The Politics of Identity – The Influence of National ... · The Politics of Identity – The Influence of National Identity on States’ Foreign Policy Agenda A Case Study of Post-Socialist

ThePoliticsofIdentity–TheInfluenceofNationalIdentityonStates’ForeignPolicyAgenda

ACaseStudyofPost-SocialistRomania

ThesissubmittedforthedegreeofDoctorinPhilosophyattheUniversityofLeicester

By

IoanaTartacuta-LawrenceMASchoolofHistory,PoliticsandInternationalRelations

UniversityofLeicester

2017

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Abstract

ThisthesisexplorestheinfluenceofnationalidentityonRomania’spost-socialistforeignpolicyagenda,workingattheintersectionofStrategicCultureandForeignPolicyAnalysis.Itadoptsaconstructivistapproach,puttingforwardanarrativetheoryofidentity,accordingtowhichprofoundlyheldbeliefsaboutthenatureoftheSelfandOthersinfluencethebehaviourofstatesthroughtheprerogatives,anxietiesandred-linestheygenerate.Thethesisidentifiesthetellingofnationalhistoryasthemainvehicleforthesocialisationoftheidentitynarrative.ItthentracesthedevelopmentoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,fromitsformativeyearsinthenineteenthcenturytocontemporarytimes,arguingthatthesedimentationofitsmainfeaturesislinkedtotheconsistencyofitshistoricalnarrative.AparticularemphasisdevelopsintheRomanianimaginaryintermsofprioritisingtheissuesofstatesecurity,sovereignty,territorialintegrityandunity.ThethesisthenexplorestheinfluenceoftheseelementsonRomania’spost-socialistbehaviour.Itfocusesfirstlyonthetransitionperiod,whenidentity-relatedprerogativesresultedbothinadesireforEuro-Atlanticintegration,butalsoinananxietytowardschangeatdomesticlevelwhichactedasanobstacletotherealisationoftheseinternationalgoalsinthefirsthalfofthe1990s.Secondly,thethesisinvestigatesthenatureofthreerelationshipscriticaltoRomania’sforeignpolicyagenda–thosewithRussia,HungaryandtheRepublicofMoldova.OverallthethesisshowsthatthereexistsanoticeablepatternofbehaviourwhichconformswithRomania’sidentity-drivenanxietiesandprerogatives,particularlyinthecurrentvolatileenvironment.WhilstrelationswithRussiaandHungaryaremarkedbyattitudesofanxietyanddistrust,thatwithMoldovaischaracterisedbyanaffinityrootedintheirsharedidentitymarkers.ThismakesRomaniaacutelysensitivetorecentregionaldevelopmentsandhasresultedinthestate’sadaptingitsbehaviourtowardsthesethreeactorsinordertoalleviateitsidentity-relatedanxietiesconcerningsecurity,unityandindependence,notonlyofitself,butalsoofMoldova.

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TableofContents

TABLESANDFIGURES............................................................................................................5LISTOFTABLES.............................................................................................................................5LISTOFFIGURESWITHSOURCEATTRIBUTION....................................................................................5

INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................6CASE-STUDYANDCONTEXT............................................................................................................9STRUCTUREOFTHETHESIS...........................................................................................................15CONCLUDINGREMARKS...............................................................................................................18

CHAPTER1.THEORETICALBACKGROUND............................................................................20INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................20ATTHECROSSROADSOFSTRATEGICCULTUREANDFOREIGNPOLICYANALYSIS.....................................20STRATEGICCULTURE(SC)............................................................................................................21FOREIGNPOLICYANALYSIS(FPA).................................................................................................36LIMITATIONSOFSCANDFPAANDTHECONTRIBUTIONOFTHISTHESISTOTHEFIELD.............................48

SCandtheStudyofIdentity...............................................................................................49TheAgent-StructureDebate..............................................................................................51TheUtilityofa‘SmallState’CaseStudy............................................................................55

CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................57

CHAPTER2.METHODS–APPROACHANDCONSIDERATIONS...............................................59EMPLOYINGACONSTRUCTIVISTAPPROACH....................................................................................59METHODOLOGY.........................................................................................................................65

ANoteonInterviewsandRomanianSources....................................................................65TheNatureandContentoftheRomanianIdentityNarrative...........................................66TheInfluenceofIdentityonBehaviour..............................................................................72

CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................75

CHAPTER3.ROMANIANHISTORYANDIDENTITY–ANATIONALOBSESSIONWITHUNIQUENESS.......................................................................................................................79

INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................79THECONTINUITYOFTHEROMANIANIDENTITYNARRATIVE................................................................80ANTIQUITY–FOUNDATIONMYTHS:ORIGINS,HABITUS,RELIGION.....................................................82

Origins...............................................................................................................................82Habitus...............................................................................................................................83Religion..............................................................................................................................85

THEMEDIEVALERAANDEARLYMODERNITY–THE‘BESIEGEDFORTRESS’...........................................86TheThreeProvinces...........................................................................................................88Transylvania–HungaryastheEssentialOther.................................................................88WallachiaandMoldavia....................................................................................................92

THEMODERNERA–THETHEMEOFUNITY.....................................................................................94TheBirthofRomanianNationalIdentity–Unity...............................................................94TheEssentialOthersandNeedforIdentityNarrativeContinuity....................................100

THECOMMUNISTPERIOD..........................................................................................................103CeausescuandtheWeaponisingofRomanianNationalIdentity....................................103TheOthersinCeausescu’sRomania................................................................................107

CONCLUSION–STRUCTURE,AGENCYANDROMANIANIDENTITY......................................................110

CHAPTER4.CONTINUITYRATHERTHANCHANGE–ROMANIA’SNATIONALIDENTITYINTHETRANSITIONERA...............................................................................................................114

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................114ROMANIAIN1989...................................................................................................................115ROMANIAINEARLYTRANSITION–IONILIESCUANDTHEUSEOFIDENTITYASELECTORALTOOL.............117

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ROMANIA’SCONTEMPORARYIDENTITYNARRATIVE–CONTINUITYONCEMORE.................................123ROMANIAINTHETRANSITIONERA–FOREIGNPOLICYDIRECTIONANDDOMESTICREFORM..................128

DesiretoJointheWest–StrongercommitmenttowardsNATO.....................................128ObstaclestoAccession–ResistancetoChangeandInsistenceonStateSovereignty.....132

THERETREATOFIDENTITARYANXIETIESINTHEMID-1990S.............................................................140CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................142

CHAPTER5.ROMANIA’SRELATIONSHIPWITHRUSSIA–SURVIVINGINTHESHADOWOFTHEGREATEASTERNPOWER...................................................................................................144

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................144ANOTEONROMANIA’SCONTEMPORARYFOREIGNPOLICYANDTHECURRENTINTERNATIONALCLIMATE145ROMANIA’SIDENTITYDRIVENATTITUDETOWARDSRUSSIA–DISTRUST,FEARANDANXIETYOVERSECURITYANDINDEPENDENCE.................................................................................................................148RUSSO-ROMANIANRELATIONSDURINGTHETRANSITIONPERIOD.....................................................152CONTEMPORARYRUSSO-ROMANIANRELATIONS...........................................................................158FUTUREDIRECTIONSFORRUSSO-ROMANIANRELATIONS................................................................169CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................174

CHAPTER6.ROMANIA’SRELATIONSHIPWITHHUNGARY–MANAGINGALEGACYOFATHOUSANDYEARSOFCONFLICTANDDISCORD.................................................................176

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................176ROMANIA’SIDENTITYDRIVENATTITUDETOWARDSHUNGARY–DISTRUSTANDANXIETYOVERTERRITORIALINTEGRITYANDSOVEREIGNTY.....................................................................................................177HUNGARIAN-ROMANIANRELATIONSDURINGTHETRANSITIONPERIOD.............................................181CONTEMPORARYHUNGARIAN-ROMANIANRELATIONS...................................................................190FUTUREDIRECTIONSFORHUNGARIAN-ROMANIANRELATIONS........................................................199CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................203

CHAPTER7.ROMANIA’SRELATIONSHIPWITHTHEREPUBLICOFMOLDOVA–TWOSTATES,ONEPEOPLE?....................................................................................................................205

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................205ROMANIA’SIDENTITYDRIVENATTITUDETOWARDSTHEREPUBLICOFMOLDOVA–AFFINITYFORTHEESTRANGEDSELF......................................................................................................................206MOLDO-ROMANIANRELATIONSDURINGTHETRANSITIONPERIOD...................................................210CONTEMPORARYMOLDO-ROMANIANRELATIONS.........................................................................217FUTUREDIRECTIONSFORMOLDO-ROMANIANRELATIONS..............................................................225CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................232

CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................234FINALCONSIDERATIONS............................................................................................................240DIRECTIONSFORTHEFUTURE.....................................................................................................244

BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................246

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TablesandFiguresListofTablesMajorEventsofRomanianHistoryandIdentityNarrativeThemes…………………. 67MajorEventsofRomanianContemporaryHistory……………………………………………. 102

ListofFigureswithSourceAttributionFigure1.ThemainperiodsofRomanianhistoryandtheircorrespondingthemes……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

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Figure2.MapofmoderndayRomania(1945-).………………………………………………Source:RomaniaMare(JudetesiRegiuniIstorice)[GreaterRomania(CountiesandHistoricalRegions)]inHeniusAtlas(Leipzig:KartographischeAnstaltvonF.A.Brockhaus,1926),Copyright:PublicDomain,availablefromWikimediaCommons,Category:OldMapsofRomania,uploadedbyOlahus,06.12.2007,https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Romania_Mare_(judete_si_regiuni_istorice).JPG[accessed13December2016].

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Figure3.MapoftheOldKingdom(1859-1918).……………………………………………..Source:Ibid.

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Figure4.MapofGreaterRomania(1918-1940).……………………………………………..Source:Ibid.

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Figure5.MapofTerritorialLossesof1940.…………………………………………………….Source:Ibid.

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Figure6.MapoftheRepublicofMoldova………………………………………………………Source:Cepleanu,S.I.,MoldovaToday,Copyright:CreativeCommonsShareAlike3.0Unported,availablefromWikimediaCommons,12.11.2011,https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MoldovaToday.png[accessed09January2017].

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Introduction

Awaken,Romanian,fromyourdeadlyslumberInwhichbarbarictyrantshavesunkyou

NoworneverfashionanewdestinyTowhichevenyourcruelenemieswillbow.

NoworneverletusprovetothisworldThatthroughthishandsRomanbloodstillflows

AndinourchestsweproudlyholdanameVictoriousinbattle,thenameofTrajan.

Watch,mightyshadows,Michael,Stephen,CorvinTheRomaniannation,yourgreat-grandchildren,Weaponsinarms,yourfirethroughtheirveins,

‘Lifeinfreedomordeath’allshout.

Priestswithcrucifixesatthehelm,asthearmyisChristianTheaimisfreedomanditssacredgoal

Wewouldratherdiefighting,infullgloryThanbecomeslavesagaininourancientland.1

TheversesabovearefromapoembyAndreiMuresanu,aTransylvanianRomanian

poetandpoliticalactivist,writteninthecontextofthe1848Pan-European

revolutions.Laterputtomusic,thehymnbecameknownasAwaken,Romanianand

wasadoptedasRomania’snationalanthemintheaftermathoftheanti-communist

insurrectionof1989.Despiteitsinherentpatriotism,orperhapsbecauseofit,these

versestellussomethingaboutwhatRomanianshaveunderstood,acrossthecenturies,

tobeessentialfeaturesoftheircharacterandhistory.TherearehintstoaRoman

origin,alinkisdrawnbetweenpresentandpastgenerations,andapictureofa

troubledhistoryawaitingvindicationispainted.TosomeonefamiliarwithRomania’s

historythefactthatthefiguresmentionedcomefromthestate’sthreeprovinces–

1A.Muresanu,‘UnRasunet[AnEcho],’originallypublishedinFoaiepentruminteXI:25,21June1848(paginationunknown),inC.Bodea(ed.),1848laRomani–oIstorieinDatesiMarturii[1848forRomanians–aHistoryinDatesandTestimonies](Bucharest:EdituraStiintificasiEnciclopedica,1982),pp.506-507.

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Wallachia,MoldaviaandTransylvania,respectively–is,itself,symbolic.Thispoem

constitutesacalltoarms,aninvitationforRomanianseverywheretoawaken,realise

theirdestinyofunityandindependenceandavengeahistoryinwhichtheyhavebeen

separatedandoppressedbyforeignpowers.In1848,thestanzasstoodfora

desideratum.In2017,nearlyonehundredyearssinceitbecameareality,theyhave

notlosttheirsalience.Indeed,aslyricstothenationalanthem,theyserveasa

reminderofpaststruggles,aswellasofferingasnapshotofwhatitis,andwhatithas

alwaysbeen,tobeRomanian.TheanthemhasprideofplaceinRomanianpubliclife–

itisplayed,accordingtolaw,atofficialceremoniesandfestivities,atthebeginningof

eachsessionofParliament,andeven,asthisauthormayconfirm,atthestartofevery

school-dayoftheprimaryandsecondarycycles.2Additionally,eachschooltextbookof

Romanianhistoryandlanguagemustfeatureonitsfirstpagetheexactverses

reproducedabove.3

Thisstudybeganwiththeself-evidentfactthatnationalidentityisaconstitutive

featureofRomanians.TheportrayaloftheSelf,itscharacteristicsandthepriorities

whichflowfromthem,aresignificanttothispeople.Moreimportantly,these

representationsbothreflectandshapethemannerinwhichRomaniansviewthe

worldandtheirplacewithinit.ThenotionthatRomaniansareaLatin,Orthodox

people,whohavefoughtforunityandindependence,createsaparticularimageofthe

role,orevendestiny,thattheirstatehas.Putsimply,thisroleis,muchlikethatofany

nation-state,toprotecttheRomaniannation,bothphysicallyandculturally,andfoster

itsdevelopment.However,understandinghowthespecificgoalsandprioritiesofthis

stateareset,orthemannerinwhichitrelatestootheractors,requiresanin-depth

knowledgeofthepeculiaritiescreatedbyRomanians’storiesabouttheirnational

identity,theprioritiesandanxieties,theattitudesandred-linestheygenerate.These

2ParliamentofRomania,Lawnr.75/1994,Article10,publishedintheOfficialJournalofRomania237(26August1994),availablefromMonitorulJuridic[n.d.]http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/lege-nr-75-din-16-iulie-1994-privind-arborarea-drapelului-romaniei-intonarea-imnului-national-si-folosirea-sigiliilor-cu-stema-romaniei-de-catre-autoritatile-si-institutiile-publice-4303.html[accessed05January2017).3Lawnr.75/1994.Onadifferentnote,Article13ofthesamelawstipulatesthattheanthemmayonlybereproducedinRomanian.Assuch,therearenoofficialtranslationsoftheversesatthebeginningofthischapter,and,consequently,thetranslationistheauthor’sownandthesourcetowhichitisattributedisthepoem,ratherthantheanthemitself.

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willbeuniquetoRomania,asitshistoricalexperiencesandthemannerinwhichthey

havebeenframedthroughitsnarrativeonidentitywillbeexclusivetoit.Therationale

behindcertaintypesofbehaviour,therefore,isconnectedto,andindivisiblefrom,the

preceptswhichemergefromthestoryofnationalidentity.Inotherwords,behaviour

isinextricablylinkedtoidentity,becausethelatterformsthelensthroughwhich

Romaniansappraisetheirenvironment.

Thisthesis,therefore,hasatitscoretheconceptionthatidentitymattersinthe

articulationofRomania’sinterestsandpreferencesbutalsoinperceptionsofother

actors’actions.Inotherwords,theprojecttakestheviewthatitisthroughstories

about‘whoweare’thatRomaniansareabletomakesenseoftheworldaroundthem

andthat,asaresult,thenarrativeonidentityconstitutestheinter-subjectivereality

withinwhichthestatefunctions.Asaresult,accountingforthestate’sbehaviour

requiresgraspingtheessentialtenetsoftheRomaniannationalidentitynarrativeand

assessingtheirinfluenceonitsactions.Assuch,thisprojects’mainresearchquestionis

‘WhatistheimpactofthenationalidentityonRomania’spost-socialistforeignpolicy

agenda?’Itsaimistoaddanotherlayerofunderstandingtothemotivationsbehind

statebehaviourbyadoptinganidentity-basedperspective.Whatisofinterest,firstly,

aretheanswersRomanianshavegiventothequestionsof‘whoweare,’‘whatis

importanttous,’and‘whoourOthersare.’Thesewilloffercluesastothenatureand

contentoftheidentitynarrative,aswellasthetypesofintereststhatdrawonit,and

willallowforanevaluationoftheinternationalenvironmentthroughtheRomanian

lens.Ontheotherhand,assessingitsimpactonbehaviourentailsoverlayingthis

imageovercontemporaryeventsandtracingwhen,where,andtowhatextentthe

attitudes,prioritiesandred-linesthatflowfromthisnarrativecomeintoplay.Overall,

theaimoftheprojectistoshowthatthereexistsadiscerniblepatternofbehaviour

whichfollowsaspecificrationaleconformingwithRomania’sidentity-based

prerogatives.

Thepresentendeavouris,therefore,amulti-disciplinarystudywhichengageswith

issuesofidentity,history,sociology,foreignanddomesticaffairs.Itaimstoexplain

howstoriesaboutRomanianidentityhavedevelopedandbeenperpetuatedandalso,

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moreimportantly,howtheyfeedintopresentdaybehaviour.Theaimistoshowthat

thenationalidentitynarrative,amongstotherfactors,likeexternalpressures,actsto

influencestateactioninamannerwhichhasrarelybeenaccountedforbyresearch

intoRomanianforeignpolicy.Inasense,thisprojectbringstogethertwohitherto

largelyseparateenterprises–Romanians’owninterestindefining‘whatitmeansto

beRomanian’whichhasgenerallytakentheformofsociological,anthropologicalor

psychologicalworks,andefforts,whicharefairlyrareintheWest,toexplain

Romania’sforeignpolicydirectionafter1989.Bycombiningthetwo,thethesiswill

shedlightonthemotivationsbehindRomania’sactionswhich,whilsttheymayappear

obviousfrominsideRomania,aredifficulttocomprehendfromtheoutsideorhave

beenoversimplifiedbyrationalistormaterialistexplanations.Theavenueofferedinto

thestudyofstatebehaviourbyanidentitaryperspectiveisnotanaltogethernovel

one,butitsapplicationtotheRomaniancaseis,particularlyoutsideofitsborders.

BringingRomaniaintothefold,however,isausefulundertakingnotonlybecauseit

fillsagapintheresearchbyexaminingastatewhichisseldomthesubjectofstudy,

butalsobecauseitpaintsamoreaccuratepictureoftheinter-staterelationsand

conflictswhicharecurrentlyinplayinEasternEurope,asthefollowingsectionwill

show.

Case-StudyandContext

ThescopeofthisthesisplacesitattheconfluenceofStrategicCulture(SC)andForeign

PolicyAnalysis(FPA),withinthespecificfieldofconstructiviststudiesontheinfluence

ofnationalidentity/cultureonstateinternationalbehaviour.Thepresentendeavour

seekstoaddtoagrowing,ifstillunderdeveloped,areaofresearch.SChashada

traditionalinterestinthestudyofcultureasavariableimpactingonbehaviour,andits

focushasgenerallybeenon,asthenamesuggests,thestrategicsphere,especially

concerningtheuseofforce.Researchintopoliticalculture4or,morebroadly,national

culture,arerareandeventhosetendtoemphasisethestrategyaspect.5Ontheother

side,worksonidentitywithinFPAareamorerecentdevelopment,dueatleastinpart

4SeeDuffield(1999).5SeeBerger(1996)orGray(2007).

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totheconstructivistshiftwhichbeganinthe1990s.Bothschools,however,have

tendedtoprioritisecasestudiesconcerninggreatpowersand,consequently,the

spotlighthasrarelyfallenonsmallstates,asbothRasmussenwithinSCandBrowning

inFPAhavepointedout.6Thepresentthesis,therefore,aimstoaddtothefieldby

focusingonRomania,amedium-sizedformersocialiststatewithinEasternEurope.

Thereexistsaview,impliedintheemphasisonlargepowers,thatsmallerstates

providelessusefulcasestudies,astheyareonthereceiving,ratherthangenerating,

endoftheregionalorworldorder.Inotherwords,thatthebehaviourofsmallstatesis

toalargeextentdictatedbytheactivitiesofthegreatpowerswhichdominate

regionallyorinternationally.Thisistruetoapoint.Itisnottheintentionofthisthesis

toarguethatRomaniahasthesamefreedomofactionasRussiaortheUnitedStates,

orevenitsalliesinWesternEurope.Instead,oneacknowledgesthatexternal

pressuresaremorepowerfullyfeltbysmallstatesthantheyarebygreatpowers.

Havingsaidthat,theprojectrejectsthenotionthatthebehaviourofsmallstatesis

onlydeterminedbytheglobalbalanceofpower,or,indeed,thatallsmallstates’

prioritiesaresetexternally.Instead,itholdstheviewthat,notonlyisthestudyof

smallstatesausefulendeavourbecauseminoractorshavejustasstrongasenseof

theirownidentityasgreaterones,butthattheydo,inthecurrentcontextofa

globalisedandinter-connectedworld,havetheabilitytoimpacttheregional,ifnot

international,order.

Withthisinmind,acasestudyofRomania’smotivationsforbehaviourisboth

worthwhile,and,moreimportantly,apropitiousenterprise.Firstly,Romaniaprovides

theopportunecontextinwhichtoexploretheinfluenceofidentitynarrativeson

behaviour.Despitebeingasmallandrelativelyyoungnation,Romanianshave

developedaparticularlypowerfulsenseofidentitywhichhasbeenperpetuatedacross

severalgenerationstothepointthatitsmainfeatureshavebecomesedimented.

Indeed,oneofthehallmarksoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeisitshistoric

continuity.Assuch,thisthesisargues,inthespecificareasinwhichitfunctions,such

asensuringthephysicalintegrityofthestate,orprioritisingcertainrelationshipsover

6SeeRasmussen(2005)andBrowning(2008).

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others,theinfluenceofthenarrativeisparticularlypotent,andmoredifficulttooffset

byexternalpressures.Tracingtheinfluenceofstoriesonidentityintheseinstancesis

notonlyempiricallymorestraightforward,butalsoshowshowpowerfulthe

connectionbetweenidentitynarrativesandbehaviourcanbe,totheextenttowhich

identity-relatedprerogativesdominatemotivationsforstateactionincertainareas.

Ontheotherhand,thestateofaffairswithinEasternEuropealsowarrantsthistypeof

investigation.Theregionalclimateatthemomentis,inmanyways,oneofuncertainty

overthefutureandtherearetwofronts,inparticular,whichdeservemention.Firstly,

Russia’sannexationofCrimea(2014)andcontinuedinvolvementwithintheaffairsof

UkraineintheDonbashasunsettledtheequilibriumofEasternEuropeandputinto

questionthesecurityandstabilityoftheregion.BeyondthefactthatRussia’sactions

threatenthesovereigntyandintegrityofoneofthelargeststatesintheEuropean

Unionneighbourhood,thecrisisinUkraineisarguablyoneofthemostpressing

challengesfacedbytheEUandNATOsincetheendoftheColdWar.These

developmentshaverevealedthelackofefficiencyofEuropeanstrategicpolicytowards

theneighbourhoodandRussia,aswellasthedifficulties,inherenttoacertainextent

totheEuropeanproject,ofreachinganunanimousdecisiononaparticularcourseof

action.TheannexationofCrimeaandensuingconflicthavebeenmetwithaslowness

inreactiononthesideofEuropeanstates,butalsovaryingdegreesofthreat

perception.Adifferenceinpositionisapparentbetweenstateswithtighteconomic

linkstoMoscowandothers,particularlyontheeasternflank,wheretheproximityof

theconflictisacutelyfeltandmemoriesofanexpansionistRussiaarestillvivid.While

theEUhasputinplaceeconomicsanctionsagainstRussia,thelackofconsensuson

whatconstitutesameasuredandeffectiveresponsecontinues.Effortstoestablisha

frameworkformoreprofoundstrategiccooperationbetweenEUstatesarenascent,

andassuch,forthenumberofstates,Romaniaincluded,whoperceiveRussianactions

asanimminentthreattothemselvesandtheWesternsystemofalliances,NATO

providesthemoreeffectiveavenuetocounterbalanceMoscow’srevived

expansionism.Itisquestionable,however,whetherNATO’sincreasedpresenceinthe

regionandthestrategicsupportofferedtoitsEasternflankalliesdoesnotserve

Russia’sowninterests,ifoneweretoassumeMoscowwishestoseeareturntothe

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ColdWarspheresofinfluence.Overall,thecrisisinUkrainehascreateddissension

amongstEuropeanstatesand,particularlyinEasternEurope,aclimateofuncertainty

andsuspicion,inwhicholdtensionsandanxietieshavebeenbroughttothefore.

ThesecondfrontconcernsHungary,andinparticulartheactionsandrhetoricofits

right-winggovernment,ledbyprime-ministerViktorOrban.Overthelastfewyears,

HungaryhasbeenadisruptiveforcewithintheEUandNATO.Beginningwitha

nationalistshift,particularlythedecryingoftheTreatyofTrianon(1920)–whichsaw

thedissolutionoftheKingdomofHungaryandasignificantlossofterritorytoits

neighbours–andthepolicyofawardingofHungariancitizenshiptoitsdiasporain

contiguousstates(2010),OrbanhasunsettledhisEUandNATOeasternpartners,not

leastRomania.Budapest’sseekingofcloserrelationswithRussia,especiallyinthe

contextofthecrisisinUkrainehasalsocastdoubtonthestate’scommitmenttothe

EUandNATO.Thisdivergenceisallthemoresignificantasitcomesagainstabackdrop

ofincreasedregionaltensionswithRussiaand,morebroadly,asquestionsarebeing

raisedabouttheeffectivenessoftheEUandNATOinrespondingtocontemporary

securitychallenges.ThetheoryofTrojanHorseHungary,inotherwordsofHungaryas

adestabilisingpro-Russianelementfromwithinthetwoalliances,isoneofincreasing

concerntomembersoftheEUandNATO,particularlyinEasternEurope.Thepicture

revealedisnotonlyofariftbuildingbetweentheregionandRussia,butalsoamongst

actorswithintheEasternflankitself.Altogether,thesedevelopmentsmeanthatthe

situationinEasternEuropeisofanequilibriumteeteringontheedgeand,assuch,

understandingthemotivationsbehindthebehaviourofastateofstrategicimportance

intheregionisausefulendeavour.

Indeed,withinthismeleeRomaniaoccupiesacentralrole.Firstly,itisoneofthe

largest–secondtoPoland–statesintheEasternflank.Additionally,itisplacedatthe

edgeoftheEUandNATOandtheEuropeanneighbourhood,borderingUkrainetothe

northandtheRepublicofMoldovatotheeast.Furthermore,sincetheoutbreakofthe

Ukrainiancrisis,itsaccesstotheBlackSeahasincreasedinsignificanceduetothe

proximityofRomania’scoastlinetotheCrimeanPeninsula.Finally,italsoborders

HungarytotheWest,meaningthatthisstate’seasternandnationalistshifthavebeen

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mostacutelyfeltinBucharest.Harnessingitsstrategicposition,Romaniaplaysa

pivotalroleintheEUandNATO’sresponsetothetwoissuesmentionedabove.In

whatconcernsRussia,ithasbeenoneofthestates,alongsidePolandandtheBaltic

countriesmostprominently,todecrytheEU’ssoftapproachandrequestgreater

NATOinvolvementintheregion.Amongstthestepsundertakenonewouldhighlight

thebuildingofananti-ballisticmissileshieldwhichbecameoperationalin2016,the

establishmentofapermanentNATOofficeonitsterritory,andtheincreasingnumber

ofnavalexerciseswhicharetakingplaceintheBlackSea.ItsstanceonRussia’s

aggressionofUkrainehasbeenoneofthemostaggressive,asRomaniahassupported

thepro-WesterndirectionofformerSovietstatesandclosercooperationbetween

WesternorganisationsandtheEUneighbourhood.Onthisfront,Romaniahasalso

aimedtobuttressitsrelationshipwiththeRepublicofMoldovaandsecurethisstate’s

independencefromRussia.Ontheotherhand,Bucharesthasalsobeenmostcriticalof

Hungary’snationalistrhetoricanditspursuitofclosertieswithMoscow.

However,althoughRomania’spositionisevidentfromtheempiricalevidence,

understandingthemotivationsbehinditsforeignpolicyand,consequently,itsbroader

repercussions,requiresanin-depthanalysisofthemannerinwhichthenarrativeon

identityhasfedintothestate’sbehaviour.Thatisbecause,thisthesisargues,

Romania’sactionsarenotonlyrootedincontemporaryconcernsoverregionalsecurity

andstability.Instead,thisprojectwillshowhowRomania’sforeignpolicyagendaand,

morespecifically,itsresponsetoRussiaandHungary’sactions,areinformedby

identity-basedanxietiesandprioritieswhichhavemadeitparticularlysensitiveto

thesedevelopments.Romania’sportrayaloftheSelfandRussiaandHungaryasOthers

offersanavenueintounderstandingthestate’sbehaviourtowardsthem,beyondover

simplifiedrationalistandmaterialistexplanationswhichmayfocusonalignmentwith

itsmorepowerfulalliesorself-interestmaximisation.Thebenefitofthisnovel

approachisthatitshedslightontherationaleofparticularactions,suchasRomania’s

attemptstostrengthenitsrelationshipwiththeRepublicofMoldovaatthecostof

increasingtensionsbetweenitselfandRussia,whichmaybeperceivedas

counterintuitiveotherwise.Whatwillberevealedisacomplextableauoftheidentity-

basedmotivationswhichunderpinRomania’sbehaviourandmakeitnotafollowerof

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thegeneraldirectionpushedbyothers,butanautonomousactorinapositionto

harnessitsstrategicpositiontopursuespecificgoals.

However,preciselybecauseofitsstrategicimportance,Romania’sactionsmayhave

widerandprofoundrepercussionsontheinnerstabilityoftheEUandNATObutalso

consequencesintermsofthequalityofrelationsbetweentheseorganisationsand

Russia.Thethesiswillarguethatidentity-basedanxietiesoverHungary’sactionshave

ledtoagrowingriftbetweenBucharestandBudapestwhich,inthecurrentcontext,

shouldbeofutmostconcerninregardstothetwostates’capacitytocooperate

efficientlyinrespondingtothesecuritychallengesthreateningtheregion.Similarly,

thegrowingtensionsbetweenRomaniaandRussiacaused,ontheonehandbythe

hard-lineresponsefromBucharestontheissueoftheannexationofCrimea,andthe

pursuitoftighterlinksbetweenRomaniaandtheRepublicofMoldovaontheother,

revealRomania’sstanceasmoreaggressivetowardsRussiathanthatofmanyofits

allies,andoutofstepwiththegenerallinepursuebyitsWesternEuropeanpartners.

Theimplicationsmaybethatitsresponsetofuturedevelopmentsintheregionmight

deviateevenfurtherfromthedirectionprescribedbyitsalliestoapointatwhich

Romania’sbehaviouritselfwillconstituteachallengetotheregion’ssecurityand

stability.VariousscenariosincludingapotentialadhocunificationwiththeRepublicof

MoldovainthecontextofascalingupofMoscow’sinvolvementinitsaffairs,for

instance,wouldposeseriousquestionsoftheEUandNATO,aswellasRussia,interms

ofreactionandmayfurtherdestabilisethefragileequilibriumwhichexistswithin

EasternEuropecurrently.Inthiscontext,understandingthemotivationsbehind

Romania’sbehaviourbecomesanevermoreusefulandnecessaryendeavour.

Overall,thisprojectaimstohighlighttheinfluenceoftheRomanianidentitynarrative

onitspost-socialistbehaviour,anditsimpactontherelationshipsbuiltandpursued

withitssignificantOthers,namelyRussia,HungaryandtheRepublicofMoldova.Itwill

revealhowtheidentitynarrativehascreatedparticularprioritiesandanxietieswhich

havemadeRomaniaamodelEUandNATOpartnerbut,inthecontextofcurrent

developments,mayleadittodeviatefromcompletealignmentwithitsallies.More

importantly,itwillshowthatthereexistsapatternofbehaviourtherationalityof

15

whichislinkedtotheprerogativessetbyitsidentitynarrative.Fromthisperspective,

thethesismayaccountforRomania’scurrentactionsaswellasmakecertain

assumptionsaboutitsfutureforeignpolicydirection,contingentonthecontinuation

ofpresentcircumstances.Thebenefitofthepresententerpriseisthatitprovidesa

casestudyofastatecriticaltothestabilityoftheregion,butalso,insodoing,provides

asnapshotofsomeoftheinter-staterelationshipswhichexistinEasternEuropeatthe

moment.Theadvantageofthisapproach,however,isthatitnotonlycapturesthe

natureoftheserelationsastraditionalaccountsmay,butoffersthemaspecificdepth

byexploringtheirhistoriccontextandthemannerinwhichRomania’srepresentations

oftheSelfandOtherhavefedintopresentinteractions.Bypursuingthetaskfromthis

angle,itishoped,thecomplexityofthestateofaffairswithinEasternEurope,aswell

asRomania’srolewithinit,willberevealed.

StructureoftheThesis

Theprojectisorganisedwiththepurposeofansweringthemainresearchquestion,

‘WhatistheimpactofnationalidentityonRomania’spost-socialistforeignpolicy

agenda?’Assuch,thethesisbeginswithachapterdedicatedtothetheoretical

backgroundandaimedatsettingtheworkinitsresearchfield.Thiscontainsa

discussionofthetwomainstrandswithinwhichthethesisfits,SCandFPAandtheir

convergenceinthespecificareaofconstructiviststudieswhichinvestigate

identity/cultureandtheirlinktostatebehaviour.Thechapterexaminestheresearch

alreadyexistinginthefieldandthelimitationsofthetwoapproachesinconcernsto

thefocusandapproachoftheirstudy.Finally,thesectionoutlinestheproject’s

positiononanumberofissuesrelevanttoitsscopewhereeitheritsperspectivediffers

fromotherswithinthefieldoroverwhichthereexistsdisagreement,andthe

contributiontoknowledgeofthepresentendeavourisdemonstrated.Thischapteris

followedbyasectiononmethods,inwhichtheproject’sapproachtothestudyof

identityisexpandeduponandthethesisislocatedinexistingdebateson

constructivismtakingplaceinIR.Followingonfromthis,themethodologyofthe

projectisoutlined,withafocusonitstwo-stepapproach,namelyofinvestigatingthe

16

natureandcontentoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,succeededbyananalysisofits

influenceoverthestate’sinternationalbehaviour.

Subsequenttothesetheoreticaldiscussions,theprojectmovesintoitssubstantive

sections.Chapter3,‘RomanianHistoryandIdentity’isconcernedwithexploringthe

Romaniannarrativeonidentityanditshistoricaldevelopment.Thissectionexamines

thedominantrepresentationsoftheSelfandOthers,thesourcesoftheseportrayals,

andhowtheyhavebeenperpetuatedacrossthegenerations.Alinkisconstructed

betweenRomania’shistoricalandidentitynarratives,particularlyintermsofhow

historicalexperiencehasbeeninterpretedandusedinthecreationofidentitary

representations.ThechapterexaminesthemajorthemesoftheRomaniannarrative

onidentityastheyemergedintheformativeperiodofthenineteenthandtwentieth

centuries,highlightingtheirperpetuationinthemodernnarrative.Achronological

structure,focusedonthemainperiodsofRomania’shistory,organisesthesethemes

accordingtotheeraswithinthehistoricalnarrativeinwhichtheywereprevalent.

Overall,thischapteraimstoportraythemannerinwhichthesethemesbuildonone

anotherandcometogethertocreateaparticularrepresentationoftheSelfanOthers

inmoderntimes.Theroleofexternalcircumstances,namelytheactionsoftheOthers

HungaryandRussia,andofagency,particularlythatofNicolaeCeausecu’sregime,are

exploredinthecontextoftheunusualdegreeofcontinuityoftheRomanianidentity

narrative.

Chapter4,‘ContinuityratherthanChange,’isthepointofcrossoverbetweenthetwo

stepsinthethesis’approach.Thesectionbringstheanalysisofthenatureandcontent

ofRomanianidentitynarrativeinthecontemporaryera,namelyafterthe1989anti-

communistrevolution.ItexamineshowclaimsaboutRomanianidentitywereutilised

byreformedcommunists,ledbyIonIliescu,insecuringearlyelectoralvictoriesand

popularlegitimacy.Insodoing,thechapteralsoaddressestheissueofthe

perpetuationoftheidentitynarrative,withthenotabledeletionofthecommunist

period,intothepresentday,ascribingtheagencyofIliescu’sgovernmentsacrucial

role.Ontheotherhand,thischapteralsoanalysestheidentitynarrative’sinfluenceon

Romania’sinternationalbehaviour,withparticularemphasisonitsgoaltojointhe

17

WesterncommunitybyaccedingtotheEUandNATO.Itsinternationaleffortsare

contrastedwiththeresistancetochangenoticeableinitsdomesticpolicyagendaon

theissueofinternalreformduringthefirsthalfofthe1990s,onthesuccessofwhich

theachievementofitsforeignpolicyprerogativeswascontingent.Overall,thischapter

willshowhowtheRomanianidentitynarrativeandthecontinuityofitsmajorfeatures

werebothattherootofthestate’sinternationalagenda,butalsoconstitutedan

obstacleinitsrealisation.

Thefollowingthreechaptersarededicatedtotheexaminationofthreerelationships

crucialtoRomania’sforeignpolicy:thosewithRussia,HungaryandtheRepublicof

Moldova.Allsectionshaveasimilarstructure,focusedontracingtheinfluenceofthe

narrativeandtheanxietiesandprioritieswhichflowfromitontherelations

establishedwiththesethreeactors.Eachchapterbeginswithanexaminationofthe

particularattitudeRomaniahastowardsthesestates,asinformedbyitsidentity

narrativeandhistoricalinteractions.Subsequently,thechaptersexaminethethree

relationshipsthroughoutthetransitioneraanduptothepresentday,byaccounting

forthemajoreventswhichhaveshapedthem.Theaimistotracktheinfluenceof

theseattitudesinrelationtothechangesintheinternationalenvironmentandactors’

ownpriorities.Itwillbeshownthat,giventheopportunecircumstances,identitary

factorsmayeitherretreatorbecomeaugmented,hintingatthenotionthatthedegree

ofimpacttheidentitynarrativeonbehaviouriscontingentonbothexternaland

domesticcircumstances.Inthisexercise,currentdevelopmentsinUkraine,Hungary

andtheRepublicofMoldovaareofparticularinterest.Themainargumentwillbethat

thecontemporaryclimateissuchthatidentitaryattitudesandprerogativeshavean

especiallypowerfulinfluenceonRomania’scurrentandpotentiallyfuturebehaviour.

Finally,eachchapteroffersapredictionofthefuturerelationshipbetweenRomania

andthethreestates,aswellasRomania’sgeneralforeignpolicydirectionmore

broadly,basedonacontinuationofpresentcircumstances.Thesearebasedon

scenariosconsideredbyRomanianelitesasplausibledevelopmentswithintheregional

environment.

18

Thefinalchapterofthethesisisaconcludingsection.Heretheargumentsputforward

bytheprojectasawholearebroughttogetherinamannerwhichhighlightsthe

benefitofstudyingRomania’sbehaviourbyworkingatthejunctionbetweenSCand

FPAfromanidentitaryperspective.Thechapteroutlineswhichelementsthethesishas

borrowedfromeitherschoolofthoughtandhowstudyingidentityfromthismiddle

groundservestopaintamoreaccuratepictureofthecomplexrationalebehind

Romania’spost-socialistforeignpolicyagenda.Furthermore,thissectioncompilesthe

evidencepresentedinthethesistoshowthatthereexistsadiscerniblepattern

noticeableinRomania’sbehaviourwhichfollowsaparticularrationaleconformingto

Romania’sidentity-basedprerogatives.Theconclusionalsodiscussescertainpotential

issuesconcerningthepresentresearchapproach.

ConcludingRemarks

Thisprojectsetoutfouryearsagotopaintamoreaccuratepictureofthemotivations

behindRomania’sbehaviour,intheknowledgethatpaststudieshadseldomtaken

identityintoaccount.Theaimwasoriginallytoshowthatthemannerinwhich

Romanianegotiatesitsrolewithintheinternationalorganisationsitisamemberof,as

wellasitsrelationshipswithitsthreeOthers,isnotsimplydeterminedbythe

internationalbalanceofpower.Morespecifically,theremitwastoprovethat

Romania,asanactor,hasacertaindepthandequatestomorethanthelabelof

medium-sizedstateinEasternEurope.Romaniawouldbeportrayedasan

autonomousentity,shapedbutnotdefinedbyitsalliances;or‘defined’onlytothe

extenttowhichmembershipoftheEUandNATOistheresultofapursuitofitsown,

specificforeignpolicygoals.Thisisstilloneoftheaimsofthethesis.

However,sincethisprojectbegan,theinternationalenvironmenthasaltered

significantly,adding,inasense,tothescopeoftheproject.Itsremitwasalwaysto

showthatRomaniaviewsbothRussiaandHungaryasthreateningOthers,andthe

RepublicofMoldovaasanEstrangedSelfandthatitsforeignpolicygoalsinrelationto

theseactorswouldbeshapedaccordingly.Romaniawouldpursuethebolsteringofits

cooperationwithNATOinordertoguarditselffromRussia,maintaincordialbutnot

closerelationswithHungaryandaimtostrengthenitslinktotheRepublicofMoldova.

19

Althoughinmanywaysconfirmingtheoriginalassumptions,eventsofrecentyears,

particularlythecrisisinUkraineandBudapest’smarkedchangeinrhetoricand

behaviour,alterthecontextofthisthesis’arguments.Throughitsstrategicposition,

butalsoitsownactions,Romaniahasplaceditselfattheheartofthesedevelopments

andisnowplayinganincreasinglycriticalroleintheregion’sstability.Ithas,perhaps,

foundthenicheforitselfithadbeensearchingforsincethetimesCeausescumadea

standonbehalfofhisstateagainsttheactionsoftheSovietUnion.

Inanycase,thisendeavourisofferedadditionalutilitybythecurrentinternational

climate.Whilstitstillshowsthecapacityofasmallstatetodevelopadistinctsenseof

identityanditsabilitytopursueaparticularforeignpolicyagendapeculiartoits

internalprerogatives,italsonowshedslightonthepotentialimpactasmallstate

mighthaveontheregionalequilibrium.Romanianotonlyspeaksandactsforitself;its

behaviourhasrepercussionsonthewiderinternationalorganisationsitisamember

of.ItsrelationshipwithRussiaaffects,byextension,thenatureandqualityofthe

dialoguebetweentheseactorsandMoscow.Similarly,Romania’spursuitofcloser

relationswiththeRepublicofMoldovashouldbeseenasanaffinitybetweena

memberoftheEUandNATOandastatestillpartofRussia’ssphereofinfluence.

DiscordbetweenRomaniaandHungaryequatestoaninternalriftbetweentheEUand

NATO.Whilstthiswasalwaysthecase,inlightofrecenteventstheseconsiderations

gainfurthersignificance.IfthesituationinEasternEuropecanbequalifiedasafragile

equilibrium,thentheissueofRomania’sbehaviourbecomesevermoresalient.Inthis

vein,understandingthemotivationsbehindwhatRomaniadoes,aswellasitwhatit

mightdointhefuture,ismoreimportanttodaythanitwasfouryearsago.Thatis

becausenow,inthecontextofthevarioussecurityandpoliticalchallengesfacedby

EasternEurope,RomaniaisinapositiontoaffecttheeffectivenessoftheEUand

NATOaswellastheirrelationshipwithRussia.Theconcludingremarkofthissection,

therefore,wouldbethatendeavourssuchasthisareofparticularutilityin

contemporarytimes,whentheactionsofevenasmallstatemayimpactthe

internationalenvironmentintimesofcrisis.

20

Chapter1.TheoreticalBackground

Introduction

Thischapteroutlinesthetheoreticalbackgroundofthethesis,locatingitintheareaof

InternationalRelationsstudiesinwhichForeignPolicyAnalysisandStrategicCulture

overlap.Morespecifically,thisfieldcontainsconstructivistStrategicCulturestudies

whichgobeyondtheschool’straditionallynarrowfocusonmilitarystrategy,

examiningtheimpactofpoliticalcultureonstatebehaviourmoregenerally,and

constructivistapproacheswithinForeignPolicyAnalysiswhichdealspecificallywith

nationalidentity.Thechapterexamineseachofthedevelopmentswithinthetwo

schoolsinturn,withafocusonthemannerinwhichidentityisconceptualisedand

studied.Followingfromthis,thelimitationsofthetwoapproachesand,inthiscontext,

thethesis’ownpositiononcertainissues,suchasitsconceptionofidentityandthe

structure-agencydebate,isoutlined.Finally,thecontributiontothefieldthethesis

bringswillbeexplored,particularlyinregardstothenotionthat,byfocusingona

minorpowersuchasRomania,theprojectaddressesagapintheresearchandpaintsa

moreaccuratepictureoftheinter-staterelationshipswhichexistinEasternEurope.

AttheCrossroadsofStrategicCultureandForeignPolicyAnalysis

ThisthesisexploresthelinkbetweenidentityandRomania’spost-socialistforeign

policyagendaand,insodoing,aimstoaddanotherlayerofunderstandingtothe

motivationsbehindstatebehaviour.Theprojectthereforefindsitselfatthe

confluencebetweenthestudyofidentity/cultureandthatofforeignpolicy.Whatis

more,theprojectviewsnationalidentityasasocialconstruct,asharedsystemof

beliefsoranarrativeaboutwhotheSelfis,howitcametobethatway,whatitsvalues

andpriorities,bothdomesticandinternational,are.Asenseofidentitydevelopsasa

resultofanaccumulationofsocio-historicalexperiences–or,morespecifically,their

subjectiveinterpretation–aswellastheactor’srelationswithandpositioningin

contrasttoOthers.Whatnationalidentityprovidesisasubjectiveperceptionof

reality,alensthroughwhichastateorpeople,inthiscaseRomania,viewstheworld

anditsplacewithinit.Thisthesis,therefore,employsaconstructivistapproachto

21

statebehaviour,inwhichnarrativesonidentity,oftenunwittingly,shapethedecision-

makingprocessbyinfluencingthegoalspursuedbystates,butalsotheirappraisalof

specificcontexts,whichmaybeperceivedasespeciallythreateningorfavourable.

Thispositionlocatesthethesisinthefieldofconstructivistculturalstudiesofstates

whichidentifycultureoridentityashavingspecificimplicationsforforeignpolicy.

Therearetwospecifictraditionsengagingwiththisagendawithinwhichthisproject

maybesituated:StrategicCulture(SC)andForeignPolicyAnalysis(FPA).Inthecaseof

both,theendoftheColdWarand,morerecently,the9/11terroristattacks,7have

sparkedrenewedinterestintheconnectionbetweenidentityandbehaviour.Having

saidthat,bothintermsofscopeandapproach,thetwofieldsdiffersignificantly–

whileSCtraditionallyhasanarrowerfocusoncultureinfluencingastate’sstrategicuse

offorceandpredominantlychampionstheimportanceofstructure,FPAcastsawider

netinanalysingforeignpolicydecisionmakingingeneralandemphasisestheroleof

agency.Furthermore,whatwillalsobecomeclearisthetwotraditionsmakevery

differentclaimsaboutidentityandthemannerinwhichitshouldbeapproached.

However,asthefollowingsectionwillexplore,aswithmostschoolsofthought,SCand

FPAarenotcompletelyhomogenousanditisintheareaofoverlapthatthetypeof

studyattemptedherefitsin.

StrategicCulture(SC)

Originallydevelopedin1977byJackSnyderinanattempttoutilisethenational

culturevariableinordertoexplainthedifferentstrategiesemployedbytheSoviet

UnionincontrasttotheUnitedStatesduringtheColdWar,8SCisaneclecticclusterof

theoriesexamining,atthemostfundamentallevel,“therelevanceof‘culturalcontext’

ininfluencingstrategicpreferences.”9Inotherwords,SC’smainaimhasbeento

“integrate[withinsecuritystudies]culturalinfluencesabouthowactorswithinthe

7See,forinstance,Hudson(2013)andLantis(2009).8J.Snyder,TheSovietStrategicCulture:ImplicationsforLimitedNuclearOperations,R-2154-AF(SantaMonica:RandPublications,1977).9S.Poore,‘StrategicCulture,’inJ.Glenn,D.HowlettandS.Poore(eds),NeorealismversusStrategicCulture(Aldershot:Ashgate,2004),p.45.

22

internationalsystemmadedecisionsregardingtheuseofforce.”10Thepointof

convergenceofallstrategicculturalistsisarejectionoftherationalismand

materialismoftraditionalperspectives,suchas(Neo)realismandNeoliberalism.

Indeed,SCdefinesitselfasaschoolwhichtakes“therealistedificeastarget.”11Atthe

rootoftheirchallengeisaquestioningofthemannerinwhichidentityandcultureare

treatedandtheextenttowhichtheinfluenceofthesefactorsonpolicyarticulationis

accountedforbymainstreamperspectives.Ofparticularconcerntoculturalistsarethe

logicofanarchyanduniversalismfundamentaltotheseapproachesingeneral,andto

Neorealisminparticular.Theytakeasdeeplyproblematicthenotionthatthe

behaviourofstatesissolelyattributabletotheanarchicstructureoftheinternational

systemandthedistributionofmaterialcapabilities.Thetreatmentofstatesas‘like

units,’strippedbareofanyoftheiruniquecharacteristics,impliesthatstateidentities

areexogenouslygivenandtheirinterestsarelimitedtoadesiretosurviveunderthe

pressuresoftheinternationalstructure.Theassumption,however,thatstatesare

essentiallyutilitymaximisersisunsatisfactorytostrategicculturalistswhohave

pointedtothe“shortcomingsinahistoricalandnon-culturalstructuralmodels”12in

predictingandexplainingstatebehaviour.Insteadofthisimpoverishedconceptionof

identity,SCemphasises“theinfluenceofthedomesticculturalcontexton(…)

behaviour.”13

However,despiteitsintuitivelyattractiveapproachtoexplainingstatestrategic

behaviour,SCfailed,initsearlyphase,toenterthemainstreamofinternational

relationstheory–asGlennetalhaveputit,SCspenttheColdWar“languish[ing]in

neorealism’sshadow.”14Thishas,atleastpartly,beenputdowntoitsheterogeneityin

termsofscopeandlevelofanalysis–whetherthefocusofstudyshouldbemilitary,

politicalororganizationalculture–or,indeed,howtooperationalizetheconceptof

10C.Greathouse,‘ExaminingtheRoleandMethodologyofStrategicCulture,’Risk,Hazards&CrisisinPublicPolicy1:1(2010),p.57.11A.I.‘Johnston,‘ThinkingaboutStrategicCulture’,InternationalSecurity19:4(Spring1995),p.41.12Ibid.,pp.32-33.13J.Glenn,D.HowlettandS.Poore(a),‘Introduction,’inJ.Glenn,D.HowlettandS.Poore(eds),NeorealismversusStrategicCulture(Aldershot:Ashgate,2004),p.4.14Ibid.,p.3.

23

‘culture.’15Theresultoftheseinternaldisparitieshasbeen,asGreathouseargued,that

“the30+yearsofworkdevelopingSChasyieldedneitherastandarddefinitionnora

commonmethodologicalapproachtousing[it].”16Thelackofacoherentapproach

doesnot,however,meanthatthisbodyofworkhaslittletoofferthestudyof

internationalrelations.TheendoftheColdWarandtheeventsof9/11haveledtoa

re-evaluationoftheimportanceofnationalspecificityinregardstostatebehaviour.

Understandingandexplainingculturaldifferencesseemsmoreworthwhiletoday,one

wouldargue,thanatanytimeincontemporaryhistory.Inthiscontext,SCappears

abletoaddressthisgapinknowledge,preciselybecauseitholds‘culture’asitsmain

focusandacknowledgesthelinksbetweenitandastate’shistoryandsociety.Among

thecommonfeaturesofvariationsofSCstudiesPoorehighlightsthatthey“identify

specificnationaltendenciesthatderivefromhistoricalexperiences”andthattheterm

itselfrefers“tocollectives,whethermilitaryorganisations,policycommunitiesor

entiresocieties(…)provid[ing]certainenduringattitudes,assumptionsandbeliefs(…)

whichwillleadtoaparticularinterpretationofmaterialconditions.”17

Intheirapproachtothestudyofidentity,constructivistSCowesmuchtotheworkof

AlexanderWendt.Aimingtofindaviamediabetweenmaterialist-rationalist

perspectivesandthoseofpoststructuralism,Wendtbroughtsociallyconstructed

identitytotheforeofhissystemictheoryonthebehaviourofstatesandwithit,

broughtconstructivismitselftothetableofgreatdebateswithinIR.AsIverNeumann

suggests,“Wendt’sworkhadthegreatmeritofpropellingthestudyofcollective

identityforwardinthesensethatheplaceditbeforeawiderIRaudience.”18Inhis

influentialarticleAnarchyisWhatStatesMakeofItandlaterintheseminalSocial

TheoryofInternationalPoliticsWendtquestionsNeorealism’slogicofanarchyby

positingthatidentitiesareindeedconstructedthroughsocialinteractionandcannot

betreatedasexogenouslygiven,nordivorcedfromthenotionofinterest.Inthisview,

15TheJohnston-Graydebateinthe1990sfocusedonwhether‘culture’asavariableshouldbeevaluatedonlyinitsimpactontheoutcomealone(Johnston),oralsotheinput(Gray).Formoredetail,seeJohnston(1995)andGray(1999).16Greathouse(2010),p.58.17Poore(2004),p.50.18I.Neumann,CollectiveIdentityFormation:SelfandOtherinInternationalRelations-EUIWorkingPapers(Florence:EuropeanUniversityInstitute,1995),p.28.

24

“identityisaninherentlysocialdefinitionoftheactorgroundedinthetheorieswhich

actorscollectivelyholdaboutthemselvesandoneanotherandwhichconstitutethe

structureofthesocialworld.”19Moreover,headds,these“identitiesarethebasisof

interests.Actorstonothavea‘portfolio’ofintereststhattheycarryaround

independentofsocialcontext;instead,theydefinetheirinterestsintheprocessof

definingsituations.”20ForWendt,thesocialidentitiesofstatesdonotexistpriorto

theirinteractionoftheinternationalstageand,assuch,areaflexiblestructureopento

change.

InthisWendt’spointisthatNeorealism’s‘cultureofanarchy’isnotaninescapable

featureoftheinternationalsystem,becausethisandanyotherstateofaffairs

dependson“howidentitygetsdefined”21throughsocialinteraction.Itisperfectly

plausibletherefore,andWendtgoesontomakethisargument,22thatcooperation

betweenstatesisachievableifactorsrecasttheirownandothers’identitiesand

institutionalisethesethroughthepracticeofinteraction.23Inthisvein,thebehaviour

ofstatestowardsoneanother,aswellastheintereststheypursue,aredefinedbya

processofcontinuoussociallearning.Forthisreason,Wendtisregardedasoneofthe

mostinfluentialconstructivistswithinthediscipline.Havingsaidthat,hedoesmake

someimportantconcessionstorationalist-materialistapproaches.

Firstly,whereasidentityisatthecoreofWendt’swork,inhisdefinitionofthevarious

identitiesofstateshepurposefullyseparatestheinternationalanddomesticspheres,

andbracketsthelatterasasubjectofanalysis.AsWendthimselfnoted,“some

propertiesofthestateare‘self-organising’relativetootherstates(muchas

rationalistswouldargue,forwhomactorpropertiesareexogenoustothesystem),and

19A.Wendt,‘AnarchyIsWhatStatesMakeofIt:TheSocialConstructionofPowerPolitics,’InternationalOrganization(Spring1992)46:2,p.398.20Ibid.21M.Zehfuss,‘ConstructivismandIdentity–ADangerousLiaison,’inS.GuzziniandA.Leander(eds.),ConstructivismandInternationalRelations–AlexanderWendtandhisCritics(London:Routledge,2006),p.95.22Wendt(1992,1999)23Wendt(1992),p.417.

25

somearedependentonculturalstructuresatthesystemiclevel.”24Asaresult,hisisan

“an‘essentialist’or‘weak’constructivismthatleavestheterms,butnotthefact,of

stateindividualityopentonegotiation.”25Toputthisintocontext,Wendt

differentiatesbetween‘corporate’and‘social’identities.Theformerexistspriorto

socialinteractionandisastable,unitaryandexogenouslygiventypeofidentitywhich

“referstotheintrinsicqualitiesthatconstituteactorindividuality”and“hasitsrootsin

domesticpolitics.”26Fromthisidentityemergeseveralinterestswhichechothose

positedbymaterialist-rationalistapproaches:physicalsurvival,autonomy,economic

wellbeing,andcollectiveself-esteem.27States’‘social’identities,ontheotherhand,

“canexistonlyinrelationtoothersandthusprovideacrucialconnectionforthe

mutuallyconstitutiverelationshipbetweenagentsandstructures.Thistypeofidentity

iscontinuously(re)definedinprocessesofinteraction.”28Itisthisdimensionofidentity

whichismalleable,andwhichhasabearingonthebehaviourofstatestowardsone

anotherwithintheinternationalsystem,whereasthedomesticrealmandtheidentity

whichemergesfromitare“systematicallybracketed.”29

Inthis,ashighlightedbyWendthimself,thetheorymakesanimportantconcessionto

materialist-rationalistperspectives.Themostobviousconsequenceintermsof

Wendt’sconceptionofidentityisthenotionthatdomesticfactorshavenoimpacton

inter-staterelationsnor,indeed,thatinternationalinteractionmayalsoinfluence

‘corporate’identity.Theinterestscreatedbycorporateidentityarethesameforall

statesandexistaprioritointeraction.Thereislittleinterest,sincethisareais

bracketed,ininquiringhowthisidentityisconstructed,letalonehowitismaintained

orchallenged,whilsttheprocessof‘social’identityconstructionandadaptationare

centraltoWendt’stheoryofidentity.Theexistenceoftwoseparateidentitiesofan

actor,oneinternal,stableandexogenouslygiven,theothermalleableandexisting

24A.Wendt,‘IdentityandStructuralChangeinInternationalPolitics,’inY.LapidandF.Kratochwil(eds.),TheReturnofCultureandIdentityinIRTheory(Boulder,Colorado:LynneRiennerPublishers,1996),pp.50.25Ibid.26Wendt(1996),p.50.27A.Wendt,SocialTheoryofInternationalPolitics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010–original1999),pp.235-236.28Zehfuss(2006),p.98.29Wendt(1992),p.423.

26

solelyintheinternationalcontext,hasledtocriticismofWendt’swork,particularly

fromcriticalconstructivistsandpoststructuralists.30Havingsaidthat,asthissection

willshow,Wendt’stheoryofidentityandhisattempttofindaviamediabetween

materialist-rationalistperspectivesandmorecriticalformsofconstructivismand

poststructuralismhashadgreattractionamongststrategicculturalists.Although

domesticfactorsarenotbracketedbytheseauthors,indeedtheyarefundamentalto

theirresearch,theirconceptionofnationalidentitiesassociallyconstructedbutatthe

sametimestableandunitaryechoesWendt’stheoryofidentity.Whereasstrategic

culturalistsarguethatidentitiesarecriticaltothearticulationofstrategicandbroader

foreignpolicy,theprocessesthroughwhichthoseidentitieswereconstructed

generallydonotfeatureintheiranalyses.Theyare,inthisrespect,thoroughgoing

structuralists,31muchlikeWendthimself,showinglittleinterestinagents’roleinthe

shapingofidentities.

Havingsaidthat,theinsightprovidedbyWendt’stheoryhascontributedtobothan

expansionanddiversificationofculturaliststudiesoverthelasttwodecades.One

particulardirectionadoptedbyanumberofstrategicculturalistsinwhatJohnstonhas

termed‘thethirdwave’32shouldbehighlighted,asitcombinesabroadeningofthe

fieldofresearchwiththisweakerconstructivistapproach.AsGlennetalpointout,the

thirdgenerationaresingledoutby“theirwillingnesstoconsiderotheraspectsofstate

policy,notjustthoserelatingtomilitaryfactors,whichmaybeinfluencedby

culture.”33Thereisanacknowledgmentinthisthatthestrategicculturewhichinforms

thedecisionsofelitesonsecurityissuesmusteithercorrespondorbesubscribedtoan

underlyingnationalpoliticalculturewhichimpactssociety,and,consequently,state

behaviour.Duffield,forinstance,arguedthattraditionalunderstandingsofSC,which

areconcernedwith“militarystrategy,especiallynuclearstrategy,andtheuseof

force”precludetheapplicabilityoftheapproach“tothefullrangeofstatebehaviours

30OnthisseeZehfuss(2002,2006),Waever(2002),Neumann(1995,2004).31R.Jepperson,A.WendtandP.J.Katzenstein,‘Norms,Identity,andCultureinNationalSecurity,’inP.Katzenstein(ed.),TheCultureofNationalSecurity–NormsandIdentityinWorldPolitics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),p.66.32Johnston(1995),pp.32-64.33Glennetal(2004a),p.9.

27

thatmaybeofinterest.”34Anexaminationofstatepoliticalcultureinsteadoffersa

widerdimensionforculturalresearchintostatebehaviour(thepolitical,ratherthan

thesolelythestrategic)whileeffectivelysubsumingSC.35Thisbroaderapproachis

pursuedbyanumberoftheorists.Inhiscollaborativeworkof1996,Katzensteinbegins

withtheassumptionthat“stateinterestsdonotexisttobe‘discovered’byself-

interested,rationalactors.Interestsareconstructedthroughaprocessofsocial

interaction.”36Moreimportantly,heandhiscolleagueslinksecuritypolicy-makingand

theactorsresponsibleforittothewidersocialcontextinwhichtheyfunction;the

book,accordingly,“stipulatesamoresocialviewoftheenvironmentinwhichstates

andotherpoliticalactorsoperate.Anditinsiststhatpoliticalidentitiesareto

significantdegreesconstructedwithinthatenvironment.Itthusdepartsfrom

materialistnotionsandtherationalistviewofidentitiesasexogenouslygiven.”37A

moreinclusiveapproachispresentedheretothenotionsofcultureandidentity,both

ofwhicharesociallyconstructedand,therefore,contextspecific;furthermore,thereis

anacknowledgmentthatactorsthemselvesareenculturedwithinthesocial

environment.

Theupshotoftheirapproachisthatitallowstheauthorstoaccountfortheinfluence

ofcultureoverthestateasawhole.Inthesamevolume,Jeppersonetalarguethat

“culturalenvironmentsaffectnotonlytheincentivesfordifferentkindsofstate

behaviourbutalsothebasiccharacterofstates–whatwecallstate‘identity.’”38

Equally,inhisstudyofGermanandJapanesebehaviourofde-emphasisingmilitary

instrumentsasameansofsecuringnationalsecurityobjectivesaftertheSecondWorld

War,Bergerarguesthatmilitarycultureisrootedinconstantlyre-evaluatednational

identities.HisargumentisthatGermanyandJapan,“asaresultoftheirhistorical

experiencesandthewayinwhichthoseexperienceswereinterpretedbydomestic

politicalactors,havedevelopedbeliefsandvaluesthatmakethempeculiarlyreluctant

34J.Duffield,‘PoliticalCultureandStateBehavior:WhyGermanyConfoundsNeorealism’,InternationalOrganization53:4(Autumn1999),p.776.35Ibid.,p.777.36P.Katzenstein(b),‘Introduction:AlternativePerspectivesonNationalSecurity,’inP.Katzenstein(ed.),TheCultureofNationalSecurity–NormsandIdentityinWorldPolitics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),p.2.37Ibid.,p.26.38R.Jeppersonetal(1996),p.33.

28

toresorttotheuseofmilitaryforce.”39Heimpliesthatmilitarycultureisasubsetof

politicalculture,whichisinturninformedbysocietalvaluesandpreferences;

additionally,cultureisnotstatic,butamenabletochange,asitis“underpressurefrom

externaldevelopmentsandinternalcontradictions.”40Althoughchangeismostoften

incremental,traumaticeventscantriggertheneedforsuddenrenegotiationofthese

identitiesaswasthecaseofGermanyandJapanaftertheSecondWorldWar.Overall,

Berger’saccountshowsthatmilitarystrategy,inparticularfavouringorrejectingthe

useofmilitaryinstruments,canbeaffectedbyageneralshiftinthestate’sculture,

which“comprisesbeliefsaboutthewaytheworldis–includingatthemostbasiclevel

beliefsthatdefinetheindividual’sandthegroup’sidentities–andideasabouttheway

theworldoughttobe.”41

However,moreisrevealedabouttheauthors’theoreticalcommitmentsintheir

conceptionsof‘culture’and‘identity.’Theformer“denotescollectivemodelsof

nation-stateauthorityandidentity,”42whilstthelatterismoremodestlyutilisedasa

shorthandlabel“forvaryingconstructionsofnation-andstatehood,”thatare

“enacteddomesticallyandprojectedinternationally.”43Ifidentityistreatedasa

‘label,’thequestionthatremainstobeansweredishowitshouldbeinvestigated.On

thispoint,theauthorsmakecleartheir“methodologicalconventionalism,”44andtheir

lackof“commitmentto‘subjectivism’inwhateversense.”45Theirfocusisnoton

accountingfortheprocessesthroughwhichidentitieswereconstructed,butratheron

“recount[ing]inhistoricalfashion”thedevelopmentofthe“interpretativeframes

employedbyactors.”46Therefore,itfollowsthat,whereasinterestsarenot

exogenouslygivenbutareinsteadgeneratedfromideationalfactors,understanding

howandwhytheseideationalfactorshavedevelopedisnotnecessaryto

understandingtheirinfluenceonbehaviour.ThisechoesWendt’sconceptionof

39T.Berger,‘Norms,IdentityandNationalSecurityinGermanyandJapan,’inP.Katzenstein(ed.),TheCultureofNationalSecurity–NormsandIdentityinWorldPolitics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),p.318.40Ibid.,p.326.41Ibid.,p.325. 42Katzensteinetal(1996b),p.6.43Ibid.44Jeppersonetal(1996),p.67.45Ibid.,p.66.46Ibid.,p.67.

29

identityasstableandunitary.Itshouldcomeasnosurprise,then,thatWendtwas

himselfoneofthevolume’scontributors.

Havingsaidthat,thisintegratedviewofculturecontinuestohavetractioninthefield

ofSC.IntheirvolumeStrategicCultureandWeaponsofMassDestruction(2008),

Johnson,KartchnerandLarsendefinetheconceptas:

Thatsetofsharedbeliefs,assumptions,andmodesofbehaviour,derivedfromcommonexperiencesandacceptednarratives(bothoralandwritten),thatshapecollectiveidentityandrelationshipstoothergroups,andwhichdetermineappropriateendsandmeansforachievingsecurityobjectives.47

Thelinkbetweenidentitiesandthedecision-makingprocessishighlighted:incontrast

toneorealistassumptionsofstatesasessentiallypower-seekers,thisversionofSC

“assumesthatstatesformtheirinterests,andtheirviewsofotheractors,basedona

normativeunderstandingofwhotheyare,andwhatroletheyshouldbeplaying.”48In

otherwords,identityprovidesthelensthroughwhichstatesperceivetheirownplace

inthebroaderinternationalsetting,aswellasthemotivationsofOthers;this,inturn

affectshowstatesinteractwiththeseotheractors.

Additionally,thereisanacknowledgementthat,asidentitiesandculturesaresocially

constructed,changestothesocialcontextmayleadtotheirre-evaluation,and,

consequently,toanalterationofstatepoliciesandbehaviour:“Ifhistoricalmemory,

politicalinstitutions,andmultilateralcommitmentsshapestrategicculture,then,

recentstudiesargue,itwouldseemlogicaltoacceptthatsecuritypolicieswillevolve

overtime.”49ThisisintunewithBerger’sfindingsonGermanandJapaneseculturebut

alsowithErmarth’sstudyofthehistoricalevolutionofRussianstrategicculture.He

arguesthatRussia’spoliticalculturehasplayedasignificantroleinshapingthe

47J.L.Johnson,K.M.KartchnerandJ.A.Larsen,‘Introduction,’inJ.L.Johnson,K.M.KartchnerandJ.A.Larsen(eds.),StrategicCultureandWeaponsofMassDestruction–CulturallyBasedInsightsintoComparativeNationalSecurityPolicymaking(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2009),p.9.48J.L.Johnson,‘Conclusion:TowardaStandardMethodologicalApproach,’inJ.L.Johnson,K.M.KartchnerandJ.A.Larsen(eds.),StrategicCultureandWeaponsofMassDestruction–CulturallyBasedInsightsintoComparativeNationalSecurityPolicymaking(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2009),p.246.49J.S.Lantis,‘StrategicCulture:FromClausewitztoConstructivism,’inJ.L.Johnson,K.M.KartchnerandJ.A.Larsen(eds.),StrategicCultureandWeaponsofMassDestruction–CulturallyBasedInsightsintoComparativeNationalSecurityPolicymaking(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2009),p.44.

30

strategicsubset,inthatit“isitselfvery‘martial’orharmoniouswithmilitaryvaluesin

thatitisgroundedontheprincipleofkto-kovo(literally‘who–whom’),thatis,who

dominatesoverwhombyvirtueofcoercivepowerorstatusimpartedbyhigher

authority.”50Unsurprisinglyhowever,hehaslesstosayabouthowthispoliticalculture

hasdevelopedtofitneatlywithapolicyofheavymilitarisation–or,indeed,explore

thelinkbetweenRussianidentityandthispoliticalculture.Instead,Ermarthfocuseson

tracingthedevelopmentoftheroleofthemilitaryasessentialtoRussianstrategic

cultureintheImperialandSovieteras,toitsdeclineattheendoftheColdWarand

intotheYeltsinperiod.Whatisinterestingabouthisapproachistheacknowledgment

thataculturewhichprioritisesmilitarymightisamenabletore-interpretationandmay

fallfromfavourintheopportuneinternationalanddomesticsetting,eveninthecase

ofastatewhichhassostrongatraditionofitasRussia.

Weakconstructivism,therefore,hasnotonlyaccommodatedabroadeningofitsfield

ofresearch,buthasalsoledtoaquestioningofSC’straditionalviewofcultureasa

largelystaticfeatureofstates.In1995,Johnstonwasarguingthat“theweightof

historicalexperiencesandhistorically-rootedstrategicpreferencestendstoconstrain

responsestochangesinthe‘objective’strategicenvironment(…).Ifstrategicculture

changes,itdoessoslowly,laggingbehindchangesin‘objective’conditions.”51Inother

words,cultureisembeddedintheconsciousnessofdecision-makersand,asaresult,is

slowtoreacttothechangingenvironment.However,constructivismnotonlyallows,

butinmanywaysdictatesthechallengingofthisnotion.Ifculturesandidentitiesare

sociallyconstructed,thentheyareopentobeingperpetuatedorreinterpretedin

equalmeasure.Thealterationofthedomesticorinternationalsettingmaytrigger

culturaldilemmaswhich“definenewdirectionsforforeignpolicyanddemandthe

reconstructionofhistoricalnarratives.”52ThisisevidentinbothBergerandErmarth’s

casestudiesonthechangeinperceptionovertheutilityofmilitaryforceinsecuring

securityobjectivesinGermany,JapanandRussia.Overall,whatthisshiftentailsisnot

50F.W.Ermarth,‘RussianStrategicCultureinFlux:BacktotheFuture?,’inJ.L.Johnson,K.M.KartchnerandJ.A.Larsen(eds.),StrategicCultureandWeaponsofMassDestruction–CulturallyBasedInsightsintoComparativeNationalSecurityPolicymaking(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2009),p.87.51Johnston(1995),p.34.ThisviewoftraditionalStrategicCulturestudiesissharedbyPoore(1996),Lantis(2009)andLibel(2016).52Lantis(2009),p.45.

31

arecognitionthatchangeisnecessary,butthatitispossible.Inasense,thisimpliesa

higherdegreeofattentionbeingawardedtotheimpactofagencyoveridentities.

Changesintheenvironment,andparticularlyshockswhichmayalterthe“evolutionary

pattern”53ofstates,areopportunitiesforidentitarytenetstobequestionedandeither

buttressedoramended.Howactorsnegotiatesuchdevelopmentsisthereforecrucial

inunderstandingstatebehaviour.Inthisview,bothcontinuityandchangeofidentity-

relatedpreceptsandthepoliciestheygeneratearevalidresponsesandrecentSCcase

studiesreflectthis.

Onthecontinuityside,andfollowingonfromBerger’saccount,Dalgaard-Nielsen

analysesGermany’snegativeresponsetotheIraqinvasionbytracingitsrootsbackto

twocompetingschoolsofthoughtwhichemergedafter1945,‘neveragainalone’and

‘neveragainwar,’which“representedcompetinginterpretationsofGermanhistory

anddivergingprescriptionsregardingsecurityanddefencepolicy.”54Boththese

interpretationsarebasedonthetraumaincurredbytheGermanpeopleasaresultof

theSecondWorldWarbut,whilsttheformeremphasisestheneedfor

democratisationandintegrationwithinthebroaderWesterncommunity,thelatter

focusesondemilitarisationandarejectionoftheuseofforcebeyondself-defenceor

humanitarianintervention.55Dalgaard-NielsenexplainsGermany’sreactiontothe

alliedinvasionofIraqasacontinuationofthedialoguebetweenthesetwotraditions.

Apre-emptivestrikeagainstIraqintheabsenceofanUNresolutionwentagainst

Germanpreceptsonmilitaryintervention,andasaresult,Germanydeclinedentering

thecoalitionofthewilling.AtthesametimeGermanywantedtoavoidinternational

isolationinthematterbyseekingtobuildananti-warcounter-coalitionalongside

FranceandRussia.56BoththemotivationsbehindGermany’snegativeresponsetothe

Iraqinvasionanditssubsequentpositiontowardsitaretellingofitsingrainedanxiety

towardswarandisolation.Dalgaard-Nielsenthereforechallengestheneorealist

assessmentoftheevent,whichwouldviewthe‘no’toIraqasevidenceofthe

53Greathouse(2010),p.78.54A.Dalgaard-Nielsen,‘TheTestofStrategicCulture:Germany,PacifismandPre-emptiveStrikes,’SecurityDialogue36:3(2005),pp.339-359.55Ibid.,p.344.56Ibid.,pp.351-352.

32

emergenceof“amoreassertiveandindependentGermany,”57andtracesittoa

continuationofitspost-warpoliticalandstrategicculture.

Ontheotherhand,inacomparativestudybetweenAustraliaandNew-Zealand,David

McCrawexplorestheissueofchange/continuitybyanalysingthedevelopmentofthe

twostates’strategiccultures.Theauthorarguesthatastate’sstrategicculturehasits

“rootsinfundamentalinfluencessuchasgeopoliticalsetting,historyandpolitical

culture.”58Assuch,hesuggeststhatthedifferenthistoricalexperiencesanddomestic

environmentsoftwosimilaractorscanleadtodistinctstrategicpositions.In

Australia’scase,McCrawnoticesacontinuityofitsrealiststrategicculture,“whichis

permeatedwithaconcernaboutthedevelopmentofmilitarythreatstothecountry

andtheneedfordeterrentforceandallies.”59Incontrast,NewZealand’sgeographical

isolationandlackofhistoricalexperienceofexternalattacks–whichhadcausedthe

developmentofsecurity-relatedanxietiesinAustralia–ledtothedevelopmentofan

alternativeidealiststrategicculture,which“isanti-militaristandlooksforwaysto

resolvedisputesbynegotiationanddiplomacy.”60Asaresult,theneo-liberal

alternativereplacedthetraditionalAustralian-inspiredrealistvariantandisnowNew

Zealand’sdominantstrategicculture.61Again,McCrawdoesnotanalysetheprocesses

throughwhichthesepoliticalculturesdevelopedor,indeedthebroaderlinkto

Australian/NewZealanderidentities.However,hisstudyofgeo-politicallysimilar

actorsdoesshowthatcontinuityorchangeofculturesiscontextcontingentandthat

historicalnarratives,thoughenduring,areopentore-interpretation.

Finally,thebroadeningofthefieldofresearchofSC,aswellasitsventureinto

constructivism,mightultimatelyaddressasignificantissuewiththisschool–thelack

ofcasestudiesofminorpowersorsmallstates.Strategicculturalistshavetraditionally

showngreatinterestinanalysingtheuniqueculturesofgreatpowers,suchasthe

57Ibid.,p.340.58D.McCraw,‘ChangeandContinuityinStrategicCulture:theCasesofAustraliaandNewZealand,’AustralianJournalofInternationalAffairs65:2(2011),p.167.59Ibid.,p.174.60Ibid.,p.176.61Ibid.,p.182.

33

USA,62SovietUnion/Russia,63Germany,64orChina.65Lessattentionhasbeenpaidto

smallerstateswhosecapacitytoinfluencetheinternationalworldorderislimitedand

moredifficulttogauge.Arguably,arecognitionhasgenerallybeenlackingthatminor

powersmay,attheveryleast,bereactingtochangeswithintheinternationalsystem

inuniqueways,ifnotactivelyshapingit,andthatthereisutilityinstudyingtheir

behaviour.TherearethosewithinSC,however,whohavesettorectifythisgapinthe

research.Rasmussen,forinstance,arguesthat,byexaminingaminorstate,inhiscase

Denmark,onemayuncovercertaintruthsaboutthechangingworldorderthatwould

otherwisebehiddenfromus:“perhapstheaffairsofminorpowersbetterreflectthe

effectsofchangesinworldorderthanthoseofmajorpowersbecausewhileitisthe

majorpowersthatbringaboutchangesinworldorder,itistheminorpowersthatare

affectedbythechanges.”66

HisstudyrevealsthatDenmark’sperceptionsovertheuseofmilitaryforceafterthe

ColdWarhasbeenshapedbyculturalfactors,namelyadialoguebetweentwo

discourses–‘cosmopolitans’and‘defencists.’Hethereforerejectsthestructuralist

explanationforDenmark’sincreasedmilitaryactivismduringthe1990sthat“anystate

(…)hassomeinherenturgetoprojectmilitarypower,i.e.anurgethatmightbe

quelledbyoutsidepressure(…)butwhichwouldsurelyberevivedwhenthatpressure

disappeared.”67Insteadheoffersanagent-orientedanalysisofhowcosmopolitans–

whorejecttheuseofarmedforcesbutfordefensivepurposes–anddefencists–who

argueforastrongmilitarycapacity–foundcommongroundovertheutilityofusing

militaryforceinthepost-ColdWarenvironment.RasmussenarguesthattheDanish

strategicculturedebateshifted“fromwhetherforcewasusefulatalltothepurposes

thatforceshouldbeusedfor”andemphasised“‘activism,’whichsignifiesawillingness

tousemilitaryforceagainstwhatisperceivedasthenewthreattotheglobalised

world.”68Moreimportantly,hehighlightstheroleofagents,byarguingthattheir

62Mahnken(2009).63Herman(1996),Ermarth(2009).64Berger(1996),Daalgard-Nielsen(2005).65Johnston(1996).66M.V.Rasmussen,‘What’stheUseofIt?DanishStrategicCultureandtheUtilityofArmedForce,’CooperationandConflict:JournaloftheNordicInternationalStudiesAssociation40:1(2005),pp.68.67Ibid.,p.69.68Ibid.,p.82.

34

discoursewasbothshapingandbeingshapedbyanewpolicyorpracticeofactivism.

ForRasmussen,bothdiscourseandpracticeconstituteaculture;theendoftheCold

War‘unsettled’thebalancebetweenDanishdiscourseandpractice,and,Rasmussen

argues,theconsequencewouldeitherhavebeentheemergenceofanewculture,or

therefashioningoftheexistingoneinamannerinwhich“therelationshipsbetween

discoursesareredefinedtofitanewpractice.”69

BytracingtheevolutionofDanishstrategiccultureinthisway,theauthoruncoversa

continuityrootedinflexibilityandaculturewhich,whilstdeveloping,maintainsits

originalvalues.Therefore,Rasmussenshows,ontheonehand,thatthebehaviourof

smallstatescannotbeaccuratelyunderstoodsimplybycorrelationtomajorpowers,

asminoractorsaredrivenbydomesticandculturalfactorsasmuchastheyare

impactedbyexternalconditions.Secondly,heemphasisestheroleofagencyin

(re)shapingculture.Insodoing,however,Rasmussenalsopresentsadeeper

conceptionofculture/identity,questioningtraditionalconstructivistSCaccounts’focus

ondescribinghowagentsact,whilstignoringwhyandforwhatpurposecertain

coursesofactionwerepursued.Instead,thepracticetheoryheputsforwarddrawson

morecriticalstrandsofconstructivismandpoststructuralism,byincludingdiscourseas

wellaspracticeinthestudy.70Hisanalysisthereforeprovidesananalysisofagents’

interactionwiththediscursivestructureofstrategicculturebyexamininghownew

possibilitiesforaction“influenceandareinfluencedbyexistingdiscoursesonthe

country’splaceintheworld.”71Overall,Rasmussen’semphasisondiscourseand

agents’abilitytoemployitinadjustingthestrategicculturesoastofitandlegitimate

newpracticesshowsaconceptionofidentitywhichsetstheauthorapartfromthe

mainstreamWendt-inspiredculturalists.Indeed,thisapproachbringsRasmussen’s

studyclosertothoseincreasinglyadoptedinidentity-orientedFPA,suchasBrowning

andDoty.

Overall,theschoolofSChasdevelopedsignificantlyinbothnatureandscopeof

researchoverrecentyearsandthisthesisincorporatesmanyoftheseelements.It

69Ibid.,p.72.70Rasmussen(2005),p.71.71Ibid.

35

sharestheviewthatculture/identityissociallyconstructed,andexploresitsinfluence

inguidingthebehaviourofstates,intermsofeffectivelysettingprioritiesandred-

lines.Thebroadeningofthefieldfrommilitarystrategytoforeignpolicyisnecessary,

because,asDuffieldargued,thisallowstheresearchertostudytheimpactof

culture/identityoveravarietyofactionswhichgobeyondsolelytheuseofforce.

Secondly,thethesisacknowledgesthatre-evaluationsofcultures/identitiesarenot

onlypossible,butaconditionfortheirsurvival.Thirdly,itaddstotheincidenceof

studiesofminorpowersbyfocusingonRomania,astatewhichintraditionalaccounts

haslimitedfreedominsettingitsownforeignpolicyagenda.Whatisalsoclear,onthe

otherhand,isthatSCislargelydominatedbyWendt-inspiredweakconstructivismand

adoptsaconceptionofidentityinwhichthelatterisrendered,asDavidCampbellhas

noted,assomethingessentialised,72ineffectavariablethatcanbestudiedby

recoursetoaconventionalmethodology.73Inconsequence,thefocusismostoften

exclusivelyonhowacultureinfluencesbehaviour–i.e.ontheeffects–ratherthan

alsoonthesocialprocesseswhichhaveledtoitsdevelopment.Althoughthereexists

anacknowledgmentoftheroleofagentsinshapingculturesandidentities,rather

thansolelybeinginfluencedbythem,thislinkisrarelyexplored.Assuch,theinroads

madebyauthorssuchasRasmussen,whointerrogatetheroleofagentsinthe

developmentofidentitiesthroughbothdiscourseandpracticeareespecially

significant.Thethesiswillthereforeaimtoaddressthelimitationsofthisweak

constructivistperspectivebyarguingthatthestructuresofmeaningwhicharticulate

intoasenseofidentitymayindeedbecomesedimented,offeringthemparticular

stabilityandresiliencetochange.However,bytheirverynature,thesestructuresare

constitutedandsocialisedbyagentsthroughdiscourse.Assuch,treatingidentities

simplyasvariableseschewstheprocessesthroughwhichtheanswerstothequestions

‘whoweare,’‘whoourothersare,’etc.weredevelopedandcametobeacceptedas

trueatonepoint,and/orrejectedatanother.Incontrasttothisconstrictingapproach,

thethesis’adoptsadeeperconceptionofidentity,onewhichexamineshowagents

areshapedby,butalsothemselvesshape,identitiesthroughsocialprocesses.Inthis

view,thesedimentednatureandstabilityofparticularstructuresofmeaningcannot

72Campbell(1998),p.218.73Jeppersonetal(1996),p.67.

36

betakenasagiven;insteaditcanonlybeaccountedforbyexploringagents’

interactionwiththesestructures.

ForeignPolicyAnalysis(FPA)

Initsapproach,thethesisdrawsonadeeperconceptionofidentitywhichis

increasinglynoticeablewithintheschoolofFPA.ContrastingSC’straditionallynarrow

fieldofresearchandpreferredstructuralism,FPA,asthe“studyofconductand

practiceofrelationsbetweendifferentactors,primarilystates,intheinternational

system,”74isnaturallybroaderinscopeandprimarilyagent-oriented.Duetoits

interestinthedecision-makingprocessanditsvarioussourcesofinfluence,thisschool

fitstheagendaofthisthesis,inparticularitsmorecriticalconstructivist/postructuralist

strands.IthasbeenarguedthatconstructivismandatleastsomeFPAaccountsare

naturalbedfellows75and,accordingtoHoughton,therehasexisted“afocuson

subjectivity,theconstructionofmeaningandideationalfactors–asopposedto

supposedly‘objective’structures–[which]wasevidentinthestudyofforeignpolicy

decisionmakingfromthestart.”76OneoftheearlyseminalworksonFPA,Richard

Snyder(nottobeconfusedwithSC’sJackSnyder),BruckandSapin’sForeignPolicy

Decision-Making(1963)highlightstheinterplaybetweenactorsandtheenvironment

inwhichtheyfunction:

Itisdifficulttoseehowwecanaccountforspecificactionsandforcontinuitiesofpolicieswithouttryingtodiscoverhowtheiroperatingenvironmentisperceivedbythoseresponsibleofchoices,(…)whatmattersareselectedforattention,andhowtheirpastexperienceconditionspresentresponses.77

Moreimportantly,theyarguethatcultureisafeaturesharedbyallmembersofa

community,includingdecision-makersand,assuch,hasabearingonstateaction:"the

decision-makerentersthegovernmentfromthelargersocialsysteminwhichhealso

74C.AldenandA.Aran,ForeignPolicyAnalysis(London:Routledge,2013),p.1.75D.P.Houghton,‘ReinvigoratingtheStudyofForeignPolicyDecisionMaking:TowardaConstructivistApproach,’ForeignPolicyAnalysis3(2007),p.27.76Ibid.,p.31.77R.C.Snyder,H.W.BruckandB.Sapin,ForeignPolicyDecision-Making–AnApproachtotheStudyofInternationalPolitics2ndEdition(NewYork:TheFreePressofGlencoe,1963),p.5.

37

retainsmembership.Hecomestodecision-makingasa‘culturebearer.’Any

conceptualschemeforanalysingstatebehaviourmustattempttoaccountforthe

impactofculturalpatternsondecisions.”78Fromitsveryinception,therefore,FPAwas

concernedwithbothactors’subjectivityandthemannerinwhichtheiridentities

influencethedecision-makingprocess.However,asHoughtonpointsout,“this

dimensiontoFPAlaylargelydormantuntilthe1990s.”79Constructivistperspectives,

indeed,weresomewhatside-lined,as“thedominantapproachestoFPAshare[d]an

acceptanceofrationalismandamaterialistontology,”whichwere“particularlyclear

in(Neo)Realistaccountsoftheinternationalsystem.”80

Havingsaidthat,muchlikeinthecaseofSC,theendoftheColdWarsawaresurgence

ininterestforthestudyoftheinter-subjectivenatureofrealityand,consequentlythe

influenceofideationalfactorsonbehaviour.Hillarguesthatincreasinglyrelevantto

FPAistheconstructivistinspirednotionthat“identityiscentraltoourunderstanding

offoreignpolicy,and(often)viceversa”andthat“itsuseextend[s]FPA’sstandard

concernwiththedomesticsourcesofforeignpolicytotheareasofculture,including

nationalism,tradition,memoryandself-understanding.81Forhim,theincreasedfocus

onidentityislinkedtoaturntowardsconstructivismthat“representsan

epistemologicalchallengeinthesenseoftherenewedcriticismofpositivismthatit

implies(…).Itsuggeststhatforeignpolicycanbotharisefromaconstructednational

identityandbeconstitutiveofthatidentity.”82Thereisanacknowledgmentinthis

that,farfrombeingexogenouslygiven,identitybothshapesandisshapedbythe

discourseandpracticeofagents.Assuch,changesinidentitiesandvalues,aswellas

theforeignpolicytheyinfluencebecomesnotonlyapossibility,butoften,anecessity.

AldenandAran,forinstance,observethat“normsarecontingentandreinterpretedby

stateandnon-stateactorsovertime.Foreignpolicydecisionmakingisaprocessthat

evolvesandrespondstochangingconditionswithinthehallsofpolicyandthewider

78Ibid.,p.156.79Houghton(2007),p.32.80C.Browning,Constructivism,NarrativeandForeignPolicyAnalysis–aCaseStudyofFinland(Bern:PeterLang,2008),pp.19-20.81C.Hill,‘ForeignPolicyAnalysis,’inB.Badie,D.Berg-SchlosserandL.Morlino(eds.),InternationalEncyclopediaofPoliticalScience(London:Sage,2011),p.921.82Ibid.,p.922.

38

society.FPAshouldrecognizeasformativetheseconditionsofchange(…).”83They

arguethatconstructivism“providesacoherentsetofinsightsandanalysesofpractice

whichcoherewellwithcoreinterestsofFPAscholarship.”84Constructivismoffers,

therefore,awayofrevealingtheinterplaybetweenactorsandtheiridentities,how

theyareutilised,refashionedorreinforcedtolegitimateresponsesinthedomesticor

internationalenvironment.

ThisturninFPAmatchesthesimilardevelopmentwithinSC.Incontrasttotheweak

constructivismwhichdominatesculturalists,however,inFPAonenoticesamove

towardsamoreholistic,deeperconceptionofidentity.Firstly,thereexistsincreased

interestintotheprocessofdevelopmentofidentitiesandansweringquestionsrelated

towhycertainidentitieshaveevolvedinparticularways.Inthis,theroleofhistoryor

rather,thetellingofhistory,becomeskey.AsBreuningpointsout,historical

experienceisparamountintheshapingofculturesandidentities:“culturedenotesthe

setofvaluesthatistransmittedthroughtheteachingofnationalhistory.Attheheart

ofaculturearegeneralizedbeliefsandattitudesaboutone’sownstate,aboutother

states,andabouttheactualanddesirablerelationshipsbetweenthese.”85Asaresult,

studyingacultureoridentityentailsunderstandinghowmemoriesofthepast

influencepresentconcernsandhowthey“shapethesensibilitiesofleaders,interms

ofboththeirownreflexivereactionsandtheirperceptionsofwhattheirdomestic

publicwillaccept.”86History,orbetteryet,howhistoryisinterpreted,mattersinthe

constructionofidentities,which,inturn,matterintheconstructionofforeignpolicyas

wellasthemannerinwhichforeignpolicychoicesarerelayedorlegitimatedtothe

widerpublic.

BanerjeepicksuponthisandSnyderetal’snotionofdecision-makersasculture

bearersinhisstudyofthebehaviourofthetwosuperpowersduringtheColdWar.His

argumentisthat“culturemakesstatesnotonlyunitarydecision-makersbutintegrated

psychoculturalsubjectswithstate-levelidentities,emotions,causalbeliefs,and

83AldenandAran(2013),p.115.84Ibid.,p.116.85M.Breuning,ForeignPolicyAnalysis–aComparativeIntroduction(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2007),p.128.86Ibid.,pp.128-129

39

motives.”87Actorsareseennotas“individualpsychologicalsubjectsbutascarriersand

coauthors(sic)ofculturesanddiscoursesthatgainacoherentexistenceoutsideany

oneperson.”88Specifically,Banerjeearguesthatcultureguidestheactionsofactorsby

providingthemwithbehaviouralscriptsorhistoricalstructures.Agentslearnfromthe

past,constructingpatternsofresponsetospecificcircumstanceswhicharerepeatedin

futuresimilarsituations:“historicalstructuresareviewed(…)asself-perpetuating

systemsofbeliefs,motives,andactionsofinteractinggroups.Theyarerepetitive

patternsofcollectiveactionthatreinforceandareanimatedbyenduringpatternsof

culturalbelief.”89TheseculturalbeliefsarerootedindescriptionsoftheSelfand

Othersincertainhistoricalcontexts,implyingthattheSelf-Othercontrastsbecome

entrenchedandcertaincircumstancestriggerparticulartypesofbehaviour:“agroup

ofstateleaderswhoshareaculturewillrespondtoeventsdeemedbythatcultureto

implicatetheirstatewithcommonperceptions,causalattributions,emotions,and

motives.”90Overall,Banerjeeseesagencyandstructureasmutuallyconstituted,with

culturesprovidingactorsablueprintforaction,whichactorsthenreinforcethrough

theirbehaviour.Continuityofculturalpatternsofbehaviouristhereforeahallmarkof

Banerjee’smodelanditimplies,toadegree,thatculturelimitstheavenuesforaction

totheprescribedscript.

However,perhapsthemostradicalmoveintheconceptualisationofidentitywithin

FPAandIRmorebroadlyisofferedbycriticalconstructivistsandpoststructuralists.In

contrasttoweakconstructivistswho,aswehaveseen,makecertainconcessionsto

rationalist-materialistapproaches,theseauthorstaketheissueoftheconstructionof

socialrealitymostseriously,questioningthenotionoftheexistenceofamaterial

world,atleastinsofarasobjective,unmediatedknowledgeofthisrealityispossible.

Whereassomeofthetheoristsreferredtointhissectionmayidentifythemselvesas

poststructuralistsorconstructivists,whatbringstheirtheoriestogetherareanumber

87S.Banerjee,‘ReproductionofSubjectsinHistoricalStudies:Attribution,IdentityandEmotionontheEarlyColdWar,’InternationalStudiesQuarterly35:1(1991),pp.19-20.88Ibid.,p.20.89Ibid.,p.23.90Ibid.,p.20.

40

offundamentalassumptionsonhowtoapproachthestudyofidentityandafocuson

themannerinwhichtheyareconstitutedandalteredbyagents.

Firstly,thereexistsarecognitionthatwhotheSelfisisnotsomethingthatcanbe

takenforgrantedoressentialised.BecausetheimageoftheSelfisproducedinternally

throughsocialprocessesanytheorytreatingidentityasaunitary,stableandeasily

intelligiblefromtheoutsideeschewsthecomplexityinvolvedintheconstructionof

theSelf.AsZehfusspointsoutinhercriticismofWendt,thenotionofapre-given

corporateidentitydoesnottakeintoaccountthevariousdebatesaboutwhotheSelf

shouldbe,91whichtakeplacedomestically,adimensionbracketedinhisinquiry.

Zehfussdrawsattentiontothefactthat,inhercasestudyofGermanidentity,“a

numberofdifferentrepresentations(…)werearticulatedwithintheFRG.Hencethe

questionofwhatidentityistobeattachedtothenotionof‘German’or‘Germany’was

acontestedissuenotonlybetweentheFRGanditssignificantothers.”92Therefore,

theprocessesthroughwhichanswerstothequestion‘whoweare?’areproduced,

reproducedorcontestedarekeyinunderstandingstateidentities.Thesedonotsimply

exist,butareinstead“emergentaspartofanongoingperformancereaffirming

subjectivityandidentity.”93Actorsconstructstoriesaboutwhotheyare,intheprocess

ofwhichtheynecessarilycreateaparticularrepresentationoftherealmwithinwhich

theyfunction,andtheotherstheycomeincontactwith.Atthesametime,these

stories,ornarratives,createinterestsandhavethepowertolegitimatecertaincourses

ofaction,whilstmakingothersimpossible.94Identityandforeignpolicy,therefore,are

inextricablylinked,asforeignpolicyreflectsaparticularrepresentationoftheSelfand

itsinterests.Ontheotherhand,withidentityunderstoodasperformance,foreign

policybecomesameansof(re)constitutingtheSelfasasubject.95

Inthisconceptionofidentity,moreover,discourseorlanguageiscentraltothe

constitutionoftheSelf.AsBrowningnotes,“ifweaccepttheconstructivistviewof

91Zehfuss(2006),p.107.92Ibid.93Browning(2008),p.45.94R.L.Doty,‘ForeignPolicyasSocialConstruction:APost-PositivistAnalysisofUsCounterinsurgencyPolicyinthePhilippines,’InternationalStudiesQuarterly37(1993).95Browning(2008),p.45.Author’sownemphasis.

41

language,thenitfollowsthatadescriptioncanneversimplyclaimtobediscovering

theessenceofsocialreality,butisalsoengagedincreatingandconstitutingit.”96A

specifictellingofidentity,then,hassignificantconstitutivepower,becauseby

presentingastoryasfacts–‘thisiswhoweare,’‘theseareourothers’–iteffectively

makesthemreal.Campbell,forinstance,arguesthat“identityfunctionswithin

discourse,butinsodoing,ittransgressesanderasesthediscursive/extradiscursive

distinction.”97Inotherwords,itisonlythroughdiscoursethatwemaycomprehend

andbringnon-linguisticphenomenaintobeing.98BydrawingonDerrida,Zehfuss

makesasimilarpointontheconstitutivepowerofidentitynarrativesthat,contraryto

mainstreamaccounts,thedistinctionbetweenrealityanditsrepresentationsisnot

clearcut,99becauseweallalreadyfunctionwithinthisrealityandcannotmakesense

ofitexceptthroughourinterpretations.100Asaresult,shecontinues,“ifthe‘real’is

notnatural,ifwecannotevergobacktoadefinitiveorigin,thenanyclaimtoanorigin

willneedtobequestioned.Narrativesofidentitystartsomewhere.Theyclaim

possessionofanorigin.”101Anidentitynarrative,therefore,buildscontext.Itprovides,

importantly,anorderingandinterpretationofthepastwhichlegitimatesaparticular

representationoftheSelf.AsCampbellnotes,thenarrativisingofhistorymediates

betweenpastandpresentbyconferringontohistoricaleventsandrelationshipswith

othersmeaningswhichmakethepresentworldintelligibletous.102AsBrowning

furtherargues,throughthesestoriesaboutthepastitbecomespossibleto

“understandthesituationswefacetodayandtotellourselveswhatkindofpersonwe

were,areandwillbe.”103Thetellingofhistory,therefore,becomescriticalasthemain

vehiclethroughwhichaparticularrepresentationoftheSelfisconstructedand

socialised.Consequently,anidentitynarrativecreatesnotonlythecurrentsocial

reality,butentailsalsoa(re)constitutionofthepastand,inthisconception,identity

96Ibid.,p.42.97D.Campbell(a),NationalDeconstruction–Violence,Identity,andJusticeinBosnia(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinneapolisPress,1998),p.25.98Ibid.99M.Zehfuss,ConstructivisminInternationalRelations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),p.246.100Ibid.,p.256.101Ibid.,p.246.102Campbell(a)(1998),p.34.103Browning(2008),p.47.

42

constructionisrevealedasamuchmorecomplexprocessthanmainstreamorweak

constructivistaccountswouldallow.Itisthislinktothetellingofhistory,that‘whowe

were’hassignificantbearingon‘whoweare,’whichgivestheidentitynarrativeits

depth.Withoutit,asaresult,identityremainsepiphenomenaland,toacertainextent,

hollow.

Afinalpointonthisconceptionofidentityreferstothesignificanceoftheprocessof

differentiationentailedintheconstructionofSelf.AsBrowningargues,“fundamental

tonarrativeisanexplicitconcernwithachievingaself-constitutionthrough

differentiatingtheselffromothers.”104Inotherwords,thecreationoftheSelfis

achievedinrelationtoOthers,whichprovidesboththeboundariesoftheSelf–whois

inandwhoisout–and,importantly,itscharacteristics–‘howweare’aswellas‘how

wearenot.’Becauseofthis,asCampbellnotes,theconceptsofidentityanddifference

aremutuallyconstituted.105TheOther,therefore,becomesanessentialelementofthe

Self,asanyeffortatestablishingindividualityandidentityentailsframingtheactorvis-

à-visOthers.Inthisview,delineationfromOthersisan“activeandongoingpartof

identityformation.”106Havingsaidthat,asWaeverandHansenpointout,the

Self/Othernexusisnotalwaysnecessarilyantagonistic.Theyarguethat“difference

onlycollapsesintooppositioninspecialsituations”andthat,“inadditiontoOthers

(castasradicallydifferentandpotentiallythreateningenemies)thereare,forinstance,

friendsandrelatives.”107Thefocusofidentitystudies,asNeumannargued,should

thereforebeon“howtheseboundaries,”orlackthereof,“comeintoexistenceandare

maintained.”108

WithinFPA,aseminalworkemphasizingtheconstitutivepowerofdiscourseinthe

processofotheringisthatofRoxanneDotyandherstudyoftheUS’counterinsurgency

policytowardsthePhilippines.ShecriticisestraditionalFPAaccountsofstate

104Ibid.,p.49.105D.Campbell(b),WritingSecurity–UnitedStatesForeignPolicyandthePoliticsofIdentityRevisedEdition(Manchester:EireandEurope,1998revisededition,original1992),p.9.106Neumann(1995),p.28.107Waever,O.,‘Identities,CommunitiesandForeignPolicy:DiscourseAnalysisasForeignPolicyTheory,’inL.HansenandO.Waever(eds.),EuropeanIntegrationandNationalIdentity–TheChallengeoftheNordicStates(London:Routledge,2002),p.24.108Neumann(1995),p.28.

43

behaviour,notingthattheyarepredominantly“concernedwithexplainingwhy

particulardecisionsresultinginspecificcoursesofactionweremade;”109inother

words,theyfocusonansweringwhyquestions,ortoprovethataspecificactionwas

predictableinagivensituation.110However,inherview,thistypeofanalysespreclude

adiscussionofwhyandwhichcertaintypesofbehaviourcouldbeundertaken.Doty’s

studyexploreshow-possiblequestions,byexamining“howmeaningsareproduced

andattachedtovarioussocialsubjects/objects,thusconstitutingparticular

interpretivedispositionswhichcreatecertainpossibilitiesandprecludeothers.”111

Consequently,“whatisexplainedisnotwhyaparticularoutcomeobtained,butrather

howthesubjects,objects,andinterpretivedispositionsweresociallyconstructedsuch

thatcertainpracticesweremadepossible.”112Onenoticesheresignificantsimilarities

betweenthisstudyandRasmussen’swork,asittoofocusesontheconstructivepower

ofdiscourse,whichmaybeusedtolegitimatecertainpractices–inthiscase,Doty

showshowtheUSconstructedanimageofthePhilippinesthatjustifiedan

interventionwhichwouldotherwisehavebeenimpossibleifthestatewereviewedas

asovereignequal.ForDoty,theemphasisisonthe“linguisticconstructionof

reality,”113whichmeansthattheportrayaloftheSelfandOthersinparticular

situationsisfluidandopentoreinterpretation.Thisstudythereforeemphasisesthe

constructednatureofsubjectiverealitiesandagents’roleinshapingthem.As,

ChristopherBrowninghasargued,“‘how’questionsproblematizetheverybasesof

‘why’questionsbyanalysingthesociallyconstructedbeliefs,symbolsandmythswhich

underliedominantclaimstorationality.”114Furthermore,becauseitisinthepowerof

agentstoaltertheserealities,constructivistFPAstudiesmustacknowledgethatthe

systemsofmeaningattachedtotheSelfandOtherswhichundergirdpoliciescan

alwaysbechanged,consequentlyleadingtoanalterationofthepoliciesthemselves.

Drawingonthisinsight,CosandBilginexamineTurkey’sconstructionoftheSoviet

Other,namelythefactthattheportrayaloftheSovietUnionshiftedfromfriendtofoe

109Doty(1993),p.298.110Ibid.111Ibid.112Ibid.113Ibid.,p.302.114Browning(2008),p.22.

44

aftertheSecondWorldWar.115TheybuildonDoty’show-possibleapproachtoshow

how,throughvariousportrayalsoftheSelfandOther,identitiesandinterestslinkedto

themareconstructed.116Theimportanceofdiscourseinthisprocessisalso

highlighted:“dominantdiscourses,throughrepresentationsofthe‘self’andthe

‘other,’constructa‘commonsense’thatpredefineswhatis‘intelligible’and‘rational’

courseofactionandwhatisnot.”117Asaresult,discourseactsasan

“enabler/limiter”118offoreignpolicychoice.CosandBilginusethisframeworkto

exploreTurkey’sotheringofTsarist/SovietRussia,theimageofwhichdeveloped,ina

fewdecades,from‘TsaristRussia,therival,’to‘SovietRussia,thesincerefriend,’and,

finally,to‘SovietRussia,theexpansionistthreat’after1945.119ByportrayingSoviet

Russiaasanexistentialthreat,Turkey’spro-Western,andparticularly,pro-American

foreignpolicydirectionwastherebylegitimated.Theauthorsshowhowtheidentityof

anOthermayberecastinthecontextofchangingcircumstancesand,insodoing,they

revealtheconnectionbetweenrepresentationsoftheSelf/Otherandnational

identitiesandinterests:analterationoftheimageofanOtheris,atthesametime,a

consequenceofachangeinnationalidentityandinterests,andareinforcementof

them.

Finally,whilstCosandBilginareconcernedprimarilywiththeconstructionofOthers’

identities,Browningprovidesacomprehensivestudyofhowcriticalconstructivismand

Doty’show-possibleapproachmaybeemployedintheexaminationofportrayalsof

theSelfandtheirimpactonforeignpolicy.Placingthesocialprocessesthroughwhich

subjectivityisconstitutedattheheartofhisanalysis,Browningputsforwarda

narrativetheoryofidentity,“whichseekstoshowhowactionbecomesmeaningfulin

theprocessofnarratingconstitutivestoriesoftheself.”120Hearguesthat“identities

(andtheintereststhatflowfromthem)arenotahistoricalandfixed,butareunstable

andinconstantneedofre-affirmationandre-constructioninviewofunfoldingevents

115K.CosandP.Bilgin,‘Stalin’sDemands:Constructionofthe‘SovietOther’inTurkey’sForeignPolicy,1919-1945,’ForeignPolicyAnalysis6(2010),pp.43-60.116Ibid.,p.46.117Ibid.118Ibid.119Ibid.,pp.57-58.120Browning(2008),p.45.

45

anddevelopingrelationships.”121Browninghighlightsthecontinuousdialogue

betweenagentsandthestructureofidentitynarratives,emphasisingthatisthrough

storiesaboutwhowearethatweareabletoattachmeaningtothesocialworldand

makesenseofourplaceontheinternationalstage.Inthisview,theSelf/Othernexus

becomeskeytotheconstitutionoftheSelf:“in[the]processofstorytelling,the

storytellingsubjectpositionsvariousevents,incidentsandactors(includingitself)ina

frameworkofnegativeandpositiverelationships.”122Drawingoncriticalconstructivist

andpoststructuralistapproachtoidentityconstruction,theauthorexploresthe

processesofconstitutingtheSelfinrelationtoOthersthroughnarratives,andhow,in

hiscasestudyofFinland,“particularconceptsandidentitymarkershaveemerged”but

also“howtheirinterpretationandmeaninghaschangedanddevelopedasFinnshave

soughttopositionthemselvesintheworldthroughtime.”123Inhisapproach,identity

isfluid,malleable,andmultiplenarrativescanexistatanyonetime,eachwithitsown

degreeofsalienceandtraction.

Similarlytothisproject,BrowningidentifiesrecurringthemesofFinnishidentitywhich

have,eitherontheirownorinvariouscombinations,shapedthedominantidentity

narrativeatdifferentpointsintime,suchas“Nordicity,Europeanness,theBaltic,

Russia,neutrality,sovereignty,unity,sizeandpragmatism,aswellashowFinlandhas

beenvariouslypositionedalongtheEast-Westcontinuum.”124Ontheotherhand,

whilstemphasisingthenecessitythatidentitynarrativesarechallengedand

reinterpretedovertime,withmultiplethemesbeinginplayatanygivenmoment,“itis

alsothecasethatacrossdifferentperiodsacertainamountofsedimentationof

particularnarrativestructuresbecomesevident.”125Inthis,Browningacknowledges

thatcertainidentitythemesmaybecomeentrenchedmakingthemincreasingly

resilienttoagents’attemptsattheirmarginalization.Therefore,continuity,aswellas

change,ispossible.

121Browning(2008),p.11.122Ibid.,p.46.123Ibid.,p.14.124Ibid.125Ibid.,pp.14-15.

46

Ontheotherhand,Browningalsoarguesthat,foracertainnarrativeofidentityto

fulfilitsfunction,itmustbesocialisedsoasto“createacrossagroupofpeoplea

feelingofasharednationalexperienceandcommonidentity.”126Inthisthe

constructionofahistoricalnarrativeiscrucial.Inasense,thispositionpicksupon

Breuning’sconnectionbetweenidentityandhistory,butreversesthecausal

relationship:“presentconcernsandconflictstendtoreceiveanhistoricalprojection,

aspresentrepresentationsoftheselfandofothersandtherelationshipsentailed,are

givenhistoricalvaliditythroughselectivenarrativesthatimplythatithasalwaysbeen

so.”127Theroleofhistoricalnarrativesisthereforeeithertobuttressacertain

conceptionofidentityortoreconstituteittofitcontemporaneousinterestsand

alteringSelf-Otherrelations.ThisperspectivecontrastsBreuningandBanerjee’s

positionthathistoricalstructuresareenduringandlimitorshapeagents’identities

andactions;inhisnarrativetheoryofidentitytheagent-structurerelationshipis

decidedlytiltedintheagency’sfavour.

Finally,Browning’sstudyhasanadditionalsignificanceinthecontextofthisthesis,

namelythathisaccountsimilarlyfocusesontheidentitypoliticsofaminorstate.Ina

separatearticletheauthorchallengesmainstreamFPA’sfocusonmajorpowersand

therealitythat“smallstatesarefrequentlyignored,theviewbeingthatultimately

theyhavetogoalongwiththeframesdictatedbylarger,morepowerfulstates.”128

SimilarlytoRasmussen,Browningrejectsneorealistassumptionsthatsmallstateshave

littlefreedominpursuinganidentity-drivenforeignpolicyagendabecausethe

pressuresoftheinternationalsystemaretoostrongfordomesticfactorstobearany

meaningfulinfluence.129Instead,Browningarguesthatwhatoffersorlimitssmall

states’opportunitiesformanoeuvreisthemannerinwhich‘smallness’isfedintothe

identitynarrative:ifitisportrayedasaweaknessorasrestrictingthestate’scapacity

foraction,“thenthiswillaffecthowstateinterestsandpossibilitiesforactionare

conceived.Incontrast,morepositiverenderingsofsmallnessinconstructingstate

126Ibid.,p.52.127Ibid.,p.54.128C.Browning,‘Small,SmartandSalient?RethinkingIdentityinSmallStatesLiterature,’CambridgeReviewofInternationalAffairs19:4(2006),p.669.129Ibid.,p.671.

47

identitieswillentailbroaderpossibilitiesforforeignpolicies.”130Asaresult,studying

smallstatesisaworthwhileexercisebecausetheseactorspossessthecapacitytocast

their‘smallness’inwayswhicharerelevanttotheirforeignpolicybehaviour.

Browning’scasestudy,therefore,hasasimilarscopetothepresentthesisand,

althoughtherearesomedifferencesintheirapproaches,hisworkremainsan

importantreferencepointforit.

Overall,FPA,muchlikeSC,hasdevelopedinadirectionwhichsuitsthepurposesof

thisproject.Theacknowledgmentofidentityasadomesticfactorwhichinfluencesthe

foreignpolicydecision-makingprocesshasbeenfacilitatedbytheadoptionof

constructivistapproaches.Moreover,initscriticalconstructivist/postructuralist

strands,wehaveseenamovetowardssomeradicalclaimsaboutthenatureof

identitiesandtheroleofsocialprocessesintheirconstitutionanddevelopment.This

projectpicksupmanyoftheassumptionsandtypesofargumentmadebythese

theories.Firstly,themutuallyconstitutivenatureofagentsas‘culturebearers’and

identitiesiscriticaltothisthesis.Onthispoint,FPA,withitsagent-orientedagenda,

offersacontrastingperspectivetothatofthestructure-focusedSC.However,even

withinFPA,ashasbeenshown,therearedifferentpositionsonwherethebalancelies

withinthisrelationship,fromBreuningandBanerjee’sargumentsthathistorical

structureshaveanenduringqualitywhichlimitsorshapesagents’coursesofaction,to

identity-as-performancetheoriesinwhich“theselfisalwaysfreetonarrate

differently,tochangethestory.”131Ontheagent-structuredebate,aswillbediscussed

presently,thethesiswillpositionitselfinthemiddlegroundbyarguingthat,whilstas

socialconstructsstructuresofmeaningmayalwaysbealtered,themoresedimented

andentrenchedtheyarethemoredifficultthesestructuresbecometodisplace.

Havingsaidthat,thepremisesofthisprojectowemuchtocriticalconstructivistand

postructuralistworkonidentity.Oneoftheseisacknowledgingtheimportanceof

discourseintheprocessofconstitutingtheSelf.Itisthroughstories,ornarrativeson

‘whoweare’thatagentsareabletogenerateasenseofcollectiveidentity,

understandtheenvironmentinwhichtheyfunctionandattachmeaningtocertain

130Ibid.,p.674.131Browning(2008),p.58.

48

coursesofaction.Moreover,theprojectarguesthatnarrativesnotonlycreatea

currentsubjectiverealitybutalsoconstitutethepastinamannerwhichlegitimisesa

particularrepresentationoftheSelf.Historicalnarrativesthereforebecomeavehicle

forthesocialisationandsedimentationofspecificidentitynarrativesandtheinterests

whicharederivedfromthem.Furthermore,thethesisdrawsonthenotionthatinthe

processofestablishing‘whoweare,’agentsarealsoinherentlyoutlining‘whoweare

not.’Assuch,theprocessofdifferentiationfromOthersisvitaltotheconstitutionof

theSelf–identitynarrativescreate,bytheirverynature,threateningorfriendly

Others,butalso,aswillbeshowninthecaseofRomania,EstrangedSelves.Finally,

addingtotheincidenceofstudiesontheforeignpolicyofsmallstates,thisproject

takesasimilarviewtoBrowningontheutilityofexpandingtheagendainthisdirection

andtakingadvantageoftheexplanatorycapacityofconstructivistapproaches,in

contrasttothelimitedabilityofrationalist-materialistavenuestoaccountforthe

foreignpolicydifferencesbetweenminorpowers.

LimitationsofSCandFPAandtheContributionofthisThesistotheField

Thereis,therefore,anoverlapbetweenSCandFPAanditiswithinthisfieldthatthe

presentprojectfits.BothSCandFPAfeatureconstructivistapproachestothestudyof

stateaction.Furthermore,constructivismhasallowedtwoschoolswhichtraditionally

adoptdifferentstancesontheagency-structuredebatetomeetinthemiddle,atleast

toacertainextent;forSC,thishasmeantmoreattentionbeingpaidtoactors’capacity

toaltertheirstrategiccultureinthechangingenvironment,whilstforFPAithas

involvedaccountingforthepossibilitythatitisnotonlythatagentsshapethe

structure,butthathistoricalnarrativesandidentitiesalsoshapeactors.Thisoverlap

hasoccurredbecauseSC,whichhasculture/identityatitsheartthroughout,has

expandeditsresearchfromtherathernarrowinterestinthecultureoftheuseof

force,intothebroaderfieldofpoliticalandnationalculture.ForFPA,ontheother

hand,thecrucialshiftwasinincludingidentityintherangeofdomesticfactorswhich

haveanimpactonforeignpolicy.Finally,bothfieldshaveexpandedtheirresearchinto

thestudyofsmallstates,goingagainstthetraditionalfocusonthebehaviourofmajor

powers.However,thereexistalsosomeimportantdifferencesbetweenthesetwo

49

traditions,especiallyintermsoftheirapproachtothestudyofidentityand,generally,

therelationshipbetweenagencyandstructure.Theaimofthisthesisistofinda

middlepathwhichbringstheseapproachestogetherand,insodoing,providea

frameworkforresearchingtheinfluenceofidentityonthebehaviourofstateswhichis

sensitivetoallthecomplexitiesinvolvedinthedevelopmentofidentities.

SCandtheStudyofIdentity

Forthepurposesofthisproject,themostimportantlimitationofSCistobefoundin

themannerinwhichidentityisconceptualizedandstudied.Ashasalreadybeen

outlined,bydrawingonweakconstructivistclaimsaboutthenatureofsocialreality,

SCtendstotreatidentitiesinanessentialistmanner,asvariableswhichserveto

explainparticularpatternsofbehaviour.Thereexists,onewouldargue,alargely

exclusivefocusondescribingthecontentofcultures,whilstthesocialprocesses

throughwhichtheyareconstitutedinthefirstplacearenotinvestigated.Inhisstudy

ofGermanyandJapan,forinstance,Bergerdoesnotengagewiththeprocessofhow

thepost-waridentitiesdevelopedbutlimitshimselftoexploringhowtheyimpacted

onthetwostates’strategicculture.132ThisfactispickedupbyKatzensteininthe

conclusiontothevolume:“theempiricalessayshavelittletosayaboutthemannerby

whichcollectiveidentitiesandnormsareconstructedthroughdifferentgenerative

processes:ecological,socialandinternal.”133ThesamecouldbesaidofErmarth’s

studyofRussianstrategiccultureorDalgaard-Nielsen’saccountofGermany–neither

examinethedeeperculturalmeaningsattachedtothepositionsoutlined,orthe

processeswhichhaveledtotheirdevelopment.134Overall,mostSCstudiestendtobe

concernedsolelywiththeimpactofidentityonbehaviour,whilstitssourcesand

evolutionarepredominantlybracketed;incidentally,thismirrorsDoty’scriticismof

mainstreamFPA.Thefocustendstobeonwhyratherthanhowquestions,whichis

132Berger(1996),pp.317-356.133J.Katzenstein(a),‘Conclusion,’inP.Katzenstein(ed.),TheCultureofNationalSecurity–NormsandIdentityinWorldPolitics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),p.513.134Ermarth(2009),Dalgaard-Nielsen(2005).

50

moreproblematicforSCthanitisforFPA,preciselybecauseculture/identityisitscore

concern.

PickinguponacriticismleviedbyZehfussagainstWendtwhichcanbeappliedto

strategicculturalistsalso,“theexclusionof(…)domesticprocessesofarticulationof

stateidentityarepartoftheproblem.”135Theissuewiththisapproachtothestudyof

identityisthat,bynotexamininghoworwhyaspecificactorhascometodevelopa

specificidentity,thesubjectiverationaleforactiontheidentitygeneratesremains

underdetermined.Whatweareleftwithisaschematicrepresentationofstate

identitiesandinterestswhichmayexplaincertainbehaviours,butnotall.AsWaever

andHansenpointout,thetheory“isunabletoexplaininasystematicway–beyond

historicalnarrative–whythesameculturalandhistoricalbackgroundcansustain

highlycontradictoryforeignpolicies,ortoexplainchange,especiallydiscontinuous

change.”136Whilstacknowledgingthatchangesinbothidentityand,consequently,

policyarepossible,SC’sweakconstructivismdoesnotprovideanadequateframework

foritsinvestigation.Inotherwords,tounderstandthefullspectrumofbehaviours

whichmayberenderedaslegitimateorillegitimate,necessaryorimpossibleata

specificmomentintime,adifferentapproachtothestudyofidentityisneeded.Most

importantly,thisapproachmustinterrogateseriouslytheroleofagencyinidentity

construction,anissueonwhichSCrarelytouchesupon.

Anavenueforaddressingthislimitationisofferedbycriticalconstructivistsand

poststructuralistswhoplacesocialprocessesattheverycoreoftheiranalysis.

Understandingidentitiesasbeingarticulatedthroughdiscoursehighlightsthe

importanceofnarrativestoidentityconstitution.Whatiskeyisthatdescribing

identitiesisinsufficienttograspingtheirinfluenceonbehaviourbecauseidentitiesare

notgeneratedoutofthinair.Theyaresubjectiveconstructswhichprovideanswersto

criticalquestionsregardingthenatureoftheSelfandthemannerinwhichitrelatesto

theoutsideworld,whichisitselfcreatedintheprocessofconstitutingtheSelf.

Therefore,examininghowevents,bothpastandpresentareperceivedbyagentsand

135Zehfuss(2006),p.111.136Waever(2002),p.22.

51

howstoriesabouttheSelfarereinforcedorchallengedataparticularmomentintime

isvitaltoexplainingachangeorcontinuityinbehaviour.Moreover,becausemultiple

answerstothesamequestionsof‘whoweare’or‘whatthiseventmeans’are

possible,thestabilityandunitarycharacterofidentitiesneedstobeprovenandnot

takenforgranted,asisthecasewiththevastmajorityofSCstudies.Consequently,the

projectwilldrawontheinsightsprovidedbycriticalconstructivistsandpostructuralists

toshownotonlyhowstoriesaboutRomanianidentityinfluencethestate’sbehaviour,

butalsohowthefeaturesoftheidentitynarrativewhichshapeforeignpolicypriorities

haveemergedandacquiredgreatstayingpower.Theprojectwillidentifytherecurring

themesofRomanianidentity–similarlytoBrowning’sexercise–andplacethemin

historicalcontext,tracinghowthenarrativesurroundingthemhasbeenadaptedor

reinforcedatkeymomentsinthestate’sevolution.Thebenefitofthishistorical

perspectiveisthatitcapturesthemutuallyconstitutivenatureofstoriesofnational

identityandhistory;ontheonehand,theportrayaloftheSelfandOthersisreflected

inthenarrativeofRomania’shistory;meanwhile,thehistoricalnarrativeactsasan

instrumentforthesocialisationoftheseportrayals.Thisapproachoffersanavenue

intounderstandingthecontinuityorchangeofnationalidentitynarrativesand,

consequently,behaviour,bylinkingittothedialoguebetweentheagents–Romanians

–andthestructure–theidentitynarrative–throughthetellingofnationalhistory.

TheAgent-StructureDebate

Drawingonthepointabove,thenextnecessarystepisoutliningthethesis’positionon

thequestionoftherelationshipbetweenagencyandstructure.Ashasbeenpreviously

examined,SCandFPAtraditionallytakecontrastingviewsonthematter,withthe

formerpredominantlystructuralistandthelatteragent-oriented.Although

constructivismhas,toacertainextent,bridgedthisgap,differencesinapproach

remain.Aswehaveseen,SCtendstofavourstructureoveragency.Thisisevident,for

instance,intheworkofKatzensteinetal,who“areinterestedinhowstructuresof

constructedmeaning,embodiedinnormsoridentities,affectwhatstatesdo.”137

ThereisanobviousconnectioninthispositiontoSC’sweakconstructivismandtheir

137Jeppersonetal(1996),p.66.

52

lackofconcernwiththeprocessesinvolvedin(re)constitutingidentitiesrootedina

predilectiontowardsposingwhyratherthanhowquestions.Animportantexception

tothistrendisrepresentedbyRasmussen’sstudyofDanishdiscourseonmilitary

strategybut,ashasbeennoted,heisheavilyinfluencedbycritical

constructivist/postructuralistworkonidentity.HisapproachmatchesthatofFPA

authorssuchasDoty,CosandBilginandBrowningwhosimilarlyfocusonagents’

discursiveconstructionoftheSelfandOthers.However,outsideofcritical

constructivist/postructuraliststudies,withinFPAtherealsoexistsmovementonthis

debate,withauthorssuchasBanerjeeorSnyderetal,forinstance,allowingfora

greaterdegreeofimpactofculturalstructuresovertheagent.

Asforthisproject,takingintoaccountthecriticalassumptionsregardingthe

importanceofsocialprocessesinthegenerationofidentitynarratives,itfollowsthat

SC’sthoroughgoingstructuralismmustberejected.Thethesisunderstandsaparticular

representationoftheSelfasbeingarticulatedthroughnarrativeand,insodoing,

acknowledgesthatagentscananddointeractwiththestructureinmeaningfulways.

Inaneverchanginginternationalanddomesticenvironments,thenatureandprecepts

ofstoriesofnationalidentityareunderconstantscrutinyandpressure.Whenthe

contextchanges,whenaperceptionemergesthatathreathasemergedor

disappeared,there-evaluationofcertainidentitarytenetsmaybenecessary.Inthis

sense,theprojectagreeswithBrowning’sassertionthatcertainnarrativesofidentity

maygainsalienceandbecomeentrenchedorbemarginalisedovertime,138andinthis

theroleofagentsisparamount.Thetwoparticularsuchinstancesthisthesiswillfocus

onaretheinteractionofNicolaeCeausescuandIonIliescuwiththeRomanianidentity

narrativeduringthecommunistperiodanditsaftermath.However,thefreedom

awardedtoagentsinalteringidentitynarrativesorcomingupwithnewones

noticeableinmuchofcriticalconstructivist/postructuralistworkisslightlyproblematic.

Forinstance,inDoty’sexaminationoftheUScounterinsurgencyofthePhilippines,she

examineshow“thesubjects,objects,andinterpretivedispositionsweresocially

constructed”139insuchawaythataninterventionwhichwouldhavebeenillegitimate

138Browning(2008),p.16.139Doty(1993),p.298.

53

ifthePhilippineswererepresentedasasovereignequalwasmadepossible.Inthis

case,theagent,theUS,hadcompletefreedomtoconstitutethesubjectofPhilippines,

anOther,intoanentityagainstwhomactionwasjustified.ForBrowning,too,identity

asperformancemeansthat“theconstitutionoftheselfisalwaysinprocess,and

alwaysopentochangeanddevelopment.”140Inthisview,“multiplenarrativesof

identityarealwaysinplay,eachwithvaryingconstitutiveeffectsandpower.”141Again,

agentsplayacriticalroleindeterminingwhichrepresentationoftheSelfbecomes

dominantandhowandwhenitischallengedbydevelopingandbringingintoplay

alternativenarratives.

Onequestions,however,whetherthesepositionsaccuratelyreflectthebalance

betweenagencyandstructure.Moreover,ifagentshaveanunhinderedabilitytoalter

thestructuresofidentitynarratives,thenthereisnopossiblewayinwhichthelatter

mayinfluencetheformerintermsofbehaviour,whichwouldrenderthisproject

purposeless.Instead,thisthesisproposesthatstructuresofidentitynarrativesmay

acquireacertaindegreeofresilienceand,insodoing,limitagents’abilitytomodify

them,especiallyindrasticways.Atthesametimeasbeingresilienttochange,these

structureswillhaveanimpactonthebehaviourofactors,bymakingcertaincoursesof

actionpossibleandothersimpossible.Onarrivingatthisposition,thethesisdrawson

WaeverandHansen’sworkonNordicstatesandEuropeanintegration.Whereasthey

describethemselvesaspostructuralistintheirfocusontheconstructionofstructures

ofmeaningthroughdiscourse,theyacknowledgethattheyare“morestructuralist”142

intheirargumentthatparticularconceptionsofstate,nationandpeoplemayhave

specialstaying-power.Theysuggestthat,whilstmultipleandcompetingdiscourseson

identitymayexistatthesametime,somegodeeperthanothersintermsoftheir

sedimentation,makingtheseparticularnarrativesespeciallydifficulttodisplace.They

proposealayereddiscursivestructureinwhich“deeperstructures,”suchas

conceptionsofstateandnation,“aremoresolidlysedimentedandmoredifficultto

140Browningbook,p.48.141Ibid.,p.14.142L.Hansen,‘Introduction,’inL.HansenandO.Waever(eds.),EuropeanIntegrationandNationalIdentity–TheChallengeoftheNordicStates(London:Routledge,2002),p.5.

54

politiciseandchange,”143thansurfacelayersconcerningEurope.Inthisapproach,

agents’abilitytoconstituteEuropeasasubject,andinso-doingarticulateaparticular

‘nationalinterest’inregardstointegration,isrestrictedbyaconceptualconstellation

whichfusesstatewithnationandthePeopleandseesanymovestowardssupra-

statehoodasinherentlythreatening.144Inthisview,theabilityofagentstoalterthis

deeperdiscursivestructureonstateandnationisseverelylimited,becauseofits

sedimentation.This,inturn,affectstheircapacitytoaltertheconstellationofmeaning

concerningEurope,becausedeepstructuresprovidethefoundationforlayerscloser

tothesurface.145

WhatWaeverandHansen’sperspectiveoffers,therefore,isawayoflinkingthecritical

constructivist/postrstructuralistconceptionofidentitywithamorestructuralist

approachaccordingtowhich,whilsteventhedeepeststructuresofidentitynarratives

mayberearticulated–astheyare,afterall,discursiveconstructs,-theyare

nonethelesshighlyresilienttoalterationbyagents.Forthisproject,keyinthe

developmentofsuchidentitynarrativesaretheprocessesofsedimentationand

socialisation.Whenaparticularnarrativehasbeenreproduced,alongitsbroadlines,

overthecourseofseveralgenerations,asitwillbearguedwasthecaseinRomania,it

becomesincreasinglydifficulttodisplaceasthedominantrepresentationoftheSelf

andrestrictiveintermsofagents’abilitytoalteritsmaintenets.Thatisthecase,one

wouldsuggest,fortworeasons.Firstly,pickinguponapointmadebySnyderetal,

agents’ownrationalityisshapedbytheidentitynarrativeinwhichtheywere

socialised146and,assuch,allinteractionsbetweenagentsandthestructureare

achievedfromapositionwithinratherthanwithoutthesubjectiverealitygenerated

bytheoriginalidentitynarrative.Consequently,certaincoursesofactionwillbe

perceivedaspossible,whilstotherswillbeimpossible;theselimitsultimatelyalso

includethemannerinwhichtheSelfanditsinterestsmaybe(re)presented.Secondly,

foranewnarrativetotakerootsitneedstobeacceptedand,subsequently,socialised.

Assuch,discourseswhichseemtogoagainstthefundamentalvaluesofthedominant

143Waever(2002),p.32.144Ibid.,p.80.145Browning,p.61.146Snyderetal(1963),p.156.

55

representationinplay,asHansenshowsinhercasestudyofDenmark,147are

particularlydifficulttolegitimateatsocietallevelandthereforeunlikelytogain

traction.Whilstchangestothesesedimentedstructuresispossible,theymustbe

incrementalandoccurintheopportunecircumstancesofastableenvironmentwhich

wouldallowfortheirsocialisation,inotherwords,fortheshapingofanewgeneration

ofagents.

Thebenefitofthismiddlegroundapproach,asopposedtothosewhichfavoureither

agencyorstructure,isthatitallowsonetotracetheinfluenceofagentsonstructures

ofidentitynarrativesandvice-versa.Fromthisposition,narrativealterationisa

possibility,butnotanecessity,ascertainconditionsmustbefulfilledforittooccur.

Thisallowstheresearchertoexaminebothcontinuity–theremitofmostSCstudies–

andchange–thefocusofdiscursiveapproaches–inidentitynarrativesandbehaviour.

Moreover,thisperspectivedoesnotoutrightdismissSC’sassumptionthatidentities

arestableandunitary.Thethesisarguesthatnarrativesofidentitymayindeedhavea

certaindegreeofstability,relativetotheleveloftheirsedimentation.Equally,in

situationsinwhichthedominantrepresentationoftheSelfhasbecomeentrenchedit

willbedifficultforalternativeportrayalsabouttheSelftoemergeandevenmore

difficultforthemtobecomeacceptedatthesocietallevel.However,whatiskeyisthat

thisisnotagiven.Suchstructuresonlycomeaboutinspecificcircumstances,asisthe

caseofRomaniaand,asaresult,thestabilityandunitarycharacterofthesestructures

mustbeinterrogated,ratherthantakenforgranted.

TheUtilityofa‘SmallState’CaseStudy

Finally,thisprojectsaddstothefieldbyfocusingonasmallstatewhichhasrarely

beenthesubjectofacademicinvestigation.Ashasbeenoutlined,mosttraditional

analysestendtoconcernmajorpowers.Althoughthereisincreasinginterestinthe

identitypoliticsofminorpowers,148thissectionofthefieldisstillunder-researched,

particularlyinEasternEurope.Acase-studyofRomaniathereforecontributestothe

147L.Hansen,‘SustainingSovereignty:TheDanishApproachtoEurope,’inL.HansenandO.Waever(eds.),EuropeanIntegrationandNationalIdentity–TheChallengeoftheNordicStates(London:Routledge,2002).148Rasmussen(2005),Browning(2006,2007,2008,2010).

56

understandingofidentity-basedmotivationsofastatewhichhasanimportantroleto

playinthesecurityandstabilityoftheEasternhalfofthecontinent.Thisisallthe

morethecaseastensionsbetweentheEuropeanUnionandNATOontheonehand,

andRussiaontheother,areatapost-ColdWarhigh.Thisthesisagreeswithboth

Rasmussen’spointthattheeffectsontheinternationalenvironmentcausedbythe

actionsofmajorpowersaremostaccuratelygaugedinthebehaviourofsmall

states,149andBrowning’sargumentthatminorpowersretainacertainfreedomof

actiondictatedbytheirperceptionofhow‘smallness’affectsthem.150Romania’sown

narrativeonidentityhasoftenhighlightedtheanxietiescausedbyitssmall-state

condition,particularlyintermsoftheinfluenceexertedbygreaterpowersinits

domesticaffairs.ItisequallytruethatRomania’shistory,andprobablyfuture,has

beenandwilllargelybedeterminedbythebalanceofpowerandnatureofinteraction

betweenRussiaandtheWest.

That,however,doesnotmeanthatRomania’sforeignpolicyshouldbeseensimplyas

apredictablereactiontotheinterplaybetweengreatpowers,northatitsagendaisset

solelybyitsstrongerallies.Thisthesisarguesthatthistypeofassessmentiserroneous

becauseitfocusesonexternalpressuresanddiscountstheinternalmotivationsbehind

thestate’sbehaviour.Byadoptinganidentity-basedperspective,Romaniaappearsnot

asapowerlessentity,guidedinitsbehaviourbythegreatpowers,butasan

autonomousactor,whichfunctionswithinauniqueinter-subjectivereality.Theutility

instudyingit,then,liesintheacknowledgmentthatRomaniaalsofeaturesunique

patternsofbehaviourwhichcorrespondtohistoricallyenduringclaimsaboutits

identity.InRomania’scase,theseentrenchedbeliefshaveinfluencedbothitsgeneral

foreignpolicydirection–namelyanemphasisonitsWesternalliances–andits

contemporaryrelationstoitssignificantOthers–thecasestudiesfocusonRussia,

HungaryandtheRepublicofMoldova.Inthesethreerelationshipsparticularlyitwill

bearguedthatidentity-basedanxietiesandprerogativesinfluenceRomania’s

behaviourtowardsthem.Bystudyingthenatureoftheseelementsandtheirimpact

onforeignpolicy,thisthesisaimstohighlighttheroleRomaniaplays–orseesitselfto

149Rasmussen(2005),p.68.150Browning(2006),p.674.

57

beplaying–inEasternEuropeandhowitsactionsmightshapethefuturestabilityand

securityoftheregion.

Overall,thebenefitofthisstudyisfirstlythatitfillsagapintheresearch,asanalyses

ofthisstate’sforeignpolicyspecificallyarerare,andgenerallyadoptaneo-realistof

neo-liberalperspective.151Fromanidentity-basedapproach,however,themotivations

behindRomania’sinternationalbehaviourappearmorecomplexthantheseaccounts

wouldassume.Ontheotherhand,focusingonRomaniaandthenatureandqualityof

itsrelationshipwithitsneighboursoffersaclearerpictureoftheinteractionbetween

EasternEuropeanstates,bothwithintheEUandNATOaswellastheirrelationswith

Russia.Thisprojectcapturestheintricacyoftheserelationsandshowshow,inan

interconnectedworld,theactionsofevenasmallstatemayhaveprofoundregionalor

internationalrepercussions.Inthisview,identity-basedtensionsbetweenRomania

andHungaryaresignificantbecausetheymayaffectthestabilityandeffectivenessof

theEUandNATO,organisationsbothstatesaremembersof.Similarly,Romania’s

perceptionsofthethreatposedbyRussia’sannexationofCrimeadiffersignificantlyto

thoseofmanyintheWest,duetothisstate’sportrayalofitshistoricalexperienceof

interactionwithanexpansionistRussia.Understandingthemotivationsbehind

Romania’sbehaviour,therefore,isnotonlyausefulendeavourinitself,butisvaluable

inrevealingthestateofaffairsintheregionasawhole.

Conclusion

Thischapterhasplacedthethesisinthefieldofconstructiviststudiesintothelink

betweennationalidentityandforeignpolicy,intheareaofintersectionofSCandFPA.

Findingamiddlegroundbetweentheweakconstructivistandpredominantly

structuralistapproachofculture-focusedSCandFPA’straditionalagent-oriented

perspective,aswellasthedeeperconceptionofidentityemployedbyitscritical

constructiviststrand,isnotaneasyfeat.However,bydevelopinganarrativetheoryof

identityandcouplingthiswithabalancedapproachtotheagent-structuredebate,one

mayarguethisis,indeed,possible.Whatisultimatelyrequiredinstudyingthe

influenceofidentityonbehaviour–SC’smainaim–isanexpansionoffocus,which

151See,forinstanceAndreev(2009),Gallagher(1998),Ivanov(2010),Nicolescu(2010),Turnock(2001).

58

incorporatesbothhowandwhyquestions.Understandingidentitiesassubjective

storiesabouttheSelfallowsonetoeffectivelyinterrogatetheroleofagentsin

constructingidentitiesthroughsocialprocessessuchasthetellingofnationalhistory.

However,contrarytothepositionofmostcriticalconstructivist/postructuralist

authorsreviewedinthischapter,thethesisarguesthatthedeepest,mostentrenched

structuresofmeaningwhicharticulateintoidentitynarrativesareparticularlydifficult

todisplaceand,asaresult,acertaindoseofstructuralismisrequiredtotrulygraspthe

relationshipbetweenagentsandtheiridentity.Finally,thethesisalsoaddstoa

broadeningofthefieldofresearch,byfocusingonasmallpowerwhichhasrarely

beenthesubjectofanidentity-basedanalysis.Byrevealingtheinternalmotivations

behindRomania’sactions,thisthesisarguesthatnotonlyaresmallstatesinfluenced

byidentitaryfactors,butthattheiractionshaverepercussionsataregionalandeven

internationallevel.Ultimately,thepointisthatmakingsenseand/orpredictingthe

behaviourofsmallstatesrequires,muchasisthecasewithgreatpowers,an

understandingoftheuniqueidentitieswhichshapetheforeignpolicydecisionsofsuch

actors.

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Chapter2.Methods–ApproachandConsiderations

Thischapterhighlightsthemethodologyemployedforthepurposesofthisprojectas

wellascertainconsiderationsrelatedtoitandissplitintotwosection.Thefirst

discussesthebenefitsofemployingaconstructivistapproachinthestudyofRomanian

identityanditsbearingonforeignpolicyandlocatesthepresentthesiswithinexisting

debatesaboutconstructivismwithreferencetoSCandFPA.Secondly,afteranoteon

interviewsandtranslations,themethodologyoftheprojectisexpandedupon:atwo-

stepapproachisoutlined,thefirstofwhichisconcernedwiththenatureand

developmentoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeandthesecondwiththemannerin

whichitinfluencesbehaviour.Thesectiondiscussesthethesis’processoftacklingthe

twostepsinthecorechaptersandthesourcesitwillutilisetothisend.

EmployingaConstructivistApproach

Asmentionedpreviously,thereexistsarathersmallselectionofaccountsofRomania’s

foreignpolicyagenda,coveringeithertheperiodimmediatelyfollowingtheColdWar

(knowndomesticallyas‘thetransition’)orthetimesincethestate’saccessiontoNATO

andtheEUwasachieved(2007andonwards).ThestudieswhichdoaddressRomania’s

foreignpolicyunsurprisinglyoutlinethedifficultyoftransitionandtheslowpaceof

domesticreformmeanttoalignthestatetothestandardrequiredformembershipof

thesetwoorganisations.Traditionalexplanationsofferedofboththeparticulargoalof

accessionandthechallengesRomaniafacedinachievingittendtofocusonthe

generaltrendofformersocialiststatesseekingmembershipofEuro-Atlantic

organisations152andonthecontinuationofcommunisteraautomatismsbyRomania’s

politicalleadership,respectively.153Inotherwordsandtoputitsimply,thegeneral

perceptionisthatRomaniaappliedtojointheEUandNATObecause,aswasthecase

withalltheEasternblocstates,thiswasthesensiblethingtodo,andhaddifficultiesin

accomplishingthisaimbecauseoftheill-judgeddecisionsofitspoliticalelites.Since

accession,thebulkofstudiesonRomaniatendtofocusonitspolicyofalignmentwith

152Nicolescu(2010),p.65.153SeeGallagher(1995,1998),Cinopoes,(2010)etc.

60

thegeneraldirectionpursuedbytheinternationalorganisationsitisamemberof154

and,again,thechallengesposedbyintegrationtoasystemstillplaguedbya

communistlegacy.155

Onewouldarguethatwhattheseaccountshaveincommonisamainstream

materialistandrationalistapproachtoRomania’sbehaviour.Whetheradoptinga

NeorealistorNeoliberalperspective,suchstudieshavelargelyfocusedonwhatcould

bedirectlyobservedandempiricallyproven,withapreoccupation,asBrowningnotes,

“withpositinguniversallawsofrationalbehaviour.”156Explanationshighlightingthe

‘returntoEurope’trendfitsneatlyinthiscategory.Ontheotherhand,perspectives

whichfocusonRomania’slittleexperienceofbeingademocracyandstrong

communistlegacybetraythetypeoftreatmentofideationalfactorspresentinthe

workofNeoliberalssuchasGoldsteinandKeohane.157Inthisview,whereasideasare

broughtintothefold,withafocusonthosedrawnfromcommunistexperience,all

theseideasdoisobscurewhatwouldotherwisehavebeentherationalandlogical

courseofactiontobeundertakenduringtransition.Inotherwords,explanations

revolvearoundthenotionthatRomanianelitesinfluencedbytheircommunistera

trainingwereunabletodiscerntheirandtheirstate’sobjectiveinterestincarryingout

reformand,asaresult,theprocessofaccessionwasprolongedandmadeneedlessly

morechallenging.

However,thenotionthatRomaniabehavesasarationalactordrivenbyobjective

interestsreadilycomprehensibletooutsideobserversisproblematicbecause,as

Browningcontinues,“itentailsahollowconceptionofsubjectivityandofidentity.”158

InsofarasRomaniahasanidentity,thisisdictatedbyitscapabilitiesandposition

withintheinternationalsystem,i.e.asmallstateoftheformerEasternbloc.Inwhatits

politicalleadershipisconcerned,theiridentityandinterestsarecapturedunderthe

labelof‘unreformedcommunists.’However,thisthesisarguesthatthisapproach

154Nicolescu(2010).155SeeGallagher(2009),Andreev(2009),forinstance.156Browning(2008),p.18.157J.GoldsteinandR.Keohane,‘IdeasandForeignPolicy:AnAnalyticalFramework,’inJ.GoldsteinandR.Keohane,IdeasandForeignPolicy–Beliefs,Institutions,andPoliticalChange(Ithaca,NewYork:CornellUniversityPress,1993),158Browning(2008),p.18.

61

betraysanimpoverishedappreciationoftheinternalmotivationsbehindRomania’s

behaviour,bothbeforeandafteraccession,andthereforeseekstoaddanotherlayer

ofunderstandingtothishithertorarelyexploreddimension.Constructivism,onthe

otherhand,offersanavenueintoexploringidentitiesassocialconstructsgenerated

withinthedomesticenvironmentinwhichtheactorfunctions.Inthisview,farfrom

beingepiphenomenal,identitiesareattheverycoreofestablishingwhatarational

courseofactionentailsinaparticularsituation.Aconstructivistapproachreveals

Romanianotasanactorwhoseinterestsaredeterminedbymaterialcapabilitiesora

schematicrepresentationofitselite’scharacteristics,butasonewithitsown

viewpointoftheinternationalrealmandaperceptionofitspositionwithinit,and

whicharticulatesinterestsinresponsetobothexternalandinternalpressuresasthey

areinterpreteddomestically.

InlightofthecriticismbroughttomainstreamperspectivesonRomania’spost-socialist

foreignpolicyagenda,itshouldcomeasnosurprisethatthisthesisemploysa

constructivistapproach.Havingsaidthat,asthepreviouschaptermadeclear,there

existsavarietyofconstructivistpositionsbeingadoptedwithinbothSCandFPA.There

iscertainlyaprofounddifference,bothintermsofclaimsaboutthenatureofidentity

andthemannerinwhichitshouldbestudied,betweentheweakconstructivism

predominantinSCandthecriticalconstructivist/postructuraliststrandofFPA.The

issueswithweakconstructivism’sconceptionofidentityhavelargelybeenoutlined

earlier,andthischapterwillnotgothroughthemagainindetail.However,thelackof

interestintheprocessesthroughwhichidentitiesarearticulatedisdeeplyproblematic

becauseiteschewsfromthecomplexitiesofidentityconstructionanditslinksto

foreignpolicymaking.Onesuchissueisitscommitmenttoobjectivism,andthenotion

thatidentityisavariabletheinfluenceoverbehaviourofwhichcanbeexaminedsolely

byrecoursetohistoricalrecounting.Bytreatingidentityinthiswaythese

constructivistseludethefactthatidentitiesdonotsimplyexist,butaresubjective

interpretationsofwhotheactorwasorisatanyonepointintime.Moreover,the

processesofsocialisationthroughwhichtheseinterpretationsbecomeacceptedas

truearebracketedintheirinquiry.Assuch,internaldebatesabouttheSelfandthe

roleofagentsinalteringorreinforcingparticularstructuresofmeaningare

62

inaccessibletotheiranalysis.InthecaseofRomania,thisperspectivecouldnotexplain

thewayinwhichthestoryofRomanianidentitywasadaptedtofitthechallengesof

transitionoraccession.Anothersignificantdrawbackinthisapproachisthatthe

theorycannotaccountforaspecific,yetcriticalissues–thataparticular

representationoftheSelfismutuallyconstitutedinrelationtoportrayalsofOthers.In

otherwords,thatitisthroughprocessesofdifferentiationandassociationthatagents

renderintelligibletheenvironmentandactorsaroundthem,butalsopindownthe

Self.159Sincetheseportrayalsgenerateintereststobepursuedthroughforeignpolicy,

changesinbehaviourtowardsOthersnotonlyreflectapotentialreassessmentof

theseactorsasfriendsorfoes,butalsosignalare-evaluationofcriticalprecepts

regardingtheSelf.Again,goingbacktothecasestudy,weakconstructivismcannot

explainhowchangesinforeignpolicytowardsRomania’sOthersbecamepossiblein

contextsinwhichparticularidentity-relatedprioritiesconcerningtheSelfwere

reorderedinthefaceofanever-changingdomesticandinternationalenvironments.

Overall,weakconstructivismdoesnotofferacomprehensiveframeworkforstudying

Romanianidentityoritslinktothestate’sbehaviour.Instead,thisthesisdrawson

criticalconstructivist/postructuralistthoughtinordertoexplorehowidentitiesare

developedandfunction.Itputsforwardanarrativetheoryofidentity,inwhichthe

storieswetellourselvesaboutwhoweareandtheenvironmentinwhichwefunction

notonlyhaveabearingonforeignpolicyandbehaviour,butalsomakeaction

meaningful.160Inthissense,storiesaboutidentityareseenasbotharesult,because

theyaresocialised,andacreatoroftheuniquesubjectiverealityinwhichtheSelfand

Othersarepositioned.161Acknowledgingtheimportanceofdiscourseinthe

constitutionoftheSelf,acrucialroleinthegenerationofnarrativesonidentityis

attributedtothetellingofnationalhistory.Thethesisarguesthat,byconstructing

storiesabouthistoricaleventsandrelationships,itbecomespossibletorenderthe

presentinamannerwhichisintelligibletous.Theinextricablelinkbetweenhistorical

andidentitynarrativesliesinthenotionthat‘whowewere’legitimatesaparticular

159Neumann(1995),p.27.160Browning(2008),p.45.161Ibid.,p.46.

63

representationof‘whoweare,’butalso‘whoweshouldbe.’Storiesaboutthepast

Selfthereforebecomevehiclesforthedisseminationofspecificidentitynarrativesand

theinterestswhichflowfromthem.Asaresult,oneofthemainaimsofthisthesisis

toshowhowtheRomaniannarrativeonhistoryhasbeendevelopedandexplorethe

mainidentity-relatedthemeswhichemergefromit.Moreover,becausetheSelfand

Othersaremutuallyconstituted,theprojectwillalsoshowhow,throughoutthe

historicalnarrative,particularrepresentationsofthreesignificantOthersare

generatedinthecourseofconstitutingtheRomanianSelf,throughprocessesof

differentiationandassociation.

Havingsaidthat,wherethethesisdivergesfromthevastmajorityofcritical

constructivist/postructuraliststudiesanddrawsonthestructuralismofSCand,

importantly,theworkofWaeverandHansen,isontheissueoftheenduranceof

identitynarratives.Theprojectarguesthatparticularstructuresofmeaning,once

socialised,acquireasedimentedquality.ThemoreastoryabouttheSelfis

reproduced,therefore,themoreitbecomesentrenchedanddifficulttodisplace.This

isexactlythecase,itwillbeargued,inthecaseofRomania,wherethehistoricaland

identitynarrativeshavebeendisseminatedalongthesamelinesoverseveral

generations.Asaresult,specificconceptionsaboutthenatureoftheRomanianSelf

anditsOthershavebecomerootedintheRomanianimaginaryandarehighly

influentialandresilienttochange.Forinstance,thisappliestonotionsaboutwhatthe

roleoftheRomanianstateisandthethreateningnatureofHungaryandRussia,as

Romania’shistoricalfoes.Fromthesedeepeststructuresofmeaningemergeparticular

anxieties–‘thiscannotbedone’–andprerogatives–‘thismustbedone’–which

generateparticularattitudesandintereststhatarepursuedthroughbothdomestic

andforeignpolicy.Maintainingterritorialintegrityorensuringthesecurityand

sovereigntyofthestatefallintothiscategory.Inacknowledgingtheroleofagency,

however,thisisnottosaythatthesestructuresarecompletelyrigidandtheirbearing

overagentsisuniform.

Therewillbesituationsinwhichcertainprerogativesgenerateconflictinggoals

requiringagentstogiveoneantecedenceovertheother.Equally,therelativestrength

64

ofanxietiesisnotconstantovertimeandthisiswhentheinfluenceoftherespective

structuresofmeaningoveragentsisdiminished.Indeed,anxietiesmayrecedeor

becomeaugmented,becausetheyrespondtochangesinboththedomesticand

externalenvironments,orratheragents’interpretationofthem.Forinstance,

apprehensionoverrelationswithathreateningOthermaydiminishifthatOther

ceasestobeconsideredathreat.Itwillbearguedthatinperiodssuchasthese,when

anxietiessurroundingparticularissuesarelowwithmultiplegoalsinplay,agentsenjoy

morefreedominreorderingpriorities,adoptingdifferentattitudesandarticulating

newinterestsinconnectiontothem.Forexample,thegoalofmaintainingdistance

fromapreviouslythreateningOthermaybesupersededbythatofaccessiontoan

internationalorganisationwhichpresupposescooperationwiththisOtherand

thereforeaninterestinestablishingamiablerelationsmaybearticulated.This,itwill

beargued,arepreciselythecircumstanceswhichsawasignificantdétenteinthe

relationshipbetweenRomaniaandHungaryinthe1990s.Becausethesegoals–

distancefromHungaryandaccessiontotheEUandNATO,–bothofwhicharerooted

intheidentitynarrativeandtheprerogativesofensuringstatesecurity,sovereignty

andunity-cannotbesecuredatthesametime,agentsmustprioritiesoneoverthe

other.ThisorderingofprioritiesdependsbothonwhetherHungaryisperceivedasa

threatandtherelativeextenttowhichitisconsideredthatthestatewillbenefitfrom

achangeinattitude.Agents’owninterpretationofthedomesticandinternational

environmentsisthereforekeyintheprocessofestablishingpriorities,whilethe

structureoftheidentitynarrativeismalleableenoughtoallowforthistypeof

changes.This,ineffect,explainswhyandhowthesameidentitynarrativemay

legitimateabroadspectrumofbehaviours162andrevealsagencyandstructureas

mutuallyconstituted,witheachexertingacertainlevelofinfluence,withoutholding

dominion,overtheother.

Throughthisapproach,thethesisseekstobridgethevariousconstructivistpositions

employedwithinSCandFPA.SimilarlytoWaeverandHansen,onewoulddescribeitas

criticalconstructivistinitsapproachtothestudyofidentityandtheconstructionof

structuresofmeaning.However,itremainsmorestructuralistthanotherstudiesdue

162Waever(2002),p.22.

65

toitsassumptionthatsedimentedidentitynarrativeshaveacertainresilienceto

changeand,therefore,abearingonagents,byshapingnotionsofnationalinterestand

generatingprerogativesandred-lines.Nonetheless,inacknowledgingagents’rolein

constructingidentitynarrativesinthefirstplaceandtheirabilitytointeractwitheven

thedeepeststructuresofmeaning,thethesisdepartsfromthe‘thoroughgoing’

structuralismofSC,treadingthemiddlegroundinwhatconcernstheagent-structure

debate.Thisapproach,however,posesanumberofmethodologicalchallenges,in

termsofhowexactlyonemaygoaboutanalysingboththenatureandcontentaswell

astheinfluenceofsedimentedclaimsaboutidentityonstatebehaviour.

Consequently,thefollowingsectiondealswiththeproject’smethodology.

Methodology

ANoteonInterviewsandRomanianSources

ForthepurposesofthisresearchseveralinterviewswithRomanianpoliticiansand

academicswereconductedinBucharest,inJune2014.Theoriginalideawasthatthey

wouldprovidetheprimaryaccountsandinterpretationsofRomania’sforeignpolicy

agenda.However,itsoonbecameobviousthattherewassignificantoverlapinthe

informationgatheredfromtherespondents,suchasuniversitylecturers,aliberal

politicianandaformerMinisterofCulture.OnRomania’sforeignpolicydirectionand

challengesposedbycommunismduringtransition,forinstance,therewasalmost

completealignment.Thereasonbehindthis,onewouldsuggest,isthatthegeneral

assessmentoftheissuesinvolvedinthesubjectmatteraddressedbythisproject,such

astheonesmentionedabove,arenotareasofcontroversywithinRomaniansocietyat

themoment.Therefore,itwasconsideredthatadditionalinterviewswereunlikelyto

contributeanysignificantadditionalinformation.Asaresult,thethesisshiftedfocusto

couplingthedatacollectedfromtheseinterviewswiththatofotherprimarysources,

suchasstatementsfromofficials,pollsandstatistics,andanalysesofeventsalready

availableinthemedia.Theinformationfromtheinterviewsisusedpredominantlyin

Chapter5,inthesectiononRomania’scontemporaryforeignpolicyagenda.However,

therespondents’inputisalsothreadedthroughouttheothercorechapters,offering

66

primaryinformationonthenatureoftransitionandtherelationshipwithRussia,the

HungarianminorityandtheRepublicofMoldova.163

AsecondmatterwhichshouldbeexpandeduponconcernsthematerialinRomanian

utilisedbythisproject.Severalsuchsourceshavebeenemployed,suchasbooks,

journalandnewspaperarticles,onlinematerial,officialstatements,statistics,the

interviewsconductedandevenfragmentsofpoemsorsongs,suchasthenational

anthem.AlltranslationsfromRomaniantoEnglisharetheauthor’sownandthe

sourcesinRomanianarereferencedbytheoriginaltitlefollowedbyitstranslationinto

Englishinsquarebrackets.

Thissectionwillnowmoveontoexpandonthemethodsusedinansweringthethesis’

mainresearchquestion‘WhatistheimpactofnationalidentityonRomania’sforeign

policyagenda?’Assessingtheinfluenceoftheidentity,understoodasanarrative

structure,onbehaviourfromaconstructivistperspectiveentailstwoseparatesteps.

ThefirstisexaminingthenatureandcontentofRomania’sidentitynarrative,whilst

thesecondrequiresoverlayingthisrepresentationontopofthestate’scontemporary

behaviourinordertoexaminehowthenarrativefeedsintobehaviour.Forpurposeof

clarity,bothwillbeexplainedinturn.

TheNatureandContentoftheRomanianIdentityNarrative

IntermsofthenatureandcontentoftheRomaniannarrativeonidentity,the

challengeisinestablishingitsessentialfeatures,howtheyhavedeveloped,aswellas

thereasonswhycertainconceptsholdaparticularsignificance.Inasense,thisisan

exerciseinposingatleastsomeofDoty’show-possiblequestions.164Inanswering

them,thisthesisholdsthathistory,orthetellingofhistory,iscentral.Ifidentityisnot

takenasagiven,thenshowinghowandwhichcertaintenetsbecameentrenchedin

theRomanianimaginaryrequiresahistoricalapproach.Indeed,forthepurposesof

thisproject,historyiscentraltotheconstructionofidentitynarratives,fortwo

reasons.Firstly,historicalexperiencesshapeactors’perceptionsofthemselvesandthe

163Asanadditionalnote,thetranscriptsoftheseinterviewsareintheauthor’spossession.164Doty(1993).

67

worldaroundthem,muchlikeBreuninghasargued.165Secondly,itislargelythrough

historicalnarrativesthataparticularstoryaboutidentityisperpetuated.166Coupled

withelitediscourse,aparticulartellingofhistoryoffershintsastotherepresentation

oftheSelfandOthersinplayatthattime.Thenarrativeofhistoryandthatofidentity

areinherentlyinterlinked–historytellingperpetuatesacertainportrayaloftheSelf

andOther,therebysocialisingindividualsinaspecificidentitynarrative,whilst

alterationstoiteithersignaltheemergenceoforactivelycreateanewone.

Asaresult,therequirementsofthissteparetwofold–firstly,onemustengagewith

Romanianhistory,withparticularfocusonthemannerinwhichitsexperienceshave

beenportrayed;and,secondly,fromthisreadingofthehistoricalnarrative,onemust

establishwhatthemainfeaturesoftheidentitynarrative–termedthemes–areand

howortowhatextentthestoryhasbeenalteredovertime.

Itisimportanttonotethat,whilstthenarrativeonRomaniannationalidentitybegins

inearnestinthenineteenthcentury,itnonethelessemploystheentiretyof

Romanians’historicalexperiences,fromtheirethno-genesistomoderntimes,in

buildingtherepresentationoftheSelfandOthers.Therefore,whilstwhatisofinterest

herearetellingsofRomania’shistoryofthemodernera,theprocessofexaminingthe

identitynarrativerequiresengagingwithRomania’shistoryasawhole.Whatthe

projectaimstoachieve,therefore,isatableauofdomesticinterpretationsof

Romanianhistorywithafocusontheidentitarythemeswhichtheyseektoemphasise.

Thisreproducingofthehistoricalnarrativedrawsonanumberofsources,fromthe

nineteenthcenturyandtothepresentday–someareconcernedspecificallywith

Romania’shistory,suchastheworksofNicolaeIorga(1830),HenrisStahl(1922),

Fischer-Galati(1970),NeaguDjuvara(2010)andFlorinConstantiniu(2011).Others,

suchasLucianBoia(2011,2012)orMihaiMilca(2010),offerahistoricalperspective

onthedevelopmentofRomanianidentity.Theformerisareputedcontemporary

RomanianhistorianbuthisworkalsodelvesintothemythsprevalentinRomanian

society(IstorieŞiMitȊnConştiinţaRomânească[HistoryandMythinRomanian

165Breuning(2007).166Browning(2008).

68

Consciousness],2011)andalsothemannerinwhichRomaniahasadapted,orrather

hasfailedtoadapt,toEuro-Atlanticintegration(Romania,TaradefrontieraaEuropei

[Romania,FrontierStateofEurope],2012).SociologistMihaiMilca,ontheotherhand,

offersachronologyofthedevelopmentoftheRomanianstateswhilstalsojuxtaposing

RomanianidentitytothatoftheEuropeanversion(IdentitateRomâneascăşi

Europeană[RomanianandEuropeanIdentity],2010).Finally,contemporaneous

accountsofeventshavealsobeenutilisedtoshowperceptionsofcertaineventsatthe

timewhentheyoccurred–themagazinearticlesofKirileanu(1909)orRebreanu

(1940),ortherevolutionaryaddressofBalcescu(1847),areexamplesofthese.The

interestinthesesourcesisnotonlyininformationgathering,butalso,more

importantly,themannerinwhichhistoryisbeingnarrated.Theexpositionitselfoffers

cluesintowhataspectsoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeareinplayandhowthey

arecontextuallyframed.

Ontheotherhand,inestablishingthethemesoftheidentitynarrativetheproject

drewonsomeofthemajordomesticworksontheRomaniancharacter,psychology,

andmythology.Fromtheearlierperiodofthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury,the

seminalworksofDraghicescu(1907)andRadulescu-Motru(1937)wereofparticular

interest.ThesewerecoupledwithmodernanalysessuchasBoia(2011,2012)orMilca

(2010)inwhichtheconcernwithboththehistoricalandidentitynarrativesisevident.

Finally,theworkofDutceac-Segesten(2010),whichoffersinsightintoRomanians’Self

andOtherimagemyth-buildingthroughanexaminationofhistorytext-books,further

strengthenstheconnectionbetweenthetellingofhistoryandidentityconstruction.As

such,itisaninvaluablesourceforthisproject,notleastbecauseitshowshowthe

socialisationofaparticularnarrativeonidentityisachieved.Fromthesesources,the

projectidentifiedthemainrecurringthemesandclassifiedthemastheFoundation

Myths,consistingofOrigins,HabitusandReligion;theBesiegedFortress,with

victimisationandresistanceastwosidesofthesamecoin;andthethemeofUnity,

withitsemphasisonthenation-state.

Asacaveat,thisprojectdoesnotmakethepretencethatthesethemesorthemanner

inwhichtheyaretreatedareorisexhaustive.Indeed,thereareaspectsrelevantto

69

representationsoftheRomanianSelfwhicharenotaddressedhere–oneofthemore

obviousonesistheconundrumofwhetherRomaniabelongsintheEastortheWest.

Ontheotherhand,therearecomplexitieswithineachthemewhichhavenotbeen

analysed–intheOriginstheme,forinstance,overtimetherehasbeenintense

discussiononwhethertheRomanorDacianrootsaremostvaluabletotheRomanian

character.Whysomethemesandaspectspertainingtothemhavebeenpreferred

overothersis,toalargeextent,asubjectivematter.Whatonewouldargueisthat,

overall,theaimofthethesisistoshowhowenduringclaimsaboutRomanianidentity

influencebehaviourand,assuch,thechoiceofthemesmustberelevanttothis

endeavour–theEast-Westdebatehaspredominantlybeensettledintheaftermathof

theendoftheColdWar;Romaniacancertainlynotbearguedtobewaveringbetween

pro-Westernandpro-Easterndirections.Ontheotherhand,thatwhichdividesthose

whofavoured,atonepointoranother,theRomanorDacianrootsoftheRomanian

peopleislesssignificant,onewouldargue,thanthatwhichunitesthem–thatthe

originsofRomaniansmarkthemoutasspecial,orpeculiarwithintheirregional

setting.Assuch,althoughthereisadangerofover-simplifyingthecontentandhistory

ofdebateonRomanianidentity,thethesisaddresseswhatareconsideredtobe,

subjectivelyofcourse,boththedominantandmostrelevantfeaturesofthenarrative.

Asimilardiscussionshouldfollowonthechoiceofsources.Thereare,ofcourse,many

accountsofRomanianhistoryandpsychology,someofwhichhavenotbeenincluded

inthisproject.Workingoutwhichsourcestoutiliseandwhichtoomitis,again,a

subjectivebutnecessaryprocess.Spacedoesnotallowforanexhaustive

representationofeitherRomania’shistoryoridentitynarrative.Assuch,theaccounts

usedwerethosedeemedofmostinterest,eitherbecausetheirauthorsortheirwork

areparticularlyreputable–NicolaeIorgaandNicolaeBalcescu,forinstance,aresome

ofthemostcelebratedpersonalitiesofRomania’sunificationperiod,duetotheir

politicalactivismbutalsotheirhistoricalwork;DraghicescuandRadulescu-Motru’s

accountsaremostinfluentialinthefieldofRomanianidentity,or‘psychology’asit

wasthenreferredto,whilstBoiaandConstantiniuareamongstthemajor

contemporaryRomanianhistorians.Other,moreobscuresources,havebeen

employedbecausetheyconfirmoraddtothemoreprominentaccounts–

70

stenographerandhistorianHenricStahl’slectureonthehistoryoftheRomanian

people(1922),lawyerSofronie’sarticleonthehistoricandjuridicalsignificanceofthe

unificationof1918(1942)orFischer-Galati’sHistoryofTwentiethCenturyRumania

(sic)(1970)fallintothiscategory.Whatthethesisisattemptingtoachieveisa

renderingofRomania’sidentitynarrative,butitalsoaimstohighlighttheconsistency

acrosstheliteraturewithwhichitsmaintenetsaredepicted.Asaresult,allthese

sourcesarevaluableintheirinput,andwhilst,manyothersarenotaddressed,the

onespresentedarerelevanttothisinquiry.

Returningtotheissueathand,theprojecttracesthethemesoftheRomanianidentity

narrativeandthemannerinwhichtheyemergefromthetellingofhistory.The

historicalapproachisevidentinthestructureofChapter3,whichcoversthisissue.

Thechapterisdividedintofourhistoricalperiods,Antiquity,Middle-Ages,Modernity

andCommunism.Toeachofthefirstthreeareassignedthemajorthemeswhich

predominatetheirinterpretation.Asaresult,thehistoricalnarrativeofAntiquityis

concernedwiththeFoundationMyths,theMiddlesAgeswiththeBesiegedFortress

andModernitywithUnity.Thethesisshowshowtheseaspectsemergefromthe

particularnarrationofeachindividualperiod,butalsohowtheyfeedintoone-

another.Forinstance,theFoundationMythsareseenasmotivationforRomanians’

resistanceagainstforeigninfluenceduringtheMiddleAgesandboththeFoundation

MythsandtheBesiegedFortressarefundamentalinjustifyingUnitybetweenthe

threeprovincesintheModernera.Theaimistoshownotonlywhichthemeis

dominantwithinacertainperiod,butalsohowtheycometogetherinaparticular

articulationoftheimageofSelfandOther.

Bymatchingupmodernandcontemporaryaccounts,apictureofthecontinuityofthe

identitynarrativeisrevealedthroughtheperpetuationofaparticulartellingofhistory.

Continuityinallthemajoraspectsoftheidentitynarrativeisconsideredtobeoneof

itsmajorhallmarksand,importantly,attherootoftoday’sattitudestowardsits

significantOthers–RussiaandHungary.Thethesisaccountsforthisenduranceby

examiningthefactorsinplaybetweenthecreationoftheRomaniannation-stateand

theendofSecondWorldWar,inparticulartheactionsofRussiaandHungarywhich

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sedimentedtheperceptionofthetwoactorsasexistentialthreatsandensuredthe

continuedsalienceofthethemesofUnityandBesiegedFortress.Finally,thechapter

turnstotheimpactoftheCommunistera,andespeciallyNicolaeCeausescu’sregime,

inbuttressingandaugmentingthemainfeaturesoftheidentitynarrativebyexamining

bothprimarysources,workspublishedorrepublishedintheperiodconcernedwith

theRomanian‘nationalcharacter,’manyofwhichhavebeenmentionedabove,aswell

assecondaryaccountsassessingtherepercussionsofCeausescu’sactionson

Romanians’perceptionsoftheSelfandRussianandHungarianOthers.Theaimofthis

sectionistoshowhowCeausescu’shyperversion,preoccupiedpredominantlywith

theuniquenessofRomanians,builtonalreadyexistingrepresentationstoensurethe

reproducingofanarrativeofidentityinwhichthecontrastbetweenSelfandOtheris

sharpened.Asaresult,bothexternalfactors,ortheirdomesticinterpretation,and

agencyplayasignificantroleintheperpetuationofRomaniannarrativeofidentityup

totheanti-communistrevolutionof1989.

Thefinalstageistobringtheanalysisintothecontemporaryera,namelyafterthe

1989uprising.Thetransitionperiodofthe1990sisarguedtohavebeendecisiveinthe

versionofthenationalidentitynarrativeinplaytoday,notleastbecausethefallofthe

communistregimequalifiesasthetypeofhistoricshockwhichnormallyleadstoare-

evaluationofidentities.Asaresult,thethesispaysparticularattentiontotherole

playedbytransitiongovernments,andparticularlythoseofIonIliescu,inorderto

determineboththeextenttowhichclaimsaboutidentitywerequestionedandhow

thecommunistlegacywasnegotiated.Chapter4analyseshowtheidentitynarrative

fedintoearlyelectoralcontestsandwasutilisedbyIliescu’sreformedcommuniststo

justifytheirelection.Furthermore,thethesisshowshow,throughitsactionsand

rhetoric,thegovernmentensuredtheperpetuationofaversionofthenarrativewhich,

whilstiteliminatedthecommunistcomponent,wasotherwiseindistinguishablefrom

earlierdominantrepresentationsoftheSelfandOther.Asaresult,itwillbeargued,

thecontemporaryself-imageofRomanians,aswellastheirperceptionoftheir

significantOthers,remainedlargelyunaltered.Forthispurpose,thethesisemploysa

varietyofsources,includingprimaryones,suchasparliamentarydebatesand

interviews,andsecondarydomesticandWesternaccounts,includingnewspaper

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articles,assessingthenatureofthetransitionperiod.Theinputofforeignobservers,

suchasCipkowski(1991),Gilberg(1990),Gallagher(1995,1998,2009)andTurnock

(2001)isvaluableinachievingabalancedandobjectiveoverviewoftheevents,whilst

domesticsourcesofferinsightintohowthesewereperceivedontheground.Overall,

thissectioncompletesthetableauofthedevelopmentandmaincharacteristicofthe

Romanianidentitynarrativeandemphasisestheroleofagency,thistimeofIliescu’s

regime,inensuringitscontinuity.

TheInfluenceofIdentityonBehaviour

ThesecondstepentailsoverlayingthemainpreceptsoftheRomanianidentity

narrativeontothestate’sinternationalbehavioursincethe1989revolution.Thethesis

aimstoachievethisbyaddressingbothdimensionsofidentity,concerningtheSelfand

theOther.Ontheonehand,throughunderstandingRomanians’perceptionoftheSelf

and,particularly,whattheyviewedtobeRomania’splaceinthepost-ColdWar

internationalenvironment,onemightshedlightonthestate’sgeneralforeignpolicy

directionaswellashowBucharestwentaboutachievingitsgoals.Representationsof

Others,meanwhile,setthesegoalsintoabroadercontextandservetoexplainthe

typesofrelationsestablishedbetweenRomaniaandtheseactors.Themannerin

whichtheidentitynarrativeinfluencesbehaviour,thisthesisargues,isbygenerating

certainprioritiesorred-linesinwhatconcernstheactionsofthestate.Inotherwords,

itactstocreateparticularprerogatives,anxieties,andattitudestowardsotheractors

ontheinternationalstageanditisthroughunderstandingtheseby-productsofthe

identitynarrativethatonemayaccuratelyaccountforastate’sbehaviour.

Assuch,Chapter4isconcernedwiththetransitionperiodfromcommunismto

attainingmembershipofEUandNATO(1989-2007).Thisspanofnearlytwentyyearsis

considereddecisiveinestablishingandconsolidatingRomania’scontemporaryforeign

policyagenda.Thethesisidentifiestwopredominantandultimatelyconflicting

attitudesrootedinitsnationalidentitynarrativewhichhadasignificantimpacton

Romania’sbehaviourinthisperiod.Thefirstisitsforeignpolicypriority,basedonthe

unanimousdesiretojointheWest,whichdominatedtheentiretransitionperiod.

Integrationwouldsatisfytheprerogativeofensuringthesecurityofthestaterootedin

73

theUnitythemeand,tonolesserextent,itseconomicdevelopment.Thesecondwas

ananxietymanifestingintheresistancetochangeofbothelitesandthegeneral

populationinplayinthefirsthalfofthe1990s,alegacyofthecommunistperiodin

equalmeasuretothatofthehistoricalcontinuityofitsidentitynarrative.Thechapter

examineshowthesetwoattitudescreatedbothopportunitiesandchallengesfor

Romaniantransitiongovernments,untilthelatterattituderecededafter1996.Forthis

purpose,thedomesticreformswhichwereessentialinachievingmembershipofEU

andNATOareanalysed,withparticularemphasisonthedifficultiesofeconomic

reformandtheminorityquestion,namelytheissueofawardinggrouprightsto

Romania’ssignificantHungarianminority.Thesourcesemployedinthissectionare

accountsofRomania’sexperienceoftransition,bothdomesticandinternational,

mentionedabove.Additionally,primarysourcessuchastheinterviewsconductedfor

thisprojectandparliamentarydebatesarealsoutilised.Whatthissectionultimately

aimstoachieveisahighlightingofthecrucialdiscrepancybetweenRomania’s

behaviourontheinternationalanddomesticstages,inthatitwishedtoalteritsglobal

statuswithoutitstraditionalmodusvivendibeingaffected.Boththeseaspectsare

arguedtoberootedinitssedimentedportrayaloftheSelf.

Followingonfromthis,thethesisexaminesthenatureofRomania’sforeignpolicy

directionafteraccession,atthebeginningofChapter5,anditsrelationshipswithits

significantOthers,fromthetransitionperioduptothisday.Forthispurpose,three

casestudieshavebeenchosen,namelyRomania’srelationswithRussia,Hungaryand

theRepublicofMoldova,eachofthemhavingbeendesignatedaspecificchapter.The

reasonwhythethesisfocusesonthese,ratherthanotherrelationships,isprimarily

becauseoftheirsignificanceintheRomanianview.RussiaandHungaryemergefrom

thehistoricalandidentitynarrativeasthemainthreateningOthers,whilstthe

RepublicofMoldovais,conversely,viewedasanEstrangedSelf.Thecontinuityofthe

mainaspectsoftheidentitynarrative,ontheotherhand,isconsequentialtothe

perpetuationofaparticularrepresentationoftheseactors,whichinfluences

Romanianattitudestowardsthem.

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Thethreecasestudychaptershavesimilarstructures.Firstthethesisidentifiesthe

mainattitudesRomaniaexhibitstowardsthesethreeactors,aswellastheareasof

sensitivityrelevanttotheirrelationship.InthecaseofRussiaandHungary,themain

identity-basedattitudeisoneofdistrust,anxietyandfearovertheiractions,rootedin

thethemeoftheBesiegedFortress.TherelationshipbetweenRomaniaandRussiais

markedbyaviewoftheOtherasexpansionistandadangertoRomania’s

independence,securityandcloserelationswiththeRepublicofMoldova.Ontheother

hand,thethreatperceptionwhereHungaryisconcernedmainlyrevolvesaroundthe

preservationoftheterritorialintegrityandsovereigntyoftheRomanianstateandthe

issueofTransylvaniaasadisputedregionbetweenthetwoactors.InwhatMoldovais

concerned,thethesisarguesthatRomanians’attitudeisinformedbyboththe

FoundationMythsandthethemeofUnity.MoldovaisviewedasanEstranged

RomanianSelf,withthesameoriginsandidentitymarkers,leadingtoaperception

thattheyarelikeus.Ontheotherhand,theforcedseparationofMoldovafrom

Romaniaisseenasaninherenthistoricalinjustice,strengtheningboththecaseof

Russiaasanexistentialthreat,andtheRomanianinterestintheaffairsofChisinau.

Oncetheseattitudesareoutlined,thethesisexaminesRomania’sbehaviourinrelation

toeachoftheseactors,accountingforboththeretreatandaugmentationofidentitary

factorsinspecificcontexts.Itdoessoinchronologicalmanner,examiningthemajor

eventswhichhavedefinedtheirpost-1989relationship.Inordertoachievethis,the

thesisdrawsonprimaryaccounts–theinterviewsconductedbytheauthor,

parliamentarydebatesandofficialstatements–andsecondarysourcesassessing

eithertheeventsthemselvesortheirconsequences.Manyofthesourcesutilisedin

thesechaptershavealreadybeenmentioned:Boia(2011,2012)orDutceac-Segesten

(2010),forinstance,arepointsofreferencethroughoutthethesis.Additionally,each

chapterutilisesspecificsourcesconcernedwiththerespectiverelationshiporthe

activitiesofthatactor.Theseincludebooks,journalandnewspaperarticles,and

declarationsbyvariousorganisations,suchasNATOortheUnionistPlatformAction

2012.InthecaseofRussia,theworkofEurasianisttheoristDughin(2011)isemployed,

asistheworkongeopoliticsbyRomanianpoliticalcommentatorGusa(2011),thaton

Russian-RomanianrelationsofdiplomatsStefureac(2015)andMaior(2015),aswellas

75

variousarticlesbysociologistDanDungaciu(2011,2015,2016).InthecaseofHungary

sourcesconsultedincludeSalat’schapteronthefailedreconciliationbetweenthetwo

statesafter1996(2013),andKulcsarandBradatan’sarticleonHungariandomestic

politics(2007).InthecasestudyofRomania’srelationshipwiththeRepublicof

Moldova,someofthemainsourcesincludeAngelescu’sassessmentofthe

developmentofRomania’spost-socialistrelationswithactorsinEasternEuropeand

theBlackSearegion(2011),Cash’sarticleonMoldovanidentity(2007),orthatof

PanicionRomaniannationalismintheRepublicofMoldova(2003).Additionally,all

threechaptersfeaturearticlesfromRomania’smainnewsagencies,Agerpres,

Mediafax,andHotnews,aswellasstatisticsandopinionpollsconductedbyINSCOP

andIRES,astwoofthemostcitedsuchsourcesbytheRomanianmedia.

Onthisnote,thethesisfinallyoffersapredictionofRomania’sfuturerelationshipwith

theseactors,aswellasitsforeignpolicydirectionmorebroadly.Itdoesthisby

drawingonscenariosconsideredbyRomanianelitesinlightofpresentinternational

developments–theconflictinEasternUkraineorHungary’snationalistandeastern

shiftareexamplesofthis.Whatisofinteresthereisnotwhetherthesescenariosare

probable,orevenplausible,butthefactthatRomaniansperceivethemassuch.Thatis

becausethisthesisarguesthat,withinitsintersubjectivereality,themotivations

behindRomania’sactionsarerootedinperceptionsofcurrent,aswellasfuture,

threatsandopportunities.Thefactthatthesescenariosarebeingcontemplated,

therefore,offershintsatRomania’spresentbehaviourbutalsothetypesofactionsit

islikelytoconsiderinthefuture.Withthecaveatthatsuchdevelopmentsare

contingentonacontinuationofcurrentcircumstances,onewouldarguethatidentity

offersanavenuefornotonlyaccountingfor,butalsopredictingstatebehaviour.With

this,itisaimed,acomprehensiveinsightintotheinfluenceofentrenchedbeliefsabout

Romanianidentityoverthestate’srelationshipwiththeseactors,andthebehaviour

whichflowsfromthem,willbeachieved.

Conclusion

Thischapterhasoutlinedthethesis’approachandmethodologytostudyingthelink

betweentheRomanianidentitynarrativeandthestate’sforeignpolicyagenda.As

76

such,storiesaboutidentity,andtheinter-subjectiverealitytheycreate,arethemain

focusofthisproject.Thatisbecausethesenarrativesconfermeaningoncultural

factors,suchaslanguage,religion,geography,historyandethnicityandconsequently

shapethemannerinwhichRomaniansperceivethemselvesinrelationtothose

aroundthem.ThefollowingchapterswillexaminehowthisparticularimageoftheSelf

andOtherwasconstructedandperpetuatedinordertocreatetheidentitynarrativein

playtoday.Itwillbeshownhowtheculturalelementsmentionedabovewereutilised

tojustifyaspecificdestinyforRomanians,thatofbeingunited,andanequally

importantroleforthestate,toprotectthisunityandtheRomaniancharacter.Finally,

thethesiswillexaminehowtheattitudeswhichflowfromthisnarrativefeedinto

Romania’scurrentinternationalbehaviour,bothintermsofsatisfyingtheidentity-

prerogativessetbytheportrayaloftheSelf,butalsothroughtheanxietiesand

affinitieswhichemergefromtherepresentationoftheOthers.

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Table1.MajorEventsofRomanianHistoryandtheIdentityNarrativeThemesTheyAreSubscribedTo

FoundationMyths

106A.D. DaciaiscolonisedbyRome271A.D. RomansretreatfromtheregionCirca3rdcentury ChristianisationofDacia

BesiegedFortress

11thcentury

HungariansbegintheircolonisationofTransylvania,achievedbytheendofthecentury

1330 Wallachiaisestablished,followingavictoryagainsttheHungariantroops

1365 Moldaviaisalsocreated,insimilarcircumstances

1366 HungariankingdecreesthatnobilityinTransylvaniashouldbeconditionedbyaffiliationtotheCatholicfate

1437UnioTriumNationumcertifiesRomanianTransylvaniansastoleratednationandeliminatespoliticalrights.

1476 WallachiabecomesapermanentvassaltotheOttomanEmpire

1512 Moldavia,similarly,recognisestheOttomanEmpireassuzerain

Unity

1791

SupplexLibellusValachorumispublished,callingforequalityofrightsforTransylvanianRomanians.Thefirstdocumentwhichintroducesnationhoodasabasisforemancipation

1812 Moldaviaispartitioned.EasternMoldaviaisplacedunderTsaristruleandbecomesknownasBessarabia

1848 Failedrevolution,hadasexpressgoalunification1859(24January)

WallachiauniteswithWesternMoldovatoformthefirststateofRomania

1878 TheOldKingdomachievesindependencefromtheOttomanEmpire

1916 RomaniaentersthefirstWorldWaronthesideoftheEntente,withtheexpressgoalofgainingTransylvania

1918TheFirstWorldWarendsandtheDualMonarchyandTsaristEmpirecollapse.TransylvaniaandBessarabiaareawardedtoRomania

1918(1December)

GreaterRomaniaisproclaimed.ThenewstateapproximatestheterritoryinhabitedbyRomanianethnics.

BesiegedFortress&Unity

1940

Ayearofterritoriallosses.ASovietultimatumresultsinthecedingofBessarabiaandNorthernBukovina(June).HungaryisawardedNorthernTransylvania(August)andBulgariagainstheCadrilater(September).

78

1941RomaniajoinstheSecondWorldWaronthesideoftheAxiswiththegoalofwinningbackBessarabia,whichisquicklyoccupiedbyGermanandRomaniatroops

1944 Thetideofthewarischanging.RomaniaturnsthegunsonGermanyandbeginsfightingonthesideoftheAllies

1945

TheSecondWorldWarends.Romaniaisconsideredadefeatedstate.NorthernTransylvaniaisreturned,butBessarabiaisonceagaincededtoRussia.BessarabiaisincludedintheMoldavianASSR(hithertoTransnistria)andbecomesafullyfledgedSovietRepublic

Communism

1948 TheMoscowbackedCommunistPartycomestopowerinRomania

1965 NicolaeCeausescubecomesSecretaryGeneraloftheCommunistParty.RomaniabeginsitsbreakfromRussia.

1968 CeausescucondemnstheSovietinvasionofCzechoslovakia.

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Chapter3.RomanianHistoryandIdentity–aNationalObsession

withUniqueness

Figure1.ThemainperiodsofRomanianhistoryandtheircorrespondingthemes.

Introduction

Thischapter’smainaimistooutlinethemajorthemesoftheRomanianidentity

narrativeastheycrystallisedintheformativeperiodofthenineteenthandearly

twentiethcentury,highlightingtheirperpetuationintothemodernhistoricalnarrative.

Thechapterbeginswithadiscussionofcontinuityoftheidentitynarrativeinthe

Romaniancontext.Thefollowingthreesectionsexaminethenarrativeofthethree

mainperiodsofRomanianhistoryandtheidentitythemeswhichemergemost

prominentlyfromthem.Assuch,theeraofAntiquitycorrespondstotheFoundation

Myths–Origins,theHabitusandReligion,–thebedrockofthenarrativeonthe

Romaniancharacter’suniqueness.TotheMiddleAgesisconscribedthethemeof

BesiegedFortress,theidentitarymanifestationofahistoryofoppression,whilst

ModernityismarkedbytheemergenceofthethemeofUnity,whichbringstogether

thefirsttwothemes.BoththeidentitaryuniquenessoftheRomanianpeopleandtheir

unjusthistoricalexperiencevindicatethecreationofanationalstatewithinwhichthe

specialdestinyofRomaniansmaybefulfilled.Thecontinuityofthishistoricalnarrative

intothecontemporaryera,asahallmarkoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,is

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exploredwithreferencetoexternalcircumstances,namelyperceptionsoverthe

actionsoftheOthers,butalsoinrelationtotheroleplayedbyNicolaeCeasescu’s

regimeduringthefinalperiod,Communism.Whilstaddingnothingnewtothe

narrative,Ceausescu’sregimeaugmentsitsmainfeatures,particularlyinregardsto

RomanianuniquenessandthethemeofUnity,therebyentrenchingtheSelf-Other

contrastwithHungaryandRussia.Thechapterendswithanassessmentofthe

RomanianidentitynarrativeinplayattheendoftheCommunistperiod,andthe

impactofagencyonthisstructure.

TheContinuityoftheRomanianIdentityNarrative

Dutceac-Segestenwrote,“thenationalprojectisanodetoparticularism,to

uniquenesseven.Everynationattemptstodescribeitselfasanexceptional

combinationofcharacteristics,hand-pickedtodefinethetruesoulofthe

community.”167ThisquoteneatlyappliestoRomanians,apeopleconcernedwiththeir

nationalcharacterbothbeforeandafterthecreationoftheirstate.AsLucianBoia

argues,tothisday“theendeavourtouncover‘whatitmeanstobeRomanian’seems

farfromhavingexhausteditsresourcesandarguments.Onemightevenarguethatthe

firsttraitofRomaniansistheobsessionwiththeirownidentity.”168Indeed,in

researchingthesubjectofRomanianidentityonehasdiscoveredacontinuedeffortby

localhistorians,sociologistsandphilosophersto‘makesense’ofRomaniannes,whatis

‘special’aboutRomanians,andestablishtheirdestiny,inotherwordstheirrightful

placewithinEuropeandthewiderinternationalcommunity.Whilstthismay,initself,

notbepeculiartoRomanians,whatisperhapssurprisingisthereproductionofthe

originalidentitynarrativewhichemergedinthenineteenthandearlytwentieth

century,andwasaimedspecificallyatthejustificationofthecreationofaRomanian

nationalstate,tothisday.Thisisapparentintheremarkablecontinuityofthe

historicalnarrativethroughwhichclaimsaboutidentityaresocialised.Aparticular

viewofhistoryisperpetuated,ensuringthatportrayalsoftheSelfandOthersfollow

167A.Dutceac-Segesten,Myth,Identity,andConflict–AComparativeAnalysisofRomanianandSerbianHistoryTextbooks(Plymouth:LexingtonBooks,2011)p.122.168L.,Boia,IstorieŞiMitȊnConştiinţaRomânească[HistoryandMythinRomanianConsciousness]2ndEdition(Bucharest:Humanitas,2011),pp.245-246.

81

similarpatternsofrepresentation.AssociologistConstantinSchifirnethasargued,“in

whatconcernstheexpressionofRomaniannationalcharactertraits,aXXIcentury

RomanianisnotentirelydifferentfromtheXIXcenturyRomanian.Therefore,

RomanianidentitybecomesaconstantoftheRomaniannationalcharacter.”169

Thisensuresacertainlevelofsolidarityanduniformityofcharacternotonlybetween

Romaniansofacertainperiod,butacrossgenerations.Thelinkwiththepastbecomes

ahallmarkoftheidentitynarrativeasmemoriesofeventhedistanteventsare

retainedinthecontemporaryimaginaryandtranslatedintomodernversionsofthe

narrative.AsSchifirnetcontinues,“it[Romanianidentity]hasitsorigininapast,andis

thereforesubscribedtoahistoricandgenerationalcontinuity.Romanianstodayare

identical,incertainethnicandspiritualtraits,toRomaniansfromacrosstheages.”170

Thisnarrative,however,isadoubleedgedsword.Ontheonehand,theactualisation

ofthepasthastheeffectofcreatingadurablesenseofnationalidentity,thefeatures

ofwhichshowremarkablecontinuity,preciselybecauseitdrawsontimespast:“we

liveinthepresent,butwerelateourselvestoourorigins,wehaveanincontestable

identity,butweharnessitthroughtheidentityofourancestors.”171Ontheother

hand,acertainportrayaloftheSelfbringswithitacorrespondingrepresentationof

theOthers,whichissimilarlyperpetuated.Assuch,theantagonismswithHungaryand

RussiafromtheformativeeraoftheRomanianstatearereproduced,ensuringthatthe

characteroftheseOthersasessentiallythreateningisreinforced.Inwhatis,

essentially,aviciouscycle,theseimagesoftheOthersensurethecontinuedsalienceof

themainfeaturesoftheSelf–thedesiretoaffirmitsuniquenessandprotectitfrom

foreigninfluences.Inthefollowingsections,thecontinuityofthehistoricalnarrative

willbeoutlined,coupled,finally,withanassessmentoftheCeausecuregime’s

particularimpactontheidentitynarrative.

169C.Schifirnet,‘IdentitateRomaneascainContextulModernitatiiTendentiale[TheRomanianIdentityintheContextofTrend-SettingModernity],’RevistaRomanadeSociologie[TheRomanianJournalofSociology](newseries)XX:5-6(2009),p.474.170Ibid.,p.473.171Boia(2011),p.188.

82

Antiquity–FoundationMyths:Origins,Habitus,Religion

Origins

ForRomanians,bothhistoryandidentitybeginatthebeginning.TheSelfandthe

Otheraretwosidesofthesamecoin,inotherwords,themoreeffortispouredin

accentuatingone,thestrongerthecontrastisbuiltbetweenthetwo.IntheRomanian

imaginary,differentiationfromitsneighbourshasitsrootsintheirpeople’sunique

commonancestry–asMihaiMilcaargues,“Romanianidentityisbuiltsuigenerisonan

inheritanceresultedfromthesymbiosisoftheDaco-Romanstrands.”172Thisnotionis

notnew;itpicksuponearlierworksonwhatwasthentermed‘Romanianpsychology:’

in1907DumitruDraghicescuarguedthat“thesoulandcharacterofapeopleare

decidedby(…)[firstamongthreeaspects]thebasicethnicelement.”173In1937,

anotherimportantsociologicalworkbyConstantinRadulescu-Motrualsoemphasised

originsasthehallmarkofapeople’spsychology:“thespiritualtraitsofanationare

conditionedby(…)thehereditarybiologicalfundamentofthepeople.”174

InRomania,this‘fundament’isconsidereduniqueintheregion.Romaniansarethe

resultoftheRomancolonisationoftheancientregionofDacia,followingashortwar

in105-106AD.Thispeople,astheirnamesuggest,are,therefore,ofLatinorigin,

delineatingthemfromtheOthersofEasternEuropeortheBalkans;thesegroupsare

generallyofSlav,TurkicorMagyar(Hungarian)descent.AlthoughtheRomans

retreatedfromDaciain271AD,theirlegacywassignificant,bothatthetimeand

subsequently,particularlyinwhatconcernslanguage.TheRomanianlanguageisbased

onaformoflateLatin,which,althoughexposedtoSlavicinfluenceslateron,remains

closelyrelatedtoWesternLatinlanguagesand,therefore,essentiallyunlikeanyother

Easterndialects.Assuch,asDutceac-Segestenpointsout,“languageactedfromthe

verybeginningasanobviousdissimilaritywithrespecttothegroupslivinginthe

172M.Milca,IdentitateRomâneascăşiEuropeană[RomanianandEuropeanIdentity](Bucharest:Virtual,2010),p.27.173D.Draghicescu,DinPshihologiaPoporuluiRomân[FromthePsychologyoftheRomanianPeople](Bucharest:Albatros,reprintedin1995original1907),p.7.174C.Radulescu-Motru,PsihologiaPoporuluiRomân[ThePsychologyoftheRomanianPeople](Bucharest:Paideia,reprintedin1999original1937),p.11.

83

vicinityandbecametheprimarymarkerforgroupidentity.”175Intheabsenceof

statehood,languageisthemainunifyingfeaturesharedbyallRomaniansandoccupies

animportantpositioninthearticulationofthenarrativeconcerningRomanians’

spiritualunity.Thisisevidentina1922lecturebygraphologistandhistorianHenric

StahlcalledtheancientRomanianterritory“thelandofallofasingletongue.”176

Habitus

Figure2.ModerndayRomania(1945-),withthethreeregionsoutlined.Transylvaniatothewest,MoldovatotheeastandWallachiatothesouth.ThecurvatureoftheCarpathiansformsthebackboneofthecountry,andtheDanubeRomania’sborderwithBulgaria.TheBlackSeainthesouth-eastisthefinalgeographicreferencepoint.AdaptedbytheauthorfromMapofGreaterRomania,HeinusAtlas(Leipzig:KartographischeAnstaltvonF.A.Brockhaus,1926).Seelistoffiguresforcompletereference.

ItisalsosignificantthatRomanDaciaoccupiedapproximatelythesameterritoryasthe

proto-Romanianstateswhichsucceededit.Therefore,fromtheirveryincipience,

175Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.122.176H.Stahl,TarileRomanestipanainpreajmatimpurilormoderne–douaprelegeritinuteofiterilorscoaleispecialedegeniu[TheRomanianStatesUntilAroundModernTimes–TwoLecturesHeldfortheOfficersoftheSpecialSchoolofEngineerCorps](Bucharest:CulturaNeamuluiRomanesc,1922),p.12.

84

Romaniansestablishalinguisticandethno-geneticuniqueness,aswellasanatural

habitus,inotherwordsageographicalspacewhichbecomesthecradleofthispeople.

Radulescu-Motru,forinstance,believedthat,alongsideethnicity,“geographical

surroundings”177alsoinfluencedthecharacteristicsofanation.Likewise,philosopher

LucianBlaga,oneofthemostcelebratedRomanianphilosophers,arguedthatthe

physicalfeaturesoftheterritoryreflectedinthepeople’sspiritandeveninfluenced

theirfate:“ourunconscioussoulisorganicallyandinseparablysolidarywiththis

spatialhorizon(…)whichconstitutestheframeworkforaparticulardestiny.”178Inthe

Romanianimaginary,notuniquelyofcourse,thereisapowerfullinkagebetweenthe

geographicalspaceandthepeople.Naturallandmarksformthebordersofthe

territory–ashistorianDjuvaraargues,“ourcountryisalargecirclearoundthe

Transylvanianplateau,”179withtheCarpathianMountainsasitsbackboneandthe

RiverDanubeandBlackSeaasitssouthernandeasternlimits.Forreference,see

[Figure2],themapofmoderndayRomania.Manyhavearguedthatthisnatural

enclosurehasnotonlymarkedtheRomaniancharacter,butalsophysicallyprotected

it,initsearlydays,fromforeigninterference,thusensuringtheunitaryethno-genesis

ofthispeople.AshistorianFlorinConstantiniupointsout,“thereisatendency(…)to

considertheharmoniouscompositionoftheCarpathian-Danubianspaceasagift

offeredbyProvidenceorNaturetoitslater‘worthy’inhabitants–theRomanians–

helpingthemconfirmandaffirmtheirunity.”180ThisisevidentinStahl’searlierwork,

wherehearguesthat“becauseofourgeographicalpositioningwewerenotethnically

influencedbybarbarians”andtoitRomaniansowe“theircontinuityasapeople.”181

Additionally,tracingtheiroriginsbacktoAncientDaciaandRomeoffersRomanians

historicalantecedencewithintheregionandevenacertainpedigreeofancestryto

whichSlavicorMagyargroupsmaynotlayclaim.Ontopofdemarcatingthemfrom

peoplesofSlavicorHungariandescentwhoarrivedonthecontinentduringthe

177Radulescu-Motru(1999),p.11.178L.Blaga,TrilogiaCulturii[TheTrilogyofCulture](Bucharest:Humanitas,2011),p.164.179N.Djuvara,OScurtăIstorieaRomânilorPovestităCelorTineri[AShortHistoryofRomaniaNarratedtoOurYoung]12thEdition(Bucharest:Humanitas,2010),p.11.180F.Constantiniu,OIstorieSincerăAPoporuluiRomân[AnHonestHistoryoftheRomanianPeople]4thEdition(Bucharest:UniversEnciclopedicGold,2011),p.27.181Stahl(1922),p.11,p.9.

85

migrationwavesofthesixthcenturyandonwards,thisDaco-Romanlinkprovides

Romanianswithanteriorityintheirterritoryand,consequently,alegitimacyin

occupyingit.AsMilcacontinueshissummaryofthefundamentalfeaturesof

Romanianidentity:“itcertifiesitselfbyinvokingtheprincipleofhistoricalcontinuityin

theCarpathian-Danubian-Pontic182space.”183ThisformsthebasisofRomania’s

argumentofhistoricownershipoverTransylvania,theareaofcontentionwith

Hungary.

Religion

ThethirdfoundationmythoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeisreligion.For

Romanians,belongingtotheEasternChristianfaithisapivotalaspectbecauseitacts

asamechanismofbothself-definitionanddemarcationfromOthers.Religion

becomespartoftheoriginsnarrative,asproto-RomaniansChristianisewhilststill

underorimmediatelyaftertheRomanoccupationofDacia.AsDjuvaraargues,proof

canbefoundintheRomanianlanguageitself:“thetestimonyoflanguageisthemost

powerfulinestablishingtheancientnessofChristianityinRomania;allfundamental

termsrelatingtoreligionareofLatinorigin(…).”184Moreimportantly,however,the

narrativeemphasisesthefactthatOrthodoxywasnotimposedonRomanians,but

developednaturallyspreadingacrossthepopulation,evenbeforetheChurchbecame

anorganisedinstitution,exemplifiedhereinMihaiMilca’sassertion:“beforebeing

embodiedintheChurch(…),ChristianOrthodoxywasapopular,diffuse

phenomenon.”185Thenotionofagrass-rootsChristianityanditsearlybeginnings

implies,ineffect,thatreligionformspartofthefabricofRomanianness–Romanians

werebornChristianand,assuch,theirculturalandidentitarydevelopmentistightly

linkedtotheadherencetoandprotectionofChristianvalues.Thislinkhasbeen

emphasisedbyRomanianhistoriansacrosstheages,asDutceac-Segestenpointsout:

“thethesisofapopularChristianityoroftheorganiclinkbetweenthedefinitionofthe

ethnicgroupsanditsreligionwasverypopularamonghistoriansof19thcentury,and

182ThistheRomanianhabitus,orthenaturalgeographicspaceassociatedwiththeRomanianpeople.See[Figure2].AllRomanianinhabitedterritoriesarecontainedwithinthisimaginedregion.183Milca(2010),p.27.184Djuvara(2010),p.38.185Milca(2010),p.66.

86

evenbeforethem,amongthefirstauthorsofmedievalchronicles.”186Thisis

noticeableinStahl,whoarguesthat“thecementofthesamereligioninallRomanian

speakers”187preservedtheunityoftheRomanianpeople.Religion,coupledwith

language,becomesasecondidentitarymarkerandfeedsintotheSelf-Othernarrative.

ThiscombinationofLatinityandOrthodoxyisindeedunique,revealingRomaniansasa

‘special’ethnicgroup,delineatingthemnotonlyfromnon-Christiangroups,suchas

theOttomanEmpire,butalsosettingthemapartfromotherChristianpeoples–

Dutceac-Segesten,forinstance,suggeststhat“thethesisofpopularChristianityisused

asasignofprideandprimacyoverotherinhabitantsoftheregion.”188TheHungarians,

whoconvertedtoChristianityonlyin1001,areacaseinpoint–theirlateconversion

placestheminaninferiorpositionvis-à-vistheRomanians,inanotherdimensionof

thenarrativeonlegitimacywithinthehabitus.OrthodoxyplacesRomaniansfirmly

withintheEasternEuropeanhistoryandspaceandoffersthemacertainpedigree;

journalistPamfilSeicarusummarisesthisbyarguingthat“throughOrthodoxywehold

thetruthoftheEasternworld.”189

TheMedievalEraandEarlyModernity–The‘BesiegedFortress’

InRomania,boththeidentityandhistoricalnarrativesmustreconciletwoseemingly

incongruousfacts:whilsttheyseektoportrayRomaniansasuniqueandevensuperior

fromtheperspectiveoftheiroriginsandculturaltraits,itisnonethelessthecasethat

theiractualhistoricalexperienceislessthanillustrious.NotonlywereRomanians,for

muchoftheirhistory,separatedinthreeprovinces,buttheywere,byallaccounts,

developmentallaggards,only“effectivelyenteringtheMiddleAgesinthe14thcentury,

whenintheOccidenttheywerecomingtoanendandtheRenaissancewasnear.”190

Evenmoresignificantly,thislateenteringintohistorymeantthatRomanianscouldnot

competewiththeestablishedregionalpowers,whetherPoland,Hungaryorthe

186Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.167.187Stahl(1922),p.46.188Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.121.189P.Seicaru,SensultraditieiinDreptullamemorie[TheMeaningofTraditionintheRighttoMemory]VolumeIV(Bucharest:Dacia,1993),p.172,reproducedinM.Milca,IdentitateRomâneascăşiEuropeană[RomanianandEuropeanIdentity](Bucharest:Virtual,2010,p.71).190L.Boia,Romania,TaradefrontieraaEuropei[Romania,FrontierStateofEurope],4thEdition(Bucharest:Humanitas,2012),pp-61-62.

87

OttomanEmpire:“theycouldnot–accordingtomedievalhierarchy–beonequal

footingwiththeirneighbours.”191TheconsequenceisaMedievalperiodwhichfor

Romaniansessentiallyconsistsofsuccessivevassalagetoandoccupationbythe

foreignpowersmentionedabove.Thenarrativemustmitigatethissmall-state

conditionand,essentially,justifyRomanianexceptionalisminsuchmodestconditions.

ItachievesthisbyreinforcingtheSelf-Othercontrastalreadyarticulatedinthe

FoundationMythsandconstructingcertainrecurringthemes,mostprominentlyofthe

RomanianprovincesasBesiegedFortresses,victimsoftheexpansionisttendenciesof

theOthers,butwhichshowaremarkablecapacityofresistanceundermanyguises,

frommilitary,toreligiousandcultural.Asaresult,thenarrativereconcilesthe

provinces’historicfailuresbyattributingthemnottoRomanians,buttotheirharassing

Others,asDutceac-Segestenpointsout:“thepositionofvictimoffersmoralhigh

groundfromwhencetopassjudgementontheworld,one’sneighbours,orone’s

critics;sowhileitappearstobeapositionofweakness,itconfers,infact,acertain

merit.”192Thistendencytowardsself-victimisationisevidentfromanearlystage.The

threadcanbetracedbacktomedievaltimes,whenaMoldovanchroniclernotedthat

hisstatewas“inthepathofmalice.”193Thistheme,however,hasbeenprevalent

amongstmodernwritersalso.Draghicescunoted:“ourhistoricandsociallife(…)was

estranged,dependentandlimitedbythatofothers.Ourhistorywasmadebyour

neighbours,notaswewouldhavewantedit,butastheywishedit.Wedidnotliveour

ownlife,butthatofmanyothers(…).”194Evenasrecentlyas2011,historianFlorin

Constantiniucommentedthat“weweresuccessivelyattacked,plundered,dominated,

occupied,exploited.”195Romania’shistory,particularlyintheMedievalperiod,is

essentiallyconflictual,andthedestinyofitspeopleisnotintheirownhands,butoften

atthemercyoftheOther.Inthesub-sectionswhichfollow,examiningtheexperience

ofthethreemedievalprovincesduringtheMiddleAges,itwillbeshownhowthe

narrativereinforcestheSelf-Othercontrast.

191Boia(2012),p.62.192Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.107.193GrigoreUreche,citedinConstantiniu(2011),p.28.194Drăghicescu(1995),p.355.195Constantiniu(2011),p.29.

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TheThreeProvinces

ThethreeRomanianprincipalitiescameintobeingatdifferenttimesinthecontextof

theHungariandominationovertheregionattheturnofthefirstmillennium.

TransylvaniawasdirectlyoccupiedandintegratedintheKingdomofHungarybythe

endoftheeleventhcentury,whilstWallachiaandMoldaviawerecreatedasaresultof

theaggregationoflocalfeudallordswhobuiltalliancesinordertopushback

HungarianarmiescrossingtheCarpathianMountains.Thetwoprovinceswere

officiallyestablishedin1330and1365,respectively,intheaftermathofmilitary

victoriesagainsttheMagyarforces,becoming,asConstantiniuargues“irreversible

political-territorialrealitiesonthemapofmedievalEurope.”196Thereare,therefore,

threeregionswhichbringtogetherthevastmajorityofRomanianspeakers.Theyare

not,however,equalinstatus.Fromtheverybeginning,Transylvaniawaspartofthe

HungarianKingdomanditspathanddevelopmentwaslargelydisassociatedfromthat

ofWallachiaandMoldaviauntilthetwentiethcentury.Theothertwoaresemi-

independentsmallmedievalstateswhowillhavetonegotiatetheirgeo-strategic

positionattheconfluenceofanumberofregionalpowers–Poland,Hungaryand,

later,theOttomanandTsaristEmpires.Thehistoricalnarrative,althoughittreats

WallachiaandMoldaviaseparatelyfromTransylvania,197nonethelessfollowsthesame

patternofinterpretation,addressingthesamethemesinbothcases,inorderto

create,perhaps,thesenseofasharedexperience,ofcommunalitybetweenthethree

provinces,underdifferentcircumstances.

Transylvania–HungaryastheEssentialOther

InTransylvania,thefocusisonthecontrastbetweentheconqueredRomanians,who

formthemajorityofthepopulation,andtherulingHungarianswho,althoughinthe

minority,suppressandpersecutetheautochthonouspopulationthroughoutthe

thousandyearstheymaintaincontroloftheregion.Oppressionfirsttakesona

religiousdimension,withHungary’sconcertedattemptsattheconversionofthe

196Ibid.p.77.197Iorga,Constantiniu,Djuvara,Boia,etc.assignseparatesubchapterstothedevelopmentofTransylvania.

89

OrthodoxRomanianstotheCatholicfaith,totheextentthat,thenarrative

emphasises,itconditionsaccesstothenobilityclasstoaffiliationtotheWestern

Church.198Thesecondfacetofsuppressionistheinstitutionalisedpoliticalexclusionof

Romaniansfromtheregion’sleadershipstructure,throughapactnamedUnioTrium

Nationum(1437),regardingthedistributionofpoweramongsttheprivilegednations

oftheHungariansandtheirallies,theSaxonsandtheSzeklers.Romanians,mostof

whomhadbeenrelegatedtotheranksofthepeasantrybytheCatholiccondition,

wereconsideredatoleratednation,and“weredeprivedofpoliticalrightsandsubject

todiscriminationbytheprivilegednations.”199Thisstatusquowouldlargelyholduntil

theunificationwithRomaniain1918,meaningthat,forfourhundredyears

TransylvanianRomanianswerediscriminatedagainstandwere,asDjuvaraargued“a

negligiblequantityfromapoliticalperspective.”200

ThisportrayaloftheRomaniansasthe“mainvictimsofasystemofsocial

oppression”201makesTransylvaniathequintessentialBesiegedFortressinthe

Romanianimaginary,asthepopulationhereiscompletelysubjugatedtoitsHungarian

conquerors,lackingbothpoliticalrightsandsocialstanding.Draghicescu,forinstance,

arguesthat“theHungarianshavecommandedus,astheydostillinTransylvaniaand

Banat,andhaveimposedonustheirwillandlanguage.”202Tothisheaddsashort

commentonaforeignobserver’sdescriptionofTransylvanianRomanians,tellingof

theSelf-imagewhichhasdevelopedasaresultofthisnarrative:“theyhaveslyness,

theslave’sweapon.”203ThisimageoftheenslavementofTransylvanianRomaniansisa

powerfulandenduringone;Dutceac-Segestenpointsoutthat“themillenniumlong

slavery”204undertheHungariansisevenreferredtoinmodernhistorytextbooks.

Resentmentoverthisstateofaffairsisnoticeableinthenarrativetothisday:“inusing

theterm‘Romanianstate’forTransylvaniaoneshouldnotlosesightofthisreality[of

Romanians’exclusionfrompubliclife]:Romanianswereautochthonousandinthe

198Djuvara(2010),p.98;Constantiniu(2011),p.81.199S.Fischer-Galati,TwentiethCenturyRumania(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1970),p.14.200Djuvara(2010),p.102.201Iorga(1930),p.112.202Draghicescu(1995),p.460.203deGerando,citedinDraghicescu(1995),p.510.204Mihailescuetal,citedinDutceac-Segesten(2011),p.225.

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majority,butthepoliticalclasswasinitsoverwhelmingmajorityHungarian.”205This

interpretationofthesituationofTransylvanianRomaniansduringtheMiddleAges

definesRomanians’collectivememoryofandcontemporaryattitudestowards

Hungary.LucianBoiacapturesthisaccuratelywhenhesuggeststhat“extreme

opinionsreachmythicalproportionsandreachtheintensityofapsychosis.Evidently,

historybearsitsresponsibility:thediscriminationofRomaniansandthecontemptuous

attitudetowardstheminHungarybefore1918(…)cannotbuthavemarkedRomanian

consciousness.”206

ThisisallthemorethecaseaspersecutionwasrootedinRomanians’initialrejection

ofHungary’sattemptstoconvertthemtotheCatholicfaith.Theresistanceaspect,

presenthereinaculturalform,completesthethemeofBesiegedFortress.Romanians’

attachmenttotheirreligionhasadoublesignificance,astheoriginalbasisfor

discriminationbutalsoasproofoftheessentialdelineationbetweenthemselvesand

Hungarians.Milcaemphasisesthiswhenhesuggeststhat“Orthodoxy(…)wasaform

ofidentitaryresistanceagainstHungarianattemptstocatholiciseRomanians.”207

ConversionisseenasconducivetoassimilationintotheHungariancommunity208and

resistancetoit,inasense,entailsthesurvivaloftheRomanianethnicelementin

Transylvania.Draghicescu,forinstance,arguesthat:“itmusthavebeenan

extraordinaryvitalitywhich,withalltheindignationofourhistory,keptusalive.Since

theChristianlawseemstohavecontributedtopreservingusinCatholicHungary(…),it

wasabsorbingitsconservationpowerfromtheenergyofourpeople.”209In1930,the

statesmanandhistorianNicolaeIorga,oneoftheartisansoftheunification,implied

thattherejectionoftheCatholicfaithwasparamountinTransylvanianRomanians’

preservationoftheiruniquecharacter:“theRomanianlifeofthevillagesfrom

Ardeal210wasnotonlymaintainedbutwasflourishingintermsofawarenessofits

nationhood”asthepopulationtherewas“profoundlyboundtoitslanguage,religion

205Constantiniu(2011),p.82.206Boia(2011),p.278.207Milca(2010),pp.68-70.208Djuvara(2010)andConstantiniu(2011)bothpointthatseverallaterTransylvanianvoevodsdescendfromCatholicisedandMagyarisedRomaniannoblelines.209Draghicescu(1995),p.358.210ThecentralregionofTransylvania.

91

andtraditions.”211Conversely,forRomanianswhohadcatholicised,thislinkhadbeen

lost:“therehadexistedaRomaniannobility[inTransylvania].(…)Butanotherreligion,

anothersociallife,anotherpoliticalgoalhadwonovertheirsouls,whichwere,

becauseofit,slowlytransformed.”212

Inidentitaryterms,thisisimportantbecauseitcementsthenotionofanequalitysign

betweenOrthodoxyandRomanians.Ontheotherhand,theessentialsocialand

politicalrepercussionsofthisequationcompletethetableauofRomaniansasvictims

oftheHungarians.Ultimately,thisinterpretationofTransylvania’shistoryemphasises

thepricepaidbyRomaniansforretainingtheirtraditionalvaluesandgivesthis

struggleanalmostheroicdimension–survivalbearsthecostofdominationbya

foreignpower.AsDutceac-Segestenpointsout,thisnarrativeispervasive:inacertain

Romanianhistorytext-book,Hungariansareportrayedas“responsibleforthelackof

officialrecognitionofOrthodoxy,andthereforeforthemaltreatmentofthosewho

continuetoembraceitdespitedifficulties.ThesufferingoftheOrthodoxfaithfulis

placedintheheritagelineoftheearlyChristianmissionaries.”213Thisportrayalofthe

SelfiscomplementedbyarepresentationofHungaryasanessentialOtherand

responsibleforthehistoricsubjugationofTransylvanianRomanians.More

importantly,presentedinthecontextofthehistoricalexperienceoftheRomanian

people,thedramaofTransylvaniaisexportedsuchthatHungary’spersecutionof

TransylvanianRomaniansbecomesaninjusticeleviedagainstallRomanians;inother

words,anationalratherthanregionalissue.Asaresult,Boiaargues,Romanianshave

constructedamytharoundHungary’sinfluenceontheexistenceandaffairsoftheir

state,ascribingtoittheroleof“dominantpiecetowhicharesubordinatedallmajor

Romanianevolutions.”214Dutceac-Segestenpicksuponthismythbuildingexercise.In

herreviewofRomanianhistorytextbooks,shefindsthat,mostoften,“Hungariansare

portrayedonlyasenemies,ascounterweightstotheRomanianaction.Theydonot

appeartopossessspecificfeatures,otherthananincessantdesiretoopposethe

211Iorga(1930),pp.110-111.212Ibid.,p.112.213Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.167.214Boia(2011),p.279.

92

Romaniancause(…).”215Consequently,Hungariansoccupyaspecificandcriticalplace

intheRomanianimaginary,attheheartofalleffortstocreate,uniteandprotectthe

Romanianterritories.

WallachiaandMoldavia

InWallachiaandMoldavia,thehistoricalnarrativefollowssimilarpatternsof

interpretation,despitethedifferenceinstatusbetweenthemandTransylvania.The

twoprincipalitieswere,ineffect,establishedpoliticalandadministrativeentities,but

theirsmall-stateconditionmeantthattheycouldnotachieveindependence.Inthe

twocenturiesthatfollowedtheircreation,Wallachiawas“attimes(…)avassalof

Hungary,oravassaltotheOttomans(forthefirsttimein1390),orasemi-

independentstate(…)”216whilstMoldaviaswitchedfrombeingavassalofHungaryto

swearingallegiancetothePolishcrowninwhathasbeendescribedasa“strugglefor

politicalemancipation(…)bythevoevodsofWallachiaandMoldova.”217Withtherise

oftheOttomanEmpireinthefifteenthcenturythebalanceofpowerinSouthernand

EasternEuropechangedandthetwostatesbecamepermanentvassalstothePorte,

Wallachiain1476andMoldaviain1512,suzeraintywhichlasteduntilthenineteenth

century.Themedievalexperienceofthetwostates,therefore,isoneprimarilyof

subserviencetoforeignpowerswhichisobviouslyatoddswiththeprerogativeofself-

preservationandofrejectionofexternalinfluencesthatappearssoprominently

throughoutthenarrative.Again,thethemeoftheBesiegedFortressaimstovindicate

thisstateofaffairsand,similarlytothecaseofTransylvania,thefocusisonboththe

victimisationoftheRomanianpeoplesandresistance,whichheretakestheguiseof

ensuringthesurvivalandautonomyofthestates.

Draghicescuhighlights“theintriguesandinterventionoftheTurks,Hungariansand

Polesintheinternalaffairsofthesistercountries”aswellasthe“humiliationsand

defeatssuffered”218bytheRomanianpeople.Radulescu-Motrualsotalksabout“the

215Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.224.216P.R.Magocsi,HistoricalAtlasofCentralEurope(Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress,2002),p.30.217Fischer-Galati(1970),p.10.218Draghicescu(1995),p.297.

93

wickedcircumstancesourpeoplehaveendured.”219Contemporaryhistorian

ConstantiniubelievesthattheRomanianstateswereexploitedbecauseoftheir

inherentgeo-politicalsignificance,onthepathofallcontinental“expansionsand

invasions.”220ThepicturecreatedisoneofRomaniansashelplesstargetsof

expansionistlargerpowers.Undersuchcircumstances,independenceisnotanoption

andthedestinyofthesestatescanonlybeoneofsubmission.Thistypeofnarrativeis

evidenceofwhatDutceac-SegestenarguesisRomania’s“traditionofplacing[itself]in

aninferiorpositionvis-à-vistheirmorepowerfulneighboursandthusjustify[ing]the

lackofpowerordominancebyplacingtheblameelsewhere.”221

Showing,however,Romanians’relativeweaknessisnotenough.Inordertocomplete

theBesiegedFortresstableauanarrativeofresistanceisrequired.Forthis,thefocus

shiftsonportrayingRomanians’benevolentacceptanceofsuzeraintyasaguaranteeof

thesurvivalofthestateswhichprotectstheRomanianethnicelement.AsBoiaargues,

theRomaniannarrativeemphasisesthe“remarkablevitalityoftheRomanianregions,

whichsucceeded,indifficultconditions(…),toprotecttheirexistence,whilstonce

powerfulstates,suchasHungaryorPoland(…),collapsed,swallowedbyevengreater

powers.”222MihaiMilcagoesasfarastosuggestthatthis,infact,wastheraisond’être

oftheprincipalities:“aminimumstrategyofsurvivaloftheRomanianelement

requiredaccommodatingtocircumstancesandthetemporarycompromisewith

superiorforces,crushingfromamilitary,demographic,etc.perspective.”223

Romanianscannothopetoachieveindependence,butself-preservationisattainable;

therefore,acceptingvassalageisnotcowardlybutadefendable,perhapseven

ingenious,measureofensuringthesurvivaloftheRomanianelement.Inidentitary

terms,thisnarrativeissignificant,becauseitreinforcestheportrayalofRomaniansas

resoluteinretainingtheirstatehoodinahistoricalcontextwhichisagainstthem,as

wellasrevealingthemasspecialinhowtheynegotiatethedifficultcircumstancesthey

arefacing.

219Radulescu-Motru(1999),p.45.220Constantiniu(2011),pp.28-29.221Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.107.222Boia(2012),p.62.223Milca(2010),p.70.

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Withthis,thethemeofBesiegedFortressiscomplete.InbothTransylvaniaontheone

hand,andWallachiaandMoldaviaontheother,thepicturecreatedbythehistorical

narrativeisoneofconflictandoppressionbygreaterpowers.Romaniansarevictimsof

historybutmanagetoretaintheirfledglingidentitybyvariousmeans,andoftenat

greatcost.ThedifferentiationbetweenSelfandOtherisathreadthatrunsthroughout

andleadstoaperceptionthat,althoughphysicallyseparated,Romaniansnonetheless

shareadesiretoprotectthevaluesthatwouldlaterdefinetheuniquenessoftheir

character,whetherreligiousattachmentorautonomywithinthehabitus.Inthe

modernera,theseideaswouldallbeharnessedwhenanewthemeemerges–thatof

unityandindependence.

TheModernEra–theThemeofUnityTheBirthofRomanianNationalIdentity–Unity

UnityisthelinchpinoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,towhichallSelfandOther

regardingfeaturesexploredsofararesubordinated–Dutceac-Segesten,forinstance,

considersittobe“oneofthemajorpillarsofintheconstructionofnationalRomanian

identityandadominantmyth.224TheemergenceofthisthemeintheRomanian

regionsisunsurprisinglytightlylinkedtothenationalisttrendwhichsweptEuropein

theeighteenthandnineteenthcentury,asLucianBoiaargues:“thethemecouldnot

buttemptRomanians.Anationwhichwaslateinachievingunity,(…)Romaniansfelt

theneedtodefinetheelementsofthisunity,thetraitswhichmadethemsimilarto

oneanotheranddifferentfromothers.”225Tothisend,theFoundationMythsaswell

astheBesiegedFortressthemewereutilisedtoprovethespiritualunityofthe

Romaniansand,ultimately,legitimisethecreationofasinglestatebringingtogether

allRomanianspeakers.ThesenowsedimentedclaimsaboutRomanianidentitywere,

therefore,fromtheverybeginningapoliticaltool.Theconnectionbetweenthisunity-

drivensenseofidentityandthetroubledhistoryoftheRomanianregionswasalso

paramount.Intellectualsbasedtheirargumentsforunificationonthecultural

communalitiesofallRomaniansandtheexistenceofadefactoRomaniannation,but

224Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.171.225Ibid.,p.238.

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alsousedthevictimhoodnarrativetoportraythecreationofanation-stateas

vindicationforRomanians’historyofoppressionandinterferencebyforeignpowers.

Themodernhistoricalnarrativehighlightsboththepoliticaleffortstoachievethe

unificationoftheregions,andalsotheprocessofdevelopmentoftheseideas.For

instance,thefactthatthefirstattestationofRomaniannationhoodinanofficial

contextcamefromTransylvaniaintheformofapetitionforpoliticalrightsfor

RomanianTransylvanians(SupplexLibellusValacharomTranssilvaniae,1791)isof

particularsignificancefortworeasons.Firstly,theappealwasbasedonthe

preponderanceoftheRomanianethnicelementintheregion,butalsoonits

anterioritycomparedtotherulingHungarians226anargumentintunewiththeOrigins

andHabitatmyths.RomanianscouldtracetheirexistencewithinTransylvaniato

Antiquityandthisdefinedtheirhistoricalrightinoccupyingit,whilst,atthesametime,

entitlingthemtopoliticalrecognition.Assuch,Constantiniuargues,theSupplex“was

theexpressionoftheremarkableprogressinthecrystallisationofRomanian

nationalistideology.”227Secondly,itprovesthattheemancipationmovementbeginsin

Transylvaniaandfromhereitis“funnelledintoWalachiaandMoldavia”228throughout

thenineteenthcentury.Thisiscrucialtotheidentitynarrativeasitmeansthatthe

awarenessofnationalbelongingofTransylvanianRomaniansisnotstymiedbytheir

suppressionunderHungarianrule,but,tothecontrary,triggeredbyit.Theattestation

ofnationhoodbecomes,inthisvein,amodernmanifestationofresistancetoforeign

ruleintheBesiegedFortressofTransylvania.Asthisthemeiscarriedacrossthe

CarpathiansintoWallachiaandMoldavia,theidentitarydiscourseplacesTransylvania

attheheartoftheendeavourtobringtogethertheRomaniannation.

Itwasnotlongbeforethesenotionsbegantogathertractionintheothertwo

Romanianregionsanditisherethattheybecomeargumentsfortheestablishmentof

anation-state.Aparticularlyinterestingbook,publishedinthecommunistperiod

(1982),acompendiumofworksandcorrespondencebyRomanianleadersand

intellectuals,effectivelytrackstheevolutionofthediscourseonunityinthefirsthalf

226SeeMilca(2010),Constantiniu(2011),Djuvara(2010).227Constantiniu(2011),p.190.228Ibid.,p.15.

96

ofthenineteenthcentury.Bythe1830sRomanianadministratorswerepointingout

that“thedifferencebetweentheworld’speoplesarefirstaccordingtoreligion,

languageandproximity–andsecondly,accordingtotraditionsandthenatureofthe

administration–neitheroneofthesecanbefoundbetweenWallachiansand

Moldavians.”229Thereisarecognition,therefore,thatthesimilaritiesbetweenthe

peoplesinthetwoprincipalitiesarebasedonboththeircommonorigins,butalso

theirsimilarhistoricalexperiences.BythePan-Europeanrevolutionof1848,the

discoursehadcrystallisedaroundtheidentificationofthesefactorsastheconstitutive

elementsofaRomaniannationencompassingnotonlyWallachiaandMoldavia,but

theotherRomanianinhabitedregionsaswell.RevolutionarieslikeNicolaeBalcescu

werearguingthat“ouraim,gentlemen,IbelievecannotbeotherthantheNational

UnityofRomanians.Aunityfirstoffeeling,tobringwithitpoliticalUnity,tomake

Wallachians,Moldavians,Bessarabians,230Transylvanians(…),onebodypolitic,one

nation,onestate.”231Theframingofhisargument,however,highlightsthemannerin

whichthemedievalvictimhoodnarrativehasfedintotheunitydiscourse:“these

Romanianstatesthathaveexistedforeighteencenturies,thisnation(…)whichhas

escapedunscathedfromtheterroroftheMiddleAgeswhensomanyenemiesmore

powerfulthanitthreatenedtoconquerit(…)howcoulditbedestinedtodisappear

now(…)inthecenturyofliberty.”232Unityandindependenceweredeserved,

therefore,preciselybecausethehistoryoftheRomanianregionshadhithertobeen

oneofhardshipandendurance.

229Conachi,citedinG.Kirileanu,‘IdeeaUniriilamarelelogofatC.Conachi[TheIdeaofUnificationinLogotheteC.Conachi],’ConvorbitiLiterare,XLIII:1(1909),pp.55-59,inC.Bodea,1848laRomani–oIstorieinDatesiMarturii[1848forRomanians–aHistoryinDatesandTestimonies](Bucharest:EdituraStiintificasiEnciclopedica,1982),p.80.230BythispointMoldaviahasalreadybeenpartitionedintheWesternMoldavia,thesemi-independentstateandBessarabia,controlledbytheTsaristEmpire(1812).231N.Balcescu,’Privireasuprastariidefata,asupratrecutuluisiviitoruluipatrieinoastre[AnOverviewoftheCurrentSituation,overthePastandFutureofOurNation],’Operevol.I,G.ZaneandE.Zane(eds)(Bucharest:EdituraAcademieiRomane,1974),pp.171-178,inC.Bodea,1848laRomani–oIstorieinDatesiMarturii[1848forRomanians–aHistoryinDatesandTestimonies](Bucharest:EdituraStiintificasiEnciclopedica,1982),pp.319-320.232Ibid.,p.318.

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Figure3.TheOldKingdom(1859-1918).ResultedfromtheunificationofWesternMoldavia,inblue,andWallachia,inpink.Adaptedbytheauthorfrom‘MapofGreaterRomania,’HeinusAtlas(Leipzig:KartographischeAnstaltvonF.A.Brockhaus1926).Seelistoffigureforcompletereference.

Boththesegoalswereeventuallyachieved,althoughinstages.In1859camethe

unificationofWallachiaandMoldaviainthefirststateofRomania,alsoknownasthe

OldKingdom–see[Figure3].IndependencefromtheOttomanEmpirewasattainedin

1878andTransylvaniaandBessarabiajoinedtheothertworegionsaftertheFirst

WorldWar,in1918–see[Figure4].ThisfinalstageistheculminationoftheRomanian

nationalprojectand,assuch,oneofthemostcelebratedeventsofitshistory–itisno

coincidencethatthedateofthedefactounification,1December,isRomania’s

nationalday.Thecompletionofthehabitusandtheestablishmentofanindependent

statebringingtogetherallRomanianspeakersisthebenchmarkoftheRomanian

identitynarrativeandavindicationofahistoricalexperiencemarkedbyforeign

domination.ContemporaneousstatesmanandhistorianIorgaframesthisbestwhen

heassertsthat“inthisCarpathian-DanubianOrient[exists]apeopleofabout

14.000.000souls,withanancientoriginalcivilisationwhichdoesnotask,inexchange

foritsmillenarysuffering(…),foranythingmorethanrespectofitsincontestable

98

destiny”233tobebroughttogetherinasinglestate.Revealingpoliticalunityasthe

specialdestinyofallRomaniansplacesthenation-stateatthecentreoftheidentity

narrative;thestatewasseenasthephysicalmanifestationoftheexistenceof

Romaniansasapeopleand,assuch,itscreationsignifiedtherightful‘cominginto

being’oftheRomaniannation,againstthevicissitudesofhistory.Thisperceptionof

theestablishmentofanation-stateasjustdesertsispervasive.NotedjuristGeorge

Sofronie,activeinthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,arguedin1942that“forthe

nationalconsciousness(…)ofRomanianseverywhere,thedecisiontakenon1

December1918(…)has,aboveallelse,thesignificanceofajustsentenceinalong

historicalprocess.”234

Figure4.GreaterRomania(1918-1940).ResultedfromtheunificationoftheOldKingdom,inpink;Bessarabia,inyellow;andTransylvania,inblue.Adaptedbytheauthorfrom‘MapofGreaterRomania,’

233N.Iorga,IstoriaRomanilorsiaCivilisatieiLor[TheHistoryofRomaniansandTheirCivilisation](Bucharest:EdituraFundatieiFerdinandI,1930),p.281.234G.Sofronie,‘Semnificatiajuridico-istoricaaActuluidelaAlba-Iulia[TheJuridicalandHistoricalSignificanceoftheAlba-IuliaAct],’inG.Ivascu,andA.Tanasescu(eds.),CumpănaCuvântului1939-1945[TheSweepoftheWord1939-1945](Bucharest:Eminescu,1977),p.329.

99

HeinusAtlas(Leipzig:KartographischeAnstaltvonF.A.Brockhaus1926).Seelistoffiguresforcompletereference.

Eveninthecontemporarynarrative,boththeFoundationMythsandBesiegedFortress

themeareusedinframingthisachievement.Djuvara,forinstance,callstheGreat

Unification“miraculous(…)[and]thefulfilmentofRomanians’centuriesolddreamto

cometogetherfromBanat[A/NregionintheWestofthecountry]totheDniester

River.”235Onenoticeshereanemphasisontheorganichabituslimitedbynatural

landmarksandalinkingbetweenpoliticalandgeographicalcompleteness.Milca,on

theotherhand,arguesthat“Romanianidentitymetamorphosed,afterperiodsof

humiliationandoppressionbythegreatpowers,knew,after1918(…)aneraof

patrioticexaltationandnationaljubilation.(…)Romaniansenjoyedafeelingof

realisationofacollectiveaspirationrefusedforcenturiesonend(…).”236Thereisa

certainsenseherethatRomaniaineffectdefeatshistory,achievingunificationdespite

itseternalill-wishersandthusitssuccessisanindividualendeavour,outliningonce

againtheresilienceanddeterminationofitspeople.Itisthereforethecasethat,whilst

thethemeofUnityisdominant,thediscourseonitslegitimacyincorporatesthemajor

aspectsofthefoundationandmedievalthemes,tothepointatwhichtheybecome

constitutiveelementsofit.

235N.Djuvara(2010),p.236.236Milca(2010),p.86.

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TheEssentialOthersandNeedforIdentityNarrativeContinuity

Figure5.TerritorialLossesof1940.Inyellow,Bessarabia,cededtotheSovietUnion;inblue,North-WesternTransylvania,cededtoHungary;inorange,theCadrilaterregion,cededtoBulgaria.Adaptedbytheauthorfrom‘MapofGreaterRomania,’HeinusAtlas(Leipzig:KartographischeAnstaltvonF.A.Brockhaus1926).Seelistoffigureforcompletereference.

AlthoughtheunificationofthethreeRomanianprincipalitiesisnowalmostahundred

yearsold,thethemeofUnitystillrepresents‘amajorpillar’oftheRomanianidentity

narrative.AsLucianBoiahasargued,“inRomanianculture,themythofunity,orof

uniformity,issoentrenched”thatitaffectsevenspecialists,“historiansor

sociologists.”237Thereare,ofcourse,complexreasonswhythatisthecase,notleast

theinfluenceofcommunismontheidentitynarrativewhichwillbediscussedinthe

followingsection.Thisthesisargues,however,thatanimportantaspectwhichone

shouldtakeintoaccountisthat,intheRomanianperception,thisunitytodayis

neithercompleteoruncontested,givingthethemecontemporarysalience.Asaresult,

nationalunitycontinuestoplayacrucialpartintheRomanianimaginary,withthe

237Boia(2010),p.235.

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focusnowshiftingfromthecreationtotheprotectionoftheRomanianstate.Inthis,

twoparticularactorsplayacriticalrolebecauseoftheirperceivedinterestsand

interferenceintheaffairsofthenewstate–HungaryandRussia,–becoming

effectivelysubscribedinthethemeofUnityasessentiallythreateningOthers.

IthasalreadybeenshownhowHungary’sconqueringofTransylvaniaandits

treatmentoftheindigenousRomanianpopulationhasbeenportrayedinthehistorical

andidentitynarrative,buildingHungaryintoanessentialenemyofRomanians’efforts

foremancipation.TransylvaniawaseventuallyannexedbytheOldKingdomafterthe

FirstWorldWarresolvingasituationwhichDjuvaraargued,“weighedheavilyonthe

Romanianheart.”238Thatisbecause,withoutTransylvaniathenationalproject

remainedincomplete,asDraghicescu’sassertionexemplifies:“ourhistory,ourmap,is

unfinishedandstillawaitsthefulfilmentofitsrealandnaturalcontours.”239These

identitaryscarswouldperhapshavehealed,hadtheissueofownershipof

Transylvaniabeensettledatthetime.However,Hungarydidnotrenounceitsclaim

overTransylvaniaand,giventheopportunityin1940,itannexedpartofitunder

sanctionfromGermany–see[Figure5].Althoughtheterritorywaseventually

returnedtoRomaniaattheendoftheSecondWorldWar,thefactthatHungary

challengedRomania’srightofpossessingTransylvaniadefinitivelyconfirmedthe

interpretationofthisactorasanexistentialthreattoitspeopleand,fromnowon,its

territorialintegrity.AcontemporaneousaccountrevealstheimpactofHungarian

aggressionontheRomanianimaginary:“wedidnotbelieve,no-onecouldeverhave

imaginedthattherighteousnessofRomania,whilstsoevident,wouldeverbe

questionedagain.”240BuildingonthealreadyexistingtensionsbetweenRomaniaand

Hungary,thedenialofthe‘righteousness’ofthecontoursoftheRomanianstate,

basedonhistoricalrights,istheeventwhichconclusivelysituatesHungaryasan

antagonisticforceintheRomanianidentitydiscourse,ascribingtoit,asBoiaand

Dutceac-Segestenhaveargued,adominantmalignantroleinthenation’sevolution.241

238Djuvara(2010),p.230.239Draghicescu(1995),p.447.240L.Rebreanu,‘Transilvania1940[Transylvania1940],’Familia[TheFamily]76,seriesIV:1(January1941),pp.8-10,inG.Ivascu,andA.Tanasescu(eds.),CumpănaCuvântului1939-1945[TheSweepoftheWord1939-1945](Bucharest:Eminescu,1977),p.207.241Boia(2011),p.279,Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.224.

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TheperceptionthattheirterritorycontinuestobecontestedandisstillaBesieged

FortresscausesinRomaniansaninherentsuspicionanddistrustofHungary’sactions,

whilst,ontheotherhand,inidentitarytermsreinforcestheimportanceofaffirming

andprotectingtheirunity.Thisisultimatelyattherootofcontemporaryattitudes

towardsHungary,notleastduetoBudapest’scontinuedinterestintheaffairsofits

minorityinTransylvania.

Inthisview,theraisond’êtreoftheRomanianstatebecomestheprotectionoftheir

habitusandpeoplefromexternalinterference.TheactionsofthesecondOtherdo

nothingifnotexacerbatethistendency.Russiaentersthescenemuchlaterthan

Hungary,butitsinfluenceonRomanianhistoryandidentityisportrayedtobejustasif

notevenmorepowerfulthanHungary’s.PartofthereasonisthatTsaristRussia’s

expansionintoEasternEurope,primarilythroughthecenturies-longRusso-Turkish

Wars,coincideswiththearticulationoftheRomaniannationalproject–atatime

whennationalunitybecomestheirmainpoliticalgoal,Russia’sinterferenceinthe

affairsofMoldaviaandWallachiaintensifies.AsLucianBoiaargues,theconsequence

isthatRussiansareseen“withsuspicions,evenhostility,asapotentialthreattothe

Romaniannation.”242Thethreatmaterialisesmostprominentlyinthecaseof

Bessarabia,originallytheeasternpartofMoldavia.TheregionisannexedbyRussiain

1812243beginningwhatDjuvaratermed“thetragedyofBessarabia.”244Despite

unifyingwithRomaniain1918afterthedisintegrationoftheTsaristEmpire,

BessarabiaisreclaimedbyRussiain1940andlostforgoodaftertheendoftheSecond

WorldWar,whenitbecomesaSovietrepublic–see[Figure5].Thepartitionof

MoldaviaanditsforcedseparationfromtheRomanianstateasadirectresultof

RussianinterferencehashadaprofoundimpactontheRomanianidentitynarrativein

boththearticulationoftheSelf,andRussiaasanOther.

InwhatconcernstheSelf,thesheerexistenceofBessarabia–nowtheRepublicof

Moldova–anotherterritoryinhabitedbyRomanians,meansthatthenationalproject

242Boia(2012),p.80.243In[Figure3]onenoticesthat,bythetimeofthe1859unification,BessarabiawasseparatefromMoldavia,p.79.244Djuvara(2010),p.172.

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remainsincomplete–thegoalofnationalunityand,asacorollary,theprotectionof

thestate’sintegrityhavebeenfailed.Whatmakestheeventevenmoresignificantis

thefactthat,forRomanians,Bessarabiaisnotacontestedterritory:asBoiaargues,

“over[it]Romanianshadanincontestablehistoricalright–ithadbeenstolenfrom

Moldaviain1812.”245Agreatinjustice,therefore,hasbeeninflictedontheRomanian

peoplewhich,coupledwiththerealitythatGreaterRomaniawasanephemeral

project(allinall,BessarabiawaspartofRomaniaforonly25years)makesitslossthe

greattragedyofRomanianmodernhistory.Ontheotherhand,theauthorofthis

wrongdoingisRussia,yetanothergreatpowerenforcingitswillontheRomanian

people,confirmingitssmallstateconditionandputtinganendtothedreamofa

“GreaterRomaniafromtheDniester[i.e.theeasternborderofMoldova]totheTisza

[thewesternborderofTransylvania].”246ThethemeofBesiegedFortressreprised,

RussiareplacestheOthersofthepast–Poland,Austro-Hungary,theOttomans–as

theessentialthreateningsuperpower,withtheRomaniansvictimsoftheir

expansionism.AsMarinargues,Russiansbecomeforeversubscribedinthevictimhood

narrative:“(…)itisthemwhoareresponsibleofthe‘unfortunatedestiny’ofthe

Romanians.”247Thisnotionmayseemsurprising,takingintoaccountthefiftyyears

thatfollowedthelossofBessarabia,whichsawRomania’smoveintotheSoviet

Union’ssphereofinfluenceduringtheColdWar.However,aswillbeshowninthe

nextsection,althoughtheresponsetotheeventwasmutedatthetime,Ceausescu’s

nationalsocialismsoonbroughtthissimmeringresentmenttotheforeanddefined,to

alargeextent,Romania’scontemporaryattitudetowardsRussia.Theconsequenceof

theeventoverallisthatthereisanindeliblelink,intheRomanianimaginary,between

RussiaandtheunravellingofRomanianunity.

TheCommunistPeriodCeausescuandtheWeaponisingofRomanianNationalIdentity

SofarithasbeenshownhowtheRomanianidentitynarrative,whichemergesin

earnestduringthenineteenthcentury,hasnationalunityandthenation-stateatits

245Boia(2012),p.94.246Boia(2011),p.216.247MarincitedinDutceac-Segesten(2011),p.218.

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heart,andisdeeplyrootedinthetellingofitspeople’shistory,particularlyitsorigins

andmedievalexperiences.TheSelf-Othercontrastisoneoftheprimarymarkersof

thisnarrative,afactwhichisnotinitselfunique.However,themannerinwhichitwas

utilisedinthecommunistperiod,especiallyduringCeausescu’sregime,makesit

crucialinunderstandingRomanians’contemporaryanxietiesandsensitivitiesin

regardstotheroleofthestateanditsrelationswithbothRussiaandHungaryas

Others,andtheRepublicofMoldova,asanEstrangedSelf.

Romaniancommunismis,initself,anoddentity.BeforetheSecondWorldWarit

wouldhavebeenunthinkablethattheCommunistPartycouldeverrisetopowerin

thisstate.AsBoiahasargued,itwasperceivedasa“foreigner’sparty,betrayerof

nationalinterests(…).TherealityisitplayedtoMoscow’stune,proclaimingthe

multinationalcharacteroftheRomanianstateandnations’righttoself-determination

(inotherwords,thebreakingupofRomaniaand,mostimportantly,therecoveryof

BessarabiabytheRussians).”248Asaresult,itwentagainsttheprimaryprerogativesof

theRomanianstate,theprotectionofitsunityandevenitsnationalcharacter.Addto

thisthedramaofthelossofBessarabia,Romania’sadoptionofcommunismasstate

ideologycould,therefore,nothavebeenthepeople’schoice;asRomanianhistorians

haveendeavouredtopointout,itwas,instead,imposedbyMoscow.249Sinceboth

communistideologyandtheclosenesstoRussiaitsadoptionentailedwere

incompatiblewiththepreceptsoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,theirenforcement

would,overtime,cementtheimageofRussiaasamalignantinterferingforceinthe

affairsoftheRomanianstate.Intheshortterm,therewasnonethelessanattemptby

thepro-MoscowCommunistPartytopursueare-alignmentoftheRomanianidentity

andhistoricalnarrativestothisnewcourse.Boiaarguesthat,duringthe1950sthe

Sovietmodelhadto“impregnateRomanians’minds.Theonlyhistoricandcultural

referencepointremainedRussia.(…)Historywasrewritten.”Ifbeforetheemphasis

hadbeenonthenationalidea,“nowtheaccentshiftedto(…)integrationintheSlav

space,inparticular‘brotherly’relationswithRussiaandtheSovietUnion.”250The

248Boia(2012),p.105.249SeeBoia(2011),Constantiniu(2011),Djuvara(2010).250Boia(2012),pp.117-118.

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population’sand,soonafter,elites’reactiontothis,however,wasoneintunewith

Romanianattitudetowardsforeigninfluenceingeneral,namelyresistance;not

political,butcultural.AttemptsatRussification,forinstance,failedcomprehensively,

asBoiapointsout:“even(…)whenRussianwasintenselystudied,toofewactually

learntit.Manyonly‘pretended’:itwasasignofnon-adherence,apassiveformof

resistance.(…)EvenlessdidtheRomanianslearntolovetheRussians.Noteven

Romaniancommunistslovedthem.”251

Additionally,whatfollowedwasanendeavourtobreakawayfromRussian

communismand,whilstnotrenouncingtheideologyaltogether,fashioningitinto

somethingcompatiblewiththedominantportrayaloftheRomanianSelf.AsDutceac-

Segestenstates,thiswasachievedbycreating“theRomanian‘socialistnation,’a

combinationofnationalismandMarxism.”252Althoughthetrendbeganinthelate

1950sundertheleadershipofGheorgheGheorghiu-Dej,itisNicolaeCeausecu’s

administrationwhichexemplifiestheseeffortsmostprominently.Hisregime

combined,andthuslegitimised,personalrulewiththemainpreceptsoftheRomanian

identitynarrative,cloakedinadestructiveformofnationalism.AsCinopoeshas

pointedout“thecultofpersonalitywenthandinhandwiththenationalistdirection

Ceausescuadoptedsoonaftercomingtopower.”253Ceausescueffectivelytookthe

constitutivethemesofthenarrativeandalteredtheminsuchaswayastoportraythe

uniquenessoftheRomaniancharacterandthedifferentiationfromOthersasaproud

nationaldestinyandtheirprotectionasthemainresponsibilityofthestate.Asaresult,

constructinganunquestionablelinkbetweenhisregimeandRomania’sgloriouspast

ofresistingforeigninterferencewascrucial,withcertainattempts,suchasthebuilding

ofa“totem-likesculpturewithCeausescu’sheadatthetopofacolumnofRomanian

princes,”254whichmaytodayseembizarre,ifnotentirelyfarcical.Despiteits

questionablemethods,theaimsofRomaniancommunismweretosubscribe

Ceausescutothelonglistof‘historicaldefendersofthenation’and,throughthis,

251Ibid.p.225.252Dutcean-Segesten(2011),p.21.253R.Cinopoes,NationalismandIdentityinRomania:AHistoryofExtremePoliticsfromtheBirthoftheStatetoEUAccession(London:Tauris,2010),p.74.254Dutceac-Segesten(2011)p.22.

106

createhimintoapowerfulfigurecommittedtoensuringthecontinuityand

strengtheningoftheRomaniannation.

Thepursuitofthisnewdirectionentailedaliftonthestrictcensorshiponnationalist

literatureofthe1950sandthere-publishingandcreationofnewworksonRomanian

identity.TheFoundationMyths(withthenotableexceptionofreligion)andUnity

themetakecentrestage,inapolicythatmythologisesRomanianhistoryandidentity.

Ceausescuhimselfrathercrudelyseekstocapturethepsychologicalprofileof

Romaniansbydrawingonthecharacteristicsoftheirancestors,theDaciansand

Romans:“fromtheDacians[theRomaniantakes]histhirstforfreedom,thewillto

neverbowhisheadtoforeignoppressors,thedeterminationtobetruetohimself,the

onlymasterofhisfate,”whilstfromtheRomanshederiveshis“rationalspirit,

judgmentandpassionforcreation.”255Are-iteration,therefore,ofthenotionof

Romaniansassynthesisoftwoequallynobleandancientlines,theinfluenceofwhich

isstillvisibleintheircharacter.Thehabitusanditssignificanceindefiningand

protectingtheRomanianpeopleisofequalimportanceasdescriptionssuchasthis

exemplify:

OurDacia,themostpreciselycontoured,themostsolidlyandorganicallyconstructedgeographicspace[oftheBalkans](…),hasslowlykneadedandrevealed,whiledetachingitwithitsownphysiognomyfromtherest,aparticularpeople–theRomanianpeople.Thereis,indeed,nootherhistoryorpeopletorepresentsuchclearexpressionsoftheirland,asaretheRomanianpeopleandtheirhistory.256

Geographyandhistoryareinterconnected,thecombinationofthetwoprovidingthe

auspiciouscircumstancesfortheuniquedevelopmentoftheRomaniannation.Interms

ofimplicationsfortheRomanianidentitynarrative,thisemphasisongeographyismeant

toinstilinthemindofthepeopleasenseofprideintheindividualityoftheirnationand

255Ceausescu,citedinBoia(2011),p.245.256I.Conea,‘Spatiulgeograficromanesc[TheRomanianGeographicalSpace],’RevistaFundatiilorRegale[TheRoyalFoundationsMagazine]IX:7(1July1942),pp.38-47,inG.Ivascu,andA.Tanasescu(eds.),CumpănaCuvântului1939-1945[TheSweepoftheWord1939-1945](Bucharest:Eminescu,1977),p.301.

107

theoverallconvictionthattheRomanianterritoryformsanorganicandindivisiblepart

oftheirnation.

Fromthisthemetonationalunityandthenation-statethereisbutonestepandfor

theRomaniancommunistregime,itisparticularlyimportant.AsDutceac-Segesten

pointsout,theemphasison“culturalunitybasedonashareddescentjustifiesthe

formationofa‘nationalunitarystate’includingallRomanianspeakers.Thisis

presentedasthemostardentdesireofthepeopleandaconstantpreoccupationof

theirleaders.”257Ineffect,Ceausescu’sregimere-imaginedRomanianhistoryasa

constantendeavourtoachievepoliticalunity,therealitybeing,ashasbeenshown,

thatthisprocessbeginsonlyinthenineteenthcentury.LucianBoiaarguesthat“unity,

alongsidecontinuity,becamethedirectingaxisofthehistoricaldiscourse.”258Through

this,hecontinues,theregimeportrayedunityasa“specifictraitoftheRomanian

being.”259Itistellingofthisrhetoricthattheperiodsawthepublishingofworkssuch

asthecompendiumontheunitydiscourseofthenineteenthcentury(Bodea,1982)or

anotheranthologyofessaysandarticlesfromtheSecondWorldWar(Ivascuand

Tanasescu,1977)whichfeaturesreactionstotheoccupationofTransylvania

prominentlyalongsidepressreleasesbytheCommunistParty.

TheOthersinCeausescu’sRomania

Endeavourssuchasthesearemeantnotonlytoensurethatthepast,distortedasitis,

remainsvividinthecollectivememoryofthepeople,butalso,inadvertently,thatthe

imageofthethreateningOthersisperpetuated.Inthis,thecommunistagencyhas

beenparticularlysuccessful,notinchangingthemaintenetsoftheRomanianidentity

narrative,butinbuttressingthemandaugmentingtheSelf-Othercontrast.By

emphasisingboththeuniquenessofRomaniansandtheirdesireforunity,aswellas

thedisruptiveinterferenceoftheOthers,thisversionofthenarrativeensuresthatthe

pastisneverforgottenandoldtrespassesneverforgiven.Assuch,inwhatconcerns

bothRussiaandHungary,theirimageasexistentialthreatstotheRomanianstateis

257Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.171.258Boia(2011),p.229.259Ibid.

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exacerbated.Inthefirstinstance,thebreakfromMoscowisowedasmuchto

Romania’sresentmenttowardsRussiaastoCeausescu’sdesiretoholdsoledominion

overthestate.Thetwoareeffectivelyrelated–Ceausescuconnectedhisowndesire

forindependence260fromtheSovietUniontotheexistingpopularanimositytowards

Moscow.ThebreakupofGreaterRomaniaandthemannerinwhichtheremainderof

thestatehadbeentreatedbytheSovietsaftertheSecondWorldWarhadcemented

intheRomanianimaginarythenotionthatRussiawasaninherentthreat,andnota

friend,totheirpeople.AsBoiaargues,“theassaultofcommunismonRomanian

cultureandsocietywasofextraordinarybrutality.”261Althoughundercommunistrule,

Romaniahadbeenconsideredalosingpartyofthewarandorderedtopayheavy

reparationstotheSovietUnion.262Addedtothis,itremainedunderSovietoccupation

fromtheendofthewaruntil1958.Altogether,theseinfringementsonRomania’s

sovereignty,notwithstandingthedissolutionofitsunity,contributedtowhatBoiahas

arguedweresignificantanti-Russian“nationalsentimentsofthepopulation.”263

Underthesecircumstances,independencefromMoscowwasasmuchCeausescu’s

personalasitwasapopulardesire.Asaresult,when,inAugust1968,hepublically

condemnedtheSovietinvasionofCzechoslovakia,hedidso“infrontofacrowdwho

wassolidarywithhimandreadytodefendtheircountryifSoviettanksweretocross

theRomanianborder.”264Ceausescupursueda“policyofautonomyintheWarsaw

Pact”265andclosenesstotheWestwhichfittedneatlyontopof,butalsofuelled,the

populardemandfordistancefromMoscow.Ontheotherhand,thenarrativeof

independencewithintheSovietspherecouldnotbuthavetoucheduponthesensitive

issueofthelossBessarabia.DuringtheCeausescuregime,thestate’spositiontowards

thematterwasre-evaluated:ifinahistorytextbookofthe1950stheannexationof

easternMoldovawasreferredtoasaliberation,266laterthestatepursueda“policyof

260Constantiniu(2011),p.498.261Boia(2012),p.108.262Constantiniu(2011),p.435.263Boia(2012),p.120.264Constantiniu(2011),p.500.265Ibid.,p.509.266M.Roller,IstoriaR.P.R.–ManualpentruInvatamantulMediu[TheHistoryoftheP.P.R.–ManualforSecondaryEducation](Bucharest:EdituradeStatDidacticasiPedagocica,1952),p.632.

109

supportinghistorianswhowerecriticaloftheSovietofficialposition.Theynever

directlyattackedtheSovietposition,butthroughouttheCeausescuperiod,historians

arguedthatMoldovawasaRomanianterritory.”267Oneshouldnotbesurprised,

therefore,thattheissueofBessarabiamaintaineditssaliencethroughoutthe

communistperiod.

Ontheotherhand,relationswithHungaryduringthecommunistperiodwereinmany

waysdefinedbytheiraffiliationtotheEasternBloc.WithinRomania,however,

resentmentagainstHungarianswasripenotleastbecauseoftheregime’seffortsto

keepthememoryofthethreattoTransylvaniaandthehistoricalsubjugationofits

Romaniancontingentalive.Roles,however,hadnowbecomesomewhatreversed;

afterhundredsofyearsofTransylvanianRomaniansbeingsubjectstotheHungarian

crown,theirstatenowcontainedanotinsignificantHungarianminority(around7%of

thetotalpopulation),‘inherited’fromtheannexationofTransylvania.Withthisin

mind,Ceausescu’sregimeandthetypeofnationalismitpursued,were,asCinopoes

argues,“markedinaparticularethnicway.”268Throughemphasisingcultural

uniqueness,nationalunityandpoliticalindependencefromMoscow,Ceausescuhad

glorifiedandmythologisedtheexceptionalismoftheRomanianpeopleandtheirstate.

Insuchcircumstances,theHungarianminoritystuckoutasspoilersoftheunitary

nation-stateandbecamethetargetofaconcertedpolicyofdiscriminationandforced

assimilation.AccordingtoGillberg,thisincludedthelimitingof“educational

opportunities[inthemothertongue,presumably];placenames[being]changedto

reflectRomanianheritagewhileremoving(…)[foreign]influence;officialsallegedly

chang[ing]birthcertificatestoreducethenumberofethnic(…)Magyarsbornin

Romania.”269

Theresultwas,undoubtedly,theoneintended–Romaniaisnowmoreethnically

homogenous,withthepercentageofinternalOtherssignificantlylowerthanatits

267S.D.Roper,Romania:TheUnfinishedRevolution(Florence,KY:Gordon&BreachPublishing,2000),p.126.268Cinopoes(2010),p.4.269T.Gilberg,NationalismandCommunisminRomania–TheRiseandFallofCeausescu’sPersonalDictatorship(Boulder,Colorado:WestviewPress,1990),p.177.

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creation.270Moreimportantly,however,theemphasisontheSelf-Othercontrastin

rhetoriccoupledwiththediscriminationofminoritygroupsinpractice,has

perpetuatedtheperceptionthatHungarianswhohavenotbeenassimilatedcannotbe

trueRomanians:“howcouldyousayaHungarianisRomanian?(…)TheHungarianis

Hungarian!”271UltimatelythistypeofthinkinghasledtoanisolationoftheHungarian

communityfromRomanians–a‘back-toback’existence,asaninterviewrespondent

putsit272-andtheconstructionintheRomanianidentitydiscourseofanOtherfrom

within.Importantly,thishasasignificantimpactonhowRomaniansviewtheroleof

thestateinnegotiatingitspositionvis-à-vistheHungarianminority,aswellasthe

latter’sdemandsforculturalandpoliticalrecognition.Theperception,aswillbe

exploredinthefollowingchapteris,tothisday,thattheinterplaybetweenthestate

andtheHungarianminorityisazero-sum-gameandacquiescencetoanyoftheir

demandscomescontrarytotheprerogativesofanationalstate,andeventhreatensits

existencebecauseofboththerealandimaginedlinkbetweentheHungarianminority

anditskinstate.

Conclusion–Structure,AgencyandRomanianIdentity

Thischapterhasshownhowthehistoricalnarrativehasbeenconstructedinsucha

wayastohighlightthemainfeaturesofRomaniannessandtoemphasiseanidentity

narrativefittedtothepoliticalgoalsoftheera,namelythecreationandprotectionof

aRomaniannation-state.ThisconcurswithBrowning’sviewthatthehistorical

narrativeshowsthe“contingencyofdominantrepresentations”273oftheSelfand

Other.Neitherthisnor,perhaps,thethreethemesoftheRomanianidentitynarrative

areuniquetoRomanians.Whatis,however,peculiaristhecontinuationofthese

themesintothecontemporarynarrative,inthattheportrayalofboththeformative

eventsoftheRomanianpeopleaswellastherepresentationoftheSelfandOther

270AccordingtoBoia(2012,p.144)eveninTransylvaniathepercentageofHungarianshadgonedownfrom24.4%in1930to21%in1992,whilsttheproportionofRomanianshadincreasedfrom57.8%to73.6%inthesameperiod.271Boia(2012),p.213.272AnonymousD.,InterviewwithFormerMinisterofCulture,byI.Tartacuta-Lawrence,12.06.2014,tape,Bucharest,Romania.273Browning(2008),p.64.

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haveremainedlargelyunchangedfromthebeginningofthetwentiethcenturyandup

tothisday.AlthoughcircumstancesandperceptionsovertheactionsofOthersplayed

theirpart,theroleofagency,andparticularlythatofCeausescu’sregime,hasbeen

paramountinensuringcontinuity.InCeausescu’sinteractionwiththeRomanian

identitynarrative,theimpactofagencyoverstructureappearsmostemphatically,

followingupontheassumptionsmadeinChapters1and2.Hisrole,asitturnedout,

wasnotinre-interpretingtheimageoftheSelfandOthers,butaugmentingthe

alreadyexistingportrayals.Therewas,therefore,analterationoftheidentitynarrative

duringhisregime,butitmanifestedthroughthereinforcementofitsoriginalfeatures.

ThereasonwhyCeausescu’sapproachwassuccessfulwhereearlypro-Moscow

communistshadfailedisthatthelatter’swastoodrasticadeparturefromtheoriginal

tenetsofthenarrative–closenesstoRussiaandsilenceonthelossofBessarabiawere

simplyuntenablepositionsforRomanians.Ceausescu,however,hadtheabilitytoalter

thenarrativeinthemannerhedidbecausetheversionofRomaniannesspursuedhad

tractionatsocietallevel.IndependencefromMoscowandthemythologizingof

Romanianuniquenesswereattractivepropositions,aswasraisingUnitytothestatus

ofnationaldoctrine.Assuch,Ceausescuworkedwithintheboundsoftheoriginal

versionofthenarrative,butactedtointensifytheSelf-Othercontrast.Ceausescu’s

regimeisthereforeresponsibleforthecontinuationand,atthesametime,

exacerbationofthemainfeaturesoftheidentitynarrative,asseveralgenerationsof

Romaniansbecamesocialisedinthisnewhypervariant.

AppraisingthelegacyofRomaniancommunismisnotaneasytask.Itsimpactonthe

state’seconomicsituationorindustryismorevisiblethanitseffectsonRomanian

mentality,whichareofinteresthere.TheregimeendedinarejectionofCeausescu,

buttheversionoftheRomaniannarrativeofidentityheperpetuatedwasnotas

readilyjettisonedastheregimeitself.Aswillbeexploredinthefollowingchapter,the

endoftheColdWarofferedanotheropportunityforthere-evaluationofitsmain

tenetsandthesettingofnewforeignpolicygoals.However,asshownbythe

contemporaryhistoricalnarrative,portrayalsoftheSelfandOthersremainlargely

unmodified.Thenextsectionwillexamineboththereasonsbehindandconsequences

ofthiscontinuity.

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Table2.MajorEventsofRomanianContemporaryHistoryandofRelationshipwithThreeOthers 1989(December)

ApopularrevoltseesthecaptureandexecutionofNicolaeCeausescu.ThecommunistregimeendsinRomania

1990 IliescuandFSNwinRomania’sfirstdemocraticelections.1991 IliescusignstreatywiththeSovietUnion,nullifiedbythelatter’s

dissolution,sixmonthslater.TheRepublicofMoldovaproclaimsitsindependence.UnificationwithRomaniaseemsimminent

1992 AshortcivilwarbreaksoutinMoldova.Transnistria,supportedbyRussiantroops,defeatstheMoldovanarmyandbecomesasecessionistregion.Unificationtalkstakeabackseat.Iliescuisre-elected.RomaniabeginsnegotiationswithRussiaonaBasicTreaty

1994 Underpressurefromtheinternationalcommunity,RomaniaandHungarybeginnegotiatingaPrincipalTreaty.RomaniasignsNATO’sPartnershipforPeace.

1995 RomaniatendersitsapplicationtotheEuropeanUnion.NegotiationswithHungarybreakdown

1996 RomaniarefusestosignTreatywithRussia.Iliesculoseselections.RomaniaandHungarysignthePrincipalTreaty;relationsbegintorecover.

1998 ViktorOrban’siselectedinhisfirsttermasprime-minister.1999 HungaryaccedestoNATO.Romaniabeginsnegotiationsforaccession

toEU.2000 AccessionnegotiationstotheEUbegin.2001 ThePartyofCommunistswinpowerinMoldova.Relationsbetween

BucharestandChisinauareaffected.2002 StatusLawpassedinHungary.RelationsbetweenRomaniaand

Hungarysuffer.2003 RomaniaandRussiasignBasicTreaty.2004 RomaniajoinsNATO.HungaryaccedestotheEuropeanUnion.2007 RomaniabecomesamemberoftheEuropeanUnionalongside

Bulgaria2009 RomaniaofferscitizenshipandEuropeanpassportstoMoldaviansof

Romaniandescent.Pro-EuropeanfactionswinpowerinMoldova.2010 ViktorOrbanreturnstopowerinHungary.Aperiodoftension

betweenBucharestandBudapestbegins.TheDualCitizenshipLawispassedbyHungary.

2014 RussiaannexesCrimeaandwarbreaksoutinEasternUkraine.RomaniareactsbylobbyingforincreasedNATOpresenceintheBlackSearegionandstrengtheningitstieswiththeRepublicofMoldova.ElectionsinHungary-JobbikrunscampaigninRomania,Orbanisre-elected.

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2015 OrbanpublishesphotosofHungariansecessionistregioninTransylvaniaonFacebook,promptingaggressiveresponsefromBucharest.

2016 RomaniaassumesgreaterNATOresponsibilitiesintheregion.Theanti-ballisticmissileshieldontheDeveselubasebecomesoperational.Pro-RussianIgorDodonwinspresidentialelectionsintheRepublicofMoldova.

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Chapter4.ContinuityRatherthanChange–Romania’sNational

IdentityintheTransitionEra

Introduction

ThischapterexaminesthemannerinwhichtheRomanianidentitynarrativehas

developedaftertherevolutionof1989andhowithasfedintothestate’sinternational

anddomesticbehaviourduringthetransitionperiod.Firstly,thevariantinplayatthe

timeoftherevolutionisexamined,withafocusontheparticularimplicationsthe

portrayalofSelfhadonviewsregardingtheroleandprerogativesofthestate.

Followingonfromthis,theeventsof1989anditsaftermatharebrieflyrecountedand

thechapterproceedstooutlinethemannerinwhichIonIliescuandhisparty,theFSN,

madeuseoftheidentitynarrativeinordertosecurevictoryinthe1990elections.A

subsequentsectionanalyseshowtheIliescuregimere-conceptualisedRomanian

identityinsuchawayastobuttressthenarrative’smajorfeatures,butremoveits

communistcomponent.TheargumentismadethattheagencyoftheIliescuregimein

interactingwiththestructureofthenarrativeiscrucialinunderstandingthevariantin

playinRomaniatoday.Finally,thechapterdiscussesthemannerinwhichtheidentity

narrativeinfluencedRomania’sforeignpolicyanddomesticagendas.Onthe

internationalfront,theprerogativeofensuringthesecurityofthestatedrawingonthe

themeofBesiegedFortressresultedinaunanimousdesiretojointheWestern

community.Assuch,themainforeignpolicygoalsarticulatedinthetransitioneraare

accessiontotheEUandNATO.Romania’sbehaviourtowardsachievingthese

objectivesis,however,ambiguous,showingadivergencebetweenrhetoricand

internationalbehaviour,ontheonehand,andcommitmenttowardsdomesticreform,

ontheother.ThechapterexaminestherootsoftheIliescuregime’sanxietytowards

changeintheperiodof1990-1996andhowthisaffectedtheintegrationprocesswith

regardstointernalreformandtheminorityquestion.Finally,thechapterconcludesby

arguingthatitisonlywhenthisattitudechanges,after1996,thatRomania’sdomestic

behaviourbeginstomatchuptoitsinternationalcommitments,andthegoalof

accessionbecomesthepredominantmotivationbehindstateaction.

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Romaniain1989

Afternearlyhalfacenturyofcommunism,thewinterof1989sawthefallofthe

Ceausescuregime.TherevolutioninRomaniafollowedsimilaruprisingsinPoland,

Hungary,EastGermany,andCzechoslovakia,274andresultedinthetotaldisintegration

oftheEasternBloc.InordertounderstandthenatureandrepercussionsofRomania’s

anti-communistrevolution,whichstandsoutamongsttherestthroughitsbrutality,

butalso,arguably,itslackofsuccessincleansingthepoliticalclassofelements

pertainingtotheformerregime,onemustsetthediscussioninthecontextof1989

Romania.

ThepreviouschapterexploredhowCeausescu’sregimehadactedtocreateahyper

versionoftheRomaniannationalidentitynarrative,inwhichuniqueness,unityandthe

linktoagloriouspastwereemphasised.ThelegitimacyoftheRomanianCommunist

Partyrestedonitscapacitytoprotectthesevalues,whichbecamesedimentedinthe

mentalityofapopulationsubjectedtoitspropaganda.AsLucianBoiahasargued,“the

dominant,inasenseevensingular,discoursewas,duringCeausescu’stime,the

nationalistdiscourse.”275WhilstbuildingontheexistingfeaturesoftheRomanian

identitynarrative,Ceausescuhadinstilledinhispeopleaperceptionofthe

exceptionalismofthisnation;thepersonalitycultwhichascribedtohimalonethe

specialroleofdefendingitsinterestswenthand-in-handwiththisportrayal.Overall,as

Boiacontinues“thetakingoverandamplifyingofthenationalmythologyofthe

nineteenthcentury,distortedasitwas,conferredontotheregimecredibilityand

legitimacy,andtothedictatoranauraofpatriotism.”276Ceausescuwassuccessfulin

entrenchingtheseaspectsbutalsogivingtheidentitynarrativeaspecificfocus.

Romanianidentityisprimarilyinwardlooking;Romaniansareconcernedwiththe

preservationoftheiruniquenessand,inthis,thestateplaysacriticalrole.Thestateis

aninstrumentfortheprotectionoftheRomaniancharacter,andtheprerogatives

whichflowfromit–defenceofitsindependence,sovereigntyandterritorialintegrity.

274P.Cipkowski,RevolutioninEasternEurope(NewYork:JohnWiley&Sons,1991),p.120.275Boia(2011),p.140.276Ibid.,p.141.

116

Ceausescu’sregimewasparticularlyaptatimpartingthisview,andatachievingthese

goals–independencefromMoscowandtheisolationoftheHungarianminoritywere

notonlyrationalcoursesofactionsbutpartofthestate’sduties.Thisperceptionof

Romanianexceptionalismandtheroleofthestateasitsguardianareoneofthemost

lastinglegaciesofcommunismandimpactedthenatureofRomania’stransitionto

liberaldemocracy,influencingtothisdayportrayalsoftheSelfand,necessarily,of

Others.

IfonthisfrontCeausescuprovedefficacious,hewaslesssuccessfulinmanagingthe

socio-politicalandeconomicspheres.OneoftheaspectswhichsetRomaniaapart

fromotherEasternblocstatesistherejectionofGorbachev’spoliciesofPerestroika

andGlasnostwhichelsewheremeantaprocessofde-Stalinisationwithsignificant

liberalisationandeconomicreform,culminatinginthedevelopmentofcivil

societies.277CeausescurejectedthereformsproposedbyMoscow,accordingto

historianFlorinConstantiniu,fortworeasons:“therefusaltoreintegratewhatseemed

tohimtobeanew‘blocdiscipline,’”and“hisconservativedogmaticvision,opposedto

structuralchanges.”278Inotherwords,Ceausescuwasahard-liner,whoemployeda

quintessentiallyindividualtypeofruleanddidnotsuffertheinvolvementofMoscow

inhiscountry’sdomesticaffairs.Consequently,withthemediaremainingcensored

andthedevelopmentofciviloppositionmovements,suchasSolidarityinPoland,

prohibited,Romaniastoodoutamongstsocialistregimesas“oneofthemostilliberal

andrepressive.”279Ontheotherhand,thelivingstandardsoftheRomanian

populationunderadeterioratingeconomicsituationandunpalatablelevelof

involvementofthepoliticalinallareasofpubliclife280hadbecomeunbearable–

Djuvaragoesasfarasarguingthatthecommunistregime“spoiledoursoul.”281

Insuchcircumstances,identity-baseddiscoursewasnolongersufficientinmaintaining

thelegitimacyoftheregime.AsBoiapointsout,thepolicyworked“untilRomanians

277Cinopoes(2010),p.74-75.278Constantiniu(2011),pp.520-521.279C.Chen,‘TheRootsofIlliberalNationalisminRomania:AHistoricalInstitutionalistAnalysisofLeninistLegacy,’EastEuropeanPoliticsandSocieties17:2(2003),p.194.280Cipkowski(1991),p.125.281N.Djuvara(2010),p.262.

117

begantosufferofhungerandcold.Thegloriousshadowsofthepastcouldnotavert

neithertheeconomicdisaster,northeexplosionofsocialtensions.”282Thecontextof

1989wasoneinwhichtheRomanianpopulationwasdespondentandunrepresented,

withnooppositionstructure,politicalorcivil,aroundwhichtocoalesce.Asformer

ministerAnonymousD,argues,theprofileofRomaniancommunismwassuchthat“it

didnotprovideanynicheforlibertyasinPolandandHungary,inwhichthesingle

partyhadnointerlocutorwithwhomtonegotiateitshistoricexit,itsexitingthe

scene.”283Theconsequencewasaviolentuprising,whichclaimedover1.100

victims,284including,ultimately,therulingcouple–ElenaandNicolaeCeausescu–who

wereexecutedbysquadronafterashamtrial285onChristmasdayin1989.Romanian

communismfinishedinbloodshedandrepresentsadefiningmomentinthestate’s

history.TherevolutionpavedthewayforRomaniatoreformitstieswiththeWestern

communityandembarkonatransitionfromsocialismtoliberaldemocracyand

capitalism.Thatisnottosay,however,thatthecommunistlegacywasreadilyshed.As

Boiapointsout,“thehistoricmythologyaccumulatedin[Ceausescu’s]erasurvivedthe

dictator.Psychologicalconstellationshavealongerlifethanmaterialstructures.”286

Thatisallthemorethecaseasthecommunistinfrastructurewasnotaltogether

disassembled,asthefollowingsectionwillexplore.

RomaniainEarlyTransition–IonIliescuandtheUseofIdentityasElectoralTool

Thelackofafunctioningandpro-activecivilsociety,ontheonehand,andofapolitical

opposition,ontheother,hadsignificantrepercussionsonthenatureofthepower

strugglewhichfollowedtherevolution.Ineffect,thevacuumleftbythefallofthe

CeausescuregimecouldnotbefilledbyanyoneotherthanlowertierCommunistParty

officials.Thegeneralconfusionsurroundingtherevolutiondidnothingifnotfacilitate

thisprocess:thefigureheadswhohadmadetheirwaytothenationalbroadcaster

buildingafterCeausescu’sflight,suchasfuturepresidentIonIliescu,became

282Boia(2011),p.141.283AnonymousD(2014).284Constantiniu(2011),p.534.285Ibid.,pp.532-533.286Boia(2011),p.141.

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associatedwiththeuprisingdespitetheirknowntieswiththeformerregime.287In

otherwords,asStanandZahariasummarise,“therevolutionresultedinelite

reproduction,notelitereplacement”288–in1989Romaniadidnotachieveabreak

fromitscommunistpast,butareshufflingofitsleadership.Themannerinwhichthe

politicalclassnegotiateditscommunistlinkswastodivertattentionfromthemby

eliminatingalltracesoftheParty.AsBoiapointsout,“itwasastrokeofgeniusto

dissolvetheparty(…).Suddenly,communismceasedtoexist,andno-onewas

communist,becausetheycouldnotbe.AformerdignitaryinCeausescu’sregimewas

justasnon-communistasaformerpoliticalprisoner.”289

Itsreplacementwasanall-encompassingpoliticalbodycalledtheFrontforNational

Salvation(FSN),whichwaspredominantlycomposedof“second-echelonCommunist

Partyofficials,communistdirectorsofstate-ownedenterprises,andSecuritatesecret

agents”290andledbyIonIliescu,whoseregimewasprovidingtheinterimstate-

leadership.BythetimeofRomania’sfirstdemocraticpresidentialandparliamentary

elections,in1990,several‘historical’parties,whichhaddominatedRomanianpolitics

intheinter-warperiodbutwereabolishedintheearlydaysofthecommunistregime,

hadbeenresurrected.TheseweretheNationalLiberalParty(PNL)andtheNational

Peasants’Party,whichhadaddedChristianDemocrattotheirtitle(PNTCD).Their

leaders,RaduCampeanuandCorneliuCoposu,andmanyothermembers,were

communistdissidentswhohadbeeneitherimprisonedorforcedintoexile,oftenboth,

bytheformerregime.Ifonehadassumedthattheoppositionstoodachanceof

curbingIliescu’srisetopower,theywouldhavebeendisappointedwiththeresultof

theelection.AsCipkowskipointsout,“IonIliescuwaselectedpresidentwitha

landslideof80%ofthevote.(…)The16millionelectorate,whichturnedoutinits

entirety,knewthatheandhisaidsintheFronthadbeenCommunistswhoworkedfor

Ceausescu.”291TheLiberalandPeasants’candidatesreceivedameagretenandfour

287Cipkowski(1991),p.144.288L.StanandR.Zaharia,‘Romania,’inD.OBeachain,V.SheridanandS.Stan(eds),LifeinPost-CommunistEasternEuropeafterEUMembership–HappyEverAfter?(Abingdon:Routledge,2012),p.186.289Boia(2012),p.148.290StanandZaharia(2012),p.186.291Cipkowski(1991),p.144.

119

percentofthevotes,respectively,whilstintheparliamentaryelection,theFSN

securedtwothirdsofseatswithonlysixandtwo-and-a-halfpercentforthehistorical

parties.292

Itmayseempeculiarthatafterabloodyrevolutionthefirstdemocraticmandatein

post-socialistRomaniawasoverwhelminglyofferedtorefashionedcommunists,as

theycontrolledboththelegislatureandtheexecutivebranches.Thereasonsbehind

thiselectoralresultareworthexaminingastheyrestonboththecircumstancesofthe

suffragebutalsoonthemannerinwhichIliescuandhispartyframedtheirpolitical

discourse.Onthefirstpoint,traditionalaccountsstressthefactthattheFSNcameinto

theelectionswithsignificantcapital,astheyweregoverningastatewhichin

communism,andstillatthispoint,controlledeverything.Aninfrastructurewasin

placewhichallowedthemtodisseminatetheirmessageand,moreimportantly,alter

thepublic’sperceptionsoftheiropposition.AsCinopoesargues,“animportantfactor

thathelpedFSNtostrengthenitsgriponpowerwasthefactthattheFrontgained

controlovervariousstatefacilities,especiallythepress,theradioandtelevisioninthe

earlydaysoftherevolution.”293Additionally,Romaniansatthetimewerevulnerable

tothesemachinations.Havingbeen“brutalised,poorlyeducated(…)andstarvedof

informationabouttherealworld,”294theywereinherentlysusceptibletothe

propagandaoftherulingparty.ThefactthattheFSNactedinthefashionofthe

formerregime,effectivelyarrestingthestateapparatusandusingatacticof

disinformationanddenigration,doesnot,however,capturetheentirestory.The

identitaryperspectiveemployedhereoffersanadditionalexplanationforIliescu’s

success,byfocusingontheroleplayedbythediscourseonidentityinlegitimisingthe

Iliescuregimeandensuringitselection.

ThechapterhasalreadyexploredtheversionoftheRomaniannationalidentity

narrativeinplayatthepointoftherevolution.Itwasonewhichdrewheavilyonthe

UnityandFoundationthemes,builtonnotionsofastrongconnectiontothepastand

aninherentexceptionalismoftheRomaniannation.Thecontinuityandaugmentation

292Boia(2012),p.152.293Cinopoes(2010),p.80.294Cipkowski(1991),p.145.

120

ofanidentitynarrativefocusedontheseelements,however,meansthatRomanians

werenaturallyresistanttochangeandsuspiciousoftheunknowninequalmeasureto

foreigninterference.Despitetheeventsoftherevolution,theseperceptionsdidnot

disappear.However,thebrutalityoftheoverthrowofcommunismmeantthat

“Romanianidentitywaswoundedandanxious.”295Thesecircumstancesnotonlymade

theFSNtheobviouschoice,butalsogaveIliescu’spartytheopportunitytoutilise

anxietiestowardsanuncertainfuturetoitsadvantage.Thepost-revolutionaryclimate

wasoneofgeneralconfusioninwhichcertainrumoursbegantospread,most

famouslyovertheactionsofforeign(particularlyRussian)‘terrorists’whoweresaidto

beattemptingtocapturethestateapparatus.296Whethertheseforeignelementswere

indeedactiveduringandimmediatelyaftertherevolution,orwhethertheywere

entirelyimaginedthreats–perhapsevendeliberatediversions–isopento

contention.297

Inanycase,theimagebeingportrayedwasoneofRomaniaasaBesiegedFortress–

outsideforceswerethreateningthesuccessoftherevolutionorthestate’soverall

independence,orevenboth.Theresurrectionofthethemeisnotsurprising,as

ensuringthesecurityofthestateanditspopulationisacrucialprerogativesetbythe

Romanianidentitynarrative,andoneofthemajorremitsofgovernmentwhich,atthe

time,wasnon-existent.Asaresult,thepotentialexistenceofforeignterroristsfuelled

asenseoffearandinsecurityamongstthegeneralpopulationandadesireforan

interimgovernmenttoemergeexpeditiously.Itshouldcomeasnosurprise,then,that

familiarfiguressuchasIliescuwerenotdismissedbecauseoftheirassociationwith

Ceausescu,but,tothecontrary,werewelcomedasrecognisedelementsofthe

establishment,and,therefore,notforeign‘terrorists.’FramedwithintheBesieged

Fortress,theunknownwasamuchmorefrighteningperspectiveforRomaniansthat

the‘evil’theywereaccustomedto.Asaresult,theFSN’srisetopowermustbesetin

thecontextoftheanxietieswhichdominatedpubliclifeatthetimeoftherevolution–

theprioritiessetbytheRomanianidentitynarrativewhichdrawonthethemeofthe

295Milca(2010),p.97.296Constantiniu(2011),p.533.297SeeBoia(2012),p.147.

121

BesiegedFortressnecessitatedimmediateactiontowardstheestablishmentofa

climateofsecurity.Inthisvein,theFSNwerenotonlypartytotheliberationofthe

people,communiststhoughtheywere,buttheonlyavailableoptioninresolvingthe

perceivedsecuritycrisis.

Ontheotherhand,thepreceptsoftheRomaniannationalidentitynarrativealso

shapedtheFSN’sdiscourseandthemannerinwhichitportrayeditselfandits

opposition.Beyondtheirefficientutilisationoftheprintedandbroadcastmedia,

reformedcommunistsbuilttheirargumentsaroundelementswhichresonatedwith

theRomanianaudience.Therevolutionwasseen,conformingtothethemeofUnity

andBesiegedFortress,asahistoricalvictory,asharedendeavourofthepeopleanda

struggleforfreedomwhichcameatagreathumansacrifice.Thesimilaritiesbetween

itandtheGreatUnificationof1918wereapparent.Evenincontemporarytimes,the

associationisnotuncommon–in2002,MPIonSolcanuarguedduringaParliamentary

Debatethat“anarchovertime,linkingtheGreatUnificationof1December1918and

thePopularRevolutionof1989(…),leadsustothinkthatthegloriouspagesof

traditionandfightforfreedommustbecarriedonbytheyounggeneration.”298The

FSNhadalegitimatereasontoaffiliatethemselveswiththisendeavour,astheyhad

beenpartofit;moreimportantly,theyhadtheopportunitytohighlighttherealitythat

theiropposition,manyofwhomhadbeeninexile,hadnot.TheFSNcouldportrayits

oppositionasunrepresentativeoftheRomanianpeopleand,ratherunjustly,

unsympathetictowardstheirsuffering:“‘whileweweresufferingunderCeausescu,

theyhadcoffeeandcroissantsinParis’wasonepopularslogan.”299WhatIliescuand

FSNwereattempting,ultimatelysuccessfully,wasanotheringoftheiropponents.The

argumentwasthatonlythosewhohadfeltthehardshipofcommunismandhad

foughttooverturnitcouldleadRomaniaontoitsnewpath,becausetheyknewwhat

Romaniansneeded.AsjournalistIonCristoiuarguedin1990:

298I.SolcanuinParliamentofRomania,DezbatereParlamentara-SedintasolemnacomunaaCamereiDeputatilorsiSenatuluidin28noiembrie2002[ParliamentaryDebate-TheSolemnPlenarySessionoftheChamberofDeputiesandSenateof28November2002],28.11.2002,availablefromhttp://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5372&prn=1dateofpostingunknown,[accessed30April2015].299J.G.Pilon,TheBloodyFlag–Post-CommunistNationalisminEasternEurope,SpotlightonRomania(NewBrunswick:TransactionPublishers,1992),p.66.

122

Thismassivelyimportantvotewastheconsequenceofanemotionalstateratherthanaprofoundanalysis(…).InoptingforMr.IliescuwhatmatteredwasthefactthattheothertwocandidateshadnotlivedthroughthedifficultrealitiesofCeausescu’sregimealongsidetheRomanianpeople.300

Whilstthistypeofdiscoursemayseemneedlesslyinflammatory,itreflectedpublic

opinion.AlthoughtheirelectoralpledgeofinstatingaWestern-typedemocracyin

Romaniacertainlyhaditsappeal,themessageofthesecandidateswastoofar

removedfromtheinterestsofthegeneralpopulationandtheirstyletooheavywith

foreigninfluences:“thevastmajorityofthepopulationwasgenuinelyterrifiedofthe

prospectofabow-tiewearingpresidentwithanoccidentaldiscourse[referringtoIon

Ratiu].”301Suspicionregardingthemotivesofthesecandidatesandtheirabilityto

servetheRomaniannationinitsstateatthetimehintedatthefactthatthepublic

preferredincrementalratherthanradicalchange.Fromthisperspective,Iliescu’s

arguablypopulist,butcertainlynationalidentity-focused,message,whosecampaign

posterscarriedtheslogan“APresidentforRomanianRebirth,”302provedmuchmore

successful.Ineffect,byplayingthenationalistcardandotheringhisopponents,Iliescu

usedtohisadvantagetheanxietiesandprioritiescreatedbytheRomanianidentity

narrative.Theargumentwasthathiswasapartywhichunderstoodthetraumaofthe

revolution,protectedRomanianvalues,andwouldpursueadirectioninbothits

domesticandinternationalagendawhichconformedtothem.

Theseconsiderationsshowthatidentity-relatedfactorsplayedasignificantroleinthe

establishmentandlegitimisationofthepoliticaleliteafter1989.Whatisrevealedis,

ontheonehand,areformedclassofcommunistswhoadoptedsimilartacticstothe

previousregimeinsecuringandmaintainingpowerandunderstoodthepublic’s

anxieties,butalsoapopulationwhichrespondedtoandsharedtheconcernsraised

300I.Cristoiu,‘UnVotIngrijoratorpentruFrontulSalvariiNationale[AWorryingVotefortheNationalSalvationFront],’Zig-ZagMagazin27.05.1990,availablefromhttp://www.nasul.tv/editorial-ion-cristoiu-din-anii-90-despre-victoria-zdrobitoare-fsn-alegeri/postedon10.12.2012,(authorofpostingunknown)[accessed30April2015].301M.Voinea,‘Documentar–Istoriaalegerilorprezidentiale.1990,IonIliescusipacalealedemocratieioriginale[Documentary–TheHistoryofPresidentialElections.1990,IliescuandTheFarceofOriginalDemocracy],’Politica,22.10.2014,availablefromhttp://adevarul.ro/news/politica/documentar-istoria-alegerilor-prezidentiale-1990-ion-iliescu-pacaleala-democratiei-originale-1_544685c80d133766a81eb935/index.html[accessed30April2015].302Ibid.

123

overthesuitabilityoftheiroppositiontoprovidetheleadershipthestateneeded.Ina

sense,theoverarchingattitudeofboththepoliticalelitesandsocietywasoneof

resistancetochangeandadesiretopursueadirectionoftransitioninkeepingwith

whatRomaniansperceivedasfamiliar–afocusonsolidarityand,totheextentitwas

attainable,continuity.Itisthecontentionofthisthesisthatthisperspectiveoffersa

moreaccuratepictureastowhyIliescuandFSNweresuccessfulintheearlystruggle

forpower,ratherthanthemosttraditionalassessmentthatthesocialists’state

capturealoneaccountsforthisvictory.

Romania’sContemporaryIdentityNarrative–ContinuityOnceMore

ThisprojecthasarguedthatoneofthehallmarksoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeis

continuityalongitsmajorfeatures.Thepreviouschapterexploredthereasonsbehind

thisconsistencyandascribedtotheCeausescuregimeaparticularroleintheprocess.

Ceausescu’sinteractionwiththestructureofthenarrativehadbeenoneofbuildingon

previousportrayalswhilstexacerbatingthecontrastbetweenSelfandOther,creating

thehyperversionwhichwasinplayatthetimeoftherevolution.However,the

uprisingandtheoverthrowofcommunismofferedtheopportunecircumstancesand

eventhenecessityforareevaluationofitsmajoraspects.Thiswasthetypeof

situationwhen,asdiscussedinthetheoreticalbackgroundchapter,amendmentsto

thenarrativestructurewerenotonlypossible,butrequired.Whatisclear,despite

this,isthatcontemporaryrepresentationsofboththeidentityandhistoricalnarrative

matchthoseofearlierperiods–see,forinstancethesimilaritiesbetween

Draghicescu’swork(1907)andtheassessmentsofConstantiniu(2011),Milca(2010)or

Djuvara(2010)303–whilstthecommunist-inspiredaspectsarenotablethroughtheir

absence.Inasense,onenoticesareturntothepre-communistnarrative,which

vindicatesSchifirnet’sargumentthat“aXIXcenturyRomanianisnotentirelydifferent

fromtheXXIcenturyRomanian”andthat“identitybecomesaconstantofthe

Romaniannationalcharacter.”304Accountingforthecontinuityofthenarrative

303Chapter3,whichdealswiththereproductionoftheRomanianhistoricalandidentitynarrativepresentsanumberofinstanceswherethereexistssignificantalignmentbetweenmodernandcontemporarysources.304Schifirnet(2009),p.474.

124

requiresanexaminationoftheroleofIliescu’sregimeanditsowninteractionwiththis

structure.

Earlytransitiongovernments,andIliescu’sinparticular(1990-1996),hadasignificant

challengeinrepairingthewoundscreatedbycommunismandtherevolution.Firstly,

Ceausescu’shypervariantwasnolongerfitforpurpose,notleastofallbecauseofthe

linksithadconstructedbetweenRomanianidentityandthepersonalityofanow

vilifiedleader.Secondly,thedownfallofCeausescu’sregimebroughtaboutsignificant

social,economicandpoliticalchanges.QuestionsregardingthenatureofRomanian

identitybeyondtheinfluenceofcommunism,aswellasRomania’splaceina‘new’

Europehadtobeanswered,for,asMilcahadpointedout,thepublic’sattitudewas

oneofgeneralanxiety.305Iliescuwasfacedwithaconundrum.Asaformercommunist,

hewasawareofhowpowerfulatooldiscourseonidentitywasinlegitimisingand

strengtheninganadministration–indeed,hehademployeditsuccessfullyduringthe

1990election.However,hecouldnotutilisethesamedevicesasCeausescuhad,as

thattypeofrhetoriccouldneverappealtoarevolutionarygeneration.Instead,one

wouldsuggestthatIliescuhadtwochoices:hecouldremodeltheidentitynarrative

withafocusonthe‘returntoEurope,’ineffectmovingRomaniaonfromthelong-

establishedinwardlookingexceptionalismwhichhadbeenthebuilding-blockofthe

narrativehitherto;orhecouldcontinueinthesametraditionbutdownplay,or

remove,communism’scontributiontoRomanianhistoryandidentity.Iliescuchosethe

latterofthetwo.LucianBoianoticesintheofficialdiscoursethe

PersistenceofprofoundisolationisttendenciesbeyondtheapparentembracingofEuropeanvalues.ReconstructingthepastinamannerwhichamplifiesautochthonicfactorstothedetrimentofEuropeandynamicsandinfluencecontinuestobepractised.306

Theargumentofthisprojectisthat,inwhatconcernsRomania’sportrayaloftheSelf

anditsOthers,thischoiceisvital.Iliescupursuedare-evaluationoftenetsofthe

Romanianidentitynarrativewhichabstractedcommunismfromthecountry’shistory

305Milca(2010),p.97.306Boia(2011),p.371.

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and“fix[ed]theattentionofcitizensontoalongertime-frame.”307Thefocusremained

onRomania’sgreathistoricalachievementsinthefightforunityandindependence:

theanniversaryofthecreationofGreatRomaniain1918,1December,becamethe

nationalday,whilstthe24January,theanniversaryoftheunificationofWallachiaand

Moldovain1859,becameacauseforpubliccelebrationandmilitaryparades.Thepre-

unificationstruggleinTransylvaniawasmarkedin1991throughavisitbypresident

IliescutoClujtocommemoratethesigningoftheSupplexLibellusValachorum,the

significanceofwhichwasexploredinthepreviouschapter.Theleadersinstrumentalin

therealisationofthesegoalswerealsorecognised,forinstancetheartisanof24

January,PrinceA.I.Cuzawasfashionedinto“theemblematicofficialfigureofthe

constitutionofmodernRomania.”308Gallagher’sassessmentoftheIliescu’sregimeon

thisissueisthat“itquicklyseemstohavegraspedthatifitprovedabletoredefinethe

pastinwaysthatsuiteditsownpoliticalagenda,thiscouldstrengthenits

legitimacy.”309

Beyondstatesponsoredmanifestationsandcelebrationssuchastheonesmentioned

above,thisdirectionwasalsopursuedbymeansoftheeducationsystem,and

especiallythroughthehistorycurriculum.Asthetellingofhistoryinaparticular

mannerisoneofthemaininstrumentsforthesocialisationoftheidentitynarrative,it

offersanavenueforidentifyingtheclaimsaboutRomanianidentitythestatewished

toreproduceorreconstruct.AsKorostelinapointsoutthiselement“iscrucialtothe

developmentofnationalidentitywithauthority-approvedcontentandmeanings.It

alsosuppressesorredefineseventsandinterpretationsthatcouldmaintainor

promotedevelopmentofalternativeethnic,political,religious,andregional

identities.310Fromthisperspective,theamountandnatureofchangeinhistory

textbooksafter1989wouldofferaninsightintotheregime’sapproachtoremodelling

oftheRomanianidentitynarrative.Itistelling,therefore,thatDutceac-Segesten,after

307T.Gallagher,RomaniaAfterCeausescu(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,1995),p.108.308Boia(2011),p.370.309Gallagher(1995),p.107.310K.Korostelina,‘HistoryEducationandSocialIdentity,’Identity:AnInternationalJournalofTheoryandResearch,8:1(2008),pp.38-39.

126

examiningthemake-upofseveralpost-revolutiontextbooksreachesthefollowing

conclusion:

Astudycomparinghistorytextbooksbeforeandafter1989noticestheemphasisonthenationalaspectsandconcludesthatthemajorchangesproducedupto1996aretheeradicationfromtheoldtextofreferencestothecommunistideologyandthedisappearanceofobligatoryquotesfromNicolaeCeausescu.Butwhenitcomestochangesofsubstanceandthemannerinwhichthenationalcultureorthemeaningofhistoryareportrayed,thereisno"revolution"butaslowandsometimesimperceptible"evolution."311

Ineffect,theauthorsuggeststhat,apartfromarejectionofcommunism,thecontent

ofhistorytextbooksinthefirsthalfofthe1990sremainslargelyunaltered.Inother

words,post-1989generationsofpupilsareexposedtoasimilarapproachtoRomanian

historyaswerethegenerationsbeforethem.ThisisconfirmedbyUniversityof

BucharestEuropeanStudieslecturer,AnonymousE,whopointsoutthat“westudythe

samehistoryinschools,andhearthesamemessagespropagatedinpublic

discourse.”312

Intermsoftheidentitynarrative,thisensuresthecontinuityofportrayalsoftheSelf

andOther,whilstremovingthesharpnessinthecontrastpursuedbyCeausescu.This

means,ontheonehand,thatthemainfeaturesoftheRomanianidentitynarrative

becomefurthersedimented,but,ontheother,thatthecomplexeswhichemergefrom

themareequallyperpetuated.Memoriesofthepast,particularlyantagonismswith

thethreateningOthers,remainsalient,asdoesthethemeofBesiegedFortress.As

Boiapointsout,“theactualisationofaninsistenceonagloriouspastand

abandonmentinthistrapperpetuatesconfrontationwithothersandtheimmobilityof

theself.”313Intermsoftheportrayalofthelatter,therevolutionisasignificant

additiontothenarrativeonRomania’shistoryofstruggleforaffirmationand

independence.However,becausetheidentitynarrativeremainsinwardfocusedand

311Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.22.312AnonymousE,InterviewwithIRUniversityLecturer,byI.Tartacuta-Lawrence,12.06.2014,tape,Bucharest,Romania.313Boia(2011),p.390.

127

retrospective,theeventsof1989areportrayedasanindividualvictoryofthe

Romanianpeopleovertheiroppressors,inlinewithrepresentationsoftheunification

of1918,fromwhichemergesthe‘archovertime’betweenthetwo.

Thebroaderconsequenceofthisdepictionisthattheuprisingisnotsetinthecontext

ofthecontinentaldemiseofcommunism.Thisinadvertentlyhassignificant

repercussionsonRomanians’viewoftheirplacewithinthis‘new’Europe,particularly

whethertherevolutionsignalsa‘return’toit,orthechancetoenteritinearnestfor

thefirsttime.Inasense,Iliescumissedatrick;hecouldhaveremodelledtheidentity

narrativeinsuchawayastosubscribetheRomanianrevolutiontothePan-European

anti-communiststruggle.Instead,theRomanianrevolutionisportrayedonlythrough

itsinternalconsequences,ratherthanregionalones.TheresultisthatRomanian

exceptionalismisemphasised,notsomuchasuniquenessbutasisolationism.Much

likeBoiaarguesabove,anarrativefocusedonthenationalratherthanEuropean

dimension,inotherwordsonwhatsetsRomaniansapartfromOthersratherthan

whatbringsthemtogether,isoneofthemajordrawbacksofthecontemporary

narrativeonRomanianidentity.AsSchifirnetpointsout,theresultisthat“Romanians

arestillmodelledbytheirownhistoryandsocialworld,whichcontinuestoperpetuate

mentalitiesandwaysofconductwhichareincompatiblewiththemodernEuropean

typeofculture.”314Atthisearlystage,adiscrepancyarisesbetweenRomania,still

inwardfocused,andEurope,increasinglybroughttogetherbysharedvaluesanda

communitarianspirit.Thisdivergence,inthecreationofwhichIliescu’sgovernment

playsasignificantrole,willaffectthenatureandsuccessofRomania’stransition,as

willbeexploredinthefollowingsection.

ThissectionhasshownhowtheRomanianidentitynarrativewasremodelledinthe

early1990s,withafocusonthecontinuityofitsmajorfeatures,butwithan

eliminationofthecommunistaspect.TheagencyofIonIliescuandhisregimeare

paramountinunderstandingthereasonsbehindtheperpetuationofthenarrative,

confirmingtheassumptionsmadebytheprojectinChapters1and2,thatagentsmay,

indeed,interactwiththestructureoftheidentitynarrativeinmeaningfulways.

314Schifirnet(2009),p.478.

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However,theconsequenceofthisre-evaluationinamannerwhichdownplaysthe

communistelementbutkeepsitsinsistenceonnationalvaluesandtheroleofthe

stateasenabler,isthattheanxietiesthesesedimentedclaimsaboutRomanian

identitycreate,especiallyinregardstochangeandchallengestostatesovereignty,

wouldcontinuetoinfluencebothelites’andthepublic’sattitudetowardstransition

duringthenexthalfofthedecade.

RomaniaintheTransitionEra–ForeignPolicyDirectionandDomesticReform

ArguingthatRomaniaremainedinwardlookingandretrospectiveisnottosaythatit

wishedtoremainseparatedfromthebroaderinternationalcommunity.However,this

particularrepresentationoftheSelfandOtherimpactedboththemotivationsbehind

theconstructionofitsforeignpolicyagenda,aswellasthemannerinwhichtransition

governmentswentaboutachievingthisgoal.Inparticular,theidentitynarrative

influencedRomania’stransition-erabehaviourintwospecificareas,oneofwhichset

theprerogativeofitsforeignpolicy,whilsttheotheractedasanobstacleinits

achievement.ThefirstisthepriorityofjoiningtheWestthroughaccessiontotheEU

andNATOinplaythroughouttransition;thesecondistheresistancetochangealluded

toabove,noticeablebothatsocietallevelandinthepoliciespursuedbytheIliescu

regime(1990-1996).Bothoftheseissueswillbeexaminedinturn.

DesiretoJointheWest–StrongercommitmenttowardsNATO

Identityoffersanalternativeavenueforunderstandingthemotivationsbehind

Romania’sforeignpolicyagendaafter1989.AlthoughEuro-Atlanticintegrationwas,

by-and-large,thegeneraldirectionpursuedbyallpost-socialiststates,inRomaniathe

identitynarrativeplayedasignificantroleinthedecisiontoadoptthiscourse.The

desiretojointheWesthaditsrootsinRomania’sownquestionsregardingitsrolein

theemergingregionalandinternationalworldorder.Moreimportantly,itwasalso

linkedtoidentity-basedprerogativeswhichdrawonthethemeofBesiegedFortress.

Ensuringthesecurityofthestateanditsprotectionfrom,particularlyRussianand

Hungarian,interferencewasamatterofpre-eminenceinthechangingenvironment

followingtheendoftheColdWar.AccessiontotheEUandNATOwherethetwomain

129

goalsformulatedforthesepurposesasmembershipoftheseorganisationswould

servedifferentbutinterrelatedobjectives.TheEUofferedRomaniaeconomicsecurity

andheldtheprospectoffutureprosperitywhilstaccessionguaranteedthatits

territorialintegritywouldbeacknowledgedandrespectedbyfellowmembers;inthis,

thedisputewithHungary,alsoacandidate,overTransylvaniawasofcritical

importance.Ontheotherhand,NATOofferedphysicalsecurityandwouldembed

RomaniaintheAmericansphereofinfluence,effectivelycounteringthethreatposed

byRussia.315Additionally,accessiontobothallianceswouldfinallyconstituteproof

thatRomaniahasbeenacceptedasamemberoftheWesterncommunity,afterhaving

languishedbehindtheIronCurtainforfivedecades.

Identity-relatedfactorsplayedacrucialpartinthearticulationofthesegoals,butalso

theintensitywithwhichtheywerepursued.Ontheseissuestherewascomplete

alignmentbetweenthepublicanditselites.PollsshowedRomanianswere

overwhelminglyinfavourofaccession–inthemid-1990s97%ofthepopulation

supportedRomania’sjoiningtheEU,316and95%itsenteringNATO,highestamongst

EasternEuropeanapplicants.317Ontheotherhand,butforabriefmomentin1991,318

thedirectionwasunanimouslypursuedbyallpoliticalpartiesandallsucceeding

transitiongovernments.ALiberalPartyYouthleaderinterviewedbytheauthor

outlinesRomania’s“constantpro-Europeanandpro-Americanforeignpolicycourse”

andthefactthat“afterthedefiningofthesetwodirectionsbyvastpoliticalconsensus,

anyevolutionswerenotofsubstance,beingatthemostissuesofnuance.”319Cross-

partyagreementoverthesetwogoalsisperhapsoneofthemoststrikingfeaturesof

Romania’stransition.InthecaseoftheEU,thisisevidentinthefactthat,when

Romaniaformerlysubmitteditsrequestformembership,“allparliamentaryparties

convenedataconferenceon21June1995,andsignedastatementagreeingtoa

315D.Turnock,‘Romania:ContemporaryGeopoliticalPerspectives,’Geopolitics6:1(2001),p.128.316Roper(2000),p.118.317Ibid.,p.123.318BeforetheendoftheColdWar,IliescusignedatreatyofalliancewiththeSovietUnionwhichremainedunratifiedbecauseofthelatter’sdissolutionsixmonthslater.Thefollowingchapterwillexaminetheissueinmoredepth.319AnonymousA,InterviewwithPNLPolitician,byI.Tartacuta-Lawrence,10.06.2014,email,Bucharest,Romania.

130

commonintegrationstrategy.”320AsforNATO,Boiahaspointedoutthatjoiningthe

TransatlanticAlliancehadbecomea“nearnationalobsession.”321Turnocksummarises

Romania’sagendawellwhenhestatesthatitwas“focusedunconditionallyon

integrationwithEuropethoughmembershipoftheEUandNATOwhichwoulddo

muchforthecountry’ssecurityinaregionhistoricallypronetoturbulence.”322

However,fromtheunanimousdesiretojointheWesttoattainingmembershipthere

remainstheimportantstepoftheaccessionprocess.Initscommitmenttoproveitself

aworthycandidate,Romaniaexhibitedanambiguousbehaviourwhichrequiressome

attention.Namely,thisreferstothestate’sapproachinwhatconcernstheEUand

NATO.AlthoughitwasamongstthefirststatestosubmititsapplicationforEU

membership,Romaniaquicklyfellbehinditsneighboursinaddressingthenecessary

criteria–negotiationsbeganin1999,andRomaniaonlyjoinedinthelaterwaveof

2007,alongsideBulgaria,threeyearsafterthebulkoftheEasterncontingent.The

identity-basedreasonsbehindthisdelayareexploredinfurtherdetailinthefollowing

section;fornow,itissufficienttoarguethatattherootliestheinabilityor

unwillingnesstomatchupthepaceofdomesticreformrequiredforaccessiontothat

ofitselites’rhetoricontheimportanceofattainingthisgoal.InitsrelationtoNATO,

ontheotherhand,Romaniawasabletoshowitscommitmentnotonlythroughwords,

butalsoaction.In1994itbecamethefirststatetosignNATO’sPartnershipfor

Peace.323By1996,ithadalso“participatedin960activitieswithNATOmember

forces.”324UnwaveringdedicationmadeitoneofNATO’smostreliablepartnerseven

beforeaccession,despitethefactthatithadbeenleftoutoftheexpansionwaveof

1997,againbecauseofthelackofdomesticreform.Ontheinternationalscene

however,theregionalandglobalclimateofferedopportunitiesforthestatetomake

itselfusefultotheUS–itsenttroopstoKosovo,AfghanistanandIraqandeventook

Washington’ssideontheissueoftakingAmericanservicemenfromunderthe

jurisdictionofinternationalcriminalcourt,goingagainsttheEuropeanposition.325As

320Roper(2000),p.118.321Boia(2012),p.160.322Turnock(2001),p.137.323Roper(2000),p.122.324Ibid.325Boia(2012),p.175.

131

Boiahasnoted,inreactiontothisaEuropeandelegate“askedrhetoricallywhether

RomaniawishestobecomeamemberoftheEUorthefifty-firststateoftheUS.”326

Thereis,therefore,adivergenceinRomania’sattitudetowardsaccessionregarding

internationalanddomesticbehaviour,whichmadeitscandidacyformembershipof

theEU,inparticular,morechallenging,but,conversely,portrayeditasausefuland

reliablepartnertoNATOinternationally.Here,workingfromanidentity-based

perspectiveprovidesparticularinsightintothereasonsbehindRomania’sbehaviour.A

traditionalexplanationmaybeeitherthatmembershipofNATOtookprecedenceover

accessiontotheEUor,alternatively,itwasconsideredamoreattainablegoal.Itis

likelythatbothare,toacertainextent,true.Roperarguesthat,inthelate1990s,“EU

membershipwasviewedasthemajorlong-termforeignpolicypriority,[while]NATO

membershipwasconsideredthemostimportantshort-termobjective.”327Itis

certainlyevidentfromRomania’saccessionexperiencethatfulfillingtheCopenhagen

CriteriaprovedmuchmorechallengingthanrespondingtoNATO’srequestsfor

support.However,inthisbehaviourthereisalsoaquestionofpriorityandthisis,toa

point,dictatedbyidentity-relatedprerogatives.ThecruxofRomanianconcernsis

security,especiallyinitsphysicaldimensionofensuringtheterritorialintegrityand

independenceofthestate,whichdrawsonthethemeofBesiegedFortress.

Particularlyinthecontextofahistoricallyvolatileregion,theprotectionoftheirstate

anditspro-Westerndirectionarecritical.Additionally,theportrayaloftheRussian

OthermeansthatMoscowisviewedasaconstantdangertoRomania’sindependence

anditspursuitofjoiningtheWesterncommunity.AnchoringRomaniaintheWest

throughthesealliancesisthemainmeasureofguardingfromtheRussianthreatand

regionalinstability,morebroadly.NATO,asamilitaryalliance,servesthese

prerogativesbetterthantheEU,andassuch,accessiontoitbecametheprimaryfocus

ofRomaniangovernments.ThisisevidentinRomania’sinternationalbehaviour,

explainingBoia’sdescriptionofitasa‘nationalobsession.’FormerForeignAffairs

MinisterandlaterheadoftheSecretService,TeoderMelescanucapturedthisview

whenhearguedthat“whiletheadjustmenttoEUstandardswouldimplyareasonable

326Ibid.327Roper(2000),p.122.

132

periodoftransition,securityneedsareimmediateandcanbecomestringent.”328In

otherwords,precedenceisgiventoensuringsecurityoverothergoals,suchasthose

satisfiedbyEUaccession,namelytheprospectsofeconomicsecurityandinclusionin

theEuropeancommunity.InitsrelationtoNATOanditsinternationalbehaviour,

therefore,Romaniaisguidedbytheprioritiesgeneratedfromhistoricallyenduring

claimsaboutitsidentity.

ObstaclestoAccession–ResistancetoChangeandInsistenceonStateSovereignty

TheprevioussectionoutlinedthemotivationsbehindRomania’sdesiretojointhe

Westandtheprioritisingoftheissueofsecurity,pursuedinternationallyprimarily

throughunwaveringcommitmenttoNATO.Ifintermsofitsforeignpolicyagendathe

directionwasclear,andremainedconstantthroughoutthetransitionera,thefirsthalf

ofthe1990swasaperiodwhenRomaniamadelittleadvancementonthedomestic

reformfront.Assuch,understandingtheidentitaryanxietiesbehindthisreluctanceto

enactmeaningfulreformrequiresananalysisofthebehaviouroftheIliescuregime,in

poweratthetime.Inasense,thepoliticalelitefailedtounderstandthattheaccession

processwouldrequireprofoundstructuralchangestothedomesticenvironment,inall

areasfromthesocio-politicaltotheeconomic.Althoughthenotionthatinternal

reformwasnecessarywasundoubtedlyrecognised,thelevelofpressurefromtheEU

andNATOonthenatureandpaceofthesedevelopmentswasdifficulttoreconcile

withRomanians’traditionalviewsontheroleofthestateandtheapproachoftheir

leaders.ThismayperhapsbemotivatedbyRomanians’viewsontheessential

separationbetweentheinternationalanddomesticspheresbutalsotheirperception

ofwhat‘Europe’actuallymeant.AsBoiahasargued,

Noteveryoneunderstandsthesamethingby‘entryintoEurope.’Manyfocusonthebenefits(…)preferringtoignorethestructuraltransformationsimposedbysuchadirection,thenecessaryre-elaborationofpoliticalandculturalreferencepoints,aswellastheinevitablelimiting

328Melescanu,citedinRoper(2000),p.122.

133

ofnationalsovereignty.TheycontinuetohopeforanintegratedRomania,butatthesametime‘untouched’initsperennialvalues.329

Therewas,asaresult,alackofawarenessthatachievingtheirforeignpolicygoals

requiredthatRomaniangovernmentsincurredcertainresponsibilitieslinkedtothe

internaltransitionfrompoliticalandeconomicsocialismtoafullyfunctioningliberal

democracyandcapitalistsystem,overwhichtheEUandNATOwouldexerta

significantlevelofscrutiny.Intwoareasinparticular,thesechallengeswereobvious

andbothareconnectedtospecificidentity-basedprerogatives.However,the

influenceoftheidentitynarrativeinthiscasedoesnotmanifestasaforeignpolicy

prioritybutas,Boiasuggests,aresistancetochangeofthefamiliarmodusoperandiof

theRomaniansystem,aswellastowardsexternalinvolvementinthedomesticaffairs

ofthestate,whichareperceivedasaninfringementofitssovereignty.

ResistancetoChange

ThenotionofaRomaniansocietyandpoliticaleliteresistanttochangehasbeen

exploredearlier,inthecontextoftheimmediateaftermathofthe1989revolution.

ThefactthattheIliescuregimereceivedasecondendorsementin1992inboth

parliamentaryandpresidentialelectionsmeantthathispartyofreformedcommunists

(renamedPDSR)shapedRomania’stransitioninthefirsthalfofthe1990s.His

mandatessawtheapplicationtenderedforEUaccessionandthesigningofNATO’s

PartnershipforPeace.Theprocessofinternalreform,ontheotherhand,which

entailedaprofoundreorganisationofthestate’spoliticalandeconomicsystems

focusedondemocratisation,liberalisation,transparency,accountabilityandthe

establishingofafree-market,wasslowandRomaniawasunabletocompetewith

otherEasternstates:bythemid-1990sRomaniahadfallen“economicallybehind

Poland,theCzechRepublicandHungary”and“wasseenbymanyasanti-reformistand

anti-democratic.”330

Traditionalaccountshavearguedthattheprocessofstaterebuildingwashinderedby

Iliescuhimselfwho,accordingtoGallagher,was“unabletoshake-offhiscommunist-

329Boia(2011),pp.275-276.330Roper(2000),p.65.

134

eraconditioning.”331Inotherwords,hestandsaccusedofpursuingreformthroughthe

tacticsoftheformerregime.GrossandTismaneanupointoutthat,atthepolitical

level,“Romania’seffortatdemocratisationhasbeenboggeddownbyitscommunist

legacy–widespreadpessimismandapathy,politicaldilettantism,clientelism,and(…)

corruption.”332Theapproachtoprivatisationofthehithertostate-controlledindustry

isarguedtobeamanifestationofthesetendencies.Gallagherobservesthatformer

membersoftheintelligenceservicesbenefittedfromresourcesandcontactsamongst

thepoliticalelites.333ThisresultedinstateassetsbeingsoldtothePDSR’sclientele,

ensuringthatthefirstgenerationofcapitalistbusinessmen,adefactonewsocialclass,

grewoutoftheoldnomenclature.Overall,Iliescu’seconomicpolicy,focusedon

incrementalratherthanradicalreform,resultedinthe“near-destructionofan

economy”334alreadyweakenedbytheformerregime.Hispoliciescouldnotbuthave

resultedinrisingunemploymentandaloweringoflivingstandards.335More

importantly,Romania’sresistancetochangegavetheWesterncommunitythe

impressionthatthe“pursuitofclosertieswiththeOccidentwaswithoutconviction

andstrictlycircumstantial”andthat“nogreatlovetowardstheWestorWestern

valueswasapparent.”336

ItisevidentthatthisattitudewaslargelyresponsibleforRomania’sdifficultrouteto

Euro-Atlanticintegration.However,thereisanidentitarydimensiontothiswhich

traditionalexplanationssuchastheonesabovecannotaccountfor.Theargumentof

thisthesisisthatthereactionaryattitudeoftheelitesreflectedthepublic’sanxiety

towardschange,particularlyinregardstotheroleofthestate,anareainwhichthe

communistlegacyontheidentitynarrativewaspowerful.AnonymousD,forinstance,

arguesthatatthelevelofpublicmentalitystillendurestheperceptionofthestateasa

provider:theexperienceofastrongsystemofstatewelfarehas“createdincitizensof

allcategoriesandalmostalllevelsofeducation,afeelingofentitlement.(…)They

331T.Gallagher,‘Romania’sDesiretoBeNormal,’ContemporaryPolitics4:2(1998),p.111.332P.Gross,andV.Tismaneanu,‘TheEndofPost-CommunisminRomania,’JournalofDemocracy16:2(2005),p.149.333T.Gallagher,RomaniaandtheEU–HowtheWeakVanquishedtheStrong(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,2009),p.19.334Gallagher(1998),p.113335Turnock(2001),p.124.336Boia(2012),p.157.

135

expectthestatetobethemaininvestor,toprovidequalityanduniversalhealthcare,

andacertainlevelofsalaryandincome.”337Thestate,intheRomanianperception,

mustremainactiveinthespheresofpubliclife,despitetheobviouslimitationinits

capacitytomaintaintheseservicesinademocraticcapitalistsociety.Boiahintstothis

viewaswellwhenhenotesthat“asaconsequenceoftraditionandhabit(…)

Romaniansappearmoreattractedtosymbolsreferringtonationalcohesionand

authoritythanthosecharacteristicofademocraticlife.”338Itisquestionable,

therefore,whetherblameforRomania’stroubledtransitionshouldbelaidsquarelyat

Iliescu’sdoor.Theroleofthestateasprotectorandacertaindesireforcontinuityand

anxietytowardstheunfamiliararenoticeableequallyattheeliteandsocietallevel.

Iliescuis,inthisvein,representativeofthegeneralattitudepervasivethroughoutthe

firsthalfofthe1990s.Inotherwords,onewouldmaketheargumentthat,iftheIliescu

regimewasill-equippedtorespondtothechallengesoftransition,sotoowasRomania

asawhole.

TheIssueofNationalSovereigntyandtheMinorityQuestion

Subscribedtoacertainextenttotheissueofreform,buttouchingonadifferent

anxietywhichdrawsontheRomanianidentitynarrativeistheinherentchallengeto

statesovereigntyposedbytheaccessionprocess.Theblurringofdomesticand

internationalpolicyisnowheremoreobviousthanintheHungarianminorityquestion.

TheSzeklerHungariancommunity,primarilyconcentratedinthreecountiesinthe

centreofthecountry,hadbeen,asexploredinthepreviouschapter,discriminated

againstbythecommunistregimeandavictimofitsnationalistdiscourse.Inthe

aftermathoftherevolutiontheirsituationbecameoneofthemoststringentissuesfor

theIliescuregimeandattractedsignificantattentionfromtheinternational

community.Theminorityquestionconcernedthetypesofrightswhichshouldbe

awardedtodifferentethnicgroupsbytheRomanianstate.Inthis,theHungarian

contingenthademergedasthemostvocalindemandinglegislationonbasicminority

grouprights,suchaseducationinthemothertongueoraccesstoadministrative

337AnonymousD(2014).338Boia(2011),p.372.

136

officesinareaswithsignificantHungarianpopulations.Thesedemands,however,were

unacceptabletoRomanians,asSilviuBrucan,oneofthetoppoliticalcommentatorsof

thedayarguedin1990:“theMagyarminoritywantstoeliminateatastrokeevery

harmfuleffectoftheassimilationcampaignbeganintheCeausescuperiod(…).The

Romanianssimplydonotunderstanddemandsofthiskind,andtheyevaluateallthis

asextremist.”339

ThisviewhasitsrootsinboththeportrayaloftheRomanianSelfandoftheHungarian

Other.IntermsoftheSelf,thisinterpretationdrawsonthethemeofUnityand

concernsthenatureoftheRomanianstateandethnicRomanians’positionwithinit.

Theemphasisisonbothsovereigntyandnationalunity,asthefirstarticleofthe

constitutionshows:“Romaniaisanation-state,(…)unitaryandindivisible.”340Asa

result,ethnicminoritiescouldbeextendedrightswhichdidnotcontravenethethree

principlesoutlinedabove,andindeedHungariansbenefittedfromthesameindividual

rightsasthemajority,aswellas“somecollectiverightssuchastheguaranteeofaseat

inthelowerhouseparliament.”341TheproblemarosewhentheHungarianminority

demandedcomprehensivegrouprightswhichwoulddifferentiatethemfromtherest

oftheRomaniancitizens,particularlyinregardstostateeducationinthemother

tongue,asmentionedearlier,andtighterculturallinkswithHungary.342This

contravenedthenotionthatallRomaniancitizenswereequalasithadtheimplication

thatthestatewouldofferextrarightstoaminoritygrouptherebydiscriminating

againstthemajority.Withinastatewhichwasmeanttobenationalandunitary,such

asRomania,thiswasanuntenablepositionasisclear,again,fromtheConstitution.

Whilearticle6(1)stipulatesthatnationalminoritieshavetherighttopreservetheir

ethnicidentity,343article6(2)qualifiestheserightsbystatingthat“theprotecting

339Brucan,citedinGallagher(1995),p.86.340ParliamentofRomania,ConstitutionofRomania(2003),Article1(1),[n.d.]availablefromhttp://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_1&par1=1#t1c0s0sba1[accessed22December2016].341Roper(2000),pp.113-114.342Gallagher(1998),p.115.343ParliamentofRomania,ConstitutionofRomania(1991),Article6(1),[n.d.]availablefromhttp://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act1_2&par1=1[accessed7July2015].

137

measurestakenbytheRomanianstate(…)shallconformtotheprinciplesofequality

andnon-discriminationinrelationtotheotherRomaniancitizens.”344

Thesituationwasfurtherexacerbatedbythefactthattheminorityinquestionwas

ethnicHungarian.TheportrayalofthisOtherasanexistentialthreattoRomania’s

territorialintegrityaugmentedsuspicionsoverthemotivesbehindthesedemands.The

themeofBesiegedFortressisevidentinRomanians’reactionandthearguably

excessivelevelofthreatperception.AsDragomanargues,“theHungariancommunity

waslargelysuspectedofdisloyaltyandevenofplottingTransylvania’ssecession.”345

Ontheotherhand,theinterestshownbyitshistoricalfoe,Hungary,inthe

emancipationofitsdiasporadidnothingbutfurtherexacerbateRomanians’distrust.

Forinstance,themainpoliticalarmoftheHungarianminority,theUDMR(the

DemocraticAllianceofHungariansinRomania)hadbeenestablishedwithfinancial

assistancefromHungary,346sendingoutaclearsignalofsupportfromRomania’s

neighbourforthedemandsoftheirbrethrenacrosstheborder.Evenmoreworryingly,

Hungary’sconservativeprimeminister,JozsefAntall,hadclaimedtobetheleaderof

“fifteenmillionHungariansinspirit,includingthefivemillionlivinginothercountries

thanHungary.”347WhatRomaniasawinthiswastheconcertedeffortofitswestern

neighbourtoaidtheHungarianminorityinachievingitsaimsand,insodoing,

threatenthesovereigntyandintegrityofitsterritory.IliescucapturesRomania’s

assessmentofthesituation:“governmentsandpoliticalforces(…)tendtousethe

noblepreoccupationwiththeprotectionofminorityrightsasasubstituteforputting

forwardterritorialclaims,whichotherwisecaninnowaybeacceptedbythe

internationalcommunity.”348

AsfarasRomanianswereconcernedthedemandsoftheHungarianminoritywere

seenasthreateningtheintegrityofthenation-state,andtheinvolvementofHungary

344ConstitutionofRomania–1991,article6(2).345D.Dragoman,‘NationalIdentityandEuropeanizationinPost-CommunistRomania.TheMeaningofCitizenshipinSibiu:EuropeanCapitalofCulture2007,’CommunistandPost-CommunistStudies41(2008),p.69.346L.J.KulcsarandC.Bradatan,‘PoliticsWithoutFrontiers:TheImpactofHungarianDomesticPoliticsontheMinorityQuestioninRomania,’CommunistandPost-CommunistStudies40(2007),p.303.347Ibid.,p.305.348Iliescu,citedinRoper(2000),p.116.

138

inthematterwasregardedasinterferenceinthedomesticissuesoftheirsovereign

nation.RathercontrarytoIliescu’sstatement,theissuewascomplicatedfurtherby

theinvolvementoftheinternationalcommunity.Inthebackgroundofincreasing

ethnictensionsandconflictsthroughoutEasternEurope,theWesthadtakenakeen

interestintheprotectionofminorityrightsinpost-communiststates,withtheOSCE

statingin1997thatthelegalstatusandprotectionoftheidentityofnational

minorities“weremattersoflegitimateinternationalconcernandconsequentlydidnot

constituteexclusivelyaninternalaffair”349ofstates.Theproblemofnationalminority

rightswasbecomingbothincreasinglyinternationalisedandakeyaspectofthe

accessionprocesstoWesternorganisations,afactreflectedintheEUandNATO’s

decisioninDecember1991“tomakeminorityrightsoneofthefourcriteriathat

candidatecountrieshadtomeetinordertobecomemembersofthese

organisations.”350Beforelong,theresolutionoftheminorityissueand,morebroadly,

thenormalisationinrelationsbetweenthetwostatesbecameaprerequisitefor

accession:“organisationssuchasNATOandtheEUwerecleartobothpartiesthat

signingabasictreatyandresolvingthestatusofethnicHungarianswascriticaltotheir

admissionintotheseandotherEuro-Atlanticstructures.”351

Inthiscontext,twoseeminglyconflictingidentity-relatedgoalswereinplay.Onthe

onehand,resolvingtheminorityquestionwasparamountinRomania’saccession

process,itsmainforeignpolicypriority.Ontheother,anyPrincipalTreatynormalising

relationswithHungarywouldinvolvealevelofcompromiseonissuesrelatedto

sovereigntyandunitytowhichfewRomanianswouldacquiesce,astheirprotection

wasamajorstateprerogative.IntheIliescuregime’streatmentoftheissuethe

antagonismisclearandforeigninvolvementindomesticaffairsremainedproblematic

throughoutthemandate:“formuchofthe1990s,thegovernmentresistedattempts

tointernationalisethestatusofethnicHungarians,”352insistingthattheissue,ifit

349OSCE,ImplementationMeetingonHumanDimensionIssues–ConsolidatedSummary,12-28November1997,p.15,availablefromhttp://www.osce.org/odihr/19941?download=true[accessed10January2017].350W.Kymlicka,‘TheEvolvingBasisofEuropeanNormsofMinorityRights:TightstoCulture,ParticipationandAutonomy,’inM.Weller,K.NobbsandD.Blacklock(eds.),TheProtectionofMinoritiesinWiderEurope(Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2008),p.12.351Roper(2000),p.115.352Ibid.p.116.

139

existedatall,wasaninternalone.Consequently,negotiationsoverthePrincipalTreaty

betweenRomaniaandHungarybeganin1994andfellthroughin1995.Itwas

evidentlydifficultforthisregimetoacceptthattheirunderstandingofnationhoodand

citizenrightscontravenedthatoftheinternationalcommunityand,fromabroader

perspective,thattheseorganisationshadanybusinessquestioningit.More

importantly,herewasatstaketheregime’sowndomesticlegitimacy.Afterall,Iliescu

andthesocialistshadwontwomandatesonthebackofadiscoursefocusedon

“nationalunity,andevenunanimity,aroundcertainvalues(…).”353Anymovementon

theseissues,evenaimedataidingRomania’saccessionprocess,wouldhavedamaged

itscredibility.Maintainingofsovereigntyandtheprotectionofthenationalcharacter

oftheRomanianstatewerecrucialinthiscontext.

Someauthors,suchasDragoman,arguethatthisviewissharedamongstEastern

Europeanstates,whichtendtoregardthemselves“asmembersofethnicallybased

states.Itisstilldifficultforthemtothinkoutsidetheframeworkofthenationalstate

(…).”Therefore,headds,RomaniaandEasternstates,ingeneral,finditchallenging“to

conceivealimitationofthenationalsovereignty.”354Havingsaidthis,evenifonewere

toacceptthisfeatureascommonthroughoutEasternEurope,onewouldarguethatin

Romaniathedifficultyofovercomingtheissueofforeigninterferenceismagnifiedby

theportrayaloftheHungarianOther.Thereisanoticeableperception,atthelevelof

boththepopulationanditsleaders,thatanyconcessionstotheHungarianminority

causewouldautomaticallysnowballintodemandsforterritorialautonomyoreven

independence.AlthoughsometraditionalaccountshavesuggestedthatRomanian

eliteswere,ineffect,exploitingtheinsecuritiesofthemassesbyartificially

augmentingthe‘Hungarianthreat,’355theidentity-basedperspectivesuggeststhat

manyRomaniansindeedbelievedtherewasagenuinedanger,notleastduetoprime-

ministerAntall’sstatements,thatthestatewouldbreak-upalongethniclines,asithad

353Boia(2011),p.373.354Dragoman(2008),p.74.355SeeGallagher(1995).

140

inthepast.AsKulcsarandBradatanpointout,Romanianelitesdemonstrateda

“fixationthatautonomyofanykind(…)willeventuallyleadtosecession.”356

Asaresult,inthisissue,asinthatofdomesticreform,theidentitynarrativeinfluenced

Romania’sbehaviourandactedasanobstacletothestate’saccessiontotheEUand

NATO.Moreimportantly,thetransitiongovernment’sinabilitytonavigatethese

challengeseffectivelyshowstheessentialdisconnectionbetweenRomania’sviewon

theroleofthestateanditsprerogatives,andthoseoftheWesterncommunity.Itmay

simplybethecasethattheIliescuregimewasessentiallyunableorunwillingtoenact

thechangesnecessaryforadmissiontotheEuropeanclub.Ontheotherhand,itmay

bethat,duringearlytransition,Romaniansasapeoplewerenotpreparedtorenounce

certaintraditionalvaluesandthe‘national’directioninfavourofWesternisation.Itis

alsoplausiblethatbothinterpretationsaretrue,inthatanincompetentpolitical

leadershipstuckwiththefamiliarwhiletheiractionswereperceivedaslegitimatebya

publicwho,similarly,hadnootherreferencepointfortheirassessmentotherthanthe

perceivedpursuitofidentitarygoals.Inanycase,duringthetransitioneraitisinthe

periodbetween1990and1996thatidentity-relatedanxietiesmostobviouslyinformed

Romania’sbehaviourtowardsreformandtheminorityquestion.

TheRetreatofIdentitaryAnxietiesinthemid-1990s

Finally,oneshouldconsiderthequestionofwhytheconservativefacetofRomanian

societyshoweditselfsoprominentlyinthesefirststagesoftransition.Inaddressing

this,onewouldarguethattheidentitaryperspectiveemployedhereshedslightonthe

complexitiesofRomanianmotivationsforactioninamannerinaccessibleto

traditionalaccounts.Iliescu’sregimehadnotacquiredandmaintainedpowersolely

throughmachinationsandpropaganda,but,instead,wasreflectingaswellasshaping

theviewsofthebroaderpopulation.Fromthisperspective,theanswermaylieinthe

consequencesoftheshockcausedbytherevolution.AsHudsonhasputit,“thereare

times,particularlyinthewakeofgreatsystemicorsubsystemicchange,whena

nation-statemayencounterprofounduncertainty”357inaddressingthequestionof

356KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.307.357Hudson(2013),p.119.

141

‘whoarewe?’Inthesesituations,itisuptotheelitestooffersocietyanansweranda

direction.AsHudsoncontinues,“tobesuccessfulinsteeringthatdiscussion,these

forceswillhavetotapintodeepculturalbeliefsactivelysharedorlyingdormant

amongalargemajorityofthepopulace.”Moreimportantlysheadds,"insuchtimes,

theprimacyofthequestion‘whoarewe?’maytrumpallotherquestionsofsuccessor

failureorriskinforeignpolicy.”358Itisbeyonddoubtthatthesocialistsdidtapinto

alreadyexistingprofoundbeliefsandwereabletoperpetuatethem.Ontheother

hand,thisshowsaparticularpredilectiontowardsinertia,rootedinthecontinuityof

theidentitynarrative.Onewouldarguethat,between1990and1996Romania

adoptedareactionaryattitudeinatimeofprofoundsystemchange.Inotherwords,

post-revolutionaryanxietiesbornoutofuncertaintyoverthefuturewere,inmany

ways,compensatedinRomaniabyare-emphasisingofidentitarycertainties–

Romaniansmaynothaveknownwhattheywereheadingtowards,buttheyknewwho

theywereandwhattheystoodfor.Fromhereemergesthedisjunctionbetweentheir

foreignpolicygoalsandthehalf-heartedcommitmenttoenactchangesatthe

domesticlevel.

Muchlikeinthecaseofcommunism,however,anidentity-baseddomesticlegitimacy

couldonlysustaintheregimeforsolong.Astheeconomicsituationdeteriorated,and

itbecameclearthatRomaniawasfallingbehinditsEasternneighboursinthe

accessionprocess,thepublicreactedinthe1996electionsbyoustingtheIliescu

regime.Therewas,inthis,are-evaluationofidentitarypriorities.Inthesocialists’

placecamearight-wingcoalitionledbyafreshface,presidentEmilConstantinescu,a

universitylecturer.ThischangehadsignificantrepercussionsonRomania’s

developmentandthemannerinwhichitwasperceivedinternationally.Thecoalition

ranonamessageofcommitmenttoaddressingtheissueseitherignoredor

mishandledbythesocialists,particularlyintheareaofgovernmentspendingand

privatisation.359AccordingtoGallagher,“therewerewidespreadexpectationsthatin

1996aturning-pointhadbeenreachedwhichwouldenableagenuinetransitionto

358Ibid.359Roper(2000),p.82.

142

politicalandeconomicpluralismtogetunderway.”360Moreover,thischangein

governmentimprovedRomania’sprospectsofaccessionasit“sentasignaltotheEU

andNATOthatthecountrywaswillingtoaddressreform.”361Althoughthecoalition

governmenthadissuesofitsown,itslegacyremainsthatofspeedingupRomania’s

Westernaccessionprocess–duringConstantinescu’smandateRomaniabeganformal

negotiationswiththeEU(1999),signedthePrincipalTreatywithHungary(1996)and

enhanceditscooperationwithNATO.Moreimportantly,itselectionsignalledthe

entrenchingofthedemocraticprocess.AsGrossandTismaneanuhaveargued,their

victory“finallycreate[d]acultureofpoliticalalternationandfreepublicdiscoursethat

mostRomanianshadneverbeforeexperienced.”362From1996Romaniasawahealthy

alternationofleftandrightwinggovernments,allofwhichprioritisedthegoalof

accessionoverthatofprotectingnationalvalues,thesocialistsincluded.Ititistelling,

inthisview,thatRomaniagainedmembershipofNATOin2004,duringIliescu’sfinal

mandate.AlthoughRomanianconservatismstillheldswayoveranimportantpartof

Romaniansociety,identity-relatedanxietiesreceded,allowingforthedesiretojoin

theWesttobecomethepredominantattitudedrivingRomania’sbehaviour.EU

membershipwasfinallyattainedin2007,underpresidentBasescuandhisrightwing

coalition.

Conclusion

ThischapterhasexploredthenatureofRomania’sidentitynarrativeatthetimeand

afterthe1989revolution,andhowitfedintothestate’sbehaviourduringtransition.

Theperspectiveofferedherecomplementstraditionalaccountsofthestate’sdifficult

transition,byfocusingonhowtheidentitynarrativewasutilisedbytheIliescuregime,

butalsohowit,inturn,influenceditsbehaviour.Theroleplayedbyagencyinre-

conceptualisingtheclaimsmadeaboutRomanianidentityinthiscontextisvital,as

theseprovidethebasisforthecontemporarynarrative.Equally,identity-related

factorsarecriticalinaccountingforthepriorityofallofRomania’stransition

governmentstosatisfytheprerogativeofensuringthesecurityofthenewlyliberated

360Gallagher(2009),p.19.361Roper(2000)p.122.362GrossandTismaneanu(2005),p.152.

143

statebyaccessiontotheEUandNATO.Ontheotherhand,thecomplexesand

anxietieswhichdrawontheportrayaloftheSelfandOtherhadtheeffectofstymying

theseendeavours.Specifically,theresistancetochangeinthedomesticsphereand

insistenceonmaintainingnationalsovereigntyduringthe1990-1996perioddamaged

Romania’sinternationalprospects.Inthis,boththeIliescuregimeandbroader

society’sreactionaryattitudesplayedasignificantpart.Itwasnotuntiltheseanxieties

receded,underanewpoliticalleadership,thattheaccessiongoaltookprecedenceto

theprotectionofnationalvalues.

Beyondtheseconsiderationtwoimportantpointswhichemergefromtheperiodof

transitionasexaminedinthischapterare,firstly,theunanimitybehindthedecisionto

pursueEuro-Atlanticintegrationatbothpoliticalandsocietallevel,whichreflectsthe

pervasiveperceptionthatthisdirectionwasessential,andtheonlyoption,to

satisfyingtheprerogativeofensuringthestate’ssecurity.Thefollowingchapter,on

Romania’srelationshiponRussiawillexpandonthisnotionfromtheperspectiveof

thetwostates’bilateralrelations.Asecondpointwouldbethattherelationship

betweenRomaniaandHungaryisonebasedonsuspicionandanxietyconcerningthe

motivationsbehindtheiractions.Chapter6,ontherelationshipbetweenRomaniaand

Hungarywillexploretherootsandconsequencesofthisattitudeinmoredetail,

buildingontheaccountofferedhere.

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Chapter5.Romania’sRelationshipwithRussia–Survivinginthe

ShadowoftheGreatEasternPower

ARomanianstatesurroundedbySlavstatesmayseemforthe

enemiesoftheRomanianpeopleapleasantillusion;forRomaniansitisacalamity,whichforetellsnewbattles,adisaster,theonly

consolationtowhichisknowledgeoftheenduranceoftheRomanianpeopleanditshopeforvictory.363

Introduction

ThischapterexaminestheinfluenceoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeonits

relationshipwithRussia,whilstsettingthisinteractioninthebroadercontextof

Romania’sgeneralforeignpolicydirection.Thechapterbeginswithasectionon

Romania’spost-accessionforeignpolicyagendaandexpandsonthenotionthatalack

ofcoherentstrategyhasbeenthehallmarkofthestate’sinternationalbehavioursince

2007.Contrarytothisview,thethesisarguesthatthecurrentinternationalclimatehas

providedBucharestwithanopportunitybutalsothenecessityofconstructingaclear

strategyinwhichcurbingRussianexpansionismoccupiesanimportantrole.Following

onfromthis,themannerinwhichtheRussianOtherhasbeenportrayedwithinthe

Romanianidentitynarrativeisexplored,withanemphasisontheSelf-Othercontrast

andtherepresentationofRussiaasanessentiallythreateningforce.Fromthisthe

chaptermakesthecasethattheportrayaloftheRussianOthertranslatesinto

pervasiveattitudesofanxiety,suspicionandfearoverRussia’sactions,whichhave

impactedrelationsbetweenthetwostatessincethe1989revolution.Thechapter

continueswithaninvestigationoftheinteractionbetweenRomaniaandRussiaduring

transition,focusedontheidentity-relatedreasonsbehindthedifficultyofestablishing

normalrelations.Theanalysisisthenbroughttothepresentday,throughan

examinationofRomania’sbehaviourtowardsRussiaafterthe2007accessiontothe

EU.Itisarguedthatcurrentregionalandcontinentaldevelopments,suchasRussia’s

363M.Eminescu,‘Inluptacupanslavismul[AtWarwithPanslavism],’Timpul(June1878),availablefromhttp://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/portret/articol/eminescu-rusia-vrea-s-mistuiasc-poporul-rom-n[accessed29December2016].

145

increasedinvolvementintheaffairsofEuropeanstatesandtheannexationofCrimea,

haveledtoacoolingofrelationsbetweenRomaniaandRussia.Additionally,the

repercussionsofRussia’sactionsand,inparticular,thedissonanceamongstEuropean

statesonwhatconstitutesaneffectiveresponse,areexplored.Thechapteroutlines

Romania’sposition,rootedintheaugmentationofitsalreadyexistingidentitary

anxieties,emphasisingitshard-lineapproachvis-à-visRussia,andMoscow’sreaction

tothisstance.Finally,thechapteroffersapredictionofthefutureofRussian-

RomanianrelationssetinthebroadercontextofRomania’sgeneralforeignpolicy

agendaandbasedonseveralscenarioscontemplatedbyRomaniansonthepotential

developmentofcurrentsituationsatplayinUkraineandacrossthecontinent.Two

issuesarespecificallyaddressed–theperceptionthatRussia’sinvolvementinthe

affairsofEUandNATOstatesisthreateningthecohesionandabilityofthetwo

organisationstocounterMoscow;andthefactthatRussia’sforeignpolicyagendahas

yettobefullyrevealed.Inthissetting,thesectionexaminesRomania’spotential

courseofactionanditsrepercussionsonRomanian-RussianandNATO-Romanian

relations.Theaimofthischapteristoutilisetheidentity-perspectivetohighlightthe

complexrationalewhichmotivatesRomania’sbehaviourtowardsRussia,and

portrayingitasanautonomousactorthedirectionofwhomisnotdefinedsolelyby

alignmentwithitsallies.

ANoteonRomania’sContemporaryForeignPolicyandtheCurrentInternational

Climate

ThepreviouschapterexaminedRomania’spost-1989foreignpolicydirectionandthe

challengesposedbytransitionandtheaccessionprocess.Thethesiswillfollowon

fromthisaccountwithananalysisofitsrelationshipswiththreeactorswhichareall

crucialinunderstandingthestate’scurrentforeignpolicyagenda.However,before

turningtoRussia,thesubjectofthischapter,itisnecessarytoexpandonthecontext

inwhichthisinteraction,aswellasthosewithHungaryandtheRepublicofMoldova,

146

areset.ThisconcernsRomania’sforeignpolicydirectionsinceitsaccessiontotheEU

in2007,whichmarksthedefactoendofthetransitionperiod.364

Twoissuesemergedfromtheinterviewsconductedforthepurposesofthisprojectin

2014:firstly,thatthesingularinternationalgoalduringtransitionwasaccessiontothe

EUandNATO;andsecondly,thatoncethesewereachievedthereexistedasenseof

uncertaintyregardingRomania’scurrentforeignpolicyprerogatives.University

lecturer,AnonymousE,arguedthat“Romania’sstrategywasinfluencedbythetwo

targetsbutmyproblemisthatitisnotcleartomewhathappenedafter2007,(…)Iam

uncertainastowhatobjectiveswehaveonthehorizonforthefuture.”365Liberal

politicianandpoliticalscienceprofessor,AnonymousC,sharesthisview:“Iwouldsay

thatafter2004,andespeciallyafter2007,thedifferencebetweenhomeandEuropean

affairsdisappears,and,asaresult,ourforeignpolicyisfacinganidentitycrisis.”366

AnonymousB,alectureronmigrationpolicy,expoundsonthenatureofthis

challenge:“atthemoment,itisclearthatwemustplayacertaincard,butIamnot

certainwehaveidentifiedwhatthatis;because,ontheonehand,wemustnegotiate

ourforeignpolicyinthecontextoftheEUandNATO,butwemustalsopursueour

owninterests.”367WhatisrevealedisapictureofRomaniaasastatewhichhasbeen

givenadirection,onedictatedbyitsinternationalalliances.AnonymousAarguesthat

thisisclearinRomania’spositionwithintheEUandNATO:“InsidetheEuropean

Union,ithasbecomeaccustomedtotheroleoflaggard(…).Strategically,itisaligned

totheUnitedStates,whichdoesnotleaveroomformanynuances.”368Thequestion

thusarises,asAnonymousBalsonotes,ofwhatremainsofRomania’snational

interestsandtowhatextentthestateisshowinganylevelofindividualityinits

agenda.FormerCultureMinisterAnonymousDbelievesthisisnotthecase:“our

policyisalignment;wehavenonewtargets.(…)Romaniaisalmostimperceptible,

364AlthoughRomaniajoinedNATOin2004,thisthesisconsiders2007tobetheactualendoftransition,notleastbecauseitwastheareaofdomesticreformnecessaryforfulfillingtheEUaccessioncriteriathatRomaniafoundmostchallenginginitstransitionfromsocialism,ashasbeenexploredinthepreviouschapter.365AnonymousE(2014).366AnonymousC,InterviewwithPoliticalScienceUniversityLecturer,byI.Tartacuta-Lawrence,11.06.2014,tape,Bucharest,Romania.367AnonymousB,InterviewwithUniversityLectureronMinorityIssues,byI.Tartacuta-Lawrence,06.06.2014,tape,Bucharest,Romania.368AnonymousA(2014).

147

invisible,ithasnotmadeanyremarkablechoicesinitsforeignaffairs.(…)Ourforeign

policyis,ifyouwishtodescribeitinnegativeterms,mediocre;inpositiveterms,well-

behaved.”369

WhetheroneviewsRomania’sadoptionofEUandNATOgoalsasitsownaseither

naturalortroubling,thegeneralconsensusseemstobethat,asAnonymousC

summarises,“Romania’scapacityfordecidingonitsforeignpolicyismuchreduced

since2004;before2004,wehadacertainindependenceindecision-making;today(…)

thedegreeofEuropeanisationofRomanianforeignaffairsisveryhigh.”370Thespecific

areasofinterestforRomaniaarethoughttobetheBlackSearegionandtheEuropean

Neighbourhoodpolicy,371butalsoinstrengtheningtheEasternpartnership.372The

degreetowhichthestatehasbeensuccessfulinpursuingtheseavenues,however,is

consideredlimitedbytheseobservers,becauseoftherolealreadyassumedinthese

areasbymoreimportantregionalplayers,suchasPoland,373TurkeyorRussia.374These

viewsmayhaveindeedappliedin2014,whentheinterviewswereconducted.Whatis

undeniable,attheveryleast,isthattheclearforeignpolicydirectionwhichemerged

inthetransitionperiodwasnolongernoticeableinRomania’sinternationalbehaviour.

Thisthesisarguesthatthisisnolongerthecaseandthattheidentity-based

perspectiveofferedbythisthesismayshedlightonthereasonsbehindthis

development;eventsoverrecentyearshavealteredsignificantlytheinternationaland

regionalclimate.NestledwithintheEuro-Atlanticorganisations,Romaniaenjoyeda

senseofstabilityandsecuritywhichcouldexplainitspassivepost-accessionforeign

policy.Inthelastcoupleofyears,however,theequilibriumofEasternEuropeandthe

continent,moregenerally,hasbeenrockedbyeventslikethecrisisinUkraineand

Hungary’seasternshift.InternaldissensionbetweenEUstatesandrisingtensions

betweentheEuropeancommunityandRussiahaveprovidedtheopportunityandthe

necessityforRomaniatoplayamoreactiveroleontheregionalscene.Itsstrategic

369AnonymousD(2014).370AnonymousC(2014).371AnonymousB(2014),AnonymousC(2014).372AnonymousA(2014).373AnonymousE(2014).374AnonymousC(2014),AnonymousD(2014).

148

positionontheborderoftheEUandNATOwiththeEuropeanneighbourhoodand

Russiameansthatitnowhasanavenuetoassumegreaterresponsibilitiesasa

memberofthesealliances,butalsotopursueitsownnationalinterests.More

importantly,regionaldevelopmentshaveledtoareactivationofprofoundidentitary

anxietiesconcerningstatesecurityandare-evaluationofitspriorities;inotherwords,

theyhaveprovidedanimpetusforaction.Whatthefollowingchapterswillexamineis

thebilateralrelationshipsRomaniahasestablishedwithitstwosignificantOthers,

RussiaandHungary,anditsEstrangedSelf,theRepublicofMoldova.However,the

mannerinwhichRomanianegotiatesitspositiontowardstheseactorsmustbesetin

thecontextofthestate’sgeneralforeignpolicyagenda.Inotherwords,Romania’s

interactionwiththesubjectsofthethreecasestudiesofferhintsatthepartthestate

iscapableandwillingtoplayontheinternationalsceneinthecurrentcontext.More

importantly,thethesiswillportrayRomaniaasanactorwithdistinctinterestswhich

harnessesitsstrategicpositioninordertoachievespecificidentity-basedgoals.The

influenceoftheidentitynarrativeintheconstructionoftheserelationshipsandits

foreignpolicyagendawillbeexamined,revealingthecomplexmotivesbehind

Romania’sinternationalbehaviour.ThenotionthatBucharest’sdirectionmaybe

qualifiedsimplythroughalignmenttothatpursuedbyitsallies,asbothinterviewees

andtraditionalaccountsofRomanianforeignpolicymayargue,willbechallenged

throughouttheremainderofthisthesis.

Romania’sIdentityDrivenAttitudetowardsRussia–Distrust,FearandAnxiety

overSecurityandIndependence

Asperthemainassumptionsofthisthesis,onewouldarguethatRomania’s

contemporaryrelationshipwithRussiaisshapedbyitshistoricalnarrativeregarding

theirinteractionandthemannerinwhichtheseexperienceshavebeentranslatedinto

theidentitynarrative.TheparticularportrayaloftheSelfandOtherinfluences

Romanians’attitudestowardsMoscowandinformsinterpretationsoftheiractions.

Furthermore,thecontinuityofthehistoricalandidentitynarrativeleadsonetomake

twoinferences,whichapplyequallytotheothertwocasestudies:firstly,

representationsoftheRussianOtherhavebecomesedimented,ensuringthat

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perceptionsarewidespreadandenduring;secondly,thereproductionofthehistorical

narrativealongthesamelinesasintheformativeperiodoftheRomaniannation-state

meansthatthememoryofpasteventsisparticularlyvivid.Asaresult,inorderto

understandthenatureofRomanianattitudestowardsMoscow,oneshouldsummarise

themannerinwhichtheRussianOtherhasbeensubscribedtothehistoricaland

identitynarratives.

ThechapteronthedevelopmentoftheRomanianidentitynarrativehasalready

outlinedtheimportanceofconstructingasharpcontrastbetweenSelfandOther.

DuringtheMiddleAgestheRomanianstates’modestconditionhadtobereconciled

withtheexceptionalismimplicitintheFoundationMyths.Theresultwasahistorical

narrativefocusedonself-victimisationwhichportrayedRomaniansascasualtiesofthe

expansionistandoppressivetendenciesofmorepowerfulOthers,whilstalso

emphasisingtheiruncannycapacityforresistingforeigninterference.Inidentitary

termsthistranslatesintothethemeoftheBesiegedFortress.AsBoiasummarises,

self-victimisationcreatesaperceptionthatRomanianshavebeen“thrownfromsideto

sidebythewavesofhistory.”375DrawingonthethemeofBesiegedFortressisthe

themeofUnity.Effortstocreateanindependentnation-statewhichbroughttogether

alltheRomanianregionswerelegitimatedbynineteenthandtwentieth-centuryelites

asvindicationforRomania’stroubledhistory.AllthemoreshouldtheRomanian

endeavoursucceedandbeacceptedbytheinternationalcommunity,asitsexperience

oftheMiddleAgeshadbeeninherentlyunjust.

ItisagainstthisbackdropthatRomania’sexperienceofinteractionwithRussiais

portrayed.AlthoughRussiaentersthescenemuchlaterthantheHungarianOther,its

impactontheRomanianstate’ssituationinthecontextofthethemesofBesieged

FortressandUnityisjustassignificant.Russia’sinvolvementintheaffairsofthe

Romanianprovincesbeginsinearnestinthenineteenthcentury,inthecontextofthe

longfoughtRusso-TurkishWars.Asthenationalprojectisonlyjustgettingunderway,

in1812,theTsaristEmpireannexesBessarabia,aterritoryhistoricallypartof

Moldavia.Thisinadvertentlymeansthat,whentheinitialunificationbetweenRomania

375Boia(2011),p.286.

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andMoldaviatakesplace,itdoessowithouttheeasternhalfofthelatter–see[Figure

3].RussiathereforebecomessubscribedtothelistofpowerfulOtherswhichhave

stymiedtheunificationprocess,asDutceac-Segestenpointsout:representationsfocus

onthefactthat“thenationalunificationprojectsarehinderedbytheinterferenceof

empiresbothfromsouthandfromnorth.”376Amongstthem,particularlyinmodern

times,Russiaoccupiesanimportantplace,notleastbecauseoftheconsequencesof

itsinterferenceontheRomaniannationalproject.Althoughexternalcircumstances

weresuchthatBessarabiaeventuallyunitedwithRomaniain1918,Russiaremained

thesolegreatpowerintheEast.ItsinterestintheRomanianspace,aswellas

Bucharest’sinabilitytocounterit,wereconfirmedbyitsretakingofBessarabiain1940

–see[Figure5],thematterbeingsettledin1945,whentheregionwasincludedinthe

SovietUnion.Assuch,theimageofRussiaasthemainreasonbehindthefailureofthe

Romaniannationalprojectwascemented.Additionally,theSovietoccupationof

RomaniaaftertheSecondWorldWarandthepartitplayedintheinstallationofthe

communistregimehaveentrenchedtheperceptionofthisactorasanessential

threateningOther.Inthisview,RomaniatrulybecomesaBesiegedFortressasitwas

notonlyitsprerogativeforunity,butitsownsovereigntyandindependencewhich

wereatrisk.

Overall,theRussianOtherhasconsistentlybeenportrayedasanexistentialthreatto

thesurvivalofanindependentRomaniaanditsnationalproject.This,inturn,has

contributedtothecreationofdeep-seededresentmenttowardsMoscow.Asformer

advisorofthedirectoroftheRomanianIntelligenceService(SRI),R.I.Stefureacargues,

“anti-Russiansentiments[havebeen]fuelledthroughouthistoryand[are]deeply

entrenchedinRomanianconsciousness.”377Ifatthetimeoftheinstallationof

communismRomaniansalreadysharedthisviewor,asBoiaargues,“hadlittle

sympathytowardsanythingcomingfromMoscow,”378subsequentregimesdidnothing

ifnotexacerbatethecontrastbetweenSelfandRussianOther.AsBoiacontinues,

376Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.218.377R.I.Stefureac,Conflictulsecretdinspatelescenei–RomaniaversusRusia:50deaniderealitati,miturisiincertitudini.1964-2014[TheSecretConflictBehindtheScene–RomaniaVersusRussia:50YearsofRealities,MythsandIncertitude.1964-2014](Bucharest:Rao,2015),p.37.378Boia(2012),p.107.

151

becauseofCeausescu’sdiscourseandactions,inparticular,Romaniancommunism

“hadtheparadoxicaleffectofmovingRomaniaawayfromtheWest,withoutbringing

itclosertoMoscow.”379ThefailedattemptsatRussificationandthenational,anti-

MoscowdirectionpursuedbytheCeausescuregimespeaktothepotencyofanti-

Russiansentimentsatboththesocietalandpoliticalelitelevel,butalsoelites’

unwillingnesstochallengetheseperceptions.Thiswas,essentially,theportrayalofthe

RussianOtherinplayatthetimeofthe1989revolution.Thesheerfactthat,inits

aftermath,therumourspreadthatRussianterroristsweretryingtocapturethestate

apparatusistellingoftheentrenchedperceptionsoverMoscow’sinterestin

interferingintheaffairsoftheirstate.

ThisimageofRussiahastranslatedintoparticularattitudeswhichinfluenced,after

1989,notonlyRomania’srelationshipwithMoscow,butalsoitsgeneralforeignpolicy

direction.Specifically,therepresentationoftheRussianOtherasanexistentialthreat

isreflectedinapowerfulanxiety,suspicionandevenfearconcerningtheactionsand

influenceofthisactor.Inayehsummarisesthisbeliefwellwhenshenotesthat“there

is(…)littleaffinitywithRussiawithinRomaniansociety.Instead,thecomplicated

historicalrelationshipandthecountry’snon-Slavicoriginshavecontributedtoa

generaldistrustofRussia.”380Additionally,asBoiapointsout,“Romanianslookto

Russiaastosomethinghazyandnottoberecommended,somewhereintheEast.”381

ThegeneralviewisthatRussiaremainsagreatpowerbutthatitsinterestsnecessarily

goagainstRomania’s.AsAnonymousDargues,“therearefew,ifany,filo-Russians[in

Romania],”towhichheadds,“forobviousreasons.”382Becauseoftheperceptionthat

Russiahasinherentexpansionisttendenciesandismotivatedbyadesiretomaintain

andstrengthenitssphereofinfluence,therelationshipbetweenthetwostateswill

necessarilybeanuneasyone.AsambassadortotheUnitedStates,GeorgeMaiorhas

argued,thisisareproductionoftheirhistoryofinteraction:“relationsbetween

RomaniaandtheexpansioniststateswhichsucceededoneanotherintheEastern

379Ibid.,p.225.380A.Inayeh,‘Romania:LargelyImmunetoRussianPressures,’ininARegionDisunited?CentralEuropeanResponsestotheRussiaUkraineCrisis–EuropePolicyPaper,TheGermanMarshalFund,February2015,p.41.381Boia(2012),p.225.382AnonymousD(2014).

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space,whethertheTsaristEmpire,SovietUnion,ornowtheRussianFederation,may

besubscribedtoaparadigminwhichdominatedhostilityoverfriendship,conflictover

cooperation.”383

Moreimportantly,duringtransitionthenotionthatthereexistsaninherent

antagonismbetweenRomania’sprerogatives,mostnotablyconcerningthe

independenceandsecurityofthestate,andRussianinterestsplayedanimportantpart

inthesettingofRomania’sagenda.Fromanidentitaryperspectiveoneisableto

revealthedesiretojointheWestasbeingrootedinboththeprioritiesderivedfrom

theportrayaloftheSelf,aswellasanxietiesconcerningRussia’spotentialrevivalofits

expansionisttendencies.PastexperiencesandtherepresentationoftheRussianOther

ensuredtheunanimouspursuitofapro-Westerndirectionaimedatsafeguarding

RomaniafrominterferencefromMoscow.Thequalityofbilateralrelationsbetween

RomaniaandRussia,ontheotherhand,willreflectthischoicetopursueaclear

demarcationfromMoscow.Inotherwords,Romania’saimofachievingEuropeanand

TransatlanticintegrationcouldnotbuthaveledtofurthercoolingofRomanian-

Russianbilateralrelations.

Russo-RomanianRelationsDuringtheTransitionPeriod

RelationsbetweenRomaniaandRussiawerecomplicatedduringtransitionnotonly

because,aftertherevolution,Romania“turnedtotheWest,”384asBoiaargued,but

alsobecauseofRussia’sownassessmentofthisagenda.Inasense,pursuingapro-

WesternagendaandmaintaininggoodrelationswithRussiaaremutuallyexclusive

directionsinwhatMoscowisconcerned.ReflectingthisviewisNew-Euroasianist

theoristAlexandrDuginwhosuggestedthatRomania,aspartofthebufferzone

betweentheWestandRussia,hadtomakeageopoliticalchoicebetween

‘continentalism’–sidingwith‘OldEurope’(France,GermanyandRussia)–and

383G.C.Maior,‘Studiuintroductiv–DespreConflictuldinspatelesceneidupa1989siprovocarileurmatorilorani[IntroductoryStudy–OntheBehindtheScenesConflictafter1989andtheChallengesofYearstoCome],’inR.I.Stefureac,Conflictulsecretdinspatelescenei–RomaniaversusRusia:50deaniderealitati,miturisiincertitudini.1964-2014[TheSecretConflictBehindtheScene–RomaniaVersusRussia:50YearsofRealities,MythsandIncertitude.1964-2014](Bucharest:Rao,2015),p.19.384Boia(2012),p.226.

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‘atlanticism’–supportingGreatBritainandtheUnitedStates.385Accordingtothe

author,choosingthelatterwouldautomaticallybeperceivedbytheKremlinasan

“anti-Russianorientation.”386Romanianpoliticalcommentatorandformer

parliamentarian,CozminGusa,suggeststhat,throughitsunequivocalpursuitof

accessiontoNATO,Romaniadidindeedchoose‘atlanticism’tothedetrimentof‘Old

Europe,’effectivelypittingitagainstRussia.ReferringtoDugin’saccount,heargues

that“RussiawillviewRomaniaasanadversary,allthemoredangerousastheglobal

hegemon’s[i.e.theUSA’s]militarybaseswillspringuponRomanianterritory.”387

WhetherRomaniawasawarethatthiscoursewouldantagoniseRussiaor,indeed,was

inthepositionduringthe1990stomakeaconsciousdecisiontoreject‘OldEurope’is

debatable.388

Onewouldargue,however,thatjoiningNATOwasapriorityofRomanianforeign

policyintransitiondictatedbyitsidentity-drivenprerogativetoensurethesecurityof

thestate,includingagainstRussia’sactions.Intheseconditions,sacrificingdiplomatic

relationswithMoscowwouldhavebeenpreferablebecausetheend-gamewas

safeguardingitssecurityandindependence,andmembershipofNATOsatisfiedthat

goal.Onecouldgoevenfurtherandsuggestthat,totheextentthatgoodrelations

withtheUSAwereapriority,closenesstoMoscowwasared-linewhichno

governmentinBucharestcouldhavecrossedwithoutjeopardisingitsdomestic

legitimacy.Thewidespreadsentimentoverthe“unacceptabilityofvoluntary

alignmentwiththeEast,”389effectivelymeantthatapro-Westerndirectionwasthe

onlyavailableoptionforRomanianpoliticiansacrossthepoliticalspectrumduringthe

periodoftransition.AsBoiaargues,“somedopointoutthatRussiaisstillagreat

385A.Dugin,BazeleGeopoliticii–VolI:ViitorulGeopoliticalRusiei[TheFoundationsofGeopolitics–VolI:TheGeopoliticalFutureofRussia](Bucharest:Euroasiatica,2011),p.15.386Ibid.387C.Gusa,Imperialisminpostcomunism:Geopoliticadezordiniiinfostullagarsocialist[ImperialisminPost-Communism:TheGeopoliticsofDisorderintheFormerSocialistBloc](Bucharest:AdevarulHolding,2011),p.24.388SeeD.Dungaciu,‘Geopolitica,imperialism,postcomunismsidezordine–Unde(mai)suntemnoi?[Geopolitics,Imperialism,Post-communismandDisorder–WhereDoWe(Still)Stand?],epiloguetoC.Gusa,Imperialisminpostcomunism:Geopoliticadezordiniiinfostullagarsocialist[ImperialisminPost-Communism:TheGeopoliticsofDisorderintheFormerSocialistBloc](Bucharest:AdevarulHolding,2011),p.343.389Turnock(2001),p.123.

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powerandnormalandtosomeextentfriendlyrelationswithitshouldbeestablished.

ThisseemstobetheleastofRomanians’concern.”390Theconsequencewas,however,

asAnonymousBacknowledges,that“certaindiplomaticlinkswith(…)Russiawere

lost.”391

Thereis,however,oneexceptionworthdiscussinghere.In1991,despitetheprofound

anti-Russiansentimentsnoticeableatthesocietallevel,Iliescuseemedunwillingto

renegelinkstoMoscow.RomaniabecametheonlyWarsawPactstatetosignatreaty

withtheSovietUnionwhich“gaveMoscowaneffectivevetooveranyRomanian

alliancewithaWesterncountryhaditnotbeenabrogatedbythecollapseofthe

SovietUnionsixmonthslater.”392AnonymousAqualifiesthisnowrarelydiscussed

eventofRomanianpost-socialisthistoryas“abizarreepisode.”393Onewouldargue

thiswas,indeed,apeculiarmoment–althoughIliescu’sdiscoursefocusedon‘national

rebirth,’herehewasignoringbothhiselectoralpromisesandthepublic’sresentment

towardsMoscow.ItmaybethatIliescu,likeGorbachev,believedthatcommunism

couldbereformedfromwithinandactedaccordingly.Itmayalsobethathewasone

ofthepragmatistsBoiamentions–acknowledgingthattheSovietUnionwasstillthe

super-powerintheregion,andthatmaintainingcloserelationstoitwascommon-

sensical.Others,suchasformercounsellorattheRomanianEmbassyinMoscow,

VasileBuga,arguedthatwhatcharacterisedtheearly1990swasa“broadstateof

confusion,generatedbytherevolution.”394Resistancetochangeandapredilection

towardsthefamiliarwere,ashasbeenexploredinthepreviouschapter,twoofthe

mainfeaturesoftheIliescuregime.Onedoubts,however,that,hadthetreatyever

beenratified,Iliescu’sdomesticlegitimacycouldhavewithstoodthepublicopinion

backlash.Inanycase,thisisaninterestingexceptiontothegeneraltrendofRusso-

390Boia(2012),p.226.391AnonymousB(2014).392Gallagher(2009),p.133.393AnonymousA(2014).394V.BugainC.Harsan,‘Romania-Rusia,Incotro?(V)[Romania-Russia,WhichWay?(V)],’RomaniaLibera,28.11.2007,http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/documentare/romania-rusia--incotro---v--112431[accessed11January2016].

155

Romanianrelationsthatshowsthatidentitaryanxietiesneednotalwaysprohibit

endeavoursofestablishinggoodrelations.

BythetimeRomaniaandRussiaresumednegotiationsonabilateraltreatyin1992,

however,anoppositioncapableofreflectingthepublic’spowerfulanti-Russian

sentimentshadcoagulated.Twoofthemostsignificantareasofcontentionregarded

historicalgrievancesovertheSovietUnion’streatmentofRomania.Thefirst

concernedRomania’snationaltreasureof93.5tonnesofDaciangold,395evacuatedto

MoscowduringtheFirstWorldWarandarrestedbyMoscowuponRomania’s

occupationofBessarabiain1918,nevertobereturned.Thesecondissuereferredto

theRibbentrop-MolotovPact(1939);morespecifically,RomanianswishedforMoscow

topublicallydenounceitscontent,whichoutlinedtheSovietUnion’sintentionto

recaptureBessarabia.Boththeoppositionandpublic“werepressurisingpresident

Iliescu”396toforcetheinclusionoftheseissuesinthetreaty.Russiarejectedthe

proposaland,atthelastmoment,in1996,Romaniadecidednottosignthe

agreement.Qualifyingthisact,ArmandGosu,AssociateProfessorattheFacultyof

PoliticalScienceoftheUniversityofBucharest,arguesthat,mostlikely,Iliescufelt

compelledbythestrongoppositiontoatreatywhichdidnotrecognisetheseareasof

disputebetweenthetwostatestorenegeonhiscommitmentofcooperationwith

Russia.397

Inthisstance,onenoticestheinfluenceofsedimentedbeliefsconcerningRomania’s

identityonbehaviourmostprominently.Re-iteratingtheassumptionsmadeinthe

introduction,theinter-subjectiveRomanianrationaleforactionreflectstheidentity-

basedprerogativeswhichflowfromthethemeofBesiegedFortress.Bothareasof

contentionwerecrucialinRomania’sassessmentofRussiaasathreateningOtherand

itselfasvictim-thetreasure,soprofoundlylinkedtotheiroriginsasapeople,was

stolenandtheirterritorialdismembermentdecidedbetweentwostatesmore

powerfulthantheirs.Assuch,rejectingatreatywhichdidnotrecognisetheseissues,

395Inayeh(2015),p.41.396A.Gosu,‘PoliticarasariteanaaRomaniei:1990-2005[Romania’sEasternPolicy:1990-2005],’Contrafort(RepublicofMoldova)1(135)(January2006),paginationunknown,availablefromhttp://www.contrafort.md/old/2006/135/958.html[accessed06.01.2016].397Ibid.

156

thoughobjectivelydetrimentaltoRusso-Romanianrelations,wasthepreferredoption

becausesigningitwouldhavebeentantamounttoacknowledgingRomania’sinferior

positionvis-à-visRussiaandtheforgettingofpastaggressions.Botheventssignified

transgressionsagainstRomania’sheritageandsovereigntyandcouldthereforenotbe

forgiven,thecostnotwithstanding.AlthoughIliescuhimselfwould,perhaps,havebeen

willingtosignthetreaty,thefactthathebowedtopublicpressureshowsthatthe

matterwasonewhichwoulddamagehisdomesticlegitimacy.Thiswasared-linethe

regimecouldnothavecrossed.Theconsequenceofrefusingtosignthetreaty,

however,leftrelationsbetweenRomaniaandRussiaonhiatus.

After1996,arguesformercounsellortotheRomanianEmbassyinMoscow,Vasile

Buga,thequalityofrelationsbetweenBucharestandMoscow“enteredintodecline,

becauseRomania’sforeignpolicyignoredthisspaceandaltereditspriorities.”398The

necessityofestablishingnormalbilateralrelationswithRussiarecededwiththe

electionofpresidentConstantinescuandhisright-wingcoalition,muchlikethe

identity-relatedanxietiestowardsreformmentionedinthepreviouschapter.Instead,

theemphasisnowfellontheaccessionprocesstotheEUandNATO.Therewaslittle

movementonthefrontuntil2003,interestinglyalsounderpresidentIliescu,when

Romaniaachievedthefirstofitsaccessiongoals.AccordingtotheRomanianleaderit

wasGeorgeW.Bushwhoencouragedhimtopursuea‘normalisationofrelations’with

Russia,ontheoccasionofRomania’sinvitationtojoinNATO.399Thetreatysignedlater

thatyeardidcondemntheRibbentrop-Molotovpactandacknowledgedtheissueof

theRomanianTreasure.However,questionswereraisedastowhetheritcouldheal

Russo-Romanianrelations.ParliamentaryDeputyGheorgheBuzatu,forinstance,

arguedthattheRussiancondemnationofthe1939pactwasanemptyconcessionand

theircommitmenttosetupacommissiontaskedwithstudyingexistingarchiveson

theRomanianTreasureissuewouldyieldlittleresult.400Moreimportantlyandtelling

398V.BugainC.Harsan(2007).399Iliescu,citedinA.Neagu,‘IonIliescu:RomaniaaavutointelegerecuFederatiaRusa,in2004,cuprivirelanormalizarearelatiilor’[‘IonIliescu:RomaniaStruckaDealWiththeRussianFederation,in2004,inWhatConcernstheNormalisationofRelations’],Hotnews,05.05.2014,http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-17172140-ion-iliescu-romania-avut-intelegere-federatia-rusa-2004-privire-normalizarea-relatiilor.htm[accessed24December2015].400Buzatu,inChamberofDeputies–ParliamentofRomania,DezbateriParlamentare–SedintaSenatuluidin3Noiembrie2003:16.DezbatereasiaprobareaproiectuluiLegiipentruratificarea

157

oftheanxietytowardsmakinganycompromisestowardsRussia,herhetoricallyasked:

“doweremainasalittlemousewhichpokesatanelephantandwhenwecrossa

bridge,wewhisperinitsearwarningithowmuchthebridgeisrocking?”401

Russo-Romanianrelationsdidnotsignificantlyimproveafterthesigningofthe2003

treaty.Thiswaspartly,accordingtoVasileBuga,becauseofRomania’sinabilityto

capitaliseonthetreaty’spotentialandthelackofa“clearandconsistentstrategy

aimedtowardsthedevelopmentofrelationswithMoscow.”402However,theformer

diplomatalsocitesRomanianpreconceptionstowardsRussiaasreasonsbehindthe

lackofauniformapproach:“theseprejudicesarelinked,largelyerroneously,to

distrustofRussia,whichisstillviewedthroughperspectivesconstructedinthepast.

Theseareconnectedtomomentsoftensionintheirinteractionandlesssoto

momentswhentheywerecollaborating.”403Inotherwords,memoriesofpast

experiencesstillcontributedtothecreationofanimageofRussiaasuntrustworthy,

andessentiallydangeroustoRomanianinterests.ThethemeofBesiegedFortressis

apparentinthisposition,whichledtoanambivalenceinRomania’sdealingswith

Russia.Ontheonehand,Bucharestwasawarethatanormalisationofrelationswith

Moscowwasinitsobjectivebestinterest.However,therewasaperceptionthatany

concessions,particularlyonissuesofnationalimportance,wouldplaceRomaniaina

vulnerablepositionvis-à-visRussiaandimpactitsabilitytonegotiatewiththisOther

onanequalfooting.IntransigencetowardsMoscowwas,conversely,asignofstrength

andthatRomaniawaschallengingitstraditionalsmall-statecondition.Thesetwo

antagonisticattitudesareattherootofwhatBugaarguescharacterisedRusso-

Romanianrelationsafter1990:“diplomaticactivityknewperiodsofre-launchand

recoil,whichjustifyitsqualificationasincoherentandinefficient.”404

TratatuluiprivindrelatiileprietenestisidecooperaredintreRomaniasiFederatiaRusa,semnatlaMoscovala4iulie2003[ParliamentaryDebates–SittingoftheSenateof3November2003:16.TheDebateandapprovaloftheLawforratifyingtheTreatyconcerningfriendlyrelationsandcooperationbetweenRomaniaandtheRussianFederation,signedinMoscowon4July2003],03.11.2003http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5565&idm=16[accessed08January2016].401SenatorBuzatu,inSenateDebate(2003).402VasilaBugainC.Harsan(2007).403Ibid.404Ibid.

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Overall,workingontheintersectionofFPAandSCfromanidentity-basedapproach

providesparticularinsightintotherationalebehindRomania’sbehaviourtowards

Russiaduringtransition.Romania’sdesireforEuro-Atlanticintegrationwasnotonly

rootedinprerogativessetbytheportrayaloftheSelfbutalsoinanxietiesconcerning

Russia,basedonitsrepresentationasathreateningOtherthroughthelensofthe

BesiegedFortress.ItmayhavebeenthatRomanians,muchlikeDugin,viewedcordial

relationswithMoscowandapro-Westerncourseasincompatible.Inanycase,the

profoundanti-Russiansentimentsinplayatsocietallevelandtheambivalenceofelites

inmanagingdialoguewithMoscowresultedinastrainedrelationshipthroughout

transition.Inthisvein,reconciliationmayonlyhaveoccurredafterintegration,when

Romaniawasabletonegotiatethisrelationshipfromadifferentfooting.Asthe

followingsectionwillshow,however,thechanginginternationalcircumstancesand

perceptionsoverRussia’sownactionspreventedthisfrombeingthecaseand,instead,

resultedinanaugmentationofRomaniananxieties.

ContemporaryRusso-RomanianRelations

Ifbefore2007oneofthemoststrikingfeaturesofRusso-Romaniancontactwas

Bucharest’sambivalencetowardsameaningfullevelofinteractionwithMoscow,

Romania’saccessiontotheEUandNATOsettheirbilateralrelationshipinanew

contextandalteredthestate’spositionvis-à-visRussia.TheviewwasthatRomania

wasnowembeddedinasystemofallianceswhichguaranteeditsindependencefrom

Moscowandwouldallowittoplayagreaterdiplomaticroleintheregion,especiallyin

termsoftheEU’sNeighbourhoodpolicy.However,integrationposednewchallenges

forBucharestregardingitsmanagementofinteractionwithRussiafromwithintheEU

andNATO.AsNicolescuarguedin2010,Romania’spreferredoptionwouldbea

strategywhichkeepsRussiaatarm’slengthbutmaintainsthesupportofitsallies.

However,shenoted,“thefactthatthispartnershiphasworkedsofardoesnot

guaranteethefactthatitwillworkjustaseasilyinthefuture,sincetheWesthasless

instrumentsintheBlackSearegion(…)andRussia’spoliticalandeconomicinterestin

159

thispartisgreater”405thaninCentralandtherestofEasternEurope.Thereisa

recognition,therefore,thataccessioninitself,althoughitincreasestheinterestsofthe

EUandNATOtosupportRomaniainitsrelationswithMoscow,doesnotinitself

ensureabetterqualityofdialoguebetweenthetwostates.

Meanwhile,thealleviationofRomania’sidentitaryanxietiesregardingrelationswith

RussiaisnotonlycontingentonaccessiontotheEUandNATO,butalsoonhow

Moscow’sownbehaviourisinterpreted.AsoutlinedinChapter3,thethesisargues

thatchangestotheclimateandthere-evaluationofanactor’sprioritiesmayleadto

anxietiesrecedingor,conversely,becomingaugmented.Itisfeasibletopicturethe

opportunecircumstancesinwhichidentitaryanxietieswouldsubsideontheRomanian

side,wereRussiatoadoptaneo-liberal,evenpro-WesterndirectionthatRomania

perceivedasnon-threatening.Thiswas,indeed,thescenariowhichsawRomania’s

relationshipwithHungaryimprovedrasticallyinthelate1990s.AccordingtoGusa,the

RussianFederationdidadopta‘strategicidentity’ofthistypeunderGorbachevand

Yeltsinbetween1991and1993,when“itwasconsideredthat,asaresultofthe

concessionsmadetotheOccident,Russia’sinterestsinworldpoliticswouldbe

recognised.”406AnattitudeofopennesstowardstheWestmayhavebeenpartofthe

reasonwhyIliescupursuedafriendlyapproachtowardsMoscowintheearly1990s.By

thetimeofRomania’saccessiontotheEUandNATOandevenofthesigningofthe

bilateraltreatyin2003,however,Russiahadchangeditsstrategy.Itsforeignpolicy

agendahadbeenreorientedbyVladimirPutininadirectionwhichcouldonlycause

there-emergenceofRomanianconcerns.AsGeorgeMaiorsurmises,referringto

ZbigniewBrzezinski’spropositionofthreepossiblegeostrategicoptionsavailableto

RussiaafterthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion:

BetweentheoptionforanadvancedpartnershipwithAmerica,theemphasisonthenear-abroadasmainpreoccupationforRussia,eitherwiththeaimofeconomicintegration,orfortherebuildingofitsimperialcontrol,[and]theoptionforaEurasiancounter-alliancemeanttocombatAmericanpreponderanceinEurope,Russiafindsitself,today,somewherebetweenthe

405A.Nicolescu,‘ChangesinRomania’sForeignPolicyfromthePerspectiveofNATOandEUMembership,’RomanianJournalofEuropeanAffairs10:1(2010),pp.68-69.406Gusa(2011),p.210.

160

secondandthirdoptions.Russianexpansionismisnolongeratheoreticprediction,butaneffectiverealityoftheworldwelivein.407

Inotherwords,underpresidentPutin,Russiahasdisplayedare-awakeningofits

expansionisttendencies,inregardstobothitstraditionalsphereofinfluence,andits

self-perceptionasagreatpower,capableofcounter-balancingtheUnitedStatesata

globallevel.Inthisview,theEU’sEasternPartnershipandNATO’sexpansiontothe

bordersoftheformerSovietUnionrepresentthreatstoRussia’spositionasregional

hegemon.FromthisstemsRussia’soppositiontoWesterneffortsofestablishing

tighterlinkswiththestatesformerly,orstillperceivedaspart,ofRussia’sorbit.As

Nicolescupointsout,“Russia’sattitudetowardstheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy

andtheEasternPartnershipmorespecificallycontinuestobenegative,”408whilst

thereexistsaperceptionthatatthe“coreofalldifferencesbetweentheWestand

RussiaisthequestionofwhosesphereofinfluencetheSovietsuccessorstatesfall

into.”409Inthisview,theshortmilitaryinterventioninGeorgia(2008),atatimewhen

thestatewasnegotiatingclosertieswithNATO,speakstoRussia’snewdirection.

Itwasinthiscontext,therefore,thatRomaniahadtonegotiateitsnewstrategic

position.Euro-AtlanticintegrationmayhaveofferedRomaniaaguaranteeofitsstatus

asamemberoftheWesterncommunity,butRussia’sbehaviourdidnotleadtoan

ameliorationofitsidentity-basedanxietiesregardingitsintentions.Maior,for

instance,pointstoRussia’sexpansionisttendencies,suchastheinterventionin

Georgia,anditsincreasinglyvirulentEuroasianistandanti-Americandiscourseasthe

“seedsofsignificantlongtermrisks.”410Inotherwords,forRomanians,Russia

continuedtobeseenasathreat,notonlytotheirstate,buttothebroaderinterestsof

theWesterncommunity.IdentitaryanxietieshavemadeRomaniaacutelysensitive

andsuspiciousofRussianbehaviourand,asaresult,relationsbetweenBucharestand

Moscowdidnotimproveintheaftermathofaccession.

407Maior(2015),p.23.408Nicolescu(2010),p.69.409AnalystSergeiKaraganov,citedinNicolescu(2010),p.69.410Maior(2015),p.24.

161

ThemainperceptionmotivatingRomania’sbehaviourtowardsRussiatodayisthat

MoscowispursuingareturntogeopoliticsandthereformingofitsSoviet-erasphere

ofinfluence,whilstitalsosearchestodestabilisetheEUandNATOfromwithin,

threatening,atitsmostprofoundlevel,Romania’ssenseofsecurityofferedby

membership.Recentregionalandcontinentaldevelopmentshavecementedthis

interpretationofRussia’sintentionsandhaveaugmentedanxietiesovertheissueof

security.Atsocietallevel,anti-Russiansentimentsarepervasive:accordingtoa2016

INSCOPpoll,61.5%ofRomanianshavenegativefeelingstowardsMoscow,whilst,

conversely,49.7%believetheUSAisthemainallycapableofprotectingtheirstatein

caseofanationalsecuritythreat.411Ontheotherhand,thepossibilityofaregional

militaryconflictisnowviewedasoneofthemostpressingcausesfornational

concern.412Fromthisperspective,itisclearthattheconflictinUkrainehashada

significantimpactonRomanians’threatperceptions.

Intermsofthestate’sbehaviourinreactingtoMoscow’snewdirection,thereare

severalstrandswhichdeserveattention.Ontheonehand,asMaiorhasargued,

Romaniahasbeenacutelyawarethatbeforeswitchingtoanaggressiveexpansionist

agenda,signalledbytheannexationofCrimea,Russiasuccessfullyemployedasoft

approachinrelationswiththeWest.Thishasresulted,inrecentyears,initsinclusion

intheG8,and,asMaiorpointsout,a“political-economicandevenstrategicopenness

showntowardsRussia(withoutmanyinhibitionsorrestraints)bysomeEuropean

states.WewouldmentionFrance,Germany,Italy,HungaryandGreeceinparticular,

butthelistisnotexhaustive.”413OnewouldarguethatRomaniawould,whether

appropriateornot,becompelledbyitsidentitaryanxietiestoviewanysuchattempts

atbuildingbridgeswiththeWestwithscepticism,andwiththedistinctimpressionthat

Russiansoft-powerisbutathinveneermaskingtherealpolitikapproachwhichhas

411INSCOP,Barometrul–AdevaruldespreRomania:SimpatieTari[Barometer–TheTruthaboutRomania:SympathytowardsStates],March2016,availablefromhttp://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/INSCOP-raport-martie-2016_simpatie-tari.pdf[accessed23December2016].412INSCOP,Barometrul–AdevaruldespreRomania:DirectiaTarii,SursedeIngrijoraresiPerceptiaasupraVietii[Barometer–TheTruthaboutRomania:TheDirectionoftheCountry,CausesforConcernandPerceptionsoverLivelihood],November-December2015,http://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Directia-sursele-de-ingrijorare-si-perceptia-asupra-vietii1.pdf[accessed23December2016].413Maior(2015),p.28.

162

characterisedtheKremlin’sforeignpolicy.Indeed,thisisnoticeableinthestate’s

policyofaimingforeconomicindependencefromRussia.AsMaiorpointsoutthat,

“althoughithastried,Russiawasprevented(…)fromacquiringstrategicsectorsof

Romanianindustry.Todaywearemuchbetterpreparedtodefendoursovereignty

againsttheseinfluencesanddangers.”414Intheenergysector,inparticular,Romania

hasmadeapointoutoflimitingRussianimports.AsInayehshows,itsintakeofRussian

gashadgonedownin2013toonly10%,from25%ayearearlier.415Additionally,asof

2016,RomaniaisthirdamongstEuropeanstatesintermsofitsinternalenergy

production–only17%ofitsrequiredenergyisimported,comparedtoover60%

averagedacrosstheEU.416

ThisistestimonytoRomanians’prerogativesofensuringindependencefromMoscow,

butalsoitssuspicionoffellowEUstateswhicharenotwaryofrelyingonRussian

resources.TheRomanianmediahaveincreasinglyfocusedonthefactthatseveral

EuropeanstateshavestrengthenedeconomiclinkswithRussia,andincreasedthe

continent’sdependenceonRussianenergyimports.Thisisonesuchevaluation:“many

statesfromwithintheEUhavebeenaccusedoverthelastfewyearsofmaintaining

dangerouslinkstoRussia,astheyhavesupportedenergysectorprojectswhichwould

deepenrelianceonthe‘GreatBear.’”417AdifferentsourcehighlightsRussianfinancial

supportforEuropeanextremistpartiesandthefactthat“formerpoliticiansareco-

opted,nottosaybought,toserveRussia’sinterestsandthoseofRussiancompanies

suchasGazprom.”418Thereis,therefore,awidespreadperceptionthatEUstatesare

eitherunawareorignorantoftheRussianthreat.IfRomania’sownrelativeeconomic

independencefromMoscowoffersitasignificantleverageintheirbilateralrelations,it

414Ibid.,p.31.415Inayeh(2015),p.40.416D.Ionascu,‘Romania,altreileastatcaindependentaenergeticadinUniuneaEuropeana.IubireafatadeRusiavinepeconducta[Romania,thethirdstateintheEuropeanUnionintermsofEnergyIndependence.LoveforRussiaFlowsDownthePipeline],’Adevarul,21.09.2016http://adevarul.ro/economie/stiri-economice/romania-treilea-stat-independenta-energetica-uniunea-europeana-iubirea-fata-rusia-vine-conducta-infografie-1_57e2b1065ab6550cb8dcd28f/index.html[accessed23December2016].417Ibid.418C.Campeanu,‘CumneaparamdeRusia[HowToDefendOurselvesfromRussia,]RomaniaLibera,4January2016,http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/institutii/analiza--cum-ne-aparam-de-rusia-lui-putin--403565[accessed23December2016].

163

isacauseforconcernthatthealliesRomaniareliesonforsupporteitherhavea

diminishedcapacityorarenotwillingtopursueastrategyofdetachmentfromRussia.

Thefullextentofthisissue,however,isrevealedinthecontextofinternational

reactionstoRussia’sshiftfromwhatMaiorcalleda“hiddenwar”toa“phaseof

geopoliticalaggressiveness,markedbytheaccumulationofnewterritories.”419The

perceptionisthattheannexationofCrimeasignalledRussia’sreturntoanexpansionist

agenda.Anidentity-basedapproachmayshedlightonwhatthisdevelopmentmeans

forRomania.Itsstrategyhadbeenatwo-prongedapproachofensuringitsown

detachmentfromRussia,aswehaveseen,whilstsupportingthestrengtheningofties

betweentheEuropeanNeighbourhoodnextdoortoitandtheWesterncommunity.

ThisappliesnotonlytoUkraine,but,moreimportantly,totheRepublicofMoldova,a

statetowardswhichRomanianshaveanidentitaryaffinity.TheconflictinUkraine

thereforeexacerbatedRomaniananxietiesontwofronts–ontheonehand,the

annexationofCrimeahasmeantthatRomanianandRussianterritorialwatersarenow

adjacent.ThishasbroughtRussiatoanunpalatableproximitytotheRomanian

territory,asthenpresidentTraianBasescupointedout:“letusseewhatwillhappenin

Crimea,140milesfromtheRomaniancoastontheBlackSea,whichforafrigate

meansatenhourmarch.”420Ontheotherhand,thisdevelopmenthasraised

questionsastowhetherRussia’sagendahasfullybeenrevealed.Somehavesuggested

thatRussia’sultimatesecuritygoal“istocomeclosertothe‘mouthsoftheDanube,’”

highlightingthefactthat“thishasbeenahistoricendeavour,andtherecentexcessive

autonomistsignalsfromtheSouthoftheRepublicofMoldova(…)areclearsignsof

theactivemeasurespreparingforthisenterprise.”421Thishassevereimplicationsfor

Romania’sowninterestsintheRepublicofMoldova,thepro-Westerndirectionof

whichiscrucialinsecuringclosetiesbetweenBucharestandChisinau.

419Maior(2015),p.29.420PresidentialAdministration,‘DeclaraţiadepresăapreședinteluiRomâniei,domnulTraianBăsescu,inurmareuniuniiConsiliuluiEuropeanpetemasituațieidinUcraina[PressStatementofthePresidentofRomania,Mr.TraianBasescu,aftertheEuropeanCouncilMeetingontheSituationinUkraine],’MinistryofForeignAffairsPressCentre,(March2014)http://ue.mae.ro/local-news/958[accessed27December2016].421Maior(2015),p.30.

164

Asaresult,theconflictinUkraineisatthetopofRomania’sforeignpolicyworriesand

itsbehaviourtowardsRussiainthiscontextistellingofthematter’surgency.Romania

wasthefirststatetoqualifytheannexationofCrimeaasanactofaggressionagainst

Ukrainiansovereignty422andhas,sincethen,supportedthesendingofaidtoKievand

theimpositionofeconomicsanctionsagainstRussia.423Themainperceptionofthe

EU’sapproachtotheUkrainiancrisis,however,isthatithasnotbeencommittedto

counteringMoscow’sexpansionistpolicy.ThisviewissummarisedbyDanDungaciu,

presidentoftheBlackSeaUniversityFoundation(FUMN):“itisclearthatcertainEU

actorswishtolifteconomicsanctionsagainsttheRussianFederation,toresume

commercialrelationswithitandsaythatwarwithRussiaisnotworthit.”424Thisplaces

Romaniainadelicatepositionwhichincreasesitsvulnerability:“Romaniarisksto

remainisolated,nexttoPolandandtheBalticstates,betweenRussiaanditsEuropean

accomplices.”425Thereis,therefore,theperceptionofagrowinggapbetween

EuropeanstatesthatareacutelysensitivetoRussianexpansionism,andthosefor

whomfriendlyeconomicrelationswithMoscowtakeprecedenceoverensuring

EuropeanNeighbourhoodstability.

Thisdivergenceinthreatperceptionandinterestshasrevealedthedifficultiesofthe

EuropeanUnionwhichare,toanextent,inherentinitsnature,ofansweringthe

challengeposedbyRussianexpansionismtothestabilityandsecurityofEastern

Europe.Moreover,disagreementoverresponsestotheUkrainiancrisishasdrivena

wedgebetweenallieswithintheEU,threateninginternalharmonyandtheirfuture

cooperation.Inthiscontext,beingtheadvocateofahard-lineapproachtoRussia’s

behaviour,Romania,muchlikePolandandtheBalticstates,haveturnedtoNATOfor

support.SincetheannexationofCrimea,BucharesthaspushedforanincreasedNATO

422BasescuUkraineStatement(2014).423PresidentialAdministration,‘DeclaratiaDomnuluiPresedinteTraianBasescu,lafinalulReuniuniiConsiliuluiEuropeandelaBruxelles[StatementbyPresidentTraianBasescu,attheEndoftheEuropeanCouncilMeetinginBrussels],’MinistryofForeignAffairsPressCentre,(March2014)http://ue.mae.ro/local-news/963[accessed27December2016].424Dungaciu,D.,‘Interviu:Obataliestrategicafaraprecedent–investitiileamericane,maiimportantedecatscutuldelaDeveselu[Interview:AStrategicBattlewithoutPrecedent–AmericanInvestment,MoreImportantthantheDeveseluShield],’OraNoua,16.112016http://www.oranoua.ro/dan-dungaciu-o-batalie-strategica-fara-precedent-investitiile-americane-mai-importante-ca-scutul-de-la-deveselu/[accessed23December2016].425Campeanu(2016).

165

presenceintheEasternbufferzone.Onewouldarguethat,becauseofitstougher

stanceonRussia(comparedtotheEU)anditsmilitarycapability,NATO’sinvolvement

intheregionisbecomingincreasinglyvitaltotheachievementofRomania’sforeign

policygoals.UndertheprotectiveumbrellaoftheNorthAtlanticalliance,Romaniais,

forthefirsttimeinitsmodernhistory,abletoadoptaproactive,ratherthanpassive,

approachinthisrelationship.TheresistancedimensionoftheBesiegedFortressnow

takesadifferentform.Romania,alongsidePoland,isnowaccommodatingan

operationalballisticmissiledefencesystemand,atcurrentpresidentIohannis’

request,426aNATOForceIntegrationUnitandtheMultinationalDivisional

HeadquartersSouth-EastwereinauguratedinDecember2015.427NATOnaval

exercisesconductedinRomania’sterritorialwatersintheBlackSeahavebeen

increasinginnumber,notleastinresponsetosimilarRussianactivitiesaroundthe

CrimeanPeninsula.Finally,beyondits‘opendoors’policytowardsAmericanNATO

forces,RomaniahasstrengtheneditsbondswithitsregionalNATOallies–in

November2015,itco-hostedamini-summitinBucharest,bringingtogether

representativesofNATOmembersfromtheBalticstatesandEasternEurope.Theaim

was,accordingtotheRomanianForeignAffairsMinistry,tosenda“strongsolidarity

messagesupportingtheideathatthereisaneedtobolsterthecapabilityofthe

Alliancetorespondeffectivelytolong-termchallengesarisingfromdevelopments

generatedbythesecuritysituationintheEasternandSouthernNeighbourhood.”428

Overall,itisclearthatRomaniaisnotonlyfulfillingitscommitmentstowardsNATO,

buttakinginitiativeandengagingwithitsallies,bothinternationalandregional,in

combattingthesecuritycrisisitsensesbrewinginEasternEurope.

TothisbehaviourRussiahasrespondedinanaggressivefashion:inApril,aRussian

generaldeclared,referringtoPolandandRomania,that“nonnuclearpowerswhere

426I.Enache,‘RomaniavagazduiarmamentgreuAmerican:tancuri,artileriesialteechipamentemilitarevorfitrimiseintara[RomaniaWillHostAmericanHeavyArmament:Tanks,ArtilleryandOtherMilitaryEquipmentWillBeSenttoTheCountry],’Mediafax,23.06.2015http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/romania-va-gazdui-armament-greu-american-tancuri-artilerie-si-alte-echipamente-militare-vor-fi-trimise-in-tara-14490264[accessed13January2016].427NATO,”RomaniaCanCountonNATO”SaysSecretaryGeneralinBucharest,02.07.2015,http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_121532.htm[accessed13January2016].428RomanianMinistryofForeignAffairs,BriefingofStateSecretaryforStrategicAffairsDanielIoniţăonResultsofMeetingofHeadsofStatefromCentralandEasternEurope,HeldinBuchareston4November2015–PressRelease,11.12.2015,http://www.mae.ro/en/node/34602[accessed13January2016].

166

missile-defenceinstallationsarebeinginstalledhavebecometheobjectsofpriority

response.”429ThecommanderoftheRussianStrategicRocketForceswenteven

furtherwhenhesuggestedthat“theevaluationofspecialistsshowsthattheAmerican

antimissilesystems(…)willnotbeabletowithstandanintenseattackbyRussian

strategicunits.”430ThistimeRomaniahasremainedsteadfast,notleastduetotheUS’s

assurancesofsupport–inresponsetoRussia’scomments,formerprime-minister

Pontaassertedthecountry’sposition:“Romaniacannotbeintimidatedwiththreats!

Theanti-missileShieldisfundamentaltoournationalandregionalsecurity.”431This

exchangetellsussomethingaboutRomania’sinterpretationofitsownstrategic

positionwithinNATO’sEasternflank,butalsothenewfootingfromwhichitmanages

itsrelationshipwithMoscow.AsNATOishardeningitslineindealingwithMoscow,

thisstateisabletoutilisetheframeworkofferedbytheNorth-Atlanticalliancein

ordertoalleviateitsownanxietiesconcerningMoscow,while,atthesametime,

increasingitsownprestigeasavaluableandproactivememberoftheorganisation.

BecomingthevanguardofNATO’sdefencelineagainstRussianexpansionismis,

perhaps,thenicheRomaniahasbeentryingtoestablishforitselfsinceaccession.

Inanycase,itscommitmenttothiscourseofactionisdictatednotonlybyalignment

tothedirectionpursuedbytheorganisation,butalsobyprerogativesemergingfrom

itsidentitynarrative,particularlythatofensuringitssecurityandindependencefrom

Russia.Insodoing,thepoliticalleadershipisreflectingthegeneralattitudeofthe

population:anINSCOPpollof2014showedthatnearlytwothirdsofRomanians

believethattheUkrainianconflictposedathreattotheircountry(64.4%)whilst69.7%

429Gen.ValeryGerasimov,citedinP.Sonne,‘RussiaThreatensNATOOverMissileShield,’TheWallStreetJournal,16.04.2015,http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-threatens-nato-over-missile-shield-1429185058[accessed13January2016].430M.Gen.SergeyKarakayev,citedinDraghici,‘RusiaavertizeazaRomania:“Sistemeleantirachetanuvorputearezistaunuiatacintens”[RussiaWarnsRomania:“MissileDefenceSystemsWillNotWithstandIntenseAttack”],’Gandul,16.12.2015,http://www.gandul.info/stiri/rusia-avertizeaza-romania-sistemele-antiracheta-nu-vor-putea-rezista-unui-atac-intens-14922084[accessed13January2016].431VictorPonta,citedinI.Bojan,‘AvertismentulRusieipentruPoloniasiRomania:Dacaleplacesafietinte,estealegerealor[‘Russia’sWarningtoPolandandRomania:IfTheyLikeBeingTargets,ItIsTheirChoice],’Mediafax,24.06.2015,http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/avertismentul-rusiei-pentru-polonia-si-romania-daca-le-place-sa-fie-tinte-este-alegerea-lor-reactia-lui-victor-ponta-14495363[accessed13January2016].

167

wouldsupportanincreaseinfundingfortheRomanianmilitaryinthiscontext.432

Romania’shard-lineapproachcannotbematchedbytheEU,firstlybecausethis

organisationdoesnotpossessthenecessaryinstrumentstocounterRussiaeffectively

(inRomania’sview),and,secondly,becauseithasbeenunabletounanimouslydecide

onthedirectionandmagnitudeofitsresponse.TheinternaltensionswithintheEUare

evidentinGermany’soppositiontotheEasternflank’srequestforanincreasedNATO

presenceintheregionexpressedduringthe2015mini-summit,“forfearof

exacerbatingtensionsbetweenRussiaandtheEU.”433However,thisthesiswould

suggestthat,regardlessofexternalpressuresfromtheWesternEuropeanUnion,and

atthedangerofaninternalriftbeingcreatedbetweenwhatDugincalled‘Old’and

‘NewEurope,’Romaniaisunlikelytoalterthisconfrontationaldirection,becauseof

theperceptionthattheonlymannerinwhichtotackleRussianexpansionismisto

respondinkindtoitshard-lineapproach–increasedmilitarisationisseenasthesole

viablecourseofaction.

Inthiscontext,Russo-Romanianrelationsareperhapsmoretensetodaythanthey

haveeverbeen,atleastsincethetimeCeausescuwasannouncinghisstate’s

oppositiontotheinvasionofCzechoslovakia.MoreorlessveiledthreatsfromMoscow

continuetoemergeandthesearewidelypublicised.AsrecentlyasDecember2016,

Agerpres(theRomaniannationalnewsagency)wascitingVladimirPutininhis

assessmentthatRussia’s“militarynuclearforcepotentialmustbestrengthened,first

ofallwiththehelpofrocketsystemscapableofguaranteeingthepiercingofcurrent

orfutureanti-ballisticmissileshields.”434Statementssuchasthis,however,willonly

cementRomania’sviewthattheEU’smoderateapproachtotheUkrainiancrisisisnot

432INSCOP,Barometrul–AdevaruldespreRomania:SimpatiecatreTari–SituatiadinUcraina[Barometer–theTruthaboutRomania:SympathyTowardsStates–theSituationinUkraine],February2015,http://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/INSCOP-02.2014-Simpatie-tari-si-situatia-din-Ucraina.pdf[accessed24December2016].433I.AnghelandC.Hostiuc,‘SummitNATOlaBucuresti,esentialpentrusecuritateaEstului[NATOSummitinBucharest,EssentialtotheSecurityoftheEast],’ZiarulFinanciar,03.11.2015http://www.zf.ro/eveniment/summit-nato-la-bucuresti-esential-pentru-securitatea-estului-14871569[accessed13January2016].434PutincitedinS.Popescu,‘Retrospectiva:PoliticadeexternasisecuritateaRusiei2017[Retrospective:Russia’sForeignandSecurityPolicy2017],’Agerpres,23.12.2016,http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2016/12/23/retrospectiva-politica-externa-si-de-securitate-a-rusiei-in-2017-09-51-01[accessed23December2016].

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fitforpurpose,andthattheonlyviableresponseistheproactivedirectionpursuedby

NATO.Inthecurrentstateoftheirrelationship,RomaniastillviewsRussiaasan

existentialthreatthroughthelensoftheBesiegedFortresstheme.Havingsaidthat,

whathaschangedisthepositionfromwhichRomanianegotiatesitsresponse:ifinthe

pastitsreactionconsistedofself-victimisationandwasfocusedondamagelimitation–

suchasaculturalrejectionofRussification–todayRomaniahasmorefreedomtoact,

andasignificantpublicmandatetodoso.

Astheseentrenchedbeliefsdrawnfromtheidentitynarrativebecomethedominant

influenceoverRomania’sbehaviourtowardsRussia,anxietiesoverthelatter’s

expansionismcanonlybealleviatedbythepursuitofaproactiveandaggressive

foreignpolicytowardsMoscow.However,ifthiscourseshouldbeacausefor

dissensionamongstitandfellowEUcolleagues,Romaniaiswillingtoincurthecost.As

thissectionhasshown,thestatehasbeencriticalofEUmemberstates’ambivalence

towardsRussia’sactions.AlthoughitremainsdedicatedtocooperationwiththeEUin

termsofextendingeconomicsanctions,itisclearthatRomaniaseesthesemeasures

asinsufficient.Moreimportantly,fromtheRomanianperspective,theEUis

underestimatingthethreatposedtoregionalstabilityandsecurity,andisprioritising

economicintereststoitscommitmenttowardstheEasternPartnership,bothofwhich

areplayingintoRussia’shands.WhatismostimportantisthefactthatRomaniahas

foundaroleforitself,bothwithintheEUandNATO.ThecriticismsleviedatRomania’s

lackofaclearforeignpolicydirectionsinceaccession,inthisperspective,nolonger

apply.Thecurrentinternationalclimateisassuchthattheopportunityandnecessity

havearisenforRomaniatoconstructanintelligibleandcoherentagendaoftackling

whatisperceivedasanexistentialthreattothestateandregion’sstabilityand

security.Moreover,astheprerogativesfromwhichthisagendaemergeareidentity-

based,andthereforesharedbybothelitesandthebroaderpublic,theresultisthat,

unlikeotherpolicies,thisdirectionispursuedconsistently.Tellingofthisfactisthat

Romaniahasneitherwaverednoraltereditspositionsince2014,althoughTraian

BasescuwasreplacedbythemoremoderateKlausIohannisaspresident,andthe

technocratDacianCioloshastakenoverfromsocialistVictorPontaasprime-minister.

AltogetherthismeansthatRomania’sforeignpolicyagendaisrootedinarationale

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morecomplexthantraditionalFPAapproachesmightassume,asidentity-related

prerogativesarepowerfulmotivatorsforthisstate’saction.Itisthecasethatthe

nationalidentitynarrativeindeedplaysanimportantroleinshapingRomania’s

internationalbehaviour,anditsrelationshipwithMoscow.

FutureDirectionsforRusso-RomanianRelations

ThequestiononeshouldconsidernowiswhatthefuturemightholdforRusso-

Romanianrelationsandwhattheimpactofthisinteractionmightmeaninthebroader

contextofregionalstability.Therearetwospecificareasofinterestinregardstothe

relationshipbetweenBucharestandMoscow,bothofwhichhavebroader

repercussionsintermsofRomania’sperceptionsofitsEuropeanalliesanditsrole

withintheEUandNATO:thefirstisthelevelofRussianinvolvementintheaffairsof

thecontinentand,asacorollary,theviewthatmanyEuropeanstatesareexhibitinga

Russia-friendlyattitude;thesecondconcernsRussia’sownactionsandforeignpolicy

agenda.BothoftheseareascauseanincreaseinthreatperceptionsregardingRussia

andtheaugmentationofthethemeofBesiegedFortress.Thatisbecausetheexternal

risktoRomania’ssecurityposedbyMoscowisnowdoubledbydissentand

ambivalencetowardsthisactorfromwithintheEuropeancommunity.

Thefirstdimensionconcernstheperceptiondiscussedearlier,thatRussiahasaimedto

entrenchthecontinent’srelianceonitsresources,therebyforcingamoremoderate

responsefromtheEUonitscampaigninUkraine.Thisiscoupledwiththeriseto

powerofpoliticiansmoreamenabletowardstheKremlininvariousEUstates,whichis

alsoseenaspartRussia’sstrategyor,attheveryleast,asplayingintoit.Thisviewis

summarisedbyMaiorwhoarguesthatRussiahasemployedtacticswhichseekto

“feednationalistoptionshostiletoliberaldemocracy(Hungary)(…)doubled,evidently,

bymeasuresaimedatestablishinganeconomicdependence.”435Amongstthestates

whichareexhibitingpro-RussianattitudesorcloseeconomiclinkswithMoscow,the

nationalnewspaperRomanianLibera(FreeRomania)citesGermany,Greece,Italy,

Hungary,theCzechRepublic,Slovakia,AustriaandFrance.436Altogetherthese

435Maior(2015),p.27.436Campeanu(2016).

170

examplesbuildapictureofatrendinEuropeanpoliticsinwhichRussiaisnolonger,or

toalesserextent,beingviewedasasignificantthreat.Dungaciusummarisesthiswhen

hearguesthat“thereisatendencyintheEuropeanspace[toadoptamoremoderate

approachtowardsRussia]towhich,slowly,moreandmoreforcesarerallying.”437For

Romania,thisdevelopmentaugmentstheanxietiessubscribedtothethemeof

BesiegedFortress.TheperceptionisthatEuropeisbeingattackedfromwithin,andthe

riftthatisgrowingbetweenstateswithdifferentlevelsofthreatperception

concerningtheKremlinisthreateningtheinternalstabilityoftheEUandNATO,aswell

astheircapacitytocurbRussianexpansionism.

ThescenariowhichemergesfromthisviewisthatEuropewillbecomeastrategic

battlefieldbetweenproandanti-Russianpositionswhichwilldecidethedirectionand

breadthoffutureRussianexpansionsofitssphereofinfluence:“itisclearthatthe

RussianFederationwillaimtowinbackcertainareasofinfluence,andtomakecertain

thatthe(…)Westernfrontdoesnotadvancetowardsit.Thatwillbethebattle.”438

Fromanidentitary-basedperspective,onewouldsuggestthat,inthisinternalstruggle,

Romaniaislikelytoremainresoluteinitsstanceashard-liner.Thatisbecausean

exacerbationofitsperceptionsasBesiegedFortress,increasinglyisolatedinits

proactiveapproach,canonlybeansweredbysteadfastresistance.Externalpressures

fromitsEuropeanalliesareunlikelytobesufficienttocausearetreatofthese

anxieties,whichareextremelyheightened.Instead,Romaniawillprobablycontinueits

strategyofensuringeconomicindependencefromMoscow.Intermsofitsalliances,it

willlikelyfocusonpartnershipswiththoseforceswhichhavebeenunequivocalintheir

stanceonRussianexpansionism–PolandandtheBalticstates,ontheEasternflank,

andtheUSA.ThisviewissharedbyMaior,whoarguesthat“thecompleteinternal

consolidationonalllevels–political,military,economic–doubledbythe

strengtheningofcooperationframeworksintheareaofnationalandEuro-Atlantic

security,istheonlyscenarioinwhichwecanbuiltadialoguewithRussiainterms

dignifiedforus.”439WhatisclearisthatRomaniawillaimtoremainanimportantactor

437DungaciuforOraNoua(2016).438Ibid.439Maior(2015),p.33.

171

ontheEasternflankandharnessitsstrategicpositiontoensureincreasedNATO

presenceinitsterritory,andcloseinteractionwithitslikemindedallies.However,for

boththeinternalcohesionoftheEuropeanUnion,aswellasforRusso-Romanian

relations,thismaycauseadditionalstrain.Despitethis,Romaniaiscompelledbyits

identitaryprerogativesrelatedtothesecurityofthestatetopursuesuchadirection,

costsnotwithstanding.HowthistypeofcoursemightaffectregionalstabilityandEast-

Westrelationsmorebroadlyremainstobeseen.

IfthefirstissueconcernedRussia’sthreattoRomania’ssecurityviainterferenceinthe

affairsoftheEuropeancommunity,thesecondreflectsRomania’sanxietiestowards

Russia’sactionsinUkraineasarisktoanotherofitsforeignpolicypriorities,thepro-

WesternfutureoftheRepublicofMoldova.TheperceptionisthatRussia’sagenda

maycontainplansforfutureenlargementofRussia’ssphereofinfluence.Inconcrete

terms,themainfearreferstothepotentialpushfromtheKremlinforafederalisation

ofUkraine.ThisviewwasexpressedbyformerpresidentBasescuin2014:“in

Romania’sopinion,theobjectiveoftheRussianFederationis,firstly,thefederalisation

ofUkraine.(…)ItisclearthatRussiawantsadestabilisationofUkraineinordertogain

controloverit,completely,orpartially.”440Beyondthefactthatthisdevelopment

wouldbringtheRussianspheretoRomania’sborders,aconnectionisimmediately

madebetweenthesituationinUkraineandtheoneintheRepublicofMoldova,its

EstrangedSelf.

Similarly,MoldovahasitsownfrozenconflictwitharegiondominatedbyRussian

speakers–Transnistria.Inthiscontext,anymoveagainstthesovereigntyofUkraine

maysnowballintoathreattotheindependenceoftheRepublicofMoldova,a

relationshipwhichRomaniaprioritises.Inasense,theprerogativeforsecurityand

distancefromMoscowisextendedbyRomaniatoMoldovabecauseoftheirperceived

identitarysameness.Asacorollary,theanxietiesinherenttotheBesiegedFortressare

440Hotnews,‘TraianBasescu:RussiadorestefederalizareaUcrainei/UnuldintreobiectiveurmarestecateritoriulcontrolatdeRusiasaajungapanalabratulChilia,vecheafrontieraaRomanieicuURSS[TraianBasescu:RussiaWantstheFederalisationofUkraine/OneoftheObjectivesisthatRussianControlledTerritoryWouldReachtheChiliaArm,Romania’sOldFrontierwiththeUSSR],’13.05.2014,http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-17246835-ora-18-30-traian-basescu-sustine-declaratie-presa.htm[accessed23December2016].

172

alsoprojectedontothisstate.AsDungaciusummarises,“anyfederalisationofthe

UkrainewillgiveideasthattheconflictinTransnistriamayalsoberesolvedthrough

federalisation(…).IamafraidthisiswhatisinstorefortheRepublicofMoldova.”441

ThefactthatRomaniahasintensifieditssupportfortheRepublicofMoldova,both

throughNATO442butalsointheirbilateralrelations-ithas,forinstance,begun

supplyingitwithgasinorderto“alleviateitsdependenceonRussia”443-speaksto

concernsoveritsfuture.Romaniaisundoubtedlyawarethatthiscourseofactionwill

antagoniseRussiabeyondsimplytheissueofintensifyingNATOpresenceintheregion.

AsCampeanupointsout:“Romaniawillbeputinthefiringlineifitdoesnotwishto

seeMoldovabecomeaRussianexclave.”444Havingsaidthat,becauseoftheidentitary

affinitywithChisinau,RomaniaviewsMoldovaasanotherBesiegedFortressanditself

ashavingadutytointervene.Asaresult,theriskoffurtherantagonisingRussiais

insufficienttoforceRomaniatodivertfromthiscourse.

Itis,however,onthemannerinwhichRomaniamightbestaidMoldovathatissues

mightariseintheRomanian-Americanpartnership.Specifically,overthelasttwo

years,thenotionthataprecipitationofthesituationinUkrainewhichwoulddirectly

threatenMoldova’sindependencemightbeansweredbyanadhocunification

betweenRomaniaanditseasternneighbourisgatheringimpetus.Althoughthis

matterwillbediscussedatlengthinthechapterdedicatedtoRomanian-Moldovan

relations,sufficeittosayfornowthatsuchadevelopmentisconsideredaplausible

441DanDungaciucitedinFundatiaUniversitaraaMariiNegre[BlackSeaUniversityFoundation](viaRealitateaTV),DanDungaciu:‘RusiavaincepeoofensivadiplomaticanemiloasainUcraina.’CeriscaMoldova[DanDungaciu:‘RussiaWillBeginaRuthlessDiplomaticOffensiveintheUkraine.’TheRisksforMoldova],25.03.2016,http://fumn.eu/en/dan-dungaciu-rusia-va-incepe-o-ofensiva-diplomatica-nemiloasa-in-ucraina-ce-risca-r-moldova-video/[accessed07April2016].442RomaniahasbeenanactivesupporterofMoldova’sincreasedcooperationwithNATOandtheEU.Tothisend,aftertheNATOsummitinWarsawearlierthisyear,presidentIohannisemphasisedhiscommitmenttotheEasternPartnershipandhailedthe“inclusion,forthefirsttimeinaNATOSummitFinalStatement,asaresultofourundertaking,adistinctparagraphreferringtotheRepublicofMoldova.”(Iohannis,citedinPresidentialAdministration,‘DeclaratiadepresaaPresedinteluiRomaniei,domnulKlausIohannis,sustinutalafinalulSummituluiNATOdelaVarsovia[PressStatementfromtheRomanianPresident,Mr.KlausIohannis,GivenattheEndofNATOSummitinWarsaw],’09.07.2016,http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/agenda-presedintelui/declaratia-de-presa-a-presedintelui-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis-sustinuta-la-finalul-summitului-nato-de-la-varsovia[accessed28December2016].)443Innayeh(2015),p.41.444Campeanu(2016).

173

scenarioevenbyKlausIohannis,withtheimportantcaveatthatitisalong-termplan

andTransnistriacannotformpartofthedeal.445Evenso,onewouldargue,thisevent

wouldposeasignificantchallengetobothRomania’salliesandRussiaintermsof

responseandmayfurthercomplicateNATO-Russianrelations.Whatisclearisthat

Romania’scommitmenttotheRepublicofMoldova,basedontheiridentitaryaffinity

andtheportrayalofMoldovaasanEstrangedOther,farsurpassesthatofitsallies.

PerceptionsoveraMoldovaunderthreatfromRussiawouldrequiresometypeof

response,butthemilitaryoptionis,bothpragmaticallyandforreasonstodowith

Romania’sanxietiesoverengagingRussia,unlikely.Inthissituation,unificationwould

beaplausibleandpublicallymandatedcourseofaction–atthemomentaround70%

ofRomanianssupportit.446Itisclear,however,thatRussiawouldviewitasanattack

onitssphereofinfluenceand,equally,Americawouldbeunlikelytofavoursucha

solution.ThiswasmadeclearrecentlywhentheAmericanambassadortoChisinau

expressedhisopinionthatunificationbetweenRomaniaandMoldovawouldnotbe

practicalorresolveMoldova’ssituation.447Inresponse,however,theRomanian

Senateadoptedanofficialreplywhichqualifiedthestatementas“surprisingand

worrisome,aswellasreceivedwithlackofsatisfactionbypublicopinionin

Romania.”448Overall,itisclearthatitisinthisissuemorethananyotherthatcracks

mayappearinRomanian-Americanrelations.

WhatRussia’sreactionmaybetoaMoldo-Romanianunificationisdifficulttopredict–

attheveryleastitcouldleadtoacompletebreakdownofdiplomaticdialogue

betweenBucharestandMoscow.Thefactthatthisscenarioisevencontemplatedby

Romania,meanwhile,tellsussomethingofRomania’sconcernsoverthefutureand

445Iohannis,citedinF.Peia,‘Iohannis:OunirecuBasarabiaesteposibila,darnuinviitorulapropriat[Iohannis:UnificationwithBessarabiaisPossible,butNotintheNearFuture],’Agerpres,09.11.2016.http://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2016/11/09/iohannis-o-unire-cu-basarabia-este-posibila-dar-nu-in-viitorul-apropiat-21-11-10[accessed10November2016].446INSCOP,‘Barometru–AdevaruldespreRomania:RepublicaMoldova[Barometer–TheTruthaboutRomania:TheRepublicofMoldova],’July2015,http://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/INSCOP-07.2015-Republica-Moldova.pdf[accessed23December2016].447A.M.Luca,‘RomanianSenateAdoptsOfficialReplytoUSAmbassadorPettit’sStatementsonMoldova,’Agerpres–EnglishVersion,20.09.2016,http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2016/09/20/romanian-senate-adopts-official-reply-to-us-ambassador-pettit-s-statements-on-moldova-13-07-00[accessed28December2016].448Ibid.

174

howitconsiderspositioningitselfvis-à-visRussia.Fromthisperspective,itisunlikely

thatthequalityofRomanian-Russianrelationswillimprove,butforareverseofcourse

bytheKremlin.AprecipitationoftheUkrainiancrisis,conversely,wouldposea

significantchallengetothestabilityandthesecurityoftheregion,andRomania’s

responsemayaugmentthesituation.Inanycase,itisclearthatBucharest’soutlookis

oneconcernedwithsatisfyingtheprerogativeofstatesecurity,bothofitselfandthe

RepublicofMoldova.Inordertoachievethis,onewouldarguethatitwillsacrificeits

diplomaticrelationswithRussiaandalignitselfwiththehard-lineapproachpursuedby

NATO.Havingsaidthat,weretheRepublicofMoldovatocomeunderdirectphysical

threat,itsownnationalinterest,rootedinasenseofsharedidentitywiththeeastern

neighbour,wouldpotentiallysupersedeitscommitmenttoNATO.Inthissituation,all

therelationshipsmentioned,betweenRomaniaandRussia,NATOandRussiaand

NATOandRomania,wouldcomeunderseverestrainandtherepercussionsofa

unificationofRomaniaandMoldovamayfurtherdestabilisethefragileequilibrium

whichexistsinEasternEuropeatthemoment.

Conclusion

Overall,thischapterhasexploredthenatureofRomania’srelationshipwithRussia,

fromtheperspectiveofRomania’snationalidentitynarrative.Thisapproachsheds

lightonthemannerinwhichentrechedportrayalsoftheSelfandRussianOtherhave

resultedinawidespreadandenduringsenseofanxiety,suspicionandfearconcerning

Russia’sactions.Workingfromthisangle,themannerinwhichtheseattitudeshave

influencedRusso-Romanianrelationssince1989becomesapparent.Intermsofthe

mainresearchquestion,theyhavefedintoRomania’sforeignpolicyagendabysetting

distancefromMoscowasapriorityandcloserelationswithitasared-line.Russia

continuedtobeseenasathreateningOtherthroughthelensoftheBesiegedFortress

themethroughouttransitionandthisaccountsforthestate’sambivalencein

negotiatingthisrelationship.Furthermore,recentdevelopmentsbothwithintheEU

andinUkrainehaveconfirmed,inasense,Romania’sportrayalofRussiaandhaveled

toanaugmentationofthethreatperceptionovertheprerogativeofsecuritynotjust

ofitself,butalsoofitsEstrangedSelf,Moldova.Undertheprotectiveumbrellaoffered

175

byNATO,resistance,Romania’straditionalreactiontothesenseofbesiegement,now

takesadifferentform,thatofahard-lineapproachtocurbingRussianexpansionism.

Romania’scurrentpatternofbehaviourtowardsRussiafollowsthisparticular

rationale,onemotivatedbyidentity-basedprerogativesandmadepossiblebythe

state’sstrategicposition.Itis,inasense,theexacerbationofidentitaryanxietiesthat

havemadeRomaniaassumearoleofgreaterresponsibilityintheregionandallowed

ittofinditsfootingwithintheEUandNATO.Inthisvein,theutilityofstudyingthe

behaviourofasmallstateisrevealed,asRomaniahasshownitselfcapableandwilling

topursueitsowngoals,informedbyitsuniqueidentitynarrative.Havingsaidthat,

beingastateofstrategicsignificanceinanenvironmentinfragileequilibriummeans

thatRomania’srelationshipwithRussiahasabearingonthewholeandnotjustits

constitutiveparts.Whetheranormalisationofrelationsispossibleiscontingentonthe

retreatoftheseidentitaryanxietiesandthereforerestsonRussia’sfuturebehaviour

and,ofcourse,Romanians’perceptionofit.Inanycase,thesecurityofthestateand,

asacorollary,thatoftheRepublicofMoldova’s,willlikelycontinuetobethemain

identity-basedprerogativemotivatingRomania’sownactionstowardsRussia.

176

Chapter6.Romania’sRelationshipwithHungary–Managinga

LegacyofaThousandYearsofConflictandDiscord

Atruemotherwillneverconsoleherselfwiththedismembermentofachild,(...).ForusTransylvaniacannotexist

butwhole,partofourbody.Forothers,sheonlyrepresentshistoricalambitionsorfeudalcastlesbuiltonthesweatof

generationsofRomanianslaves.Forusshemeanseverything:past,present,futureornon-existence.Wedidnotcomefrom

anywhere;wewerebegot,bornandraisedoutoftheTransylvanianland.449

Introduction

ThischapteranalyseshowenduringbeliefsemergingfromtheRomanianidentity

narrativehaveinfluencedthestate’sbehaviourtowardsitswesternneighbour,

Hungary.Firstly,asectionisdedicatedtothemannerinwhichtheHungarianOther

hasbeenportrayedwithintheidentitynarrativeandhowthehistoricalnarrativehas

reinforcedtheimageofHungaryasanessentialthreattotheRomanianstate.The

argumentisthattheconsistentandpredominantrepresentationofHungaryasa

threathasresulted,similarlytoRussia,inanattitudeofdistrustandanxiety,hereover

territorialintegrityandsovereignty.ThisperceptionisaugmentedasHungaryisseen

asbothanexternal,butalsointernalOther,becauseofthesignificantMagyarminority

inTransylvania.ThefollowingsectioncoversHungarian-Romanianrelationsduringthe

transitionperiod,withafocusonthedifficultiesofreachingagreementonaPrincipal

Treaty.ThechallengesarearguedtohavebeenrootedinRomania’srejectionofthe

notionofgrouprightsfortheHungarianminorityasmuchasinbeliefsthatany

concessionstotheHungariancausemayleadtoterritorialrevisionism,bothofwhich

areconnectedtotheafore-mentionedidentitaryanxieties.However,thissectionalso

addressestheimprovementofHungarian-Romanianrelationsintheaftermathof

leadershipchangesinbothstates,whichledtoaretreatofanxietiesandallowedfor

anunprecedentedlevelofpoliticalandeconomiccooperation.Inthebackground

however,itisarguedthattraditionalsuspicionsofHungaryenduredatthesocietal

449L.Rebreanu(1941,reprinted1977),p.208.

177

level.Followingonfromthis,thechapterdiscussesthecurrentsituationofrelations

betweenBucharestandBudapest.ItexplorestheinfluenceofViktorOrban’snew

nationalistdirectionandeasternshiftwhicharearguedtohaveledtoare-emergence

andaugmentationofanxietiesconcerningRomania’sterritorialintegrityand

sovereignty.Therelationshipbetweenthetwostatesisrevealedtohavesuffered

significantlyinthiscontext,asdoubtsareraisedoverHungary’srespectofRomania’s

sovereignty,butalsoitscommitmenttowardsitsWesternallies.ThetheoryofTrojan

HorseHungary,asapro-RussiandestabilisingforcewithintheEUandNATOis

presented.Thechapterendswithapredictionthatbilateralrelationsbetweenthetwo

statesarelikelytocontinuetocool,asthereislittleindicationthatBudapestwill

changeitsforeignpolicydirection.Additionally,thepotentialrepercussionsofan

Eastern-leaningHungaryinthecontextofanincreasinglyfragileequilibriumbetween

pro-Russianandpro-WesternattitudeswithinEuropeisexploredinreferenceto

severalscenariosbeingconsideredinRomania.Themostworryingconcernsthe

West’s–andthereforeRomania’s–inabilitytocounterRussia’sattemptsatexpanding

itssphereofinfluenceasaresultofinternaldiscordandHungary’spotentialbenefits

fromsuchdevelopments.Theargumentofthischapteristhatprofoundbeliefsabout

thenatureoftheRomanianSelfandHungarianOtherarecriticaltounderstandingthe

relationshipbetweenthetwoactors,particularlyinthecurrentclimateofuncertainty.

Romania’sIdentityDrivenAttitudetowardsHungary–DistrustandAnxietyover

TerritorialIntegrityandSovereignty

MuchlikeRussia,HungaryoccupiesaspecificplaceintheRomanianimaginary.

Romania’sbehaviourtowardsitswesternneighbourissimilarlyinformedbyattitudes

rootedintheportrayaloftheSelfandOther.Additionally,asaresultoftheirhistorical

interactionandthemannerinwhichthesehavebeentranslatedintheidentity

narrative,bothHungaryandRussiahaveemergedasessentialthreateningOthers.

However,therearesomeimportantdifferencesbetweenRussiaandHungary,bothin

termsoftheirstatusandtheirpositioningvis-à-visRomania.Firstly,Hungaryisnota

super-power.AsBoiarightlypointsout:“sheispaintedasagreatpower–which,

obviously,itisnot–capableofsurmountingRomania,twoandahalftimesitssizeand

178

population.”450Inotherwords,onewouldnotexpectforRomania’straditionalanxiety

rootedinitssmall-stateconditiontomanifestinitsrelationswithHungary.Secondly,

theperceivedantagonismandconflictofinterestwithRussiaover,forinstance,the

RepublicofMoldova,shouldnotapplyinthissecondrelationship,asHungary’spost-

socialistforeignpolicydirectionhasmirroredRomania’sown.AccessiontotheEUand

NATOwereHungary’sprimarygoalsalsoandthetwoarenowpartnersandalliesin

thetwoorganisations.ItitnonethelessthecasethatHungaryisviewedasan

“hereditaryenemy.”451

Theidentitaryperspectiveemployedbythisprojectmayshedlightonthereasons

behindthisperception.Specifically,onewouldarguetheylie,firstly,inthecontinuity

ofthehistoricalandidentitynarratives,whichhaveledtothesedimentationofa

particularimageoftheHungarianOther.EquallyimportantistheextentofHungary’s

involvementintheaffairsoftheRomanianprovinces,andlater,theRomanianstate.

WhatdifferentiatestheportrayalofHungaryfromthatofRussiaisthefactthatthe

formerplaysaroleinallthethreemajorthemesoftheRomanianidentitynarrative.

HungaryentersRomanianhistoryataformativestageofthethreeprovinces,andtheir

relationshipis,fromtheverybeginning,conflictual.AssuchtheFoundationMythsare

meanttoemphasisethesharpcontrastbetweenSelfandHungarianOther,noticeable

inthedifferentoriginsofthetwopeoples–Latinversusnon-European–theirreligious

affiliation–bornintoEasternChristianityversusCatholicconverts–and,thedispute

overtheircommonhabitus–theownershipofTransylvania.Thislastelement,of

course,feedsintothethemeoftheBesiegedFortress;aswasexploredinChapter3,

duringtheMiddleAgesTransylvanianRomanianswereoppressedanddeniedpolitical

rights.InTransylvania,therefore,Romaniansweresubjugatedandheldcaptiveintheir

ownterritory,victimsoftheexpansionismofthemorepowerfulHungarianOther.

Consequently,theregionholdsasymbolicsignificanceinHungarian-Romanian

relations,asDutceac-Segestennotes:“mythsofterritorysuchasTransylvania(…)are

commoningrandnarrativesofnationsasplacesofsacredorigin,wherethevirtues

450Boia(2011)p.279.451Ibid.p.255.

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andpurityofthenationalsoularesafeguarded.”452ThisispreciselyhowtheRomanian

historicalnarrativehasportrayedthesituationofTransylvanianRomaniansintheir

relationtotherulingHungarians.

Evenmoreimportantly,theplightofTransylvaniaasanunjustly-occupiedRomanian

territoryisextrapolatedtotheentireRomanianpeoplewithinthethemeofUnity.In

modernity,Transylvania,alongsideBessarabia,becomesthekeystoneoftheRomanian

nationalproject,andtheperceptionthatRomanianswithintheseterritoriesare

persecutedandpreventedfromunifyingdoesnothingbutexacerbatetheSelf-Other

contrast.WhenTransylvaniafinallyjoinsRomaniaintheaftermathoftheFirstWorld

War–see[Figure4],thegrandunificationisseenasavictoryofRomaniansagainst

themorepowerfulHungarianOther.However,theissueofownershipofTransylvania

isyetunsettled,asHungaryoccupiedthenorth-westoftheregionin1940–see

[Figure5].AlthoughthisterritorywasreturnedattheendoftheSecondWorldWar,

thiscementedinRomanianstheviewthatTransylvaniaremainsacontestedterritory,

andthatHungaryrepresentsaninherentthreattothephysicalintegrityofthestate.

ThisexplainstheperpetuationoftheimageofHungaryalongthesamelinesasbefore

1918.AsBoiapointsout,despitethefactthatHungaryisnolongeragreatpower,

“Transylvania(…)appearsasanamorphousentity,susceptibletobeextractedfrom

theRomaniannationalensemble.”453

TheviewthatHungaryhasbeenaconquerorandoppressoroftheRomanianpeople

is,therefore,historicallyenduringandwidelyaccepted.Equally,theperceptionisthat

shehasalsobeenanobstacletotheachievementofunityandindependence,the

mainidentity-drivengoalofthemodernperiod.Finally,Hungary’sdominionover

Transylvaniahashadanotherimportantconsequence,whichisthefinalfacetof

Romanian-Hungarianantagonism:alargeHungarianminorityonRomanianterritory.

ThefactthattheHungarianOtherisbothwithinandwithoutRomaniahashadan

impactonboththeportrayaloftheSelfandoftheOther.Inregardstotheformer,as

Fischer-Galatihaspointedout,theroleofthestatewastoprovide“aterritorialand

452Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.183.453Boia(2011),p.279.

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psychologicalframework”inwhichRomanianscould“solveofteninsolubleand

unsurmountableproblemsenfamille.”454Inotherwords,thewholepointof

establishingaRomanianstatewasthatitwouldbeanation-state,aninstrumentfor

theprotectionanddevelopmentoftheRomanianethnicelement.Asaresult,the

Hungarianminority,asanOther,cannotbutbetreatedwithsuspicion,asintruders

intothenationalspace,asBoiapointsout:therelationshipbetweenRomaniansand

Hungarianswascharacterisedby“frustrationanddistrust.(…)TheywereallRomanian

citizens,butthespiritualdistinctionbetweenRomaniansandothersremained.”455This

viewwasonlyexacerbatedduringcommunism,whentheemphasisonnationalunity

andtheexceptionalismoftheRomaniancharacterled,ashasbeenpreviously

explored,toasharpeningoftheSelf-Othercontrast.

Overall,thehistoricalandidentitynarrativehaveconsistentlyportrayedtheHungarian

OtherasathreattoRomaniansand,throughmanyofitsownactions,Hungaryhas

confirmedandhelpedperpetuatethisview.TheperceptionthatneitherHungarians

withinnorwithouttheRomanianterritoryhaverenouncedtheirrightofownershipof

Transylvaniaisattherootoftheantagonismbetweenthetwostates.Inthis

Romaniansfeelboththeunityandintegrityoftheirstateatrisk.Additionally,thefact

thattheexistenceofaHungarianminoritywithintheirbordersoffersBudapesta

reasontointerfereintheaffairsoftheRomanianstateisalsoseenasathreattoits

sovereignty,ashasbeenexploredinChapter4.Allofthesefactorstakentogether

explainwhyHungarycontinuestooccupysuchanimportantplaceintheRomanian

imaginary,throughthelensoftheBesiegedFortress.Ultimately,thisimageofHungary

hastranslatedintoaconsistentattitudeofdistrustandsuspiciontowardsthe

motivationsbehindthisactor’sbehaviour,andanxietiesoverthestate’s‘true’

intentionsregardingTransylvania.Thisisevidentatasocietallevel,where,asofMarch

2016,54.3%ofthepopulationhadnegativefeelingstowardsHungary.456AsBoia

argues,whereHungaryisconcerned,“extremeopinionsreachmythicalproportions

andtheintensityofapsychosis,”457reflectingperceptionsofHungaryasanexistential

454Fischer-Galati(1970),p.9.455Boia(2012),pp.97-98.456INSCOP(March2016).457Boia(2011),p.278.

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threattotheRomanianstate.Dutceac-Segestenmeanwhilebelievesthatdisputeover

Transylvania,oratleasttheperceptionofit,“makesalmostimpossiblethepresence

ofpositivestoriesaboutcohabitationandgivesbirthtomanystereotypes.”458

Althoughpowerfulanxietiesdonotremovethepossibilityofinter-statecooperation

altogether,thefollowingsectionwillshowthatRomania’sbehaviourtowardsHungary,

particularlyintermsofsensitivitytoitsrhetoricandtheconnectionitseekstobuild

withitsdiaspora,isprofoundlyinfluencedbytheseattitudes.

Hungarian-RomanianRelationsDuringtheTransitionPeriod

AsChapter4hasalreadypointedout,thetransitionperiodposeddifficultchallenges

forRomaniaintermsofnegotiatingitscommunistpastaswellasitsregimeand

population’sgeneralresistancetochange.Itisinthiscontextthatrelationsbetween

BucharestandBudapestduringthistimeshouldbeunderstood.Specifically,

rapprochementbetweenthetwostateshadtobeachievedagainstthebackdropof

decadesofnationalistpropagandaandanarrativeonidentitywhichemphasised

RomanianexceptionalismandthethemeofUnity.Fromthis,wehaveseen,wasborna

policyofassimilationofand/ordiscriminationagainsttheHungarianminoritywhich

alienatedthecommunityfromthemajorityofthepopulation.AlthoughHungaryhad

fewavenuestoinfluenceRomaniandomesticaffairsduringtheColdWar,bythelate

1980stheissuehademergedasaprominentdiscussiontopic,“withcriticismtowards

Ceausescu’sregimebecom[ing]frequentandmoreimportantlypublicinHungary.”459

Itwasevidentthatintheaftermathoftherevolution,theminorityquestionwould

becomeacontentionpointbetweenthetwostates.

Identity-drivenattitudes,bothinwhatconcernstheportrayaloftheSelfandOther,

playedamajorpartinthedebateovertheminorityquestion.Hungarianswereasking

foracompletereversaloftheassimilationpolicyandthelegislatingonbasiccollective

rightsprotectingtheirculturalconnectiontoHungary,butalsoguaranteesthat,as

Hungarianethnics,theywouldbeintegratedintoRomaniansociety.Someofthese

propositionsdidnotrepresentanissue–thegovernmentwasquicktoallowforseats

458Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.223.459KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.303.

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inthelowerchamberofparliamenttobeawardedtominoritygroups,Hungarians

included.460Indeednegotiationonaresolutionoftheminorityquestionwere

conductedwiththeDemocraticUnionofHungariansinRomania(UDMR,)the

community’sofficialpoliticalplatform.ForRomanians,however,thereexistsavery

importantdistinctionbetweenpoliticalintegrationandallowingfortheproliferationof

Hungarianculturalelementswithinitsnationalterritory.AsGallagherargued,the

“politicalagendaofminorityrightsandculturalautonomychallengessomeofthecore

valuesoftheRomanianstate.”461IssuesarosewhenHungariansmadedemands

includingfortheestablishmentofaHungarianconsulateinthecityofCluj

(Transylvania),Hungarian-languageuniversitiesandculturalcentreswithbooksand

otherresourcesinthemothertongue.462Thevaluesunderthreathereconcernthe

viewthatRomaniawasanationalstate,withasingleofficiallanguage(Romanian),and

inwhichnodiscriminationonbasisofethnicitywaspermissible.Inthiscase,itwas

thoughtthatofficialminoritygrouprightswoulddiscriminateagainstthemajorityof

thepopulation,asdiscussedinChapter4.Therefore,severalprinciplesontheUDMR’s

agenda,suchas“therecognitionofHungarianminorityasa‘constitutivefactor’ofthe

Romanianstateaswellasbeingan‘independentpoliticalsubject’”463weremade

impossible.

Behindtheseworries,however,wastheever-presentquestionregardingTransylvania.

TheperceptionwasthatanyconversationonenhancedrightsfortheHungarian

minoritywouldleadtocompromisesonterritorialautonomy,andeventuallythe

breakupofthestate:“someRomanianpoliticiansmaintainedthatthediscussionon

minorityrightswasapretextforterritorialrevisionism.”464Theanxietyovermaking

concessionsonautonomy,whetherculturalorpolitical,issummarisedwellby

Turnock:“Hungarianseverywherehaveanunderstandablesenseofnostalgiaforthe

territorialarrangementspre-1918whichRomanianscanscarcelyacknowledgeasa

historicalfactforfearofofferingsomeconcessionsoversovereignty.”465Theissueis

460Roper(2000),pp.113-114.461Gallagher(1998),p.115.462Roper(2000),p.114.463KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.307.464Roper(2000),p.116.465Turnock(2001),p.122.

183

thattheminorityquestionconcernednotonlyHungarianswithinRomania,butalso

theirkin-state.TheperceptionthatHungaryhadnotaltogetherrenounceditsclaim

overTransylvania,coupledwiththedemandsoftheHungarianminority,ledmanyto

believethattherewasaconcertedeffortbythisOthertoundermineRomanian

sovereigntyandthreatenitsterritorialintegrity.AsDragomanargued:““theHungarian

communitywaslargelysuspectedofdisloyaltyandevenofplottingTransylvania’s

secession.”466TheobviousconnectionbetweenthepoliticalarmoftheHungarian

community,theUDMR,andBudapestwasalsorecognised,asthelatterhadbeen

establishedwith“financialhelpfromHungary.”467AddtothisthefactthatHungary’s

right-wingprime-ministerJozsefAntallstatedhisdesiretobetheleaderoffifteen

millionHungarians‘inspirit,’fiveofwhomwereinthediaspora,468itisapparentwhy

Romaniansmadetheleapfromculturalrightstoterritorialdismemberment.Overall,

theofficialpositionwasthattheminorityissuewas“purelyadomesticissue”469and

Hungary’sinvolvementinthematterwasespeciallyundesirable.Attherootofthis

stancewereundoubtedlyanxietiesemergingfromthethemeofBesiegedFortress,

concerningHungary’sinterferenceinitsdomesticaffairs,andthethreatitposedto

Romania’sterritorialintegrityandsovereignty.

However,notleastduetothepressuresexertedonthetwostatesbytheinternational

communitytoresolvetheissueandsignaPrincipalTreaty,Bucharestsatdownto

discusswithitstraditionalfoeaproblemconcerningwhatitperceivedtobeinthe

domesticsphere.Negotiationsbeganin1994,withRomania’spositiononthe

unconstitutionalityofgrouprightsremainingunchangedsince,asTurnockargues,

“nationalists(…)donotunderstandhowchargesofdiscriminationcanarisefrom

legislationthatappliesequallytoallRomaniancitizens.”470Foritspart,Hungary

focusedonacertainarticle11oftheCouncilofEuropeRecommendation1201.This

provisionstatedthat“inareaswheretheyareamajority,ethnicminoritiesshould

have‘attheirdisposalappropriatelocalorautonomousauthoritiesor…haveaspecial

466Dragoman(2008),p.69.467KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.303.468Ibid.469Roper(2000),p.116.470Turnock(2001),p.122.

184

statusmatchingthespecifichistoricalandterritorialsituation.’”471Inotherwords,the

HungarianminorityinRomaniawouldbeallowedacertaindegreeofself-governance

andpreponderanceinareasofTransylvaniawheretheyareinmajority.Unsurprisingly,

acceptingthatsuchanarticlebeincludedintheTreatywasseenasencouraging

Hungarians’claimsforpoliticalandadministrativeautonomy,pursuedinparallelby

theUDMR.ForRomanians,theperceptionwasthatthiswouldhavebeenaslippery

slopetowardsthedisintegrationoftheirstateand,amidstbroadpoliticaloppositionto

inclusionofthisarticleintheTreaty,negotiationsfellthroughin1995.AsKulcsarand

Bradatanpointout,whatmadereachingconsensusonaTreatysodifficultwas

“Romanianelites’fixationthatautonomyofanykind(andespecially

territorial/administrative)willeventuallyleadtosecession.”472

Whetherthisanxietyisjustifiedornot,itformstheprimaryrationalewhichguides

Romania’srelationswithbothitsHungariancommunityandtheirstateoforigin.The

areasofterritorialintegrity,ofthenationalcharacterofthestateanditssovereignty,

threatenedherebothfromwithin–autonomyforminorities–andwithout–

Hungary’sinvolvementintheissue–areofextremesensitivityforthepoliticalclass

andthewiderpublic.Salatcapturesthisintheformofatellingstatisticfrom2006,

that“theideaofethnicautonomyissupportedby85%oftheHungariansin

Transylvania,[whilst]only13%oftheRomaniansegmentoftheTransylvanian

populationisreadytoacceptthisarrangement.”473Thesamesplitisnoticeableon

otherissuessuchaseducationinthemothertongue,supportfromtheHungarian

government,andtheuseofHungarianasanofficiallanguageofcommunicationin

stateinstitutions.474Consequently,theattitudeofthepublicmatchesthatofits

leadership,inthatmakingconcessionstotheHungariancauseconstitutesared-line,

thecrossingofwhichmaythreatentheessentialvaluesonwhichtheRomanianstate

isbuilt.

471Roper(2000),p.119.472KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.307.473L.Salat,‘ARapprochementwithoutReconciliation:Romanian-HungarianRelationsinthePost-CommunistEra,’inA.E.B.Blomqvist,C.IordachiB.Trencsenyi(eds.),HungaryandRomaniaBeyondNationalNarratives–ComparisonsandEnlargements(Bern:PeterLang,2013),p.683.474Ibid.

185

Theseattitudesnotwithstanding,RomaniansandHungarianswentbacktothe

negotiationtablein1996,thistimewiththemoremoderateConstantinescuandGyula

Hornatthehelm.Constantinescu’sgovernmentwasmuchmoreamenabletoreaching

agreementwithHungary,asitwouldhavebeenbeneficialtowardsRomania’s

Europeanintegrationprospects.Havingsaidthat,eventhisleadershipcouldnotignore

theanxietiesofthegeneralpublic,northoseofthesocialistopposition.Assuch,whilst

RomaniaacquiescedtoRecommendation1201,itpushedforaclause“thatconfirmed

the‘inviolabilityoftheircommonborderandtheterritorialintegrityoftheother

Party.’”475Additionally,theTreatyspecifiesthattheRecommendation“doesnotrefer

tocollectiverights,nordoesitobligatePartiestograntthosepersonstherighttoa

specialterritorialautonomystatusbasedonethniccriteria.”476Inotherwords,

Romaniaacceptedthatacertain‘specialstatus’maybeofferedtoHungariansinareas

inwhichtheyformedthemajority,butthiswasnottobeconfusedwith

institutionalisedgroupsrights.Furthermore,theRomanianstateincurredno

responsibilitytograntautonomyonthebasisofthisspecialstatus.Evenmore

poignantly,therecognitionofbordersasinviolablewouldhavebeentantamount,for

Romania,toanadmissionthatTransylvaniabelongsinRomaniaand,therefore,a

renunciationofHungary’sownershipofit.However,thiscompromisedidnotplease

eitherthenationalistsortheUDMR;bothdenouncedit,presumablynotforthesame

reasons.477

Nonetheless,thisfirststepsignalledachangeintacticbyRomaniainitshandlingof

theminorityquestion–althoughcollectiverightshaveneverbeenformalised,

concessionsbegantobemade.Anexampleofthisisthefactthatin1997,Hungarians

weregiventherighttobeschooledintheirmothertongue,aswellastousetheir

languageincourtsoflawandatlocaladministrationlevel.478Overall,afterthesigning

ofthisTreaty,theminorityquestion,atleastintermsofitsinternationalramifications,

recededinsalience,despitethefactthattheUDMRstillcampaignsforgreater

territorialautonomyfortheHungariancommunity.Furthermore,thetrendthat,after

475Roper(2000),p.121.476Ibid.477Ibid.478Gallagher(1998),p.115.

186

Constantinescu’scomingtopower,theaccessionprocesstakesprecedenceoverother

identity-relatedgoalsholdsinthiscase.Itwouldseemasthougharemarkabledétente

happenedintheaftermathofthePrincipalTreaty,whichsawaretreatofthe

identitaryanxietiesregardingtheHungarianthreattoRomanianintegrityand

sovereignty.Attemptsweremadeatbuildingthisrelationshipaccordingtocompletely

differentreferencepointsthanthoseoftheirhistoricalinteraction.AsSalatpointsout,

thusbegan“achapterofco-operationunprecedentedinthehistoryofthetwostates”

with“variousformsofdialogueandconsultation(…)subsequentlyinstitutionalised,

includingregularjointmeetingsofthetwogovernmentsandconsultationsofthe

presidentsofthetwoparliaments.”479Examplesofinstitutionalisedcooperationarean

IntergovernmentalMixedCommissiononCollaborationandStrategicPartnership

(1997),aMixedCommissiononEnvironmentalProtection(1997),andevenajoint

Hungarian-RomanianBattalionestablishedin1998.480Moreimportant,perhaps,was

theestablishmentofaEuro-regioncoveringHungary,RomaniaandSerbiawhich

“encouragesgreaterpermeabilityonthewesternfrontierandreversesthexenophobic

nationalistviewofcross-bordercooperationasalaunchingpadforHungarian

imperialism.”481

Havingsaidthat,theargumentofthisthesisisthat,whilstchangestotheinternational

environment,inthiscasethepresenceinHungaryofamoderategovernmentledby

thesocialistGyulaHorn,mayresultinaretreatofidentity-relatedanxieties,itisnot

thecasethattheseattitudesdisappearaltogether.Instead,distrustandsuspicionof

HungaryarepowerfuldispositionswhichdrawonenduringclaimsaboutRomanian

identityand,assuch,couldnothavebeenwrittenoffbyatemporaryameliorationof

theirrelationship.Similarly,ontheotherside,Hungarians’concernsregardingtheir

minorityinRomania,althoughputonthebackburnerbythesocialistgovernment,

479L.Salat(2013),p.655.480RomanianMinistryofForeignAffairs–RomanianEmbassyinHungary,RelatiiBilaterale–RelatiiPolitice[BilateralRelations–PoliticalRelations],[n.d.],http://budapesta.mae.ro/node/167[accessed02.01.2017].481Turnock(2001),p.129.

187

remainedanissueofcontention,especiallyfortheconservativeoppositionparty,

FIDESZ.482AsSalatargues,

Therapprochementattheinterstateleveldidnotmanage(…)togenerateanewnarrativecapableofgivinguptheoldgrievancesbelongingtothepast.Beyondthefaçadeoftheoutstandingintergovernmentalco-operation,thepublicdiscourseinthetwocountriesremaineddominatedbypatternsofmutualmistrustandprejudice,thedominantidentitystructuresarestillconflicting(…).483

Inotherwords,whileonthesurfaceprogresshadbeenachieved,thefundamental

internaltensionsenduredandallthatwasneededforthere-emergenceofthe

traditionalantagonismbetweenthestateswasachangeinthepoliticalscenery.That

cametopassin1998,whentheHungarianSocialistsweredefeatedinthenational

electionsbytheright-wingFIDESZ,ledbythenationalistViktorOrban.Theinfluenceof

thissingleindividualinthepresent(andquiteprobablyfuture)interactionbetween

RomaniaandHungarycannotbeoverstated.Inhistwospellsingovernment–1998-

2002and2010onwards–Orbanhaspushedforanagendawhichhasincreasingly

beenstrikingattheheartofRomaniananxietiesconcerningHungary.Ashiftinboth

rhetoricandbehaviourtowardsradicalnationalismandapro-Russianattitudehave

ledtoareactivationofthethemeofBesiegedFortressinregardstoHungary,and

frustratedrelationsbetweenBucharestandBudapestbeyondanacceptablelimitfor

stateswhicharenotonlyneighbours,butpartnerswithintheEUandNATO.

Orbanhasbeendescribedasa“gifted,popularstrongman”butalsoas“restlessand

combativewithleaningstowardsmegalomania.”484Duringhisfirstgovernment,

cooperationbetweenRomaniaandHungarycontinued,particularlyasBucharestsaw

thispartnershipasthe“thecoreoftheprocessofconsolidatingsecurityintheregion

ofsoutheastEurope,actingasalinkintheEuro-Atlanticsecurityarchitectureofwhich

482KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.308.483Salat(2013),p.655.484I.Traynor,‘BudapestAutumn?HollowingoutDemocracyontheEdgeofEurope:PremierViktorOrbanisBlowingaChillWindofChangethroughHungary,’TheGuardian30.10.2014,availablefromProQuest,http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1621309093?accountid=7420[accessed16March2016].

188

Hungary[was]nowamember,”485asof1999whenitjoinedNATO.Thetide,however,

waschanging.Orban’snationalistorientation,whichfeaturedaconceptionofthe

nationasnotbeingconstrainedbythebordersofthemodernHungarianstate,

becamethecornerstoneofthisnewgovernment’spolicyagendabothdomestically

andinternationally.AssociologistBozokiargues,thisextra-territorialnational

unificationformsoneofthepillarsofOrban’s‘newpolitics.’486Tothatend,the

Hungariangovernmenthaspursuedanagendaaimedatundoingthedamageofthe

TreatyofTrianon(1920)andbringingtogethertheHungarianswithinandwithoutthe

state,inamodernversionofGreaterHungary.ThemostproblematicofOrban’s

policiesduringtransitionwastheStatusLaw(2002),whichwas“designedtogive

certainrightsinthekincountrytominorityHungariansabroad.487Benefitsincluded

seasonalworkingpermits,travelandeducationbenefits,socialsecurityprovisionsand

healthbenefits.”488

WorkingattheintersectionofFPAandSCfromanidentity-basedperspectiveoffers

insightintoRomania’sperceptionsofthisOther’sactionsasessentiallythreatening.As

thestatewiththelargestHungarianpopulationintheregion,forRomaniathislaw

“conjur[ed]up(…)thespectreofirredentism.”489DespitethefactthattheStatusLaw

was(onewouldsuspectintentionally)non-political,focusinginsteadonsocio-cultural

andeducationalrights,theextraterritorialityaspectinherentinitsscope–namelythe

awardofcertainbenefitswitheffectinthekin-statetoaspecificcategoryofcitizensof

anotherstate–wasintenselyproblematic.NotonlydidtheStatusLawallowHungary

tobecomedirectlyinvolvedinthelivesofRomaniancitizens,buildinglinksbetween

themandaforeignstate,but,bysettingaparttheHungarianminorityfromtherestof

thepopulation,itresultedinto“discriminationamongRomaniancitizensbasedon

ethnicity.”490Ithadbeenpreciselyforthisreason(orpretext)thatRomaniahad

485Turnock(2001),p.131.486Bozoki,citedinA.Deak,‘HungarianDances–theOriginsandtheFutureofViktorOrban’sRevolution,’LithuanianAnnualStrategicReview11:1(January2013),p.153.487SpecificallyconcerningminoritiesinRomania,Slovakia,Slovenia,Croatia,SerbiaandtheUkraine.488KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.309.489TheEconomist,ViktorOrban,anAssertiveHungarian;Charlemagne,02.03.2002,availablefromExpandedAcademicASAP,http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA83561677&v=2.1&u=leicester&it=r&p=EAIM&sw=w&asid=3021d7995063e2094a889236f980fcb7[accessed16March2016].490KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.309.

189

refusedtograntminoritygrouprightstotheHungarianminorityinthe1990s,butnow

Hungarywasunilaterallyembarkinguponanagendawhichultimatelyachieveda

similargoalbydifferentmeans.Despiteregionalopposition,thelawwaseventually

passedwithanoverwhelmingmajoritybytheHungarianparliament,resultinginan

increasinglycloselinkbetweentheHungarianstateanditsdiasporainneighbouring

states.

ForRomanians,meanwhile,the‘spectreofirredentism’wasquicklybecominga

certainty,astheoldidentitaryanxietiesandsuspicionstowardsHungary’sintentions

andmotivationsbehindtheStatusLawwerecomingbacktothefore:

Theratificationofthe‘StatusLaw’bytheHungariangovernmentproducedapowerfulnegativepublicopinionreaction(…).Inthiscontext,Hungarywasaccusedthat,whilethe‘StatusLaw’doesnotexplicitlystipulatetheannexationofTransylvania(…)andthereconstitutionofGreaterHungary,themannerinwhichthelawwasadoptedspoketothisHungariandesideratum.491

Inotherwords,Romanians(aswellasSlovakians,Ukrainians,Serbs,etc.)were

naturallyscepticalofOrban’srhetoric,specificallyhisinsistenceonthenotionthathis

modernpost-stateconceptionofthenationdemandedonlya“spiritualandcultural

reunificationoftheHungarianpeople,”492ratherthanapolitical/physicalone.

Romanians,however,havearadicallydifferentunderstandingofnation/statehood.As

Dragomanhasargued,“Romanianswillseethemselvesasmembersofanationandof

anation-state.Itis,therefore,difficultforthemtoconceivealimitationofthenational

sovereignty.”493Assuch,anyHungarianargumentthatseekstodown-playthe

significanceofbordersor,indeed,theoverallrelevanceofthenation-statein

contemporarypoliticswillbeseenasadirectchallengetoRomania’ssovereigntyand

itsphysicalintegrity.Coupledwithhisemphasisonthesymbolic‘GreaterHungary’and

othermeasuressuchas“settingtheTrianonMourningDay,”494Orban’sagendadid

491R.M.Vadean,Relatiileromano-ungareincontextulintegrariiinstructurileeuropeenesieuroatlantice–1989-2010[Romanian-HungarianRelationsintheContextofEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticIntegration–1989-2010](Iasi:Lumen,2011),p.110.492OrbancitedinTheEconomist(2002).493Dragoman(2008),p.74.494Deak(2013),p.154.

190

littlebutreactivateRomanians’anxietiesconcerningHungary’sinterest,notonlyinthe

welfareofitsminorityinRomania,butalsoinrenewingitsclaimoverTransylvania.

ItistellingoftheimpactthatOrbanandhisFIDESZhaveonRomanian-Hungarian

relations,that,oncehelosthismandatetotheSocialistsin2002,contactbetweenthe

twocountriesimprovedsignificantly.Overthelasthalfdecadeoftransition,the

relationshipbetweenBucharestandBudapestregainedsomeoftheimpetusofthe

late1990s.Startingwith2005,forinstance,therewerefourjoinedannualsessionsof

thetwogovernmentsand,beginningin2006,alsofourannualmeetingsofthe

intergovernmentalMixedCommissiononEconomicCollaboration.495Rather

poignantly,neitherofthesemeetingstookplaceafterFIDESZcamebackintopowerin

2010.Thisthereforeconfirmstheassumptionsofthethesis,concerningtheretreat

andre-emergenceofidentitaryanxietiesinspecificcontexts.Whilstthedominant

portrayalofHungaryasadangerisperpetuatedinthehistoricalandidentity

narratives,theattitudeofanxietytowardsitsactionsandintentionscan,toalarge

degree,bealleviatedbyperceptionsofasustained,positiveandnon-threatening

behavioursuchasthatexhibitedbyBudapestintheperiodswhensocialistswerein

power.Ontheotherhand,thethemeofBesiegedFortresscomesbacktothefore,as

anxietiesarereactivatedandaugmented,whenperceptionsoverthisOther’s

intentionsarereversedbyachangeindirectionandrhetorictowardsanationalist

agenda,witnessedduringAntalland,later,Orban’smandates.Perhapsprecisely

becauseRomaniakeepsacloseeyeondevelopmentsinBudapest,itselfasignof

distrust,ithasbeenacutelyawareoftheseshiftsinBudapest’soutlook,andaswillbe

exploredinthefollowingsection,hasreactedtothembyalteringitsbehaviour

towardsitswesternneighbourconsiderably.

ContemporaryHungarian-RomanianRelations

RomaniajoinedNATOin2004andtheEUin2007;HungarybeatRomaniabyfiveyears

inachievingmembershipoftheformer,andthreeyearsforthelatter.Inasense,the

factthatRomanialaggedbehindHungaryandtheotherCentralEuropeanstatesin

495RomanianEmbassytoBudapest(dateunknown).

191

fulfillingtheaccessioncriteriamayactuallyhavecontributedtothecooperationofthe

2000s.ApossibleexplanationforthisbetteringofrelationshipswasHungary’sown

pro-Westerndirection.Inotherwords,theperceptionthat,inherentinitsdesireand

ultimatesuccessofintegratingintheEuro-Atlanticstructures,wasacommitmentby

Hungarytorespectthevaluesoftheseorganisations.Onewouldarguethat,for

Romania,theinviolabilityofborderswithintheEUandthemutualprotectionoffered

byArticle5oftheNATOTreatyoncollectivedefence496offeredtheprospectthat

Hungarycouldneveragainconstituteathreattoitsterritorialintegrity.Fromthis

perspective,EUandNATOmembershipprovidedtwobenefits–itmovedRomaniaout

oftheEast,eliminatingthethreatposedbyRussia,andmadeHungaryitsformalally,

therebymakingitnigh-onimpossibleforTransylvaniatore-emergeasacontested

issue.

However,ifrapprochementwasnoticeableatthelevelofbilateralrelations,there

existsignsatsocietallevelthatthepublic’sfeelingstowardstheHungarianminority

endured.AccordingtoSalat,astudyof2006revealedthatyoungRomanians(15-25

yearsold)“considerthatHungariansinRomaniahavetoomanyrights,”despitethe

lackofformalgrouprights,“theyaredisturbedbythefactthattheHungarian

languageisspokeninpublic,andtheyfirmlyrejecttheideaofautonomy.”497Itwould

seemasthoughthefundamentalissuesbetweenRomaniansandHungarians

concerningthethreatofthelattertothenationalcharacterofthestatecontinued

amidstincreasedbilateralcooperation.Distrust,therefore,remainedacharacteristic

ofRomanians’relationtoHungarians,anditisagainstthisbackdropthatoneshould

assesscurrentRomanian-Hungarianinteraction.

ThatisallthemorethecaseasOrban’ssecondspellasprime-minister,whichbeganin

2010andcontinuestothetimeofwriting,hasseenanevensharpershiftinHungary’s

rhetoricandbehaviourthanhisfirst,whichhasresultedinanaugmentingofthreat

perceptionsregardingHungarythroughthelensoftheBesiegedFortresstheme.

Firstly,thepronouncednationalistdiscoursethatinthe1998-2002periodemphasised

496NATO,TheNorthAtlanticTreaty,04.04.1949,http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm[accessed06April2016].497Salat(2013),p.684.

192

thespiritualunificationoftheHungariannationsymbolisedintheStatusLawwasnow

offeredapoliticaldimension.In2010,theDualCitizenshipLawwaspassed,which

stipulatedthatcitizenshipwastobegrantedexpeditiouslytoHungarianslivingabroad,

providedthattheir“originfromHungaryisprobable”andtheir“Hungarianknowledge

isproven.”498Furthermore,forthisacceleratedprocessofawardingcitizenship

“neitherresidenceorsubsistenceinHungary,noratestonknowledgeofthe

constitution[was]required.”499Asaresult,thelawpavedthewayformillionsof

HungarianethnicslivinginneighbouringcountriestoreceiveaHungarianpassport–

indeedby2016,accordingtoAgerpres,around785.000peoplehadtakenadvantageof

thislooseningofthecitizenshiplaw,halfofwhomwerereportedtohavebeen

Romanian.500Perhapssurprisinglyatfirstglance,thebacklashagainsttheDual

CitizenshiplawwasfairlysubduedinRomania,withthevastmajorityofthepolitical

leadershipremainingquietonthematter.Certainly,thereactiondidnotcomparein

intensitywiththeoneinSlovakia–wherethegovernmenttookthedecisionto

“revokeSlovakcitizenshipforanyonewhoacquireitofanotherstate,”501ameasure

clearlyaimedatdissuadingtheoverhalfamillionoftheirowneligiblecitizensfrom

applyingforHungariancitizenship.

TheassumptionsmadebythisprojectregardingRomaniananxietiesoverretaining

sovereigntyandthenationalcharacterofthestatemay,atfirst,seemchallengedby

Romania’sreactiontothislaw.ThisisespeciallythecaseasRomaniaishometothe

largestHungarianpopulationoutsideofthekin-stateandtherhetoricsurroundingthe

DualCitizenshipLawwasladenwithmentionsofdue‘reparationsoverthepainful

498J.Toth,‘Update:ChangesintheHungarianCitizenshipLawandAdoptedon26May2010,’EuropeanUnionDemocracyObservatory,19.07.2010,http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/recentChanges/Hungary.pdf[accessed24.03.2016],p.2.499Ibid.500G.Stefan,‘CNMT:Peste785.000demaghiaridinafaragranitelorausolicitatcetateniaungara;jumatatesuntdinRomania[Over785.000HungariansfromabroadhaveappliedforHungarianCitizenship;HalfComefromRomania,’Agerpres03.02.2016http://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2016/02/03/cnmt-peste-785-000-de-maghiari-din-afara-granitelor-au-solicitat-cetatenia-ungara-jumatate-sunt-din-romania-14-28-44[accessed24.03.2016].501J.R.Haines,‘Hungary:GoingintheWrongDirection?ViktorOrban’s‘Illiberal’HungaryLooksEastward,’ForeignPolicyResearchInstitutes,E-Notes,September2014,http://www.fpri.org/article/2014/09/hungary-going-in-the-wrong-direction/[accessed09.03.2016].

193

injusticesofTrianon.’502OnewouldexpectthatRomaniamusthaveperceivedthis

behaviourasthreateningtoitsstateintegrityandsovereignty,yet,unlikeSlovakia,it

keptsilent.Thereasonbehindthisseeminglypeculiarbehaviour,onewouldargue,

wasthefactRomaniahad,itself,onlyrecentlypassedsimilarlegislationconcerningthe

RepublicofMoldova(2009),underwhichthestateofferedMoldovansofRomanian

ethnicityRomanian,andthereforeEU,citizenshipandpassports.Fromthis

perspective,speakingagainstHungary’sDualCitizenshipLawwouldhavebeen

tantamounttoopeningRomaniatocriticismagainstitsownpolicyofbuildinga

strongerconnectiontotheRepublicofMoldova.WhatoneseesinRomania’s

behaviour,therefore,isanorderingofpriorities–Romania’sdesiretostrengthenlinks

withitsdiasporainMoldovatrumpedthethreatinherentinHungary’scourseof

action.However,byreactinginthisway–or,rather,notreacting–toHungary’s

policy,RomaniawasgivingViktorOrbanandFIDESZastakeinitsdomesticpolicyanda

politicalplatformintheMagyardominatedareasofTransylvania,asHungarianethnics

becameHungariancitizens.

Thishasresultedinsomeratheroddsituationsoverthelastfewyears,whichhaveled

toacoolingofRomanian-Hungarianrelations,oneofthemindirectconsequenceof

theextensionofvotingrightsinHungarianelectionsthroughtheCitizenshipLawto

thediasporainTransylvania.Thefar-rightnationalistsJobbikranpartoftheir2014

parliamentaryelectionscampaigninRomania,withpeopleinseveralcountiesin

TransylvaniareceivingleafletsonJobbikevents,andwhichencouragedthem“totake

partintheelectionsinHungary,asdecisionstakeninBudapestwouldinfluencethe

fateofMagyarsinTransylvania.”503ThiswasasteptoofarforRomanians,who

recognisedthatthemessageandsheerpresenceoftheradicalnationalistsJobbik

wereboundtoreignitethedisputeoverthestatusoftheHungarianminorityin

502M.Picard,‘Budapestoffrelanationalitéhongroiseauxmagyars[BudapestOffersMagyarsHungarianNationality],’LeFigaro18.05.2010,http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/05/18/01003-20100518ARTFIG00637-budapest-offre-la-nationalite-hongroise-aux-magyars.php[accessed29March2016].503D.Pacala,‘JobbikisifacecampanieelectoralainCovasna,Harghita,MuressiBrasov[JobbikIsRunningitsElectoralCampaigninCovasna,Harghita,MuresandBrasov],’Mediafax,12.03.2014,http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/jobbik-isi-face-campanie-electorala-in-covasna-harghita-mures-si-brasov-12250448[accessed29March2016].

194

Romania.PresidentBasescuqualifiedJobbikas‘extremist’504andwarnedthat

Bucharestwouldtakeactionagainstactivethreatsagainstitssecurityandstability:

“ourobjectiveisthatHungarianpoliticiansdonotutiliseelectoralcampaignsinorder

tomakestatementswhichcontravenetheRomanianConstitution,theruleoflawand

the[reasonable]behaviourofaguestwhilstinforeignterritory.”505

Itisapparent,onewouldargue,whatparticulararticlesoftheConstitutionBasescuis

referringto–thereisnoroomforHungarianradicalnationalisminthe‘national,

unitaryandindivisible’stateofRomania,andanysuchmessagewillbeseenasan

attackonRomaniansovereigntyanditsnationalprerogatives.Consequently,the

MinistryofInternalAffairsannouncedthatJobbikcampaignerswouldformallybe

declaredpersonaenongrataeandbannedfromenteringRomanianterritory,soasto

“pre-emptanyeventswhichmayaffectpublicorderornationalsecurity.”506It

becomesapparentthat,whiledualcitizenshipforRomanianMagyarswasaconcession

Romaniafeltobligedtomake,alimithadtobedrawnconcerningthelevelof

involvementofHungarianorganisationsintheaffairsofthestateanditscitizens.Itis

clearthat,astheformalconnectionbetweentheHungarianminorityanditskin-state

hasstrengthened,Romaniahasincreasinglybecomemoresensitiveto,andless

toleranttowards,anyperceivedattemptsbyHungarytointerfereintheminority

question.

BeyondJobbik’sinvolvementintheelectioncampaign,Orban’sownbehaviourhasled

toastraininrelationsbetweenBucharestandBudapest.Inparticular,thediscourseon

theirrelevanceofnationalbordersasanobstacletoHungarianunityhastranslated

intoactionswhichhaveamplifiedRomania’sinterpretationsofBudapest’sbehaviour

asirredentist.Perhapsthebestillustrationoftheseheightenedtensionsisanevent

504Ibid.505Basescu,citedinV.Anghel,‘MAI:S-adecisINTERZICEREAintrariiintaraaunorcetateniungaridinJobbiksialtetreiformatiuni[MIA:ItHasBeenDecidedthatCertainHungarianCitizensfromJobbikandThreeOtherOrganisationsAretoBeBANNEDfromEnteringtheCountry],’Mediafax,14.03.2014,http://www.mediafax.ro/social/mai-s-a-decis-interzicerea-intrarii-in-tara-a-unor-cetateni-ungari-din-jobbik-si-alte-trei-formatiuni-12266590[accessed29March2016].506RomanianMinistryofInternalAffairs,DeclaratiedepresaapurtatoruluidecuvantalM.A.I.[PressBriefingbytheM.I.A.OfficialSpokesperson],14.03.2014,http://www.comunicare.mai.gov.ro/arhiva.php?subaction=showfull&id=1394818102&archive=1395902350&start_from=&ucat=9&[accessed30March2016].

195

whichtookplacein2015.AfteravisittoaHungariansummeruniversityinthe

RomaniantownofBaileTusnad,Orbanpostedaseriesofphotographsofinsignias

featuringmapsofGreaterHungaryandtheso-calledSzeklerland,507ageographicunit

unrecognisedbyBucharest.508Thispromptedanenergeticandforcefulreactionfrom

Bucharest,withtheofficialstatementfromtheMinistryofForeignAffairsalsocoming

viaFacebook:

Thepromotion,bytheHungarianprime-minister,oftheserevisionistsymbols,completelyunacceptableandcontrarytothe(…)[PrincipalTreaty]of1996,(…)andtheconstitutionalorderinRomania,doesnotbyanymeanscontributetothe‘streamlining’ofHungarian-Romanianrelationsortheestablishmentofaclimateoftrust(…).AslongastheHungarianpartydoesnotprove,beyonddoubt,thatitiswillingtoabidebythepolitical-juridicalparametersagreeduponbybothRomaniaandHungaryintheaforementioneddocuments,thebilateralrelationshipwillnotbecomebalancedorbuiltonmutualtrust.509

InthisonecanseethecomingtotheforeofRomaniananxietiesconcerningHungary’s

truemotivationsforactionthroughthelensofBesiegedFortress.Thementionofthe

PrincipalTreatyisnotbycoincidence,asthisrecognisedtheinviolabilityofRomania’s

bordersbyHungary.Throughhispost,butalsohispoliciesandrhetoric,ViktorOrban

isperceivedtorenegeonHungary’scommitmenttorespectRomania’sterritorial

configurationandsovereignty.Fromthisperspective,nomeaningfulleveloftrustcan

existbetweentheRomanianandHungariansides.Asaresult,unlessHungarychanges

direction,theMinistry’spostsuggests,therelationshipbetweenthetwocountrieswill

remainimbalancedandmarkedbysuspicionanddistrust.Moreimportantly,the

reactionfromRomania’sleadershipisoneintunewiththegeneralfeelingsofthe

population.InNovember2015,anationalsurveyshowedthat17%ofRomanianssee

507Mediafax,ViktorOrbanapostatimaginicusimboluriale‘Ungarieimari’si‘TinutuluiSecuiesc’[ViktorOrbanHasPostedPictureswithSymbolsof‘GreaterHungary’and‘Szeklerland’],26.07.2015,http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/viktor-orban-a-postat-imagini-cu-simboluri-ale-ungariei-mari-si-tinutului-secuiesc-reactia-mae-foto-14641262[accessed30July2015].508SzeklerlandistheterritorialunitwherethemajorityoftheHungariancommunityisconcentrated.MostinitiativesregardingautonomyandsecessionoftheMagyarminorityfocusonthisregion.509RomanianMinistryofForeignAffairs,StatementConcerningViktorOrban,deliveredonFacebook26July2015,https://www.facebook.com/mae.romania/?fref=nf[accessed31March2016].Theemphasisistheauthor’sown.

196

Hungaryastheirgreatestenemy,withonlyRussiascoringahigherscore(35%).510

WhatisseenhereisareactivationoftheoldanxietiesoftheBesiegedFortress,anda

responsefromRomaniawhichconformstotheseperceptions.Interventionsofthis

typeareanotheridentitaryred-line,andanaggressiveresponseistheonlylegitimate

courseofactionincounteringHungary’sirredentism.Thispositionwasexpressedby

formerprime-ministerVictorPontawhosaidthat“ViktorOrbancomplimentedme,he

toldmehehadhadagreatrelationshipwiththeRomaniangovernmentuntil2012[i.e.

theyearPontabecameprim-minister],andafterwardshedidnot,”addingthat

“Romanianswillnotacceptagovernmentwhichwouldmaintaingoodrelationswith

ViktorOrban.”511

Fromthispointon,althoughformalcooperationwithintheEUandNATOcontinued,

onewouldarguethatrelationsbetweenRomaniaandHungarycooledsignificantly.

Thesewerebutacoupleofexamplesofbilateralskirmisheswhichhintattherift

buildingbetweenthetwostates.Furthermore,thistrendhasbeenexacerbatedby

Hungary’seasternshiftinitsgeneralforeignpolicydirection,theseconddimension

whichshouldbediscussed.Specifically,certainelementsofOrban’srhetoricand

behaviourhavecastdoubtoverHungary’scommitmenttotheEuro-Atlanticalliancesit

isamemberof.TheviewisthatOrbanhas“transformedthecountryinwaysthat[are]

inconflictwithmanyoftheEU’scorevalues.”512Particularly,Hungaryseemstobe

looseningtieswithitsWesternpartnersinfavourofcloserlinkswiththeEast,

particularlyPutin’sRussia.AsamemberoftheEU,Hungaryvocallyopposedthe

economicsanctionsleviedagainstRussia,and,in2014,struckadealallegedlyworth

tenbillioneuros513withMoscowtoexpandthenuclearpowerplantatPaks.Whilst

510M.Mihalache,‘SondajIRES:Rusia,consideratecelmaimaredusmanalRomaniei’[‘IRESPoll:Russia,SeenasRomania’sGreatestEnemy’],Adevarul,27.11.2015,http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/sondaj-ires-rusia-considerata-mai-mare-dusman-romaniei-cunosc-romanii-despre-produsele-rusesti-1_565889827d919ed50ea6bf8d/index.html[accessed24December2015].511Ponta,citedinA.Moise,‘Ponta:Orbanmi-afacutuncomplimentcandaziscapanain2012s-aintelesfoartebinecuRomania[Ponta:OrbanComplimentedMewhenHeSaidThat,until2012,HeHadGoodRelationswithRomania],’Mediafax,27.07.2015,http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/ponta-orban-mi-a-facut-un-compliment-cand-a-zis-ca-pana-in-2012-s-a-inteles-foarte-bine-cu-romania-14646464[accessed30July2015].512K.Verseck,‘HungaryEyesCloserTieswithRussia,’DeutscheWelle,02.02.2015,http://www.dw.com/en/hungary-eyes-closer-ties-with-russia/a-18230319?maca=en-rss-en-eu-2092-rdf[accessed05April2016].513Ibid.

197

economicdependenceonRussianenergyofseveralEUmemberstates,Germany

included,hasbeenthemajorimpedimentinEurope’sadoptingastrongstanceagainst

Russia’srecentactions,Hungaryhasaddedadogmaticdimensiontoitsreasonsfor

resistingtheembargo.

Duringaspeechatthe2014HungariansummeruniversityinBaileTusnad,where,one

yearlater,hewouldtakethenowinfamous‘GreaterHungary’photos,Orban

questionedthecontemporaryrelevanceoftheWesternliberalmodelanditscapacity

toremaincompetitiveinaglobalisedworld.Thesuggestionwasthatitissystemssuch

asthoseinChina,TurkeyandRussia,“thatarenotWestern,notliberal,notliberal

democracies,maybenotevendemocracies,[that]aremakingnationssuccessful.”514In

ensuringhisstate’scompetitiveness,thefocusforOrban,too,wouldthereforebethe

nation,ratherthantheindividual:“theHungariannationisnotasimplesumof

individuals,butacommunitythatneedstobeorganised,strengthenedanddeveloped,

andinthissense,thenewstatethatwearebuildingisanilliberalstate,anon-liberal

state.”515Theessenceofhismessage,especiallyinthecontextinwhichitwas

delivered–totheHungariandiasporainRomania–wasthat‘newnationalism’would

dominateHungary’sagenda,itscommitmentstoWesternvaluesapotentialobstacle

tothecountry’ssuccess.Inthisview,thesimilaritieswithPutin’sowndogmaare

apparent;coupledwithHungary’seconomicventureswithRussia,theevercloser

connectionbetweenBudapestandMoscowshouldcomeasnosurprise.

Fromanidentitaryperspective,onemayshedlightonthemagnitudeandreasons

behindRomania’sconcernoverthisshift.RussiaandHungaryarealreadyseenasthe

twogreatestthreatstotheRomanianstate,astheIRESsurveyshows.516The

annexationofCrimeaandfrozenconflictsintheDonbashavereactivatedanxieties

concerningRussianexpansionism,particularlyinregardstotheRepublicofMoldova.

Similarly,thischapterhasdiscussedhowOrban’srhetoricandpolicyfocuson‘Greater

Hungary’haveamplifiedtensionssurroundingthestatusoftheHungarianminority

514C.,Toth,‘FullTextofViktorOrban’sSpeechatBaileTusnad(Tusnádfürdő)of26July2014,’TheBudapestBeacon,29.07.2014,http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/10592[accessed05April2016].515Ibid.516IRESstatisticinMihalache(2015).

198

andevenownershipofTransylvania.Assuch,friendshipbetweenBudapestand

Moscowinthecurrentinternationalclimateaugmentstheperceiveddanger.Thisis

thecombinationoftwoseparateareasrelevanttothethemeofBesiegedFortress.On

theonehand,Hungaryisathreatinitself.Ontheother,membershipoftheEUand

NATOareseenastheessentialsafeguardsagainstRussia.Hungary,however,asa

fellowmember,underminesthese‘insurancepolicies’throughitseastward-looking

agenda.ThepossibilityofHungarybecomingaTrojanHorseinsidethesetwo

organisationswoulddestabilisethemfromwithin.ThetheoryofTrojanHorseHungary

isnotuniquetoRomania,butitdoesstrikeaparticularchordwiththisstate,asitplays

onthealreadyexistinganxietiesconcerningtheintentionsofthisactor,and

compoundstheindividualHungarianandRussianthreats.Thisviewiscontendedby

DanDungaciuwhohasstatedthat,inrespecttoHungary,“wearedealingwitha

‘cleverdick,’(…)fromwithintheEuro-Atlanticspace,whoisplayingadoublegame”

arguingthat“RussiaisnotoppositeofEurope,butitspartner.”517Itisthistypeof

message,hecontinues,coupledwithageneralanti-Westerndiscourse,thatthreatens

theEuropeanprojectaltogether.518

OnemaygatherfromthisthatRomaniaviewsHungarynotonlyasathreattoitself

but,throughitsassociationtoRussia,asadestabilisingactorwithintheEUandNATO.

Coupledwiththepro-RussianattitudesofotherEuropeanstates,thedangerisonly

magnified.ItisbecauseoftheimportanceofHungaryintheRomanianimaginary,

however,thattheTrojanHorsetheorysopreoccupiesRomania.Thenationalistand

easternshiftstogetherconfirmforRomaniansthefactthatsuspicionanddistrustof

theirwesternneighbourwerewellfoundedand,consequently,anxietiesconcerning

Budapest’sbehaviourareaugmented.Inthisview,therelationshipbetweenRomania

andHungaryhasreachedaleveloftensionsimilartothatintheearly1990sandthis

shouldcomeasnosurprise.Theargumentofthisthesisisthattodaythemain

referencepointsofRomania’spositiontowardsHungaryarenolongertheprinciplesof

517DungaciuinFundatiaUniversitaraaMariiNegre[BlackSeaUniversityFoundation],Dezbatere:PunteaMoscova-BudapestapesteUcrainasiRomania[Debate:TheMoscow-BudapestBridgeovertheUkraineandRomania],18.02.2015,http://fumn.eu/urmariti-inregistrarea-integrala-a-dezbaterii-puntea-moscova-budapesta-peste-ucraina-si-romania-18-februarie-2015/[accessed06April2016].518Ibid.

199

cooperationandinterdependencedictatedbymembershipoftheEuropean

community,buttheidentity-drivenprerogativesofkeepingherfrommeddlingin

Romania’sdomesticaffairsandensuringthestate’ssecuritybyevercloser

collaborationwith,particularlyAmerican,NATOforces.Onewouldarguethat,as

identitaryanxietiesareexacerbated,distancefromthetraditionalfoeistheonly

permissiblecourseofaction.Inthissense,theidentity-perspectiveemployedhere

capturesthecomplexmotivationsbehindRomania’sinteractionwithHungary,and

highlightsthered-linestheidentitynarrativecreates,oneofwhichisclosenessto

Budapestincurrentcircumstances.

FutureDirectionsforHungarian-RomanianRelations

Whatremainstobediscussednowisthepotentialfutureofrelationsbetween

BudapestandBucharestbyreferringtoscenariosbeingconsideredinRomaniaatthe

moment.PickinguponthediscussionintheintroductionandChapter1onthe

necessitytostudythebehaviourofsmallstates,onewouldarguethat,whilstitistrue

thatRomaniaandHungaryarenotmajorinternationalplayers,thefactthatthetwo

areallieswithintheEUandNATOmeansthatthestabilityoftheregionandthe

efficiencyofthetwoorganisationrests,atleastinpart,ontheirabilitytocooperate

andmaintainatleastcordialdiplomaticrelations.However,forRomania,thedirection

thatBudapestseemstohaveadoptedrecentlymakesconciliationanalmost

impossibleoption,butforachangeindirectionbyBudapest.Themostworrying

scenariosarethosewhichconcerntheroleHungarymightplayinthestand-off

betweentheEUandNATO,ontheonehand,andRussiaontheother,allofwhich

subscribetothethemeofBesiegedFortress.

Romania’sreservationsandcriticismtowardsstateswhichhaveeitherfailedtoassess

thedangerposedbyRussianexpansionisminUkraine,orhavedisplayedpro-Russian

attitudeshasalreadybeendiscussedinthepreviouschapter.Inthespecificcaseof

Hungary,however,theanxietyiscompounded.Forinstance,Romaniahasproven

sensitivetothefactthatOrban’s‘GreaterHungary’includesacommunityinUkraine,

intheregionofTranscarpathia.Asaresult,theRomanianmediawerequicktopickup

onasuggestionmadebyAnneApplebauminTheSpectatorthatViktorOrbanmay

200

haveavestedinterestinRussia’scampaignintheUkraine,regardingTranscarpathia:

“asmallsliceofthatfabledlostterritory[i.e.GreaterHungary]isnowpartofUkraine

—apointtheRussianforeignministeralsobroughtup,curiously,inMunich.Perhaps

thiswasahint:ifRussiasuccessfullypartitionsUkraine,maybeBudapestwillgetaslice

too.”519ThroughthelensoftheBesiegedFortresstheme,theworryisthat,asa

memberofNATO,Hungarywouldbeunwillingtoadoptastrongpositionagainst

Putin’spotentialpartitionofUkrainetherebyunderminingNATO’sEasternEuropean

flank’scapacityintacklingtheensuingsecuritycrisis.WithHungarystandingtoprofit

fromafederalisationofUkraine,theentireviabilityofNATOasanactorcapableof

withstandingandcounteringRussianexpansionismwouldbeindoubt.ForBucharest,

thiswouldsignalthattheprotectiveumbrellaofferedbyNATOmembershipmayturn

outtohavebeenanillusionandthesecurityprerogativemembershipsatisfiesmaybe

undermined.Additionally,RussianadvancesinUkrainemighthaverepercussionson

thefateoftheRepublicofMoldova,astatethepro-Europeanfutureofwhichisof

particularsignificancetoBucharest,foridentitaryreasonswhichwillbediscussedin

thefollowingchapter.Dungaciusummarisedthisviewwhenhearguedthatthe

adoptionofthefederalsolutioninUkraine“willgiveideasthattheconflictin

Transnistriamayalsoberesolvedthroughfederalisation(…).Iworrythatnotall

occidentalswillbeopposedtothisandthosewhohavethepowertoopposeitwill

not.”520ThelossofMoldova,itsEstrangedSelf,totheRussianspherewouldbe

perceivedascatastrophicinRomania,ascloserelationswiththisstatehavebeenat

thetopofitsforeignpolicyagendasinceitsaccessiontotheEuro-Atlanticprojects.

Inessence,Hungary’spotentialroleasaRussianTrojanHorseinsidetheEUandNATO

isseenbyBucharestasoneofthegreatestdangersfacingEasternEuropeansecurity,

butalsotheRomanianstateitselfand,asacorollary,Moldova.Thespreadofthe

RussiansphereofinfluenceintoUkraineandMoldovawouldmeanthedistance

RomaniahasbeenbuildingbetweenitselfandRussiawouldbethreatenedandits

519Applebaum,citedinL.Stan,“RelatiaUngaria-RusiapoateinfluentasirelatiaRomania-Rep.Moldova[TheRelationshipbetweenHungaryandRussiaMayInfluencetheRelationshipbetweenRomaniaandtheRepublicofMoldova],”InfoPrut,20.02.2015,http://infoprut.ro/36670-dungaciu-relatia-ungaria-rusia-poate-influenta-si-relatia-romania-rep-moldova.html[accessed05April2016].520DungaciuforFUMN(2016).

201

interestsintheRepublicofMoldovairremediablydamaged–indeedMoldovamay

ceasetoexistasasovereignstatealtogether.Worsestill,ifHungarywereawarded

TranscarpathiaandwithNATOimpotenttocurbRussianaggression,therewouldbeno

guaranteethatHungary’sclaimoverTransylvaniawouldnotbeentertainedby

Moscow.AlthoughthisnotionhasnotbeenaddressedbyBucharestpoliticians,ithas

beendiscussedinthemedia.Recently,theRomaniannewsnetworkB1pickedupona

commentbyVladimirPutinthat“ifsomeonewantstostartrevisitingtheresultsof

WorldWarII,well,let’strytodebatethattopic.Butthenweneedtodebatenotonly

Kaliningradbutthewholething(…).There’salsoHungaryandRomania.”521The

RomaniannetworkquotesHungarianreactionstothisstatement,suchastheopinion

that“PutinraisedeyebrowsamongRomaniansandraisedhopeamongsome

Hungariannationalists,bysuggestingthatreviewingthepostWorldWarIIborder

betweenHungaryandRomaniacouldbeontheagenda,ifpeoplequestionRussia’s

bordersandterritories.”522InthesescenariosareatplaymanyofRomania’smajor

anxietiessubscribedtothethemeofBesiegedFortress–itssecurityandindependence

fromMoscow,Moldova’spro-Westerndirection,andevenRomania’sownterritorial

integrity.

Thisfinalscenariomayseemimplausible,butitisnonethelessthecasethat

considerationssuchasthiscapturethestrainedrelationshipbetweenRomaniaand

Hungaryandhintatthefactthatthissituationcanonlycontinue,undercurrent

circumstances.Thatisbecausethelevelofsuspicionandanimositybetweenthetwo

statesisbeingfuelledbyHungary’spursuitofitsnationalistandpro-Easternagenda.In

aclimateinwhichtherearedoubtsoverwhetherOrbanfavoursanalliancewithhis

partnersinthetheEUandNATO,orPutin’sRussia,itisnotsurprisingthatthese

sequencesofeventsarebeingconsidered.Russia’srhetoric,meanwhile,ishavinga

521Bloomberg,PutinDiscussesTrump,OPEC,Rosneft,Brexit,Japan(Transcript),05.09.2016,https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-05/putin-discusses-trump-opec-rosneft-brexit-japan-transcript[accessed02January2017].522HungarianPress,citedinB1,UngariaredeschidesubiectulpretentiilorteritorialeasupraTransilvaniei:PresamaghiaracomenteazaafirmatiileluiPutinprivindreconsiderareagranitelor[HungaryReopensDiscussionoverTerritorialDemandsoverTransylvania:HungarianPressCommentsPutin’sStatementConcerningReconsideringBorders],06.09.2016,http://www.b1.ro/stiri/externe/ungaria-redeschide-subiectul-pretentiilor-teritoriale-asupra-transilvaniei-presa-maghiara-comenteaza-afirmatiile-lui-putin-privind-reconsiderarea-granitelor-foto-video-161145.html[accessed02January2017].

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destabilisingeffectontherelationshipbetweenRomaniaandHungary,andissowing

discordamongstEuropeanallies.Thisonlyaddstothechallengesposedbythe

Eurosceptictrendthatissweepingthecontinent,andbythespateofRussophileswho

havewonelectionsinEasternEuropeanstates.Themostworryingoftheseis,

unsurprisingly,theRepublicofMoldova,wherethepro-RussianIgorDodonwas

electedpresidentinNovember2016.AnalliancebetweenHungaryandRussia,

doublednowbytheriseofRussophilesintheRepublicofMoldovameansthatthereis

aworryingpotentialeasternalignmentamongstsomeofthemostcrucialactorsinthe

constructionofRomanianforeignpolicy.AsDungaciupointedout,“theBudapest-

Moscowaxishasanewcomponent–theoldBudapest-Chisinau-Moscowaxis,which

willcausegreatproblemsforRomania.”523

Theperceptionis,ashasbeenexploredinthepreviouschapter,thatRomaniais

becomingincreasinglyisolatedandbesiegedontheEasternflank,caughtbetween

fragilestates,suchasUkraineandMoldova,Eastern-facingHungary,andRussiaitself.

Theimplicationsofthissituationforthefuturestabilityandsecurityoftheregion,but

alsoforthepotencyofNATOtocurbRussianexpansionismand,perhaps,theviability

oftheEuropeanprojectaltogether,areuncertain.Dungaciubelievesthatthiswillbea

“strategicbattlewithoutprecedent”andthattheissueisoneof“balance”524between

pro-Russianandpro-Westernattitudes.TheresistanceaspectoftheBesiegedFortress

themesuggeststhatRomania’spositionwillbeunwaveringinitscommitmenttoa

hardapproachtoRussianexpansionism.However,Hungary’spositionisperceivedas

equallysteadfastintheoppositedirection.Inthesecircumstances,itisdifficulttosee

areconciliationbetweenthetwostates,particularlybecauseofbroader

considerationsregardingthefutureofTransylvaniaandMoldova.Sincethisanimosity

permeatesthroughthepoliticalleadershipintoRomaniansociety,itisalsodifficultto

envisageexternalpressurebeingenoughtoforcearesolution.Asmentionedearlier,

publicanti-Hungariansentimentsarepervasiveandanygovernmentwillingto

compromiseinthisstand-offwouldhaveitslegitimacyinstantlyeroded.Inconclusion,

onewouldarguethatRomaniaandHungaryareheadingtowardsanunbridgeable

523DungaciuforOraNoua(2016).524Ibid.

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levelofoppositionwhichmay,atitsheight,severelyaffectthestabilityofEastern

Europe,andtheinternalcohesionofboththeEuropeanUnionandNATO.

Consequently,notawardingthisbrewingconflicttheattentionitdeservesmay,inthe

nearfuture,comebacktohauntanalystsandpolicy-makerswhomightbetemptedto

writeitoffasaquintessentialexampleofBalkanskirmishes.

Conclusion

ThischapterhasexploredthenatureofRomania’srelationshipwithHungarywith

referencetohistoricallyenduringclaimsaboutitsidentity.Workingwithintheareaof

overlapofFPAandSChasallowedthisthesistocapturethecomplexrationalebehind

Romania’spositionvis-à-visHungary,byfocusingontheidentitaryanxietiesemerging

fromtheportrayalsofSelfandHungarianOther.Themainassumptionmadebythe

project,namelythatsedimentednarrativesonidentityinfluencebehaviourthrough

theanxietiesandprerogativestheycreateisconfirmedbythiscasestudy.Anxieties

overterritorialintegrityandsovereigntyimpactedRomanian-Hungarianrelations

throughoutthefirsthalfofthe1990s.However,thenotionthatthesemayrecedein

opportunecircumstancesisalsoconfirmedbythedétenteofthelate1990sand2000s.

Havingsaidthat,theenduranceoftheseattitudesshowsinthefactthatpublicdistrust

towardsHungarydidnotdisappearevenasbilateralrelationsbetweenthetwostates

wereflourishing.Finally,thethesisarguesthat,inthecurrentcontextofViktor

Orban’spronouncednationalistandeasternshift,anxietieshavebeenaugmentedtoa

criticallevel,becomingthemainreferencepointinBucharest’snegotiatingofits

relationshipwithHungary.InasettingofsystemicchallengesfacedbytheEUinlight

ofeconomicdependenceonandconflictingapproachestowardsRussia,Romania’s

perceptionthatitisaBesiegedFortress,caughtbetweenfragileandpro-Russian

states,hasbeenexacerbated.Inthislight,thepatternofbehaviourtowardsHungary,

oneofthemainproponentsofthisshift,isonefocusedoncriticismofitsgeneral

directionandlimitingitsinvolvementinRomania’sdomesticaffairs.Despitethefact

thattheriftbuildingbetweenBucharestandBudapestisthreateningregionalstability

andmay,indeed,playintoRussia’sownagenda,conciliationwithHungaryisunlikely,

becauseofthelevelofthreatperceptioninregardstoitsplansforTransylvania.As

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anxietiesareattheirheight,Romania’scontemporarybehaviourtowardsHungaryis

dominatedbytheidentity-drivenprerogativestoensurethesecurityandintegrityof

thestate,andRomanians’unquestionedsovereigncontroloverit.

205

Chapter7.Romania’sRelationshipwiththeRepublicofMoldova–

TwoStates,OnePeople?

PoorBessarabiansisterYou,theholiestofall

InvainyourmotherasksyouIfyouliveinfreedom.

Wakeupyou,benumbednation

BecauseifintheheatofcoldcalculationsWeloseBessarabiaoncemore

WetoowillbelostforeverThereisnowhereforourbrotherstoturnAndtheywaitinvainforasignfromusBessarabiaistakenawayonitscross

Andwecontemplateitwithablankstare.525

Introduction

ThischapterexaminesthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenRomaniaandthe

RepublicofMoldovafromtheperspectiveofitsnarrativeonnationalidentity.Thefirst

sectionexplorestheportrayalofMoldovaintheRomaniannarrative,andthefactthat

BessarabiaisrepresentedasanEstrangedSelf,ratherthananOther.Fromthis

representationemergetheidentity-derivedattitudeswhichshapeRomania’s

behaviourtowardsitseasternneighbour,namelythatRomaniaperceivesithasa

vestedinterestinthefateofthisstateandadutytoensureitssecurity,pro-Western

directionandmaintainaspecialrelationwithit.Followingonfromthis,thenext

sectionexaminesMoldo-Romanianinteractionsduringtransition,emphasisingtherole

Moldova’sambivalencetowardsitsownidentity,butalsootherdomesticandexternal

factors,haveplayedinpreventingthetwostatesfromunifyingand,later,complicated

theirspecialrelationship.Itisarguedthat,asaresultofthesecircumstances,

BucharestchangeditsgoalsfromunitingwithMoldovatosupportingitsintegration

525Romanianfolksong:T.StepaandA.Paunescu,‘SoraBasaraba/BaladapentruBasarabia[BessarabianSister/BaladforBessarabia],’CenaclulFlacara[TheFlameLiteraryCircle],Vol.12(2008).

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process,alongsideRomania’sown.AsubsequentsectionisdedicatedtoRomania’s

contemporaryrelationshipwiththeRepublicofMoldovaintheaftermathofthe

former’saccessiontotheEUandNATO.ThethesishighlightstheeffortsBucharesthas

madetostrengthenthisrelationship,whilstalsoremaininganadvocateofChisinau

withtheEUandNATO.However,regionaldevelopments,mostnotablythecrisisin

EasternUkraineandMoldova’sdomesticpoliticalturmoilhavecreatedanxietiesin

Bucharestoveritsneighbour’sfuture.Thefinalsection,therefore,examinestwo

specificscenariosconcerningpossibledevelopmentsregardingUkraineand

TransnistriawhichmayputatriskMoldova’spro-Westerndirectionandevenits

independenceandsovereignty.Thepotentialoutcomes,thatofacomplete

breakdownofrelationsbetweenBucharestandChisinau,andofanadhocunification

incaseoftheoutbreakofaconflictbetweenMoldovaandTransnistria,areexploredin

termsoftheirrepercussionsonregionalstabilityandEast-Westrelations.The

significanceofthischapteristhatitexploreshowidentitynarrativesmaygenerate

affinitiesaswellasanxietiesandexaminesthemannerinwhichtheseattitudesimpact

boththebilateralrelationshipbetweenthetwostates,aswellasregionalstability

morebroadly.

Romania’sIdentityDrivenAttitudetowardstheRepublicofMoldova–Affinityfor

theEstrangedSelf

Muchlikeintheothertworelationshipsexploredsofar,entrenchedclaimsabout

identityplayasignificantroleininfluencingRomania’sattitudes,andthroughthis,its

behaviourtowardstheRepublicofMoldova.Similarlytothepreviouscase-studies,the

particularrepresentationofthisactorisdeeplysedimentedintheRomanian

consciousness,andthecontinuityofthehistoricalnarrativehasensuredthatthe

historyofinteractionbetweenRomaniaandMoldovaisespeciallyvivid.However,this

iswheresimilaritiesbetweentherepresentationofthisOther,andthoseexplored

previously,end.Sofar,thefocushasbeenonhowtheidentitynarrativehascreated

profoundanxietieswhich,particularlyinthecurrentinternationalclimate,accountfor

increasinglytenserelationsbetweenthisstateanditstraditional‘foes’Russiaand

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Hungary.PickinguponWaeverandHansen’sargumentabouttheSelf/Othernexus,526

however,itisalsothecasethat,inthesamewayitcancreateenduringanti-Other

sentiments,profoundbeliefsaboutidentitycanalsoleadtotheestablishmentof

indeliblelinksbetweenRomaniansandthoseseentobe‘likethem.’TheRepublicof

Moldova,Romania’sdirecteasternneighbour,and,moreimportantly,itspeople,are

preciselysuchanentity.Boththehistoricalandidentitynarrativeshavegenerated,

fromtheRomanianperspective,atleasttheperception,ifnotthecompletereality,of

asharedidentitybetweenthetwopeoples.Infact,Romaniansoftenrefertothe

RepublicasRomania’s‘sister,’andMoldovansastheir‘brothers.’527Moldovais

thereforenotportrayedasanOther,inthestrictsenseoftheterm;rather,

representationsofthisactoremphasisetheidentitarysamenessbetweenRomanians

andMoldovansand,assuch,thisneighbourisperceivedmoreaccuratelyasan

EstrangedSelf.

Figure6.TheRepublicofMoldovainhistoricalandgeographiccontext.Inred,thecontemporary

526HansenandWaever(2002).527ArecentexampleistheleaderoftheSocialistParty,LiviuDragnea,quotedinA.TobiasandV.Magradean,‘Dragnea:TrebuiesaexisteoimplicaremaimareaRomanieiprivindRepublicaMoldova,esoranoastra[Dragnea:RomaniaMustBeMoreInvolvedinRegardstotheRepublicofMoldova,SheIsOurSister],’Mediafax,08.07.2015,http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/dragnea-trebuie-sa-existe-o-implicare-mai-mare-a-romaniei-privind-republica-moldova-e-sora-noastra-14563168[accessed9July2015].

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territoryoftheRepublic;inpink,RomanianMoldova;inorange,formerMoldavian(andRomanian)territoriesannexedbyUkraineaftertheSecondWorldWar;inlightredattheeasternborderoftheRepublic,thesecessionistregionofTransnistria.Source:S.I.Cepleanu(2011).Seelistoffiguresforcompletereference.

Thisportrayalisrootedinboththeintertwinedhistoryofthetwostatesandintheir

similaridentitymarkers.TheterritorywhichisnowtheRepublicofMoldova,also

knownasBessarabia,formed,forthebetterpartofthehistoryoftheRomanian

provinces,theeasternhalfofMoldavia–forthisandMoldova’soverallterritorial

evolution,see[Figure6].Thatmeans,ineffect,thattheFoundationMythsapply

equallytoMoldovaastheydotoRomania.TheiroriginsareDaco-Roman,their

languageisLatin-itis,ineffect,“indistinguishablefromRomanian,”528theirreligionis

Orthodoxyandtheirethnicityis,implicitly,Romanian.Bessarabiansare,forallintents

andpurposes,identicalfromthisperspectivetotheirbrothersacrosstheRiverPrut

(nowtheborderbetweenthetwostates)intheRomanianpartofMoldavia.Equally,

theirhistoricalexperienceoftheMiddleAgesandofthebeginningofModernitywas

sharedwiththeirfellowMoldavians.529Asaresult,thereexistsanindeliblehistorical

andidentitarylinkbasedontheFoundationMythsandthemeofBesiegedFortress

betweenthisterritoryandRomaniaproper.AsLucianBoiasummarises,thishas

createdinRomaniansthesensethatBessarabiansare,ineffectthesameasthem:

“theybelongedtoMoldavia,thenRomaniaandtheyspeakRomanian;theyare

therefore,Romanian,bornRomanian.”530TheissueofBessarabiaand,indeed,what

setsitapartfromRomaniaproperarelinkedtoeventswhichbeganin1812andhave

ledtotheforcedseparationofthetwostates,theauthorofwhichwasRussia.

PreviouschaptershavealreadyexploredthecircumstancesofthelossofBessarabiain

theaftermathofaRusso-Turkishwar,atatimewhentheRomaniannationalproject

wasonlyjustgettingunderway.ForDjuvara,forinstance,thereexistsa“dramaof

Bessarabia”whichstartsin1812when“welose[it]forthefirsttime.”531Thedrama

continuedasBessarabiaunitedwithRomaniain1918butwasreturnedtoRussiaasa

528Magocsi(2002),p.151.529Forpurposesofavoidingconfusion,thethesiswillusethetermsBessarabiaandMoldovainreferencetotheterritoryoftheRepublicofMoldova,andthatofMoldaviaforthehistoricalregionfromwhichitwasseparatedin1812.530L.Boia(2012),p.245.531Djuvara(2010),p.172and170.

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resultoftheSovietultimatumof1940.BucharestenteredtheSecondWorldWarto

recovertheregionbutthedefeatofGermanyconsecratedtheultimateseparation

betweenthetwostatesandMoldova’sincorporationintheSovietUnion.Thisreality,

coupledwiththefactthat“theSovietUnionpermittedverylimitedcontactbetween

RomaniaandMoldova”532duringtheColdWar,hashadasignificantimpactonboth

theportrayaloftheSelfandtheRussianOther.Bessarabiais,ontheonehand,the

newBesiegedFortress;itsunjustseparationfromRomaniapropermeansthatthe

prerogativedictatedbythethemeofUnity,thatallRomaniansshouldbebrought

togetherinasinglestate,remainsunfulfilled.Ontheotherhand,theregion’srightful

unificationwiththemother-statehasbeenupsetbytheactionsofanOtherwithno

justifiedclaimsoverthisterritory.533TheissueofBessarabiais,consequently,oneof

thethornyareasofcontentionbetweenBucharestandMoscow.Inthiscontext,

Moldovansareseenasvictimsofanoppressiveforeignforce,muchlikeRomanians

hadbeenthroughoutmuchoftheirhistory.Thereisaprojection,therefore,of

Romanians’troubledexperienceontotheregionofBessarabia,whichstrengthensthe

affinityoftheformertowardsthelatter.Tellingofthisisthefactthatthecommunist

regimeofNicolaeCeausescuhadapolicyof“supportinghistorianswhowerecriticalof

theSovietofficialposition,”namelythatMoldovarightlybelongedtoRussia,and

instead“arguedthatMoldovawasaRomanianterritory.”534Thenotionthat,even

duringcommunism,theviewthatBessarabiahadbeeneffectivelystolenfrom

Romaniawaspropagatedisproofofhowentrenchedthisbeliefisamongst

Romanians.

TheresultoftheportrayaloftheRepublicofMoldovaasanEstrangedOtherhasledto

thedevelopmentofaparticularattitudetowardsthisstate,dominatedbythe

perceptionofsameness,orasignofequalitybetweenthetwostates.Whilsttheymay

beseparateentitiesthereexistsapowerfulsensethatbothRomaniaandMoldovaare

inhabitedbythesamepeople.Thismeans,ontheonehand,thatBucharesthasa

vestedinterestintheaffairsofChisinauandmaintainingcloserelationshipswithitis

532Roper(2000),p.125.533SeeBoia(2012),p.94orConstantiniu(2011),p.286.534Roper(2000),p.126.

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paramount.AsAnonymousDhasargued,Moldovarepresentsan“obsession”535for

Romania.Ontheotherhand,thematterofapotentialre-unificationhasneverbeen

takenoffthetablecompletelysincetheendoftheColdWar.Theresultofthis

identitaryaffinityisthatMoldovaoccupiesaveryspecialplaceintheRomanian

imaginary,asoneofitscriticalrelationshipswhichspeaksdirectlytotheprerogatives

setbyitsnationalidentitynarrativeinregardstothethemeofUnity.Oneshouldnot

forgetthat,aslongasBessarabiaremainsanindependentstate,theRomanian

nationalprojectisincomplete.Theseperceptionshavehadasignificantimpactonthe

interactionbetweenthetwostates,bothbeforeandafterRomania’saccessiontothe

EUandNATO.Inlightofcurrentregionaldevelopments,thisaffinitymay,however,

haveseriousrepercussionsonthestabilityofEasternEurope,aswillbediscussedin

followingsections.

Moldo-RomanianRelationsDuringtheTransitionPeriod

TheRepublicofMoldovarepresentstheareaintheEastRomaniansaremost

concernedwith.UnlikeitsrelationstoRussiaandHungary,Romaniawasverykeento

establishastrongconnectionwithChisinauandinitiallypursuedtheavenueofre-

unificationintowhatwouldhaveapproximatedthecontoursofGreaterRomania.536

Indeed,evenamongstWesternobserversthisoutcomeseemedinevitable.537The

wavesofoptimismandnationalismofthelate1980sandearly1990s,however,never

materialisedintoaunionsimilartothatofEastandWestGermany.Thereasonswhy

thatwasthecasehavetodowithbothexternalandinternalcircumstances,butmay

alsohaveanidentitarydimension,bothofwhichrequiresomeattention.

AtthemomentofthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,Romania’spositionontheRepublic

ofMoldovawastheoneoutlinedabove:thesenseofasharedidentitywithMoldova

hadneverwaned,fuelled,asithadbeen,bythesocialistnationalistpolicyof

Ceausescu.Ontheotherside,Moldovatoowasexperiencingsomethingofanational

535AnonymousD(2014).536See[Figure4].Onesays‘approximate’because,asisevidentfrom[Figure6],certainMoldovanterritorieswereannexedtoUkraine.537SeeCash(2007)orPanici(2003)forinstance.

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awakening.UnderGorbachev’sglasnostpolicypro-Romanianoppositiongroupshad

coalescedintoapoliticalformation,thePopularFrontwhichhadbeenpushingfor

“linguisticandculturalfreedom.”538Morebroadly,theFrontwasaskingforaformal

recognitionofthelinkbetweentheMoldovanandRomanianlanguagesandthe

essentialdemarcationbetweentheirrepublicandMoscow.In1989theFront

summonedalargescalerallywhichwasattendedby500.000people“carrying

RomanianflagsandplacardswrittenwithLatinlettersanddenouncingtheMolotov-

RibbentropPact[and]theSovietannexationofBessarabia.”539ThePopularFrontwon

the1990electionsandwhen,inAugust1991,Moldovadeclareditsindependence

fromtheUSSR,Romaniawasthefirsttorecognisethenewstate’ssovereignty.540With

apro-Romaniangovernmentatthehelm,itseemedasthoughtheSovietdominion

haddonenothingtodampentheRomaniannessofMoldovans.Indeed,asBoiaargues,

“theRepublicofMoldovaseemedreadytothrowitselfinRomania’sarms.Romanian

(andnot‘Moldovan,’asitwascalledintheSovietera)wasdeclaredtheofficial

languageandeventhecoloursoftheRomanianflagwereadopted:red,yellowand

blue.”541Evenmorepoignantly,Romania’santhem,Awaken,Romanian,becamethe

newrepublic’snationalanthemalso.

Thiseuphoria,however,wasshortlived.TheyearsofSovietrulehadchangedthe

ethniccompositionoftheMoldovanstate–only65%ofitscitizenswereethnic

Romanians,whilstamongsttheminoritiesnearly14%wereUkrainianand13%

Russian.542Therefore,Chisinau’spro-Romaniandirectionmayhaveappealedtotwo

thirdsofthepopulation,butithadthereverseeffectontheotherthird.AsCashpoints

out,“pro-unificationrhetoricgeneratedsignificantfearandanxietyamongethnic

minorities,contributingtothedevelopmentoftheTransnistrianandGagauzconflicts

intheyearsfollowingindependence.”543Indeed,soonaftertheMoldovan’s

governmentintentiontopursueaunionistpolicybecameclear,Transnistriaand

538Roper(2000),p.125.539A.Panici,‘RomanianNationalismintheRepublicofMoldova,’TheGlobalReviewofEthnopolitics,2:2(January2003),p.39.540Ibid.,p.46.541Boia(2012),p.246.542Magoci(2002),p.152.543J.R.Cash,‘Origins,Memory,andIdentity:‘Villages’andthePoliticsofNationalismintheRepublicofMoldova,’EastEuropeanPoliticsandSocieties,21:4(2007),p.590.

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Gagauzia544proclaimedthemselvesrepublicsseparatefromChisinau.WiththeGagauz

Chisinaumanagedtosettlethedisputeinapeacefulmanner,offeringtheregion

specialautonomousstatusinDecember1994.545

Transnistria,however,wasadifferentmatter.EastoftheDniesterthepopulationwas

initsmajorityofRussianorUkrainianethnicityandaRussianregiment,knownasthe

14thArmy,wasstationedinitsterritory.TransnistriawasalsothefocusofSoviet

industrialisationand,althoughitmakesuponly8%ofthecountry’sterritory,it

accountedfor40%ofitsoverallindustrialoutput546and87.5%ofitselectricenergy

production.547Inotherwords,theregionwascriticaltoMoldova’seconomicstability

andconstitutedRussia’smainleverageinitsrelationstoChisinau.Civilwareruptedin

1992,whenChisinauattemptedtooverthrowthesecessionistgovernmentinTiraspol.

However,theTransnistrianforces,whichbenefittedfromtheactivesupportofthe

2.600strong14thArmyanda“substantialstockpileofSovietweaponry,”548quickly

emergedvictorious.Asaresult,Transnistriabecameasecessionistregion,proclaiming

itselftheTransnistrianMoldovaRepublic,itsexistenceacknowledgedbyitsmain

benefactor,Russia,butunrecognisedbyChisinau.Astalematehadbeenreached,

unsurpassedtothisday,withneithertheMoldovansnorTransnistriansopento

compromiseandwithRussiahappytomaintainthestatus-quoofafrozenconflict.

Throughoutthis,Romanianevergotactivelyinvolved,acting,instead,onlyasa

“diplomaticsupporterofMoldova.”549Whetheranxietiesoverapotentialclashwith

Russiawereattherootofthishesitationisdifficulttoassess.Whatthisepisodeproves

isthatre-unificationwasnotasstraightforwardanaffairasthethetwostateshad

expected.BothRomaniaandMoldovahadchangeddramaticallysincetheinter-war

period.ForBucharest,Moldovawasrevealedasafragilestatewithpowerfullinksto

544TheGagauzpeopleareethnicallyofTurkicdescent,butwhohaveadoptedOrthodoxy,ratherthanIslam,astheirmainreligion.545Magocsii(2002),p.151.546A.Sanchez,‘The‘Frozen’Southeast:HowtheMoldova-TransnistriaQuestionHasBecomeaEuropeanSecurityIssue,’TheJournalofSlavicMilitaryStudies,22:2(2009),p.158.547Panici(2003),p.47.548E.Korosteleva,‘Moldova’sEuropeanChoice:‘BetweenTwoStools?,’Europe-AsiaStudies,62:8(2010),p.1268.549Roper(2000),p.126.

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Moscow,theveryentityRomaniawasattemptingtodistanceitselffrom.Moldova,

similarly,foundthatRomania“wasbyfarnosocialoreconomicparadise”550andcould

notofferanalternativeavenuetoRussia.Beyondthat,unlikeRussia,whichhadmade

itsinteresttokeepMoldovainitssphereofinfluenceclear,Romanianevermadeany

decidedefforttokick-starttheunificationprocess.551Thesewereseriousimpediments

tounification,and,astheinitialeuphoriaofMoldova’sindependencedissipated,they

becameinsurmountable.Thetwostatesbegandriftingapart.First,in1992,when

negotiatingaBasicTreaty,theycouldnotagreeon“howtodefinethenatureofthe

relations(whethertheyare‘brotherly’or‘neighbourly’).”552In1994,Chisinautooka

furthersteptowardsdelineatingtheMoldovanandRomanianpeoples:theRomanian

anthemwasreplacedwithanoriginalhymn,OurLanguage,whilsttheconstitution

statedthattheofficialstatelanguagewastobeMoldovan,ratherthanRomanian.553

TherealitythatMoldovaandRomaniawouldremainseparatestateswasultimately

confirmedin1994,whenanationalreferendumshowedthat95%ofMoldovans

wishedfortheircountrytoremainindependent.554

Workingfromanidentity-basedperspective,however,mayofferadditionalinsight

intothereasonsbehindthefailedunificationproject.ForRomanians,ontheonehand,

therehasneverbeenanyquestionthattheyandtheMoldovansarethesamepeople,

andthatMoldova-thestateistheartificialcreationoftheSoviets.Thisisreflectednot

onlyintherhetoricitsleaders,whocontinuetorefertoMoldovaas‘oursister,

Bessarabia,’555butalsointhefactthatthenotionhasneverbeenchallengedbyany

politicalparty.Instead,onenoticesthat,alongsideRomania’spro-Westerndirection,

onthisissuealonethereexistscompletepoliticalalignment.AnonymousDcaptured

thisviewwhenhearguedthat“thereexistsacertainobsession,whichinawayis

legitimateandcanbeconsideredrational.”556Panicialsonotesthat:“allpartiesin

550Panici(2003),p.42.551Cash(2007),p.591.552I.Angelescu,‘NewEasternPerspectives?ACriticalAnalysisofRomania’sRelationswithMoldova,UkraineandtheBlackSearRegion,’Perspectives,19:2(2011)-SpecialIssue:IdentityandSolidarityinForeignPolicy:InvestigatingEastCentralEuropeanRelationswiththeEasternNeighbourhood,p.131.553Panici(2003),pp.43-44.554Ibid.,p.43.555LeaderofthePSD,LiviuDragnea,citedinTobiasandMagradean(2015).556AnonymousD(2014).

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Bucharestagreedthattheannexationin1940wasillegal,thattherewasnoquestion

aboutthetrueRomanianidentityoftheMoldovans(…),andthatinanidealworldthe

twostateswouldcertainlybejoinedintoareconstitutedGreaterRomania.”557This

viewreflectsthepositionofRomaniansociety,76%ofwhomsupportedapotential

unificationwiththeRepublicofMoldovain2013.558Soingrainedisthispositioninthe

Romanianmentalitythatitmayitselfhaveactedasanobstacletounification.AsCash

argues,overwhelmingconsensusatbothsocietalandpoliticallevelmeantthat

“‘Bessarabia’neveremergedasawedgeissuethatcouldincreaseoneparty’spower

overthatofothers.”559BecausetheMoldovanquestionwasnotcontested,itwasnot

anissueofmajorsalienceand,consequently,neverrepresentedamajorforeignpolicy

priority.Thefact,however,remainsthatRomanianssharetheconvictionthat

MoldovanandRomanianidentitiesareanalogous,andthereforethatunificationis

justified.

Ontheotherhand,whethertheMoldovansstill‘feel’Romanianisanaltogethermore

complexissue.DespitetheresurgenceofRomaniannationalisminthelate1980s,the

subsequentcoolingofrelationsbetweenChisinauandBucharestwasasymptomof

Moldova’sstruggletodecideonitsownidentity,arealityacutelyfeltontheotherside

oftheRiverPrut.ThequestionLucianBoiaasksispertinent:“aretheystill

Romanian?”560ThefactisthatBessarabia,separatedfromtherestofMoldaviain

1812,wascutawayfromtheotherRomanianregionsatatimewhentheprocesses

aimedatunificationweregatheringpace,atbothpoliticalandpsychologicallevels.

ThequestionthereforeiswhetherthethemeofUnitywaseveraspowerfulin

Moldovaasithadbeeninthekinstate.Romaniaitselfcameintoexistencewithoutthe

Bessarabians,whowere,instead,thesubjectofintenseRussification.Intotal,

BessarabiaspentunderthreedecadesaspartoftheRomanianstate(1918-1940and

1941-1944),comparedtoaconsiderablylongerperiodofinfluencefromRussia(nearly

557Panici(2003),p.45.558IRES[TheRomanianInstituteforEvaluationandStrategy],AgendaPublica–Semnifiactiasarbatoriide1Decembrie.VizitaPremieruluiChineiinRomania[PublicAgenda–theSignificanceoftheCelebrationof1December.TheChinesePrime-Minister’sVisittoRomania],29November2013,http://www.ires.com.ro/uploads/articole/ires_agenda_publica-1_decembrie_2013.pdf[accessed31.05.2016],p.9.559Cash(2007),p.591.560Boia(2012),p.245.

215

150years),who,conversely,hadmadeaconcertedefforttoengineerthesenseofa

uniqueMoldovanidentityandstrengthenthelinksbetweenChisinauandMoscow.

Asaresult,asearlyastheinter-warperiod,Bessarabianolongerperfectlymirroredits

Romaniancounterpart.RomanianadministratorsattemptingtointegrateBessarabia

intothenewlyexpandedstate,“werefacedwiththetaskofconvincingethnic

Moldovansthattheywere,infact,ethnicRomanians.”Thisandthebroaderprojectof

statebuildingencountereddifficulties“becauseethnicMoldovansheldRussian

languageandcultureinhighesteem.”561Itwouldseemasthoughthenation-building

processembarkeduponbyBessarabiaunderRussianauthorityhadtakenroots,afact

whichBucharestfailedtorecognise,anditseemsapparentthatthegapbetween

MoldovaandRomaniawasnotfullybridgedduringtheunificationperiod.Thefifty

yearsoffurtherRussiandominationaftertheSecondWorldWarwouldonlyhave

deepenedthecleavagebetweenthetwo.AsPanicipointsout,“theauthoritarian

politicalsystemoftheSovieteraputapremiumonMoldovannationalaffiliationand

oftensparednoexpenseintheefforttoengineerone.”562Amongsttheactions

undertakenonewouldhighlightthealphabetchangefromLatintoCyrillicandthe

adoptionofRussianasasecondnationallanguage.AllthewhileinCeausescu’s

RomaniatheidentitynarrativewasemphasisingthethemeofUnityandtheRomanian

nationalcharacter,inMoldovathenation-buildingprojectwasaimedintheopposite

directionandwasmeanttoinstilthebeliefthatoneithersideoftheircommon

border,theRiverPrut,existedtwodifferentpeoples.This,inasense,explains

Moldovans’ambivalencetowardsclaimsthattheiridentityis,infact,Romanian.Boia

emphasisesthiswhenhearguesthat“MoldovadoesnotresembleRomania.(…)

RomanianBessarabiansareofadifferentsort.Theirculturallevelislowerthanin

Romania,andtheRussianhallmarkissubstantial.Thepastcannotbeundone,thisis

theoutcome.”563Ineffect,Boia’simpliedoutcomeisthatthesamehistoricalprocesses

whichreinforcedRomanians’convictionsthatMoldovaisrightfullyapartofRomania

561Cash(2007).P.592.562Panici,(2003),p.37.563Boia(2012),p.246.

216

mayhaveledMoldovanstoquestionthisverynotion,andmayhavekick-startedthe

developmentofasenseofaunique,Moldovan,nationalidentity.

Inanycase,oncetheeuphoriaoverapotentialre-unificationsubsided,dialogue

betweenthetwostatesbecamemorecomplicated.AsAngelescuhasargued,

”relationsbecametenseafter1993,andafterthetensionspassed,therelationshave

beengradually,butslowly,improving,”564asRomaniareconciledwiththenotionthat

unificationwasnotaviablesolution.Therestillexistedthebasisforaspecial

relationship–theborderbetweenthetwostateswaspassportandvisafree,565and

thesocio-culturalconnectionwasstrengthenedthroughaprogramofofferingschool

textbooksanduniversityscholarshipstoMoldovanstudents.566However,interaction

betweenBucharestandChisinaubecamestrainedoncemorewiththerisetopowerof

thePartyofCommunists.Thefactthattheyattractedasignificantelectoral

percentagein1998andremainedaforceinMoldovanpoliticswellintothetwenty-

firstcentury567signalledtoRomaniatheRepublic’sambivalencenotonlytowardsthe

typeofrelationshipthetwoshouldmaintainbutalsoitscommitmenttopursuinga

pro-Westerndirection.WiththeCommunistsinpower,thegovernmentinChisinaudid

muchtothreatenthisrelationshipandwithit,Romania’sappetiteforestablishing

closertieswithMoldova.AsPanicipointedout,in2002thePartyofCommunistsled

byVladimirVoronindeclaredaRomanianmilitaryattachépersonanongrataand

announceditwasconsideringrejectingthatyear’stwothousanduniversity

scholarships.568

Overall,thefactthatthedomesticpoliticsofitsclosestneighbourwereoncemore

dominatedbycommunistsdampenedRomania’saplomb;itcertainly,attheveryleast,

raisedquestionsastowhetherMoldovawishedtoescapetheRussiansphereof

influenceatall.InlightofRomania’sowndifficulttransition,thismeantthatrelations

withtheRepublicofMoldovacouldnotbeprioritisedovertheaccessiongoal.AsCash

564Angelescu(2011),p.130.565Panici(2003),p.46.566Ibid.567ThePartyofCommunistswasareconstitutedversionoftheCommunistPartyoutlawedin1991,setupin1993.Inthe1998parliamentaryelectionstheysecured30%ofthepopularvoteandin2001theywonaparliamentarymajority.OnthisseePanici(2003).568Ibid.,p.50.

217

argued,whilst“nationalidentityisdeeplyimportanttothepoliticalprocess,(…)

regionalpowerbalances,economicinterestandpragmatisminethnicrelationshave

heldswayinforeignpolicydevelopments.”569Romania,therefore,limiteditsapproach

tothatofsupportingMoldova’sownaccessionprocesstotheEUalongsideitsown.570

However,onewouldmakethepointthat,onceMoldova’sambivalenceoverits

Romaniannessbecameapparent,andwasdoubledbytheriseofthePartyof

Communists,whathappenedinRomaniawasareshufflingofitsidentity-based

priorities.ThegoalofunificationwouldhavehadpreponderanceoverthatofEuro-

Atlanticintegration,becauseofthesignificanceofthethemeofUnityintheRomanian

identitynarrative.ThefactthatIliescu,whowasgenerallyresistanttochangeand

dubiousinhiscommitmenttowardstheaccessionprocess,pursuedthisdirection

outrightintheearly1990sspeakstotheimportanceofthisdesideratum.Under

presidentConstantinescu,however,asaperceptionemergedthatMoldovawaseither

notyetreadyforthisstep,orhadapro-Easternagenda,theissueofunificationwas

movedtothebackburner,allowingforthemorepragmaticgoalsCashmentionsto

becomepredominant.Thesetoo,meanwhile,hadapowerfulidentitarydimension,as

thedesiretojointheWestwasmotivatedbytheprerogativeofensuringthestate’s

physicalandeconomicsecurity,aswellasitsdistancefromMoscow.Inconclusion,

onewouldarguethatbothgoalsaremotivatedbyidentity-drivenconsiderations,but

whatchangedinthe1990sandearly2000swastheirorderofpriority,muchlikeinthe

caseofHungarian-Romanianrelationsofthesameperiod.Asthenextsectionwill

explore,onceaccessionbecamereality,thepolicyofpursuingclosertieswithChisinau

camebacktotheforeofRomania’sforeignpolicyagenda.

ContemporaryMoldo-RomanianRelations

Despiteperiodsduringthetransitionwhenrelationsbetweenthetwostateswere

particularlyuneasyandRomaniaprioritiseddifferentforeignpolicygoals,socio-

economicandculturallinksbetweenthetwocountriescontinuedandonlyintensified

afterRomania’saccession.Buildingontheassumptionsmadebythethesisinthe

569Cash(2007),p.592.570Angelescu(2011),p.132.

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introductorychapters,inthisrelationship,again,onenoticestheprimacyofidentity-

basedprerogativesinthepursuitofindividualforeignpolicypriorities,namely

ensuringcloserelationswithMoldova.Thistranslatedineffortstoencourage

Moldova’stransitionfromsocialism,itspro-Westerndirection,andmostimportantly,

strengtheningtheethnicRomanianelementatthesocietallevel.Becausetheborder

arrangementbetweenthetwostatescouldnolongercontinueafterRomania’s

enteringtheEuropeanUnion,Bucharesttookthedecision,in2009,toofferall

MoldovansofRomanianethnicityaRomanian,andthereforeEuropean,passport.

Additionally,asignificantnumberofRomaniancompanieshavebeenregisteredinthe

Republic(around650)andRomaniaranksamongstthetenmostimportantforeign

investorsinthestateintheperiodof1994-2008.571Romaniaalsopledgedtooffer

Moldova100millioneurosbetween2011-2014,572inaidof“oneofEurope’spoorest

countries.”573Theculturalconnectionwasmaintained,withRomaniastillproviding

RomanianlanguagetextbooksanduniversityscholarshipsforMoldovanstudents.

FinallyRomaniahasactedasanadvocateforMoldova’sownEUintegrationefforts,

withformerprime-ministerPontaannouncingRomania’smissiontoachieveMoldova’s

Europeaninclusionby2019,whenRomaniatakesoverthepresidencyoftheunion.574

Asasidenote,thisdeclarationtookplaceimmediatelyafterMoldovasignedthe

AssociationAgreementwiththeEU,attheEasternPartnershipSummit,inVilnius

(2013).

Whetherthisaimistrulyfeasibleinthecurrentcontextornot,Romania’s

commitmenttodrawingMoldovaclosertoitselfandWesternEuropeis

unquestionable.Ofcourse,thefactthatafterthe2009parliamentaryelectionsthe

leadershipofMoldovaswitchedtoapro-Europeanandpro-Romaniancentre-right

coalitionwouldalsohaveaidedthesedevelopments.TheperceptionthatinChisinau

sitsagovernmentwhichiscommittedtothecountry’spro-Westerndirection

alleviatesRomaniananxietiesovertheextentofRussia’sinvolvementintheiraffairs

571Angelescu(2011),p.133.572Ibid.573G.Bosse,‘TheEU’sRelationswithMoldova:Governance,PartnershiporIgnorance?,’Europe-AsiaStudies,62:8(October2010),p.1291.574AnonymousD(2014).

219

or,attheveryleast,theextenttowhichtheleadershipiscomfortablewiththis.Inany

case,itisclearthat,especiallysince2007,relationswiththeRepublicbecamea

priorityforBucharest.ThroughthelensoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,the

reasonsbehindthisappearstraightforward.Romaniahasconsolidateditsposition

bothwithinEuropeandasNATOpartner.Now,establishingevercloserrelationswith

ChisinaugoesbeyondbilateralagreementsbetweenthetwostatesandRomaniahas

additionalleveragetotempttheRepublic.Bucharestnowembodiesnotonlyitssister

state,butalsoallEuro-Atlanticvaluesaswellasthepotentialbenefitstobereaped

frompursuingapro-Westerndirection.Fromanidentitaryperspective,whatisclearis

thatRomania’saffinitytowardsMoldovadidnotdisappearduringthedifficultperiod

oftransition;itsinfluenceoverBucharest’sbehaviourrecededtemporarilybecauseof

perceptionsovertheMoldovandomesticclimateand,consequently,analterationof

Romania’sownpriorities.However,asexternalcircumstancesbecameopportune,it

re-emerged,thusprovingtheenduranceofthisidentity-basedattitude.

Therealityis,nonetheless,thatwhatLucianBoiacalledtheRussian‘hallmark’is

indeedstillverypowerful.TherearetwoaspectsinparticularinwhichRussia’s

dominationovertheRepublicofMoldovaismostprominent–theeconomicandthe

political/strategicspheres.Ontheonehand,theRepublicisoneofEurope’spoorest

statesanditis,almostentirely,dependentonRussia.Firstly,Moldovahastoimport

nearlyallofitsenergysupplies575and,althoughRomaniabegansupplyingitelectric

powerin1998576andgasin2014,Russiaremainsitsmainsourceofgasimports,which

accountforover60%ofitsenergyconsumption.577Intermsoftrade,ontheother

hand,althoughtheEUhasbecomethe“maindestinationforMoldovanexports,”578

theRussianFederationremainsthemostimportantsingleimporterofMoldovan

goods(40%),579withanigh-onmonopolyonMoldova’swinetrade.Theseareboth

significant,astheymayact,astheyhaveinthepast,asleversforRussiatoput

pressureonChisinauandcurbMoldova’sWesternaspirations.AsKorostelevaargues,

575L.V.Fokina,‘EconomicCooperationBetweenRussianRegionsandMoldova,’ProblemsofEconomicTransition,47:12(April2005),p.80.576Panici(2003),p.46.577Fokina(2005),pp.80-81.578Bosse(2010),p.1303.579Fokina(2005),p.80.

220

“Russiahas(…)usedvariouseconomicmeanstonegotiateitspoliticalleverage,such

asthesuddenreductionsinthesupplyofgas,oilandelectricityinthewinterof2005-

2006afterthefailuretoreachagreementontheKozakMemorandumfor

Transnistria,”580butalsothrougharecentembargoonMoldova’swineexportswhich

“wereusedtodisciplineMoldovaforitsincreasinglydefinedleaningtowardsthe

West.”581Inotherwords,Russiahasnotrefrainedfromusingitshardpowertokeep

Moldovafirmlywithinitscontrol.InthefaceofsuchdecidedactionfromMoscow,and

withaEuropeanUnionambivalentinitscommitmentstowardstheEuropean

Neighbourhood,582itisdifficultforMoldovatodisentangleitselffromRussia’ssphere

ofinfluence.

TheseconddimensionworthyofdiscussionconcernsTransnistriaandRussia’sown

strategicagenda.TheseparatistregionfunctionslargelyasaRussianenclavesince,

beyondthepresenceofthe14thArmy,Russiasubsidises“asmuchas80%ofthe

Transnistrianbudget”and“hasissuedpassportstosome150.000residentsofthe

region.”583Assuch,ithasavestedinterestintheregionandtherefore,intheaffairsof

Chisinau.Additionally,RussiahasallowedTransnistriatoacquiresignificantdebtsto

Gazprom,tothevalueof3.8billiondollars,nearlydoublethatoftheUkraine’s(2

billiondollars).584IfintheUkrainethisdebtresultedinacut-offofgassupplywhich

inadvertentlyaffectedtheentirecontinentin2009,considerablylesspressurehas

beenputonTiraspoltoclearitscredit.585ThatmaybebecausetheTransnistriandebt

givesMoscowascendancyinitsrelationshipwithChisinau,particularlyinregardstoa

potentialresolutiontotheTransnistrianconflict.Russiafavoursafederativesolution

whichwouldresultinapower-sharingagreementbetweenthegovernmentsin

TiraspolandChisinau,whichtheMoldovans,particularlyitspro-Westernparties,

wouldlikelynotacquiesceto.586WereMoldova,however,tosearchforadifferent

580Korosteleva(2010),p.1279.581Ibid.582SeeBosse(2010)foramoredetailedaccountoftheunequalpartnershipbetweentheRepublicofMoldovaandtheEuropeanUnion.583N.PopescuandL.Litra,‘Transnistria:ABottom-UpSolution,’EuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations,63(September2012),p.4584Ibid.,p.2.585Korosteleva(2010),p.1279.586PopescuandLitra(2012),p.5.

221

solution,whetheracentralisedreintegrationorevenaunificationwithRomania

withoutTransnistria,RussiamaydemandthedebtbeclearedbyChisinau.AsDmitry

Rogozin,Russiadeputyprime-ministerandPutin’srepresentativeinTransnistriahas

stated,“ifMoldovawillnotrecogniseTransnistria,thenitmeansthatthegas

consumedbyTransnistria(…)isMoldova’sdebt,andMoldovashouldpayforit.Who

else?”587

Itisobvious,therefore,thatTransnistriarepresentsamajorissuefortheRepublicof

Moldova,bothasadomesticconcern,butalsoinitsrelationswithRussia.Aneven

greaterthreat,however,isthatafrozenconflictsuchasthisisalwaysliabletobe

reactivated.Russiahasproven,bothinGeorgiain2008andinUkrainein2014,thatit

willnothesitatetoutilisetheseproblemregionstopursueitsownforeignagenda.In

thiscontext,Moldova’sgeopoliticalpositioningasabufferstatebetweenNATOand

Russiaisalsosignificant.AttheRiverPruttheCISandNATOhaveadirectborder,and

theinstalmentandoperationalizationoftheballisticmissileshieldonRomanian

territoryhasbeentakeninMoscow,ashasbeenshowninpreviouschapters,asa

directchallengetoRussia.AsGusahaspointedout,“quiteobviously,Russiawishesto

transformtheEuropeanflankoftheCIS–Ukraine,Belarus,Moldova–inaveritable

bastioncapableofrejectingEuropeanandAmericanpresenceintheregion.”588Ifthis

assessmentiscorrect,thenthepro-WesternshiftofbothUkraineandMoldovaof

recentyearsmustbetakenasdirectthreatstotheRussiansphereofinfluence.

Additionally,ifRussia’sresponsetothisdevelopmentinUkraineisanythingtogoby,it

hintsattherisksMoldovafacesinpursuingaWesternandpro-Romaniandirection.

Thisexplains,coupledwiththegeographicproximityofMoldovatotheUkraine(the

latteractuallyengulfstheformerandtheonlysectionofMoldovawhichdoesnot

borderUkraineisitswesternfrontierwithRomania),Bucharest’sconcernoverrecent

regionaldevelopments.Fromthisperspective,MoldovaisindeedaBesiegedFortress,

587Rogozin,citedinPopescuandLitra(2012),p.5.588Gusa(2011),pp.225-226.

222

threatenedbotheconomicallyandphysicallybytheTransnistrianissue,aregionwhich

recentlyrestateditsdesiretoannexitselftoRussia.589

AlthoughRussiahasnotyetrespondedtothisrequest,recentdevelopmentswould,

nonetheless,haveunsettledbothChisinauandBucharest.Theviewisthatbothstates

haveanimportantstakeintheUkrainianconflict,becauseofthestrikingsimilarities

betweenTransnistriaandCrimea.ThedevelopmentsinUkrainehaveundoubtedly

strengthenedperceptionsofMoldovaasaBesiegedFortressandfromthisstems

Romania’scurrenteffortstopushforcloserrelationsbetweenMoldovaandNATO590

andactasanadvocateforChisinauinitsnegotiationswiththeEuropeanUnion.Forits

ownpart,thepro-EuropeangovernmentinMoldovahasintensifieditscontactwith

NATOinparticular:in2016itreachedanagreementontheestablishmentofaNATO

LiaisonOfficeinChisinau.591Moreimportantly,duringthepressconferencewherethe

announcementwasmade,SecretaryGeneralofNATO,JensStoltenbergreiterated

NATO’spositionthatit“respects(…)Moldova’sterritorialindependence,integrityand

sovereigntyandNATOalliesdonot,andwillnot,recogniseTransnistria.”592

Therefore,onecouldarguethatRomaniaandMoldovahavefoundanequilibriumin

therelationship–RomaniaactsasasupporterandadvocatesthecauseofMoldova,

keepingtheissueofTransnistriaontheinternationalagenda,whileMoldovaremains

committedtopursuingapro-Westernagenda.Thediplomaticrelationshiphaving

improvedsignificantly,RomaniaalsosupportsMoldova’sdisentanglementfromRussia

byprovidingfinancialaidandanalternativesourceofenergyimports.593Thatbeing

said,theinternalissueswhichinthetransitionperiodcomplicatedBucharest-Chisinau

589L.Bogdan,‘AmabsadorulruslaUE:RusianuintentioneazasaanexezeTransnistriasauoricealtaregiunedinlume[RussianAmbassadortotheEU:RussiaDoesNotIntendtoAnnexTransnistriaorAnyOtherRegionoftheWorld],’Mediafax,17.04.2014,http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/ambasadorul-rus-la-ue-rusia-nu-intentioneaza-sa-anexeze-transnistria-sau-orice-alta-regiune-din-lume-12481474[accessed14January2016].590See,forinstance,PresidentIohannis’statementaftertheconclusionoftheNATOSummitinWarsaw(2016).591AnnouncementbySecretaryGeneralofNATOStoltenberg,inNATO,JointPressPoint–withNATOSecretaryGeneralJensStoltenbergandthePrimeMinisteroftheRepublicofMoldova,PavelFilip,29.11.2016,http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_138326.htm?selectedLocale=en[accessed29December2016].592Ibid.593Inayeh(2015),p.41.

223

interactionaremakingacomebackinMoldova’sdomesticpolitics.Withoutgoinginto

toomuchdetail,aseverecaseofembezzlementwhichtranslatedintothe

‘disappearance’of1billioneurosfromitsbankingsystemin2014,ledtothefallof

Moldova’spro-Europeangovernmentandtheprosecutionofitsprime-minister.A

periodofchaoswasfollowed,inearly2016,bytheestablishmentofanew

governmentputtogetherbyalocaloligarch,VladimirPlahotnyuk(suspectedtohave

been,atleastinpart,responsibleforthetheft),whichwasmetwithviolentprotestsin

Chisinau,organizedbybothpro-Russianandpro-WesternandUnionistfactions.594The

consequencesoftheseinternaleventsaretwo-foldandhavesignificantimplications

forMoldova’scurrentandfutureforeignpolicydirection.

Firstly,disillusionmentwiththeaccusedgovernmentshasresultedinasurgeof

supportforthepartieswhichfavourclosertieswithMoscow,nowinopposition.

AccordingtoanIPPpollfromNovember2015,acombinedtotalof50%ofthe

populationwouldvoteforoneofthreepro-Russianparties–OurParty,thePartyof

SocialistsoftheRepublicofMoldova,andthePartyofCommunists.595Asimilarpoll

fromApril2016showedIgorDodon,theleaderoftheSocialists,tobethepopular

frontrunnerforthepositionofpresident(29.3%),whilesupportforthethreepartiesis

at55%.596SincethenDodonwonthepresidentialelectionswhichtookplacein

MoldovainNovember2016,confirmingthepopulation’sshifttotheleftand,

consequently,theEast.Althoughbythetimeofwriting,thepresident-electhasyetto

beinvestedandMoldova’sleadershipisprovidedbyPavelFilat’spro-European

coalition,itisbeyonddoubtthatthiselectionand,weretheresulttorepeatitself,the

parliamentaryelectionsexpectedtotakeplacenextyearmightdestabilisethisnew

foundequilibriuminMoldo-Romanianrelations.

594V.Josu,andJ.Hawk,‘TheEconomicandPoliticalCrisisinMoldova,’SouthFront,publishedinGlobalResearch,24.01.2016,http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-economic-and-political-crisis-in-moldova/5503229[accessed03June2016].595InstitutuldePoliticiPublice[InstituteforPublicpolicy](RepublicofMoldova),BarometrulOpinieiPublice–noiembrie2015[BarometerofPublicOpinion–November2015],08.12.2015,p.23,http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&id=760&idc=156[accessed01May2016].596InstitutuldePoliticiPublice[InstituteforPublicpolicy](RepublicofMoldova),BarometrulOpinieiPublice–aprilie2016[BarometerofPublicOpinion–April2016],04.05.2016,pp.40&47,http://ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r.pdf[accessed20June2016].

224

Thesearethetypesofchangeincircumstanceswhichthisprojecthasarguedleadto

anaugmentationofidentitaryanxietiesandthiswas,indeed,thecase,onbothsides

ofthePrut.InRomania,theelectionswereintenselymediatised,includinginthe

nationalnewsagency,Agerpres.AlthoughRomania’spositiontowardsthetwo

candidates–Dodonforthepro-RussiansandMaiaSanduforthepro-Europeans–was

officiallyneutral,theaffinityoftheformertowardsMoscowandhisvarious

statementsconfirmingit,suchasthefactthataspresidenthewouldvisitfirst

Moscow,thenBrusselsandonlyafterwardsBucharest,597wereemphasised.Asfor

Moldovaitself,thisshifttothelefthasbeencounteredbyaresurgenceofpro-

Romanianattitudes.InacontextinwhichtrustinthepoliticalclassinMoldovaisatan

alltimelow–intheAprilsurvey49%ofthepopulationansweredittrustednoneof

Moldova’spoliticalfigures598–agrassrootsorganisationhasbeensetuptorebuild

thestate’sconnectionwithRomania.Themovement,calledtheCivicPlatform‘Action

2012,’iscomprisedofpro-unionistNGOsfromRomania,Moldova,theUSandseveral

Europeancountries,andproposesatwo-prongedpoliticalandsocialplanwhichwould

seeunificationachievedin2018.599Theplatformencouragesthesetupofa

frameworkinbothstateswhichcouldadministrativelymanagetheunificationproject.

In2015,forinstance,itlobbiedBucharestfortheestablishmentofinstitutionswhich

wouldeasetheprocess–apresidentialcommissiontaskedwithanalysingtheimpact

ofunification,apermanentjointMoldo-Romanianparliamentarycommissionanda

RepublicofMoldovaOffice,directlysubordinatedtotheprime-minister.600Onthe

socialside,theplatformisappealingtothepubliconbothsidesoftheborderto

strengthenlinksbetweenthetwostates.Uponsigninguptotheproject,individuals

597Agerpres,CetateniiRepubliciiMoldovaisialegpresedintele,intr-unscrutinalcaruirezultatdepindederataparticipariilaurne[MoldovanCitizensChoosetheirPresidentinanElectioninwhichtheResultDependsonTurnout],11.11.2016,http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2016/11/11/cetatenii-republicii-moldova-isi-aleg-presedintele-intr-un-scrutin-al-carui-rezultat-depinde-de-rata-de-participare-la-urne-13-41-59[accessed11November2016].598IPPBarometer(April2016),p.36.599UnionistPlatform‘Action2012,’OfficialWebsite,http://actiunea2012.ro[accessed20June2016].600Agerpres,Platformaunionista‘Actiunea2012’solicitainfiintareaunorinstitutiiresponsabiledegestionarearelatieicuRepublicaMoldova[UnionistPlatform‘Action2012’RequeststheEstablishingofInstitutionsResponsiblewithManagingRelationswiththeRepublicofMoldova,12.07.2015,http://www.agerpres.ro/social/2015/07/12/platforma-unionista-actiunea-2012-solicita-infiintarea-unor-institutii-responsabile-de-gestionarea-relatiei-cu-republica-moldova-17-26-50[accessed20June2016].

225

aresuggestedtoundertakevarious‘actions,’whichrangefromRomanianlanguage

bookdonationstowardstheRepublic,tolobbyinglocalcouncillorstotwintheirtown

withoneinMoldova,apen-palprogram,tonamebutafew.601Inshort,whilstata

politicalleveltheplatformisengagingwithstategovernment,atthesociallevelitis

pursuingasofterbottom-upapproachmeanttobringRomanianvaluesintoMoldovan

dailylifeandconstructpersonalrelationshipsbetweenindividualsandcommunities.

Overallthisendeavourshowsthatthereisappetite,atleastincertaincircles,forthe

developmentofMoldo-Romanianrelations,andperhapseventowardsthe

achievementofthemainprerogativesetbytheRomanianidentitynarrative–unity.

AlthoughitiscertainlydifficulttoforeseehowtherelationshipbetweenBucharestand

Chisinauwillbeimpactedbyrecentregionalanddomesticdevelopments,the

identitaryperspectiveemployedherewouldsuggestthatMoldova’sambivalence

towardsitsidentitymaynowactasanenablerratherthananobstacle.Thatisbecause

RomaniamaystillharnessitsspecialrelationshipwithMoldova,andthehesitation

noticeableatsocietalandpoliticallevelsofturningfullytowardsRussia,aswellasits

positionwithintheEUandNATO,todrawMoldovatowardstheWest.Whatisclear,

however,isthat,becausethemainreferencepointinthearticulationofitsagenda

towardsMoldovaistheiridentity-basedaffinity,Romaniaislikelytoremainresolutein

itsendeavourtokeepitsneighbourclose.Thisisallthemorethecaseasanxieties

concerningboththesituationinUkraineandpro-RussianattitudeswithinMoldova

haveheightened.AsInayehpointsout,Romanians“arewaryofpotentialmoveson

SouthernBessarabia”602andthisisoneofitsmainmotivatorsforaction.Moldovais

increasinglyperceivedasaBesiegedFortressandconcernstowardsitsfuturecanonly

beansweredthroughBucharestofferingitsupport.

FutureDirectionsforMoldo-RomanianRelations

ThissectionwillexaminesomeofthedirectionsrelationsbetweenRomaniaand

Moldovamaytakeand,inturn,theirrepercussionsonthestabilityandsecurityofthe

601Ontheirwebsite,thePlatformadvertises‘100Actions’tobringforththeunion.Seewww.Actiunea2012.ro.602Inayeh(2015),p.42.

226

region,butalsotheirpotentialimpactonrelationsbetweenboththeseactorsand

Russia,ontheonehand,andtheWesterncommunity,ontheother.Thisanalysismust

besetinthepeculiarcontextofRomaniaandMoldova’sstatuswithinEasternEurope:

whilstoneisanincreasinglyactivememberoftheEUandNATOontheEasternflank,

theotherisintheCIS,partoftheRussiansphere.Asaresult,inasettingofgrowing

tensionsbetweenEastandWest,herearetwoactorswithaspecialrelationship,which

onemaycallkin-states,onoppositesides.Thismeans,ontheonehand,thatRomania

hassignificantcommitmentstowardsitspartners,butalsoanindividualinterestinthe

fateofanactorexternaltothesealliances.Ontheotherhand,italsoimpliesthatthe

developmentsinUkrainecreateadditionalanxietiesforRomaniaregardingMoldova’s

futuretothatofitsallies.ThatisbecauseRomaniaviewsMoldovaasanEstranged

Self,andthereforeprojects,toacertainextent,itsownprerogativeoverensuringthe

physicalsecurityofthestatetoitsneighbour.Themaintypesofscenariosbeing

consideredinbothBucharestinChisinauconcernRussia’sownstrategicagendafor

expansionofeitheritsterritoryorregionalinfluence,bothofwhichhave

repercussionsintermsofthethemesofBesiegedFortressandUnity.

AsoftscenarioconcernsapotentialdiplomaticresolutionofboththeUkrainiancrisis

andtheTransnistrianfrozenconflictthroughfederalisation,orinanycase,apower-

sharingagreementwhichwouldseepro-Russianforcesfromtheseparatistregionsof

DonbasandTransnistriahaveaccesstotheleadershipstructuresofthesetwostates.

WhetherthefederalisationofUkrainewouldbeachievedfirstandwouldresultin

pressureontheTransnistrianquestiontoberesolvedinasimilarmanner,603orthe

powershiftinChisinaumaycausethesituationtobereversed,aswasarguedrecently

byMoldovanpoliticalanalystOazuNantoi,604issomewhatinconsequential.Whatis

significantistheoutcome,whichwouldsee,asthelatterhasnoted,“theRepublicof

Moldova[transformed]inapseudo-state,paralysedfromtheinsideandcontrolledby

603TraianBasescumakesthispointasearlyas2014,whilstDanDungaciureiteratesin2016;Seechapter5fordetails.604Digi24.ro,‘OazuNantoi:FederatiaRusanuarenevoiedeTransnitria,cidetoataRepublicaMoldova[OazuNantoi:TheRussianFederationDoesNotNeedTransnistria,ButtheRepublicofMoldovaasaWhole],’Timpul,19.12.2016,http://www.timpul.md/articol/oazu-nantoi-federatia-rusa-nu-are-nevoie-de-transnistria-ci-de-toata-republica-moldova-101856.html[accessed29December2016].

227

Russiafromtheoutside.”605Theimpactofthisdevelopment,inidentitaryterms,

wouldbecatastrophicforMoldo-Romanianrelations,butalsofortheRomanian

consciousness.

Thespecialrelationthisstatehasestablishedwithitsneighbourwouldlikelybe

terminatedinsuchcircumstances,asMoldovaturnedtotheEast.Moreimportantly,

thiswouldimpactontheSelfmostprominently.Romania’sinabilitytoprotectanactor

therelationshipwithwhomisviewedas“anextremelyimportantnational

objective,”606wouldrevealitssmall-stateconditiononcemoreanditslackofstrength

vis-à-visRussia.Inasense,abreakdownofrelationsbetweenRomanianandMoldova

wouldbetantamounttoanother‘loss’ofBessarabiaasthelyricsatthebeginningof

thischapterdescribedit.SubscribedtothethemeofBesiegedFortress,and

irreparablydamagingtheongoingnationalprojectofbuildinglinkswiththisstate,this

isaworstcasescenario.Therepercussionsofsuchadevelopmentonregionalstability

intermsoftheexpansionoftheRussiansphereofinfluencearedifficulttoforeseeand

itislikewiseproblematictoenvisageRomania’sreaction.Whatisclear,however,is

thatthiswouldhaveasignificantimpactonRomania’srelationshipwithMoscow,but

mayalsoleadtoahardeningofitspositionwithinNATO–againasaformofresistance

tobesiegement–whilstsupportforpro-EuropeanfactionsinMoldovawouldlikely

continue.Thenotionofastand-offbetweenRomaniaandRussiaontheborderofthe

RiverPrutisnotimpossibletoenvisage.Nantoicapturesthisriskwellwhenheargues

thatRomaniashouldbecarefulinmanagingthissituationlestitmaysoonbe

confrontedwith“RussiansoldiersalongtheRiverPrut.”607

Havingsaidthat,asecond,hardscenarioisalsobeingconsidered.Thisconcernsa

potentialmilitaryinvasionofUkraineorareactivationofthefrozenconflictin

Transnistria,eitherofwhichwouldputMoldova’ssovereigntydirectlyatrisk.For

instance,thenotionthatTransnistriacouldbeutilisedbyMoscowinitsstandoffwith

NATOandtheconflictinUkraineisonewhichworriesbothChisinauandBucharest.

PopescuandLitrapointoutthat“Russiahasalsoraisedthepossibilityofdeployinga

605Ibid.606AnonymousC(2014).607Nantoi(2016).

228

radarstationinTransnistriatocountertheRomania-basedUSelementsoftheAnti-

BallisticMissileshield.AndtherehavebeenreportsthattheRussianpeacekeeping

forcecouldbeturnedintoamilitarybaseinTransnistria.”608Morerecently,Moldovan

newsagencyPublikahighlightedthepossibilitythatUkrainecouldbeattackedby

RussiafromthedirectionofitsborderwithTransnistria.609Overall,thefactthat

Moldovahasforeigntroopsonitsterritorywhichcouldbefashionedintoaninvasion

forceorabastionagainstNATOisaworryingprospect–Moldovacouldoffera

gatewayforaRussianinvasionofOdessa,whilstTransnistria’sproximitytoRomania

wouldmakeitanidealbaseforRussianretaliationagainstincreasedNATOpresencein

theregion.Inanycase,itisquestionablewhetherinanescalationofthesituationin

UkrainethefragilestalematebetweenChisinauandTiraspolcouldhold,particularly

takingintoaccountTransnistria’sownagendaofannexingitselftoRussia.

Inthesecircumstances,awarbetweenMoldovaandtheseparatistregionisnotoutof

thequestionandthiswouldposeaseriousquestionforRomaniaintermsofresponse,

asanyperceiveddangertoMoldova’sstabilityandsovereigntywouldresultinan

augmentationofthethemeofBesiegedFortressandRomaniawouldfeelcompelledto

react.Whilstthemilitarysolutionhasneverseriouslybeenonthecards–afterall,

Romaniadidnotintervenein1992–apotentialsolutionmightbeofferedbyanadhoc

unificationbetweenthetwostates,whichwouldeffectivelyputMoldovaunderthe

protectiveumbrellaofRomania’sinternationalallies.RomanMihaies,apolitical

scientistinChisinauhasarguedthat:

UnificationmaytakeplaceonlyinthecontextofahumanitariancatastropheintheRepublicofMoldova,suchasawarwithseparatistTransnistria(…),andtheinternationalcommunityandgreatpowerswouldbefacedwiththetaskofsavingthepopulation,oneofthesolutionsbeingarapidunificationwithRomania.610

608PopescuandLitra(2012),p.5.609Publika,Avertisment:RusiaarputeaatacaUcrainadindirectiaregiuniitransnistrene[Warning:RussiaMayAttachUkrainefromtheDirectionofTransnistria],28.05.2015,http://www.publika.md/avertisment-rusia-ar-putea-ataca-ucraina-din-directia-regiunii-transnistrene_2317861.html[accessed29December2016].610UnionistPlatform‘Action2012’,InterviewwithRomanMihaies–‘Incazderazboi,RomaniasiRepublicaMoldovas-arputeauni[InCaseofWar,RomaniaandtheRepublicofMoldovaMayUnite],’Ziare,13.09.2014,http://www.ziare.com/europa/moldova/in-caz-de-razboi-romania-si-rep-moldova-s-ar-putea-uni-interviu-1321146[accessed03June2016].

229

Thismayseemanimplausiblescenario;however,thereasonswhyitshouldnotbe

discountedfromanidentitaryperspectiverestonMoldova’sambivalencetowardsits

‘Romanian’identity.Panici’s2003assessmentthatMoldovanpartiescontinue“to

formaspectrumrangingfromthosesupportingsomeformofpoliticalunionwith

Romania,thoseinfavourofindependence,tothosedesiringsomedegreeof

reintegrationwithRussiaandtheformerSovietrepublics”611stillholdstruetoday.The

issueofunificationbecomesamatterofbalancebetweenthesedirectionsand

historicalexperiencehasshownthatintimesofcrisis,suchasthedisintegrationofthe

SovietUnion,Moldovanpro-Romanianattitudesarelikelytoemerge.Itmayjustbe

thattheriskposedbyanoutbreakofconflictinTransnistriawouldtipthebalancein

thefavourofunification,asMihaiesimplies.Thiswouldbeapossibleresponseto

besiegementand,forRomania,itwouldsatisfytwoidentity-relatedpriorities:itwould

servetobringMoldovaoutofRussia’ssphereonceandforallandensureitssecurity,

butwouldalsosatisfythemainprerogativedictatedbythethemeofUnity.Therefore,

fromanidentitaryperspective,thescenarioisindeedplausibleparticularlyinacontext

ofvolatility,astheissuedependslargelyonMoldova’spositiononunification.As

AnonymousCargues,theperceptionisthat“reunificationcanbeachievedtomorrow

ifthereisconsensusbetweenBucharestandChisinau.”612

ThematterisincreasinglybeingconsideredinRomanianandMoldovancircles.The

UnionistPlatform‘Action2012’isamanifestationofthesedevelopments.Likewise,in

RomaniaincreasingnumbersofRomanianpoliticiansandcommentatorsarediscussing

theissueofunification.FormerpresidentTraianBasescu,nowleaderofthePopular

MovementParty,hasassumedtheunificationwithMoldovaasaprimarynational

objectiveofhispoliticalformationandhasacquired,attheirfirstelection,26seatsin

theRomanianParliament(proportionaltojustunder5.5%ofthevote).613This,

coupledwiththefactthatinJuly2015,67.8%oftheRomanianpopulationsupported

611Panici(2003),p.44612AnonymousC(2014).613K.Olteanu,‘Retrospectiva2016:Alegerilelocalesiparlamentareinprim-planpolitic[Retrospective2016:LocalandGeneralElectionsinthePoliticalForeground,’Agerpres,http://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2016/12/30/retrospectiva-2016-alegerile-locale-si-parlamentare-in-prim-plan-politic-formarea-guvernului-in-2017-cu-prim-ministru-desemnat-la-a-doua-propunere-16-53-17[accessed30December2016].

230

Action2012’sgoalofre-unificationin2018614istellingofthefactthatplatformssuch

ashisaregatheringmomentum.

Whilstunificationmayleadtoanalleviationofanxietiescausedbytheaugmentation

ofthethemeofBesiegedFortress,andsatisfyforRomaniatheprerogativeofUnity,

theimplicationsforregionalstabilityandthestate’srelationshipwithitsalliesand

Russiamaybesevere.ThepositionoftheUSonthematterwashintedatwhenthe

ambassadortoChisinausaidthatunificationwouldnotbepracticalorarealsolution

toMoldova’sproblems.615WhilstNATOhasbolstereditsrelationswithChisinauover

recentyears,notleastthroughtheestablishmentoftheLiaisonOfficementioned

previously,ithasshowninthepastthatitsappetiteforcooperationwithstateswithin

Russia’ssphereofinfluenceislimitedbyitsdesiretomaintainanon-conflictual

relationshipwithMoscow.CertainlyRussia’sinterventioninGeorgiain2008settled

theissueofthatstateachievingNATOmembership.Assuch,aunificationbetween

RomaniaandMoldovawouldfurthercomplicateanalreadydifficultco-existenceinthe

BlackSearegion.FortheEU’spart,equally,anunplannedenlargementintheEast

wouldbringuntoldconsequences.OneoftheintervieweesbelievesthattheEuropean

integrationofMoldovaaspartofRomaniawouldbeactivelysupportedbytheEU,as

throughitsCohesionFund“poorerregionsoftheRepublicwouldbeprioritisedahead

ofotherlessdevelopedregions[ofEurope,presumably].”616However,inaEuropean

Unionalreadysufferingfromenlargementfatigueandtheriseofapan-continental

trendofEuroscepticismdoubledbypro-Russianattitudes,aswellasunderstrainfrom

therefugeecrisis,onewouldsuggestitisunlikelythattheorganisationwould

welcomethisterritorialexpansion,especiallyifitwerefacedwithafaitaccompli.

Itfollows,therefore,thattheunificationprojectmayhavecomplexrepercussionson

bothEUandNATOrelationswithRussia,butalsoonRomania’sownrelationswithits

Westernallies.Thestabilityandsecurityoftheregionmay,itself,beputunderthreat.

Romania,however,maynotbesensitivetothesepotentialissuesbecausethematter

ofunificationisperceivedaslegitimateandacrucialidentity-relatedgoal.Toputit

614INSCOP(July2015).615AccordingtoLuca(2016).616AnonymousC(2014)

231

anotherway,thismaybeanothermatteroforderingpriorities–ifintransition

RomaniasacrificedgoodrelationswithadifficultgovernmentinChisinautoprioritise

accession,nowitmaybethatthegoalofprotectingMoldovaandachievingunitytakes

precedenceoveritsinternationalcommitments.Thefactthatareorderingofidentity-

relatedprioritiesmayoccurintheopportunecontextisoneofthemainassumptions

ofthisthesisandperceptionsoveraMoldovaunderthreatwouldcreatejustsuch

circumstances.

Thisreality,thischapterargues,shouldworrytheinternationalcommunity,becauseof

Romania’sgeopoliticalpositiononthefringesoftheEUandNATOandattheborder

betweentheEuropeanEastandWest.Todownplaythissecondscenario,however

implausibleitmayseemnow,istoignorethefactthatRomania’sactionsmaycritically

altertheweakequilibriumandstand-offwhichexistsbetweentheRussianFederation

andtheEuro-Atlanticpartners.Ontheotherhand,Romania’ssuspicionofthefederal

solutionhintsatariskwhichisdownplayedbytheinternationalcommunity,namely

that,whilstpowersharingmayonthefaceofitsettletheconflictsinUkraineand

Moldova,itwouldalsoinherentlyofferRussiaanavenueforbuttressingitssphereof

influence.ThiswouldhaveseverelyimpactthebalanceofpowerwithinEastern

Europeanddiminishtheallies’capacitytocounteranyfurtherexpansionistmoves.It

wouldalso,onewouldargue,impactRomania’sconsistentpro-Americanand

Europhileattitude.AsGusahasnoted,Romaniaisatthemoment,“probablythemost

pro-AmericanstateinEurope,”617whilstpollsconsistentlyshowthattheEurosceptic

trendsweepingthecontinenthasyettoaffectit.618However,ifthereisonewayin

whichtoalienatesuchanotherwisereliableally,itistodownplayorignorethe

situationofMoldova,thefateofwhomisattheverytopofRomania’sforeignpolicy

agenda,alongsideensuringitsownsecurity.Attheveryleastatsocietallevela‘lossof

Bessarabia’wouldbeacatastrophe,andsomeoftheblamewouldlikelybelaid

squarelyatthedooroftheinternationalcommunity.

617Gusa(2015),p.225.618EuropeanCommission(2014),StandardEurobarometer82/Autumn2014–OpiniaPublicainUniuneaEuropeana[PublicOpinionintheEuropeanUnion]NationalReport–Romania,http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_ro_ro_nat.pdf[accessed13July2015].

232

Conclusion

Inconclusion,thischapterhasexploredtheidentitaryaffinityRomaniahastowards

theRepublicofMoldovaandhowthishasshapedthestate’sbehaviourtowardsit.The

identity-basedperspectiveemployedbythisprojectoffersanalternativeavenuefor

understandingthenatureandrootsofthisrelationship.Intermsofthemainresearch

question,theattitudeofaffinitytowardsMoldova,basedonitshistoricallyenduring

portrayalasanEstrangedSelf,hasfedintoRomanianbehaviourthroughits

commitmenttoensurethepro-Westerncourseofitsneighbourandthebolsteringof

theirrelationship.However,thischapteralsoconfirmstheassumptionsofthisthesis

thatidentity-relatedgoalsmaybecomedeprioritisedinspecificcontexts–anexample

ofthisistheabandonmentofthegoalofunificationinthe1990s.Havingsaidthat,

Romania’sEuro-Atlanticintegration,andthemorerecentregionaldevelopmentshave

risenMoldovatothetopofRomania’sforeignpolicyagenda,substantiatingthe

enduranceofthisaffinity.InthisrelationshiponemayseemostclearlyRomania’s

abilitytopursuespecificgoalswhich,whilsttheymaybeinalignmentwiththeposition

ofitsallies,aremotivatedbyitsindividual,identity-basedprerogatives.Projecting

theseprerogativesconcerningtheSelfontotheRepublicofMoldovameansthatthe

developmentsinUkrainereflectinanxietiesregardingMoldovansecurity,

independenceandsovereignty,augmentingperceptionsoftheEstrangedSelfasa

BesiegedFortress.Importantly,thesechallengesareseennotonlyasMoldova’sown,

butRomania’saswell,andthishasimpactedthelatter’sstanceonRussian

expansionismandstrengtheneditscommitmenttowardsChisinau.

ThepatternofbehaviournoticeableherefollowstherationaledictatedbyRomania’s

identity-basedpriorities,ofkeepingMoldovaclosetoitselfandtheWest,while

counteringRussianinfluenceoverit,throughharnessingitspositionwithintheEUand

NATO.Havingsaidthat,theunificationscenario,increasinglyconsideredinBucharest,

confirmsthethesis’earlyassumptionsonthestate’scapacitytopursuedirections

whichmaydivergefromthoseofitsallies.Fromthis,bothRomaniaandMoldovamay

becomesourcesofregionalinstability,contingentonfuturedevelopments,particularly

withinMoldovandomesticpoliticsandTransnistria.Whetherthebehaviouroftwo

233

smallstatesmayupsettheequilibriumofEasternEuropeandcomplicaterelations

betweentheEuro-AtlanticorganisationsandRussiamoregenerally,remainstobe

seen.Whatonewouldargue,however,isthattheexistenceofkinstatesoneitherside

ofthisgrowingriftbetweenEastandWestshouldbeacauseforconcernforall

involved.

234

Conclusion

Apeopleabandonedatthejunctureofstormswhichstrikehere

centuryaftercenturyandwillalwaysblowovertheselandsofplentyandinthepathofmarchingarmies.ChildofRomelostinthe

wildernessforeverrenewedbybarbarians,sofewamongstsomany.(…)Anyotherswouldhavescatteredacrosstheworld.Sweet

homelandshavebeendesertedforless.Weremain.Swordinhandandonguard(…).Andhereweare,stillathome!619

Thisthesisaimedtoanswerthequestion‘Whatistheimpactofnationalidentityon

Romania’spost-socialistforeignpolicyagenda?’Assuch,ithasengagedwiththe

developmentofthisstate’snationalidentitynarrative,thesourcesofitscontinuity

andsedimentationofitsmainthemes,andthemannerinwhichithasinfluenced,inits

presentversion,Romania’sinternationalbehavioursincetheanti-socialistrevolution

of1989.Thetaskwascomplex,notleastbecauseoftheinter-disciplinarynatureofthe

studyproposed.However,thepresentthesishashighlightedthecomplexitybehind

thisstate’smotivationsforactionand,moreimportantly,theroleplayedbyidentity

narrativesinthearticulationofnationalinterestanddirectionsforforeignpolicy.At

theendofthisendeavour,itisimportanttotakestockofthemainargumentsone

mightdrawfromtheanalysispresentedandtheircontributiontothebroaderfield.

WorkingintheareaofoverlapbetweenSCandFPAmeantadoptingahybridapproach

whichofferedparticularinsightintothestudyoftheinfluenceofenduringclaims

aboutnationalidentityonRomania’sinternationalbehaviourandagenda.Thestudy

tookfromcriticalconstructivist/postructuralistFPAtheconceptionofidentityasa

discursivestructureanddevelopedanarrativetheoryofnationalidentity,inwhich

storiesabouttheSelfandOthersprovidethelensthroughwhichstatesviewtheworld

andtheirplacewithinit.Thethesisadoptedaconcernwiththedevelopmentofthe

Romanianidentitynarrativeandthereasonsbehinditscontinuity.Byhighlightingthe

619N.Iorga,‘CetindIstoriaRomanilor[ReadingRomanians’History],’NeamulRomanescXXXV:136(23.06.1940),inG.Ivascu,andA.Tanasescu(eds.),CumpănaCuvântului1939-1945[TheSweepoftheWord1939-1945](Bucharest:Eminescu,1977),p.183.

235

tellingofhistoryasthemainvehicleforthesocialisationoftheidentitynarrative,the

projectarguedthatstoriesabout‘whowewere’legitimateparticularrepresentations

oftheSelf,itsinterestsandrelationshipswithOtherswhicharerelevantin

contemporarycircumstances.Byexaminingthelinkbetweenthehistoricalnarrative

andidentityconstruction,theprojectoutlinedthemainthemesoftheRomanian

identitynarrativeastheFoundationMyths,andthoseofBesiegedFortressandUnity.

ThesethemesplayacriticalroleintheportrayaloftheRomanianSelf,butalsointhat

ofitssignificantOthers,theimageofwhomisgeneratedthroughprocessesof

differentiationandassociation.Ontheotherhand,drawingonSCanditsexpress

interestintohowcultureinfluencesstatebehaviour,butalsoontheworkofWaever

andHansen,thethesisadoptsamorestructuralistapproachthanmostcritical

constructivistsandpostructuralists.Thisisexpressedintheviewthatthestructuresof

identitynarratives,socialconstructsthoughtheyare,maybecomeentrenchedwhen

reproducedoverlongperiodsoftime.Assuch,theyareespeciallyresilienttochange

anddifficulttodisplaceundertheactionofagents,offeringthenarrativesparticular

stability,relativetothedegreeoftheirsedimentation.Itisfromthisthattheproject

drawsitsassumptionthatidentitynarrativestructurescananddohaveaninfluence

onstatebehaviour.Thethesishasshownidentity-relatedfactorstoimpactnotonly

thestrategicsphere,SC’smainconcern,butgeneralstatebehaviouraswell.Thatis

nottosaythatthestrategicdimensionwasignored;tothecontrary,inRomania’s

relationshipwithNATOduringtransitionandwithRussiainthecurrentcontext,the

useofforceandmilitarisationwererevealedasimportanttoolsinRomania’ssecuring

ofitsnationalobjectives.Inotherareas,however,suchasintherelationshipwith

HungaryandMoldova,orinitsgeneralpro-Westerndirection,thethesishas

emphasisedtheinfluenceofidentity-relatedconsiderationsonRomania’sforeign

policybehaviourmorebroadly,bringingthestudyclosertothemoreexpansive

agendaofFPA.

Bypositioningitselfinthemiddlegroundonthestructure-agencydebateand

emphasisingtheprocessesofsocialisationandsedimentationofidentitynarrativesthe

projectwasabletoaccountforthecross-generationalconsistencyoftheRomanian

narrative,whilststillascribingagencyaspecificandimportantrole.Thisapproachhas

236

allowedthethesistoexaminebothagents’interactionwiththestructureofthe

identitynarrative,withafocusontheregimesofCeausescuandIliescu,aswellasthe

mannerinwhichthenarrative,inturn,impactedtheperceptionsandactionsof

agents.ByarguingthatthestructureoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeisenduring

andrecognisingthefactthatagentsare,themselves,socialisedinaparticularversion

ofit,thethesishascontendedthatagentsarelimitedintheirabilitytoalterthe

structuredrastically.Acknowledgingtherelationbetweenthetwoassuchallowedthe

projecttoexplainwhattypesofalterationswerepossible,suchasCeausescu’s

emphasisingofcharacteruniquenessandUnity,orIliescu’seliminationofthe

communistcomponent,andwhichwereimpossiblebecausetheydeviatedtoomuch

fromtheoriginalversion,suchastheattemptsatRussificationandtheportrayalof

Russiaasafriendduringthe1950s.Workinginthismiddlegroundhastheimplication

that,whilstchangestothenarrativearepossible,theyarenotanecessityand,indeed,

intheRomaniancase,thisexplainsthecontinuityoftheidentitynarrativealongits

majorfeatures.

Followingonfromthis,functioningatthecrossroadsbetweenSCandFPAallowedthe

thesistoexploretheconnectionbetweenelitesandthebroadersociety,asmembers

ofacommunitysocialisedinaparticularversionoftheidentitynarrative.Theproject

showedhow,whenitcametoidentity-drivenprerogatives,theretendedtobe

consistentalignmentbetweenthepositionofRomanianelitesandthatofthegeneral

population.TheunanimousdesiretojointheWest,thedeep-seededanti-Russian

sentiments,distrustofHungaryoraffinitytowardsMoldovaareallexamplesofsuch

instances.Additionally,wehaveseenthat,ifelitestrytodeviatefromthegeneral

position,aswasthecasewiththetreatynegotiationswithRussiain1996,societal

pressuremaybepowerfulenoughtoforcethemtochangecourse.Therefore,the

pursuitofidentity-basedprerogativesintheRomaniancaseisoftenamatterof

maintainingdomesticlegitimacy,limitingelites’freedomofaction.Thethesisargues,

muchinthespiritofDoty’showpossiblequestions,620thatentrenchedidentity

narrativescreatered-lineswhichgovernmentsmaynotcross,lesttheirlegitimacybe

severelydamaged.ThisviewhasofferedadditionalinsightinRomania’spursuitofa

620Doty(1993).

237

hard-lineapproachtoRussiaanditseffortstolimitHungarianinterferenceinits

domesticaffairs,aswellastheendeavourstoestablishcloserrelationswiththe

RepublicofMoldova.

Onadifferentnote,theidentitaryapproachemployedbythisprojecthasprovidedan

avenueforofferingalternative,identity-relatedexplanationsforRomania’sbehaviour,

bothinternationallyanddomestically.Inthetransitionperiod,forinstance,thethesis

addsanotherdimensiontothediscussionsurroundingRomania’sstaggeredprogress

ondomesticreform,anditsunwillingnesstoallowforoutsideinterferenceinthe

minorityquestion,whichitperceivedasaninternalaffair.Thenotionthatanxiety

towardschangestothestatusquoandalimitationofstatesovereigntywerenotonly

Iliescu’scommunistautomatismsbuttheywereattitudesinplayatsocietallevel

explainsnotonlyhiselectoralsuccessduringtheperiod,butalsowhyRomaniafound

negotiatingthetransitionperiodsodifficultinthefirsthalfofthe1990s.Similarly,in

Romania’scontemporarybehaviourtowardsRussia,HungaryandMoldova,onedoes

notnoticesolelyalignmenttothepositionpursuedbyitsallies,buttheinfluenceof

individualspecificidentity-relatedgoals.Therefore,thethesisarguesthatthereexists

apatternofbehaviourinalltheseinstanceswhichconformstoRomania’sidentity-

basedprerogatives.InthecaseofRussia,thismanifestsasahard-lineapproachtoits

perceivedexpansionism,inwhichthestateisharnessingitsstrategicpositiononthe

edgeofNATO.WithHungary,thepatternconsistsofanefforttodistanceRomania

fromthisactorwhilstmaintainingtheveneerofcooperationdictatedbytheir

membershiptotheEUandNATO.Finally,withtheRepublicofMoldova,itconsistsof

attemptstostrengthenthelinksbetweenthisstateandtheWest,includingRomania,

whilstdrawingitoutofRussia’sshadow.Thispatternofbehaviour,althoughapparent

intheempiricalevidence,cannotbeaccuratelyaccountedfor,onewouldargue,

withoutanunderstandingoftheidentitydimension.

Anovelelementofferedbythisthesis,whichstemsfromitsconstructivistapproach,is

theanalysisoftheretreat/augmentationofidentity-relatedfactors.Inacknowledging

thattheirinfluenceonbehaviourisnotconsistent,butcontingentonexternal

circumstances,orperceptionsoverthese,andagents’priorities,allowedthethesisto

238

tracethemannerinwhichparticularidentitaryanxietiesorgoalsrecededorre-

emergedinspecificcontexts.Examplesofthesearetheretreatofanxietiestowards

changeduringtransition,theabandonmentofthegoalofreunificationwiththe

RepublicofMoldova,orthedétentewithHungary,duringthe1990s.Inthose

instances,changesinthesituation,namelythequalityoflifeunderIliescu’sregime,

andthecomingtopowerofcommunistsintheRepublicofMoldovaandthesocialists

inHungary,triggeredareorderingofprioritiesinwhich,incidentallythesameinall

threesituations,thegoalofEuro-Atlanticintegrationtookprecedenceoverother

identity-relatedconsiderations.However,thethesishasalsoshownhow,inthe

currentclimate,Hungary’seasternshift,Russia’sactionsinUkraineandeven

Moldova’sownquestionsaboutitsidentityhaveledtoare-emergenceofthese

elements,resultinginthepatternofbehaviouroutlinedabove.Ineffect,whatthe

analysispresentedherehasdemonstratedisthat,whilstidentity-relatedfactorsmay

movetothebackgroundwithchangesintheenvironment,becauseofthe

sedimentationoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,theseattitudesareliabletobe

reactivatedinopportunecircumstances.Thatiswhythethesisarguestheissueof

unificationwithMoldova,whetherapprovedbyitsEuro-Atlanticpartnersornot,isnot

anoptionwhichcannotbetakenoffthetable,asitisrootedinprofoundconceptions

ontheroleofthestatetoprovidesecurityandintheprerogativessetbythethemeof

Unity.

Finally,followingonfromthepointsaboveandbuildingontheworksofRasmussen

andBrowning,621theaimofthisthesiswasalsotoshowthatthestudyofsmallstates,

suchasRomania,isausefulendeavourasminorpowersarenotonlycapableof

developingpowerfulidentitynarrativeswhichinfluencetheirbehaviour,butthat,in

volatileenvironmentssuchasthatofEasternEuropetoday,theiractionsmayhavea

bearingonregionalstability.Indeed,thethesishasshownhowRomaniaisacting

autonomouslyvis-à-visHungary,straininganalreadytenserelationship.Equally,in

relationtoRussiaandMoldova,RomaniaisharnessingitspositionwithintheEUand,

especially,NATO,andtakinginitiativeinbotheffortstocounterRussiaandtodraw

MoldovaclosertotheWest.However,Romaniahasalsoshownitselfwillingtogo

621Rasmussen(2005),Browning(2006,2007,2008,2010).

239

againstthegrain,inadoptingaharderstanceagainstRussiathanmanyofitsWestern

andEasternEuropeanpartnersandinconsidering,atleastincertaincircles,the

possibilityofareunificationwiththeRepublicofMoldova.Inthisvein,itisapparent

thatthisstateismotivatedbyamorecomplexrationalethantraditionalaccounts

wouldassume.Therefore,understandingRomania’spatternofbehaviourandthe

reasonsbehinditbecomesausefulandimportantendeavourinlightofitspotential

repercussionsonregionalstability.

ThenotionofRomaniaasanautonomousactor,whoseagendaisnotsolelydictated

bythedirectionpursuedbyitsallies,impliesacertainlevelofunpredictabilityofits

futurebehaviourfromtheperspectiveofmainstreamFPAaccounts.However,working

attheintersectionofconstructivistSCandFPAandadoptinganidentity-based

perspectiveoffersthetypeofinsightwhichmakesRomania’sbehaviourintelligible

and,therefore,toacertainextent,predictable.Thefinalsectionofeachcasestudy

chapteroffersjustsuchpredictions,basedonthecontinuationofcurrent

circumstancesandinreferencetothescenariosbeingconsideredinRomaniaatthe

moment.Whatthesescenarioscaptureistheheightenedlevelofanxietyconcerning

recentdevelopmentsandtheirpotentialconsequencesonwhatRomaniansviewas

theirnationalinterests.Assuch,theyofferhintsatboththelikelihoodthatidentity-

drivenprerogativeswillcontinuetobecrucialinthearticulationofRomania’sfuture

foreignpolicyagenda,butalsoatthetypesofbehaviourwhichareviewedaspossible

orimpossible.AbandoningtheRepublicofMoldovainthecaseoftheoutbreakofwar

withTransnistria,forinstance,isared-line.Sotooisadoptingamoremoderatestance

towardsRussiaandHungary.Whatthebalancewillbebetweenidentitaryanxieties

andpriorities,ontheonehand,andexternalpressure,ontheother,isdifficultto

foresee.Itis,nonethelessthecase,thisthesisultimatelyargues,thatRomaniais

playinganincreasinglyimportantroleintheregionand,inthesecircumstances,the

identitydimensionofthissmallstate’sforeignpolicyagendaandthecomplexesit

createsshouldbeofinteresttoobservers.

240

FinalConsiderations

Therearefewfinalissueswhichshouldbeaddressed.Theseconcernparticular

questionswhichcouldberaisedovertheutilityoftheapproachemployedhereandits

potentialapplicationtoothercasestudies.Thefirstpointrelatestotherelative

strengthofidentity-basedconsiderationscomparedtothatofotherfactors,most

notablyexternalpressures,ormorepragmaticreasonsforadoptingaparticularcourse

ofaction,suchaseconomicbenefits.Therearecertainly,particularlyintransition,

instanceswhenRomanianswantedsomethingbutcouldnotachieveit–e.g.

unificationwithMoldova–ordidnotwantsomethingbutdiditanyway–e.g.the

PrincipalTreatywithHungary.Inthisvein,thethesishasacceptedthatidentity-based

goalscanbede-prioritisedifsituationsarenotopportune.Itcould,however,bethat

actorsactuallyhavebroaddiscretioninorderingpreferencesandprioritisingpragmatic

goalsallowedorforcedbyexternalcircumstancesoveridentity-basedones.Thisisa

difficultissue,because,iftheformeralwayssupersedesthelatterinimportance,then

anidentity-basedapproachcanneverofferaconvincingexplanationforbehaviour.

Rather,amaterialistaccountwouldbesufficient.

Tothisonewouldrespondthattheorderingofpreferences,orwhatisperceivedas

possibleorpermissibleinacertaincontext,dependsasmuchonexternal

circumstancesasitdoesonthesalienceofidentityfactorsatthatpointintime.In

otherwords,thestrongerthelatterare,thelesslikelytheyaretobeoverriddenby

otherconsiderations.Forinstance,duringtheearly1990stherewasconsiderable

pressureonRomaniatoreachagreementwithHungaryoversigningaPrincipalTreaty

whichwouldnormaliserelationsandsettletheminorityquestion,butidentity-based

anxietiesoverthelimitingofitssovereigntyandtheinvolvementofBudapestinits

internalaffairspreventeditfromdoingso.Itwasknownthatthiswouldresultina

slowingofRomania’saccessionprocess;inotherwords,failuretosignatreatywould

haveanobjectivelynegativeeffectonitsintegrationprospects,butthispressurewas

insufficienttocauseitsleadershiptochangecourse.Theambivalenceoverprioritiesin

transitionwasonlysolvedlateron,whentheseanxietiesrecededandaccession

becamethepredominantgoal.Fromthis,onewouldmaketheconjecturethat

241

externalcircumstancesmay,indeed,leadtoare-orderingofprioritiesbutthatthe

contextmustbeassuchastofirstlyallowfortheretreatoftheidentity-based

anxieties.Thesame,onewouldargue,wasthecasewithunificationwithMoldova,

wherethereexistedawill,buttheperceptionwasthatitwasstrongeronthe

RomaniansidethanonMoldova’s.Ultimately,thewillremainsbut,sinceittakestwo

totango,theachievementofunificationiscontingentonMoldova’sdecisiononthis

course.Inotherwords,thesalienceofthisprerogativeisnotsufficienttooverride

externalpressuresbecauseofMoldova’sambivalenceandthisremainsthecasetothis

veryday.Overall,however,andashasbeenpointedoutthroughout,incurrent

circumstancesofheightenedanxieties,particularlysurroundingtheareaofstate

security,identitaryconsiderationsareincreasinglybecomingthemainreferencepoints

foraction,makingthemmoredifficulttosupplantbyotherfactors.

Asecondissue,whichbuildstosomeextentontheissueabove,relatestothenotion

thatclaimsaboutidentityare,indeed,enduringandhaveanimpactonbehaviouror,

conversely,theyaremoreofaninstrumentutilisedbyactorsinlegitimatingtheir

actions.Thisconnects,toanextent,totheagency-structuredebate.Theviewofthis

thesishasbeenthat,becauseagentsarewithinratherthanwithoutsociety,theyare

inthemselvessocialisedinaparticularversionoftheidentitynarrativewhichlimits

theircapacitytointeractwithit,intermsofalteringitdrastically.Thereare,ofcourse,

instanceswhenagentshaveutilisedidentitaryprerogativesfortheirownbenefit,as

wasthecasewithIliescu’shandlingofthe1990campaign.This,however,doesnot

meanthattheyaresubtractedoroutsidetheinfluenceofthenarrativealtogether.If

anything,Iliescu’sconservativeapproachtoreformshowsthathesufferedfrompost-

revolutionaryidentitaryinertiamorethanmost.Thereareotherinstances,however,

wherethereseemstohavebeenadrasticdeparturefromtheoriginalnarrative.

AlthoughitisdifficulttofindsuchaninstanceintheRomaniancase,itisworth

consideringthatofHungaryunderViktorOrban.Althoughtheparticularitiesofthe

Hungariancasearenotthedirectremitofthisthesis,itdoesseemsomewhatpeculiar,

undertheassumptionsofthisproject,thatOrban’seasternshiftwaspermissible.After

all,Hungary’sinteractionwithRussiahasbeentroubled,notleastbecauseofthe

latter’sinvasionof1956aftertheHungarianrevolution.Inthesecircumstancesitis

242

difficulttoimaginehowOrbanmighthavelegitimatedacloserelationshipwithRussia

atdomesticlevel,unlessthereisasignificantmalleabilityofthestructureofthe

identitynarrative.Thisisallthemorethecaseastheeasternshiftwascoupledwitha

pronouncednationalistrhetoricwhichcorrespondstoidentitarycomplexesrelatedto

thetraumaoftheTreatyofTrianon(1920)andtheterritoriallossessubsequenttoit.

Tothisonewouldanswerthatthekeyisinthenatureofinteractionwiththestructure

oftheidentitynarrativeand,specifically,anorderingofidentity-basedpriorities,

similarineffecttowhatCeausescuachievedinRomania.ForOrban,thecorner-stone

ofhisregimeisthe‘newnationalism,’withitsemphasisonbuildinglinkswiththe

Hungariandiasporasinneighbouringcountriesandhealing,toacertainextent,the

woundsofTrianon.Inotherwords,Orban’sregimehasaverystrongidentity-related

component.TherefashioningofagreaterHungariannation,whetherphysicallyor

spiritually,wouldseemtobeapriorityandfromthisstemstheantagonismwith

Romaniaanditsotherneighbours.Itisalsoclear,however,thatsuchapositionis

somewhatantagonisticwiththeprinciplesonwhichtheEUandNATOarebuilt,

particularlysurroundingrespectofotherstates’sovereigntyandborders.Russia,on

theotherhand,hasshownitselfmuchmoreamenabletoquestioningthecurrent

shapeandstructureofEasternEuropeandoffersadogmaticavenueinalignmentwith

Hungary’sown.Inthissense,onewouldargue,Orbanmaylegitimatefriendshipwith

RussiaasnecessaryfortheattainmentofHungary’sprimarygoalofbringingthe

Hungariannationclosertogether.Inotherwords,hemayreshuffletheorderof

prioritiesinsuchawayastomakethemovepermissible.Inthisinstance,Russiamay

notbeafoebutafriendtoHungary.Havingsaidthat,onewouldarguethatsucha

changeindirectionwouldnotbepossibleinRomania,ifsimilarconsiderationwere

appliedtotheRepublicofMoldova,becauseofthedeeply-seatedanti-Russian

sentimentsatsocietallevel.Itwaspossible,however,tolegitimatecloserrelations

withHungaryafter1996,whentheaccessiongoalbecamepredominant.Itisnotout

oftherealmofimagination,therefore,thatcertainreinterpretationsoftheidentity

narrativeandareorderingofprioritiesintheHungariancasemayresultinsucha

course.Butthatcanonlybepermissibleifoneidentitarypriorityissubstitutedby

another.Inotherwords,thatpermutationsworkwithinthealreadyexisting

243

frameworkandthereexistsabeliefthattheachievementofonegoalismadepossible

bytherenouncingofanother.Inthisview,sedimentedclaimsaboutidentityremaina

powerfulmotivatorforaction,albeitwithalteredreferencepointsandpriorities.

AfinalissuewhichshouldbeaddressediswhetherRomaniaisuniqueinthestrength

andconsistencyofitsidentitynarrative,and,ifso,whatthiscasestudycouldbringto

thefieldofresearch.ItistruethattheRomanianexampleispeculiar,fromthe

continuityoftheidentitynarrativeandthepresenceofasingledominantnarrativeto

theobviousalignmentofallpartiesonissuesofforeignpolicy.Itisequallythecase

thatotherstateshavedevelopedalternativenarrativesofidentityorhavepartiesthe

approachofwhichhasamoreobviousideologicalcomponent.Inthissense,theutility

ofthepresentendeavouristhatitshowstheextenttowhichprofoundlyheldbeliefs

emergingfromsedimentedidentitynarrativescanbecomeadominantfactorin

influencingbehaviourinveryspecificcircumstances.ItisobviousthattheRomanian

contextisnotonewhichmaybeappliedtoeverystate,asthenatureand

developmentofidentitynarrativesiscontingentontheuniqueexperiencesofthat

particularstate.However,themethodologyusedherecouldofferanavenueinto

exploringtheevolutionandinfluenceofidentitynarrativesonotherstates’behaviour.

Tracingtheprocessofthedevelopmentoftheidentitynarrativeandtheextentto

whichportrayalshavebecomeeitherentrenchedorhavebeenalteredbyagentsisthe

keytounderstandingwherecertainrepresentationscomefrom,howpowerfulthey

are,andinwhatdirectionortowardswhatgoalstheymayinfluencebehaviour.Inthis

sense,theprocessmaybeappliedtoanystate,whetherornottheidentity

componenttoitsbehaviourisobvious,orwhetherthereappeartobemultiple

narrativesatplayovertime.Whatmayberevealedisthattheinteractionbetween

agentsandstructuresismorecomplexthanintheRomaniancase,orthatcertain

assumptionsarechallengedbyalternativenarratives,or,indeed,thattheinfluenceof

thesenarrativestructuresonbehaviourisnotaspowerfulinsomecasesasitisin

others.Overall,onewouldargue,theutilityofthisendeavourisasmuchinthe

outcome,acasestudyofararelyresearchedactor,butalso,potentially,inofferingan

alternativeavenueforthestudyofidentityanditsrelationshipwithstatebehaviour.

244

DirectionsfortheFuture

Inconclusiontothisprojectoneshouldconsiderthefuture,bothofthesituationin

EasternEuropeandthatofRomanianidentity.Itisplausible,indeedprobable,that,

untilthechallengestheregionfacesareresolved,atleastintermsofRomania’s

perceptions,identity-relatedconcernswillcontinuetoplayanimportantroleinthe

articulationofthisstate’sforeignpolicyagenda.Moreimportantly,ifthesituations

discussedthroughoutthisthesisescalateitisplausiblethatRomania’sreactionswillbe

shapedbyidentitaryconsiderationsratherthansolelydictatedbythedirection

pursuedbyitsallies.Inanycase,explainingorpredictingRomania’sbehaviourin

currentcircumstanceshingesonanunderstandingofitsidentity-relatedanxietiesand

priorities.ThepartthatRomaniamightplayineithertheresolutionorthe

augmentationofthesechallengesremainstobeseen.

AsforthefutureoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,itwillbeinterestingtosee

whetherthesedevelopmentswillleadtore-evaluationsofitsmajortenets.Overthe

lasttenyears,sinceaccessiontotheEU,theidentitynarrativehaschangedvery

little.622Certainly,Romanianelites’rhetorichasafundamentalEuro-Atlantic

component,noticeable,ashasbeenexplored,inthestate’seffortstojustifyitsstance

againstRussiaandtosupporttheRepublicofMoldova.Havingsaidthat,itis

questionablewhetherintegrationhasalteredRomania’sviewsoftheSelforitsOthers

significantly.Thatisbecause,onewouldargue,Romaniaviewsmembershipofthetwo

organisationthroughtheprismofitsownnationalinterest.Accessionwasameansto

anendofensuringsecurityagainsttheRussianthreatandamoreprosperousfuture.

Membershipisstillaninstrumentinsatisfyingthesecurityconditionanditisnow

beingextendedinaidofMoldova.WithHungary,thisassociationmeansthatthereare

inherentlimitstotheamountandnatureofinterferenceBudapestcanexertuponit.

Inthislight,whetheraEuropeanversionoftheRomanianidentitynarrativewill

emergeisdebatable.Thisis,certainly,thedirectioninwhichitistravellingasanatural

622Thisconclusionisdrawnbothbyexaminationofhistoricalsources–Constantiniu(2011),Djuvara(2010),etc.–butalsoassessmentsbyauthorssuchasBoia(2011,2012)orDragoman(2008)whohavepointedouttheenduranceofperceptionsofRomaniaasanationalratherthanEuropeanstate.

245

consequenceofincreasedcontactandinterdependencewithEurope.Claimsabout

Romanianidentity,however,areparticularlyenduringandanyalterationstothe

narrativetoaccommodateforthisEuropeancomponentwouldhavetobegradualand

contingentonagents’desiretoconstructsuchaportrayal.Thereisaparadoxin

Romania’sviewsofEurope:ifontheonehanditispowerfullyEurophile,thereisno

obviousdesiretorenounceitsnationalvaluesforEuropeanones.Rather,ifEurope

mayindeedaltertheRomanianidentitynarrativeitwilldosobysupplementingrather

thanreplacingfeatures.Romania’smoveoutofthenation-statephasewillbeslow,

particularlyasthisistheonlyroleforthestateeverconceivedinitsidentitynarrative.

Therefore,whilstitisnotinconceivablethatthestoryofRomanianidentitywillevolve,

asitisnatural,thetimeframewouldlikelybealongone.Inanycaseitisunlikelythat

thiswouldoccurduringcurrentchallengesfacedbytheEuropeanprojectasawhole.

246

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