The Post-1989 Radical Left in Europe: Results and Prospects - Marcello Musto

7/25/2019 The Post-1989 Radical Left in Europe: Results and Prospects - Marcello Musto

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The Post-1989 Radical Left in Europe:

Results and Prospects

Marcello Musto

1. The end of actually existing socialis!

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought about a profound change in the European politicallandscape. The implosion of the repressive bureaucratic regimes of the Soviet bloc had the

positive effect of freeing communism from actually eisting socialism!" and of opening it upagain to the struggle for #or$ing%class emancipation. The structural political upheavals"ho#ever" together #ith ma&or economic transformations" set in train a process of capitalistrestoration that had severe social repercussions on a global scale. 'n Europe" anti%capitalistforces found their influence being irresistibly s(uee)ed* it became more and more difficult forthem to organi)e and orientate social struggles" and ideologically the +eft as a #hole lost thehegemonic positions it had #on after 19,8 in $ey areas of many national cultures.

This reverse #as also apparent at an electoral level. -rom the 198s on" the parties unitedaround the idea of Euro%/ommunism1as #ell as those still strongly tied to 0osco#suffereda sharp decline in support" #hich turned into a veritable crash after the collapse of the Soviet2nion. 3 similar fate also affected the various 4e# +eft groups and Trots$yist parties.5

3 phase of reconstruction then began" in #hich ne# political formations often emergedthrough the regrouping of anti%capitalist elements still in eistence. This enabled thetraditional forces of the +eft to open up to the ecological" feminist and peace movements thathad developed in the previous decades. ')(uierda 2nida in Spain" created in 198," #as the

pioneer in this respect. Similar initiatives then too$ shape in 6ortugal 7#here the 2nitaryemocratic /oalition 7/2 #as formed in 198:; enmar$ 7the 2nity +istreens" in1989; -inland 7the +eft 3lliance" in 199; and 'taly and >reece in 1991" #hen =ifonda)ione/omunista 76=/ and Synaspismos 7/oalition of the +eft" 0ovements and Ecology cameinto being. The organi)ational forms of these ne# aggregations varied considerably. The

parties comprising ')(uierda 2nida ? including the /ommunist 6arty of Spain ? maintainedtheir eistence; the /2 in 6ortugal functioned only as an electoral bloc; and =ifonda)ione/omunista and Synaspismos constituted themselves as a ne# unitary political sub&ect.

'n other countries" ho#ever" there #ere attempts 7some only cosmetic to rene# the partiesthat had eisted before the fall of the Berlin Wall. 'n 1989" follo#ing the foundation of the/)ech =epublic" the /ommunist 6arty of Bohemia and 0oravia 7@SA0 #as proclaimed;

and in 199 the 6arty of emocratic Socialism 76S appeared in >ermany" ta$ing over from1In 1989 the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Communist Party of Spain (PCE),

the Greek Left (EAR) and the Socialist Peoples Party (SF) in Denmark formed the

Group for the European United Left in the European Parliament.

2Beginning in 1989, the French Communist Party (PCF), the Portuguese

Communist Party (PCP), the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Workers

Party (WP) in Ireland formed a Left Unity group in the European Parliament.

3The most significant of these electorally wasWorkers' Struggle(LO) in France.

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the Socialist 2nity 6arty that had ruled the >= since 199. 3lso in 199" in S#eden" the+eft 6arty?/ommunists adopted more moderate positions and dropped the name/ommunist! from its title.

". #ailures in go$ernent

These ne# parties" li$e others that had not changed their name" managed to retain a politicalpresence on their respective national stages. Together #ith the social movements andprogressive trade%union forces" they contributed to the heightened resistance againstneoliberal policies after 1995" #hen the 0aastricht Treaty came into effect and set rigidmonetarist parameters for ne# member%states &oining the European 2nion.

'n 199 a European 2nited +eft group #as formed in the European 6arliament" and the netyear" follo#ing ne# adhesions from Scandinavia" it changed its name to the European 2nited+eftreen +eft 7>2E+.

'n the mid%nineties" buoyed up by stri$es and large demonstrations against their respectivegovernments 7Berlusconi and ini in 'taly" CuppD in -rance" >on)le) and 3)nar in Spain"some forces of the radical +eft even achieved modest electoral brea$throughs. ')(uierda2nida scored 15. per cent in the European elections in 199; the 6artito della =ifonda)ione/omunista 8.F per cent in the national elections of 199,; and the -rench /ommunist 6arty76/- almost 1 per cent in the parliamentary elections of 199:. 3t the same time" these

parties increased their membership and their implantation at local level and in the#or$places.

3part from the /)ech =epublic 7#ith its /ommunist @SA0" the countries of Eastern Europe#ere an eception to this phase of consolidation; the legacy of the post%#ar communist!dictatorships ecluded ? and continues to hinder ? a process of rebirth of forces of the +eft.3s the ne# century da#ned" a huge" politically heterogeneous movement of struggle againstneoliberal globali)ation spread to every corner of the globe. Since the late 199s" self%organi)ed collectives" ran$%and%file union movements" anti%capitalist parties and non%governmental organi)ations had already been promoting mass protests at the summits of the>8" the 'nternational 0onetary -und" the World Trade Grgani)ation and the World Economic-orum 7in avos" S#it)erland. The subse(uent birth of the World Social -orum 7WS- inBra)il in 1" and the European Social -orum 7ES- encouraged broader discussion ofalternatives to the dominant policies.

0ean#hile" #ith the rise of Tony Blair as +abour 6arty leader 7199 and 2@ prime minister7199:%:" the #ay #as open for a profound shift in the ideology and programme of theSocialist 'nternational. Blair!s Third Way! ? in fact" supine acceptance of the neoliberal

4The government led by Lionel Jospin in France, which reduced the working week

to thirty-five hours, was an exception to this tendency. In Spain, the Zapatero

government pursued the same neoliberal policies as in other European countries

and was swept away by the effects of the economic crisis. Nevertheless, it adopted a

number of important reforms with regard to civil rights. For a full analysis of social-

democratic tendencies in Europe, seeJean-Michel de Waele, Fabien Escalona,

Mathieu Vieira (eds.),The Palgrave Handbook of Social Democracy in the European

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mantra mas$ed by vacuous ealtation of the ne#! ? #as supported in varying degrees andforms by the governments of >erhard SchrHder in >ermany 7Social emocrat chancellorfrom 1998 to FFand CosD SIcrates in 6ortugal 7Socialist 6arty prime minister from Fto 11. =omano 6rodi in 'taly 7prime minister and head of centre%left coalitions from 199,to 1998 and , to 8 also shared many of the same themes and echoed the search for a

ne# #ay!.

'n the name of future generations! 7#ho in the meantime #ere to be deprived of the right to#or$" and inspired by the E2!s adoption of the +isbon 6rogramme in " thesegovernments pursued a series of economic counter%reforms that have eroded the Europeansocial model. They rigidly initiated deep cuts in public ependiture" made labour relationsmore precarious 7by limiting legal safeguards and generally #orsening conditions at #or$"implemented policies of #age moderation" and liberali)ed mar$ets and services in line #iththe disastrous Bol$estein directive! of ,. The so%called 3genda 1 in >ermany"especially SchrHder!s Jart) 'K! plan" #ere the most conclusive evidence of this ne# policydirection.

0any parts of southern Europe sa# the #hittling do#n of #hat remained of the #elfare state"attac$s on the pensions system" another massive round of privati)ation" the commodificationof education" drastic cuts in the funding of research and development" and a lac$ of effectiveindustrial policies. These trends #ere also apparent in the governments headed by@onstantinos Simitis 7199,% in >reece" 0assimo L3lema 71998% in 'taly andCosD Mapatero 7%11 in Spain.Similar choices operated in Eastern Europe" #here the Socialist governments of +es)e$0iller 71% in 6oland and -erenc >yurcsny 7%1 in Jungary #ere amongthe most dedicated follo#ers of neoliberalism and enforcers of public spending cuts. Theythereby alienated the #or$ing classes and the poorest sections of the population" to the etentthat today the forces of the Socialist 'nternational occupy a completely marginal position in

both countries.

3s regards economic policy" it is hard to detect anything more than minimal differencesbet#een these social%democratic governments and conservative regimes in po#er at the time.'ndeed" in many cases the social%democratic or centre%left administrations #ere more efficientin carrying through the neoliberal pro&ect" since the trade unions found the governmentactions more acceptable because of an old illusory belief that they #ere friendly! to thelabour movement. Gver time" the adoption of a pliant" non%conflictual model has made thetrade unions less and less representative of the #ea$est sections of society.

-oreign policy orientations involved a similar discontinuity #ith the past. 'n 1999 agovernment headed by the +eft emocrats 7S" the inheritors of the old /ommunist 6arty"authori)ed 'taly!s second military intervention since the #ar; the 43TG bombing in @osovo"#ith its much%reported use of depleted uranium #eapons. 'n 5 British +abour 6artyleaders stood in the frontline alongside >eorge W. Bush" in a #ar they #aged against the 'ra(i

Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

5See Anthony Blair and Gerhard Schrder,Europe: The Third Way - die Neue Mitte,

London/Berlin, Labour Party/SPD, 1999.

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rogue state! that they falsely accused of possessing #eapons of mass destruction.,Bet#eenthese t#o conflicts" no force #ithin European Socialism opposed the intervention in3fghanistan 7#hose devastating collateral damage! affected the population at large or spo$eout against the more general Enduring -reedom campaign #aged by the 2nited States.

The Socialist parties often shunted the ecological (uestion into declarations of principle" butalmost never translated these into effective legislation to solve the ma&or problems facing theenvironment. This #as helped by the moderate turn on the part of most >reen parties" #hich"in choosing to ally indiscriminately #ith parties of the =ight or +eft" mutated into post%ideological! formations and gave up the battle against the eisting mode of production.

The shifts in European social democracy" involving uncritical acceptance of capitalism andall the principles of neoliberalism" demonstrated that the events of 1989 had sha$en not onlythe /ommunist camp but all the forces of Socialism. -or these abandoned any reformingambition and no longer espoused the $ind of state intervention in the economy that had beentheir main distinguishing feature after the Second World War.

espite these profound changes" many parties of the European radical +eft allied themselves#ith social%democratic forces ? #hether out of a legitimate concern to bloc$ the advent ofright%#ing governments that #ould further degrade the situation of young people" #or$ersand pensioners" or in some cases to avoid isolation or to prevent the logic of tactical voting!from #or$ing against them. Thus" #ithin the space of a fe# years" =ifonda)ione /omunistain 'taly 7199,%98 and ,%8" the -rench /ommunist 6arty 7199:%" ')(uierda 2nida inSpain 7%8 and the Socialist +eft 6arty in 4or#ay 7F%15:all supported" or served asministers in" governments of the /entre +eft. 0ore recently" the +eft 3lliance 711%1 andthe Socialist 6eople!s 6arty 711%1F have assumed governmental responsibilities in -inlandand enmar$ respectively. Such choices had already been consistently made at local level"often #ithout serious attention to the programmes of the political forces accepted as coalition

partners.8

The neoliberal #ind that ble# unopposed from the 'berian 6eninsula to =ussia" together #iththe absence of large social movements capable of shaping government actions in a socialistdirection" evidently represented a negative constellation for radical left%#ing parties.0oreover" #hether they #ere called upon to occupy lo#%profile ministries 7as in -rance or'taly or had to content themselves #ith tiny parliamentary groups 7as in Spain" therelationship of forces vis%N%vis the ruling eecutive #as etremely unfavourable to them. Theanti%capitalist +eft did not succeed in etracting any significant social gains that ran counter

6On 18 October 2015 the conservativeMailon Sundaypublished a secret document

(Secret/Noforn), dated 28 March 2002 (a year before the Iraq war), which proves that the

British prime minister while publicly declaring his resolve to seek a diplomatic solution to

the crisis had offered Bush his support to persuade world public opinion that Saddam

Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.

Seehttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3277402/Smoking-gun-emails-reveal-Blair-s-

deal-blood-George-Bush-Iraq-war-forged-YEAR-invasion-started.html.

7This party only joined the Nordic Green Left, not the European United

Left/Nordic Green Left group in the European parliament.

4
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3277402/Smoking-gun-emails-reveal-Blair-s-deal-blood-George-Bush-Iraq-war-forged-YEAR-invasion-started.htmlhttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3277402/Smoking-gun-emails-reveal-Blair-s-deal-blood-George-Bush-Iraq-war-forged-YEAR-invasion-started.htmlhttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3277402/Smoking-gun-emails-reveal-Blair-s-deal-blood-George-Bush-Iraq-war-forged-YEAR-invasion-started.htmlhttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3277402/Smoking-gun-emails-reveal-Blair-s-deal-blood-George-Bush-Iraq-war-forged-YEAR-invasion-started.html


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to the basic economic guidelines; all they could achieve #as an occasional feeble palliative.0ost often" they had to s#allo# a bitter pill and vote for measures against #hich they hadearlier promised the most intransigent opposition. Steered by parliamentarians and localfigures selected for their uncritical loyalty to the leadership" these parties #ere s#allo#ed up

by the policies of the cabinets they supported. 3 gap #ith their o#n base gre# slo#ly but

constantly #ider" #ith a resulting loss of credibility and consent among their electorate.

Oet the results at the ballot bo #ere disastrous every#here. 'n the presidential elections of:" the -rench /ommunists obtained less than per cent of the vote" and the net year')(uierda 2nida hit roc$ bottom #ith a score of 5.8 per cent. 'n 'taly" for the first time in thehistory of the =epublic" the /ommunists #ere shut out of parliament" reaching a dismal totalof 5.1 per cent and only under the umbrella of the =ainbo# +eft.9

%. The Troi&a dictatorship

'n the course of :" the 2nited States #as hit by one of the gravest financial crises inhistory" #hich soon affected Europe and plunged it into a deep recession. 3s the soaring

public debt increased the dangers of insolvency" many countries had to resort to credits fromthe 7so%called Troi$a" consisting of the European /ommission" the European /entral Ban$and the 'nternational 0onetary -und. 4ations at ris$ of default #ere granted loans in returnfor the introduction of rigid austerity policies" beside #hich the restructuring! measures ofthe 4ineties seemed (uite restrained. Beginning in 8" there have been a total of 15 bailout

programmes in the E2* one in Jungary 78%1" one in +atvia 78%111and three in=omania" plus ? #ithin the Euro)one ? three in >reece 71%18" one in 'reland 71%15"one in 6ortugal 711%1" t#o in /yprus 711%1, and one in Spain 71%15.

The very term structural reforms! under#ent a radical semantic transformation. Griginally" inthe vocabulary of the #or$ers! movement" it had indicated a slo# but steady improvement insocial conditions" but no# it became synonymous #ith a profound erosion of the #elfare

8The Left Party (Die Linke) took the same decision in Germany, entering

government with the Social Democrats in Brandenburg State (where its vote fell as

a result from 27.2 per cent in 2009 to 18.6 per cent in 2014) and in Berlin (where it

halved from 22.6 per cent in 2001 to 11.6 per cent in 2011). In the Netherlands,

the Socialist Party is in government in six of the countrys twelve provinces, having

joined in some cases with centre-right parties, while the Labour Party (PvdA), theaffiliate of the Socialist International, has remained in the opposition.

9In Denmark, the Socialist Peoples Party scored 13 per cent in 2007, but then

plunged to its present 4.2 per cent after a moderate political turn in favour of the

government. This fall took place at the same time that the party crossed from the

European United Left/Nordic Green Left group in the European parliament to the

European Green Party group a move approved by its national congress in 2008.

10Latvia adopted the euro on 1 January 2014.

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state. The pseudo%reforms in (uestion ? regressions #ould be a better #ord ? have cancelleda host of achievements and re%established legal and economic conditions reminiscent of therapacious capitalism of the nineteenth century.

This #as the setting for the terrible recession from #hich Europe has still not emerged" and

#hich at present sees it grappling #ith the spectre of deflation. 3 strong do#n#ard pressureon #ages has caused a collapse of demand" #ith a resulting fall in >6" and unemploymenthas reached levels never before recorded since the Second World War. Bet#een : and1" the &obless rate soared from 8. per cent to ,.F per cent in >reece" from 8. per cent to.F per cent in Spain" from ,.1 per cent to 1.: per cent in 'taly" and from 9.1 per cent to1.1 per cent in 6ortugal. 'n 1 the lac$ of #or$ reached epidemic proportions for a #holegeneration of young people* .1 per cent in -rance" 5.: per cent in 6ortugal" .: per centin 'taly" F. per cent in >reece and F5. per cent in Spain. 0ore than a million" often themost s$illed and best educated" have been forced to emigrate from these five countries.11

We are thus facing ne# forms of class struggle* it is #aged #ith great determination by the

dominant classes against the subaltern classes" #hile the resistance of the latter has often beenfeeble" disorgani)ed and fragmented.1This has been the case both in the most developedcapitalist heartlands" #here the curbs on #or$ers! rights have eceeded anything imaginablethirty years ago" and in the periphery of the #orld economy" #here corporations 7many ofthem multinational eploit their #or$force in etreme forms and ruthlessly strip countries oftheir precious natural resources. This has led to a huge gro#th in ine(ualities and a ma&orredistribution of #ealth in favour of the #ealthiest inhabitants of the planet. Social relationshave undergone profound changes" driven by &ob insecurity" competition among #or$ers"commodification of every sphere of life" social #arfare among the most impoverished strata"and a ne#" more invasive capitalism that corrupts people!s lives and consciences in #aysnever seen before.

3t the same time" the crisis in Europe has rapidly spread to the #orld of politics. 'n the lastt#enty years" decision%ma$ing po#ers have been increasingly transferred from the political tothe economic sphere; economics no# dominates politics and is often depicted as a separaterealm unsusceptible to change" setting the agenda and ensuring that the $ey choices areoutside popular control.

11The Portuguese National Institute of Statistics has calculated that, from 2010 to

2014, at least 200,000 people between the ages of 20 and 40 left the country. In

Spain, the National Institute of Statistics counted at least 133,000 new young

emigrants in the years from 2008 to 2013. And in Italy, at least 136,000 young

people left for abroad between 2010 and 2014. In reality, these estimates are well

below the true figures. In the Greek case there are no official data, because the

national statistical board does not record youth emigration.

12In 2006, the US investor and magnate Warren Buffet eloquently stated in an interview:

Theres class warfare all right, but its my class, the rich class, thats making war, and were

winning. See Ben Stein, In Class Warfare, Guess Which Class Is Winning,New York Times,

26 November 2006.

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What used to be seen" not so long ago" as a field for political action is no# governed byeconomic pseudo%imperatives" #hich" behind their ideological mas$ of non%politics" actually

present a dangerously authoritarian form and a totally reactionary content. The mostemblematic case in point is the Treaty on Stability" /oordination and >overnance in theEconomic and 0onetary 2nion 7TS/> ? the fiscal compact!" as it is #idely $no#n" that

rammed the obligation of balanced budgets into the la# of E2 countries. This means thateach member%state underta$es to comply" #ithin the space of t#enty years" #ith the

provisions of the 0aastricht Treaty of 1995" according to #hich public debt must not eceedthe threshold of , per cent of >ross omestic 6roduct. 'n fact" according to the statistics for1" this figure is currently 9 per cent in the Euro)one; it stands at :. per cent in>ermany and 89. per cent in the 2@ 7the only country #ith the /)ech =epublic not to havesigned the pact" and rises to 1,.F per cent in Belgium" 15. per cent in 6ortugal" 15 percent in 'taly and 1:: per cent in >reece.

'n building a #all to prevent national parliaments from ta$ing independent decisions onpolitical%economic ob&ectives" the TS/> thus serves to undermine the social state in the most

heavily indebted E2 countries and threatens to deepen still further the ongoing recession. 3spart of this general offensive" and inspired by some English%spea$ing countries" -rance 7from: on and 'taly 7in 11 introduced ne# spending revie#! commissioners to rationali)e!

public ependiture. The measures they proposed not only reduced #aste" as intended" but ledto a decline in the (uantity and (uality of services.

The net stage of this pro&ect is meant to be the Transatlantic Trade and 'nvestment6artnership 7TT'6" an accord bet#een the E2 and the 2S3. Jighly confidential negotiationsare currently under #ay about the details" geared to the further deregulation of trade" the

primacy of corporate profit over the general interest" and a conse(uent rise in destructivedo#n#ard competition to bring about further #age cuts and fe#er rights for #or$ers.

3lready the shift from proportional electoral systems to#ards others based on ma&oritybonuses! of one $ind or another" as #ell as anti%democratic tendencies to strengthen theeecutive against the legislative po#er" have undermined the representative character ofnational parliaments. But this latest transfer of po#er from parliament to the mar$et and itsoligarchic institutions is the gravest impediment to democracy in our times.15't demonstratesthat capitalism today is in the throes of a deep crisis of consensus and is incompatible #ithdemocracy.

Gn the other hand" in the fe# national referenda since the adoption of the 0aastricht Treaty"

the choices of the dominant technocratic po#ers in Europe have more than once beendefeated at the ballot bo. This happened in -rance and the 4etherlands in F" #ith regardto the Treaty establishing a /onstitution for Europe"1and in 'reland in 8 #ith regard tothe +isbon Treaty.1F

13On the relationship between capitalism and democracy a theme on which a

vast literature has blossomed in recent years see Ellen Meiksins Wood,

Democracy Against Capitalism, London: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

14Approved only in Spain and Luxemburg, the ratification of this treaty came to a

standstill precisely as a result of these rejections in France and the Netherlands.

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Stoc$ echange indices" rating agency assessments and the yield spread bet#een governmentbonds are huge fetishes for contemporary society* they have ac(uired greater value than thepeople!s #ill. Jence the decisions that cause most harm to the mass of the population arepresented as absolutely indispensable for the restoration of mar$et confidence!.

3t the most" politics is summoned to lend support to economics" as in the case of the ban$ingbailouts in the 2S and Europe in the #a$e of 8. The representatives of high financeneeded public intervention to mitigate the devastating effects of the most recent capitalistcrisis" but they stoutly refused to reopen discussion on the underlying rules and economicoptions.

4ot even the rotation of centre%right and centre%left governments has changed the basicsocial%economic direction" since it is increasingly economics that determines the formation"composition and purpose of the administrations holding the reins of po#er. Whereas" in the

past" the main factor #as the large sums of money given by vested interests! to thegovernments or parties they sought to control" as #ell as the shaping of the mass media in

their service" the $ey element in the t#enty%first century is" rather" the edicts issued byinternational institutions.

The clearest evidence of this came #ith the season of technocratic governments!. Withinless than a single #ee$ ? from 11 to 1, 4ovember 11 ? t#o paragons of economic po#er"+ucas 6apademos 7vice%president of the European /entral Ban$ from to 1 and0ario 0onti" #ere appointed as prime ministers of >reece and 'taly respectively" #ithout the

benefit of elections. 6apademos remained in office for only seven months" #hile 0onti"than$s to the resolute support of the emocratic 6arty 76" held on for a year and a half.Javing built themselves up as champions of austerity" they simultaneously introduced drasticspending cuts and further social sacrifices. Their eperience proved short%lived" since they#ere seen off in short order as soon as the voters #ere given a say. But the activity of theirgovernments had deeply damaging effects" both at an economic level and" perhaps evenmore" because of the vulnus to democracy caused by the form of their investiture.

uring those years" some forces in the Socialist 'nternational too$ a path that ended in asimilar #ay. 'deologically convinced that there #as no alternative to neoliberalism ? eventhough the crisis of 8 had sho#n its disastrous potential and the Gbama administrationhad opted for a different course #ith its 3merican =ecovery and =einvestment 3ct of 9 ?they allied #ith the forces of the European 6eople!s 6arty 7E66 group of centre%right partiesand uncritically adopted the main elements of its approach to the economy and society.

The prototype of this tendency #as the Grosse Koalitionin >ermany" the agreement #herebythe S6" in supporting 3ngela 0er$el as chancellor from F to 9 and from 15 to the

present" has to all intents and purposes given up its autonomy. Gther eperiments in nationalunity! have occurred in southern Europe. 'n >reece" bet#een 1 and 1F" the 6an%Jellenic Socialist 0ovement 763SG@ and" for a time" the emocratic +eft 7'03=" gavetheir support to the 4e# emocracy 74 prime minister" 3ntonis Samaras. 'n 'taly" after the15 elections" the emocratic 6arty entered government 7#ith its deputy secretary" Enrico+etta" as prime minister alongside the centre%right 6eople of +iberty 76d+ coalition headed

by Silvio Berlusconi. 'n 1 the young neo%Blairite iconoclast! 0atteo =en)i too$ over and

15In Greece, the consultative referendum held by the Tsipras government in July

2015 also delivered a resounding no on the relevant policies of Brussels.

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gave life to the government that is still in office today" in #hich the 6 has #or$ed #ith the4e# /entre%=ight 74/" a splinter group from Berlusconi!s movement" and reached anagreement #ith it on some significant electoral and constitutional reforms!.

Since the election of Cean%/laude Cunc$er1, in 1 as president of the European

/ommission" the grand coalition bet#een the European 6eople!s 6arty and the 6rogressive3lliance of Socialists and emocrats 7SP has continued to govern the main institutions ofthe European 2nion.

'. (nti-politics) populis and xenopho*ia

The harmful uniformity of approach to political and economic (uestions ? #hich has beenconfirmed since 1 by the evolution of Jollande!s Socialist administration in -rance ? andthe gro#ing hostility of public opinion to the Brussels technocracy have helped to produce asecond ma&or change 7after the one in 1989 in the European political contet.

'n the last fe# years" a profound aversion has developed every#here on the old continentto#ards anything that can be described as politics!; this has become synonymous #ith po#erfor its o#n sa$e" rather than a commitment to" and a collective interest in" social change" as it#as mostly understood in the 19,s and 19:s. This ne# phenomenon concerns particularly"

but not eclusively" the younger generations. 't has also encouraged a more diffuse apathyand a decline in social conflicts" especially as the organi)ations of the trade union movementare increasingly seen as approved by the po#ers that be.

'n a number of countries" the tide of anti%politics has also #ashed over the forces of theradical +eft. +argely because of their poor performance in government" they are even blamedfor adaptation to the eisting climate and gradual abandonment of the militant demands thatthey used to champion.

There have been significant changes in the European balance of forces. Some bipartisansystems have simply imploded" as in post%dictatorship Spain and >reece" #here Socialist and/entre%=ight forces regularly used to account for three%(uarters of the electorate. Similartrends seem to have affected the political systems in -rance and 'taly" #here for decades thevote #as divided bet#een the centre%right and centre%left blocs. -urthermore" the three

political groups in the European 6arliament elected in 9 ? the European 6eople!s 6arty"the 6rogressive 3lliance of Socialists and emocrats and the 3lliance of +iberals and

emocrats for Europe 73+E ?lost more than 15 per cent of their deputies at the electionsheld in 1.

The political%electoral landscape has been modified by abstentionism" the rise of ne# populistformations" the ma&or advance of by far%right forces" and in some cases the consolidation of aleft alternative to neoliberal policies.

The higher levels of electoral abstentionism" a tendency apparent in a variety of countries" aremainly attributable to the gro#ing detachment from political parties in general. The turnout at

parliamentary elections declined in -rance from ,:.9 per cent in 199: to F:. per cent in

16As prime minister of Luxemburg, Juncker had enabled more than three

hundred multinationals to take advantage of a special tax regime in his country.

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15;1:in >ermany from 8.5 per cent in 198: to :1.F per cent in 15; in the 2@ from ::per cent in 199 to ,,.1 per cent 1F; in 'taly from 8:.5 per cent in 199 to :. per cent in15; in 6ortugal from :1.F per cent in 198: to F: per cent in 1F; in >reece from :,., percent in to F,.F per cent in 1F; and in 6oland 7at presidential elections from ,.: percent in 199F to 8.9 per cent in 1F.

6articipation in elections for the European 6arliament has also fallen" from , per cent in19:9 to ., per cent at the most recent polls; 18This reflects loss of interest in an institutionthat represents an ever more technocratic" ever less political model for Europe. =iding theanti%E2 #ave" ne# post%ideological! movements have arisen in recent years" guided bygeneric denunciation of the corrupt eisting system or by the myth of online democracy as aguarantee of ran$%and%file political participation in contrast to the usual practice of political

parties.

Gn the basis of these principles" a 6irate 6arty 766 #as founded almost simultaneously inS#eden and >ermany in ,. Three years later" it #on :.1 per cent of the vote at the

S#edish Euro%elections and t#o per cent at the elections for the Bundestag. 'n 1" thisparty #as also established in 'celand" #here it scored F per cent at the elections held thefollo#ing year. These are significant percentages if #e consider the 66!s limited political

programme" but tiny #hen compared #ith the -ive Star 0ovement 70FS that the comedianBeppe >rillo created in 9. 3t the net general elections it became the first political forcein 'taly" #ith F.F per cent of the vote.

'n 15 the 3lternative for >ermany 73f #as founded in Berlin" and than$s to the surge ofeuro%scepticism it #on .: per cent at the federal elections in 15 and : per cent at the Euro%elections the follo#ing year. 'n 1 it #as the turn of The =iver 7T6 in >reece" #hichnotched up ,., per cent and .1 per cent at the net European and national electionsrespectively. 0ean#hile" /iudadanos 7/Ls ? a movement founded in /atalonia in , ?

bro$e through to score 5. per cent at the Euro%elections and ,., per cent at the local councilelections in 1F. -inally" at the recent presidential elections in 6oland" the right%#ing

populist singer 6a#el @u$i) captured 1.5 per cent of the vote; his movement" @u$i)!1F" hasbecome the third political force in the country" #inning 8.8 per cent at the legislativeelections in Gctober 1F.

uring the same period" a number of already eisting formations boosted their presence onthe basis of similar political platforms. The most stri$ing eample is the 2nited @ingdom'ndependence 6arty 72@'6" #hich" by combining populism #ith nationalism and

enophobia" topped the Euro polls in 1 7,., per cent and achieved 1., per cent at the17It should be noted, however, that participation in Frances more important

presidential elections has been much higher, as shown by the 79.4 per cent

turnout in 2012.

18In many countries of Eastern Europe the figures were extremely low: Slovakia

13 per cent, Czech Republic 18.2 per cent, Slovenia 24.5 per cent, Croatia 25.2 per

cent, Hungary 28.9 per cent. Also noteworthy were the 33.6 per cent in Portugal

and the 35.6 per cent in the UK. See

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/elections_results/review.pdf.

10


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general election in 0ay 1F. 'n the European 6arliament" 2@'6 deputies have &oined #iththe -ive Star 0ovement to form a ne# group" the Europe of -reedom and irect emocracy.

'n S#it)erland" the S#iss 6eople!s 6arty< emocratic 2nion of the /entre 7SK6%2/ pulledoff its best%ever result in 1F" #inning 9. per cent at the Gctober elections. 3lthough its

name might suggest something else" it is in fact a enophobic far%right formation" #hichdistinguished itself in the past by advocating a referendum 7actually approved in 9 for a

ban on ne# minarets.

'n many European countries" enophobic" nationalist or openly neo%fascist parties have madebig advances as the effects of economic crisis have made themselves felt. 'n some cases" theyhave modified their political language" replacing the classical left%right division #ith a ne#struggle specific to contemporary society* #hat 0arine +e 6en calls the conflict bet#eenthose at the top and those at the bottom!.19 'n this ne# polari)ation" far%right candidates aresupposed to represent the people! against the establishment 7or the forces that have for a longtime alternated in government and against the elites #ho favour an all%po#erful free mar$et.

The ideological profile of these political movements has also changed. The racist componentis often shifted to the bac$ground and economic issues brought to the fore. The blind"restrictive opposition to E2 immigration policies is ta$en a stage further by playing on the#ar among the poor" even more than discrimination based on s$in colour or religiousaffiliation. 'n a contet of high unemployment and grave social conflict" enophobia is raisedthrough propaganda asserting that migrants ta$e &obs from local #or$ers and that the lattershould have priority in employment" social services and #elfare entitlements.

This change of course has certainly played a role in the recent successes of the -ront4ational" #hich" under 0arine +e 6en!s leadership" shot up to 1:.9 per cent in the 1presidential elections" became the largest -rench political party 7.8 per cent at the 1Euro%elections and carried a#ay F. per cent of the vote at the local elections in 1F. 1'n'taly" mean#hile" the +ega 4ord has also undergone a metamorphosis. 't #as born in 1989demanding independence for 6adania! 7its name for northern 'taly" and after 199, itenvisaged the unilateral secession of the region. But recently it has turned itself into anational party" #hose non%euro!" anti%immigrant platform is the lynchpin of an alliance #iththe main forces stemming from the fascist tradition. 3s a result" its electoral score hasclimbed dramatically* it is no# the largest organi)ation of the 'talian centre%right" havingoverta$en Silvio Berlusconi!s -or)a 'talia.

'n both -rance and 'taly" some historical fortresses of the #or$ing%class and /ommunist votehave mutated into stable electoral bases of the above t#o parties. 3 coalition agreementbet#een the -ront 4ational and +ega 4ord led to the formation in Cune 1F of a Europe of

19After the municipal elections of March 2014.

20Priority for the French is an old xenophobic slogan of Jean-Marie Le Pen: see

hisLes Franais d'abord, Paris: Carrre-Michel Lafon, 1984.

21Since the 2012 election, the Front National has stood as part of a broader

coalition calling itself the Navy Blue Rally (Rassemblement Blu Marine RBM).

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4ations and -reedom 7E4+ at the European 6arliament in Brussels; this also includesestablished political parties #hich" alongside lesser organi)ations" have for some time beendemanding #ithdra#al from the euro" a revision of the treaties on immigration and a return tonational sovereignty. 3mong the most representative forces in this respect are -lemish'nterest 7KB in Belgium; the 3ustrian -reedom 6arty 7-6Q" #hich #on .F per cent of the

vote at the 15 national elections" 19.: percent in 1 at the European elections and 5.8per cent at the Kiennese elections in 1F; and the 6arty for -reedom 76KK in the4etherlands" founded in ," #hich scored 15.5 per cent at the last European elections. Thelatter t#o parties have risen to occupy third position in their national politics.

-ar%right forces have &oined more than one group in the European 6arliament and" for the firsttime since the Second World War" have made important advances in various parts of thecontinent. 'n every Scandinavian country" for eample" they are already an established reality"not to spea$ of the ideological reorientation that their electoral successes have encouraged insociety. 'n the homelandpar excellenceof the 4ordic model!" the S#edish emocrats 7S"#hich arose in 1988 through a fusion of neo%4a)i groups" have emerged as the third largest

political force" and are allied #ith 2@'6 in Europe. 'n enmar$ and -inland" t#o partiesfounded in 199F and affiliated to the European /onservatives and =eformists >roup havescored even more surprising results" becoming the second largest parties in their respectivecountries. To general ama)ement" the anish 6eople!s 6arty 766 #on the highest numberof votes at the last European elections" #ith ,., per cent of the total; it then consolidated itssuccess #ith 1.1 per cent at the 1F legislative elections and &oined the governmentma&ority. 'n -inland" the True -inns 76S also no# sit on the government benches" havingattracted 1:., per cent support at the ballot bo in 1F. -inally" in 4or#ay" the 6rogress6arty 7-f6 ? #hich already collected .9 per cent of the vote in 9" and #hose politicalvie#s are e(ually reactionary ? has entered government for the first time" #ith a score of 1,.5

per cent.

The near%uniform assertion of these parties" in a region #here the organi)ations of the#or$ers! movement had eercised undisputed hegemony for a very long time" may also beattributed to the fact that they have ta$en up battles and issues once dear to both the Socialemocratic and /ommunist +eft. T#o other useful" though not fundamental" factors are theircarefully designed political symbolism ? the S#edish emocrats" for instance" have replacedthe old flame common among fascist movements #ith a reassuring #ild flo#er in the nationalcolours ? and the rise of young leaders s$illed at communication #ith the media.

The =ight has made its brea$throughs not only by means of classical reactionary instruments"

such as campaigns against globali)ation" but also through the arrival of ne# asylum%see$ersand the spectre of the 'slami)ation! of society. 3bove all" ho#ever" they called for socialpolicies traditionally associated #ith the +eft" at a time #hen the Social emocrats #ereopting for public spending cuts and the radical +eft #as gagged because of its support for" oractual participation in government. The rightist #elfare! is of a different $ind" ho#ever* nolonger universal" inclusive and solidaristic" but based on a principle that some theorists havedescribed as #elfare nationalism!. 'n other #ords" it involves the offer of rights and servicesonly to members of the already eisting national community.

'n addition to its #idespread support in rural areas and the provinces" #hich are oftendepopulated and hit by high unemployment because of the economic crisis" the Scandinavian

far =ight has been able to dra# on a significant number of #or$ers #ho have yielded to theblac$mail of either immigration or the #elfare state!.

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The radical =ight has also managed to reorgani)e in a number of East European countries"since the end of the pro%Soviet regimes there. Bulgaria!s 4ational 3ttac$ 2nion! 73T3@3"the Slova$ 4ational 6arty 7S4S and the >reater =omania 6arty 7=0 are some of the

political forces that have often obtained good results and sent their o#n deputies to

parliament.

'n 6oland" the populist +a# and Custice 76iS party #on the presidential elections in 0ay1F and" having scored 5:., per cent at the legislative elections in Gctober 1F" holds thefirst absolute ma&ority of seats in parliament since the end of the /old War. 2nli$e the usualappeals to nationalism and ultra%conservative religious values" the 6iS economic programmehighlights promises to increase social spending" to improve #age levels and to lo#er theretirement age. 't is a left platform" in a country #here the anti%capitalist +eft is non%eistentand social democracy is confined to a small residual space after its pursuit of policies that hitthe #ea$est layers of society.

The most alarming case in this part of Europe" ho#ever" is Jungary. 3fter the Socialist 6artygovernment had imposed severe austerity measures at the behest of the Troi$a" causing alurch into deflation" the Jungarian /ivic 2nionolden a#npic$ed up 9. per cent of the vote in the European elections of 1 and : percent in the general elections of 1F" thereby asserting itself as the third political force in thecountry.

'n recent years" therefore" the parties of the populist" nationalist or neo%fascist =ight haveconsiderably broadened their support in almost every part of Europe. 'n many cases" they

have proved capable of hegemoni)ing political debate and sometimes entered government ina coalition #ith the more moderate =ight. 't is a disturbing epidemic" to #hich it is certainlyimpossible to respond #ithout fighting the virus that caused it in the first place* the neoliberalmantra still so fashionable in Brussels.

4evertheless" neither in >reece nor in eastern regions of >ermany has the far =ight done as#ell as it might have done; and in Spain" 6ortugal and the /)ech =epublic ? that is" in places#here the /ommunist +eft has maintained its roots in society and developed a coherent

22For a study of far-right forces in Europe, see the volume edited by Andrea

Mammone, Emmanual Godin and Brian Jenkins:Mapping the Extreme Right in

Contemporary Europe, London: Routledge, 2012.

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opposition policy in recent years5? the conditions for a ne# rise of the radical =ight havenot been fulfilled.

+. The ne, political geography of the European radical Left

The political and economic crisis traversing Europe has not led only to the advance ofpopulist" enophobic and far%right forces. 3t the same time" it has prompted ma&or strugglesand protest demonstrations against the austerity measures imposed by the European/ommission and implemented by national governments.

Especially in southern Europe" this has encouraged a renaissance of the radical +eft" as #ellas notable electoral brea$throughs. >reece" Spain and 6ortugal" along #ith 'reland and" in alesser $ey" other countries" have been the scene of imposing mass mobili)ations againstneoliberal policies. 'n >reece" more than forty general stri$es have been called since 1.

'n Spain" millions of citi)ens participated in a huge rebellion beginning on 1F 0ay 11 thatgave rise to the movement later called the 'ndignados. The demonstrators occupied 0adrid!smain s(uare" the 6uerta del Sol" for a good four #ee$s. 3 fe# days after their action began" asimilar protest movement too$ to the streets in 3thens" at Syntagma S(uare. 3nd in bothcountries" the social struggles effectively laid the foundations for a subse(uent gro#th andaffirmation of the +eft.

Gn the other hand" although the trade union movement faced a common situation ? officialpost%crisis measures had caused the same social disasters in the countries of Europe ? it didnot have the political #ill to formulate a shared platform of demands and to organi)e a seriesof continent%#ide mobili)ations. The only partial eception #as the general stri$e of 1

4ovember 1 in Spain" 'taly" 6ortugal" /yprus and 0alta" #hich #as also supported bysolidarity actions in -rance" >reece and Belgium.3t a political level" the anti%capitalist +eft stuc$ to its course of rebuilding and regrouping itsforces in the field. 4e# formations inspired by pluralism too$ shape and came to constitute a#ide arc of political sub&ects" at the same time securing greater democracy through the

principle of one person" one vote!.

'n 1999 the +eft Bloc 7BE in 6ortugal brought together the most important forces to the leftof the /ommunist 6arty" and in the same year the foundation of The +eft mar$ed a freshdeparture in +uemburg. 'n Synaspismos and a range of other anti%capitalist forces in

>reece came together to form Syri)a" the /oalition of the =adical +eft 7although its fusioninto an actual party occurred only in 1.

'n 0ay " the foundation of the 6arty of the European +eft initially associated fifteencommunist" socialist and ecological parties" #ith the aim of building a political sub&ect thatcould unite the main forces of European militant +eft around a common programme. 3t the

present time" political organi)ations from t#enty countries are part of it. This re%groupmenthad been preceded" a fe# months earlier" by the creation of the 3lliance of the 4ordic >reen+eft" involving seven parties from northern Europe.

23This is true even if we take into account the oscillations in the stance of

Izquierda Unida towards the government in Spain between 2004 and 2008.

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3part from the European +eft coalition" there is also the European 3nti%capitalist +eft7E3/+" a smaller formation launched in and consisting of more than 5 7oftendiminutive Trots$yist organi)ations. 'ts chief promoters #ere the +eft Bloc in 6ortugal" the2nity +istreens in enmar$ and the 4e# 3nti%capitalist 6arty in -rance. 'n theEuropean 6arliament" representatives of these forces have &oined the European 2nited

+eftreen +eft group.F

3 fe# years later" the most radical components of the >erman S6 and the -rench Socialist6arty 76S,split a#ay and rapidly adopted positions to the left of the leaderships of the 6artyof emocratic Socialism 7in >ermany or the -rench /ommunist 6arty. This encouraged thelaunch of The +eft 7ie +in$e ? + in >ermany in : and of the -ront de >auche 7-d>in -rance in 8. 3lso in -rance" the transformation of the +igue /ommuniste=Dvolutionnaire 7+/= into the 4ouveau 6arti 3nti%capitaliste 7463 in 9 may beascribed to the same vision as that of certain typically class%oriented forces of European/ommunism* that is" to focus political initiatives on important ne# contradictions bound up#ith social eclusion.

'n 'taly" also in 9" the ne#ly founded Ecology and +iberty +eft 7Sinistra Ecologia e+ibertN ? SE+brought together three elements* the moderate #ing of =ifonda)ione/omunista"a group of dissidents from the +eft emocrats 7S; and the -ederation of the+eft 7-dS" an alliance bet#een the /ommunist =efoundation 6arty and three smaller

political movements. 'n S#it)erland" a similar process #as completed in 1 #ith thefoundation of The +eft 73+.

The same $ind of path #as tried in Britain" #ith the foundation of the =espect 6arty in and +eft 2nity in 15. The trend even crossed the Bosphorus" #here @urdish activists cametogether in 1 #ith several movements of the Tur$ish +eft to form the 6eople!s emocratic6arty 7J6; this rapidly became the fourth political force in the country" achieving 1.: percent of the vote in the elections of 4ovember 1F.:

24For a list of the forces comprising the Party of the European Left, see

http://www.european-left.org/about-el/member-parties.

25This group does not, however, include formations participating in the Initiative

of Communist and Workers Parties, an alliance launched in 2013 that comprises

apart from the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), its main component 29 tiny

orthodox Stalinist parties.

26Oskar Lafontaines cartel Labour and Social Justice The Electoral Alternative

(WASG) came into being in 2005, and the foundation of the Parti de Gauche (PG) in

France under the leadership of Jean-Luc Mlenchon was announced in November

2008 (its founding congress being held in February 2009).

27At the elections of June 2015, before the spiral of violence and assassinations

triggered by President Recep ErdoRan, the HDP won an even larger share of the vote

(13.1 per cent).

15
http://www.european-left.org/about-el/member-partieshttp://www.european-left.org/about-el/member-parties


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The year 1 sa# the emergence of the 2nited +eft in Slovenia and 6odemos in Spain. Thelatter is rather a special case" since it claims to go beyond the traditional definition of a partyof the +eft" but it presented candidates for the first time in the last European elections and has

&oined the European 2nited +eftreen +eft group in the European 6arliament.

-inally" in Gctober 1F" a ne# electoral coalition called the 3nti%3usterity 3lliance ? 6eopleBefore 6rofit 7333%6B6 put an end to the long feud bet#een the Socialist 6arty 76S andthe 6eople Before 6rofit 3lliance 736B6.8

The plural model" so different from the monolithic" democratic centralist! party of thet#entieth%century /ommunist movement" (uic$ly spread to most forces of the Europeanradical +eft.The most successful eperiments have been not so much those that simply unifysmall pre%eisting groups and organi)ations as genuine re%compositions driven by the need toinvolve the vast" scattered net#or$ of social sub&ects and to #eave together different forms ofstruggle. This approach has been victorious in so far as it has attracted ne# forces" dra#ing inyoung people" bringing bac$ disillusioned militants and assisting the electoral advance of the

ne#ly created parties.

'n the >erman elections of 9" ie +in$e #on 11.9 per cent of the vote ? three times morethan the per cent achieved by the 6arty of emocratic Socialism seven years earlier. 'n the-rench presidential elections of 1" the candidate of the -ront de >auche" 0Dlenchon"achieved the highest vote obtained by any party to the left of the Socialist 6arty since 1981.3nd in the same year" Syri)a began the rapid ascent that too$ it to 1,.8 per cent in the 0ayelections" ,.9 per cent in Cune and eventually 5,.5 per cent in Canuary 1F" #hen" uni(uelyfor a European anti%capitalist party since the Second World War" it formed a government asthe ma&ority partner.9

Ecellent results #ere also achieved in the 'berian 6eninsula" #here the Spanish 6lural +eft7a ne# electoral bloc headed by ')(uierda 2nida crossed the 1 per cent threshold in the1 Euro%elections" and 6odemos came #ithin a #his$er of 8 per cent. 3s to 6ortugal" the2nited emocratic /oalition totalled 8.5 per cent in the general election of Gctober 1F"#hile the +eft Bloc" #ith 1. per cent" scored its best result ever" becoming the third

political force in the country.

6lural left eperiments" al#ays characteri)ed by a clear opposition to neoliberalism" have alsoborn fruit in local ballots. 3 good case in point #as the -rench regional elections of 1 inthe +imousin" #hen the -ront de >auche coalition and the 4e# 3nti%capitalist 6arty together

achieved 19.1 per cent in the second round" and the municipal elections in Spain" #here the0adrid 3hora and Barcelona en /omlists 7including both ')(uierda 2nida and 6odemos

28For a map of the European Left, see Birgit Daiber, Cornelia Hildebrandt, Anna

Strienthorst (eds.),From Revolution to Coalition: Radical Left Parties in Europe,

Berlin: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2012; and, more recently, the special issue of

Socialism and Democracy(vol. 29/3, 2015) edited by Babak Amini:The Radical Left

in Europe.

29The only other example is the small state of Cyprus, where the Progressive Party

of the Working People (AKEL) formed a coalition government in 2009.

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#on the t#o largest cities in the country. 'n both cases" broad alliances driven by the ran$ andfile made it possible to overcome differences bet#een the national leadership groups.

6arties that chose not to bloc #ith other political forces have also sometimes achieved notableelectoral results in the past decade. 'n the 4etherlands" for eample" the Socialist 6arty 7S6

rose to 1,., per cent of the vote in ," in the #a$e of its call for a no! vote in thereferendum on the European /onstitution; and in /yprus the 3@E+ general secretaryemetris /hristofias #on the presidential elections of 9 #ith 55. per cent in the firstround vote and F5.5 per cent in the second. /hrstofias!s term in office ended in ma&orsetbac$s" ho#ever" since he #as unable to end the conflict that has divided the island since19:" and eplicitly bo#ed to the Troi$a!s demands on the economy.

3nother turnaround that has sha$en the geography of the European +eft #ould have been atleast as unpredictable a fe# years ago as Syri)a!s governmental victory in >reece. 'n

primary%style elections held in September 1F" F9.F per cent of British +abour 6artymembers and registered supporters voted in favour of Ceremy /orbyn as their ne# leader. 'n

the country #here Tony Blair ruled the roost t#enty years ago" a self%declared anti%capitalisthas no# occupied the top post in the +abour 6arty" the most left%#ing in its history. Thisetraordinary turn of events represents a further significant eample of the revival of the +eft.3t the level of the E2" the general advance of the radical +eft #as confirmed at the lastEuropean elections in 1. 'ts total number of votes reached 1"981"5:8" or 8 per cent" #ithan increase of 1"88F"F: over 9.5

Even by the sole criterion of the number of elected deputies 7,.9 per cent" or F 06s" theEuropean 2nited +eftreen +eft is no# the fifth political force in the European6arliament" up from the seventh in 9.51't thus comes behind the European 6eople!s 6arty79. per cent" the 6rogressive 3lliance of Socialists and emocrats 7F. per cent" theEuropean /onservatives and =eformists 79.5 per cent and the 3lliance of emocrats and+iberals for Europe 78.9 per cent; but ahead of the >reens


18/24

This situation is reflected at the polls. 'n si countries ? 6oland" =omania" Jungary" Bulgaria"Bosnia%Jer)egovina and Estonia ? the radical +eft has garnered less than 1 per cent of thevote" #hile in others such as /roatia" Slova$ia" +ithuania and +atvia" it has hardly fared

better. 't also remains very #ea$ in 3ustria" Belgium and S#it)erland" and in Serbia the +eft

is still identified #ith the Socialist 6arty led for many years by Slobodan 0iloeviU.

The reality #e face in Europe is therefore etremely heterogeneous. 'n the 'berian 6eninsulaand the 0editerranean Basin ? #ith the eception of 'taly ? the radical +eft has epandedsignificantly in recent years. 'n >reece" Spain" 6ortugal and /yprus" its forces haveconsolidated themselves and may be recogni)ed among the principal actors in the politicalarena. 'n -rance" too" it has regained a reasonably significant role in society and politics.0ean#hile" in 'reland" the progressive 7though moderate republican nationalism of Sinn-ein 7S-" #hich collected .8 per cent of votes in the 1 Euro%elections" has acted as a

barrier to the advance of conservative forces.

'n /entral Europe" the radical +eft has managed to retain considerable electoral strength in>ermany and the 4etherlands" but its #eight is limited else#here. 'n the 4ordic countries" ithas defended the positions it secured after 1989 7around 1 per cent at the polls" but it has

proved incapable of attracting the diffuse popular discontent" #hich has been captured by theetreme =ight instead.

The main problem for the radical +eft remains further east" ho#ever" #here" #ith theeception of the /ommunist 6arty of Bohemia and 0oravia in the /)ech =epublic" and the2nited +eft in Slovenia" it is virtually non%eistent and incapable of moving beyond thespectre of actually eisting socialism!. 'n these circumstances" the east#ard epansion of theE2 has decisively shifted the political centre of gravity to the right" as #e can see from therigidly etreme positions ta$en by East European governments during the recent crisis in>reece and #ith regard to the arrival of people fleeing #ar%torn regions.

. eyond the Euro/one enclosure0

The conversion of radical +eft parties into broader" more plural organi)ations has been usefulin reducing their fragmentation" but it has certainly not solved their political problems.

'n >reece" #hen the government headed by 3leis Tsipras too$ office" Syri)a intended to

brea$ #ith the austerity policies adopted by all the administrations" centre%left" technocratic!or centre%right!" that had succeeded one another since 1. Jo#ever" because of the hugesi)e of the public debt" the concrete application of this turn #as immediately subordinated tonegotiations #ith the international creditors.

3fter five months of ehausting tal$s ? during #hich the European /entral Ban$ againstopped providing credit to the central ban$ in 3thens" causing branches of >ree$ ban$s todry up ? the leaders of the Euro)one imposed a ne# bailout plan containing all the economic

provisions that Syri)a had been firmly opposing. Since 1" the parliamentary arc ofpolitical forces that has accepted the Brussels memoranda has been #ide indeed. -rom left to

32The Eurodeputies of the EUL/NGL group come from only a half of the 28

countries making up the European Union.

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right" they have bo#ed to the ineorable logic of austerity* 4e# emocracy" the 'ndependent>ree$s 734E+" The =iver" the emocratic +eft" the 6anhellenic Socialist 0ovement" andfinally even Syri)a.554ot even the vigorous response at the consultative referendum of F Culy1F 7#hen ,1.5 per cent of >ree$s said a firm no! to the Troi$a!s proposals served to bringabout a different outcome.

To avoid an >ree$ eit from the Euro)one" the Tsipras government agreed to further socialsacrifices" a massive $noc$%do#n sale of public assets" and more generally a #hole raft ofausterity measures geared to the interests of international creditors rather than development ofthe >ree$ economy.5

Gn the other hand" a >ree$ eit from the Euro)one ? a scenario that some envisaged" but onlyif negotiations #ith the Eurogroup bro$e do#n? #ould have catapulted the country into astate of economic chaos and deep recession. 't #ould have been necessary to prepare #ell inadvance for such a momentous decision" carefully #eighing every eventuality and rigorously

planning all the appropriate counter%measures. 3bove all" it #ould have been necessary to#in over a large array of social and political forces and to count on their support ? other#ise"

the economic autar$y that >reece #ould have been condemned to adopt for an unpredictablelength of time could have opened even greater space for the neo%fascists of >olden a#n.

The outcome of the negotiations bet#een Tsipras and the Eurogroup made it abundantly clearthat" as soon as a left%#ing party #ins elections and see$s to implement alternative economic

policies" the Brussels institutions are ready to intervene and put a stop to them. 'n the 199s"unconditional acceptance of the neoliberal credo aligned the forces of European socialdemocracy #ith the parties of the centre%right. Today" by contrast" #hen a party of the radical+eft comes to po#er" the Troi$a itself steps in to prevent the ne# government from tampering#ith its economic directives. To #in elections is not enough; the European 2nion has becomea cornerstone of neoliberal capitalism.

-ollo#ing the >ree$ episode" there has been deeper collective reflection on the #isdom of$eeping the single currency at any cost. Efforts are being made to understand #hich are the

best #ays of putting an end to the current economic policies" #ithout abandoning at the sametime the pro&ect of a ne# and different European political union.The ma&ority position among the parties of the radical +eft remains that it is still possible tomodify European policies #ithin the eisting contet* that is" to do so #ithout ending themonetary union that #as achieved in #hen the euro came into effect.

33Margaret Thatchers famous slogan: There is no alternative continues to

materialize, like a phantom, even at a distance of thirty years.

34See the collectivePreliminary Report, edited by the Truth Committee on Public

Debt, the commission established on 4 April 2015 on the initiative of the former

president of the Greek parliament, Zoe Konstantopoulou:

http://cadtm.org/IMG/pdf/Report.pdf. A few weeks ago, the new Tsipras

government decided to delete this important document from the official site of the

Greek parliament.

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Syri)a is the most prominent force still holding this vie#* it had the opportunity ingovernment to formulate and implement alternative solutions ? despite improper pressurefrom the E2 institutions to bloc$ any change ? but it did not ta$e into consideration the>reit! option. 'n September 1F" Tsipras #on the early elections he called follo#ing theconflict #ith a section of the party that opposed implementation of the Eurogroup

memorandum proposals; he collected 5F.F per cent of the popular vote and returned togovernment #ith a cohesive parliamentary group" no longer eposed to the dangers ofinternal dissidence.So" despite the higher rate of abstention 7up : per cent since the previous election sevenmonths earlier" and despite the fact that a good ," fe#er people voted than in the Culyreferendum" Syri)a has managed to retain the support of a si)eable section of the >ree$

people. Jo#ever" the ne# vote of confidence they gave it #ill soon be put to the test as theae imposed by the Eurogroup ta$es effect" and it is not too rash to predict the emergence ofeven more unsettled scenarios than those #e have seen so far.

Syri)a appears to have a t#o%pronged strategy to prevent the loss of support suffered by allother parties that implemented earlier Troi$a bailout programmes. The >ree$ government#ill see$ to negotiate a substantial reduction in the public debt" in order to avoid the onset ofa ne# deflationary cycle. 3nd it #ill try to carry out a parallel agenda to the one imposed byBrussels" ta$ing some redistributive measures that may limit the effects of the most recentmemorandum.

'n the light of #hat happened in 1F" there are ob&ective grounds for arguing that this is anear%impossible mission. 'n any case" after the eperience of the Tsipras government" andgiven the li$elihood that the E2 institutions #ill re&ect any restructuring of the debt" it has

become clear that the +eft also needs to be prepared for a possible eit from the Euro)one. 't#ould be #rong" ho#ever" to thin$ of this as the remedy for all evils.

3part from Syri)a" most of the principal forces in the European +eft 6arty share the vie#that it is possible to reform the European 2nion #ithin the eisting set%up; this is true of ie+in$e in >ermany" the -rench /ommunist 6arty and ')(uierda 2nida in Spain. 6odemos" too"fits into this bloc" since its leadership is convinced that" if the >ree$ government had been

&oined by others prepared to brea$ #ith Troi$a%imposed austerity" a space might have openedup to undermine #hat today seems so unalterable. The recent election result in 6ortugal ?#hich gave a ma&ority to a hitherto (uite unli$ely alliance of the Socialist 6arty" the +eft Blocand the 2nited emocratic /oalition5F? seems to have strengthened such hopes.

'n the vie# of others" the >ree$ crisis! ? in reality" a crisis of democracy in the age ofneoliberal capitalism ? seems to prove that the eisting E2 model cannot be reformed* not somuch because the relationship of forces is even less favourable to the anti%capitalist +eft sincethe east#ard enlargement" as because of its general architecture. The economic parametersthat have been imposed #ith gro#ing rigidity since the signing of the 0aastricht Treaty haveinevitably reduced" or in some cases virtually (uashed" the much more comple andcomposite eigencies of politics.

35In Portugal of the 1970s, after the Carnation Revolution and the establishment

of the republic, the Socialists never negotiated with political forces to their left.

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'n the last t#enty%five years" neoliberal policies cloa$ed in a deceptive technocratic" non%ideological garb have triumphed all over Europe" dealing heavy blo#s to its #elfare statemodel. 'ndividual countries have found themselves gradually stripped of important politicaland economic steering instruments" #hich are indispensable to launch public investment

programmes that might change the course of the crisis. 3nd on top of this" the anti%

democratic practice of ta$ing ma&or decisions #ithout see$ing popular approval has becomeso entrenched that it no# appears (uite natural.

Those #ho consider the goal of democrati)ing the Euro)one to be illusory may still be aminority in the radical +eft" but their ran$s have been s#elling over recent months. 3longsidetraditionally Eurosceptic forces such as the 6ortuguese /ommunist 6arty" the /ommunist6arty of >reece or the 2nitary +istreens in enmar$" there is no# the 6opular 2nity7+E brea$a#ay from Syri)a. Born in 3thens in 3ugust 1F" it has recruited a considerablenumber of former leaders and members #ho opposed Tsipras!s decision to accept the dictatesof the Eurogroup. But although it favours a return to the drachma" it remained outside the>ree$ parliament after the last elections" having notched up only .8 per cent of the popular

vote.

3t the same time" various intellectuals and political leaders have eplicitly ta$en a positionagainst the euro.5,+afontaine" for instance" has proposed a return 7in a fleible form to theEuropean 0onetary System 7E0S* that is" the agreement in force before the adoption of theeuro" #hich prescribed a controlled fluctuation of echange%rates among various nationalcurrencies. The search for immediate solutions to end the stage of austerity" against the

bac$ground of ne# and unacceptable pressures li$e those eerted on >reece" mustnevertheless ma$e provision for all that they entail. 3t a symbolic level" a return to the oldmonetary system might be seen as a first step to halting the #hole pro&ect of European unity;and politically" it might prove a dangerous catalyst that #or$s to the advantage of the populist=ight.

3part from the t#o forthright positions for and against democrati)ation of the euro!" there isa fairly #ide range of opinion that #ould hesitate to offer a clear ans#er to the (uestion*

36In addition to authors who have been arguing this for some time see, e.g.,

Jacques Sapir,Faut-il sortir de l'Euro?, Paris: Le Seuil, 2012; and Heiner Flassbeck

and Costas Lapavitsas,Against the Troika: Crisis and Austerity in the Eurozone,

London: Verso, 2015 there have been a number of recent interventions in this

direction. In an interview in the famous German weeklyDer Spiegel, entitled Krise

in Griechenland: Lafontaine fordert Ende des Euro (11 July 2015), Oskar

Lafontaine did not beat about the bush in declaring that the euro has failed. In

Italy, the recently deceased sociologist Luciano Gallino published an article

explaining why Italy can and should leave the euro: Perch l'Italia pu e deve

uscire dalleuro,La Repubblica22 September 2015. And in Portugal the influential

Francisco Lou who for ten years was the main leader of the Left Bloc was

already publishing increasingly critical views before the outbreak of the Greek

crisis. See his volume together with JoaoFerreira do Amaral:A Soluo Novo

Escudo, Alfragide: Lua de Papel, 2014; and more recently his article Sair ou no

sair do euro,Pblico, 27 February 2015.

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What should be done if the things that happened in >reece are repeated in another countryV!0any #orry that other parties or coalition governments might be sub&ected to the same

blac$mail as Syri)a #as" but there is also a #idespread fear that" if it contemplates#ithdra#al from the Euro)one" the anti%capitalist +eft #ill alienate large sections of the

population #ho are alarmed at the prospect of inflation and the resulting economic instability

and erosion of their #ages and pensions. Typical eamples of this uncertainty are the shiftingpositions in recent years of the +eft Bloc in 6ortugal and the Socialist 6arty in the4etherlands.3lthough 0Dlenchon!s recent appeal" 3 6lan B in Europe!"5:is full of contradictions andobscurities" it is destined to give a further stimulus to discussion. Branding E2 interference in>reece as a veritable coup d!tat!" it proposes a permanent international conference todesign the #ays in #hich an alternative to the euro%based monetary system might becomeavailable if the need arises.58 'f" in the coming months" other social forces" political partiesand intellectuals coalesce around this ob&ective" the demand to leave the euro might in future

become the banner of more than &ust the populist =ight.

Gn the other hand" the conflict that erupted #ithin Syri)a might be reproduced else#here.3lready there are signs of this in the internal tremors that have been affecting the -ront de>auche and the ie +in$e. -or the European radical +eft" therefore" the ris$ of a ne# periodof divisions might ta$e concrete shape. This reveals the limits of the plural form that militantforces have adopted in recent years" #ith all its lac$ of programmatic definition. -or thediversity of political positions and political cultures among the organi)ations that animate thene# configurations may #ell re(uire agreements about the strategy to be pursued; that #ill bedifficult to achieve" but not impossible.

Gther tensions eist #ithin the radical European +eft concerning relations #ith social%democratic forces. The $ey issue" constantly present at both municipal and regional level" is#hether it is a good idea to ta$e part #ith them in the eperience of government; the obviousdanger is that one #ill end up playing a subservient role" accepting" as in the past" negativedo#n#ard compromises that erode eisting gains in popular support and hand a monopoly ofsocial opposition to the populist =ight.

The government option should be considered" ho#ever" only if the conditions are present toimplement an economic programme that clearly brea$s #ith the austerity policies of the lastdecade. 3ny other decision #ould mean not having learned the lessons of the past years"#hen participation Socialist%led moderate eecutives compromised the credibility of the

radical +eft among the #or$ing classes" social movements and the #ea$est sections ofsociety.

-aced #ith unemployment that in some countries has reached levels never seen since the #ar"it has become a priority to launch an ambitious plan for labour" supported by public

37The other four signatories were Oskar Lafontaine, the former Greek finance

minister Yanis Varoufakis, Zoe Konstantopoulou and the Italian economist Stefano

Fassina.

38The first meeting on the subject was held in Paris on 14-15

November ???????????????????????????????

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investment" #hich has sustainable development as its guiding principle. This should gotogether #ith a clear change of direction regarding the &ob insecurity that has mar$ed all thelatest labour%mar$et reforms!; legislation should also be introduced to set a minimumthreshold belo# #hich #ages cannot be allo#ed to fall. Such measures #ould ma$e it

possible once again for young people to plan their future. There should also be a cut in

#or$ing hours and a lo#ering of the retirement age" thereby restoring some elements ofsocial &ustice to counter the une(ual division of #ealth that has continually gro#n under theneoliberal regime.

To confront the dramatic rise in unemployment" the parties of the radical +eft should promotemeasures that tend to establish a citi)enship income and basic forms of support for the less#ell%off ? from a right to housing through transport concessions to free education ? in such a#ay as to combat poverty and the ever more #idespread social eclusion.3t the same time" it is essential to reverse the privati)ation processes that have mar$ed thecounter%revolution of the last fe# decades. 3ll the common goods transformed from

community services into means of generating profits for the fe# should be restored to publico#nership and control. Ceremy /orbyn!s proposal on renationali)ation of the British rail#ays"as #ell as the need every#here in Europe to invest significant resources in schools anduniversities" indicate the right direction to ta$e.

3s regards the funding of such reforms" this could come from a ta on capital and on the non%productive activity of large corporations" as #ell as on financial transactions and income. 'tis evident that the first necessary means to this end is a referendum to abrogate the fiscalcompact!" and the cancellation of the chains imposed by the Troi$a. 't #ould also be veryimportant to bloc$ approval of the Transatlantic Trade and 'nvestment 6artnership" #hich"if itcame into effect" could only #orsen the situation further.59

3t a continental level" a real alternative is conceivable only if a broad spectrum of politicaland social forces is capable of fighting for and achieving a European conference on therestructuring of public debt.

This can happen only if the radical +eft develops" #ith greater resolve and consistency" avariety of political campaigns and transnational mobili)ations. These should begin #ith there&ection of #ar and enophobia ? an even more decisive issue since the attac$s of 15

4ovember 1F in 6aris ? and support for the etension of citi)enship and full social rights tomigrants arriving on European soil.

3n alternative politics does not allo# of shortcuts. -or it is not enough to trust in charismaticleaders; nor does the #ea$ness of today!s parties &ustify their countermanding by theinstitutions of the state.'t is necessary to build ne# organi)ations ? the +eft needs these asmuch as it did in the t#entieth century* organi)ations that have an etensive presence in the#or$places; organi)ations that strive to unify the struggles of the #or$ers and subalternclasses" at a time #hen these have never been more fragmented; organi)ations #hose localstructures are capable of giving immediate ans#ers 7even before legislation for generalimprovements to the dramatic problems resulting from poverty and social eclusion. 't #ill

39Significant in this respect was the great demonstration of 10 October 2015 in

Berlin, which mobilized 250,000 people against this commercial agreement.

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also help this to happen if the +eft dra#s again on forms of social resistance and solidaritypractised by the #or$ers! movement in other historical epochs.

4e# priorities also need to be defined" especially a real gender e(uality and thoroughpolitical training of younger members. The lodestar for such #or$" in an age #hen democracy

is hostage to technocratic organisms" is the encouragement of ran$%and%file participation andthe development of social struggles.

The only initiatives of the radical +eft that can really aspire to change the course of eventshave a single road before them* to build a ne# social bloc capable of stimulating massopposition to the policies initiated by the 0aastricht Treaty; and therefore to change at theroot the dominant economic approaches in today!s Europe.

XTranslated from the 'talian by 6atric$ /amillerY

40When Syriza came to power in January 2015, it had obtained 2,250,000 votes,

but its total membership was no more than 36,000. Since its assumption of

government responsibilities, the decisions democratically taken by the Greek party

have been repeatedly overturned or disregarded.

Documents

The Post-1989 Radical Left in Europe: Results and Prospects - Marcello Musto