolating

and threatening its members

Indoctrination

• Uses isolation to disconnect from competing

views and values

• Gives a sense of purpose and family

– Essentially, the group becomes a substitute family

• Uses deprivation

• Fosters interdependence

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Indoctrination, cont.

• Leaders maintain:

– A collective belief system

– Establish organizational routines

– Control the flow of communication

– Manipulate incentives and goals

– Deflect conflict to external targets

– Keep the action going

Indoctrination, cont.

• Collective group identity takes over

– Everyone belongs to a number of groups

• Family, religion, community, work, etc.

• This was a problem for the WitSec program

– Members of terrorist group have only 1 set of values,

reducing the power of other groups on its members

– Separates individual from values of competing groups

Moral Disengagement

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Moral Disengagement

Practices

• Moral justification: actions serve a moral

purpose; hence, a moral imperative

• To convert socialized people into combatants,

cognitively restructure the moral value of killing

• To make violence morally defensible:

– Nonviolent options seen as ineffective

– In name of religion, ideology and/or nation

– To change inhumane social conditions

Moral Disengagement

Practices, cont.

• Diffusion of responsibility obscures link between

conduct and consequences

– Group-decision making: no one person is responsible

– Collective action: responsibility ascribed to others

• Attribution of blame

– By imputing blame to antagonist, violence is viewed

as compelled by provocation

– Oppressive and inhumane conditions breed terrorists

Moral Disengagement Practices, cont.

• Disregard for, or distortion of, consequences by:

– Minimize injurious effects

– Selective inattention and cognitive distortion

– When suffering is not visible

– Causal actions are physically and temporally removed

– The further removed from the end results, the weaker

the restraining power

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Moral Disengagement

Practices, cont.

• Dehumanization

– To prevent empathy and minimize injurious effects,

divest of human qualities

– Dehumanized are treated more punitively

• Power of humanization

– Difficult to behave cruelly when potential victims are

humanized or personalized even a bit

• Euphemistic language

– makes injurious conduct acceptable and respectable

Moral Disengagement Practices, cont.

• Moral disengagement mechanisms:

– Often interrelated and work together to weaken

internal control

• Research shows that moral disengagement

needs social conditions, not monstrous people

Gradualistic Moral Disengagement

– Happens over time, in a social setting, while

isolated

– Involves graduated and repeated acts, with

aggressive modeling

– Self-disinhibition: accelerated by moral

imperative and dehumanization

– Sense of eliteness and social rewards

– Self-exonerative comparisons

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What Drives One To

Acts of Violent Extremism

• Quest for personal significance

– Fundamental desire to matter, to be someone

– Overcomes other concerns, like survival

What Drives One, cont.

• Goal of significance becomes a quest

• Identify extremist violence as appropriate means

• A social process

– Networking and group dynamics through which

shares in violence-justifying ideology

– Proceeds to implement to gain significance

What Drives One, cont.

• Forceful suppression of alternative considerations

• Commitment shifts:

– From competing concerns like survival or love

– To dominance of the goal of violence as the

means to achieve significance

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Motivations Seen in Terrorists

• Seek status or bolster self-esteem

• Identify with an ideology as a substitute for

personal identity

• Anticipate the thrill, danger, and adventure

• Revenge: for personal loss, humiliation, or

injustice against a group with which identifies

Psychological Vulnerabilities

• Need for personal meaning and identity

• Need for belonging

• Perceived injustice/humiliation

Attitudes That Influence Involvement

• Proviolence attitude

– Violence is a legitimate option

– Violence is a useful way to achieve goals

• Grievance accumulator with desire for vengeance

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Attitudes That Influence

Involvement, cont.

• External threat

• Sensation seeking

• Disinhibition:

– Invoke a moral justification or imperative

– Defer to authority to displace personal responsibility

– Cast victim as blameworthy

– Devalue or dehumanize victims

– Generally low level of empathy

– Low restraint or low self-control

We know that….

• In 81% of violent acts, at least one person knew

• In 59% of acts, 2 or more knew

SSI, US Secret Service (2004)

Leakage

• Behaviors indicating a developing problem

• Known as leakage or pre-incident indicators

• Provides significant opportunity for intervention

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Red Flags

• Pay attention to speech:

– Grievances

– Justifying use of violence

– Identifying with terrorists, mass murderers, etc.

Red Flags, cont.

• Loss often precipitates violence

• Pay attention to sudden changes in:

– Physical health

– Mental health

– Employment

– Finances

– Relationships

Resilience

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Resilience

• Dynamic process of healthy adaptation when

faced with significant adversity

• Resilience includes:

– General resourcefulness

– Sturdiness

– Flexibility

• May even grow from their experiences

Individual Characteristics that

Provide Protection

• Optimism

• Intelligence

• Creativity

• Humor

• Physical attractiveness

• Plus coping strategies, social skills, and

educational abilitiesReissman, D, et al. (2004) Exploring Resilience….

Study on Terrorism and PTSDStein, et al. (2013) Differential Impact of Terrorism….

• Studied two areas in Israel facing terror attack– Sderot: lower SES, fewer economic and psychological resources

– Kibbutz: solid economic structure and mutual support

• Characteristics of community may be strong

predictor of PTSD and depression

• Relationship between exposure and distress may

depend on community resources and support

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Study on Terrorism and PTSD, cont.Stein, et al. (2013) Differential Impact of Terrorism….

• To mitigate the mental health response to terror,

enrich community resources, including:

– Availability of resources

– General sense of support

– Level of solidarity

Resilience at National Level:

Israel’s Iron Dome

• In 2nd Lebanon War in 2006, Israel suffered over

4000 rocket attacks in one month

• Physical and economic damage, and to morale

• Israel developed a layered approach to defense

– Iron Dome interceptor missile shoots down rockets

– Identifies impact and does not intercept those falling

in open areas or at sea

Example: Iron Dome

• Iron Dome became operational in April 2011

– Within 1st year, successfully intercepted 93 missiles

• During Operation Pillar of Defense, from 11-14

to 11-21, 1,506 rockets fired at Israel by Hamas

– 421 intercepted, with success rate of 84%

– 58 rockets caused damage, with 5 killed and 240

injured

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Supporting Resilience

• Choose Iron Dome despite cost and technical

limitations due to protection and resilience

• Layered defense includes early warning sirens

and bomb shelters

• Emphasis on managing acute stress reactions

as pivotal part of comprehensive care

Protective Factors in

Stress ReactionsBraun-Lewensohn, O., & Sagy, S. (2014)

• Importance of community resources:

– Leadership

– Preparedness

– Community relationships

Dr. Nuttman-ShwartzChief Social Worker, Israel

• Importance of community

• Importance of relationships

• How you negotiate and navigate

• Enough, it’s enough

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Dr. Nuttman-ShwartzChief Social Worker, Israel, cont.

• Fear of the next attack is part of PTSD

– It’s not paranoid – it’s reality

– So cannot just recover

• Important to acknowledge roles

– Mom and therapist, student and client

– It’s part of the reality of the situation

• Religion is a protective factor, helps people cope

Dr. Nuttman-ShwartzChief Social Worker, Israel, cont.

• Provision of clinical services in the community

– Needs to be embedded

– Developed in advance

• Need to know specifics of personal life and

details of community

• Don’t wait on government –

– Do what needs to be done

Promote Resilience

• There are multiple and sometimes unexpected

factors that promote resilience, including

– Situational factors

• Like supportive relationships

– Individual factors

• Like capacity for adaptive flexibility

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Contact Information

Nancy Zarse, Psy.D.

Forensic Psychologist

Full Professor, Forensic Department

The Chicago School of Professional Psychology

Phone: (312) 467-2101

E-mail: nzarse@thechicagoschool.edu

References

• Adini, B. & Peleg, K. (2013). On Constant Alert: Lessons to be

Learned from Israel’s Emergency Response to Mass-Casualty

Terrorism Incidents, Health Affairs 32 (12), pp. 2179-2185.

• Ajdukovic, D., Kimhi, S., & Lahad, M. (Eds.). (2015). Resiliency:

Enhancing coping with crisis and terrorism. Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Retrieved

from http://search.ebscohost.com.tcsedsystem.idm.oclc.org/login.as

px?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=984686&site=ehost-live

• American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical

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Psychiatric Publishing.

• Ashkenazi, I. (2017). Mass Casualty Preparedness in Urban

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References, cont.

• Bandura, A. (1998). Mechanisms in Moral Disengagement. In W.

Reich (Ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies,

Theologies, States of Mind (pp. 161-191). Washington, D.C.:

Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

• Bedein, N. (2018). Personal communication, Israel.

• Benjamin, D. (2018). Personal communication; Israel.

• Bonanno, G., & Mancini, A. (2008). The human capacity to thrive in

the face of potential trauma. Pediatrics 2008, 121, 369-375.

• Bonanno, G. (2005). Resilience in the face of potential trauma.

American Psychological Society, Vol. 14, No. 3, 135-138.

• Borum, R. (2014). Psychological vulnerabilities and propensities for

involvement in violent extremism. Behavioral Sciences and the Law,

32, pp. 286-305.

References, cont.

• Braun-Lewensohn, O. & Sagy, S. (2014). Community Resilience and

Sense of Coherence as Protective Factors in Explaining Stress

Reactions: Comparing Cities & Rural Communities During Missile

Attacks, Community Mental Health Journal 50:229-234

• Calhoun, F. & Weston, S. (2016). Threat Assessment and

Management Strategies. Boca Rotan: CRC Press.

• Calhoun, F. & Weston, S. (2003). Contemporary threat

management. San Diego, CA: Specialized Training Services.

• Crenshaw, M. (2000). The Psychology of Terrorism, An Agenda for

the 21st Century, Political Psychology,21(2), 405-420.

• Dorn, M., Shepherd, S., Satterly, S., & Dorn, C. (2014). Staying

alive: How to act fast and survive deadly encounters. Barron's

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References, cont.

• Breckenridge, J. N. & Zimbardo, P.G. (2007). The Strategy of

Terrorism and the Psychology of Mass-Mediated Fear. In B.Bongar,

L. M. Brown, L. E. Beutler, J. N. Breckenridge, & P. G. Zimbardo

(Eds.), Psychology of Terrorism (pp. 101-115). New York: Oxford

University Press.

• Duckworth, A. (2016). Grit: The power of passion and perseverance.

New York, NY: Scribner.

• Dutton, M., & Greene, R. (2010). Resilience and crime

victimization. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 23(2), 215-222.

doi: 10.1002/jts

• Feddes, A.R., Mann, L., & Doosje, B. (2015). Increasing self-esteem

and empathy to prevent violent radicalization: a longitudinal

quantitative evaluation of a resilience training focused on

adolescents with a dual identity. Journal of Applied Social

Psychology. 45; 400-411.

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References, cont.

• Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2013). A study of active shooter

incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013. Retrieved

from U.S. Department of Justice site:

https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-

on-active-shooter-incidents/pdfs/a-study-of-active-shooter-incidents-

in-the-u.s.-between-2000-and-2013

• Fogel, M. (2009). Violence risk assessment evaluation: Practices

and procedures. In J.T. Andrade (Ed.), Handbook of violence risk

assessment and treatment (pp. 41-81). New York, NY: Springer

Publishing Co.

• Ganor, B. (2004). Terrorism as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare,

Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 9(1/2), 33-43.

• Ganor, B. (2002). Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist

Another Man’s Freedom Fighter? Police Practice and Research,

3(4), 287-304.

References, cont.

• Gonacha, J. (2014). National Counterterrorism Center. TLOC

Presentation.

• Gow,. K., & Celinski, M. J. (Eds.). (2011). Mass trauma: Impact and

recovery issues. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Retrieved

from http://search.ebscohost.com.tcsedsystem.idm.oclc.org/login.as

px?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=581823&site=ehost-live

• Gropp, C. (2018). Personal communication; Israel.

• Hobfoll, S., Palmieri, P., Johnson, R., Canetti-Nisim, D., Hall, B., &

Galea, S. (2009). Trajectories of resilience, resistance, and distress

during ongoing terrorism: The case of Jews and Arabs in Israel.

Journal of Counseling and Clinical Psychology, 77(1), 138-148.

• Hoffman, Bruce. (2008). The Logic of Suicide Terrorism. In E.

Marquardt & C. Heffelfinger (Eds.), Terrorism and Political Islam: A

Counterterrorism Textbook (pp. 417-428). West Point: Combating

Terrorism Center.

References, cont.

• Horgan, J. (2003). The Search for the Terrorist Personality. In A. Silke (Ed.), Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences (pp. 3-27). West Sussex: John Wiley &Sons, Ltd.

• Jaworoski, S. (2018). Personal communication; Israel.

• Kamin, R. (2018). Personal communication; Israel.

• Kruglanski, A., Gelfancd, M., Belanger, J., Sheveland, A., Hetiarachchi, M., & Gunaratna, R. (2014). The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: How significance quest impacts violent extremism. Advances in Political Psychology, Vol 35, Suppl. 1, pp. 69-93.

• Nutmann-Shwartz, O. (2018). Personal communication; Israel.

• Nutman-Shwartz, O., & Shoval-Zuckerman, Y. (2015). Continuous

traumatic situations in the face of ongoing political violence: The

relationship between CTS & PTSD. In Trauma, Violence & Abuse,

pp 1-9.

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References, cont.

• Meloy, J. Reid. (2000). Violence risk and threat assessment. San

Diego, California: Specialized Training Service.

• Merari, Ariel (2007). Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism. In

B. Bongar, L. M. Brown, L. E. Beutler, J. N. Breckenridge, & P. G.

Zimbardo (Eds.), Psychology of Terrorism (pp. 101-115). New York:

Oxford University Press.

• Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The Staircase to Terrorism: A

Psychological Exploration, American Psychologist, 60(2), 161-1

• The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004).

New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

• Post, J. M. (1998). Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a

product of psychological forces. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of

Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind

(pp. 25-40). Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

References, cont.

• Post, J. M. (1998). Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a

product of psychological forces. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of

Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind

(pp. 25-40). Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

• Reissman, D. B., Klomp, R. W., Kent, A. T., & Pfefferbaum, B.

(2004). Exploring Psychological Resilience in the Face of Terrorism,

Psychiatric Annals, 33(8), pp. 627- 632.

• Ripley, A. (2009). The unthinkable: Who survives when disaster

strikes-and why. Harmony.

• Shapir, Y. (2013). Lessons from the Iron Dome, Military and

Strategic Affairs, 5 (1), pp. 81-94.

• Shahar, O. (2018). Personal communication; Israel.

• Shenon, P. (2008). The Commission: What We Didn’t Know about

9/11.

References, cont.

• Siegel, J. M., Shoaf, K. I., Afifi, A. A., & Bourque, L. B. (2003).

Surviving two disasters: Does reaction to the first predict response

to the second? Environment and Behavior, 35(5), 637-654.

• Silke, A. (2003). Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological

Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences. A. Silke, (Ed.).

West Sussex, England: John Wiley Sons Ltd.

• Stein, N., Schorr, Y., Krantz, L., Dickstein, B., Solomon, Z., Horesch,

D., & Litz, B. (2013). The Differential Impact of Terrorism Two Israeli

Communities, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 83, No 4,

528-535.

• Victoroff, J. (2005). The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique

of Psychological Approaches, The Journal of Conflict Resolution,

49(1), 3-42.

• U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (2018,

March). Mass attacks in public spaces - 2017.

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References, cont.

• U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental

Affairs (2011). A Ticking Bomb: Counterterrorism lessons from the

U.S. Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack.

• Zuckerman, J., Bucci, S.P., & Carafono, J.J. (2013). 60 Terrorist

plots since 9/11: Continued lessons in domestic terrorism. (Special

Report No. 137). Retrieved from The Heritage Foundation website:

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/60-terrorist-plots-

since-911-continued-lessons-in-domestic-counterterrorism

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