The psychology of lone-wolf terrorism

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The psychology of lone-wolf terrorismSophia Moskalenko a & Clark McCauley aa Department of Psychology, Solomon Asch Center for Study ofEthnopolitical Conflict, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010,USAVersion of record first published: 08 Jul 2011.

To cite this article: Sophia Moskalenko & Clark McCauley (2011): The psychology of lone-wolfterrorism, Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 24:2, 115-126

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Counselling Psychology QuarterlyVol. 24, No. 2, June 2011, 115–126

The psychology of lone-wolf terrorism

Sophia Moskalenko* and Clark McCauley

Department of Psychology, Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict,Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010, USA

(Received 29 January 2010; final version received 16 June 2010)

Lone-wolf terrorism is a growing concern for security and a puzzle forsocial science. We describe two very different cases of lone-wolf terrorism: ameek secretary in nineteenth century Russia who attacks a prison governor,and a criminal turned anti-abortion crusader in twenty-first century USA.These cases point to two explanations of how normal individuals canovercome the ‘‘free-rider problem’’ to undertake solo violence for apolitical cause. Strong Reciprocity establishes an evolutionary basis forhuman willingness to punish moral transgressors, even when the trans-gression is against someone else. Group Identification can enable self-sacrifice for the welfare of others, including actions against those whothreaten the group. Discussion suggests that ideology, ideas of justice, andempathy may be more important for solo political action than for actionembedded in radical groups or terrorist organizations.

Keywords: lone-wolf; terrorism; group identification; strong reciprocity;relative deprivation

Introduction

In this article, we use case history material to advance ideas that may help illuminatethe psychology of lone-wolf terrorism. The phenomenon of interest immediatelyraises a problem of definition. US Government defines terrorism as ‘‘premeditated,politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets bysubnational groups or clandestine agents’’ (from Title 22 of the US Code, Section2656f(d)). A single actor does not constitute a ‘‘group’’ or ‘‘agents,’’ and it is possibleto conclude that lone-wolf political violence is not terrorism. But in this article, weassume that an individual actor is capable of politically motivated violence againstnoncombatants, and that lone-wolf terrorism is not an oxymoron.

A spate of recent attacks has brought renewed attention to acts of politicalviolence committed by individuals acting alone. On 31 May 2009, anti-abortionactivist Scott Roeder, 51, shot and killed abortion doctor George Tiller (Gardner,2009). On 1 June 2009, African-American Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad(formerly Carlos Bledsoe), 23, shot two soldiers – killing one, wounding the other –at a US Army Recruiting Station in Little Rock, Arkansas (Barnes & Dao, 2009). On10 June 2009, James Wenneker von Brunn, 88, shot and killed a guard at theHolocaust Museum in Washington, DC (Halsey & Duggan, 2009). On 8 November

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 0951–5070 print/ISSN 1469–3674 online

� 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09515070.2011.581835

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2009, US Army Major Nidal Malik Hassan opened fire at Fort Hood military basein Texas, killing 13 and wounding 30 (McKinley, 2009).

In each case, the perpetrator seems to have acted alone for motives that are atleast in part political; but beyond this similarity are striking differences in age,background, and motivation. Scott Roeder had blue-collar jobs, participated in anti-abortion activism, and, according to his brother, had a history of mental illness.Muhammad-Bledsoe converted to Islam as a teenager, studied Arabic in Yemen, andreportedly was angry about the killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. Jamesvon Brunn was a university graduate, World War II naval officer, and in recent yearsa loner who alienated many with the fury of his racist rants. Nidal Hassan was a USArmy psychiatrist who seems to have become progressively radicalized as hecontemplated his pending deployment to Afghanistan and his moral obligations as apracticing Muslim.

What can motivate these very different individuals to risk their own safety andwell-being in order to attack strangers? When the cost of action is individual but thebenefit is general to all group members, the rational choice is to ‘‘free-ride’’ onwhatever benefit is brought by the sacrifices of others. The usual explanation of risktaking for a cause is that group and organizational incentives overcome the free-riderproblem. But here we will argue that these incentives cannot explain the actions oflone-wolf terrorists.

To gain insight into the psychology of a lone-wolf terrorist, we consider two casehistories far separated in space, time, and politics: Vera Zazulich, an anti-czaristterrorist in late nineteenth century Russia, and Clayton Waagner, an anti-abortionterrorist in twenty-first century USA. These cases suggest an account of lone-wolf terrorism that is rooted in evolutionary psychology and the psychology ofgroup identification – an account that can make sense of our two cases despite theirmanifest differences. Our account is suggested by the case study material, but weacknowledge at the start that our goal is more hypothesis generation than hypothesistesting.

Vera Zazulich: The hand of justice

Born in Imperial Russia in 1849, Vera Zasulich grew up amidst broad politicalreforms and social unrest. She came from an impoverished noble family, but receiveda good education in private boarding schools and earned a teaching degree. Workingas a secretary and a bookbinder in St. Petersburg, she made a decent living butgravitated toward student discussion circles and radical rhetoric. For this activism,she was arrested and exiled to a remote village; she returned to the capital only to getinvolved with a new activist circle. Vera’s dedication to her fellow student activistsdictated her extreme reaction to an event about which she learned from newspapers(Emaombmj{pih—, 1978).

In July 1877, a peaceful student demonstration, as was often the case, had endedwith arrest and imprisonment of particiants. Among them was a student, Bogolubov.One day, the prison where he was held was visited by General-Governor Trepov, atextbook autocrat and egomaniac. Trepov crossed the courtyard twice. On the firstcrossing, Bogolubov took his hat off to the governor, but on the second, he failed todo so. The governor screamed at him to take his hat off, and in a fit of rage, orderedthat the prisoner be publically flogged. This caused a revolt by the prisoners.

116 S. Moskalenko and C. McCauley

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The newspapers circulated rumors about the incident, as well as about other cruelties

perpetrated by the governor.Vera Zazulich, who had never met the student in question, was outraged by the

unfairness of the governor, but even more so by the absolute lack of reprecussions

for this arbitrary despotism. Her deep sympathy was not motivated by fear of

suffering the same fate as Bogolubov: in Alexander II’s Russia, a noble-born woman

such as Vera was in no danger of being subjected to corporal punishment. Nor was

her outrage limited to Trepov. She planned, with her friend Maria Kolenkina, to

assassinate two governmental officials infamous for offences against student

activists. The young women drew lots as to who would kill whom, and Zazulich’s

target was Trepov (Hocmb, 2006).She inquired through her activist connections whether any group, including

terrorist People’s Will, was planning to do anything about the incident, and received

no positive answer. After some soul-searching, she decided to take justice into her

own hands even if it meant sacrificing her own life. Vera went to see the general

during his regular ‘‘public audience’’ hours. When she was allowed into his study,

Vera pulled a gun out of her clothing and shot Trepov in the stomach. She did not

attempt to flee the scene, and was arrested. The governor later recovered from his

wound.Vera’s criminal trial was widely publicized. The best defense lawyers, products of

the recently implemented educational reforms, offered to represent her pro-bono.

The prosecution, on the other hand, had trouble recruiting attorneys, settling finally

on a personal friend of the judge. On the day of the trial, the courtroom was

overflowing and crowds gathered outside. Notable public figures, including

Dostoyevski, came to see the trial.On the witness stand Vera was stoic, calmly explaining her motivation and

readiness for the consequences of her actions. She knew she had to do something; she

said that she had to act on her conscience. The 18 jurors selected by the defense

lawyer (the prosecution declined to participate in juror selection) acquitted the

defendant of all charges. The crowd cheered. The judge later recalled that even the

people in the VIP gallery behind him, reserved for governmental officials, were

cheering, clapping, and stomping in support of the acquittal (Jmlh, 1933). As soon

as Vera Zazulich walked out of the court building, unknown benefactors whisked her

away to a conspiratorial apartment where she was supplied with fake documents,

money, and tickets to take refuge in Switzerland. She left Russia just in time; an

executive order for her immediate arrest was issued by the outraged czar despite the

court’s ruling.Vera’s subsequent political career proved remarkable. The poor bookbinder

became a celebrity as a result of her one non-fatal shot. But unlike most Russian

radicals of the time, in the aftermath of her own act, Vera publically denounced

terrorism, and remained unwavering in her non-violent stance to the end of her life.

Her later friendship with Lenin was spoiled by her Op-Eds criticizing Bolsheviks for

their violence and cruelty, such as the murders of Nicholas II and his family.Nothing in her history before or after shooting the governor suggests any kind of

psychopathology. In character, Vera Zazulich was not oppositional, stubborn, or

ideological. She was not generally aggressive. Politically, she was not loyal to

methods, people, or ideas, but only to the voice of her conscience. Our second

example is different in many ways.

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Clayton Waagner: Criminal crusader

Clayton Waagner’s 2003 book, Fighting the Great American Holocaust, spotlightsonly a few moments of his early life. He was born in North Dakota in 1956; he

married early, and with his wife Mary has nine children. His first visit to a bar was

when he was 27; his mother took him for a drink after his business failed. He owned

and operated a fishing boat out of Kodiak, Alaska. The vessel was 38 feet long andhe drove it more times than he could count into 35-foot waves, one time into

70-footers. He had a pilot’s license and three times flew into thunderstorms that

tossed his small plane around uncontrollably. He never experienced panic, he felt

fear only after the danger had passed. He liked the fellowship of small non-denominational Protestant churches. In relaxation, he appreciated a fire, a cigar, and

a good bottle of Merlot. He is a big man; when arrested in 1999, he was 6 ft 1 in. tall

and 230 pounds.Beginning in the 1970s, Waagner was convicted of various acts of theft and

burglary, and in 1992 he was sentenced to 4 years for attempted robbery. Released

from prison, he was in Pittsburgh in January 1999 when his daughter Emily went

into premature labor, producing a granddaughter, Cierra, born dead at 24 weeks.

According to Waagner (2003), his commitment to fight abortion began when he heldCierra, touched her soft skin and looked at her tiny but perfectly formed face and

body. Waagner (2003) reports that he heard an internal voice, the voice of God:

‘‘How can you grieve so hard over this one when millions are killed each year andyou do nothing?’’

In September 1999, he was driving with his wife and children in a Winnebago that

broke down. Police found stolen firearms in the stolen vehicle, and Waagner

admitted that he was planning to use the weapons to kill abortionists. Convicted and

sentenced for theft and firearms violations, he escaped from prison in February 2001.In an internet posting, he described his escape as a miracle that anointed him as

God’s Warrior. While on the run, he posted an internet threat to kill those who

worked for abortion doctors, and claimed to have target information on 42 suchemployees. In his book, he describes tracking and finding an easy shot at several

abortion doctors, but could not bring himself to pull the trigger. He kept moving

with auto theft and robbery, and changed his plans: he would use fear instead of

bullets.In October 2001, he sent out 285 letters to abortion clinics across the USA. Each

letter contained a quarter-teaspoon of white flour and an anthrax threat. Coming

soon after the still-unsolved anthrax attacks that followed the 9/11 attacks, the letters

were taken seriously – and seriously disrupted clinic operations.In November 2001, still on the run, he sent out 269 more letters to abortion

clinics. Anticipating doubts and accelerated testing after the first hoax, he included in

the white powder traces of a substance known to test positive in the most common

test for anthrax. Again, he succeeded in shutting down many clinics.Captured in December 2001, he is serving a 30-year jail sentence in the US

Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. His book, Fighting the Great American

Holocaust, offers an unusual look into the mind of one highly intelligent lone-wolf

terrorist. The intelligence gathering and planning involved in his hoaxes – including

the inspiration of sending his ‘‘anthrax’’ letters to Planned Parenthood in envelopeswith the return address of the US Secret Service and the US Federal Marshal

Service – showed a high level of self-taught tradecraft.


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Waagner calculates that his anthrax threats produced 580 clinic closures, lastingfrom 1day to a week, for a total of 3940 clinic closure days. Citing data fromPlanned Parenthood, he assumes that, when a scheduled abortion is interrupted forany reason, 25% of women change their minds and complete their pregnancy. Heestimates that his 3940 clinic closure days interrupted nearly 20,000 scheduledabortions, thus saving the lives of nearly 5000 babies. This impact is the moreremarkable because Waagner threatened violence but never actually killed or injuredanyone. He worked alone, leaving his family to fend for themselves. His booksuggests that, on the run, he knew how to find anti-abortion sympathizers but wascareful not to implicate any in his crimes. His grievance is not in doubt: ClaytonWaagner began as a petty criminal but ended with what he saw as a God-givenmission to make war on those who make war on the unborn.

Differences and similarities

Zazulich and Waagner are centuries and continents apart and their grievances arevery different – Zazulich had nothing to do with religion, Waagner was God’sWarrior. Their personalities were also different – Zazulich seems to have been asimpulsive as Waagner was planful. But both Zazulich and Waagner werepsychologically stable, with no signs of psychopathology.

Another similarity is that, in an important sense, these individuals were notalone. Although without material support or assistance for their attacks, theyparticipated in a larger movement that agreed with their goals and shared many oftheir beliefs and feelings. Zazulich had been one of many anti-czarist activists, andthe outpouring of support during and after her trial – from the cheering audiencein the courtroom to the thoughtfully arranged escape to Switzerland after the trial –demonstrated that Vera’s actions resonated among the wider public far beyondactivist circles. Similarly, Waagner associated with anti-abortion activists and postedon their websites. After his imprisonment, his self-published book has been sellingthrough anti-abortion websites, and he is likely seen as a martyr by many in the anti-abortion movement. In short, both Zazulich and Waagner had a well-groundedperception that they acted for a cause or goal shared by many others.

A third similarity is that both cases are political in the sense that they are notpersonal. Both Zazulich and Waagner showed a motivation that puts a politicalcause before self-interest. Revenge is an obvious form of self-interest, but in neitherof the cases had the perpetrator suffered personally at the hands of those targeted.Zazulich had never met the man she shot, and Waagner had never met any of theabortion providers he threatened. So far as we know, revenge for some personalinjury cannot explain their behavior.

The question then arises, what can move normal individuals to sacrifice their livesfor a political cause? We examine this question in the next section.

The psychology of self-sacrifice

Economists have framed the problem of eliciting self-sacrifice in terms of the ‘‘free-rider problem’’ (Olson, 1969). Why should I sacrifice anything for a public good –freedom, justice, equality – that will benefit others? Better I should let others sacrificeand share in the fruits of their efforts – to free ride on their efforts rather than let


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them free ride on mine. From this perspective, individuals who sacrifice for a general

good must be irrational.Political scientists working in the rational choice tradition have encountered the

same problem. Varshney (2003) has provided a frank account of the weaknesses of

rational choice theory for understanding ethnic and national conflict, and especially

for understanding the kind of self-sacrifice that produced suicide bombers. His

answer is to appeal to Weber’s distinction between ‘‘instrumental-rational’’ and

‘‘value-rational;’’ instrumental-rational behavior calibrates costs and rewards in

seeking self-interest, but value-rational behavior is insensitive to cost or to the

likelihood of reaching the goal. Thus demand for ethnic goals may be ‘‘inelastic’’ in

the way that demand for food is inelastic when starvation looms. Alternatively, he

suggests that working for value-rational goals is a source of self-respect, that

working for such goals is rewarding independent of cost or outcome.These answers raise new problems. If ethnic goals are like food for the starving, it

is surprising that ethnic conflict is not always and everywhere. If working for value-

rational goals is self-reinforcing, a source of dignity no matter the outcome, it is

surprising that so few devote their lives to national liberation, affirmative action or

multiculturalism.The problem for rational choice perspectives is, as Varshney (2003) recognizes,

that many individuals do sacrifice self-interest for causes larger than themselves,

including political causes. Perhaps the most salient example of sacrifice for a cause is

the experience of soldiers in combat. The institutional explanation for military

sacrifice is the power of the state, including both rewards for serving and

punishments for not serving. Institutional contingencies have less control of

behavior in combat, however. Research with US soldiers in World War II

(Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949) found that pay, advance-

ment, medals, and making the world safe for democracy were much less important in

combat than ‘‘not letting my buddies down.’’ Institutional power may bring soldiers

to the battlefield, but love of comrades makes them fight.In extended form, this same explanation is offered for mobilization in social

movements and political parties: the free-rider problem is surmounted and

individuals brought to sacrifice by the rewards and punishments provided by

institutions, organizations, and small groups (Cornes & Sandler, 1986; Moore, 1995).

This perspective turns self-sacrifice into self-seeking: putting time, effort, risk, and

even life into a cause is the best the individual can do under contingencies the

individual cannot escape. But our cases show normal individuals who are ready to

sacrifice everything in an attack that has neither organizational nor small group

support. How is this possible? We offer two accounts, the first from evolutionary

theory and the second from group psychology.

The evolutionary basis of altruism and strong reciprocity

Readiness to sacrifice for friends and family is so common that it is often seen as

natural and no more in need of explanation than having two eyes. But sacrifices for

non-kin present a more obvious puzzle. Why would Zazulich or Waagner, or

anyone, make sacrifices in the interest of non-kin? For Waagner, the puzzle is even

more pointed: why would he leave his family behind to become God’s Warrior?


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One answer is called strong reciprocity. Among animals that live in groups,including humans, there are advantages to cooperation. A hunter who gets luckytoday will benefit from sharing meat with the rest of the group – if he can expect toreceive a share in the group’s food supply on a less successful day. Sadly, theadvantages of reciprocity can be reaped by cheaters – those who defect fromcooperation, contributing no resources yet profiting by those who do. Over time,pure altruists in the group will lose out as more and more and more members takethe easy route of doing less and getting more.

Both animals and humans can solve this problem by punishing cheaters. A groupthat has members willing to carry out justice at a cost to themselves can afford theluxury, and reap the benefits, of altruism. Altruism can succeed if there are enoughindividuals who respond in kind – tit-for-tat – to both cooperation and cheating.Strong Reciprocity (Fehr, Fishbacher, & Gaechter, 2002) describes this combinationof two tendencies, to cooperate and to punish non-cooperators. The combinationcan be successful where the tendency to cooperate, taken alone, would disappearunder the costs of cheaters.

Research in cooperation often uses economic games. In such games, participantsmake choices, and the consequences of these choices depend on the choices of others.In a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, participants face a choice between cooperatingand defecting, where defecting means choosing self-interest over the rewards ofcooperation. Defection is always rewarded. Cooperation is rewarded if the otherchooses to cooperate, but punished if the other chooses to defect.

These contingencies are designed to imitate the consequences of real-lifecooperation and defection. Imagine meeting someone for the first time: you canact nice or mean without any idea what the person is likely to do. Extending a handand smiling at someone who then spits on you leaves you looking – and feeling –stupid. On the other hand, extending a hand and smiling at someone who does thesame might be the beginning of a beautiful friendship.

In some PD games, participants are offered a chance to pay some of their ownwinnings in order to ‘‘punish’’ defectors – paying to reduce the payment to those whodo not reciprocate cooperation. To continue the real-life metaphor, imagine beingoffered an opportunity to punish the jerk who would spit on you – or on someoneelse – in response to a smile and an extended hand. Would you pay for such a chance?

PD results show that most individuals begin by trying to cooperate, and thatmost individuals are ready to pay extra to punish those who do not cooperate. Mostinteresting for our purposes, research shows that it is not just those who suffer thedefection who are ready to pay to punish the defector. A third party is often willingto pay to punish a defector despite the fact that the ‘‘punisher’’ did not sufferpersonally any loss to the defector (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2003). Not only will we payto punish those who spit on us in response to our kindness, we will even pay topunish those who spit on others.

Even in these simple games, then, individuals are willing to pay personal costs topunish bad behavior that does not affect them personally. Punishing bad people –carrying out justice – becomes an expression of altruism no less than helping goodpeople. This kind of altruism is surprisingly common. Research in many cultures(Fehr et al., 2002) indicates that between 40% and 60% of game participants arewilling to pay to punish defectors!

To this extent, Zazulich’s shooting the governor becomes a little less mysterious.She carried out justice for the student she identified with, with full anticipation of


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paying with her life. She even checked with the group most likely to take on the causeof student Bogolubov – the terrorist group People’s Will, who were themselvesplanning an assassination on Trepov but did not divulge that information to Vera,whom they deemed a curious sympathizer rather than a potential assassin. WhenPeople’s Will told Zazulich that no action was being taken to avenge the injustice,she felt she had to take it on herself, regardless of the consequences. Presumably, theextreme personal costs of radicalization to violent action are the barrier that stopsmany individuals who otherwise would act to punish individuals and groupsperceived as immoral or unjust.

While Strong Reciprocity may be sufficient explanation for Zazulich’s action, toexplain Waagner’s attacks another logical link is needed. Even if Waagner felt thatabortion providers were acting unjustly and needed to be punished, he was notavenging a particular victim of abortion. Instead, his grievance was more general.Waagner saw the thousands of infants killed by abortion providers as a group inneed of protection that was his duty to give. How can one come to see the welfare ofa group, especially one as amorphous and ambiguous as embryos and fetuses, asdeserving and even requiring self-sacrifice?

The power of group identification

The phenomenon of identification is both wide and deep in human affairs.Identification with another means caring about the welfare of the other(Moskalenko, McCauley, & Rozin, 2006). Positive identification means we feelgood when the other is safe, prospering, and increasing, but feel bad when the otheris in danger, failing, and diminished. Negative identification is an inverse concern forthe welfare of other. Negative identification means feeling good when the other is introuble, and feeling bad when the other is prospering.

The capacity for positive identification extends far beyond those near and similarto ourselves. We can come to care about the welfare of groups that we are not part of(Tibetans), about individuals we do not know personally (Britney Spears), aboutgroups we do not know personally (Dallas Cowboys football team), about fictionalcharacters (Tiny Tim), and about companion animals (Hero the dog and Shoesy thecat). In all of these cases, our concern for the welfare of other goes beyond anyeconomic value to the self. That is, our own material welfare is not significantlyimproved by raising the welfare of Tibetans, Britney Spears, the Dallas Cowboys,Tiny Tim, Hero or Shoesy. Nevertheless, we invest real money, real time, real tears,real anxiety, real pride and real joy in the ups and downs of others that we careabout. And when what we care about is threatened, conflict is likely to ensue.

In brief, the foundation of intergroup conflict is the human capacity for groupidentification (McCauley, 2006). We can care about large and abstract groups somuch that the welfare of the group can compete with our personal welfare. When wegive money or time toward helping a victim group, or a religious, ethnic, or nationalgroup, we put group interest above self-interest to the extent that the same moneyand time could have been enjoyed more selfishly.

To the extent that a grievance depends on identification, it can be steadier thanthe vagaries of strong emotion. Positive identification with a group, combined withthe perception that this group is being victimized, produces negative identificationwith the group perpetrating the injustice. These reciprocal positive and negative


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identifications provide stable incentives for intergroup conflict, as successes of thepositive identification group are rewarding and successes of the negative identifi-cation group are punishing. The stability of group identification, both positive andnegative, can explain the stability of intergroup conflict, revenge, and justice-seekingdespite the brevity of emotions of anger and outrage.

Thus, the mental life of individuals radicalized by group grievance need not bemarked by continuous or even continual strong emotion, or by the physiologicalarousal that accompanies strong emotion. Rather, individuals radicalized bygrievance can be steady, planful, and workmanlike – as indeed many of lone-wolfattackers seem to have been, and Clayton Waagner certainly was.

Conclusion

We began by noting that a recent spate of lone-wolf political attacks had raised newinterest in understanding how this kind of behavior is possible. Two histories of lone-wolf terrorists – Vera Zazulich and Clayton Waagner, separated by time, space, typeof grievance, and methods of attack – exemplify the two biggest puzzles of lone-wolfterrorism: how an individual can sacrifice herself to revenge wrong done to aparticular stranger, and how an individual can sacrifice for the welfare of a group ofanonymous strangers.

We framed this issue in terms of the free-rider problem: it seems irrational tomake sacrifices for a public good – justice, security, or status for a whole group – thatcan be enjoyed by those who did not sacrifice for it. The usual answer to this problemis that small groups and organizations provide rewards and punishments that cansupport self-sacrifice. But this explanation fails for individuals who commit politicalviolence without help from others.

We turned then to two possible explanations of individual acts of self-sacrifice.The more distal explanation comes from evolutionary psychology, where the groupbenefits of altruism are made possible to the extent that individuals are motivated topunish those who violate group norms. The benefits of altruism require thatoccasionally even individuals who have not themselves suffered from a violationshould be willing to accept the costs of punishing the violator. The more proximateexplanation is the human capacity for group identification. Given positiveidentification with a group perceived as victimized, an individual feels anger andoutrage toward those responsible for the victimization.

Recognizing that perceived group victimization produces strong negativeidentification with the perpetrators of victimization can explain the discrepancy intime signature that undermines accounts of political violence in terms of emotion.Some lone-wolf attacks endure for months or years, but the emotion of anger – asstudied in psychology – is usually experienced only for minutes or hours (Schachter& Singer, 1962; Zillmann, 1988). Positive identification with the victims and negativeidentification with the victimizers can provide a steady source of motivation in whichhelp for the victims or damage to the victimizers is experienced as rewarding, anddamage to the victims or support for the victimizers is experienced as punishing. It isthe human capacity for group identification that can explain enduring sacrifice for agroup or cause.

Although we have focused on cases of solo political violence, it is important torecognize that, even in these examples, the individual always has some connection to


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a larger political movement. Zazulich was part of student political activism andprotest, and Waagner frequented the websites of anti-abortion groups such as theArmy of God. The lone-wolf terrorist depends on others for ideas, if not for action.

Indeed ideas may be more important for solo political action than for groups andorganizations that provide many different motives for radicalization (McCauley &Moskalenko, 2008). The usual rational-choice interpretation of self-sacrifice pointsto the power of small group and organizational rewards and punishments to movethe individual to behavior she would never choose by herself. The lone-wolf terroristoperates without these externally imposed contingencies, and has to this extent a freechoice. Ideology and ideas of justice may then be more important for solo politicalaction than for action embedded in radical groups or terrorist organizations.

We have described strong reciprocity as a distal explanation and groupidentification as a proximate explanation of lone-wolf terrorism, but these twoperspectives may be more closely linked than this representation recognizes. Theevolutionary account of the value of strong reciprocity does not say anything abouthow this value is achieved in living individuals. It is possible (but beyond the scope ofthis article) that the human capacity for identification with biologically unrelatedothers, including large abstract groups of others, is the instantiation of strongreciprocity that makes cooperation possible for groups larger than kin groups.

Our analysis points to a major puzzle remaining. Identification is cheap andaction is expensive. Many who identify with a group or cause extend only sympathy.Few extend resources, and even fewer are ready to accept the personal risks of illegal,let alone violent action, in support of the group – again the free-rider problem. Of allthose who sympathized with the student flogged for failing to doff his hat to thegovernor, what explains why only Zazulich and her friend took it on themselves topunish the governor? Of all who see abortion as murder, why was Waagner amongthe few ready to threaten violence against abortion providers?

The obvious answer is the cost of political action. Lone-wolf terrorists do not losesight of self-interest; rather, their self-interest is outweighed by group interest. Evenamong those with strong group identification, and strong negative identification withthose seen as victimizing the group, self-interest and safety usually win against groupinterest and risk taking. That few are moved to action is not mysterious, but whatremains a puzzle is which few are moved to action.

Zazulich, and Waagner – a tender-hearted secretary and a criminal-turnedcrusader – do not suggest a common personality type. Each felt a powerfulidentification with the victims in whose name they turned to violence, but thisidentification may have been as much a product of their pathway to action as a causeor explanation of this trajectory. Still, if there is a predictor for this rare form ofradicalization, it may be in the domain of sympathy and empathy. Of the many whosympathize with a group or cause, perhaps those who feel the most are most likely tosacrifice themselves for others. Indeed studies of altruism (Batson, O’Quinn, Fultz,Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983; Cialdini et al., 1987) have shown the importance ofempathy in predicting help for a stranger in distress. Although altruism research hasnot yet examined the relation between empathy and aggression toward the per-petrator of a stranger’s distress, the importance of individual differences in empathyfor understanding political radicalization may be worth pursuing in future research.

But individual differences in empathy cannot be the whole story. There are manypossible targets for sympathy and empathy: sadly, the world offers many kinds andcategories of victims. Women are abused by men, children are abused by parents,


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poor people are abused by the rich, workers are abused by owners. In Russia, theserfs were the original focus of student sympathy and student activism. Why didVera Zazulich focus her sympathy on students, in particular students abused bygovernment officials? How did this sympathy grow to the point that she felt apersonal moral obligation to punish an abusing official?

A similar question can be asked about Clayton Waagner. Along with many otherothers, he saw abortion as murder. What focused his sympathy on unborn victims tothe extent that he felt a personal moral obligation to stop abortionists? He describesthe moment, with his granddaughter dead in his arms, that he heard an internal voicetell him he had to do something. He called it the voice of God; Zazulich called it thevoice of conscience.

The common denominator is that something happened to make the politicalpersonal. Vera Zazulich experienced 2 years of prison and years of exile forassociation with student activism against the government. She had personalexperience of the helplessness of prison life to make abuses against students morethan abstract sympathy. Clayton Waagner experienced the helpless sorrow ofholding his granddaughter, born dead by accident even as millions are born dead bydesign. In short, we suspect that lone-wolf terrorism requires the combination ofstrong capacity for sympathy with an experience that moves sympathy to personalmoral obligation to act. If both personality and personal experience are necessary forlone-wolf terrorism, then attempts to profile this combination must face considerablecomplexity. Although it offers no easy answers for security services concerned withlone-wolf terrorism, this perspective has at least the appeal of being consistent withpsychological research showing that individual behavior depends, not separately onperson or situation, but on their interaction (Simpson & Willer, 2008).

Acknowledgments

Support for this research was provided by the Department of Homeland Security through theNational Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), grantno. N00140510629. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations are those of theauthors and do not necessarily reflect views of the Department of Homeland Security.

Notes on contributors

Sophia Moskalenko is a social psychologist who holds a Postdoctoral Fellowship from theDepartment of Homeland Security.

Clark McCauley is Rachel C. Hale Professor of Sciences and Mathematics at Bryn MawrCollege.

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The psychology of lone-wolf terrorism