The Positivism-Humanism Debate in Sociology: A Reconsidera tion’

Paul Tibbetts, University of Duyton

This paper examines the claim that positivism and humanism are mutually exclusive alternatives to the study and amelioration of human society. In the first part of the paper, eight theses normally associated with twentieth-century positiv- ism are documented and explicated at length, ranging from the verification doc- trine and the unified-language thesis to an emphasis on the nomological-deductive model of explanation and the fact-value distinction. In the second part the claims associated with a humanistic sociology are then examined, particularly those con- cerning scientism, the value-laden character of all scientific inquiry, and the rela- tion between science and human emancipation. In the third part of the paper a distinction is between those claims which were definitive of positivism and those which were either peripheral or later amended by the leading positivists. It is then argued that a number of the criticisms leveled against positivism such as the lat- ter’s supposed affirmation of strict determinism, of scientism, and that normative considerations, being nondescriptive in character, are of little consequence, are en- tirely unfounded criticisms. Such claims were never an explicit part of the positiv- ist program. On the contrary, it is argued that both contemporary positivism and humanism are motivated by parallel ideals of enlightenment-through-science, by a concern with reliable social knowledge as the basis for rational public policies, and-to quote Hempel-with “the broadening of our (moral) horizons.”

For the past twenty-odd years, positivism (P) in the natural sciences has been waging a defensive war of survival until today it has few advo- cates among either historians or philosophers of science. On the other hand, in the social sciences and particularly in sociology the conflict be- tween (P) and its critics has continued unabated since at least the publica- tion of Comte’s Positive Philosophy in the 1840s and Mill’s On the Logic of the Moral Sciences in 1843.

The (P) expressed in these writings antedates the Vienna Circle by nearly three-quarters of a century. In spite of its longevity, however, rather than being of merely historical interest the controversy concerning (P) is alive and vigorous in the sociological literature and shows little signs of abating and quietly withdrawing from the contemporary scene. In my opinion, the reason for this is that the issues surrounding (P) in sociology are not only highly complex and wide-ranging but entail a number of se- rious normative considerations for which there is little parallel in the natu- ral sciences. To take one example, the behaviorist position regarding the techniques and objectives of sociological inquiry has been labeled as reduc- tionistic, as dehumanizing, as fascistic (with its emphasis on control and manipulation), as an ideology masquerading as science, as reactionary, and kiological Inquiry, Vol. 52, No. 3, Summer 1982 @I982 by The University of Texas Press 0038-0245)5/82/030184-16$! .55

THE POSITIVISM-HUMANISM DEBATE 185

so on. Not even the conflict between Galileo and the Church generated as much literature and heat as has behaviorism. A possible reason for this is that behaviorism directly bears on the most pressing issues in a secular, hu- man-centered society: Who are we? What can we know about ourselves and others? How do we find this out? And what, if anything, are we to do with this knowledge?

Not infrequently the controversy surrounding (P), particularly the (P) of the Vienna Circle, is posed as one between a positivistically-as against a humanistically-conceived sociology (HS), with the former supposedly af- firming and the latter denying the validity of reductionistic and physicalistic models of explanation and inquiry. The controversy has also been framed as one concerning the supposed dehumanizing and alienating account of science popularly associated with (P) and the latter’s purported advocacy of causal determinism and the illusion of self-autonomy. I am not questioning whether a sociology which is humanistic in orientation is hostile to the claims of reductionism, physicalism, and related alienating themes in sci- ence; it clearly is and ought to be. However, it is far from clear to me whether the adoption of (P) logically entailed the adoption of any of these claims. The (P) associated with the Vienna Circle-which is the (P) most frequently attacked by its critics-was far too philosophically sophisticated to seriously entertain determinism, mechanism, and related metaphysical claims. I will suggest that this version of (P) was explicitly intended as a semantic rather than metaphysical program concerning the language, logic, and justificatory criteria of science.

After developing the claims which twentieth-century (P) made con- cerning this ‘semantic program,’ followed by a statement of the humanist position, I will argue that much of the assumed conflict between (P) and a (HS) is unfounded and arises when claims are ascribed to (P) which it in fact did not maintain. In addition, I will suggest that there is a side to (P) which is quite consistent with the humanist’s conception of the role of sci- ence in a democratic society.

The Claims Associated With Positivism, P. 1-P.8

(F! 1) Explicit adoption of the deductive-nomological model of expla- nation: The only legitimate form of explanation in science is the logical derivation of an explanation of a particular event from a set of empirically true laws together with a set of propositions concerning the relevant bound- ary conditions of independent variables affecting the event in question (Hempel, 1965:245-258). Popper (In Adorno et al., 1976:lOO) describes this model as follows:

The tentative solution of the problem-that is, the explanation-always consists of a theory, a deductive system, which permits us to explain the explicanduni by connect- ing it logically with other facts (the so-called initial conditions). A completely explicit explanation always consists in pointing out the logical derivation (or the derivability) of

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the explicandum from the theory strengthened by some initial conditions.

(P.2) The systematic and rigorous exclusion of all metaphysical claims from the domain of genuine cognitive assertions. As Ayer (1934:335) re- marked in his “Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics”:

My purpose is to prove that any attempt to describe the nature or even to assert the existence of something lying beyond the reach of empirical observation must consist in the enunciation of pseudo-propositions, a pseudo-proposition being a series of words that may seem to have the structure of a sentence but is in fact meaningless.

(P.3) Reductionism and the ‘unified language’ thesis: All observation sentences in all the sciences can be expressed with predicates describing the properties of physical objects. (This ‘unity’ extends primarily to the obser- vational languages of the various sciences and not necessarily to their re- spective methodological procedures of inquiry.) Carnap’s (in Neurath et al., 1938:53-62) statement of the unified language thesis is as follows:

There is a unity o j h n g u g t in science, viz., a common reduction basis for the terms of all branches of science, this basis consisting of a very narrow and homogeneous class of terms of the physical thing-language. [These observable thing-predicates include] ‘hot’ and ‘cold,’ together with ‘heavy’ and ‘light,’ ‘red,’ ‘blue,’ ‘large,’ ‘small,’ ‘thick,’ ‘thin,’ etc.

[Regarding the social sciences,] the application of any term can be formulated in terms of psychology, biology, and physics, including the thing-language. Many terms can even be defined on that basis, and the rest is certainly reducible to it.

If now the terms of different branches [of science] had no logical connection be- tween one another, such as is supplied by the homogeneous reduction basis, but were of fundamentally different character, . . . then it would not be possible to connect singular statements and laws of different fields in such a way as to derive predictions from them. Therefore, the unity of the language of science is the basis for the practical application of theoretical knowledge.

(P.4) The verification doctrine concerning cognitive significance: In order for an assertion to be empirically meaningful it must, in principle, be capable of verification. As Ayer (1934:337) writes:

. . . to give the meaning of a proposition is to give the conditions under which.it would be true and those under which it would be false. I understand a proposition if I know what observations I must make in order to establish its truth or falsity. . . . To indicate the situation which verifies a proposition is to indicate what the proposition means.

Moritz Schlick’s (1936:341) version of this thesis is as follows:

Stating the meaning of a sentence amounts to stating the rules according to which the sentence is to be used, and this is the same as stating the way in which it can be verified (or falsified). The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification.

(P.5) An operational definition of the empirical concepts of science: “In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of opera- tions; the concept i s synonymous wi th the corresponding set of operations.’’ (Bridgman, 192 7 : 5)

The doctrine of phenomenalism or that all empirical claims (P.6)

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which purport to be genuine must ultimately be grounded in and verified by sensory observation. To quote Schlick (1935:69) again, “the only ultimate reason why I accept any proposition as true is to be found in those simple experiences which may be regarded as the final steps of comparison be- tween a statement and a fact . . .” Elaborating on this thesis, Kolakowski (1966:3-4) remarks that according to phenomenalism,

We are entitled to record only that which is actually manifested in experience; opinions concerning occult entities of which experienced things are supposedly the mani- festations are untrustworthy. Disagreements over questions that go beyond the domain of experience are purely verbal in character. It must be noted here that positivists do not reject every distinction between “manifestation” and “cause.” . . . For positivists do not object to inquiry into the immediately invisible causes of any observed phenomenon, they object only to any accounting for it in terms of occult entities that are by definition inaccessible to human knowledge.

(P.7) The sharp dichotomy for (P) between factual and normative questions: Though science might clarify what means are most effective to obtaining a desired goal, science is simply incapable in principle of resolv- ing the issue of what values and objectives to pursue. As Hempel (1965:86-89) writes,

Categorical judgements of value, then, are not amenable to scientific test and con- firmation or disconfirmation; for they do not express assertions but rather standards or norms for conduct. . . . Science can render an indispensable service by providing us with increasingly extensive and reliable information relevant to our purpose; but again it remains for us to evaluate the various probable sets of consequences of the alternative choices under consideration. And this requires the adoption of pertinent valuational standards which are not objectively determined by the empirical facts.

In a similar vein, Popper (in Adorno et al., 1976:97) also argues that “it is one of the tasks of scientific criticism and scientific discussion to fight against the confusion of value-spheres and, in particular, to separate extra- scientific evaluations from questions of truth.”

A sharp distinction is to be drawn between the ‘context of dis- covery’ and the ‘context of verification or justification’: Though explana- tory hypotheses can be postulated by a variety of techniques (e.g., Vmstehen, empathy, hunches, etc.) the justification of such hypotheses ultimately re- quires reference to more objective procedures, namely, verification (or falsi- fication) by the community of (scientific) inquirers. Regarding Erstehen, for example, Abel (1948:218) writes that

(P.8)

Primarily the operation of V2rstchm does two things: It relieves us of a sense of apprehen- sion in connection with behavior that is unfamiliar or unexpected and it is a source of “hunches,” which help us in the formulation of hypotheses.

The operation of Vmstzhm does not, however, add to our store of knowledge . . . ; nor does it serve as a means of verification. The probability of a connection can be as- certained only by means of objective, experimental, and statistical tests.

Weber had earlier defended a variation of the above claim with his distinc-

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tion between grasping the meaning of an action through Verstehen and, on the other hand, providing an objective, causally adequate translation of one’s initial, subjective interpretation. To quote Weber (1978: 11-12; italics in last sentence added),

The interpretation of a sequence of events . . . will be called cullsally adequate in- sofar as, according to established generalizations from experience, there is a probability that it will always occur in the same way. . . . A correct causal interpretation of typical action means that the process which is claimed to be typical is shown to be both ade- quately grasped on the level of meaning and at the same time the interpretation is to some degree causal4 adequate.

Before turning to the next part of this paper it should be noted that all of the above theses associated with (P) have been attacked in one way or another.’ Accordingly, though few philosophers of science would subscribe to any of the above eight theses without qualification, I would not go so far as to claim that nothing in the strict positivist position (as represented in these eight theses) has been salvaged or is even worth salvaging. To the extent that some version of empiricism is considered as epistemologically foundational to scientific inquiry then we can expect to find variations on these theses reappearing with differing degrees of emendation in the litera- ture. The flurry of negative responses to Feyerabend’s recent defense of epistemological anarchism and of the claim that science is but one myth, one ideology among others, suggests that the verification thesis, the science- metaphysics dichotomy, and the distinction between factual as against nor- mative claims, continues to have wide support. (Gellner, 1975; Hat- tiangadi, 1977; Kulka, 1977; for replies to this literature see Feyerabend, 1979.) As I have written elsewhere,

Given that positivism ranges over a variety of theses and claims, and also given that some of these claims are indistinguishable from good empiricism, we cannot jetison positivism in toto without at the same time undermining the empiricism upon which all science-including sociology-is grounded. . . . In other words, I am questioning whether one could be an empiricist and in the same breath deny that positivism . . . has any merit whatsoever! (Tibbetts, 1979:20-21)

With this statement of the classical positivist position in mind, together with some suggested references concerning the status of (P) in the more re- cent literature, I turn now to criticisms of (P) by those theorists defending a more humanistic conception of science.

The Claims of a Humanistic Sociology HS.1-HS.8

The claims commonly associated with a (HS)-and with a humanistic approach to science in general-are as follows.

(HS. 1) The presupposition of voluntarism: Human beings are auton- omous agents capable of rational reflection and purposive action toward freely posited goals.

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(HS.2) The function of sociology and science in general is emancipa- tory, that is, to liberate humans from coercive and alienating economic, so- cia1 and ideological forces. This is in contrast with the supposed tendency of (P) towards Machiavellian control and manipulation.

Such liberation comes about through increased self-under- standing and consciousness raising concerning one’s motives, value priori- ties, and the variety of forces stimulating and delimiting human expression. In “Sociology and Humane Learning,” Bierstedt (1974:317-321) remarks that

(HS.3)

sociology, like the other arts, is one of the ornaments of the human mind, that its litera- ture extending from Plato to our contemporaries is in a great and humane tradition, that sociology-like all of the liberal arts-liberates us from the provincialisms of time and place and circumstance, . . . I think we ought to take much more seriously and literally the view that sociology can also serve as a bridge between the sciences and the humanities and that in a very important sense it belongs to the realm of humane letters.

(HS.4) This liberation through increased self-understanding can also result, according to Berger (1963:163), in

compassion, limited commitment and a sense of,the comic in man’s social carnival. This will lead to a posture uis-a-uis society based on a perception of the latter as essentially a comedy, in which men parade up and down with their gaudy costumes, change hats and titles, hit each other with the sticks they have or the ones they can persuade their fellow actors to believe in. . . . One will refuse to take seriously the rules of the game, except insofar as these rules protect real human beings and foster real human values.

(HS.5) The denial of ‘scientism,’ particularly the dogma that science and science alone possesses the only genuine methods and techniques for understanding social reality. Feyerabend (1975:299-300), one of the most voracious critics of scientism, remarks that

science still reigns supreme. It reigns supreme because its practitioners are unable to under- stand, and unwilling to condone, different ideologies, because they have the power to en- force their wishes, and because they use this power just as their ancestors used their power to force Christianity on the peoples they encountered during their conquests. . . . This separation of science and state may be our only chance to overcome the hectic bar- barism of our scientific-technical age and to achieve a humanity we are capable of, but have never fully realized.

C . Wright Mills also attacked scientism, though on somewhat different grounds from those of Feyerabend. To quote Mills (1959:16):

‘science’ seems to many less a creative ethos and a manner of orientation than a set of Science Machines, operated by technicians . . . who neither embody nor understand sci- ence as ethos and orientation. In the meantime, philosophers who speak in the name of science often transform it into ‘scientism,’ making out its experience to be identical with human experience, and claiming that only by its method can the problems of life be solved. With a11 this, many cultural workmen have come to feel that ‘science’ is a false and pretentious Messiah, or at the very least a highly ambiguous element in modern civilization.

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(HS.6) All science, whether social or physical, is a value-impregnated activity, and rather than being the objective, value-neutral form of inquiry its positivist adherents claim, science is but one value perspective on reality among others. The social scientist should recognize this and therefore, without a guilty conscience, consciously and explicitly commit himself or herself to the pursuit and realization of values most consistent with a hu- manistic perspective. As Gouldner (1973: 13) has written,

Social science can never be fully accepted in a society, or by a part of it, without paying its way; this means it must manifest both its relevance and concern for the con- temporary human predicament. Unless the value relevances of sociological inquiry are made plainly evident, unless there are at least some bridges between it and larger hu- man hopes and purposes, it must inevitably be scorned by laymen as pretentious word- mongering.

(HS.7) Related to the previous claim is the thesis that sociological in- quiry can not and ought not be divorced from the potential effects that re- search might have on the quality of human life. The sociologist therefore has a responsibility to the larger public, a responsibility which far out- weighs his or her responsibility to a given funding agency, to academia, to national interests, or whatever. The sociologist should therefore serve only humanity, not his or her career or even preservation as a social scientist. In this context, Project Camelot is a classic example of research with an inverted set of value-priorities!

The intentional, subjective and interpretative elements in hu- man action cannot simply be ignored or conceived of as mere epiphenom- ena. Human beings are not mere automata, mechanically responding to stimulus inputs, environmental contingencies, and socially prearranged schedules of reinforcement. Robert Lynd (1939:63, 70) expresses this point in the following words:

(HS.8)

granting all due weight to the institutionalized past as it conditions present behavior, the variables in the social scientist’s equation must include not only the given set of struc- tured institutions, but also what the present human carriers of those institutions are groping to become. . . . Since it is human beings that build culture and make it go, the social scientist’s criteria of the significant cannot stop short of those human beings’ cri- teria of the significant. The values of human beings living together in the pursuit of their deeper and more persistent purposes constitute the frame of reference that identi- fies significance for social science.

What Claims are Definitive of (P)?

The above list should not be construed as exhausting the humanistic position regarding scientific inquiry and its objectives, no more so than the claims discussed under (P.1 to P.8) were intended to cover all features of that position. In addition, there may very well be no one individual who could subscribe to all the points listed above under either (P) or a (HS). However, subscription to a ‘cluster’ of these claims appears sufficient to be labeled the one or the other. Von Wright (1971:9), for example, defines (P)

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in terms of “methodological monism, mathematical ideals of perfection, and a subsumption-theoretic view of scientific explanation.” I have said nothing about the formal-mathematical emphasis sometimes associated with (P) largely because it is an ideal only realizable in principle in the more advanced physical sciences. Conversely, the other two requirements listed by von Wright are characteristics of (P) in a wider range of disciplines than is the mathematical emphasis.

On the other hand, Rossides (1978:8) defines (P) in general terms as “the belief that human beings can rationally understand and control phe- nomena.” Concerning neo(P) in particular, Rossides (529-530) later states the following defining features:

equates knowledge and human well-being with science . . . denies that science can vali- date values . . . professes a radical nominalism . . . rejects recourse to concepts or values in science . . . rejects the reality of subjectivity in general . . . advocates a quan- titative sociology . . . sees all reality as that which is measured by scientific measuring devices (operationalism) . . . and makes every attempt to model social science on natural science.

Notice that nothing is said regarding phenomenalism, the verification doctrine, the science-metaphysics distinction, the deductive-nomological model of explanation, and the unified language thesis! Given the emphasis placed by such neo-positivists as Neurath on the unity of science issue, by the (early) Carnap on phenomenalism, by Hempel on deductivism, by Schlick and Ayer on verification, and by the positivists in general on the science-metaphysics distinction, Rossides’ characterization of (P) must be considered grossly inadequate. However, I would maintain that with the possible exception of (I? 1) the deductive-nomological model of explanation, (l? 5) operationalism (with which many positivists came to have serious res- ervations), and (P.6) phenomenalism, all the other theses mentioned above (i .e. , (P2 to PI and P 7 to P8)) are in my opinion dejinitiue of(P). They are definitive because it was this particular cluster of theses which was consistently de- fended over time by the great majority of the leading positivists (that is, by Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach, Feigl, Neurath, et al.).

To take a further recent characterization, Giddens (1978:237) lists the following “series of connected perspectives” as associated with (P):

phenomenalism. . . , an aversion to metaphysics. . . , the representation of philosophy as a method of analysis parasitic upon the findings of science, the duality of fact and value. . . , and the notion of the “unity of science”- the idea that the natural and social sciences share a common logical and perhaps even methodological foundation.

Giddens’ account clearly converges with my own characterization of what is defining of (P), for he too does not apparently consider hypothetico- deductivism and operationism as definitive. Though he does mention phe- nomenalism, he defines it loosely as the thesis that ‘“reality’ consists of sense impressions,” a position held by Ernst Mach but not by any of the positivists I am familiar with particularly given the metaphysical connota-

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tions of this assertion. In any case, I stand closer to Giddens than to either von Wright or Rossides concerning what is and what is not definitive of

Finally, Kolakowski (1968:3-8) singles out the following ‘rules’ which for him characterize (P): (1) the rule of phenomenalism (“we are entitled to record only that which is actually manifested in experience”), (2) the rule of nominalism (that is, “any insight formulated in general terms can [not] have real referents other than individual concrete objects”), (3) value judgements have no cognitive significance, and (4) the essential unity of the scientific method. Kolakowski’s account at least has the merit of including (P.3), the unity of science thesis, though he frames it in terms of the unity of methodological procedures of inquiry rather than as the unified language thesis. By way of contrast with Kolakowski’s interpretation, notice in the following quotation that Carnap (1938:48) is talking about a unity of term, predicates, and language and not about a unity or reduction of methods.

(P).

when we ask whether there is a unity in science, we mean this as a question of logic, concerning the logical relationships between the terms and the laws of the various branches of science. Since it belongs to the logic of science, the question concerns scien- tists and logicians alike.

Carnap (1938:60) then concludes that

The result of our analysis is that the class of observable thing-predicates is a sufficient reduction basis for the whole of the language of science, . . . Concerning (P.3) or the unified language thesis, I conclude that insofar

as this claim concerns a hypothetical semantic program for scientific dis- course then its merits can only be adequately judged in terms of its realiz- ability in practice. In point of fact, due to serious conceptual problems raised by Quine and others (Quine, 1960; Davidson and Hintikka, 1975) concerning the synonymy and preservation of meaning when translating from one realm of discourse to another, the realization of (P.3) is highly questionable. As to Carnap’s physicalistic version of semantic reduction, this appears to no longer be a live issue: the language of observable thing-predi- cates was simply too closely identified with the theory of sense-data to sur- vive when the latter was abandoned by philosophers of language and phi- losophers of science.

In any case, a (HS) had nothing to fear in my opinion from the uni- fied language thesis given that the latter was nothing but a semantic or lin- guistic maneuver. (P) never said that the subject matter of sociology is reduc- ible to that of individual psychology and, in turn, to that of animal biology, neurophysiology and organic chemistry. This would have been too meta- physical a claim for any logical positivist to assert. What they did claim was that the language descriptive of social behavior can, in principle, be system- atically replaced by a language the descriptive predicates of which denoted purely physicdobservable properties. If there is an elimination here it is

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not of humans per se (whatever that would mean) but of one type of de- scriptive predicates in favor of another. The conflict between (P) and a (HS) concerning thesis (€! 3) therefore concerns a preference for one ‘lin- guistic grid’ over another and I fail to see where a (HS) would be threat- ened by a mere semantic preference.

Humanistic Sociology and Positivism

Let us now look more specifically at the claims noted above associated with a (HS), particularly those claims supposedly in collision with (P). For a (HS) a distinguishing and perhaps unique feature of human beings is the existence of a mental life wherein reflections, imaginings, and thoughts oc- cur. (HS.8) However, it would be a serious mistake to uncritically assume that for (P) there is no mental life and that even if there were it could not be grasped introspectively. Carnap (1938:57) himself wrote that

the facts themselves to which the term ‘introspection’ is meant to refer will scarcely be denied by anybody, e.g. , the fact that a person sometimes knows that he is angry with- out applying any of those procedures which another person would have to apply, i e . , without looking with the help of a physiological instrument at his nervous system or looking at the play of his facial muscles.

So much for what one positivist had to say regarding human subjectiv- ity and introspection. As to the matter of whether such cognitive states are causally efficacious or are mere epiphenomena of cerebral processes (HS. l ) , Carnap and other positivists rightly avoided metaphysical questions con- cerning the freedom-determinism issue. On this point I am personally sym- pathetic with the position that ‘free-will talk’ versus ‘casual-determinism talk’ reduces to an essentially arbitrary preference for one preferred mode of speech over the other. To say this is not to ignore the important ramifi- cations for sociological theories and, on a more concrete level, for social policies that adoption of the one mode of speech may entail over the other; there could be political and ideological considerations at work here in one’s semantic choice. In any case, the last thing the sophisticated positivist wants to do is to dogmatize about unresolvable metaphysical issues such as ‘Is human behavior, in the final analysis, free or determined?’ ‘To what extent, if any, are we autonomous agents?’ ‘Is human reason and rational- ity an illusion, a mere epiphenomenon?’

Regarding (HS.6), or the claim that all scientific inquiry is value-laden and that a value-free, totally objective stance is an illusion, we find even critics of (P) having mixed feelings on this issue. Gouldner (1973:ll-12), for example, recognizes that the value-free doctrine

could and sometimes did aid men in transcending the morality of their ‘tribe’, to open themselves to the diverse moralities of unfamiliar groups, and to see themselves and others from the standpoint of a wider range of significant cultures.

Andreski, another critic of (P) in sociology and of the fact-value distinction,

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also has second thoughts concerning the possible utility of a (relatively) value-free objectivity in sociological inquiry and explanation. In a chapter entitled, “Evasion in the Guise of Objectivity,’’ Andreski (1972:94) begins with the question,

what could be more ethically neutral, w&e<, non-hortatory, non-valuative, call it what you will, than the question of how many people fall into which income bracket? Yet the statistics of income distribution can be regarded as highly inflammable material in a sys- tem which claims to have abolished inequality of classes.

However, Andreski (1972:98, 104) later adds that

We can discern a trend towards a more exclusive concern to understand through dispas- sionate analysis rather than to apportion blame-towards objectivity, if you like. [But] the ideal of objectivity is much more complex and elusive than the pedlars of method- ological gimmicks would have us believe; and that it requires much more than an adher ence to the technical rules of verification, or recourse to recondite unemotive terminol- ogy: namely, a moral commitment to justice-the will to be fair to people and institutions, to avoid the temptations of wishful and venomous thinking, and the courage to resist threats and enticement.

Such a position regarding objectivity and the fact-value issue is not at all foreign to the positivist tradition. Hempel (1965), for example, in a little referred-to article, argues, first of all, that by providing relevant factual in- formation, science can place us in a position from which to make more in- formed and therefore intelligent decisions. Secondly, such information can involve a revision in our value priorities, “not by ‘disconfirming’ them, of course, but rather by motivating a change in our total appraisal of the is- sues in question” (Hempel, 1965:94). Thirdly, though social scientific studies can not validate any system of value, the results of such inquiries can “psychologically effect changes in our outlook on moral issues by broadening our horizons . . . and by thus providing some safeguard against moral dogmatism or parochialism” (Hempel, 1965:94). I fail to see how any representative of a (HS) could fault Hempel for this reasoned and moderate position regarding science, objectivity, and human values. It is certainly in the spirit of the remarks above by Gouldner and Andreski. As some readers might suspect, positivists and their critics are equally con- cerned with exposing and eliminating attempts to enlist scientific findings in support of one or another thinly disguised set of normative or ideological imperatives, particularly imperatives of a dogmatic and cognitively opaque character.

Finally, there is (P.2) or the elimination of metaphysics and related cognitiveiy meaningless discourse from science proper, and (P4) or the veri- fication doctrine. I have argued that these two theses are definitive of (P). Unfortunately, in spite of numerous attempts no cognitively adequate ver- sion of either (P2) or (P.4) has thus far appeared. Regarding the verifica- tion doctrine, for example, Hempel (1965:3-51) himself discovered a num- ber of serious logical paradoxes associated with confirmation, and

THE POSITIVISM-HUMANISM DEBATE 195

Goodman (1965:59-83) raised the still unresolved ‘grue paradox’ concern- ing induction and verification. Popper’s (1959) falsification rather than veri- fication emphasis supposedly avoided these and related problems regarding justification through induction but was itself criticized by Lakatos (1970:93-132) for ignoring the distinction between naive as against sophis- ticated falsification. Then there was the problem of what it was which was verified (or falsified): Individual observation statements? Clusters of such statements? Theories in general? Or even, what Lakatos (1970: 132-138) termed, entire ‘research programmes’? A further unresolved problem con- cerned the cognitive status of the verification thesis itself it was neither true ,by definition nor itself empirically verifiable and therefore cognitively meaningless by positivism’s own criteria of significance!

If (P2) or the verification doctrine is problematic then so, in turn, is (P.4) for how can scientific statements be clearly demarcated from meta- physical assertions unless we are already clear as to what constitutes an em- pirical verification? (P.2) and (P4) therefore stand and fall together. Though most of us, including this writer, are sympathetic with (P.2) it should in all honesty be recognized that this bias against metaphysics and ‘pseudo sci- ence’ in general remains only a bias and without adequate cognitive war- rant until the logical and conceptual problems associated with the verifica- tion doctrine (as raised by Hempel, Goodman, Lakatos, Feyerabend, and others) are satisfactorily resolved, though recognizing that what will count as a ‘satisfactory’ resolution is itself problematic.

However, it would be a mistake to think that the cognitive status of (P2) and (P.4) is merely an in-house debate among epistemologists and phi- losophers of science and therefore of little or no consequence to a (HS). Unless a humanist is prepared to be so open-minded (or indifferent) as to allow any set of claims to be cognitively meaningful, then he or she will be as suspicious as the positivist of quasi- or even pseudo-scientific assertions. How many of those who call themselves humanists and who also think of themselves as scientists are prepared to admit, say, that magic can raise the dead, that witchcraft can cure leukemia, or that astrology can predict (in detail) election returns. Most of us, whether humanists or not, have little faith in such modes of inquiry. We do not have to be strict positivists to recognize the rationale behind the verification doctrine and the cognitively meaningful-meaningless distinction: the exclusion of what most of us con- sider to be sheer nonsense as distinct from those forms of inquiry (broadly labeled ‘scientific’) which we have come to identify with reliable empirical knowledge.

In this sense, even a Frank Giddings, who is usually thought of as but a statistically oriented sociologist, explicitly recognized the humanistic im- plications of empirical evidence and verification in the study of social phe- nomena. As Giddings (1924:362) wrote,

For practical reasons even more than for merely intellectual ones, we need rigor

196 PAUL TIBBETTS

ously scientific studies of human society and of our individual relations to it. In particu- lar we need such studies of the societal interests that are labeled “public policy,” . . . I am aware that this proposition is resented by men and women who suffer from an anti- “academic” complex and worry lest “the human touch” . . . shall have spontaneity squeezed out of them by theory. . . . [However,] Facing the facts that the social sciences are making known to us, and will make better known, should enable us to diminish human misery and to live more wisely than the human race has lived hitherto. . . . I! will be discovered one dny that the chief value of social science, far from being academic, is moral. (Italics added.)

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, I have suggested throughout this paper that (P) and a (HS) need not be thought of as defending mutually exclusive and antago- nistic claims. On the contrary, it should now be clear that a number of writers who ascribe to a cluster of themes in (J?l)-(P8) see themselves as continuing the traditions of the Enlightenment. This is particularly evident in their enlightenment-through-science emphasis, their concern with reli- able social knowledge as the basis for public policies, and with the “broad- ening of our (moral) horizons,” as Hempel phrased it. (P) has of course at times tipped dangerously close to scientism, a dogma which a (HS) is rightly hostile to (HS.5). Other than this particular claim, however, I have argued that none of the other theses explicated in (HS.l)-(HS.8) is inher- ently incompatible with the outlook labeled as ‘positivistic.’

I am not of course suggesting that (P) and a (HS) are perfectly com- patible on all scores. On the contrary, there was a fascination by positivists with formal deductive theorizing, quantification, and formal model buiding which is entirely foreign to the spirit of a humanistic conception of science, In addition, the high degree of law-like explanation and experimental con- trol evident in the more advanced physical sciences exercised considerable influence on practically all twentieth-century positivists. Such an influence has been entirely absent in humanism. Finally, though I have argued at length that the positivists were not at all indifferent to the matter of science and normative considerations, it must be admitted that humanists have consistently been far more vocal and vigorous in their vision of the limits, responsibility and function of science in a free society. Though these are certainly points of contrast worth noting, they should not blind us to the significant parallels and even convergences between these two complemen- tary frameworks of analysis.

ENDNOTES

* I wish to thank my colleagues Stan Saxton, Zane Zembaty and Ray Herbenick for their many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

T H E POSITIVISM-HUMANISM DEBATE 197

’ The deductive-nomological model of explanation, for example, has been extensively crit- icized by Scriven (1959, 1962), defended by Hempel (1962), Brodbeck (1962) and Schemer (1963), reattacked by Scriven (1968), and subsequently redefined by Feigl (1970) and Hempel (1970, 1974). Concerning the demarcation of metaphysical and non-scientific assertions from science proper, Feyerabend (1975) has vigorously resisted this claim, arguing that no such de- marcation exists and that even magic and witchcraft provide genuine empirical knowledge. Also see Tibbetts’ critique (1977) and Feyerabend’s response (1978). As to the phenomenalist thesis, it has been so critiqued and revised as to be practically unrecognizable from its original formulation by Schlick, Carnap and Ayer. For a beginning I recommend Quine (1961), Han- son (1958, 1969), Hesse (1970), and Tibbetts (1975).

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