The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 13 | Issue 32 | Number 2 | Article ID 4356 | Aug 10, 2015

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The Politics of Reconstruction and Reconciliation in U.S-JapanRelations—Dismantling the Atomic Bomb Ruins of Nagasaki’sUrakami Cathedral

Tomoe Otsuki

Abstract: This paper explores the politicssurrounding the dismantling of the ruins ofNagasaki’s Urakami Cathedral. It shows howU.S-Japan relations in the mid-1950s shapedthe 1958 decision by the Catholic community ofUrakami to dismantle and subsequently toreconstruct the ruins. The paper also assessesthe significance of the struggle over the ruinsof the Urakami Cathedral for understanding therespective responses to atomic bombing ofHiroshima and Nagasaki. It further casts newlight on the wartime role of the CatholicChurch and of Nagai Takashi.

Keywords: Nagasaki, Atomic Bomb, UrakamiCathedral, the People-to-People program,Lucky Dragon # 5 incident, Japaneseantinuclear movement, the peaceful use ofnuclear energy, sister city relation betweenNagasaki and St. Paul, U.S.-Japan SecurityAlliance.

The two photographs below depict theremnants of the Urakami Cathedral followingthe atomic bombing of Nagasaki. Both weretaken in 1953 by Takahara Itaru, a formerMainichi Shimbun photographer as well as aNagasaki hibakusha. Most of the childrenplaying beside the ruins were born after theatomic bombing and grew up in Urakami’satomic field. Takahara’s photographs capturethe remnants of the cathedral in shaping thepostwar landscape and lives of people in andaround Urakami.1

Remnants of the Southern Wall and statues of thesaints of Urakami Cathedral

Photo courtesy of Takahara Itaru

Children play in remnants of belfry of UrakamiCathedral

Photo Courtesy of Takahara Itaru

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The Urakami Cathedral was inaugurated in1914 and completed in 1925 with theinstallation of the twin belfries. But eventsleading to its construction date back to the latenineteenth century. Christianity was outlawedby the Japanese government from theseventeenth century to the late nineteenthcentury. In 1873, when the Meiji governmentlifted the ban on Christianity, approximately1,900 Urakami Catholic villagers, who hadsurvived exile and persecution, returned toUrakami. In June 1880, they purchased landfrom the village headman and converted ahouse into a temporary church. The propertyhad been the site of the memory of the UrakamiCatholics’ martyrdom; it was exactly the sitewhere their ancestors were ordered to trampleon Christian images (the practice was called‘fumi-e’) in order to demonstrate renunciationof Christianity to the feudal authorities. Thiswas also the site where many of their ancestorsrefused to renounce their faith in the face ofthe torture and death.2 In 1895, about 5,000Urakami Catholics decided to construct acathedral. According to the oral history of theUrakami Catholic community, the constructionof the cathedral was paid for by a tithe in whicheach parishioner donated a portion of theirscant wages. Many of them went to town to sellvegetables, and purchase bricks on their wayback with the money they had earned. Theyalso physically contributed to the constructionby manually carving stones and laying bricks. Ittook thirty years to complete the Romanesquecathedral. Every corner was adorned withcarvings and statues of Christ, Mary, and thesaints. The Urakami Catholics believed that thecathedral symbolized retribution for fourcenturies of faith and sacrifice. It was thegrandest church in the Far East.3

On August 9, 1945, twenty-four UrakamiCatholics were preparing to celebrate theAssumption of the Virgin Mary, and FatherTamaya Fusayoshi was hearing confession. Atthe same time, the American B-29 bomber“Bockscar” was redirected from Kokura to

Nagasaki due to haze and smoke obscuring thetarget site of the large ammunition arsenal inthe city of Kokura. None of the twenty-fivepeople in the cathedral survived the bombexplosion. In March 1958, the remnants of thecathedral were demolished. In 1959, theUrakami Cathedra l was complete lyreconstructed, leaving no trace of thedestruction of the original cathedral or thedemolition of its remnants. Only photographsremain to testify to its destruction.

While many older residents remember thedismantling of the ruins as an ‘unfortunate’event, younger residents were generallyoblivious of the existence of the ruins until2000 when Nagasaki Broadcasting Company(NBC), a private media corporation, produced adocumentary entitled “God and the AtomicBomb – The Past 55 Years of the UrakamiCatholic Hibakusha” (神と原爆―浦上カトリックの５５年). NBC’s documentary depicts howthe General Headquarters of U.S. occupation(GHQ) decided to permit the publication of TheBells of Nagasaki written by Nagai Takashi,Urakami’s Catholic doctor and atomic bombvictim, in 1949, and how Nagai’s biblicalinterpretation of Nagasaki’s atomic bombing as“divine providence” and his biblical narrative of“forgiveness,” “reconciliation” and “prayers”have shaped the historical consciousness ofUrakami Catholic atomic bomb survivors oversubsequent decades. In one of scene in thedocumentary, a female Urakami Catholichibakusha quietly watches the local TV newsreport on a U.S. nuclear test. The viewer seesonly her face and her gaze turning towards theTV screen as an anchor reports that thepurpose of the nuclear test was to examine the“safety” and “reliability” of U.S. nuclearweapons. Her face, half of which is covered bya keloid, seems impassive. But she bites her lipas if holding back tears. After the news, sheoffers a prayer. Then, she says:

I did have anger inside me toward

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America. But all I could do wasseek the support of God and prayto him to keep me alive anotherday and give me the strength tosurvive tomorrow. I am still angry,but there is nothing I can do. Ican’t join a movement or cry out inprotest. All we can do as part ofour [Catholic] teaching is to prayfor peace. That is all we can do inour position, no matter how angrywe may be.4

The documentary records how Nagasaki mayor,Tagawa Tsutomu, who had previously favouredpreservation of the ruins of the cathedral,changed his position following a 1956 trip tothe United States. The official purpose ofTagawa’s trip was to visit Nagasaki’s sistercity, St. Paul. The sister city agreement wassigned on December 7, 1955, the daycommemorating the attack on Pearl Harbour.The documentary also discloses that BishopYamaguchi Aijiro, an influential figure in theNagasaki Catholic community who was alsoinvited by an American Catholic institution tothe United States in 1955, determined todismantle the ruins upon his return. During onescene of “God and the Atomic Bomb,” aninterview is conducted with Nakajima Banri, anUrakami priest who, in response to thequestion of why the Urakami Catholiccommunity agreed to the dismantling of theruins, reluctantly said, “there were someexternal forces from the United States andinternational politics ...” 5 Nakajima alsomumbled that, “the Ministry of Foreign Affairsof Japan was also concerned… because theUrakami Cathedral was damaged by the UnitedStates…”6 Similarly, Ikematsu Tsuneoki, aformer Nagasaki city official and the first chiefcurator of the Nagasaki International CulturalHall (The predecessor of today’s NagasakiAtomic Bomb Museum), told a close friend that“preservation of the ruins [of the cathedral]would have caused some problem for the

United States”.7 Consequently, a considerablesum of money was donated from the UnitedStates to the Nagasaki Catholic Church toreconstruct the Urakami Cathedral oncondition that the ruins be dismantled.Ikematsu, however, never revealed where themoney came from because, he said, “those whoare involved in the politics are still alive”.8

In 2009, Takase Tsuyoshi, a journalist andsecond generation Nagasaki atomic bombsurvivor, published a book entitled Nagasaki:Another Atomic Bomb Dome Lost (ナガサキ—消えたもうひとつの原爆ドーム ) . Takaseconducted archival research in the UnitedStates and Japan to find out whom Tagawa hadmet during his 1956 trip, and if, and how thosehe met had persuaded Tagawa to dismantle theruins. He traced the role of the United StatesInformation Agency (USIA) in the sister cityproject, and shows that St. Paul officials haddrafted an agreement for sister city relations tobe signed by Mayor Tagawa on his scheduled(but postponed) trip to the city on December7th, 1955, the fourteenth anniversary of thePearl Harbor Attack. Takase concludes that thepurpose of the sister city relationship was tosymbolize the mutual forgiveness andreconciliation between the United States andJapan, and that the ruins were dismantled as asymbolic gesture of Nagasaki’s commitment tomove toward a more peaceful future byforgetting the tragedy. One retired Nagasakioff icial I interviewed in August 2010acknowledged that city workers had beenaware of the role that politics played indismantling the ruins of Urakami, but addedthat discussion of the topic had remained‘taboo’ among them.9

Takase was the first to catalogue the evidenceof U.S. involvement in Nagasaki’s decision todismantle the ruins. However, some questionshave not yet been fully answered. For instance,why did the United States seek a symbolicgesture of reconciliation between Japan and theUnited States centered on the atomic bombing

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in the mid-1950s? What role did the Nagasakiand Japanese governments play in the politicsof dismantling the Urakami Cathedral ruins andshaping remembrance/oblivion of the atomicbomb memory? What accounts for the verydi f ferent act ion of Hiroshima in thepreservation of the Atomic Dome, and withwhat consequences?

This article examines the politics surroundingthe dismantling of the ruins of the UrakamiCathedral in the face of strong oppositionamong the residents of Nagasaki and theatomic bomb survivors, the ‘hibakusha.’ It thenexplores the different outcome of the twoatomic bomb ruins— Hiroshima’s Atomic Domeand Urakami Cathedral—and reflects on thesignificance of the ruins of the UrakamiCathedral.

Debating the Fate of the Cathedral Ruins(1949-1956)

In April 1949, Ohashi Hiroshi, the mayor ofNagasaki, established the Committee for thePreservation of the Remains of the AtomicBombing (原爆遺構保存委員会) as a municipaladvisory body. From April 1949 to March 1958,the committee held twenty-seven meetings,nine of which were dedicated to the fate of thecathedral ruins. In all nine meetings, thecommittee members voted in favour ofpreserving the ruins.10

On September 1st, 1951, an article in theNagasaki Nichi-Nichi Shinbun asked: “ShouldUrakami Cathedral Be Preserved?” andincluded a comment by Ishida Hisashi, chair ofthe Committee for the Preservation of theRemains of the Atomic Bombing:

I believe that for the sake of bothtourism and peace, Nagasaki cityshould preserve the cathedral as awork of art and as a testimonial tothe atomic bombing. I f i t isdemolished, what does Nagasaki

intend to preserve as a reminder ofthe bombing? If a decision is madeto remake everything anew withoutpreserving the ruins, it will provethat Nagasaki has deliberatelyforgotten the reasons for itsspec ia l des igna t i on as aninternational cultural city. 1 1

This was the sentiment of the council and manyNagasaki hibakusha and residents.

However, Nagasaki Catholic leaders called forremoval of the ruins and the reconstruction of anew cathedral on the site of the ruins,emphasizing that their souls were deeplyattached to that site of memory where theirancestors had endured persecution more thantwo hundred years earlier. On the same daythat the local paper published Ishida’scomments, the Nagasaki Catholic PublicRelation Committee published an article intheir bi-monthly bulletin, Katorikukyô hô,stating that the remaining walls were anobstacle to reconstruction of the cathedral andhad to be torn down. The article asserted thatremoval of the ruins would be more appropriateto cultivate the “hill of blossoming peacefulflowers” in order to “plant hearts of peace”.12

The Hill of Blossoming Flowers (花咲く丘) isactually the title of one of Nagai Takashi’sbooks published in 1949. Nagai, who receivedthe first Honorary Citizen of Nagasaki awardfrom Nagasaki City Council in 1949 as well as aNational Honorary Award from the Diet in1 9 5 0 , w r o t e i n t h a t b o o k t h a t t h ereconstruction of the cathedral was critical torevive the Catholic community and spreadChrist’s love in Japan.

According to Kataoka Yakichi, a scholar on thehistory of Japanese Catholics, especially thosein Nagasaki, Nagai called for the removal of thecathedral ruins as follows:

Every time we see such a thing

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(konna mono) [referring to theruins], not only do our hearts ache,but we also do not want to showthe children— who will be born inthe future— traces of the crimes ofour generation that waged a warthat even resulted in the burningof the house of God. Rather, wewant to build a peaceful andbeautiful church, and make thisplace a hill of blossoming flowersto point the hearts of the childrenfreely to heaven.13

In using Nagai’s discourse, the NagasakiCatholic leaders may have sought to legitimizetheir policy by framing the demolition of theruins as the wi l l o f Sa int Nagai , therepresentative figure of postwar Nagasaki.

In 1954, to counter the powerful call by non-Catholic Nagasaki residents and hibakusha forthe preservation of the Cathedral, NagasakiCatholics formed the “The Association for theReconstruction of the Urakami Cathedral” (浦上天主堂再建委員会), and launched a fund-raising campaign. The Association estimatedthat the total cost for reconstruction would beover 60million yen. They anticipated that halfof that could be collected through donationsfrom Japanese Catholic churches. In the midstof their search for the other half, BishopYamaguchi received an invitation to NorthAmerica.

In May 1955, Yamaguchi left for a ten-monthtrip to the United States and Canada. Theofficial purpose of the trip was to receive anhonorary doctorate from Villanova University, aprivate Roman Catholic institution in theUnited States, for his contribution to thedevelopment of the Nagasaki Catholiccommunity and to the spiritual recovery ofNagasaki. It is believed that Yamaguchi alsohoped to use the occasion to raise additionalfunds for the reconstruction.14 Yamaguchivis i ted St . Paul , Chicago, New York,

Washington D.C., New Orleans, Los Angeles,San Francisco, Honolulu, Toronto, Montréal,and Québec City. The trip was exceptionalgiven that so few Japanese nationals werepermitted by their government to travel abroadbefore 1964. Prior to his trip to North America,Yamaguchi had noted that some Europeanchurches were reconstructed in a manner thatincorporated the ruins of their previousincarnations, though he had also noted thatAmerican tourists may not appreciate thereminder of the atomic bombings preserved inthose ruins.15 Whatever transpired during thetrip, when Yamaguchi returned to Japan inFebruary 1956, he met with the NagasakiCatholic community and announced thatUrakami Cathedral would be rebuilt and thatthe ruins had to be removed.

The debate over the fate of the cathedral ruinsamong Nagasaki Catholics, the city council, theCommittee for the Preservation of theRemnants of the Atomic Bombing, and the non-Catholic Nagasaki citizen groups intensifiedafter Yamaguchi’s return from North Americain February 1956. The city council and theCommittee received support from non-CatholicNagasaki hibakusha, who sought to ensure thatthe ruins were preserved, especially after the1955 construction of the Peace MemorialStatue, which, in their eyes, far from capturingthe destructive power and traumaticexperience of the bomb, conveyed a warlike,masculine image that failed to reference thedisaster.16 The pro-preservation group believedthat the ruins of the cathedral could bestconvey the destructive power of the bomb tonon-hibakusha both present and future.Nonetheless, Yamaguchi told a local newspaperthat he was adamant because he did notbelieve that the ruins represented peace. Theyrepresented instead a far too vivid link to atroubled and troubling past.17

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Nagasaki’s Peace Memorial Statue photographed bythe author

The specific motivation for preservation of theruins varied from one group to another. Somecity officials and business leaders saw acommercial opportunity in the remnants.Nagasaki was awarded first place in the “Top100 Tourist Destinations of Japan,” aspresented by the Mainichi Shinbun in October1950. One of the most popular touristattractions of postwar Nagasaki was the site ofthe ruins of Urakami Cathedral.18 The NagasakiTourism Office stated that removal of the ruinsof the cathedral would result in the loss ofimportant tourism revenue.

The Tourism Office’s statement provokedNagasaki Catholics. Some described it as“disturbing” that the ruins of the cathedral wastreated as a sightseeing destination.19 Kataokaclaimed that the Catholic community wanted torebuild the cathedral as quickly as possible,and that any resistance or impediment to thatreconstruction for the sake of turning theirdestroyed place of worship into a touristdestination was “sacrilegious”.20

However, Urakami Cathedral was not only theHouse of God during the Asia-Pacific War. Italso served as the warehouse for the storage ofrice and food for the Japanese imperial armyand the primary space for Urakami Catholics’

patriotic activities.21 Urakami Bishop UrakawaWasaburo taught that Urakami Catholics mustwork together with Japanese spirit to“demonstrate the faithful spirit of sacrifice thatshines with eternal hope” at the Cathedral. 22

Likewise, Katorikukyō hō, the NagasakiCatholic’s bulletin, served as the medium tocommunicate Nagasaki Catholic leaders’official views to the followers even during thewar period. On January 1, 1938, BishopYamaguchi stated in Katorikukyō hō that “Thereligious life of the present world representsthe duty to serve divine will.” He went on toclaim that, “Heaven requires violence” becauseone “cannot obtain the crown of eternalhappiness without passing through narrowpaths and roads of thorns.” Yamaguchi thencalled Japan’s invasion of China a “crusade”, a“holy war against communism” guided by the“righteousness of the Imperial Army.”23

While Yamaguchi published his annual NewYear's greetings, Nagai was serving as animperial surgeon in Nanjing where theJapanese Imperial Army occupied anddevastated the city from December 13, 1937and committed atrocities against civilians andunarmed combatants over a period of sixweeks. Nagai’s letter sent from the destroyedcity of Nanjing to his Catholic community waspublished in Katorikukyō hō in January 1938.He wrote:

I respectfully wish you all a MerryChristmas and a Happy New Yearfrom the battlefield. We havegreeted this year along with gravecurrent events, but especially thisyear Japan will soar. This is theperfect opportunity for JapaneseChristians to display that essence.As I pray for the activities ofeveryone on the home front, I, too,will render the duty of a warrior ofJapan, and repay the kindness ofthe emperor”.24

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Nagai returned to Nagasaki from China inMarch 1940 as a decorated soldier. He alsoreceived the Order of the Rising Sun for his‘bravery’ in China, and continued to wear themilitary uniform hanging a long sword at hiswaist in the Nagasaki Medical University todemonstrate his patriotism to the ImperialShinto State.25 The “troubling past” theremnants of the cathedral reminded NagasakiCatholic leaders, including Nagai, was not onlythe atomic bombing, but also their wartimeefforts.26

Meanwhile, the Committee for the Preservationof the Remnants of the Atomic Bombingbelieved that they ought to respect therel igious convict ions of the Catholiccommunity, and tried to find an acceptablecompromise. First, they proposed that the ruinsbe reinforced to prevent them from collapsingto eliminate any safety concerns. Secondly,they proposed that the city provide analternative location for the building of a newcathedral. Thirdly, they proposed that theUrakami Catholic community build a newcathedral next to the ruins. However, all ofthese proposals were rejected. Urakami BishopNakajima Banri argued that the current sitewas too small to both build a new cathedral andpreserve the ruins; secondly, he argued thatthe ruins were deteriorating, so that it was nolonger possible to reinforce them; thirdly, heargued that, from the religious point of view,“refining the tragic appearance of thecathedral” was unacceptable.27

From his inauguration in 1951 until 1956,Nagasaki mayor Tagawa Tsutomu sought toensure the preservation of the ruins of thecathedral, which was the will of many Nagasakiresidents. A local engineer who worked for thecity reconstruction project recalled thatTagawa had said the ruins would be preserved,and that Nagasaki Prefecture would have tohandle this as the city administration waspreoccupied with other reconstructioninitiatives. The engineer went on to say that “I

drew up a deta i led s t ra tegy for thepreservation of the ruins that were to bereinforced with concrete. The mayor seemedsatisfied [with the plans]”.28

In 1955, Tagawa received a letter from WilliamHughes , a member o f the Amer icanphilanthropic group, the “Friend of the World.”Hughes proposed to formulate a sister-cityrelationship between Nagasaki and St. Paul.The Nagasaki city archive documents that theoriginal proponent of the sister-city projectbetween the two cities was Lewis W. Hill Jr.,grandson of the founder of the Great NorthernRailway. The archive explains that prior to theAsia-Pacific War, Hill Jr. had travelled toNagasaki where he became fascinated withNagasaki’s landscape and its warm-heartedresidents. After the atomic bombing, Hill wasconvinced that Peace could be achievedthrough mutual understanding and thecultivation of true friendship. A localnewspaper claimed that St. Paul was chosenbecause of its large Catholic community.29

Nagasaki was the first Japanese city to receivesuch an invitation from the United States. Thecity administration enthusiastically welcomedthis offer as increasing the number of foreigntourists to the city had been one of the primaryagendas for the city’s economic policy since1949. Tagawa and Nagasaki councillorsaccepted the proposal.

In September 1955, Tagawa received aninvitation from St. Paul to the ceremonymarking the start of the sister city relationship.On September 4 th, Nagasaki Nichi NichiShinbun reported that, “…St. Paul is veryinterested in the reconstruction of the UrakamiCathedral, which was baptized by the atomicbombing. It is expected that [St. Paul] willfinancially support that reconstruction.” OnSeptember 13th, the majority of Nagasaki’scouncillors supported Tagawa’s trip to St. Paulas an important step in the cultivation offriendship between the United States andJapan.30 The city council asked the Japanese

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue a passportfor Tagawa and permit an exchange ofcurrency. The Japanese government, however,decl ined the request given i ts str ictproscriptions against exporting currency.

The U.S. State Department and the Americanembassy in Tokyo, however, intervened. OnNovember 7th, 1955, the Bureau of East Asiaand Pacific Affairs of the Far East, a branch ofthe State Department, sent a telegram toTagawa supporting the visit as a contribution tofriendship and mutual understanding.31

Two days later, the State Department sent atelegram to the American embassy in Tokyo.The telegram described the Japanesegovernment’s rejection of Nagasaki’s requestfor permission to exchange currency as asignificant obstacle to Tagawa’s attendance atthe inauguration ceremony. The StateDepartment then requested that the Americanembassy in Tokyo be permitted to unofficiallyseek to persuade Tokyo to authorize Nagasaki’srequest.32 The telegram also included copies ofthe letter the State Department had sent toTagawa and the note St. Paul had sent to theUnited States Information Agency (USIA). Onemonth later, on December 7 th, 1955, thefourteenth anniversary of the Pearl HarbourAttack, St. Paul’s city council approved itsparticipation in the sister-city program withNagasaki.

The State Department, the USIA and theAmerican Embassy in Tokyo helped Tagawa toovercome all obstacles to his visit to the UnitedStates. Tagawa left Japan for the United Stateson August 22, 1956. St. Paul’s original proposalwas to have Tagawa attend the sister cityinauguration ceremony; however, the tripturned into a grand American tour. Tagawavis i ted St . Paul , Chicago, New York,Washington D.C., New Orleans, Los Angeles,San Francisco, and Hawaii during his one-month trip. Nagasaki’s municipal budget couldnot have covered the cost of such a tour. Most

of the population in Japan was still sufferingsevere economic hardship through the 1950swhile the hibakusha were left without anymedical or financial assistance until 1957.Given fiscal constraints on the Japanese andNagasaki municipal governments to promoteand organize the tour, its funding was almostcertainly provided by the U.S. governmentand/or private U.S funding.

The Nagasaki local newspaper reported thatTagawa had an attendant, a “Mr. Shinohara,”for the duration of his tour. The articledescribed Shinohara as the head of thesecretariat of the Association for theConstruction of the Peace Memorial Statue (平和祈念像建設協会), the primary funding sourcefor the Peace Statue. A local Californianewspaper, the Press-Telegram, describedShinohara in greater detail. On September 14th,1956, the Press-Telegram identified Shinoharaas “Morizō Shinohara,” and described him asTagawa’s secretary and translator. Shinoharawas described as having studied English andthe Bible with an American Methodistmissionary in Nagasaki from 1932 to 1934. Helater received a Fulbright Scholarship to studyin the United States after the war.

A Nagasaki city report published on October10th, 1956 catalogued Tagawa’s itinerary.33 Hemet with mayors and visited hospitals, schools,and other municipal institutions. According tothe archive, Tagawa’s visit was extensivelyreported in the American media and the sistercity program was received positively in theUnited States. The report also stated that theState Department received Tagawa andorganized all his activities during his stay inWashington D.C.; it did not, however, identifywhom Tagawa met and where he visited.

U.S-Japan Relations (1953-1957)

In January 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower tookoffice as President. Eisenhower quicklylaunched a drastic review of American nuclearpolicy, military strategy, foreign affairs, and

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overseas information programs as detailed in areport of the National Security Council (NSC)in March of 1953, during which Eisenhowerand Secretary of State John Foster Dullesdiscussed how to overcome the taboosurrounding the use of atomic weapons (NSCMarch 1953). Eisenhower and Dulles wereconvinced that the most effective way tochange public opinion on the use of nuclearweapons was to shift the public perception ofthe non-military use of nuclear energy.34 StefanT. Possony, a consultant for the PsychologicalStrategy Board of the U.S. Defense Departmentand originator of the Star Wars strategy,explained that, “the atomic bomb will beaccepted far more readily if at the same timeatomic energy is being used for constructiveends”.35 To this end, Eisenhower made a speechat the United Nations General Assembly onDecember 8, 1953 titled, “Atoms for Peace.”

At the UN, Eisenhower proposed theestablishment of an international organizationfor the peaceful use of atomic energy. Thespeech described his determination to solve“the fearful atomic dilemma” by finding innuclear energy “the miraculous inventivenessof man” dedicated to life rather than death,36

and emphasized the U.S intention to halt thenuclear arms race by negotiating with theSoviet Union.37 To this end, the United Stateswould “encourage world-wide investigation intothe most effective peacetime uses of fissionablematerial” by providing its allies and third-worldcountries with “all the material needed for theconducting of all experiments that wereappropriate.” He also stated that the UnitedStates was ready to begin negotiating with theSoviets to reduce “the potential destructivepower of the world’s atomic stockpiles.”Eisenhower’s speech at the UN GeneralAssembly inaugurated the psychologicalwarfare campaign named “Atoms for Peace.”

On March 1, 1954, however, the United Statestested a 15-megaton hydrogen bombcodenamed ‘Bravo’ on the Bikini Atoll in the

Pacific Ocean.38 ‘Bravo,’ which was the mostpowerful weapon ever tested, caused massiveradiological contamination and acute radiationsyndrome on the inhabitants on the islands ofRongelap and Ailinginae located within theBikini Atoll.39 At the time of its detonation, aJapanese fishing boat named the “LuckyDragon #5” (Daigo Fukuryu Maru) was 85miles away. All crew members were exposed toradiation, one of whom died of radiationpoisoning on September 23rd, 1954.

Yomiuri Shinbun first reported the incident onMarch 16th, 1954. Panic spread across Japanover the possibility that irradiated tuna hadbeen sold to Japanese consumers. The Japanesemedia broadcast images of Geiger countersshowing high levels of radiation in fish andfishing boats in the central fish market inTokyo. The term “shi no hai” (“ashes of death”)became widespread as a means of describingthe danger of the fallout. Some 8,000fishmongers and sushi shop owners protestedAmerican nuclear tests, demanding that theAmerican government compensate them fortheir losses in discarding the irradiated catch.They also demanded that nuclear testing beoutlawed. Two months later, the Japanesemedia warned the Japanese population that itshould filter its drinking water after a strongradioactive rainfall as a result of the Bravo. Theincident heightened public awareness of andsensitivity to the dangers of nuclear testing.

Japanese antinuclear and anti-Americansentiments grew rapidly as the Americangovernment sought to minimize the damagecaused by the Bravo test and attacked Japanesecritics including the victims.40 Moreover, theUS continued testing hydrogen bombs in theBikini Atoll even after the Lucky Dragon #5incident went public; consequently an ever-increasing number of Japanese fishing shipsbrought home irradiated fish to Japanesemarkets.41 Japanese antinuclear and anti-American sentiments was heightened in theunprecedented scale and evolved into the

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national movement that called out the total banof the nuclear tests.

On August 6th 1955, the tenth anniversary ofthe atomic bombing, the first World ConferenceAgainst the Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb tookplace in Hiroshima. Some survivors of theHiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombingstestified about their experiences to the thirtythousand participants from all over Japan andsome fifty foreign delegates from thirteendifferent countries in the Hiroshima PeaceMemorial Park.42 In September 1955, theconference evolved into the Council AgainstAtomic and Hydrogen Bombs, cal led“Gensuikyo.” The U.S government expressedgrowing concern about the growing anti-nuclear movement and the role of JapaneseCommunists as it evolved into a national andinternational movement calling for theremembrance of Hiroshima, Nagasaki andBikini to emphasize Japan’s nuclearvictimization.

From the end of the Asia-Pacific War, Japan’sintegration into the American network of basesand alliances was pivotal to American interestsin the Far East. The deployment of nuclearmissiles in Japan was also an American priorityin 1954.43 On May 26th, 1954, Eisenhowerwarned that growing antinuclear sentimentthreatened to evolve into anti-Americanism ona national scale. The Lucky Dragon #5 incidentinspired the U.S to provide Japan with nucleartechnology for civilian applications in order tocounter Japan’s antinuclear sentiment,suppress communist influence, and keep Japanwithin the sphere of American power.44

Eisenhower’s nuclear campaign, “Atoms forPeace,” was very attractive to Japanesecapitalists and politicians given shortages ofelectric power. Moreover, building nuclearpower plants could pave the way for Japan’sdevelopment of nuclear weapons. However, theEisenhower administration initially excludedJapan and West Germany from its list of

possible recipients of American nucleartechnology because of the risk that they woulddevelop nuclear weaponry to challenge theUnited States.45

Shoriki Matsutaro, a Japanese media tycoon,was one of the most prominent promoters ofthe benefits of the nuclear energy. Shoriki wasan unindicted Class-A war criminal imprisonedfor two years who was released without trial in1947. He became the president of the YomiuriShinbun in 1950 and of the Japan TVCorporation in 1952. Shoriki and Yomiuribecame key Japanese proponents of nuclearenergy. In January 1954, two months before theLucky Dragon #5 Incident, Shoriki’s YomiuriShinbun began a series of special features onnuclear energy titled, “We Have Finally Caughtthe Sun – Can nuclear energy make humanbeings happy?” (「ついに太陽を捉えたー原子力は人を幸福にするか」), which vigorouslypropagated Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peacecampaign.

Meanwhile, a group of Japanese politicianswere drafting a budget for the development ofJapan’s first nuclear energy program. OnMarch 3, 1954, under the leadership of a youngpolitician Nakasone Yasuhiro, three politicalparties—Liberal Party (自由党), Reform Party(改進党), Japanese Liberal Party (日本自由党)—jointly submitted the draft. The next day,Koyama Kuranosuke, one of the authors of thedraft budget and Nakasone’s ally claimed:

The American President hasalready stated that the UnitedStates would train Japan to use anew type of weapon, and it isextremely regrettable that ourgovernment has not yet acceptedthis invitation… If we are to avoidinheriting America’s out-datedconventional weaponry, we mustunderstand the mechanisms of thenew weaponry and becomecompetent in its use. Therefore, we

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three parties have asked the Dietto pass a budget for a nuclearenergy research program that aimsto create nuclear reactors andpursue the peaceful applications ofnuclear energy along with theUnited States…46

Koyama revealed that under Nakasone’sleadership Japan would seek access to themilitary applications of nuclear energy bymeans of a non-military nuclear program.Koyama’s statement created an uproar inJapanese public opinion. On March 4, aneditorial in the Asahi Shinbun called for the“removal of the draft budget" for the nuclearenergy program. It severely criticized theambiguity of the project and suggested that theproject could be construed as preparation forwar, a course barred by Japan’s Constitution.

The members of the Science Council of Japan(JSC) also immediately criticized Nakasone’sapproach. On March 4, 1954 the Asahi Shinbunpublished, “Sudden advent of the draft budgetfor the production of nuclear reactors –Scholars oppose it as premature” That day theMainichi Shinbun headlined, “Scholars puzzledover the abrupt appearance of the budget forthe nuclear power program and call for itsamendment”.

The issue of Japanese development of nuclearenergy was not new. Japanese scientists hadconducted research into atomic bombs afterthe attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941;however, when they concluded that an atomicbomb was only possible in theory, not inpractice, the project was abandoned.47 Thus,the Japanese scientific community wasastonished by the atomic bombs and admiredthe scientific success of the American nuclearfission program. During U.S. occupation, whileGHQ banned Japan from engaging in nuclearresearch, leading Japanese scientists and thethree largest newspapers, Asahi, Mainichi andYomiuri, began to promote nuclear energy

research through the dissemination of theredemptive discourse “Atoms for Dreams” thatthe atomic bombing was the necessaryprecursor to rebuilding a new, stronger, morepowerful, peaceful, and prosperous Japan.48

Yukawa Hideki, the most prominent theoreticalphysicist in postwar Japan as well as one of thescientists in the aborted Japanese atomic bombdevelopment project, stated in 1948:

Nuclear physicists receivedsignificant benefits from thedevelopment of the atomic bombsas it facilitates the studies ofnuclear physics. As long as humanbeings do not make a mistake thatwould result in the annihilation ofthe entire world, science willcontinue to progress […] Wecannot anticipate what kind of by-products can occur in the processof developing nuclear sciencetechnology. However, there is nodoubt that it [nuclear energy] willenrich our lives and bring aboutthe perpetual peace to the world[…] The success of the atomicbomb explosion was the first stepto realize such a dream. It will bebeyond our imagination how thepeaceful use of nuclear energy cancontribute the welfare of thepeople.49

The discourse of “Atoms for Dreams” began toproliferate after Yukawa’s statement appearedin national newspapers and science journals,and reached a peak when Yukawa received theNobel Prize in Physics in 1949.50 The Japanesescientific community and print media had neveropposed research on nuclear energy per sewhen directed toward the development ofpeaceful applications of nuclear energy. AsTakekawa Shunichi argues, most prominentJapanese scientists and national newspapers“showed strong interest in the potential of

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nuclear power” and “drew a line betweenpeaceful and military uses of nuclear power”.51

Put differently, Japanese scientists and media,regardless of political position, “embraced thedual nature of nuclear power”.52 Shoriki andNakasone, recognizing the climate of publicopinion and the position of the Japanesescientific community, modified the discourse onnuclear energy research accordingly.

On March 8, 1954 Shoriki’s Yomiuri publishedan article “Japan Enters the Nuclear Era,”promoting the draft budget for the nuclearenergy program as a “progressive” idea.Promoters of nuclear energy research becamemore assertive. They again called on thememory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as reasonto promote Japan’s nuclear energy research.For instance, Taketani Mitsuo argued that, “thecasualties of atomic war are entitled to havethe strongest say in the development of atomicpower… [Japan] has the best moral grounds toconduct research. Other nations are obliged tohelp Japan”. 53 On March 11, the Japan ScienceCouncil (JSC) announced that it would endorsethe draft budget if nuclear energy researchwere directed exclusively towards civilianapplications.54 The JSC’s shift in positiontowards nuclear energy research resulted fromagreement between the JSC and Nakasone, thestrongest political proponent of nuclear energy,that Upper House approval of the budget wouldrespect their condition and provide them withsignificant research funds for JSC.55

On March 12, the Asahi reported that the“Science Council of Japan has endorsed theprogram”. On March 13, The Mainichi’seditorial stated that the draft budget hadchanged the objective of nuclear energyresearch from the “creation of nuclearreactors” to the “development of peacefulapplications of nuclear energy.” The Mainichieditorial concluded that Japan could expectpositive results from nuclear energy research.

The public debates over Japan’s nuclear energy

program took place while the radiated LuckyDragon # 5 was silently heading back to Japanfrom Bikini. On April 3rd, the Diet passed thebudget, including the first nuclear energyprogram in the midst of the panic followed bythe Lucky Dragon #5 incident. In his study onthe role of the Japanese print media in theknowledge production of nuclear energy,Takekawa concludes that “…the three majornewspapers argued against the military use ofnuclear power, but did not oppose its peacefuluses while observing the Lucky Dragon #5Incident and the rise of anti-nuclear sentimentand movement in Japan…[even] when the darkside of nuclear power was highlighted inJapan”.56

The USIA cooperated with Shoriki’s YomiuriShinbun to host exhibitions on the peacefulapplications of nuclear energy in eleven majorcities in Japan. The Yomiuri Shinbun reportedthat Japanese visitors praised the exhibition’spromotion of the civil applications of this newpowerful, clean, and boundless energy source.Positive coverage of the exhibitions weredisseminated throughout Japan by national andlocal media outlets.57

Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum wasselected as one of eleven sites of the exhibitionin May 1956. The City Council, HiroshimaPrefectural Government, Hiroshima University,and Chugoku Shinbun enthusiasticallywelcomed the exhibition and co-sponsored it.Prior to the exhibition, Hamai Shinzo, themayor of Hiroshima, even advocatedconstruction of the first nuclear reactor inHiroshima, stating that “the souls of the deadwould be comforted should Hiroshima becomethe ‘first nuclear powered city.’ The citizens, Ibelieve, would like to see death replaced bylife”.58 Six members of the Association of YoungNagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivors attended theHiroshima exhibition. The Chugoku Shinbunexplained that the exhibition helped tounderstand that nuclear energy could positivelycontribute to civilization. The Atoms for Peace

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campaign reinforced the view that the peacefuluse of nuclear energy was completely differentfrom military use for nuclear weapons.

Nagasaki was not included in the list of nuclearenergy exhibition site cities. At this time,however, USIA was coordinating a sister cityprogram between Nagasaki and St. Paul inparallel.

Sister City Program and Eisenhower’sGlobal Expansion Policy

In the aftermath of World War II, WilliamBenton, the American Assistant Secretary ofState observed that diplomacy was no longeronly between governments as “people of theworld are exercising an ever larger influenceupon decisions of foreign policy”.59 In 1946, theAmerican military initiated its “exchange ofpersons program.” A number of foreignnationals received grants to come to the UnitedStates for study, research, teaching, lecturing,and observation.60 At the same time, Americancitizens were encouraged to go abroad toachieve similar ends. This collaborative effortof the American government and privateAmerican organizations in the service of U.Sforeign policy was the centerpiece of whatcame to be called “U.S cultural diplomacy”.61

The program was transferred to the StateDepartment in 1952.

The Eisenhower administration expanded U.SCold War strategy and cultural diplomacythrough military and economic integration ofits allies and decolonized countries throughnew people’s exchange programs.62 TheEisenhower administration established theUSIA in 1953 as an agency devoted to U.Scultural diplomacy and launched the “People-to-People program” to integrate other countriesinto U.S military, political and economicpolicies.

The Eisenhower administration assigned theUSIA a role as the primary coordinator of thePeople-to-People program. The USIA Office of

Private Cooperation selected American citizensto serve as members of the People-to-Peopleprogram committee. The majority were well-known entrepreneurs who “had the most togain from the integration” of the targetcountries.63 The creation of sister city relationsbetween American and Japanese cities wastypical of activities within the People-to-Peopleprogram.64

One of the major collaborators in the People-to-People program was the American airlineindustry. Since the end of the war, U.Sgovernment had encouraged American airlinesto expand in areas considered geopoliticallyvital to American security.65 American airlinesfrequently offered free flights for foreign guestsof the State Department/USIA. The Nagasaki-St. Paul sister city program exemplifies how theEisenhower administration and privateentrepreneurs collaborated to achieve theirmutual interests.

Nagasaki Mayor Tagawa travelled byNorthwest Airlines to the United States inAugust 1956. In 1947, Northwest became thefirst American airline to open direct flightsbetween the United States and Japan in 1947.It was eager to attract American tourists toJapan. However, the Lucky Dragon #5 Incidentof 1954 and the subsequent rise of the anti-nuclear weapons movement appeared anobstacle to their expansion. Northwest Airlineswas eager to cooperate in the People-to-Peopleprogram and the sister-city program betweenNagasaki and St . Paul as a means ofovercoming anti-American sentiment. 6 6

Northwest Airlines Headquarters is located inMinneapolis, Minnesota, whose capital is St.Paul. The Minneapolis–Saint Paul InternationalAirport (MSP) is also a primary Northwest hub.This, together with its large Catholicpopulation, made St. Paul an ideal candidatefor the first sister-city program between theUnited States and Japan.

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Lewis Hill Jr., the initial proponent for thesister-city project between Nagasaki and St.Paul, was one of the most powerful financiersin Minnesota and a member of the MinnesotaState Assembly. He had a close relationshipwith Northwest Airlines and was a strongRepubl ican supporter and f r iend o fEisenhower.67 The program was consistent withthe diplomatic goals of the Eisenhoweradministration while at the same time servingthe commercial interests of Northwest Airlinesand the Minnesota economy.

William Hughes, who initially proposed thesister city program to Tagawa, was a memberof the “Friend of the World,” the Americanphilanthropic organization. Friend of the Worldhad been working to establish the sister-cityprogram between the United States and Europesince the early 1950s. Hughes’s wife was asecond-generation Japanese American. Hugheswas known for his strong sympathy toward andattachment to Japan. Visiting Nagasaki with hiswife in 1979, Hughes explained in an interviewthat the St. Paul city council chose thefourteenth anniversary of the Pearl HarbourAttack as the day to sign the sister-cityr e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h N a g a s a k i a s a nacknowledgement of mutual wrongdoingduring the Asia-Pacific War. He also stated thatthe sister-city relationship would be a pledge topursue peace in the future through healing thewound caused by the war.68 This narrative ofhealing and reconciliation through U.S.assistance with reconstruction/restoration ofwhat the atomic bomb destroyed was central toJapanese and American media discourses in themid-1950s.

Polit ics of Healing, Forgiveness,Restoration and Reconciliation

While Bishop Yamaguchi and Mayor Tagawawere touring the United States, a group oftwenty-five young female hibakusha referred toas the “Hiroshima Maidens,” were invited tothe United States to undergo reconstructive

plastic surgery from 1955 to 1956. Althougheach visit was organized by different Americanprivate organizations, the visits were plannedand carried out within the framework of U.S.cultural diplomacy. The guests from the A-bombed cities stood as symbols of healing,mutual forgiveness, restorat ion andreconciliation in American-Japanese relations.69

The Hiroshima Maidens first appeared in theJapanese media in June 1952 after the SanFrancisco Treaty went into effect and Japanesesovereignty was regained in April of that yearwithin the framework of the US-Japan alliance.Tanimoto Kiyoshi, Hiroshima based Methodistminister and founder of the Hiroshima PeaceCenter, and novelist Masugi Shizue organized afundraising campaign with Japanesecelebrities, artists and writers to providereconstruction surgery for the young womendubbed Hiroshima Maidens. With donationsfrom all over Japan, nine Hiroshima Maidensunderwent reconstructive surgery in theKoishikawa clinic in Tokyo in December 1952.Their successful surgeries encouraged Masugito extend their fundraising campaign forNagasaki Atomic Maidens as well.70

Masugi wrote to Mayor Tagawa that theKoishikawa clinic in Tokyo would provide thereconstruction surgery for five NagasakiMaidens and the Tokyo branch of HiroshimaPeace Center would bear the cost. Of the 25candidates that Mayor Tagawa and medicaldoctors had initially selected, three youngfemale hibakusha were eventually chosen fromNagasaki based on the degree and location ofthe keloids caused by the burns, their age(those deemed still ‘marriageable’), andconsequently how much they would benefitfrom the surgery.71

On January 21, 1953, the three NagasakiMaidens embarked for Tokyo. On the way, theystopped by the Hiroshima Station, where sixHiroshima Atomic Maidens and Tanimotowaited for them to offer flowers to the

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Nagasaki Maidens. On January 22, ChugokuShinbun reported that the Atomic Maidensfrom Hiroshima and Nagasaki greeted eachother in tears and spontaneously began to singthe song written for the Atomic Maidensentitled “Come Back to Me, My Smile” (ほほえみよかえれ) together. The lyrics, written bySako Michiko, one of the Hiroshima Maidens,go:

Cruel destiny I carry on my back/ Alonely life I live/ The maiden’ssmile has faded/ My smile, whenwill it return?

冷たきさだめ　身に負うて　寂しく生きる　乙女子の　頬より消えしほほえみよ

再びいつの　日にかえる

The melody was composed by KobayashiKinsaku, a Class A-war criminal imprisoned forlife in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo.72 Kobayashi wasthe senior military police officer in thePhilippines during the war.73 In June 1952,Tanimoto and Masugi brought two HiroshimaAtomic Maidens to the prison to ‘console’ (imon慰問)　the war criminals. An article in theChugoku Shinbun dated June 12, 1952 reportsthat Kaya Okinori, a Hiroshima native and theformer Imperial Minister of Finance, offered anapology to the two maidens, saying that “I amguilty for the suffering of my fellow Hiroshimapeople. I wish I could console you al l[Hiroshima citizens], but I am a prisoner…”Hata Shunroku, another war criminal and theformer Imperial Army supremo of theHiroshima military, also expressed his remorseto the Maidens that “It was inevitable that theformer enemy targeted Hiroshima because thecity was the pivot of the Imperial Army inWestern Japan. Your sufferings are the result ofour presence in Hiroshima.” Chugoku Shinbuncontinued to write that after hearing theconfession from the two war criminals, one of

the Hiroshima Maidens began to cry, sayingthat “We have never thought that you areresponsible for our suffering. We came here towork with you to eliminate war.” The articleended that the tears had “gushed from their[war criminals] devilish faces.” During this visitto Sugamo prison, the Hiroshima Maidens andTanimoto asked Kobayashi, a Christian as wellas war criminal who “loved music since he wasa child” and “never let go of his guitar” evenduring his imperial duty in the Philippines, tocompose the melody for the maidens.74 InFebruary 1953, the song was completed underKobayashi’s songwriter name, “KobayashiMichio.” Therefore, before going to the UnitedStates to undergo more advanced plasticsurgery, the Hiroshima Maidens, whorepresented Japanese victimhood, alreadyperformed the symbolic role in the forgivenessand reconciliation between the Japanesemilitary high command that represented theJapanese responsibility for the war on onehand, and the Japanese collectivized nucleartrauma on the other. In this domestic politicaltheater of forgiveness and reconciliation, theJapanese war criminals were represented asthe accountable for U.S’s use of the atomicbombs and the hibakusha’s suffering, ratherthan for the numerous Japanese war atrocitiescommitted in Asia-Pacific. It can be furtherargued that their dramatic encounter inSugamo prison also reconciled the dualsubjectivities of the Japanese nation as theperpetrators and victims.

Nagasaki Shinbun reported on December 28,1952 that the writer’s group in Tokyo hadasked Pearl S. Buck, a Nobel Prize winningAmerican writer, to help their efforts to providemore advanced reconstruction surgery for theAtomic Maidens in the United States.According to the Nagasaki Shinbun article,Buck contacted the American OrthopaedicAssociation (AOA) through the widow ofFranklin D. Roosevelt, and the chairman ofAOA sent a letter to the Atomic Bomb CasualtyCommission (ABCC), saying that they were

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planning to send a group of American plasticsurgeons to Hiroshima and Nagasaki for oneyear. On February 13, 1953, Nagasaki Shinbunreported that the news from AOA hadsignificantly encouraged Nagasaki AtomicMaidens; and some of them cried for joy.Aoyama Takeo, the chair of the YMCA inNagasaki, embarked on the establishment ofthe Nagasaki Atomic Maiden Association tohost the AOA’s medical staff.75 However, theproject faded away for unknown reasons.

On the other hand, Tanimoto arranged forNorma Cousins, editor of the Saturday Reviewand an antinuclear activist, to meet with theHiroshima Maidens at his church in Hiroshimain 1953 and asked Cousins to organize fund-raising for Hiroshima Maidens’ surgery in theUnited States.76 Tanimoto was also one of thesix survivors of the Hiroshima atomic bombwhose experience of the bombing is portrayedin John Hersey’s 1949 bestseller Hiroshima,which had made Tanimoto’s presence known toprominent American intellectuals and allowedhim to connect with them, including Cousins.

Cousins received broad support and funding forhis Hiroshima Maiden Project from all over theUnited States, most notably from the readers ofthe Saturday Review, whom Christina Klein(2003) characterizes as American liberals whofelt “tremendous guilt over the dropping of theatomic bombs” and “eagerly donated funds tothe Maidens project as a way to expiate thatguilt”.77

The State Department was initially sceptical ofthe project as the government was promotingits “Atoms for Peace” campaign and concernedthat the publicity of hibakusha’s deformedbodies would fuel antinuclear movementsworldwide. Cousins realized that the U.Sgovernment would intervene or even interdictthe project if he framed the project as theacknowledgment of American responsibility, orexp ia t i on f o r i t s use o f the bombs .Consequently, Klein argues that Cousins

tactically “caste[d] the relationship betweenthe United States and Japan in the intimateterms of one family member feeling ‘love’ and‘duty’ to another”.78 In so doing, the HiroshimaMaidens project ensured the hierarchicalrelationship between the United States andJapan by portraying the United States as thebenevolent, healthy, strong donor capable ofproviding humanitarian aid to poor fragileAsian women, and consequently generatedpatronizing sympathies from Americans.79

In the end, none of the Nagasaki Maidens wereinvited to the Hiroshima Maiden Project in theU.S. However, the ruins of the UrakamiCathedral, also known as the Cathedral of theVirgin Mary, became the recipient of U.S.reconstruction funds.

The Japanese media called the young femalehibakusha “Atomic Maidens” (Genbaku Otome)whereas they were consistently called“Hiroshima Maidens” in the United States. InJapan, the Hiroshima Maiden project wasportrayed as a form of U.S. atonement.80 TheChugoku Shinbun and Asahi Shinbun alsoreported that after returning to Hiroshima fromthe United States, both the physical andpsychological traumas of the Atomic Maidenshad been healed by advanced Americanreconstructive plastic procedures.81 The projectwas presented by the Japanese media as thesymbolic restoration of postwar American-Japanese relations, which had been ‘wounded’by the Lucky Dragon #5 Incident and the riseof Japanese antinuclear and anti-Americansentiments.82 Likewise, the plastic surgery theHiroshima Maidens received in the UnitedStates served not only as a metaphor for the‘reconstruction’ of postwar Japan, showing thehumanitarian spirit within the Americanconsciousness, but also served to underscorethe view that the trauma of the atomic bombingwas curable through advanced U.S. medicaltechnology.83

Both Yamaguchi and Tagawa were aware of the

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media discourse surrounding the HiroshimaMaidens in the United States and Japan. TheAmerican print media from 1955 to 1956indicate that Yamaguchi and Tagawa hadagreed that the remnants of the cathedralwould serve as a reminder of the hostile historybetween the two countries, hence thedemolition of the remnants and reconstructionof a new cathedral would be more appropriatethan its preservation to mark the first sistercity relationship between the United States andJapan. The statements of the two Nagasakiofficials cited in the American newspaperarticles also reveal Nagasaki leaders’competitive stance toward Hiroshima. On May6 th, 1956, The New York Times reportedYamaguchi’s comment that “many Japanesepeople thought it ironic that the atomic bombtook the grandest proportionate toll of theChristian community in Nagasaki”. But, hecontinued that the Catholics regardedNagasaki’s atomic bombing as divine “trial”and its victims as “martyrdom to end the war,the final appeasement of God for wrongsdone”.84 Yamaguchi reportedly went on toassert that “we felt that the sacrifice ofJapanese at Hiroshima must not have beenenough in the sight of Lord”.85He then statedthat he had received $40,000 for thereconstruction of the Urakami Cathedral duringhis trip to the United States. The articleconcluded with Yamaguchi’s call for furtherdonations of $100,000 to help rebuild it.

Yamaguchi visited St. Paul soon after the St.Paul City Council signed the sister-cityrelationship on December 7, 1955. OnDecember 11th, the St. Paul Sunday PioneerPress published an interview with Yamaguchiduring which he described the goal ofrebuilding the Urakami Cathedral. He statedthat given St. Paul’s desire to enter into asister-city relationship with Nagasaki, he wouldfavour dismantling the ruins of the Cathedraland rebuilding it anew.

In the American news coverage of Tagawa’s

statements, Nagasaki competition withHiroshima was a central theme. On August 9,1955, on the tenth anniversary of the atomicbombing of Nagasaki, The Daily Courier ofConnellsville Pennsylvania reported Tagawa’scomment that while Hiroshima had becomeknown around the world, Nagasaki had been allbut forgotten. On the same day, the UnitedPress cited Tagawa’s claim that “Hiroshimauses the atomic bombing as pol i t icalpropaganda” and that Nagasaki would never doany such thing. He even asserted that NagasakiAtomic Maidens would never ask the UnitedStates for reconstructive plastic surgery andremoval of their keloids.86 On December 1,1955, The Times Record in New York reportedTagawa’s emphasis on Nagasaki’s long historyas Asia’s “window to the West” since thesixteenth century and its status as a “Christiancity”.87 The article continued that “[t]hese longcontacts with the West, Nagasaki MayorTagawa said, gave Nagasaki people a tolerantspirit, and they met the atomic bomb withoutrancor”.88 The article ended with the followingstatement: “Nagasaki folks are genial incharacter; and their feeling toward Americaand Americans is good on the whole”.89 WhileTagawa clearly intended to appeal to theAmericans by contrasting the characteristic ofNagasaki citizens with that of Hiroshima, hewas apparently oblivious of the fact that thesurgery of Hiroshima Maidens and thedemolition and reconstruction of the UrakamiCathedral, both paid for with American fundsand both directed toward overcoming rancorbetween atomic victims and Americans, wereperfectly parallel.

In August 1956, interviewed by the St. PaulDispatch, Tagawa, playing the Cold War card,noted that many Japanese people wanted tostrengthen relations with the United States, butthat Japanese communists were seeking such arelationship with the Soviet Union.90 Thequestion of the renewal of the US-JapanSecurity Alliance (Ampo) was a politically andemotionally charged issue in Japan in the

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mid-1950s, a time when many Japanese fearedit could lead to their involvement in anothernuclear war.

The USIA in Japan was undoubtedly abreast ofthe debate over the fate of the ruins takingplace in Nagasaki in the midst of the Japaneseantinuclear peace movement. Typically, USIAstaff were stationed in embassies and AmericanCultural Centres (ACC) in major cities, andwere responsible for the administration ofvarious cultural and international exchangeprograms, such as the Fulbright Fellowship.The American Cultural Center had an office inNagasaki and its officers were aware thatNagasaki had been the top tourist destinationin Japan in the postwar years. The ruins ofUrakami Cathedral were the city’s mostpopular tourist attraction as the remnants wereemblematic of the popular imagination ofNagasaki as an exotic Christian city andfulfilled visitors’ desire to witness the city’srecent history of the atomic bombing. At thesame time, American policymakers may havebeen apprehensive about the potential that theruins of the cathedral could serve as an icon ofan international antinuclear movement.91

Dismantling the Ruins

After his return from the United States inSeptember 1956, Tagawa became reluctant tocomply with the committee’s recommendationfor preservation of the ruins. By that time, adecade had already passed since the atomicbombing. Roads had been widened in theUrakami district; new houses had been built;and, the number of tourists had increased. Withthe reconstruction, other ruins left by thebombing had been dismantled. The ruins of theUrakami Cathedral were the only notableremaining vestige of the bombing in the city.Non-Catholic locals, especially hibakusha, werecalling for their preservation as a materialartefact to commemorate the tragedy. Incontrast, very few Urakami Catholic hibakushaparticipated in the debate.

Remnants of Urakami Cathedral (front) and PeaceStatue (back) in 1958 Photo courtesy of TakaharaItaru

Within the Urakami Catholic community, somemembers urged Nakajima, the Urakami chiefpriest, to preserve the ruins. However,Nakajima characterized the ruins as ‘trash,’which was already destroyed, so thepreservation of the ruins was meaningless.92

Nakajima announced in February 1958 thatdismantleming of the ruins would commencewithin the month. The following day, a localnewspaper reported Mayor Tagawa’s commentthat the dismantling was “unavoidable”.93 Thecommittee members of the Atomic BombMaterial Preservat ion and Nagasakicouncilmen were puzzled by the mayor’sposition. They requested that the mayor hold ameeting to clearly communicate his intention.

At an emergency meeting of the Nagasaki CityCouncil on February 17th, 1958, Iwaguchi

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Natsuo, a former reporter for the NagasakiNichi Nichi Shinbun and the youngest memberof the council, argued for preservation of theruins. Iwaguchi emphasized that the ruins wereof historical value as material evidence of thebombing. He reminded the Council thatHiroshima and Nagasaki were the only twocities in the world where boys and girls walkedaround with keloid scars, and that the fullramifications of the event remain unknown.Consequently, it was the duty of the citizens ofNagasaki to preserve what evidence remainedto ensure that no such tragedy would everoccur again. Iwaguchi stated, “We wantpolitical leaders and visitors from all over theworld to witness the horrific power of theatomic bomb and the baseness of war!”.94

Tagawa responded to Iwaguchi, saying:

It is undeniable that the ruins arevaluable as a tourist attraction, butI do not believe they serve topromote peace. The horrific powerof the atomic bomb has alreadybeen studied and documentedscientifically, so even those whohave never experienced its powercan understand that such weaponsshould nei ther be used norproduced. Consequently, thee x i s t e n c e o f t h e r u i n s i ssuperfluous. The question at handis whether the ru ins of theUrakami Cathedral are appropriatephysical materials to convey thetragedy of the atomic bombing.Frankly speaking, my answer is no.The preservation of the ruins is notnecessary to the pursuit of peace.Therefore, I will fully support fordismantling of the ruins andreconstruction of a new cathedralat the same site to respond to thewishes of the Catholic people.95

Tagawa argued that while atomic weapons

were widely viewed as an absolute evil, thatcharacterization was l ittle more thanideological posturing. In practical terms, thepossession of atomic weapons by the SovietUnion, the United States and Britain could beconstrued as a necessary condition for peace.

Tagawa’s comment on the idea of nucleardétente shocked the council members.Iwaguchi once again rose and questionedTagawa:

Let me ask you then. Why are yougoing to erect a memorial statuefor the twenty-six martyrs?96 Whyare you going to replicate theDutch House?97 Isn’t it because youwant to convey the history ofNagasaki as Japan’s window to theWest and how Western culturecame to Japan? Isn’t it because youwant to let the architecture silentlyspeak to the viewers about suchhistory in the present? We havebeen collecting tiles, bamboo, andother small objects exposed to theradiation of the atomic bomb asartefacts of the tragedy. Do youreally believe that those littlepieces will adequately convey thehorror of the atomic bombing? Weare asking you to preserve theruins not as a symbol of hatred,but as a symbol of the baseness ofwar, as the spiritual cross of oursins! 98

Councilman Araki Tokugorō echoed Iwaguchi’splea.

[The ruins] are invaluable becausethey wil l forever cal l out tohumankind that never again shouldsuch ruins be produced. All thecitizens of Nagasaki want to

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preserve the ruins! If they areremoved, how will your successors,the mayors of Nagasaki in 100 or200 years judge our decision? Theymust be preserved! Those ruins,please preserve them! Pleasepreserve them! Mayor! Please!99

Despite the six decades that have passed,Iwaguchi’s speech and Araki’s plea, which arepreserved in audio in Nagasaki’s archives,remain heart wrenching. They were notsufficient, however, to change Tagawa’s courseof action.

The fol lowing day, the Counci l votedunanimously to preserve the ruins of UrakamiCathedral. Moreover, approximately 10,000Nagasaki residents signed a petition calling forthe preservation of the ruins. The Council Chairsubmitted a resolution for the preservation ofthe ruins to Bishop Yamaguchi. Nagasakihibakusha groups jointly submitted threeproposals with the Commission for thePreservation of Atomic Bomb Material toprevent the removal of the ruins. The firstproposal was to remove the ruins of the frontwalls, but integrate the sidewalls into the newcathedral. In the event this proposal wasrejected, the group proposed to transport theruins to Peace Park. Their third proposalinvolved the excavation and preservation of thebelfry, which remained buried after theexplosion.100 On February 26, Tagawa met withYamaguchi and asked him to consider thepreservation of the ruins. On March 5, Tagawareported that he had tried to negotiate withUrakami’s Catholic leaders; however, theremnants were deemed to be obstacles to theconstruction of a new cathedral. Consequently,the mayor asked the Counci l and theCommittee to find a location to which the ruinscould be transposrted, a practical impossibilitygiven the scarcity of available land as a resultof the 1955 construction of the giant statue‘Peace Prayer’ in the Peace Park. Nonetheless,

the Council and Committee continued to strivefor the preservation of the ruins, including aproposal for the relocation of the proposed newcathedral, a plan rejected by Catholic leaders.They ins is ted that the cathedra l bereconstructed on the same location, the site ofthe memory of the Urakami martyrdom.

In the final meeting in March, the city councilvoted to leave the ultimate decision to MayorTagawa. Iwaguchi and the hibakusha groupthen addressed three new proposals. The firstproposal was to hold surveys all over Japan todiscuss the fate of the ruins at the nationallevel. The second proposal was to invite theNational Commission for Protection of CulturalProperties (文化財保護委員会) to offer theiropinion. The third proposal was to providefinancial support not only for the preservationof the ruins, but also for reconstruction of anew cathedral.101 However, Tagawa dismissedtheir final plea.

On March 14th, 1958, the ruins of the UrakamiCathedral were dismantled. Very few peoplewere present at the site during the demolitionprocess. Only the statues of St. Mary inMourning and St. John the Apostle, and aportion of the southern wall were preservedfrom the demolition after a last desperate pleafrom hibakusha groups.

On the day of the dismantling, NagasakiShinbun reported:

[The dismantling] began with theremnants of the front walls. Thoseremnants, however, made forextremely difficult work. Thesturdy ropes meant to pull themdown were cut. Nevertheless, bymid-afternoon, the wall collapsed.About thirty tons of ruins werepulled down by early evening.102

The article indicates that the ruins were fairly

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robust, despite the Urakami Catholic church’sclaim that the remnants had posed a physicalthreat of collapse.103On March 29th, two weeksafter the demolition of the ruins, Nagasaki CityHall caught fire and was largely destroyed.Along with the building itself, much of themunicipal archives were destroyed, includingthe materials detailing Tagawa’s trip to theUnited States. The fire occurred on Saturdaywhen few people were in the city hall. Thecause of the fire remains unknown.104 As aresult of the fire, it is difficult to assess exactlyTagawa’s position concerning the cathedraland the U.S.-Japan security alliance as itevolved during his trip, who he met and whatthey discussed.

Dismantling of Remnants of the Cathedral Photocourtesy of Itaru Takahara

The construction of the new Urakami Cathedralwas completed in October 1959. The questionof how they eventually collected another$10,000 remains unknown. Three statues thatsurvived the bombing were rehoused in front ofthe new cathedral, and a portion of the wall islocated right beside the tower, making it theepicenter in the Nagasaki Peace Park. TheUrakami Catholic leaders described the newcathedral as a symbol of the recovery andreconstruction of their community. However,Nagasaki perpetually lost its most powerfulsymbol of the dawn and suffering of the nuclearage.

Remembrance of Absent Ruins inPhotographs

Today, the Hiroshima Atomic Dome isrecognized internationally as a symbol of theadvent of the nuclear age and of a universaldesire for peace. However, few municipalofficials in Hiroshima were interested in thepreservation of ruins prior to the late 1960s.They felt that their preservation would be anobstacle to Hiroshima reinventing itself from

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the former imperial army city to a city ofpeace.106

The Hiroshima Atomic Dome was originally theHiroshima Prefectural Industrial PromotionHall. Discussion over whether to preserve theremnants of the atomic bombing took place inHiroshima, too. However, neither city officialsnor the citizenry was interested in theconservation. In 1951, Mayor Hamai claimedthat preservation of the remnants of the Hallwould be wasting money since the collapse ofthe remnants was inevitable.107 Likewise, thepresident of Hiroshima University, MoritoTatsuo, stated that preserving the remnantswould only be a discomfort and that theconstruction of a new building symbolizingpeace would be far more valuable.108 TheHiroshima municipal government did notregard the remnants of the Hall as a potentialtourist resource,109 whereas the ruins of theUrakami Cathedral became the most populartourist attraction in Nagasaki, which was themore popular tourist destination for Japanesedue to Nagai’s popularity and its image as thebaptized city by the bomb in the 1950s, rightup to the 1958 demolition.

In May 1960, a children’s group called“Hiroshima Paper Crane Society,” founded tohonor Sasaki Sadako, who had died of lymphgland leukemia caused by the radiationpoisoning of the atomic bomb at the age of 12,created a petition for the preservation of theremnants of the atomic bombing. HiroshimaMayor Hamai, however, believed that “theruins have no scholarly value as they could notreveal the power of the atomic bomb”.110

Meanwhile, the remnants of the HiroshimaPrefectural Industrial Promotion Hall continuedto decay and some civil engineers warned thatthey were on the verge of collapse. The mayorand city officials waited for the question to sortitself out.111

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Remnants of the Cathedral and Urakami PriestNakajima Banri (center)

Photo courtesy of Itaru Takahara

Statue of St. John the Apostle tied up with rope fortransport.

The footprint from a shoe is visible on the chest105

Photo courtesy of Itaru Takahara

However, city officials began to recognize boththe symbolic power and the potential of theruins as a tourist attraction when civil groupsand prominent figures, such as Gensuikyo andYukawa Hideki, the first Japanese winner of theNobel Prize in Physics, called for thepreservation of the Dome, describing it as the“Memorial Cathedral of Hiroshima’s AtomicBombing” and “Unparalleled World CulturalHeritage”.112 The mid-1960s reference to a“Memorial Cathedral” has a bitter irony afterthe grandest and truly historical Cathedral inthe Far East had already been dismantled. InJuly 1966, the Hiroshima City Councilunanimously called for the preservation of theAtomic Dome and set a target of 40 million yento finance the project. They collectedapproximately 67 million yen from all overJapan and the work was completed in August1967. In December 1996, the Atomic Dome wasdesignated a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

In 1970, Matsumoto Hiroshi, a professor ofliterature at Hiroshima University, wrote thatthe Atomic Dome is no longer a ruin of theatomic bombing since it obtained the status ofan object of “perpetual preservation”.113 Heclaimed that the restoration of the AtomicDome rather indicated the death of the ruins.His controversial statement poses a question ofwhat the ruins signify to viewers. Ruins embodya sense of loss and irreversibility of the past.The fragmented body compels us to recognizethat the remnants will eventually fall into decayand oblivion if we fail to reclaim them by

generating action driven by critical thought byworking through what the ruins mean to us inthe present. Contending that the Atomic Domeno longer evokes such a sense of crisis ordynamism, Matsumoto concluded that theperpetual preservation of the Atomic Domewould not guarantee remembrance of thesubstance of the atomic bomb memory; ratherthe pretence to perpetually remember wouldaccelerate oblivion by effectively precludingthe sense of crisis in our remembrance, theessential condition for the possibility ofinheriting the remnants left by absent others.

Many Nagasaki residents today lament thedismantling of the ruins of the UrakamiCathedral which deprived them of a powerfulmonument to the atomic bomb experience—onearguably even more powerful than Hiroshima’sAtomic Dome. However, the photographs of theruins of the cathedral evoke in the viewer thesense of loss precisely because of ourrecognition of the perpetual loss. The ruins ofthe cathedral permanently remain on the vergeof the second destruction, continuouslyappearing as something to be erased. Theghostly remnants in the photographs provokethe viewer’s sense of crisis that some importanthistory and memory surrounding the ruinswould be forever obliterated if s/he fails toreclaim what was lost. The ruins themselvesnever speak to us. To have the ghostlyremnants become part of our present and ourpolitics against multiple forms of injustice, it isnecessary to articulate the significance of thatevent in the present. In other words, the ruinsin the photographs prompt the viewer toconstruct and reconstruct the means for whatis visible and seek what is not fully recoveredfrom oblivion by searching the traces of thepast.

The disentanglement of the pol i t icalimplications of the sister city relationship andthe dismantlement of the ruins reveals howdeeply Nagasaki was embedded withinEisenhower’s U.S. cultural diplomacy and the

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“People-to-People program” that aimed tointegrate Japan into U.S. global policy. Thedetour to the 1950’s political landscape, inturn, illuminates the postwar history ofNagasaki. While it is known that Nagasakihoused Mitsubishi’s largest warship productionsite, and monopolized the manufacture oftorpedoes during the Asia-Pacific War, it islargely ignored that Nagasaki remains one ofJapan’s largest manufacturing sites for militaryproduction under the Mitsubishi HeavyIndustrial Corporation.114 Though Mitsubishi’sproduction of warships was briefly interruptedduring the American occupation, it resumedoperations in 1950 with the outbreak of theKorean War.

In recent decades, Nagasaki’s economicdevelopment has rel ied heavi ly uponMitsubishi’s prosperity through the productionof weapons, nuclear vessels and nuclearreactors. The Mitsubishi Nagasaki ShippingCompany built the first Japanese-made Aegiswarship, which was originally built by the U.S.Navy, for the Japanese Maritime Self-DefenseForce in 1991.115 The Aegis Combat System alsoallows the sharing of military-strategicinformation between the United States andJapan.116 In addition, Urakami is still home tothe only factory producing Japaneset o r p e d o e s . 1 1 7 P u t d i f f e r e n t l y ,Mitsubishi/Nagasaki is one of the majorbenef ic iar ies of American-Japanesecollaborative efforts both to produce weaponsand to introduce nuclear energy into thecountry, both in the service of the U.S.-JapanSecurity Alliance.

Nagasaki prefecture hosts the third largestAmerican military base in Japan today. In 1946the U.S. took over the Japanese naval base inSasebo, just 68 kilometers from the epicenter.Sasebo was for 60 years Japan’s imperialmilitary port city. During the Korean War, itwas reorganized by the U.S. into a military portand housed one of the Headquarters of theUnited Nations Forces.118 After the end of the

U.S. occupation, Japan Self-Defense Forceswere established in 1954 and Sasebo alsobecame the homeport for Japan’s MaritimeSelf-Defense Force. As well, the NagasakiAirport has served the U.S military base inSasebo as a point of entry into, and exit from,Japan.119 Nagasaki has been firmly integratedinto the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance since themid-1950s—the period when the debate overthe ruins of the cathedral took place and thesister city relationship was made. As the U.SNavy states on its official website:

T h e i m p o r t a n t b i l a t e r a lrelationship between Japan and theUnited States that exists today isvery much in evidence at U.S.Fleet Activities Sasebo, whereships of the Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force and the UnitedStates Seventh Fleet share thisexcellent port.120

Likewise, Hiroshima, the popular symbol of thenuclear age and the mecca of world peace,shares a similarly militarized history withNagasaki. Iwakuni, which houses one of thelargest U.S bases in East Asia, is located withinmiles of Hiroshima’s epicentre. Indeed, there isa high concentration of Japanese Self-DefenseForce bases in Hiroshima Prefecture today.121

Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki manifest thecontinuing legacy of Japanese imperialism byoffering land on which the alliance with theformer enemy continue to thrive.

What the resurrected memory of the ruins ofthe Urakami Cathedral signifies is not a meremelancholic sense of loss; rather, theresurrected memory and history of the ruinsilluminate the Japanese desire for the oblivionof its imperial past as well as the contemporaryrealities, where the same political orderdominated by the U.S-Japan alliance thatdetermined the fate of the ruins, continue torule Nagasaki and Japan, and maintain the

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status quo, all of which, in their concertedefforts, produce ruins in other parts of theworld.

Conclusion

This article has explored how the fate of theruins of Urakami Cathedral has beenintertwined with multiple political, economicand military interests linking Japan and theUnited States from 1945 through the 1950s,and the competing desire and will for theremembrance and oblivion of the past in thewake of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, withresonances to the present. The debate over theruins of the Urakami Cathedral took place inthe midst of a political crisis touched off by theHydrogen Bomb test in Bikini and the LuckyDragon #5 incident that it precipitated inMarch 1954, leading to the subsequent rise ofthe antinuclear peace movement throughoutJapan and internationally.

The USIA in Japan pursued a double agendafrom 1954 to 1957. One was dissemination ofthe idea of the “peaceful use of nuclear energy”by holding joint exhibitions with the YomiuriShinbun and other national and local media totransform the cruel memory of nuclearweapons within Japanese consciousness into anew developmentalist logic. A second andrelated agenda was to disseminate thenarrative of “mutual forgiveness, healing,reconstruction and reconciliation” between thetwo countries to counter growing Japaneseantinuclear and anti-American sentiment in thecontext of the large Japanese anti-nuclearweapons movement sparked by the LuckyDragon # 5 Incident but building on theconsciousness of Japan as the only nation to betargeted with nuclear weapons. The USIA goalwas to assure Japan’s political, military andeconomic integration within the U.S sphere.The U.S.-sponsored tour of Yamaguchi andTagawa in the context of establishing the St.Paul-Nagasaki sister city program in 1955,along with the Hiroshima Maiden project, and

the dismantling of the Urakami Cathedral ruinswere part and parcel of long term U.S. policyencapsulated in the U.S.-Japan alliance and theAmpo Treaty.

One of the characteristics of Eisenhower’sPeople-to-People program is its employment ofsentimental narratives that emphasize thehuman connections, solidarities, and universalvalues between Americans and targetnations.122 In turn, selected foreign officials andindividuals translated U.S. interests into localand national policies and politics. Tagawa andYamaguchi fully recognized the value of thesister city relationship as a symbol of themutual forgiveness, reconciliation and a future-oriented relationship between the twocountries. Tagawa, who pledged the economicdevelopment of Nagasaki, likely expected thatthe sister city program would bring Americantourists to Nagasaki. This was bought at theprice of dismantling the ruins of Urakami, themost powerful symbol of nuclear catastrophe,an act carried out against the will of themajority of Nagasaki