The Politics of Parliamentary Strengthening

The Politics of Parliamentary Strengthening

Understanding political incentivesand institutional behaviour in

parliamentary support strategies

Greg Power

Published by WFD and Global Partners & Associates

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) is the United Kingdom’s democracybuilding foundation, aimed at supporting the consolidation of democratic practices in developingdemocracies. Working with partner organisations, WFD seeks to strengthen the institutions ofdemocracy, principally political parties (through the work of the UK political parties), parliaments andthe range of institutions that make up civil society. WFD believes that, for a democracy to flourish,all of these institutions must be strong.

www.wfd.org

Global Partners was established in 2005 to promote democratic politics, effective governance andhuman rights around the world by developing policy and practice, and shaping the approaches ofdonors and governments, civil society organisations and private sector partners.

www.global-partners.co.uk

About the Author:Greg Power is Director of Global Partners and Associates. He is a parliamentary specialist who hasworked with politicians, parties and parliamentary staff in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America andEurope in countries such as Iraq, Egypt andZimbabwe. He also provides strategic advice to donoragencies, foreign ministries and NGOs on support to parliaments and parties in developingdemocracies. He has written widely about parliamentary reform and international party assistance,including WFD's Handbook on Parliamentary Ethics and Conduct. He is the lead author of the firstGlobal Parliamentary Report, to be published by the IPU and UNDP in 2012.

© Global Partners & Associates, 2011

The Politics of Parliamentary Strengthening

Understanding political incentivesand institutional behaviour in

parliamentary support strategies

Greg Power

FOREWORD

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This paper is the outcome of a joint projectbetween the Westminster Foundation forDemocracy and Global Partners and Associatesto examine and suggest an alternative approachto traditional parliamentary strengtheningprogrammes, one which seeks to engage deeperwith the political context in which parliamentsoperate and to incentivise political reform.

At a time when many countries around theworld are seeking to strengthen democracy,engage better with their citizens and implementpolitical reforms, this is a timely opportunity fororganisations engaged in parliamentarystrengthening and political party developmentto re-examine how best they can support andincentivise political change and build this in to the design and implementation ofparliamentary strengthening programmes.

In publishing this paper, we seek to join otherinternational partners and agencies in developinguseful tools and models in the field ofparliamentary strengthening. These include theCPA Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatorsdeveloped in 2006; the recently published EC’’Engaging and Supporting Parliaments Worldwide:Strategies and Methodologies for EC Action inSupport to Parliament’’ (2011); as well as researchand papers in related fields such as DFID ‘’Driversof Change’’( 2004) and SIDA ‘’Power Analysis:Experiences and Challenges’’ (2006)

As a second part of this joint project betweenWFD and Global Partners and Associates, adiagnostic tool for identifying the keyinstitutional factors and incentive structures inparliamentary performance has beendeveloped. WFD will be testing the model inour parliamentary strengthening programmesand this will be published separately.

Linda Duffield, CMGChief ExecutiveWestminster Foundation for Democracy

September 2011

The Politics of Parliamentary StrengtheningUnderstanding political incentives and institutional behaviour in parliamentary support strategies

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CONTENTS

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Foreword 3

Executive summary 6

IntroductionRedefining the purpose of parliamentary support 10

Chapter oneMapping institutional power 14

Chapter twoThe human element - parliament and incentive structures 22

Chapter threeA political strategy for parliamentary strengthening 28

Chapter fourProgrammes built around how political change happens 36

ConclusionKey principles for parliamentary support 42

Footnotes 45

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

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Programmes to strengthen parliamentaryinstitutions have been a significant feature ofinternational democracy promotion strategiesfor several decades. However, in that time thegeneral consensus is that their impact andeffectiveness has been limited. Programmeshave tended to focused on technical supportdesigned to improve the capacity, infrastructureand procedures of parliaments. Yet theeffectiveness of a parliament depends on morethan structure and capacity. Ultimately, itdepends on politicians and staff using fully thetools and powers at their disposal to holdgovernment to account. By failing to engagewith the underlying factors and specificcircumstances that influence parliamentary (andpolitical) behaviour, the potential impact of suchprogrammes is immediately restricted.

The purpose of this paper is suggest analternative approach, one which engages withthe politics of parliamentary strengthening. Itstarts from the premise that the intention of all programmes is to shape parliamentarybehaviour – that is, to improve the performanceof politicians and staff in their parliamentaryfunctions. Ultimately, changing the institutionmeans changing political behaviour. In order todo this, programmes need, first, to understandthe power relationships and incentive structuresthat exist within the parliament and, second,design support programmes which engage withand shape those incentives and influences.

The paper is structured in two main parts - thefirst half of the paper uses a two-part analysis forassessing the underlying causes of parliamentaryeffectiveness to a) map institutional power andb) identify the dominant incentive structureswithin the parliament. The second half of the

paper then sets out how these insights can be applied in the design and delivery ofparliamentary support programmes, both ofwhich are described in more detail below.

The introduction provides a brief description of the traditional, technical approach toparliamentary strengthening. Although they areproviding some valuable support to developingparliaments, donors have frequently hadunrealistic expectations about the impact thattheir programmes might have. The assumptionappears to be that given the right structure,rules, skills and resources politicians willinevitably behave in a way that ensures aneffective parliamentary democracy. Yet, in everyparliament around the world there is a gapbetween the formal powers that the institutionhas to hold government to account, and thewillingness or ability of politicians to use thatpower. The point of analysis should be tounderstand why that gap exists – what iscausing politicians to behave the way that theydo, and then seek to change it.

The first two chapters provide a framework for assessing the causes of parliamentaryunderperformance - in other words, why thegap exists between parliamentary power andthe way it is used.

Chapter one provides the basis for mappinginstitutional power within a parliament. That is,identifying the key figures and sources of powerthat determine how the institution operates inpractice. Parliaments are unlike almost any otherinstitution in that there is never one person incharge. Various institutional and political figureswill shape different aspects of parliamentarybusiness, such as Ministers, the Speaker, or the


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Secretary General, but they will often have verydifferent objectives. Parliaments (and especiallynew parliaments) are frequently in a state of fluxas different individuals and groups seek tocontrol the way the institution works.

The chapter provides a basis for analysing theinfluence of different figures and the way inwhich they use control of patronage, procedureand resources to shape the behaviour of MPs. It suggests that the key figures can usually be found in one of three categories, namely, party political, administrative andcommittee/backbench. The purpose is tounderstand the sorts of client-patronrelationships that exist within a parliament, howthey distort parliamentary operation and,significantly, how they might be changed.

Chapter two looks in more detail at theincentive structures which affect parliamentarybehaviour. It argues that the main incentives canbe understood in three ways. First, the politicalparty incentive structures will often apply someform of party discipline, instil certain partyvalues and control the main forms of patronageand political promotion. Second, there will bepersonal incentive structures which operateindependent and sometimes counter to that of the party – such as obligations to theconstituency/constituents, policy ambitions,representation of certain sectional interests, or perhaps baser rent-seeking activity. Third, the institutional structure and culture of the parliament will provide incentives andopportunities to behave in ways that strengthenor undermine parliamentary function.

Analysing these patterns, relationships and incentive structures means that parliamentary

underperformance is understood in terms ofbehaviour arising out of the interaction of people,parliaments and incentives. But the challenge is thento use that analysis to develop different types ofparliamentary support – to implement programmeswhose principal objective is measured not just bystructural change, but by behavioural change.

The second half of the paper examines what thismeans for the design and delivery ofparliamentary support programmes. Chapterthree suggests that all parliamentaryprogrammes need to be built around clearerstrategic objectives. Traditional parliamentarysupport has been based on a ‘hit and hope’approach. There is, at best, a tenuous linkbetween some of the techniques used inparliamentary support and the hoped-foroutcomes – and no strategy for managingtowards certain results. It argues that thesuccess of any parliamentary strengtheningprogramme will depend on the extent to whichit is supported, promoted and owned byMembers of Parliament. This means not onlyanalysing the internal drivers and dynamics, butusing them to develop a strategy which plays tothose incentive structures and builds a coalitionof support for change amongst MPs. In short,donor-funded programmes need to borrowlessons from the business world and helpparliaments to manage the process of change.

Chapter four looks at how political changehappens - that it is a slow, incremental andhaphazard process, which is rarely amenable to neat designs or detailed reform plans.Parliaments, like every other type oforganisation, have their own internal politics,which largely determine how the institution isrun. Yet these lessons are rarely absorbed or

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accepted in the design of support projects.Programmes need to start from here: byengaging with the small ‘p’ politics ofparliamentary operation. Given this uncertaintyprojects need to be flexible, and driven byoutcomes, rather than process.

Programmes should be guided by five coreprinciples:

i) Understand what the institution looks likethrough the eyes of those in power.

Identifying the key institutional figures, their rolein running the institution and the sources of theirauthority, will provide a perspective not only onthe causes of parliamentary underperformance,but also the prospects for realistic reform.

ii) Identify the factors causing MPs to behavethe way that they do.

Parliaments are diverse collections of individualswith a variety of interests who coalesce aroundissues as they arise. Programmes need tounderstand the impact of political, personal andinstitutional incentive structures on MPbehaviour, and then seek to alter them.

iii) Parliament needs a common understandingof the problem

Change will only happen if a majority of MPsbelieve it is necessary and desirable. The successof parliamentary support programmes thereforedepends on the extent to which they areregarded as the solution to a commonly-accepted problem.

iv) Parliamentary development should beframed in personal terms

Too many programmes are built aroundinstitutions rather than individuals. Thisneeds to be turned on its head. Programmesshould define institutional deficiencies interms of how they affect individual MPs andstaff, and develop programmes whichaddress them by helping individuals to dotheir jobs more effectively.

v) Programmes must establish responsibilitywithin parliament

The success of parliamentary support must bemeasured by how far it changes politicalbehaviour, and not the structure of theinstitution. This sort of change has to be ownedby MPs themselves. Programmes shouldprovide the incentives for MPs to own and drivethat process of change.

Successful parliamentary strengthening needsto work with the grain of political opinion in aparliament, and it needs to distinguish betweenthe ‘politics’ of the institution, and the ‘Politics’ ofthe state, if it is to generate momentum. Theshift in mindset means that parliamentarysupport work should be seen less as a process ofimplementation, and more akin to consultancy– helping the parliament to define both theproblems and their own solutions. Ultimately,the pace of change cannot be determined fromthe outside by donors, it needs to emerge fromwithin the parliament. If donors are genuine intheir desire for greater impact it will mean thatthey take greater responsibility for the results oftheir interventions, but ultimately exercise lesscontrol over how reform is enacted.


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INTRODUCTIONREDEFINING THE PURPOSEOF PARLIAMENTARYSUPPORT

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Programmes to strengthen parliamentaryinstitutions have been a significant feature ofinternational democracy promotion strategiessince the 1970s, but grew markedly during the‘third wave’ of democratisation in the late 1980sand early 1990s. In the first decade of thetwenty-first century parliamentary supportcontinued to expand, and is now a key elementin the governance work of almost allinternational donor agencies. Yet it has beendescribed as the ‘least effective’ area ofdemocracy promotion which has failed togenerate any meaningful results or show anytangible changes to systems of governance.

In recent years donor agencies have sought toadopt new forms of analysis and programmedesign to address these failings, especially sincethe Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness andthe Accra Agenda for Action. A report from theODI in 2007 summed up many of thesechallenges, arguing that parliamentaryprogrammes needed to be based on a muchbetter understanding of the causes ofparliamentary weakness, much clearer about theirobjectives and built from the specific politicalcontext within which individual parliamentsoperate. However, while there is a high level ofagreement at the strategic level on bothproblem-analysis and design of programmes,there are few tangible examples of this approachreaping benefits – especially in relation toparliamentary development. There appears tobe a gap between the international strategicpriorities and country-specific programmes – itis not clear how well those strategies are beingtranslated into practical programmes. In the fieldof international parliamentary strengthening itseems we have some useful architectural plans,but we have not yet constructed many buildings.

Parliaments have an especially important role inemerging democracies - not only in improvingthe quality of governance by ensuringtransparency and accountability, but alsoplaying a critical role in shaping the public’sexpectations and attitudes to democracy. Theirperformance in holding government to accountand engagement with voters will help toestablish the norms and values in the early yearsof a democratic culture. Yet in many parts ofthe world legislatures have fallen far short ofpublic (and donor) expectations. In emergingdemocracies, parliaments are frequentlyineffective against a powerful executive, andhave little public legitimacy and authority. Thecauses for such weakness are many and varied,frequently relating to the historical legacy of aparticular country and the transition to democracy,as well as the political context in which theparliament operates. But it may also reflectmore prosaic factors such as a lack of resources,poor organisation or limited formal power.

Most support programmes are usually builtaround the performance of the parliament intheir three main conceptual functions, namely,legislation, oversight and representationalthough financial oversight is increasingly beingseen as a distinct area of activity.

• Legislation - Assessment of the legislativefunction will be concerned with how wellparliament scrutinises and amends bills, orsimply acts as a rubber-stamp for the Executive;

• Oversight - Parliamentary oversight is themain means by which government is held toaccount between elections, analysis willtherefore concentrate on whether parliamentensures government departments are run


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efficiently and that ministers are regularlycalled to account for their actions and policies;

• Representation - Parliament ultimately derivesits legitimacy from its ability to represent and articulate public concern and programmestend to concentrate on the ‘representativeness’of parliament (that is how its make-up reflectswider society) and the extent to which MPsconsult and engage with voters;

• Financial oversight – Parliament should have thepower to agree the State’s spending priorities,ensure that specific policy areas are beingfunded adequately to meet policy objectivesand to examine income against expenditure.

The inability of parliament to perform thesefunctions could be for a variety of reasons, and theprocess could break down at any point in between the initiation and drafting ofgovernment measures, through the parliamentarystages of the debate, scrutiny and amendment, orindeed at the point of implementation. Aproblem in one aspect of parliament activity isoften closely linked to shortcomings elsewhere,and it is rare for an underperforming parliamentto display weakness in only one area.

The traditional approach to parliamentarysupport largely failed to recognise this. First,it relied on too superficial an analysis of theproblems facing parliaments and rarelyunderstood the political, social and economiccontext within which they operate. As aresult, too many programmes were builtaround generalisations and attempted toreplicate the same programme in manydifferent countries, using unsuitable methodsand inappropriate techniques.

Second, the approach reflected donorpreference for technical support toparliaments. Most donor agencies havetraditionally been wary of being seen asinterfering in the domestic politics of anothersovereign nation. Parliamentary support istherefore highly sensitive if it seeks to improvethe oversight of a dominant Executive.Providing equipment, resources or training is,by contrast, much less controversial.

Third, although it is obviously important toidentify structural weaknesses and where themanifestations of poor legislative scrutiny,accountability and representation exist,programmes built solely around this sort ofanalysis are likely to focus more on symptomsrather than causes. That is, focusing on a lackof resources or skills or planning, for example,frequently leads programmes to use those asidentifiable outcomes. However, these tendto be signs of ineffectiveness rather thancauses. Programmes might be better to startby asking why the skills or resources areabsent. It also means that projects are oftenjudged on their ability to deliver training topoliticians – rather than on the impact thattraining has on the parliament’s effectiveness.

The ultimate purpose of parliamentary supportwork should not just be to change the structureof the institution, but to change the behaviourof the politicians within it. The technicalapproach is based on the assumption that giventhe right structure and resources politicians will automatically behave in a way that ensures an effective parliamentary democracy.By providing more institutional resources,delivering training courses or changing thestructure of the parliament, the hope is that

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MPs will spend more time on their coreparliamentary functions - of scrutinisinglegislation, holding ministers to account andrepresenting their constituents – and be moreeffective in each of them.

In practice, this rarely occurs. Programmes needto understand how parliaments operate inpractice, and why a gap exists between theformal powers that the institution holds and howthey are used in reality. In short, they need arounder analysis of the factors influencingpolitical behaviour. The next two chaptersprovide the basis for analysing these, by looking at institutional dynamics and incentive structures.


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CHAPTER ONEMAPPING INSTITUTIONALPOWER

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One of the most significant problems inunderstanding how a parliament is run is thatthere is never one person in charge. Variousinstitutional and political figures run differentaspects of parliamentary business. So, althoughpositions such as the Speaker or Chair will beformally responsible for procedure andmaintaining order, they compete for influencewith political party leaders, administrativefigures such as the Chief Clerk or SecretaryGeneral, and senior committee positions or other senior politicians with alternative power bases.

These problems are particularly acute in newparliaments and countries with a limiteddemocratic tradition. All legislative institutionsgo through a long period of establishing therules, precedent and procedures. Americanpolitical scientist Nelson Polsby, looking at the institutionalisation of the US Congressdescribes how, it took decades for members tocome to some agreement about the rules, theauthority of the Speaker and professionalstandards of conduct and decorum. In the USCongress, as in every other parliament, the earlyyears were rowdy and tumultuous, andcharacterised by incidents such as this from1838: “Upon resuming his seat, after havingreplied to a severe personal arraignment ofHenry Clay, former Speaker White, without theslightest warning received a blow in the face. Inthe fight that followed a pistol was dischargedwounding an officer of the police ... Thefisticuffs became so violent that even the Chairwould not quell it.”

The process he describes is one of a battle as towho controls the institution. In the early years ofa parliament, with no common agreement about

how the institution should be run, this battle isparticularly sharp, as different individuals andgroups in parliament will seek to interpret anddevelop the rules for their own political benefit.As they evolve, so members come to somecommon agreement about the rules of thegame, and the games within the rules anddevelop a greater stability.

However, parliamentary support needs to work fromthis understanding - that parliaments are rarelymonolithic or coherent institutions, but are frequentlyin a state of flux as collections of competing, andshifting, sets of interests seek to shape how theinstitution is run, and how it takes (or avoids taking)decisions. Frequently, it is the dominance of certaininstitutional figures over the running of theparliament that undermines parliamentaryperformance across the range of its functionsthrough patronage, control of procedure or manipulation of resources.

This constellation of factors will vary from oneinstitution to the next, but this chapter seeks toprovide a basic framework for identifying the keyfigures within the institution and understandinghow they exercise control. It is divided into twomain parts. The first part suggests that the keyfigures can be divided into three categories –party political positions, formal institutional andadministrative positions, and senior backbenchand committee positions. The second part,addresses the potential sources of influence andcontrol that such figures might hold, suggestingthat their authority generally comes from one ofthree sources - political power, parliamentaryprocedure or control of resources.

The final part of the chapter looks at the ways in which such control has distorted


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parliamentary performance in particularcountries, and draws out the main lessons for the design and implementation ofparliamentary programmes.

Key figures of influence

1) Party political positions

Most parliaments are characterised by thedynamic between Government and opposition.Government will usually need parliamentaryapproval for its legislation, spending and keydecisions. Perhaps it should not be surprisingthat Governments sometimes seek to controlthe parliamentary agenda and get businessthrough as quickly and smoothly as possible.

The range of figures likely to influence theoperation of parliament will therefore start withthe President or Prime Minister, the leader of themajority party or leader of government businessin parliament. Such figures are likely to have asignificant role in determining the pattern ofparliamentary business, not only when certainvotes will be taken, but also how longparliament will be given to scrutinise anddeliberate. In addition, they are likely toinfluence the appointment of MPs to variousparliamentary positions, such as committees orinternal decision-making bodies.

The parliamentary party whips will usually beresponsible for implementing many of thesedecisions, enforcing discipline and providingintelligence on MPs. However, governmentministers at every level will also have an impactthrough their participation and interaction withparliament on the effectiveness of plenarydebates, questions and committee hearings.

By definition, the opposing parties will have less influence and power, and fewer weapons at their disposal, but will usually be seeking to extend parliamentary control overgovernment. The extent to which eithergovernment or opposition will shape the runningof the institution depends on the balance ofpower (i.e. how many MPs the governing partyhas), the level of discipline and cohesion withinthe political parties and their formal roles in therunning of parliamentary business.

2) Formal institutional and administrativepositions

Although political interests may appear todominate the way in which parliament is run,formal responsibility for running parliamentarybusiness, keeping order and enforcingprocedure lies with the Speaker (or PresidingOfficer). As the public face of the plenarysession, the Speaker will have a prominent rolein most aspects of parliamentary activity,interpreting rules and sanctioning errant MPs.But the Speaker is also likely to have aprominent role in the unseen aspects ofparliamentary organisation, such as decisionsover the parliamentary timetable (eitherthrough a ‘business committee’ or in privatediscussions with government ministers andwhips). He or she is likely to be decisive in thein the creation of committee structures,appointing MPs to committees andsometimes even determining the quality oftheir work.

Within the administration of parliament theClerk or Secretary General will usually play aless public role, but will often be a pivotal figurein emerging parliaments, responsible for the

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internal organisation and staffing of theinstitution. The Clerk thus has an impact on theway the rules and roles are enacted in practice,influencing the way that committees conducttheir business, determining levels of committeestaffing and resources, and support for MPs inperforming their key parliamentary roles.

Although in the Westminster tradition suchfigures tend to be thought of as independentand ‘above politics’, in many countries both theSpeaker and the Clerk frequently play apolitically decisive role.

3) Senior ‘backbenchers’ and committeepositions

The third group is more amorphous and lesseasily defined. Although they may not seekoverarching influence over parliament in thesame way as political leaders or institutionalpositions, senior politicians are likely to shapethe behaviour of the parliament in discrete, butimportant, ways.

In most parliaments, committee performanceis uneven and inconsistent, with somecommittees performing far better than others.It is a truism that the effectiveness of aparliamentary committee depends on thequality of its chair. A well-organised andfocused chair is likely to run a well-organisedand focused committee, determining whichissues to examine and how vigorously to pursuethem. Such committees can act as a bulwarkin otherwise unimpressive institutions. InZimbabwe, for example, where RobertMugabe’s ZANU party still dominates thepolitical decision-making process, theparliament is largely inactive and ineffective.

However, one committee, responsible forEnergy and Mines vigorously pursued evidenceof corruption in the mining of diamonds. Thisis significant because the investigation was across-party effort led by a ZANU MP,investigating mostly ZANU-linked officials.The willingness of the committee to use the fullextent of their legal powers has provided MPsand other committees with an indication of howfar parliamentary power might extend.

In addition, each parliament is likely tohave certain procedural or backbenchcommittees who exercise an influence overthe operation of parliament. These mightinclude rules or procedures committees,members affairs committees, or committeesof all the committee chairs (sometimescalled liaison committees). Such forums canact as a significant location of powerindependent of the Executive. But, perhapsmore importantly for parliamentary supportprojects, each of these committees will havea direct interest in how the institution isbeing run, and will want to influence anyproposed changes or reforms.

Sources of influence – political patronage,parliamentary procedure, control of resources

Understanding the perspective on power of keyfigures will give some sense of the points ofinfluence and the way the institution is run. Butit is also important to understand how they derivetheir influence. Why is it that these figures haveauthority, and can influence the way in which MPsbehave? In other words, what sort of patron-client relationships exist that shape the runningof parliament and, more specifically, what sourcesof power underpin those relationships.


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Within parliaments these relationships arenormally defined by three main sources ofinfluence, namely:

• Political patronage. The ability to appoint MPsto ministerial office, public bodies, or committeechairs will usually be in the hands of theExecutive, as a form of political patronage. Butthe Executive’s control of government moneywill also allow them to dispense money, eitherdirectly to MPs or by approving funds forconstituency projects.

• Parliamentary procedure. As mentioned abovethe power of the Speaker derives largely fromtheir formal role in interpreting parliamentaryprocedure, which is especially important in newparliaments with little common understandingof the rules. This interpretation/adjudicationruns to keeping order and the power to sanctionMPs. But it also extends to the ability to changethe rules, determine the structure of committees,decide the pattern of business and length ofsittings. In short, the ability to determine howand when decisions are taken – or not.

• Control of resources. The ability to decidehow a parliament spends its money on staff,resources and committee enquiries, willobviously have an impact on the quality of thework in that parliament. Parliament’s controlof its own budget has been an importantdevelopment in several African parliaments in the last decade to control both staffing and spending.

Those in significant positions will often draw onmore than one source of authority. Forexample, it is not unusual to find parliamentswhere a dominant Prime Minister or President

has considerable political patronage at theirdisposal, a role in running parliamentarybusiness and procedure, and even control theparliamentary budget.

Institutional power in practice

Two examples from Africa highlight these sortsof dynamics, and particularly how the influenceof key institutional figures within the parliamentcan dramatically distort its operation.

The first is Ghana, which is generally seen as asuccessful example in Africa of the transition toparliamentary democracy. Although it gainedindependence in 1957, its sporadic bouts ofdemocratic governance were interspersed withmilitary rule. The last of these periods,instigated by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlingsthrough a coup at the end of 1981, resulted ingovernment through a Provincial NationalDefence Council. Rawlings inched Ghanatowards parliamentary democracy, legalisingpolitical parties, introducing political reform atthe local level and holding the country’s firstmulti-party parliamentary elections in 1993. Insubsequent elections the balance of power hasgradually shifted. Rawlings’ NDC party wonthe first two elections, but in 2000 the NationalPatriotic Party (NPP) won more seats inparliament, its leader John Kufuor becamePresident, and a new Speaker, Pete Ala Djetey,was elected with the specific intention ofstrengthening parliament.

Yet, despite the impression of a functionalparliamentary democracy, the institution hasbeen subject to manipulation by thegovernments of both Rawlings and Kufuor inthree main ways. First, they sought to reduce

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parliamentary opposition by simply increasingthe number of MPs who were also ministers.Between 1996 and 2008 the proportion ofMinisters in parliament increased from 20% to43% of total elected members, which in turnmeant increasing the number of ministerialposts in government by around 50% in that period.

Second, the mass of MPs were subject to arange of threats and inducements. At onelevel, Kufuor employed a tight whippingregime, forcing MPs to show their ballots toensure they voted for Executive measures. But,other forms of patronage were also deployed.In a system where the MP is under enormouspressure to provide for constituents and theconstituency as a whole, loyal MPs wererewarded with state-funded public worksprojects in their local area, personalappointments to public tender boards whichcould increase their salary by more than 30% orsimply brown envelopes full of cash at the timeof significant votes in parliament.

Third, the institution came more directly underthe control of the Executive in two ways. In thefirst instance, it increased its influence overprocedure and resources through the Speaker.Between 2001 and 2004 Speaker Pete AlaDjetey preserved parliament’s autonomy, itscontrol over the agenda and enacted significantimprovements in the terms of service for staffand MPs. But in 2005 he was removed in arigged election, and replaced by a Kufuor crony,who simply carried out the Executive’s wishes.Part of this was reflected in the seconddimension of control, as the financialindependence of the parliament was eroded. In2005 the government cut parliament’s budget

by around three-quarters and then exercisedstricter guidance over the terms under which itcould be spent.

A similar pattern of co-option and briberyplayed itself out in Kenya until the late 1990s.Kenya became independent in 1963, butparliament effectively acted as a rubber-stamp under the Presidency of JomoKenyatta between 1964 and 1978, and formuch of the time under his successor, Danielarap Moi, until 2002. However, in 1992 Kenyaresumed multi-party democracy, and betweenthen and 2007 held four sets of elections(1992, 1997, 2002, 2007).

The key parliamentary figure for Executivecontrol of the parliament under Moi was theSpeaker, Francis Ole Kaparo. Kaparo acted asMoi’s agent to contain legislative activity andoversight, limit the development ofparliamentary power, and restrict the staffingand resources of the institution. Attempts byinternational donors such as USAID tostrengthen the parliament, even in terms of itsphysical capacity, were ultimately frustrated bythe interventions of Kaparo. The Speakerultimately acted as a brake on any reforms thatmight challenge his position and authority.

However, in contrast to Ghana, a series ofreforms enacted between 2000 and 2008circumscribed the power of the Speaker. Agroup of reform-minded MPs pushed forchanges that would make the office of theSpeaker directly accountable to MPs, allowparliament to take control of its own resourcesand spending, and make parliamentindependent of the Executive. The resultingParliamentary Service Commission (PSC),


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created in 2000, took responsibility for theinternal organisation and staffing of theinstitution. Although still chaired by Kaparo, hispower was diluted by the presence of its nineother members. And, from this base, MPspushed for further reforms to strengthen thecommittee system, professionalise the staff andimprove parliamentary infrastructure. By 2008,a new Speaker had been elected by MPs and awholesale revision of Standing Orders wasapproved which made the government muchmore accountable to parliament.

The ultimate success of these reforms can beunderstood in two ways. First, the power baseof the Speaker changed. His authority hadinitially stemmed from his proximity to thePresident, and he used this to controlpatronage, procedures and resources withinparliament. However, the election of a morerestive and independent group of MPs in 1998,which reduced the President’s majority inparliament, meant that the Speaker had to relyat least in part on the support of MPs to securehis position, and therefore had to respond tosome of their demands.

Second, reforms to strengthen parliament wereclosely tied to the issue of parliamentaryinfrastructure, resources and MPs’ salaries.Kaparo bought himself some time – andtemporarily staved off parliamentary reform -by improving the support to MPs, theintroduction of constituency developmentfunds (CDFs) and a significant increase in MPspay. By 2008 Kenyan MPs were earning$157,000 per year and were disbursing anestimated $646,000 in CDFs per constituency.Yet, it was parliament’s desire to make itselfindependent of the Executive – and thus

determine its own budgets and salaries – thatacted as the catalyst for the reforms thatstrengthened parliamentary power, andultimately sealed Kaparo’s demise.

Conclusion

The point of these examples is to highlight theextent to which the key figures within aparliament can use patronage, procedure andresources to influence the behaviour of MPs.Ghana has showed the distorting effect ofExecutive dominance as it used patronage, co-option and bribery to extend its control overparliament. Kenya offers a more optimisticassessment, highlighting the way in which theissue of who controls parliamentary resourceswas used to build support for the process ofparliamentary reform, although – some wouldargue – at considerable financial cost.

The key point is that appreciating suchdistortions of parliamentary functioning shouldbe at the heart of any analysis of parliamentarysupport. Traditional forms of technical supportwould have been unlikely to tackle suchchallenges, and in providing additionalresources to the parliament may even haveentrenched the positions of those in power.

Two key lessons can be drawn. First, projectsneed to be based on an analysis of institutionalpower, and the way that it is being used.Invariably, those in positions of power will seekto use their control of patronage, procedure andresources to retain that power. Butunderstanding those institutional dynamics willmean that parliamentary support programmescan be built around a better analysis of thecauses of that institutional underperformance.

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Second, projects need to appreciate what theworld looks like through the eyes of those inpower. Any reforms to parliament, andespecially those which strengthen the autonomyor power of parliament, are likely to challengethe authority of those currently running theinstitution. Opposition to any change at all mayrun deep. A senior figure in the GovernmentWhips’ office in the British House of Commonsonce told the author, “the system may not beperfect, but we know how to operate it. Anychange might undermine our ability to get MPsto do what we want them to.” Projects need notonly to identify the key institutional figures, butalso anticipate their attitude to reform, as theirsupport or opposition is likely to determine thesuccess of the project.


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CHAPTER TWO THE HUMAN ELEMENT -PARLIAMENT ANDINCENTIVE STRUCTURES

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Parliaments rarely, if ever, act as collectiveinstitutions. Unlike other organisations boundtogether by a clear vision and mission, there arealmost no circumstances when every MP will bepursuing the same objectives. Parliamentsshould be understood in this way - as collectionsof individuals with a wide variety of interests,who band together in a series of shiftingcoalitions, depending on particular issues andthe incentives at work.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide aframework to understand those incentivestructures and their impact on the parliament.The framework provides three categories, intowhich a variety of incentives can be grouped,namely; political, personal and institutional. Thefirst covers the pattern of political control andpatronage exercised by parties, the secondincludes individual elements of representationcovering personal and constituency interests,and the third assesses the impact ofparliamentary structure and culture onbehaviour. The final part of the chapter looksat how these incentives have worked in practice,and how a combination of incentives and thefear of sanctions might be used in supportprogrammes. The point is to find ways ofaligning the interests of different groups of MPsaround a set of reforms – often to counteractExecutive pressure - which in turn meansworking with, and shaping the various incentivesthat exist.

1 - Political Incentives: patronage, discipline andparty norms

One of the commonest problems forparliamentary support programmes is in gettingMPs to see their role not just in party political

terms – that is, as either supporters or opponentsof the governing party - but as ‘parliamentarians’,responsible for ensuring effective oversight oflegislation, policy and spending regardless ofparty. In practice this is problematic, as theparties provide the main basis for organisingparliamentary business, and exercise control overtheir MPs in three main ways.

First, the party will provide the principal way ofgetting elected and the basis for aparliamentary career. Although independentcandidates do succeed, the vast majority ofMPs are elected on a party platform, benefitingfrom the campaign resources, support networksand wider recognition of the party nameamongst the electorate. Once in office, MPsare largely dependent on the senior figures inthe party, and especially the whips, to put themforward for promotion to positions withincommittees or as ministers. In short, the politicalparty will largely determine the success andlength of an individual MP’s political career.Second, parties determine the behavioural normsin parliament. Even before they are elected theparties are likely to enforce certain norms andexpectations of their politicians. The party willprovide the main source of advice for new MPsuncertain how to behave or do their job. And inthe running of parliament, parties are the principalchannel for disseminating information aboutparliamentary business to MPs and guiding MPsas to how they should vote.

Third, as the previous chapter emphasised,politicians are often subject to more directforms of patronage. This includes directlyincentivising MPs by buying their votes,appointments to government or other positionsof power, or distributing funds to projects within


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their constituency. At the other extreme,‘disloyal’ MPs may find themselves threatenedwith the removal of political or financial support.

Other drivers may also be at work. For example,in post-conflict countries where the politicalparties are made up of members of formermilitias, the discipline, cohesion and loyalty to acause, which is essential to a fighting army willcontinue to shape the behaviour of thosepeople when they are elected politicians.

Given such factors it is easier to understand levelsof party control. Parliamentary parties arestructured to ensure discipline, with the whipsexisting solely to enforce order. An MP who wantsto succeed is likely to respond to those incentives.

2 - Personal incentives: Ambitions, policyinterests and constituency accountability

Parties are thus important in understanding therelationship between the MP and oversight ofthe Executive. However, in many emergingdemocracies, and especially in Africa, partiesbear little resemblance to those in most of thedonor countries. They are rarely ideological orissue-based organisations with a clear set ofpolicies which creates internal cohesion anddistinguishes them from other parties. Rather,they tend to be loose coalitions of interestsbased around the personalities of their leaders.In such circumstances, other incentives maydilute the dominance of the parties.

In this context, it is important to understand whyindividuals seek to become MPs in the firstplace. The position is likely to offer status,influence and opportunities for financial gain.But, at the most basic level the office should

provide MPs with sufficient income andresources. The previous chapter showed how,in Kenya, the issue of parliamentary salaries andinfrastructure became the rallying point for awider process of reform amongst MPs.

Equally, the role of the MP provides theopportunity to pursue the interests of a cause,such as a trade union, civil society organisationor policy issue. They may also feel accountableto other interests such as the constituency, atribe, a religion or a class which overrides otherpatron-client relationships. It is rare to find apolitician who is not interested in some form ofpolitical change, however minor. In such casesthe politician is likely to owe their election – andpossibly re-election – to groups whose intereststhey were elected to promote. Theseconsiderations may act as a counterweight tothose of the party, especially if they are inconflict with one another.

However, the single most important factor islikely to be the electoral system. List-basedelectoral systems tend to enhance the controlof the party, as re-election depends almostentirely the party chiefs who decide the orderof candidates on the party list. Constituency-based systems, by contrast, mean that MPs areaccountable to voters in their home territory,who are likely to influence both the selection ofcandidates and their election prospects.

The expectations of the constituency thereforehave a powerful effect on the behaviour of MPs.In patrimonial societies MPs are expected todeliver tangible goods for individuals andorganisations in their constituencies. Thisstretches from direct financial support toindividuals, to help with schooling, health or even

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funerals, to providing roofs for schools, beds forhospitals or support for other public institutions.Even in non-patrimonial societies MPs are usuallyseen as important and wealthy individuals,expected to intercede and provide benefits totheir constituents from their own pocket.

This obviously has many implications for the wayMPs see their role in parliament. Two contradictorytrends are particularly worth noting. First, if re-election depends on a personal vote andconstituency opinion, MPs may be less beholdento the party, and therefore less likely to respond tothe overtures of the whips. But, second, the focuson delivering tangible goods for the constituencymeans MPs have to find the funds to provide forvoters. In some cases, this has led to the creationof constituency development funds, in others it hasmade MPs more susceptible to bribery andcorruption – and thus more likely to toe the partyline in return for patronage.

3 - Institutional incentives: Parliamentary culture,structure and experience

The way in which MPs pursue their personalinterests, and respond to party incentives canthough only be understood in the context of theparliament’s culture and structure. The country’sexperience of democracy, the turnover of MPsat each election and the extent to which normsare ‘institutionalised’ will determine the characterof the parliament. But, the extent to whichparliament provides opportunities for MPs toachieve their objectives will also encourage anddiscourage certain forms of behaviour.

The description of the early days of the USCongress at the start of chapter one, highlightssome of the challenges for developing

parliaments. The parliamentary culture willoften be very fragile, with few institutionalnorms or common patterns of behaviour,especially in countries where there is a limitedrecent experience of democratic politics. Insuch circumstances, parliamentary rules andprocedures are open to interpretation, andoften the subject of fierce contest betweendifferent parliamentary groups.

The recent history of Iraq provides an extremeexample of these dynamics. The internationalcommunity strove to provide Iraq’s Council ofRepresentatives with a clear constitutionalposition and comprehensive rules of procedure.Yet, during their first legislative term, themeaning of the rules was the subject of constantdisagreement, the authority of the Speaker andhis Deputies was frequently called into questionand their interpretation of procedureconsistently challenged. This occasionallyresulted in fistfights between disagreeingpoliticians – or their bodyguards. In anatmosphere of zero-sum politics, every MP hada direct interest in how the institution shouldbe run, but few common cultural norms whichthey could fall back on.

The process (or absence) of institutionalisationwill shape standards of behaviour andincentive structures, but parliamentary projectsalso need to take into account how politicians’activity varies in different forums. For example,the plenary session is likely to emphasisedivision and raise the level of rhetoric aspoliticians play to an audience of fellow MPs(and possibly the wider public), attack theopposition and generate support from partycolleagues. By contrast, work in permanentand portfolio committees means that


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politicians work with the same group ofmembers on a specific policy area over a longperiod. The effectiveness of the committeedepends on the ability of politicians to build up policy expertise and work across party lines, thus providing incentives for them to place their parliamentary duties ahead of party loyalty.

The structure of the parliament, and theopportunities it creates for MPs to pursue theirpolitical, personal or constituency objectives,is therefore crucial. This means thatcommittees need significant powers andresources, so that membership or chairing acommittee confers a certain status. But inaddition, there need to be enough committeesto shadow the work of the various governmentdepartments and handle legislation, but not somany as to make it difficult for them to befilled with MPs and regularly reach a quorum.In short, the committee system needs tocontain the incentives for MPs to regard it asa viable parliamentary career.

Incentive structures in practice

Parliamentary support programmes need totake into account this combination of politicalcontrol, personal ambition and structural factors,as they can often distort the process of reform.For example, in Indonesia, the parliament wasregarded as a key institution in the transition todemocracy following the collapse of threedecades of authoritarian rule by PresidentSoeharto in 1998. It though faced a series ofinstitutional and political hangovers from theprevious regime which hampered its operation,not least the quality of staff, the politicians andthe political parties.

Within this context the committee system had a vital role in securing improvedparliamentary accountability. The elevenpermanent committees are the principal way inwhich parliament exercise its constitutionalfunctions, providing the main forum for detailedlegislative scrutiny and amendment, callingministers and government agencies to accountand approving public appointments. Thecommittees thus enjoy significant powers and aformal relationship with other state institutionsincluding the Supreme Audit body andelectoral commission.

Yet, the political culture is such that theseextensive powers have been used by MPs asmeans of extortion, with numerous examples ofcommittee investigations being distorted bybribery, and chief executives of public andprivate bodies being told that they would facehearings unless they paid committee members.It has even led to competition betweencommittees over territory, and which had theright to ‘investigate’ in particular policy areas. Similarly, the attempt to reform Nigeria’scommittee system in 2008 has to beunderstood in the context of a parliament“permeated by clientilism, corruption, andstruggles over patronage”. Since the transitionto democracy in 1999 the parliament has beenactive and steadily increased its reach overgovernment. And within that system, thecommittees have played an important andenergetic role, even though performancebetween committees varies enormously.

Part of the reason for the high level ofcommittee activity was the fact that parliamentactively encouraged participation by providingallowances, the possibility of travel and

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heightened personal reputations. However, thissimply resulted in a dramatic increase in thenumber of committees, and the number of MPsattempting to maximise their allowances bysimultaneously serving on as many as possible.Whereas in the First Assembly there werearound 40 committees in each House ofParliament, by 2007 this number had increasedto 84 in the House of Representatives and 54 inthe Senate, with some MPs participating in adozen committees. After the 2007 election anew Speaker announced his intention torationalise them. However, the entrenchednature of the system and MPs’ attitudes towardsit meant that after a three month review theprocess ended with the creation of an additionaltwelve committees.

Conclusion

By its very nature, the field of parliamentarysupport tends to focus more on cases ofdistorted parliamentary incentives thanexamples of perfectly-functioning institutions,and the cases above fall in to that category.However, they do show that not allparliamentary behaviour can be explained interms of party politics or the dominance of theExecutive. In these cases, a combination ofpersonal interests, institutional culture andparliamentary structure worked to the detrimentof the parliament’s role and function.

In every parliament there is some form ofpatron-client politics which distorts activity.Understanding these patterns, relationships andincentive structures should be integral to thedevelopment of all parliamentary supportprogrammes. Traditional forms of support tendto diagnose problems in terms of institutional

deficiency, and provide resources or training onthat basis. The issue was summed up in a 2008report from the Africa All Party ParliamentaryGroup in the British House of Commons, whichquoted one senior figure in the field, “Too oftendonors and implementers ’teach’ MPs abouttheir ‘role’. [The problem] is usually not MPs’lack of understanding, but the incentivestructure that governs their behaviour.Programming needs to focus on changing theseincentive structures, rather than simply ‘teachingor ‘training’ MPs.”

Instead of diagnosing challenges simply asinstitutional problems, they need to beunderstood in terms of the individuals within theparliament. MPs differ from each other. But itis this human element that is often missing fromparliamentary support work. Programmes mustdraw on the institution’s structural weaknessesand an understanding of institutional power, butalso the incentive structures which shape thebehaviour of individual MPs.


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CHAPTER THREEA POLITICAL STRATEGYFOR PARLIAMENTARYSTRENGTHENING

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Analysis from the previous two chapters showsthat parliamentary underperformance should beunderstood in terms of behaviour arising out ofthe interaction of people, parliaments andincentives. But the challenge is then to use thatanalysis to develop different types ofparliamentary support – to implementprogrammes whose principal objective ismeasured not just by structural change, but bybehavioural change. Such an approach hasnumerous implications for how donor agenciesand implementers design and deliverparliamentary support. These are explored inthe next two chapters.

Developing programmes that seek to foster theprocess of change within a parliament meansthat they need to be informed by a strategy asto how that change might happen. Althoughsome have sought to identify characteristics ofsuccessful parliamentary reform, there are fewguides for the strategic design of suchprogrammes. There is, however, a voluminousbusiness literature on change managementwhich may provide insights for parliamentarysupport work.

These strategies invariably seek to definedesirable changes within an organisation, andthen build internal support and momentumaround that common vision. All of them stressthe importance of identifying and addressingthe links between structure, behaviour andculture. They are based on the recognition thatthe process of change is a complex one, whichoperates at a number of levels within theorganisation. The success of any parliamentarystrengthening programme will depend on theextent to which it is supported, promoted andowned by Members of Parliament. This means

not only analysing the internal drivers anddynamics, but using them to develop a strategywhich plays to those incentive structures andbuilds a coalition of support for changeamongst MPs.

There can be no universal template for this.The contents will be determined by mappinginstitutional power and identifying the dominantincentive structures so as to understand thespecific factors at work in a particularparliament. However, this chapter seeks to setout the characteristics and principles for apolitical reform strategy which builds supportand momentum behind the reform process.This is divided into six stages:

i) Work from the current political context

At the time of Barack Obama’s election to USPresident in November 2008, his Chief of StaffRahm Emmanuel, was widely quoted ascommenting that politicians “should never let aserious crisis go to waste”. What he meant wasthat certain political and economic conditionsprovide the opportunity to address problems inways that would previously have been difficultand implement far-reaching structural reformsto either the economy or political institutions.

The analogy provides an important insight intothe nature of political – and specificallyparliamentary - change. In many parliaments,bouts of parliamentary reform have beenprompted by political and public concern. Mostobviously, in the last decade or so, a number ofwell-established parliaments have createdcodes of conduct for MPs, which were generallya response to either evidence of corruption orother ethical misdemeanours, and/or public


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disquiet about standards in political life.(Although the efficacy of such measures ishighly questionable, as is whether the reformsproperly addressed the underlying problems orwere cosmetic gestures designed to respond topublic concern.)

The key point though, is that such events allowsupporters of reform to define the problem in away that builds consensus around certain keychanges. This is the central challenge forpolitical strategies for parliamentary reform.Building support for a parliamentarystrengthening programme means firstconvincing MPs and other key parliamentaryfigures that such measures are needed.

This has to start from current politicalconditions. There will not always be seriouspolitical issues which provide opportunities todefine the problem in specific terms. Butstrategies of parliamentary strengtheningshould first seek to build a sense of concernaround certain aspects of parliament’sperformance, second, develop a consensus thatit is the result of certain specific causes, andthird, that specific reforms will alleviate thoseproblems. Discussions with MPs and theanalysis of parliamentary performance shouldhighlight what the key areas are. Deciding howto frame them for MPs will draw on the map ofinstitutional power and existing incentivestructures.

ii) Co-opting key institutional figures

Chapter two on mapping institutional powerfocused on the way in which the institution wasrun – which figures determined the pace andcontent of parliamentary business, the

motivations that underpinned their decisions,and the sources of their influence. These figureswill be central to building a coalition for changefor two reasons.

First, because they play a significant role indetermining how the institution is currently run,their approach is probably contributing to anyexisting deficiencies. Second, any change to theexisting arrangement is likely to affect theirpower in some way. Both mean that they maybe sceptical of reform. But because of theirposition, their support or opposition willdetermine the success of a parliamentaryprogramme, and they will need to be part of apolitical strategy.

The mapping of power will determine whichfigures need to actively support theparliamentary support programme, whichfigures simply need to acquiesce (or not object)and which ones are not critical. But it will alsoindicate some of the problems that need to beaddressed, such as sources of patronage andpre-existing client networks. And in that light,it may be that initial ambitions for parliamentarychange will need to be tempered by theinterests and influence of such figures.

However, there are three subsequentfactors that a political strategy will need totake into account.

First, a coalition of support for change shouldbe built around a central figure to providesome leadership and act as a focal point forthe support programme within parliament.This may be the Speaker or SecretaryGeneral, or the chair of a key committee (suchas a rules or procedural committee, a

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‘modernisation’ committee or ‘liaison’committee). Without the explicit support ofsuch a figure, a support programme will alwayslook like the possession of the donor agencyrather than the parliament itself. This leadfigure should provide political legitimacy anddirection for the programme in parliament.

Second, the strategy will need to anticipatesources of potential blocking opposition,especially from senior institutional figures, andtake steps to reassure them. For example, thosenot directly involved will need to be reassuredthat their power and influence will not beadversely affected by the programme – ifanything they need to be convinced that theirposition will be enhanced.

Third, expanding and developing support willrely on other significant figures withinparliament. These will be individuals whoseopinion is likely to have an influence on certainconstituencies within the parliament. Thesemay be senior long-serving MPs, committeechairs, or senior party figures who will be able togenerate support from independent MPs,committee members or MPs in the same party.They will also be important in understandingwhy pockets of resistance exist and developingways of swaying them to support change.

iii) Start with the individual rather than theinstitution

The first stage in building a wider base ofsupport for the programme’s objectives is toensure MPs understand them. The majority ofparliamentary support programmes tend to beconstructed around the objectives ofstrengthening parliament’s ability to fulfil its core

functions of legislation, oversight, financialscrutiny and representation. As strategicobjectives these are entirely laudable. However,they are abstract concepts which mean verylittle to the MPs or staff within the parliamentwho are often on the receiving end of trainingin each of these areas. The principal concern ofboth MPs and staff will be for training orsupport which helps them to do their job.

Too many programmes start from theassumption that parliamentary strengthening is,self-evidently, a good thing – and therefore willinevitably be supported by MPs. In politics, asin every other profession, individuals aremotivated by a range of interests. High amongthese will be issues of pay and workingconditions. It is important to understand thatparliamentary change is likely to have an effecton the way in which they are able to do their job.The prospect of change creates uncertainty andis likely to prompt a reaction from everymember of parliament. In short, every MP willconsider reforms in terms of how they will bepersonally affected.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the parliament willbe determined by the behaviour of the individualswithin it. Therefore programmes need to start withthe individual, not the institution. Programmesshould define problems in terms of how they affectindividual MPs and staff, and address institutionaldeficiencies through projects that specifically helpindividuals to do their jobs more effectively. MPsneed to be convinced that they will have moreinfluence, a better reputation in the constituencyand be better able to get results on behalf ofconstituents through measures which improvecommittee oversight, legislative amendment andparliamentary questioning.


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In short, politicians need to be convinced thatthe problem at the heart of the reformprogramme is a problem for them personally –and that they are likely to benefit fromaddressing it.

iv) Adapting and aligning incentive structures

Building support amongst a diverse coalition ofMPs for the programme rests on how thatproblem is addressed – depending, as it does,on appealing to several audiences at once.Chapter two illustrated the potential variety ofdrivers and incentives that parliamentarystrengthening programmes will need to takeinto account. The effect of political, personaland institutional incentive structures willhighlight the potential for coalitions of interestto form and shift around particular issues.

Changing behaviour will rely on reforms thatencourage MPs to pursue their parliamentaryfunctions. The analysis should provide someindication of the reforms which can aligndifferent incentive structures towards a moreeffective parliament. In other words, findingmeasures that play to MPs personal or politicalobjectives, but at the same time strengthen thekey parliamentary functions. The key is inconvincing MPs that certain institutionalchanges will enable them to achieve theirpolitical or personal objectives more effectively.

There are two dimensions to this that can beused in parliamentary programmes. The first,and more obvious, is by providing directincentives for certain forms of behaviour. Sothat, for example, changes to committeeoversight, legislative process or budget oversightwill be more successful if they offer opportunities

for public profile, personal reward, officeresources, staffing or pursuing policy ambitions.

However, the second dimension is to determineto whom the MP is accountable, and for what?This would mean identifying those individualsand groups select, elect or promote the MP. Thismay be the party chiefs, constituents or outsideinterest groups. As Staffan Lindberg has shownin his analysis of MPs in Ghana, this sense ofhaving to account for themselves can be apowerful force in shaping what the MP does inthe constituency. It can lead to greaterattentiveness to local economic developmentand an emphasis on delivering tangible goods forindividuals, but can also have surprising and morepositive responses. Such is the pressure on MPsto deliver help to individuals with hospital bills orschool fees In parts of Ghana, that they arestarting to develop strategic solutions to theseproblems - by establishing collective provisionhealth and education within their constituencies.

The downside for parliamentary programmes isthat MPs are rarely, if ever held to account forlegislative scrutiny or ministerial oversight.Which means relying on incentivising thatbehaviour. However, there are exceptions,which are picked up in vi), below.

v) Build programmes around packages

It is rare that a parliamentary support programmewill seek to tackle only one issue in isolation, butthe principle of doing several things at onceshould be central to any political strategy. This isfor four main reasons.

First, attempting to reform one thing at a timeis likely to maximise opposition. As mentioned

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previously, every MP will have their own opinionon how parliament should be run, but moresignificantly, every MP will be affected bychange and is likely to have a strong opinionabout proposals for reform. One issue willsimply provide a focus for all those opposed tochange and make building support difficult, ifnot impossible.

Second, an extensive package of measuresshould appeal to the broadest range of MPspossible. In short, it needs to maximise winnersand minimise the number of losers. Althoughsome MPs may oppose elements of thepackage, there should be enough in the rest ofthe measures to secure their overall support.

Third, the process of parliamentary change isone of debate, negotiation and compromise.The original proposals will inevitably beamended and possibly weakened, elementsmay be lost entirely. Starting with a package ofmeasures provides a greater chance that the keyparts of that programme will remain in place,while items at the periphery can afford to bedropped.

Fourth, a package allows greater scope to findways of aligning incentive structures, bycombining measures that offer a personal,political and parliamentary benefit. Forexample, in the UK in 2001 the ModernisationCommittee sought to bring greater consistencyand thoroughness to the work of the scrutinycommittees by establishing a set of ‘core tasks’.The committees had traditionally prized theirindependence and ability to determine whichissues they should examine, but in practice thismeant that most committees rarely engaged in financial oversight. The Modernisation

Committee’s proposals were met with someinitial resistance, but the promise of extraresources, many tied directly to financialscrutiny, meant that the reforms were adoptedand now every committee reports annually onthe fulfilment of the core tasks.

vi) External pressure v. internal pressure

As mentioned above, certain changes can bebrought about where MPs feel they have toaccount for their behaviour, and in manycountries public pressure has been a key factorin forcing politicians to address issues ofcorruption or misbehaviour. But it can also beused to improve performance in specific areas.For example, during the 2006-10 parliament inRwanda individual committees were subject tosevere criticism for their failure to ensure certainpolicy areas were sufficiently funded bygovernment - with particular concern about theamounts allocated to gender issues. Thiscriticism came from inside the parliament butalso from civil society organisations. The effectwas twofold. First it meant that thosecommittees that were criticised became muchmore assiduous in examining the parts of thebudget affecting their policy area. Second,other committees and outside organisationsbecame aware of the influence that they couldhave on the budget process, and have alsoimproved the quality of their scrutiny.

The example shows how a combination ofexternal and internal pressure can raise thequality of oversight. If Parliament can find otherways to generate public interest in such matters,so that there is wider recognition of Parliament’spowers, it is likely to improve the quality ofperformance in several areas.


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Conclusion

The key shift needed in donor thinking is theneed to develop an overtly political strategywhich informs all parliamentary programming ina particular country. This has four dimensionsto it. First, it needs to be based on a detailedunderstanding of the causes of poorparliamentary performance. Namely, theinternal structures of power and the political,personal and institutional incentive structuresthat are distorting parliamentary practice.

Second, the ultimate purpose of donor supportto a parliament should be to improve the qualityof legislative scrutiny, government oversight andrepresentation of the public. This meanschanging the behaviour of MPs within theinstitution towards those ends. Projects shouldbe anticipating how their projects relate to thedominant incentives, and whether they willencourage new forms of behaviour, or furtherentrench existing ones.

Third, rather than relying on isolatedinterventions, the different aspects of aparliamentary programme should be consistentwith an overarching strategy designed to achievecertain outcomes. In this context, technicalsupport will still play an integral and importantrole in parliamentary development. But it is onlylikely to have a significant effect if it is conceivedas part of a wider political strategy designed tochange certain patterns of behaviour.

Fourth, the programme of work needs tounderstand how change happens, and help theparliament to manage that process. Theparallels with business change management areuseful. Thought of in these terms, a political

strategy seeking to embed new patterns ofbehaviour has to start with the internal politicsof the institution and build support amongstMPs for the process of change. Critically, thisprocess has to be owned and driven from insidethe institution, by MPs themselves. Thisrequires donor agencies to play a different role,which is the subject of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER FOURPROGRAMMES BUILTAROUND HOW POLITICALCHANGE HAPPENS

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At a conference on international support topolitical parties and parliaments in the early partof 2010, one contributor made a plea to therepresentative from the US Agency forInternational Development (USAID) for adifferent approach to the way that politicalreform is supported by donor agencies. “Whatwe need”, he said, “is less money, and more time.”

His intervention sums up many of thechallenges for donor-funded work in this area.Meaningful political change is a slow process,and invariably short-term interventions- nomatter how well-funded - have limited effect.One of the themes running through this paperis the fact that parliamentary reform isincremental, complex, messy and ultimatelypolitical. Yet most traditional parliamentarysupport still depends on technical interventions,and the assumption of linear progress as a result.They have a tendency to rely on the samemethods in different environments and takelittle account of the political context or thedistinct challenges that come with attempts toimprove the performance of a parliament, ratherthan simply enhancing its infrastructure.

The conditions for achieving parliamentarychange will vary between institutions, but oneUS academic describes a convoluted processof evolution which means that parliamentarychange is rarely predictable and never fullymeets the expectations of any of the interestedparties. In other words, such development is

“disjointed in that members incrementally add newinstitutional mechanisms, without dismantling pre-existing institutions and without rationalising thestructure as a whole ... institutional developmentis an ongoing, open-ended process. The interplay

of coalitions promoting contradictory objectivesproduces institutions that are tense battlegroundsrather than stable, coherent solutions.”

Donor-supported programmes need to workfrom this understanding that in mostparliaments change will be haphazard andunpredictable. That the institutions are rarelyamenable to neat designs or detailed reformplans, and that the interests of MPs will wax andwane over time. Adopting a more politicalapproach to parliamentary strengthening notonly means that programmes should beinformed by a clearer strategy, it also hasimplications for the way in which they areconceived, designed and delivered. Specifically,it means a different role for donor agencieswhich is explored at the end of this chapter.However, the chapter first examines three areaswhere donors might alter their immediatethinking about parliamentary support, relatingto procedural reform, the timing of programmesand outcome-driven projects.

1) Rule reform is difficult, often unnecessaryand sometimes counter-productive

In many emerging parliaments there is atendency to want rules-based solutions andmore statutory powers. Problems are oftendefined in terms of the imbalance of powerbetween the Executive and Parliament. Theunderlying assumption being that with morepower, parliament would immediately bemore effective. There is again a danger oftreating symptoms rather than causes. Itmay be that additional powers willencourage MPs to use them, but thisassumption needs to be treated carefully, forthree reasons.


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First, rule change is difficult. Although it mayseem obvious that certain reforms are needed,these reforms will usually need to be debatedand approved in the plenary session. They willalso be subject to amendment by MPs.Without a sophisticated political strategy, thereis no guarantee that the changes approved bythe plenary will bear much relation to thoseoriginally proposed. They may even end upenhancing Executive power.

Second, it is often possible to use existingparliamentary procedure. Rules of Procedureor Standing Orders tend to be complex,legalistic documents, which has two effects, a)few MPs will have a detailed understanding ofthe rules and b) they are almost always open tointerpretation. Several parliamentary strengtheningprogrammes have developed shorterhandbooks of procedure which become theworking documents for a parliament andthereby encourage new forms of behaviour.

Third, not all parliamentary power is statutory.While the legal ability to force ministers toappear before parliament is a useful threat, it isvery rarely used. The relationship betweenParliament and Executive is conditioned byother factors. At one level, it is like aninterpersonal relationship – everyone willencounter arrogant, rude, dismissive peopleduring their working lives. One cannot directlycontrol their behaviour - but how one reacts toit will often determine whether it continues. Thesame is true of parliamentary committees. Awell-organised, efficient parliamentarycommittee that keeps detailed records ofministerial responses will be regarded moreseriously by ministers and civil servants in therelevant department.

This level of organisation has another benefit.With detailed records of government responsesto parliamentary questions it is possible topublish lists of the least responsive ministers andministries. Even in systems where governmentregards parliament dismissively, no ministerwants to be publicly identified as the worst. Inseveral parliaments this tactic is starting to havean effect on the behaviour and responsivenessof all government ministries.

2) Support must be synchronised with theparliamentary cycle

Donor programmes are starting to take accountof the electoral cycle in their thinking , however,the specific rhythms of the parliamentary cycledramatically affect the prospects for meaningfulchange, and programmes should recognise thatMPs’ interests will change over the course of alegislative term.

a) Programmes at the start of a new parliament

In many emerging democracies there is a highturnover of MPs at each election, oftenreflecting voter volatility and the fact that partiesare rarely deeply rooted amongst the electorate.At one level they offer the chance to establishnew patterns of behaviour and working practisesamongst MPs at an early stage. A high level ofnew MPs may also present the opportunity forsignificant reform of the institution’s structuresand procedures, as few MPs will have built uppower bases or have a vested interest inmaintaining the status quo. On the downside,there is likely to be little common parliamentaryculture, meaning that the parliaments rules andprocedures (and those responsible for enforcingthem) may face significant challenges.

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b) Emerging issues during the first two years

It will take time for MPs to establish ways of working in committee, plenary and inconstituency. As these patterns emerge, MPs willencounter difficulties in using parliamentarystructures, rules and resources to achieve theirobjectives. For example, an effective committeedepends on its members working towardscommon objectives regardless of political party.Programmes should seek to build that collegialitybetween MPs at an early stage by supportingspecific enquiries, or sponsoring missions to othercountries. The latter option can be particularlyuseful in parliaments with inter-party tensions, asMPs on the committee are obliged to spendseveral days with each other both on committeebusiness and socialising, thus breaking downprevious barriers and building a commonunderstanding of their role.

c) Securing institutional memory at the end ofthe parliament

Support programmes frequently see many oftheir achievements disappear with outgoingMPs at an election. Programmes need toidentify and solidify potential sources ofinstitutional memory that bridge the electionperiod. Most obviously this will exist in theparliamentary staff, and the more they can bepositioned as the ultimate source ofindependent and authoritative advice onparliamentary process, the greater the chanceof a smooth transition between parliaments.

Other sources of institutional memory will existwithin the politicians themselves. For example,committees could be encouraged to draftreports on the activity during that parliamentary

term, capturing the committee’s activity overthe course of the term, but also including theirmethods of work, enquiry techniques and jobdescriptions for staff.

In addition, at the end of a parliament MPs notseeking re-election are far more likely to supportfar-reaching parliamentary reforms, as they willhave no vested interest in continuing currentpractice. These figures may provide useful alliesin building momentum for change in the newparliament or putting particular issues onto theparliamentary agenda.

d) Sensing resistance to change

Lyndon Johnson, US President between 1963and 1968, and widely regarded as one of thewiliest political operators in American politics,suggested that Congress should be treated likea whiskey drinker. In his words, “You can put anawful lot of whiskey into a man if you just let himsip it. But of you try to force the whole bottledown his throat at one time, he’ll throw it up.”

Similarly, parliamentary programmes need to besensitive to resistance, as there may be certainpoints when promoting further reform becomescounter-productive. The point of analysing theinstitutional dynamics and the incentives thatshape behaviour is to understand how ‘ripe’particular proposals for reform are. A politicalstrategy for reform needs to be built from theattitudes and expectations of MPs themselves,and respond to issues as they arise.

3) Programmes should be flexible and drivenby outcomes rather than process

Critically programmes should maintain a clear


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sense of what they are designed to achieve. Toooften this obvious point is lost during thelifetime of a project. The initial analysis of aparliament might identify areas where supportshould effect change (for example, theimprovement of financial scrutiny) and themeans for delivering this (through the provisionof training and support to MPs and staff,additional resources and the creation of abudget support office, etc.). But frequentlyprocess and outcomes are conflated, withdonors measuring activities (e.g. the number oftraining sessions, existence of a budget office)instead of the impact they were originallydesigned to have.

This reflects, partly, a preference for quantitativemeasurements on the part of donors. It is moredifficult to generate quantitative (or qualitative)measures of political change. But it is notimpossible. The lack of such measures reflectsthe fact that donors have not, until recently, paida great deal of attention to effective monitoringand evaluation in the parliamentary supportfield. The emphasis on ‘impact’ may changethis. But it is currently hampering the potentialeffectiveness of parliamentary programmes.

An outcome-driven approach would need amuch greater degree of flexibility in the designand delivery of programmes, requiring co-ordinated interventions at different parts of theparliament, designed to achieve the same end.Programmes need to be built around clearobjectives, but employ a flexible strategy toachieve those ends. In other words, if theoriginally planned activities are not having thedesired effect, use alternative methods. Atpresent, the opposite appears to be happening– that is, if the activities are not achieving what

was expected, the objectives are altered, but theactivities stay the same.

Conclusion: A different role for donors

The approach described here requires afundamental shift in the way that parliamentarystrengthening programmes are designed anddelivered. The purpose of understanding howinstitutional power is used and the incentivestructures that shape parliamentary behaviour,is to develop a political strategy for improvingperformance. The analysis should provide agood indication of the factors that need to beaddressed, and the issues around whichparliamentary support can be built.

This has significant implications for donor-funded projects. First, donor interventions mustbe informed by a detailed understanding of theinternal politics of the institution with which theyare working – the drivers and incentives thatshape behaviour. Second, programmes mustbe built around a political strategy – that is anunderstanding of how change happens, andtheir role in that process of change. Third,programmes should be always be clear thatinstitutional or structural change matters whenit changes political behaviour. Supportprogrammes should be using theirunderstanding of incentive structures to removethe distortions in parliamentary practice andencourage parliamentary oversight and scrutiny.

There may still be donor wariness about suchan approach. It requires donor-funded projectsto engage at a much deeper level with theoperation of parliament and the process ofchange. To some, it may look like donorinterference or manipulation. But, the point is

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that a political strategy starts and ends with MPsthemselves. If anything, such an approachshould mean that donors spend less time tellingparliaments what to do, and more time listening.The shift in mindset means that parliamentarysupport work should be seen less as a processof implementation, and more akin toconsultancy – helping the parliament to defineboth the problems and their own solutions.

Successful parliamentary strengthening needsto work with the grain of political opinion in aparliament, and it needs to distinguish betweenthe ‘politics’ of the institution, and the ‘Politics’of the state, if it is to generate momentum.Ultimately, the pace of change cannot bedetermined from the outside by donors, itneeds to emerge from within the parliament. .If donors are genuine in their desire for greaterimpact it will mean that they take greaterresponsibility for the results of theirinterventions, but ultimately exercise less controlover how reform is enacted


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CONCLUSIONKEY PRINCIPLES FORPARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT

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This paper started by recognising that theapproach of donor agencies in supportingparliamentary development, and goodgovernance more generally, is changing. There isalmost universal agreement that internationalsupport should concentrate more on results.Donors are therefore employing increasinglysophisticated analytical tools to understand thepolitical factors which determine the quality ofgovernance. Yet, they are struggling to find waysof translating these insights into effectiveparliamentary support programmes, and toofrequently rely on rudimentary techniques whichfail to engage with any of the drivers of change.

In previous chapters it was suggested thatparliamentary support needs to draw on a moredetailed analysis of how parliamentaryinstitutions are run and the incentives that shapethe behaviour of individual MPs. This analysisshould then form the basis of a political strategyfor parliamentary support which activelyengages with the process of change, workingwith MPs to identify and frame the key issues,and build support for reform within parliament.

This sort of analysis will make parliaments easierto understand, but no less difficult to predict.There needs to be a greater realism on the partof donors about what is achievable and overwhat time frame. Political change is messy andhaphazard. Donors need to employ moreflexible strategies built around outcomes insteadof processes – concentrating less onimplementation, and more on supporting MPsengaged in change.

Programmes should be guided by five coreprinciples:

i) Understand what the institution looks likethrough the eyes of those in power.

Identifying the key institutional figures, their rolein running the institution and the sources of theirauthority, will provide a perspective not only onthe causes of parliamentary underperformance,but also the prospects for realistic reform.

ii) Identify the factors causing MPs to behavethe way that they do.

Parliaments are diverse collections of individualswith a variety of interests who coalesce aroundissues as they arise. Programmes need tounderstand the impact of political, personal andinstitutional incentive structures on MPbehaviour, and then seek to alter them.

iii) Parliament needs a common understandingof the problem

Change will only happen if a majority of MPsbelieve it is necessary and desirable. Thesuccess of parliamentary support programmestherefore depends on the extent to which theyare regarded as the solution to a commonly-accepted problem.

iv) Parliamentary development should beframed in personal terms

Too many programmes are built aroundinstitutions rather than individuals. This needsto be turned on its head. Programmes shoulddefine institutional deficiencies in terms of howthey affect individual MPs and staff, and developprogrammes which address them by helpingindividuals to do their jobs more effectively.


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v) Programmes must establish responsibilitywithin parliament

The success of parliamentary support must bemeasured by how far it changes politicalbehaviour, and not the structure of theinstitution. This sort of change has to be ownedby MPs themselves. Programmes shouldprovide the incentives for MPs to own and drivethat process of change.

Adopting this sort of strategy has potentiallyhuge implications for donors. Strategies willneed to adapt to political conditions, placepressure where needed, but always work withthe grain of political opinion. However, suchpolitical change has to be owned and driven byMPs themselves. As stated at the end of theprevious chapter, if donors are genuine in theirdesire for greater impact it will mean that theytake greater responsibility for the results of theirinterventions, but ultimately exercise less controlover how reform is enacted.

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Footnotes1 Hudson, A., and Wren, C., (2007), ParliamentaryStrengthening in Developing Countries, ODI

2 Polsby, N., (1968), ‘The Institutionalisation of the House ofRepresentatives’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 62.,No.1, p. 167

3 This phrase is lifted from Adrian Leftwich in, (2007), Drivers ofChange: Refining the Analytical Framework,www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/DOC103.pdf

4 This case study draws heavily on the work of Staffan Lindberg– specifically, Lindberg, S. with Zhou, Y, ‘Co-option DespiteDemocratisation in Ghana’ in Barkan, J. (ed), (2009),Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies, Rienner:London; Lindberg, S, (2009), Member of Parliament ofGhana: A hybrid institution with mixed effects, Africa Power &Politics Working Paper 2, ODI: London; Lindberg, S., (2009),‘What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and howdo they respond? Evidence from Ghana’, Journal of ModernAfrican Studies, No. 48, Vol. 1, pp 117-142; Lindberg, S., (2003)“Its our time to ‘chop’: Do elections in Africa feed neo-patrimonialism rather than counteract it?”, Democratisation,Vol. 10, No. 2, pp 121-140

5 See Lindberg, S. with Zhou, Y, pp. 166-173

6 See Barkan, J., & Matiangi, F., ‘Kenya’s Tortuous Path toSuccessful legislative Development’, In Barkan, J., op cit., for afuller description of the process of reform in Kenya

7 ibid., pp. 57-9

8 See Hyden, p.10

9 For a fuller exploration of these sorts of incentive structures inpost-conflict environments see Dutta, N, et al, (no date),Strengthening Legislatures for Conflict Management inFragile States, Woodrow Wilson School of Public andInternational Affairs

10 Sherlock, S., (2003), Struggling to Change: The IndonesianParliament in a era of Reformasi, CDI, pp. 19-21; Sherlock, S.,(2007), The Indonesian Parliament after Two Elections: Whathas really changed?, CDI Policy Papers 2007/1, pp.45-6

11 Lewis, P., (2009), ‘Rules and Rents in Nigeria’s NationalAssembly’, in Barkan, J., op cit., p. 178

12 ibid., pp., 195, 199, 200-2

13 Strengthening Parliaments in Africa: Improving Support, p.44

14 See for example, Power., G. (2007), ‘The Politics ofParliamentary Reform: Lessons from the House of Commons2001-5’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 3; Barkan, J., op cit,‘Conclusion’

15 See, for example, Kotter, J., Leading Change, Heifetz, R.,Leadership Without Easy Answers, Harvard Business School,(2002), Harvard Business Review on Culture and Change,Cameron, K., & Quinn, R., Diagnosing and ChangingOrganisational Culture

16 Lindberg, (S., 2009), ‘What accountability pressures do MPsin Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence fromGhana’, Journal of Modern African Studies, No. 48, Vol. 1, p.137

17 Power, G., (2009), The Rwandan Parliament’s SelfAssessment Exercise: Insights and Issues, IPU, p 6

18 ibid, pp. 17-8

19 See http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/focus-on-effective-electoral-assistance/the-electoral-cycle-approach

20 Quoted in Heifetz, R., (1994) op cit. pp 245-6


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Documents

The Politics of Parliamentary Strengthening