The present research expands our understanding of cognitive and affective morality by exploring associations with callous-unemotional (CU) traits and externalizing symptoms

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision ProcessesVol. 77, No. 3, March, pp. 171–191, 1999Article ID obhd.1999.2822, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-GroupSocial Dilemmas

Tahira M. Probst

Washington State University

and

Peter J. Carnevale and Harry C. Triandis

University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people coop-erate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteris-tics of individuals and then related these characteristics tocooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants wereassessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualismand collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995).They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroupsocial dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-per-son dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but addedsubgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. Theresults indicated an interaction between cultural characteristicsand type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versusintergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994)was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The verticalindividualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemmabut were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma—wherecooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. Thevertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-groupdilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma—where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes.

The authors are grateful to Emmeline Hsueh for her contribution to data collection, and to twoanonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. This research was supported by NSF GrantNo. SBR-9210536 entitled “Culture and Negotiation Behavior” to Peter Carnevale and HarryC. Triandis.

Address reprint requests to either Tahira Probst, Washington State University, 14204 NE SalmonCreek Avenue, Vancouver, WA 98686. E-mail: [email protected], or Peter Carnevale,Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 603 East Daniel Street,Champaign, IL 61820. E-mail: [email protected].

1710749-5978/99 $30.00

Copyright q 1999 by Academic PressAll rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

172 PROBST, CARNEVALE, AND TRIANDIS

The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an inter-mediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperationbetween the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Takentogether, the results suggest that the relationship between cul-tural values and cooperation, in particular with reference tovertical and horizontal components of individualism and collec-tivism, is more complex than has been suggested in pastresearch. q 1999 Academic Press

Key Words: cooperation; culture; social dilemmas.

As nations emerge from relative independence and isolation, the ramifica-tions of global interdependence are becoming increasingly clear. For example,the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, the ratifica-tion of the 1995 treaty establishing the World Trade Organization, and theestablishment of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989 virtu-ally guarantee that the actions of people in one part of the world have thepotential to affect people in other parts. It is increasingly commonplace forpeople from disparate cultures to interact with each other (Cohen, 1991; Young,1989). Often this interaction requires cooperation. Therefore, a question arises:Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with oneanother?

Due in part to increasing globalization, the study of cooperation and culturehas increased in recent years, with contemporary work going beyond the early,seminal study by Kelley et al. (1970). Current research distinguishes itself byhaving the guidance of established theory of culture, for example, the theoryof individualism and collectivism. The present study extends past work oncooperation and culture by examining two additional dimensions of culture—vertical and horizontal (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995)—andby examining behavior in social dilemmas (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994).

Social Dilemmas

A social dilemma is a situation where people are interdependent and face achoice between cooperative (i.e., collective) interests and noncooperative (i.e.,individualistic) interests. Examples can be found in virtually every domain ofsocial behavior, from work and family settings to international relations. Insocial dilemmas, if everyone behaves in a manner that maximizes personalgain, everyone is worse off than if everyone behaves in a manner that maximizescollective gain (see Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983).

An interesting aspect of social dilemmas is that they often occur in thecontext of intergroup conflicts, and the intergroup conflict produces a socialdilemma within each of the competing groups. Dawes (1980) described this inlucid terms:

CULTURAL VALUES IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS 173

Soldiers who fight in a large battle can reasonably conclude that no matter what their comradesdo they personally are better off taking no chances; yet if no one takes chances, the resultwill be rout and slaughter worse for all the soldiers than is taking chances (p. 170).

The intragroup problem contained in this example incorporates the two defin-ing characteristics of a social dilemma: individual group members are betteroff not cooperating with their group, yet they are rewarded more if they allcooperate rather than if they all do not.

The intragroup dilemma in intergroup conflicts arises because the rewardsof such conflicts, such as group pride or national security, are equally accessibleto all members of the group regardless of their contribution to the group success(Bornstein, 1992). This payoff structure discourages group members from sacri-ficing their resources, such as money, bravery, or time, that are needed for thegroup to win the intergroup competition and gain the public goods. If the groupwins, the person can share in the rewards without any individual cost, and ifthe group loses, the person will not feel exploited for contributing. That theindividual’s actions could crucially determine the group’s outcome is usuallytoo remote to provide the rationale for contributing, particularly in large-scaleconflicts (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994).

Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) designed an experiment to differentiatebetween group-based altruism and narrow self-interest as motives for contribu-tion to the group. To accomplish this objective, they kept the intragroup payoffstructure of a prisoner’s dilemma task fixed. Groups of participants dealt withthe identical social dilemma, but the dilemma varied as to the absence orpresence of intergroup competition. Because both the participants in the in-tergroup condition and those in the single-group condition confronted the samechoice between self-interest and group interest, Bornstein and Ben-Yossef(1994) were able to ascribe any variance in cooperation between these twoconditions to motivation, rather than to a structural effect of the intergroupcompetition. Participants were expected to contribute more in the intergroupcondition than in the single-group condition if the conflict of interest betweenthe groups magnified the relative importance ascribed to the collective groupinterest as opposed to self-interest (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994).

They found that participants were nearly twice as likely to cooperate in theintergroup prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game than in the prisoner’s dilemma (PD)game, even though the cost of cooperation for the individual group memberwas the same in the two games and the external gain to the individual’s groupensuing from a cooperative choice was also the same. Bornstein and Ben-Yossef(1994) concluded that intergroup conflict serves as a unit-forming factor thatenhances group identification (Campbell, 1965; Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989).Further, they argued, enhanced group identification leads to a blurring of thedistinction between self-interest and group interest (Brewer & Kramer, 1986).

The present study followed Bornstein and Ben-Yossef ’s (1994) design butadded the important variable of cultural values.


Culture

According to Triandis (1994, 1995), culture is the “human-made part of theenvironment” (Herskovits, 1995). It has a subjective aspect, i.e., the sharedperceptions of the social environment. According to Triandis (1995), the subjec-tive aspect of culture results in automatic processing of information, becauseit specifies the things that are noticed, and provides a language for labelingexperience. Culture also specifies how things are to be evaluated. In addition,culture specifies what behaviors are desirable or proscribed for members ofthe culture (norms) and for individuals in the social structure (roles), as wellas the important goals and principles in one’s life (values).

Perhaps the most important and best studied dimension of cultural differenceis that of individualism and collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Kagitcibasi & Berry,1989; Triandis, 1995). Individualism is a cultural syndrome that emphasizesthe idea of individuals as autonomous and the basic unit of analysis. Collectiv-ism, on the other hand, is distinguished by the notion that groups are the unitof analysis and that individuals are highly interdependent parts of these groups(Triandis, 1995).

Corresponding to the individualism and collectivism concepts at the culturallevel are processes at the psychological level labeled idiocentrism and allocen-trism. There are numerous defining attributes of allocentrics and idiocentrics(Triandis, 1994, 1995). For allocentrics, the group is the basic unit of socialperception, the self is defined in terms of in-group relationships, in-group goalshave primacy or overlap with personal goals, in-group harmony is a value, andsocial behavior tends to be very different when the other person belongs to anin-group versus an out-group. For idiocentrics, the individual is the basic unitof social perception, the self is an independent entity, personal goals haveprimacy over in-group goals, in-group confrontation is acceptable, and socialbehavior is not so different when the other person belongs to an in-group versusan out-group.

Previous research suggests that the defining attributes of idiocentrics andallocentrics are shared in ways that are consistent with culture and culturaldifferences. Probst and Robert (1996) found that individuals sampled fromindividualist cultures had higher idiocentrism scores than individuals in collec-tivist samples. Specifically, they found that individuals from the United States,Australia, the Netherlands, and Germany (traditionally accepted to be individ-ualist countries) scored higher on a measure of idiocentrism than individualsfrom Japan, Greece, Hong Kong, and Korea (traditionally believed to be collec-tivist countries). In addition, Triandis et al. (1986) found that individuals fromIndia, Costa Rica, and Indonesia scored higher on allocentrism items thanindividuals from the Netherlands, Greece, France, and Illinois, who scoredhigher on idiocentrism. Finally, Chan (1994) found that individuals from HongKong scored higher on allocentrism, whereas students in the United Statesscored significantly higher on idiocentrism. This research is important, becauseto the extent that idiocentrism and allocentrism are differentially distributed


across cultural groups, one may draw preliminary cross-cultural inferencesbased on individual differences research within a given culture.

Collectivism, Individualism, and Cooperation

There is some evidence for cultural variation in negotiation behavior. Kelleyet al. (1970) showed that regions of the world, and regions of the United States,differ in terms of the degree to which people will define a negotiation task ascooperative or competitive. Leung and Bond (1984) found that Chinese alloca-tors were inclined to renounce their personal gain to assist in-group memberswhen they distributed a group reward. Americans failed to form such an in-group–out-group distinction. Leung (1988) also discovered that Chinese wereless contentious during conflicts with in-group members and more contentiousin disputes with out-group members, compared with Americans.

In a recent study, Chan, Triandis, Carnevale, Tam, and Bond (1997) examinedcooperation in bilateral negotiations in Hong Kong, and in Champaign, Illinois.They tested the hypothesis that collectivists are more sensitive to the natureof the relationship with the person they face in negotiation. They used samplesin the United States and Hong Kong and also measured allocentrism andidiocentrism. (As expected, individuals in the United States were more idiocen-tric, whereas individuals from Hong Kong were more allocentric.) People ineach culture were asked to negotiate with either a friend or a stranger. Thelaboratory task was a computer version of the integrative bargaining paradigm(Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Participants sat at acomputer that they thought was connected to another computer, and were ledto believe that they would communicate via a computer network. The othernegotiator’s behavior was, in fact, simulated by a computer program. The datasupported the ingroup/outgroup aspect of the theory of collectivism. The effectof relationship (the difference between negotiating with a friend versus negoti-ating with a stranger) was greater in the Hong Kong sample than in the U.S.sample. Compared to the U.S. participants, Hong Kong participants showedgreater cooperation with a friend and less cooperation with a stranger.

Vertical and Horizontal Individualism and Collectivism

Although the majority of research assessing culture and negotiation focuseson individualist and collectivist differences, recent theory has claimed thatit is important to distinguish between vertical and horizontal elements ofindividualism and collectivism (Singelis, et al., 1995; Triandis, 1995).

Horizontal collectivism (H-C) is the cultural pattern in which the individualsees the self as an aspect of the group. The self-concept is seen as closely tiedto and interdependent with others of the in-group, who are seen as similarto the self. In addition, equality among group members is a value. Verticalcollectivism (V-C) is a cultural pattern in which individuals view the self asan aspect of the group. The self-concept is closely tied to and interdependentwith others of the in-group, but the members of the in-group differ from one


another, particular with regard to social status. Inequality is accepted, andpeople do not see each other as the same. Sacrificing for the good of the groupis a salient feature of this pattern (Singelis et al., 1995). Horizontal individual-ism (H-I) is a cultural pattern characterized by a self-concept that is autono-mous, yet the individual is seen as equal in status to others. Self-reliance isespecially stressed. Vertical individualism (V-I) is a cultural pattern in whichthe individual views the self as autonomous and expects inequality. Doing wellin competitions is an important aspect of this pattern.

Each of these patterns corresponds to cultural patterns identified by Fiske(1990, 1992). Fiske developed a framework for types of universal social relation-ships that pertain to how societies distribute resources. With communal shar-ing, members of a group are entitled to share in the group’s resources accordingto need. With authority ranking, members of a group share the group’s resourcesaccording to rank, with higher ranked individuals gaining larger shares. Withequality matching, resources are distributed equally. And, with market pricing,resources are distributed according to the contributions of each group member.

Singelis et al. (1995) argued that horizontal collectivism includes communalsharing and equality matching, vertical collectivism includes communal shar-ing and authority ranking, horizontal individualism includes market pricingand equality matching, and vertical individualism includes market pricingand authority ranking. They also argued that these patterns match Rokeach’s(1973) analysis of four types of political systems, which is based on the relativeimportance of the value of equality and freedom.

The empirical research described above on cultural differences in negotiatorbehavior as well as the analysis of vertical and horizontal components of indi-vidualism and collectivism provided a basis for hypotheses about the relation-ship of these dimensions of culture to cooperation in social dilemmas.

Behavioral Hypotheses

The general hypothesis tested in the present study was that the culturalvalues of idiocentrism and allocentrism influence the amount of cooperationexhibited in a social dilemma. Further, the level of cooperation will vary as afunction of the type of social dilemma, namely whether it is a single-group orintergroup prisoner’s dilemma.

Although this experiment primarily tested for interactions between culturalcharacteristics and type of social dilemma, it was predicted that the Bornsteinand Ben-Yossef (1994) effect would be replicated. Specifically, greater levels ofcooperation were expected in the intergroup condition than in the single groupcondition. Therefore,

HYPOTHESIS 1 (replication): Participants in the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma game will con-tribute their endowment more frequently than participants in the single-group PD game.

Of greater interest, there were several hypotheses concerning the interactionof cultural values with the type of social dilemma. First, it was expected thatvertical individualists would be less cooperative in the single-group prisoner’sdilemma game, but more cooperative in the intergroup condition. As noted


earlier, a key feature of vertical individualists is the emphasis that they placeon winning competitions. The structure of the games is such that the goal ofearning the most money possible is achieved through noncooperation in thePD condition. However, to “beat” the other group in the IPD condition, thewinning strategy is to contribute so as to exceed the number of contributionsin the opposing group.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Vertical individualists will contribute their endowment more frequently in theIPD condition. However, they will defect more frequently in the single-group PD condition.

Vertical collectivists were anticipated to exhibit the opposite tendencies.Recall that vertical collectivists place a strong emphasis on foregoing individualgain in the interest of serving the larger group to which they belong. In thesingle-group prisoner’s dilemma game, it is in the group’s best interest if every-one contributes his endowment. However, this is not necessarily the case inthe intergroup prisoner’s dilemma game. Inspection of the payoff structurereveals that the group (defined as the three-person group to which the playerbelongs) is indeed best served if everyone contributes his endowment. However,if vertical collectivists define all players (in both groups) as members of theirgroup, then collective defection will provide the greatest good to the groupmembers. Collective defection results in the highest group payoff. In the in-tergroup prisoner’s dilemma setting, there is little basis for vertical collectiviststo identify and/or bond with members of their three-person group over themembers of the other three-person group. Therefore, we predict:

HYPOTHESIS 3: Vertical collectivists will contribute their endowment more frequently in thesingle-group PD game, but will defect more frequently in the IPD game.

Finally, it was expected that horizontal collectivists and individualists wouldexhibit moderate levels of cooperation in both social dilemmas. Frequency ofcooperation was not expected to differ as a function of the type of social dilemmabecause of the emphasis that they place on equality. Therefore, no interactionswere predicted for horizontal individualists or collectivists.

Attitudinal Hypotheses

Although primarily concerned with the behavioral outcomes of the interac-tion between idiocentrism/allocentrism and type of social dilemma, we werealso interested in the attitudes and goals of idiocentrics and allocentrics insingle-group and intergroup social dilemmas. Based on the theory of horizontaland vertical individualism and collectivism described earlier, we developed twoattitudinal hypotheses. Specifically,

HYPOTHESIS 4: Vertical individualists will aim to maximize individual gains more thancollectivists.HYPOTHESIS 5: Vertical collectivists will aim to maximize group gains more than individualists.


METHOD

Participants and Design

One hundred sixty-five male undergraduate students at the University ofIllinois participated in the study. They were enrolled in an introductory psychol-ogy course and received class credit for their participation. One hundred thirty-three were native speakers of English, whereas 32 were nonnative speakersof English, mostly from Asian countries. The mean age was 19, and ages rangedfrom 17 to 25 years. Eighty participated in the intergroup prisoner’s dilemmacondition and 85 in the single-group prisoner’s dilemma condition.

Procedure

When participants first arrived, they were randomly assigned to either the“red” or “green” group, with three participants in each group. Each group wasseated in a private room and partitions were used so that participants couldnot interact with one another. Then, verbal instructions were read to themconcerning the rules and payoffs of the game.

The game instructions were neutral (e.g., the term “cooperation” was notused) and were stated in terms of the individual’s payoffs as a function of hisdecision to invest or not invest, the decisions of the members of his group, andthe decisions of the other group (for the IPD condition). Participants were nottold to maximize their payoffs, and no references to cooperation or defectionwere made. Participants were given a quiz to test their understanding of thepayoff structure. If any item was incorrectly answered, the game was reex-plained until the experimenter was assured that everyone understood.

The Dilemmas

The present experiment utilized a paradigm called the intergroup prisoner’sdilemma (see Fig. 1) to simulate intergroup cooperation (Bornstein, 1992). TheIPD game is a competition between two groups where the intragroup payoffstructure is a social dilemma, regardless of the outgroup’s decisions. The IPDgame was compared with a structurally identical (single-group) social dilemma(see Fig. 2) game.

In both the IPD and PD games, a set of six participants is split into twogroups of three each. Each participant is given an endowment of $1.05 andhas to decide whether to keep the money or contribute it for the team’s benefit.In the IPD game, each participant’s payoff is a function of (a) his decision tocontribute or not contribute his endowment, (b) the decisions of his groupmembers, and (c) the decisions of the members of the other group. In the PDgame, each participant’s payoff is solely a function of his decisions and thedecisions of his group members.

In the IPD game, if two people in Group A invest their endowment and onlyone person in Group B invests his money, Group A has one more investor thanGroup B. The two investors in Group A each receive $2.00 and the noninvestor


Individual Payoff

Group with more investors Group with fewer investorsEqual number

3 more 2 more 1 more of investors 1 fewer 2 fewer 3 fewer

Your Invest $3.00 $2.50 $2.00 $1.50 $1.00 $0.50 —

Choice Do notinvest — $3.55 $3.05 $2.55 $2.05 $1.55 $1.05

Group PayoffInvestors in Red Group

0 1 2 3

$7.65 $8.10 $8.55 $9.000

$7.65 $6.15 $4.65 $3.15

Investors$6.15 $6.60 $7.05 $7.50

1

in$8.10 $6.60 $5.10 $3.60

Green Group $4.65 $5.10 $5.55 $6.002

$8.55 $7.05 $5.55 $4.06

$3.15 $3.60 $4.05 $4.503

$9.00 $7.50 $6.00 $4.50

FIG. 1. The intergroup prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) individual and group payoff matrices (withoutcomes to green group in lower left and outcomes to red group in upper right).

Individual PayoffTotal Number of Investors in Your Group

0 1 2 3

Invest — $0.50 $1.00 $1.50Your

Do not $1.05 $1.55 $2.05 —Choiceinvest

Group PayoffTotal Number of Investors in Your Group

0 1 2 3

$3.15 $3.60 $4.05 $4.50

FIG. 2. The single-group prisoner’s dilemma (PD) individual and group payoff matrices.

receives $3.05; the total group payoff is $7.05. The investor in Group B receives$1.00 and the two noninvestors each receive $2.05; the total group payoff is$5.10. If all three members of both Group A and Group B invest their money,everyone receives $1.50. The total group payoff for each group is $4.50. If noone from the two groups invests his money, then each person receives $2.55and the total group payoff for each group is $7.65.

In the PD game, if two people in a group invest their endowment, eachinvestor receives $1.00 and the noninvestor receives $2.05. The group earns atotal of $4.05. If everyone in the group invests his money, each person receives


$1.50 and the total group payoff is $4.50. If no one in the group invests, theneach person keeps his $1.05 endowment and the total group payoff is $3.15.

Measures of Cooperation

Participants made 10 consecutive decisions whether to contribute or notcontribute their endowment. Each decision was recorded on a separate pagein a booklet. The pages were numbered from 1 to 10 and participants weretold that at the end of the study, 1 page would be randomly chosen and theirpayoffs would be calculated using the decisions made by the six members ofthe set (in the IPD condition) or the three members of their group (in thePD condition) on that particular page. Participants had no opportunity tocommunicate, and feedback was not given between decisions. Participants weretold in advance that their payoffs would be distributed in sealed envelopes andthat they would be individually dismissed to protect their confidentiality. Afterall the decision booklets had been collected, 1 of the 10 pages was randomlypicked and the experimenter calculated the payoffs based on the decisionsmade on the page. The measure of cooperation used for the results presentedhere was the number of times across the 10 trials that the individuals investedhis endowment.

Prior to engaging in the IPD/PD dilemma, participants also completed Mes-sick and McClintock’s (1968) measure of social value orientation. We focused ontwo social values: cooperation and competition. Individuals with a cooperativedisposition aim to maximize the joint gain of both parties, where joint gain isdefined as the sum of the two individual gains. Competitors, on the other hand,tend to prefer a pattern of outcomes in which relative gain, i.e., the differencebetween their outcomes and the other party’s outcomes, is maximized.

Subjects were told they were going to participate in two separate experi-ments, the first of which was with people from “another class” and entailedmaking choices in 12 decomposed games. In the decomposed game, participantsare presented with a set of three choices, such that each choice specifies aparticular payoff to the participant and to an unknown other. Typically, thesechoices are made over a number of trials. To maintain the interdependencestructure of the game, participants are informed that the unknown other isalso making choices over a series of trials that will affect the outcomes of theparticipant. Participants’ total outcomes are determined by the sum of thenumber of points allocated to them as a consequence of their choices and thechoices of the unknown other. For example, in the decomposed game presentedin Fig. 3, the total outcomes for Party 1 given a choice of A by him and a choiceof C by Party 2 would be 5 (the points he allocated to himself) 1 3 (the points

Choice

Payoff

A B CSelf 5 4 6

Other 5 0 3FIG. 3. A sample decomposed game.


allocated to him by Party 2) 5 8. Party 2 would received 11 points total (6points he allocated to himself and 5 points allocated to him by Party 1).

Information regarding the choices of the other participant and the cumulativescores of both participants is withheld to minimize strategic choices and max-imize motivational choices. Therefore, it is assumed that the participant’s choicein each trial is determined by the type of social goal for which the participanthas a preference (Beggan & Allison, 1994). An individual is classified as havinga particular orientation if the majority of the individual’s choices reflects apreference for one social value, i.e., individualism, cooperation, or competition.

The Measures of Culture

Vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism were assessed bymeans of the INDCOL 32-item scale developed by Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk,and Gelfand (1995). The scale consists of four a priori groups of items writtento measure the four dimensions. Previous factor analyses confirmed the fourdimensions (Singelis et al., 1995), with the reported alpha coefficients for thesescales being as follows: H-I 5 .67, V-I 5 .74, H-C 5 .74, and V-C 5 .68.The INDCOL questionnaire was administered at the end of the session, afterparticipants completed the social dilemma task and questionnaires.1

The dimensionality of the items was reassessed in the present sample. Maxi-mum likelihood factor analysis was performed and the results were submittedto an oblique rotation, as previous analyses suggest these are not orthogonaldimensions (Singelis et al., 1995). A four-factor solution corresponding to thefour cultural dimensions was obtained, accounting for 25.9% of the variance(see Table 1 for the factor loadings, and Singelis et al. (1995) for the items thatcorrespond to the item numbers in Table 1).

Based on the factor analysis, the items with factor loadings of 50 or greateron each factor were selected to measure horizontal and vertical individualismand collectivism and were summed and averaged, producing four indexes, onefor each culture factor. Correlations between the four scales are presented inTable 2. As in Singelis et al. (1995), vertical collectivism was significantlycorrelated with horizontal collectivism (r 5 .36, p , .01). The Cronbach reli-abilities for each scale were quite good: V-I 5 .82, V-C 5 .82, H-I 5 .72,H-C 5 .85.

1 Because the INDCOL was only assessed posttask, and not pretask and posttask, possiblechanges in the INDCOL responses could not be determined. This is a limitation of the currentstudy that requires replication of findings with the INDCOL administered prior to the dilemmas.However, analyses suggest that the type of dilemma did not result in any systematic preferencefor endorsing one cultural value over the other. To assess this, a multivariate ANOVA was conducted,with type of dilemma as independent variable and the four cultural values from the INDCOL (V-I, V-C, H-I, H-C) as dependent variables. There were no effects for dilemma on the culture variables,F(4, 159) 5 .46, ns. In other words, dilemma condition did not result in systematically higher orlower V-I, V-C, H-I, or H-C scores.


Posttask Questionnaire: Attitudes and Manipulation Check

Participants completed a brief posttask questionnaire in which they wereasked questions about their contribution decisions. We wanted to assess theattitudes and goals of idiocentrics and allocentrics in the single-group andintergroup social dilemmas for the purpose of complementing the behavioralcontribution data.

Maximization of individual payoffs. Four posttask questionnaire itemsasked respondents to assess the degree to which their contributions decisionswere aimed at maximizing their individual payoffs. Participants were asked

TABLE 1

INDCOL Factor Structure after Oblique Rotation

V-I V-C H-C H-I

IC1 222 47* 25 29IC2 69* 217 13 21IC3 211 70* 25 213IC4 66* 28 3 16IC5 27 69* 20 2IC6 66* 28 10 12IC7 225 45* 2 7IC8 47* 14 30 20IC9 24 69* 26 22IC10 20 226 27 25IC11 4 23 50* 22IC12 62* 218 23 9IC13 213 42* 24 9IC14 10 22 0 79*IC15 223 49* 23 12IC16 62* 25 1 16IC17 8 11 24 211IC18 48* 3 13 13IC19 215 63* 36* 19IC20 272* 24 216 10IC21 22 62* 37* 10IC22 27 233* 23 6IC23 8 22 71* 5IC24 33* 230 3 9IC25 19 32 55* 17IC26 11 3 8 86*IC27 14 23 68* 16IC28 15 3 15 66*IC29 12 23 10 61*IC30 27 57* 29 2IC31 21 6 21 72*IC32 220 46* 0 5

Note. N 5 165. V-I 5 vertical individualist; V-C 5 vertical collectivist; H-C 5 horizontal collectiv-ist; H-I 5 horizontal individualist. See Singelis et al. (1995) for items. Values greater than 32.5are marked by an asterisk.


TABLE 2

Scale Means, Reliabilities, and Intercorrelations

M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1. VI 5.58 1.74 .82 2.09 .13 .15 2.10 .11 2.13 2.05 .44** 2.072. VC 6.58 1.36 .82 .00 .36** .15* 2.04 .14 .32** 2.10 .153. HI 7.80 1.20 .72 .14 2.08 .10 2.03 .10 .22** 2.024. HC 7.61 1.24 .85 .16* 2.02 2.02 .12 .08 .055. Cooperative 5.08 5.09 na 2.58** .17* .23** 2.06 .06

SVO6. Competitive 3.05 4.48 na 2.06 2.12 .05 2.02

SVO7. Contributions 3.54 3.81 na .45** 2.38** .108. MAXGRP 4.10 2.07 .83 .03 .27**9. MAXOWN 4.74 1.71 .78 .11

10. Manipulation 3.70 2.48 nacheck

Note. Where applicable, scale reliabilities are placed on the diagonal. VI: INDCOL Items 2, 4,6, 12, 16, and 20. VC: INDCOL Items 3, 5, 9, 19, 21, and 30. HI: INDCOL Items 14, 26, 28, 29,and 31. HC: INDCOL Items 11, 23, 25, and 27. MAXGRP 5 extent to which maximization of grouppayoff was a goal; MAXOWN 5 extent to which maximization of individual payoff was a goal. AllNs 5 165, except for HI, where N 5 164.

* p , .05.** p , .01.

to indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 the extent to which their decisions were aimedat maximizing individual or group gains (“To what extent were your decisionsaimed at maximizing your own payoff?”). Items also asked how concerned (ona scale from 1 to 7) they were about their individual and group payoffs (“Howconcerned were you for your group and its payoff?”). In addition, they werealso asked to indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 how important it was (a) that theyearned the most money possible for themselves and (b) that they earned moremoney than the other members in their group. Responses to these four questionswere averaged to form a single indicator of maximization of individual payoffs.The alpha coefficient for the scale was .78.

Maximization of group payoffs. Three items assessed the extent to whichparticipants attempted to maximize the group’s payoff : “To what extent wereyour decisions aimed at maximizing your group’s payoff?” “How important wasit that everyone in your group earned as much money as possible?” “Howconcerned were you for your group and its payoff?” These three items had analpha coefficient of .83.

Other items. Respondents were also asked to indicate how close they feltto the members of their group and the members of the other group on a scalefrom 210 to 110, where 210 represents extreme distance, 0 represents indiffer-ence, and 110 represents extreme closeness. Finally, the questionnaire includeda manipulation check item for type of dilemma. Participants were asked toindicate how much the decisions of the members of the other three-person


group affected their payoff. It was expected that in the PD condition, partici-pants would (correctly) indicate that those decisions had no impact on theirfinal payoff, whereas in the IPD condition, respondents would indicate thatthe decisions did have an impact on their final payoff. After participantscompleted the questionnaires, they were debriefed, paid, and individuallydismissed.

RESULTS

Descriptive statistics. Table 3 presents the scale means, reliabilities, samplesizes, and intercorrelations among the study variables. Of note, because theorysuggests competition may be a facet of vertical individualism and cooperationmay be a component of vertical collectivism, we were interested in the correla-tions between vertical individualism and collectivism and Messick and McClin-tock’s (1968) measure of social value orientations. These correlations indicatethat cooperation is correlated with vertical collectivism (r 5 .15, p , .01).However, competition was only marginally related to vertical individualism (r 5

.11, ns). These results suggest that the INDCOL and Messick and McClintock’s(1968) measure of social value orientations in part measure similar constructsand share common variance. However, the correlations are low enough toindicate that there are important distinctions and one should not assumecomplete convergence of the constructs.

Manipulation check. The manipulation check showed that participants un-derstood the difference between the two social dilemma conditions. When asked“how much the decisions of the members of the other group affect your payoff,”individuals in the intergroup dilemma correctly indicated that theory payoffswere influenced a great deal by the decisions of the other group (M 5 4.9 ona scale from 1 to 7). Individuals in the single group dilemma indicated theirpayoffs were less influenced by the members of the other group (M 5 2.6),F(1, 160) 5 46.84, p , .0001.

TABLE 3

Results of Regressing Contributions on Social Dilemma Condition andCultural Values

Predictor b t p ,

Type of dilemma 2.05 2.65 nsHC 2.03 2.37 nsHI 2.01 2.13 nsVC .25 2.30 .05VI 2.30 22.96 .005VC*Dilemma 2.20 21.89 .06VI*Dilemma .31 3.13 .005

F(7, 156) 5 3.01, p , .005; R2 5 .12


FIG. 4. Relationship between vertical collectivism and contribution behavior for the IPD andPD games.

Social Dilemma Analyses

To test our predictions regarding the effects of social dilemma, cultural val-ues, and the interactions between type of social dilemma and vertical individu-alism and collectivism, a simultaneous multiple regression analysis was per-formed.2 Type of social dilemma (PD vs IPD) was dummy coded as 0 and1. Horizontal collectivism, horizontal individualism, vertical collectivism, andvertical individualism were entered as predictor variables. Finally, the interac-tion between vertical individualism and dilemma type and the interactionbetween vertical collectivism and dilemma type were entered as predictors ofthe number of contributions in the social dilemma. Regression results arepresented in Table 3.

In contrast to the findings of Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), the analysesrevealed no main effect for type of dilemma, b 5 .05, ns. Therefore, Hypothesis1 was not supported. In addition, the horizontal cultural values did not appearto predict number of contributions in the social dilemmas. However, consistentwith our general hypothesis that cultural characteristics interact with featuresof the situation, the predicted interactions between type of social dilemma and(a) vertical collectivism and (b) vertical individualism were significant (bs 5

2.20 and .31, respectively; see Fig. 4). These beta weights correspond to theslope of the IPD contribution behavior as a function of the cultural value. Inaddition, the beta weights for vertical individualism (b 5 2.30) and verticalcollectivism (b 5 .25) were also significant. These standardized beta weights

2 The authors thank two anonymous reviewers for encouraging this analysis. Previous researchhas performed analyses on the culture variable by categorizing individuals on the basis of theirhighest INDCOL score (e.g., Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). However, given the modest correlationamong the INDCOL factors, one might argue that any results derived from such a classificationprocedure are an artifact of the method by which the groups are constructed from the continuousvariables, and therefore, a function of sample characteristics. Therefore, to alleviate concernsabout the categorization procedure, a multiple regression approach was taken using the continuousculture variables.


FIG. 5. Relationship between vertical individualism and contribution behavior for the IPDand PD games.

correspond to the slope of the contributions behavior as a function of culturalvalues in the PD games. These results supported Hypotheses 2 and 3.

Using the slopes provided from the regression analyses, Fig. 4 displays therelationship between vertical collectivism and contributions behavior in theIPD and PD games. As can be seen, vertical collectivism is negatively relatedto cooperation in the IPD game but is positively related to number of contribu-tions in the PD game. In contrast, vertical individualism is positively relatedto cooperation in the IPD game but is negatively related to the number ofcontributions in the PD game (see Fig. 5).

One additional analysis on the contributions data was performed to deter-mine whether the INDCOL accounted for more variance in cooperation levelsin the social dilemma than the more traditional measure of social value orienta-tion. A regression analysis using social values as predictor of cooperation inthe social dilemmas was conducted. The results are presented in Table 4. Theamount of variance explained by the social value predictors was 4%, whereas12% of the variance was explained by the INDCOL predictors. Moreover, theregression model testing social value orientation and type of dilemma as pre-dictors of cooperation was nonsignificant, F(5, 160) 5 1.40, ns.

TABLE 4

Results of Regressing Contributions on Social Dilemma Condition and SocialValue Orientation

Predictor b t p ,

Type of dilemma 2.05 2.28 nsCooperativeness 2.07 2.09 nsCompetitiveness 2.03 2.25 nsCooperativeness*Dilemma .31 .99 nsCompetitiveness*Dilemma .10 .30 ns

F(5, 160) 5 1.40, ns; R2 5 .04


Attitudes Results

The next set of analyses tested the hypotheses that (1) vertical individualismwould be more related to maximization of individual gains than vertical orhorizontal collectivism, and (2) vertical collectivism would be more related tomaximization of group gains than vertical or horizontal individualism. To testthese hypotheses, the three correlations for each hypothesis were convertedusing Fisher r to z transformations, after which the difference between eachset of correlations was tested for significance using the following equation(Hays, 1994):

z 5z1 2 z2

! 1N1 2 3

11

N2 2 3

.

Maximization of individual gains. As hypothesized, vertical individualismwas more strongly related to maximization of individual gains than eitherhorizontal or vertical collectivism was. Comparing the correlation of verticalindividualism and maximization of individual gains (r 5 .44) to vertical collec-tivism and individual maximization (r 5 2.10) resulted in a z 5 3.40, p ,

.001. Comparing the correlation of vertical individualism and maximization ofindividual gains (r 5 .44) to horizontal collectivism and individual maximiza-tion (r 5 2.08) resulted in a z 5 3.55, p , .001.

Maximization of group outcomes. In support of Hypothesis 5, individualsstrong on vertical collectivism sought to maximize joint gain more than individ-uals high on either of the individualism scales. Comparison of the correlationof vertical collectivism and maximization of join gains (r 5 .32) to verticalindividualism and group maximization (r 5 2.05) resulted in a z 5 2.53, p ,

.006. Comparison of the correlation of vertical collectivism and maximizationof join gains (r 5 .32) to horizontal individualism and group maximization(r 5 .10) resulted in a z 5 2.08, p , .02.

DISCUSSION

The data comport with Triandis’ observation that measuring horizontal andvertical components of collectivism and individualism is more informative thanmeasuring only individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1995) and that thisis especially useful for understanding cooperation in social dilemmas. The mostinteresting effect was the difference in cooperative behavior in the single-group and intergroup dilemmas by the vertical collectivists and the verticalindividualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma and were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma. A verydifferent pattern was obtained for the vertical collectivists. They were mostcooperative in the single-group dilemma and were less cooperative in the in-tergroup dilemma. What can explain this pattern?

It is important to note that the key feature of vertical individualism is


competition. All of the individualism–collectivism scale items for vertical indi-vidualism relate to competition (e.g., agreement with the statements “competi-tion is the law of nature” and “winning is everything”). In other words, thevertical individualists fit the definition of people with a competitive orientation,and indeed they behaved like competitive people in the social dilemma. Inaddition, in the post-task questionnaire, vertical individualists stated that (a)their decisions were aimed at, and they were very concerned about, maximizingtheir individual payoff; (b) it was very important that they earned the mostmoney possible for themselves; and (c) it was important that they earned moremoney than the other members of their group.

Carnevale and Probst (1998) found that, for competitive people, the goal isto do better than others, i.e., to win, and that this means, in a single-groupconflict, that the goal is achieved through noncooperation with others in thegroup. However, in intergroup conflict, the goal of winning is achieved bycooperating with one’s own group to win the conflict with the out-group. In theintergroup dilemma of the present study, cooperation with one’s own groupmeant one’s group received a higher payoff than the other group. Thus, althoughthe goal is to consistently maximize individual payoffs, the behaviors requiredto do so differ according to the type of dilemma. In the IPD game, this isachieved through contributions to the group. In the PD game, it is achievedthrough defection.

For vertical collectivists, the defining characteristics relate to sacrificingone’s own interests for the interests of the group (e.g., agreement with thestatements “I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group”and “I hate to disagree with others in my group”). Vertical collectivists in theposttask questionnaire indicated that it was not important that they earn themost individually; they also indicated unconcern for their individual payoffs.It was also unimportant to the vertical collectivists that they earn more moneythan the other group members. However, they did indicate that it was importantthat everyone in their group earn as much money as possible.

In the single-group dilemma, it was clearly in the group’s best interest ifeveryone contributed his endowment, and, in this condition, vertical collectiv-ists showed the highest level of cooperation. However, in the intergroup di-lemma, the payoff structure is such that all six people are better off if they donot cooperate. Therefore, in the intergroup dilemma, the vertical collectivistsmay have defined all six people as “the group.” Indeed, they had no reason tothink that the other two people in their room were any different than the threein the other room, since they all were separated by partitions, had not met,had no conversations, and had no expectations of future interaction. Posttaskquestionnaire analyses support this interpretation. No interaction betweenvertical collectivism and social dilemma was found during assessment of howclose participants felt to members of their group as compared to members ofthe other group, F(3, 160) 5 1.95, ns. In other words, vertical collectivists didnot feel closer to members of their three-person group than to the other three-person group in the IPD condition. These results suggest that implementation


of an intergroup prisoner’s dilemma may not suffice to instigate collectivist in-group/out-group distinctions.

The vertical collectivists appear to have been more interested than individu-alists in maximizing group outcomes as opposed to individual outcomes (cf.Carnevale, 1995). Recall that the attitudinal responses of the vertical collectiv-ists indicated that they were highly concerned about group outcomes in bothIPD and PD conditions. Apparently the collectivists also did not make an in-group/out-group distinction in the intergroup condition. This suggests thatvertical collectivists may have had a general cooperative orientation in mixed-motive interaction. Support for this interpretation can be seen in Table 2, whichshows that the vertical collectivism scale was positively correlated with Messickand McClintock’s measure of cooperative social motivation (r 5 .15, p , .05).

As anticipated, the horizontal individualists and collectivists displayed inter-mediate levels of cooperation in both the single-group and intergroup dilemmas.Their contributions did not differ according to type of dilemma. One possibleinterpretation for this is that the predominant characteristic of horizontals,equality matching (i.e., resources should be divided equally), guided their be-havior in both social dilemmas.

What conclusions can be drawn from this research? It is apparent that evenin a highly controlled laboratory setting using a simple matrix game, culturalvalues play a role in influencing cooperative and competitive behavior. Verticaland horizontal individualists and collectivists cooperated and defected in amanner that ensured their valued outcomes would occur. Vertical individualistsvalue winning. This was accomplished by cooperating in the IPD game, butby defecting in the PD game. On the other hand, the theory suggests thatvertical collectivists prefer to maximize group gains over individual gains. Thissacrifice of self-interest for the greater good was accomplished by defecting inthe IPD game and by cooperating in the PD game. Theory stresses the impor-tance that horizontal individualists and collectivists place on equality. Indeed,experimental results showed that horizontals contributed a moderate numberof times regardless of the social dilemma condition.

The current results suggest that the relationship between culture and cooper-ation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components ofindividualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested inthe past. This paper highlights the theoretical and empirical importance ofdistinguishing between vertical and horizontal aspects of culture, in additionto the more commonly studied variables of collectivism and individualism,when one looks at individual cooperation in social dilemmas. Future researchmight benefit by delineating other circumstances (e.g., bargaining tasks, face-to-face negotiations, individual and group endowment effects) in which thiscultural differentiation increases the explanatory power of experimentalresults.

Future research might also focus on improving the measurement of thesecultural values. In this study, the INDCOL scale reliabilities for the verticaland horizontal components of individualism and collectivism ranged from .72to .85 (Table 2). To improve reliability of these scales, items could be developed


that narrow these constructs. For example, items that focus exclusively onself-sacrifice could be added, and this would have the effect of increasing thereliability of the vertical collectivist scale. However, this would be done at someexpense of generality. That is, reducing the breadth of a construct will alsorestrict the scope of the situations to which the construct will have implications,a point made by Cronbach (1970).

Finally, future research should focus on replicating these results using parti-cipants from individualist and collectivist cultures, in addition to analyses onthe basis of individual-level measures of idiocentrism and allocentrism. Thepresent findings are perhaps best cast in terms of the study of individualdifferences in cultural values. Insofar as previous research suggests thesepersonality attributes are differentially distributed across cultures (e.g., moreallocentrics in collectivist cultures), we can draw conclusions about culturebased on the present findings. However, since we are primarily interestedin cross-cultural differences, future research should replicate these findingsacross cultures.

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Received: September 8, 1997

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The present research expands our understanding of cognitive and affective morality by exploring associations with callous-unemotional (CU) traits and externalizing symptoms