The Political Development of Somaliland and Its Conflict With Puntland

8/4/2019 The Political Development of Somaliland and Its Conflict With Puntland

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Berouk Mesfin ISS Paper 200 September 2009

Te political developmento Somaliland and its

conict with PuntlandIntroductIon

Te Horn o Arica is the most militarised and conict-

ridden region on the Arican continent, with armed

conicts raging requently within and between states.

In 1991, Somaliland emerged as an autonomous entity

in this turbulent region aer unilaterally declaring its

independence rom the rest o Somalia. Over the past

eighteen years Somaliland has managed to display an en-

viable measure o peace and stability. Trough successive

clan conerences, Somaliland established relatively viable

institutions which paved the path or reconstruction o an

entity mainly employing local resources. Somaliland hasthus been depicted as an oasis o stability in an otherwise

chaotic Somali regional environment.1 Te accomplish-

ments o Somaliland, however, have been overshadowed

by the lack o international recognition o its statehood

and also its territorial dispute with neighbouring

Puntland. Te overall objective o this paper2 is to provide

a detailed account and analysis o the political develop-

ment o Somaliland and its conict with Puntland.

Background

Somaliland came to the ore o the international political

system immediately aer it declared its independence

rom the rest o Somalia on 18 May 1991. Te Grand

Conerence o the Northern People was held in Burao

and was composed o the leaders o the Somali National

Movement3 (SNM) and representatives o all clans

inhabiting north-western Somalia. Te newly established

entity assumed the borders o the ormer British colony

which adjoins Ethiopia to the south and west, Djibouti

to the north-west, the Gul o Aden to the north, and

Puntland to the east. Te demarcation o these borderswas the product o the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty o 1897.4

Somaliland covers a land area o 137 600 square

kilometres and has a coastline o 850 kilometres. It had

a total population o about three million people in 1997.5

Pastoralists make up some 55 per cent o the population,whereas the rest is composed o urban and rural dwell-

ers. erritorially Somaliland is divided into six regions,

namely Northwest, Awdal, Sahil, ogdheer, Sanaag and

Sool, which are subdivided into 30 districts. Te largest

city and capital o Somaliland is Hargeisa to which

Britain relocated its colonial administration in 1941,

while Boroma, Berbera, Burao, Erigavo and Las-Canood

are Somalilands major cities. Somalilands principal port

is the strategic port o Berbera.6

Tere are three major clan amilies, namely the

Isaaq, the Darod/Harti (including the Warsangeliand Dhulbahante) and the Dir (including the Iise and

Gadabursi), representing 66 per cent, 19 per cent and 15

per cent respectively o the total population.7 Pertaining

to regional distribution, the west is inhabited by the Iise

and Gadabursi clans.8 Te Isaaq live predominantly in

the central part o the Somaliland, while the eastern

parts are occupied principally by the Warsangeli and

Dhulbahante clans.

Te people o Somaliland share a common language,

culture and religion among themselves as well as with

the rest o Somalia. Economically speaking, they pursuea traditional livelihood system based on nomadic pasto-

ralism.9 Livestock production makes up the backbone o

Somalilands economy, accounting or about 65 per cent

o its economy.10 Somalilands economy is also heavily

dependent on remittances rom the diaspora.11 Estimated

to reach US$500 million per year, remittances constitute

the largest single source o hard currency entering

Somaliland. Remittances actually bring more currency

to Somaliland than livestock export and international

assistance combined.12

Te 2001 constitution established a hybrid systemo government.13 Constitutionally, Somaliland has

three branches o government. A president, elected or

ve years, heads and nominates a cabinet o ministers


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2 The Political Development of Somaliland and its Conflict with Puntland ISS Paper 200 September 2009

theoretically subject to parliamentary approval. Te

legislature is composed o two chambers, the unelected

upper House o Elders (the Guurti) nominated by the

clans during various peacebuilding conerences and the

lower House o Representatives, which is directly elected

or six years but clearly lacks an understanding o its

role and unctional capacity.14 Te 82-member House oRepresentatives is supposed to be the main legislative

chamber. It approves all legislation as well as the annual

budget and acts as a check on the power o the executive,

which is the strongest branch.15 Te ostensibly independ-

ent judiciary is complemented by a moderately vibrant

print media.16

EconomIc pErformancE

Quite surprisingly, Somaliland has achieved a relatively

signicant degree o progress in certain social andeconomic areas. Provision o education and creation

o a suitable environment or oreign investors are

considered the key priorities, as Somaliland authori-

ties clearly believe that human development will end

poverty and thus ensure political stability.17 Somaliland

has no oreign debt, since its administration cannot

get loans and has to unction with the resources gener-

ated inside Somaliland.18 (It has to be pointed out,

however, that Somaliland has one o the worlds largest

gypsum deposits, which could be readily developed by

oreign companies.19

)

Somalilands economy has undergone substantial struc-

tural changes since the early 1990s and especially the

destructive 1980s. Te authorities have dissolved existing

monopolies, done away with rigid economic controls,

and pursued a deregulated ree market economy in

which the private business sector has thrived. Tis

private sector expansion has in turn contributed signi-

cantly to the rapid growth o the economy compared to

other Somali areas.20 Te economic growth has provided

employment opportunities and capital investment

or appreciable reconstruction. Much o Somalilandseconomic growth has also been attributed to livestock

production and trade, which is the dominant system o

production in the country. Indeed, livestock is the most

important oreign exchange earner o Somaliland, which

gets around US$200 million rom the export o livestock

to mainly Saudi Arabia.21 Fish, quality rankincense,

gemstone, minerals, natural gas and oil22 are other

products or exploitation.23

Te volume o Somalilands trade has increased

between 1993 and 1998. Te growth in livestock pro-duction and the opening o the EthiopiaSomaliland

border are actors which led to the increase. In the

same vein, the service sector, including airline business,

telecommunications and nancial transer companies,

experienced a sudden increase in the post-1991 period.

Industrialisation is at its embryonic stage in Somaliland

even though this period has witnessed the prolieration

o light industries such as ood-processing and sh-

canning plants, and bottled-water actories.24

Primary school enrolment has rocketed rom a

dismal gure o 10 000 in 1991 to 150 000 in 2007, whileenrolment in secondary schools increased by 56 per

cent over the same period. Similarly, there is a renewed

momentum towards modernisation within the universi-

ties o Hargeisa, Burao and Amoud.25 Social services

such as water and electricity are partly privatised, with

indigenous businessmen teaming up in partnerships and

joint ventures to provide these services at protable but

aordable costs.26 Finally, the revenue system has had to

start rom scratch aer the war. Te prevailing peace and

stability together with basic institutions improved the

revenue collection system and provided the groundworkor a steady growth in the revenue collected by adminis-

trative agencies.

SEcurIty forcES

Aer 1991, Somaliland embarked upon a robust intra-

clan consensus-driven process o disarmament and

demobilisation in order to make a distinction between

the regular or authorised and irregular security orces.27

A number o ghters were incorporated into the armed

orces whereas others joined components o the policeorce. Tereore, ex-combatants were recruited into one

o the three security orces, namely the armed orces,

police and correctional orce or custodial corps.28 Te

ormation o regular, uniormed and salaried security

orces involved the transer o heavy arms and weapons

to central control. Te rationale behind separating the

militia and their armament rom the direct control o

their clans was obviously to prevent the eruption o

inter-clan violence.

Upon the ormation o Somaliland, the armed

orces, including the army, navy29

and air deence orces,absorbed around 15 000 clan-based militiamen, ormer

SNM ghters, and also ghters belonging to other

armed groups. Some armed groups bargained their

Quite surprisingly, Somaliland has

achieved a relatively signicant

degree o progress in certain

social and economic areas


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3Berouk Mesfin ISS Paper 200 September 2009

surrendering o heavy weapons in exchange o a place in

the regular armed orces. Such arrangement ultimately

led to the maintenance o roughly 18 000 members o the

security orces on the administrations payroll at the cost

o about 70 per cent o Somalilands budget.30 Moreover,

the disarmament and demobilisation process was

achieved with minimal international assistance.Te 2001 constitution recognises the armed orce31

responsible or protecting Somali lands independence,

the police orce responsible or maintaining law and

order, and the prison services responsible or guarding

and reorming prisoners (articles 123 and 124).32 It also

establishes that the president is the commander-in-chie

o the armed orces (article 90).33 Over 50 per cent

o Somalilands budget is still spent on the security

sector, the bulk going to salaries and ood rations o the

armed orces which were given proper militar y ranks.

Furthermore, the administration had to shoulder thecost o maintaining security and servicing an active

military situation in the contested regions o Sool and

Sanaag.34 Tere is also an internal security service which

was established by the Egal administration through a

presidential decree. It is a clandestine organisation,

which evades parliamentary oversight and makes

them only accountable to the president. According

to a ormer Minister o Finance, the security services

budget during the Egal era was included in the vice-

presidents budget.35

HIStorIcal and polItIcal ovErvIEw

British involvement in Somaliland began in the second

hal o the 19th century. Somalilands signicance to

Britain emanated rom a purely geopolitical inter-

est as the British government was only interested in

Somalilands meat supply as a necessary ancillary to

the garrisoning o Aden.36 Tus, Britain was intent on

preserving the port o Aden where a coaling station

and a garrison were established to saeguard the sea

routes o its eastern trading empire and the imperial

jewel, India.37

Te British accordingly entered into aseries o agreements with clan leaders in order to ull

this rather uti litarian objective. Tese agreements were

signed between 1885 and 1900 and culminated in the

transormation o the present-day Somaliland territory

into a Brit ish colony.38

Te Anglo-French treaty o 1888, the Anglo-Italian

protocol o 1894 and the Anglo-Ethiopian delimita-

tion treaty o 1897 constitute the legal regimes which

largely determined the contours and borders o British

Somaliland.39 However, the subsequent agreementbetween Britain and Ethiopia in 1954 did not aect

the implementation o the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty o

1897. Accordingly, British Somaliland was composed o

the regions o Awdal, Wagrooyu, Galheed, ogdhhre,

Sannag and Sool. Britain succeeded in establishing a

system o indirect rule even though its expansion was

somehow impeded by an anti-colonial uprising between

1899 and 1920.40

On 1 July 1960, ormer Italian Somaliland and ormer

British Somaliland41 voluntarily joined and ormed the

independent state o Somalia on the basis that Somalisare the same people, speak the same language, and

have a common religion.42 Te leaders o this newly

emerging state sought, rom the outset, to create a single

supra-state, Greater Somalia, including the Ethiopian-

administered Ogaden, the French-administered-Djibouti,

and Kenyas Northern District.43 Te rst and most

essential political actor which led the Somali leaders to

take up the idea o Greater Somalia was that it seemingly

served as a uniying purpose or the consolidation o

the various clan amilies into one Somali nation. It was

also meant to serve as the most appropriate means tosupersede the deep-rooted internal divisions between the

ormer Italian and British colonies.

Aer a brie experience o civilian parliamentary

democracy which was poorly adapted to the clan-based

nature o Somali politics,44 General Mohammed Siad

Barre came to power in a bloodless coup on 21 October

1969. Barre pursued the policy o bringing together all

the lost territories o Somalia. He devoted the lions share

o Somalias national resources to an extensive military

build-up and also secured the Soviet Unions oreign

assistance. His determination or realising the vision oGreater Somalia culminated in the 1977-1978 war against

Ethiopia. For many analysts, this war constituted a

watershed in the political history o Somalia. It signalled

the end o Pan-Somali nationalism and the beginning o

the collapse o the Somali state. Somalias deeat caused

a crisis o condence and undermined the morale o the

Somali armed orces, even leading a group o ofcers to

mount a coup dtat in 1978.45 No ewer than ten clan-

based opposition groups, including the SNM, took up

arms against Siad Barres regime.46

Te insurgency was matched by harsh governmentreprisals involving indiscriminate arti llery shelling and

aerial bombardments which claimed the lives o many

civilians and displaced hundreds o thousands rom

No ewer than ten clan-based

opposition groups, including

the SNM, took up arms

against Siad Barres regime


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their homes.47 One such attack in the orm o vicious

aerial bombardments o Hargeisa and Burao took place

in 1988 in response to simultaneous and stepped-up

attacks by the SNM. Tese artil lery shelling and aerial

bombardments, which killed between 20 000 and 50 000

people and sent 400 000 reugees pouring into Ethiopia,

only served to unite the Isaaq behind the SNM and stillremain resh in their memories.48 Te intensication

o the conict eventually led to the all o Siad Barres

regime on 26January 1991, aer which the SNM took

eective control o the north-western part o Somalia.49

Since then the southern part o Somalia has been strug-

gling with a complete absence o central government and

consequently o the law and order which are prerequisites

or the existence o a unctioning state.

a Bumpy tranSItIon

Aer its takeover o Somaliland, the SNM opted or a ces-

sation o hostilities and reconciliation with the non-Isaaq

clans, which were largely associated with Siad Barres

regime, rather than engaging in retribution and the

settling o old scores.50 Reconciliation was the main theme

at a peace conerence convened by the SNM which took

place rom 15 to 27 February 1991 in Berbera. Te gather-

ing sought to restore trust and condence between theIsaaq and non-Isaaq clans51 which ought the war on op-

posite sides. Te Berbera conerence laid the groundwork

or the Grand Conerence o the Northern Clans, which

was held rom 27 April to 18 May 1991 in the town o

Burao.52 Te original purpose o this meeting had been to

cement the peace in north-west Somalia.53 Following ex-

tensive consultations o nearly two months, the clan elders

and the SNM leadership decided to expedite peacebuild-

ing and restore Somali lands sovereignty by voluntarily

withdrawing rom the union with the rest o Somalia. Te

principal actors which pushed Somaliland urther alongthe road towards independence include the unsettling

political and military situation in southern Somalia, the

revival o Isaaq ears about southern domination, and the

prospects o a new relationship with Ethiopia, which also

experienced a change o political regime.54

Accordingly, in May 1991 the SNM announced

the independence o Somaliland and the ormation

o a transitional SNM-led interim administration to

administer the newly independent entity or two years.

Te leaders o the SNM were initially reluctant about thesecession o Somaliland or two main reasons. First, they

were earul o unintended complications and o the act

that the international community would not easily grant

recognition to Somaliland. And second, many SNM

leaders supported a ederal orm o association with the

rest o Somalia. Te declaration o independence was

accompanied by the designation o Abdirahman Ahmed

Ali urr, the then chairman o the SNM, as president,

and the Isaaq-dominated SNM Central Committee

became the rst legislative institution o Somaliland.55

Te SNM leadership was vested with the powers to draa constitution and prepare Somaliland or elections. Te

interim administration was also entrusted to accom-

modate non-Isaaq clans by enlisting their participation

in the new administration.56

However, urrs interim administration aced serious

political challenges. Within the SNM, which had not

developed strong organisational structures,57 tensions

between a clan-based alliance o militias al lied to the

urr administration and an opposing action came to a

boil. Te closed-door policy and the nancial weakness

o President urrs administration, which ailed to restorelaw and order even around Hargeisa, exacerbated the

problem.58 Because o the ri within the SNM, it was

virtually impossible to convene a meeting o the SNM

central committee-turned-parliament during the two-

year tenure o the interim administration. In January

1992, political consensus began to racture and a serious

conict between the two SNM groups broke out in Burao

and around the port o Berbera.59

As Somaliland became enguled in conict,60 non-

Isaaq clan elders intervened and called a meeting at a

town named Sheikh. Te Sheikh conerence rst resolvedthe conict over the port o Berbera. Te port reverted to

the urr administration, which was now endowed with

an important source o revenue. Te conerence also

established a mechanism or the eective participation o

clan elders in Somalilands post-war political system by

creating a council o elders called the Guurti.61 Te par-

ticipation o the non-Isaaq clans in the mediation process

indicated that the SNMs inuence was declining and

that the buy-in o the non-Isaaq clans was imperative.62

tHE Boroma confErEncE

Te Boroma conerence was a dening event in

Somalilands political development. It was attended

The principal actors whichpushed Somaliland urther

along the road towards

independence include the

unsettling political and military

situation in southern Somalia


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by ve hundred politicians, elders, religious leaders,

businessmen, intellectuals, and civil servants. It was or-

ganised in the principal town o the Gadabursi clan and

lasted ve months.63 Te conerence oversaw the peaceul

transer o power in May 1993 rom the SNM to the new

civilian administration headed by Mohammed Haji

Ibrahim Egal, a widely respected Isaaq statesman whohad been Somalias last civilian prime minister beore

Siad Barres 1969 coup.64 It also produced a ransnational

National Charter and an Interim Peace Charter. Te

National Charter dened the political and institutional

structures o a three-year administration until a consti-

tution was promulgated. Te Peace Charter entrenched

the use o theXeer- a sort o an unwritten traditional

law o social conduct among the clans o Somaliland in

accordance with their traditions and Islamic principles -

as the basis or law and order.65

Te Boroma conerence was decisive in the sense thatissues o representation and powersharing were dealt

through the institutionalisation o clans and their leader-

ship into the system o governance.66 Te political system

established in 1993 became known as beel, meaning clan

or community, and used indigenous orms o social

and political organisations with modern institutions o

government. It was portrayed as a dynamic hybrid o

Western orm and traditional substances and consisted

o an executive president, an independent judiciary and

a bicameral parliament comprising an upper House o

Elders incorporating the Guurti and a lower House oRepresentatives the members o which were nominated

on a clan basis by an electoral college o elders.67

Te beelsystem o government established at Boroma

recognised kinship as the organising principle o

Somali society. In essence, the government became a

power-sharing coalition o Somalilands main clans.68

Te ramework aimed at ostering popular participa-

tion in governance or participatory governance which

might best dene the essence o democracy without theencumbrance o Western connotation.69 Appointments

to the executive were made in a way that clan balance

was ensured. Indeed, in the upper and lower houses

o parliament, seats were proportionally allocated to

clans according to a ormula initiated by the SNM.

Similarly, the beelsystem seemed to have limited the

development o a ully representative and eective

democracy and to have given rise to the marginalisation

o the Harti clan, creating a sense o alienation among

members o that clan.70 It was also criticised or lack otransparency, nepotism and corruption, with individuals

rom more powerul lineages avoured in government

appointments.71

Te beelsystem was intended to be in place or

three years, but remained or decade.72 Despite two

years o damaging civil war between November 1994

and October 1996, there was a high degree o stability

in Somaliland which experienced relatively consider-

able economic restructuring with the establishment o

customs ofces and the restarting o revenue collection

acilitated by the creation o the Berbera Port Authority.73

Apart rom that, the ministries and the civil service

were reorganised, a central bank with a new currency

was introduced, militias were melded into regular

armed orces, and roadblocks were removed.74 Much o

Somalilands urban inrastructure was repaired, and the

education and health systems were restored. Te ormal

ending o the civil war was signalled by a conerence

held in Hargeisa rom October 1996 to February 1997

which was locally nanced and managed (just like the

Sheikh and Boroma conerences) and equally conrmed

the existence o some common values and trust betweennorthern clans.75 Te conerence extended the admin-

istrations tenure or a urther our years, ratied an

interim constitution and increased the number o seats

available to non-Isaaq clans.76

conStItutIonal rEfErEndumand SuBSEquEnt ElEctIonS

In 2000, a 45-member committee appointed jointly by

the president and Parliament came up with a commonly

acceptable dra constitution, copies o which weredistributed throughout Somaliland.77 A reerendum

was held on 31 May 2001. Te major actors or un-

dertaking the reerendum were the establishment in

1998 o the Puntland autonomous entity, which laid

territorial claims to areas in eastern Somaliland (as

will be developed in the last section o this situation

report), and also the establishment aer the 2000 Arta

Conerence o the ransitional National Government o

Somalia, which claimed authority over the entire Somali

territory. Both Puntland and the ransitional National

Government simply threatened Somalilands claim tosovereignty.78 Article 1 o the constitution clearly rea-

rmed Somalilands sovereign and independent status.

Te endorsement o the nal version o the constitution

The political system established

in 1993 used indigenous

orms o social and political

organisations with moderninstitutions o government


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by 97 per cent o the electorate in Somaliland asserted an

unequivocal declaration o their aspiration to preserve

Somalilands independence,79 even though there was the

greatest opposition to the reerendum in the Sool regions

Las Anod district where limited voting took place. 80

Te adoption o the constitution, in a rather peaceul

manner, also put in place the necessary steps to changeSomalilands political system rom a clan-based admin-

istration to a limited orm o multiparty democracy. Te

constitution introduced universal surage, enshrining

particularly the right o women to vote. It also provided

that the executive, the legislature and local administra-

tive units were to be ormed through regular elections,

although it restricted the number o political parties to

participate in presidential and parliamentary elections to

three (article 9). Indeed, only the three political organisa-

tions which obtained the highest percentage o votes

during local elections could register as political partiesand contest presidential and parliamentary elections.81

Te rationale behind this restriction was to promote

the development o political organisations which would

represent a cross-section o the population and thus

avoid the sectarian politics which plagued Somalia in

the 1960s when numerous and ragmented parties used

to chaotically contest elections thus contributing to Siad

Barres coup in 1969.82

Although the public overwhelmingly endorsed theconstitution, there was considerable unease about the

move to multiparty democracy.83 President Egal, who

had survived an impeachment vote in August 2001 and

unexpectedly died o natural causes in May 2002, had

linked the adoption o the constitution to Somalilands

eort to acquire international recognition, considering

that the international community would not recognise

Somalilands independence unless it installed a consti-

tutionally based, appropriately elected and authentically

democratic government.84

Te change rom a system o selected representa-tion to elected representation in Somalilands political

institutions occurred in three phases. First, in December

2002, local elections were held and resulted in the

appointment o 332 district councillors in Somalilands

six regions. Six political organisations run or the local

elections, with three o them winning sufcient support

to become accredited national parties: the UDUB

(United Democratic Peoples Party) which was virtually

the ruling party, Kulmiye (Unity Party) and the UCID

(Justice and Welare Party). Accordingly, the UDUBmanaged to win by receiving 40,76 per cent o the total

votes, with Kulmiye coming second with 18,90 per cent

and the UCID third with 11,24 per cent.85

Second, presidential elections were held peaceully

in April 2003. Te UDUBs Dahir Riyale Kahin - the

ormer vice-president who was born in 1952 and hails

rom the Gadabursi clan, had worked as a colonel in

Siad Barres National Security Service86 and was the

target o an assassination attempt in 2002 - succeeded in

winning by beating his closest rival, Ahmed Mohamed

Silaniyo, chairman o Kulmiye and ormer Minister oPlanning and Minister o Commerce in Siad Barres

regime,87 by the slimmest o margins o only 80 votes out

o almost hal a million ballots.88 Kulmiye challenged

the results in courts, but accepted the election results

when its appeal was rejected.89 Finally, elections or the

House o Representatives were held in September 2005.

Tese elections saw 246 candidates contest 82 seats in

an undertaking that involved 982 polling stations, 1 500

ballot boxes, 1,3 million ballot papers, 6 000 party agents,

3 000 police, 700 domestic observers, and 76 oreign

observers.90

Te ruling party, the UDUB, repeatedits successes in the local and presidential elections by

winning the largest number o votes and 33 MPs, while

Kulmiye came second with 28 MPs and UCID third with

21 MPs. Tus, the two opposition political parties had

managed to control together 49 seats, an almost 60 per

cent majority.91

Somaliland has aptly demonstrated that it has the

capacity to hold peaceul elections which are conducted

in a reasonably efcient manner.92 Te act that the

elections were principally unded by the Somaliland

administration, with additional assistance rom oreigndonors, conrmed the perseverance o the political

elite to establish a constitutionally based democracy.

Moreover, the peaceul resolution o the tightly ought

presidential elections showed that there was a determina-

tion in Somaliland to sett le political dierences through

constitutional means rather than resorting to violence.93

Furthermore, the election o a non-Isaaq president rom

a minority clan lent more credibility to the claim that

Somaliland was a comparatively tolerant multi-clan

entity.94 However, the election process also revealed some

serious aws. Te process was mainly criticised because itwas not inclusive given that most o the population o the

eastern Sanaag and Sool regions did not ully participate

in it.95 It was also criticised or the ruling partys attempts

Somaliland has aptlydemonstrated that it has the

capacity to hold peaceul

elections which are conducted

in a reasonably efcient manner


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to consistently stie the media and incessantly harass

opposition sympathisers, and also or the general lack o

opportunity or women to occupy elected positions.96

tHE 2009 ElEctIonS

President Dahir Riyale Kahin was elected or a ve-yearterm on 14 April 2003 but, as mentioned beore, with the

narrowest o margins less than 80 votes over Ahmed

Mohamed Silaniyo. President Riyale has promised

repeatedly that i he loses the 2009 elections he will step

down and hand over political power to the winner o

the electoral process. Te three presidential candidates

Riyale o the UDUB, Ahmed Silaniyo o Kulmiye, and

Faisal Ali Warabe97 o the UCID had all competed in

the 2003 elections. Te presidents term in ofce was

extended or one year by the House o Elders (the Guurti)

in April 2008, a development which brought about aconstitutional crisis and was resolved only aer opposi-

tion political parties agreed to a new election date. It was

again extended on 28 March 2009.

Te European Commission, individual EU member

states and the US are supposed to und 70 per cent o the

elections expenses, including nancing the voter registra-

tion process which began in October 2008. Because o the

impossibility to provide unds directly to the National

Election Commission, unds would be ltered through

Interpeace, an international NGO which, through its

Nairobi ofce and with its partner the Academy or Peaceand Development, would monitor and assist in the imple-

mentation o the elections. Te package would have three

elements registration, local and international elements

- and cost around US$18 million, o which registration

would account or US$8-9 million.98 Te voter registra-

tion process, however, has been tainted by disputes within

the National Election Commission and registration data

which has annoyed some clans. Te estimated number

o eligible voters in Somaliland are over one million.

O these, 440 067 voted in the 2002 local government

elections, 488 543 in the 2003 presidential elections, and670 332 in the 2005 parliamentary elections. It is thus

realistic to presuppose that about 700 000 people could

vote in the 2009 elections.

During the past ew years, the National Election

Commission had come to be generally recognised as

being independent.99 Yet, it has been recently criticised

or being biased in avour o the ruling party. Tree o

its seven members whose term o ofce are ve years

were appointed in 2007 by President Riyale, the House

o Elders (the Guurti) oen seen to be aligned withthe president nominated two candidates, while the

other two were appointed by the opposition.100 Te rst

National Election Commission had adequately estab-

lished a reliable organisation and supporting inrastruc-

ture. With the support rom the administration and

several donors, it had evolved into a ully unctioning

institution with clear work-plan and long-term strategy.

Te rst National Election Commission had thus held

three successul elections, without prior experience or

training in planning, organising, monitoring, imple-

menting or evaluating democratic elections.101

However,in its present state, the National Election Commission

lacks institutional structure, a governing body o

regulations and standard criteria or recruitment; it lacks

clarity o mandate and scope o work. It also lacks sense

o permanency and lasting institutional memory.102

Te National Election Commission mediated talks

between the ruling UDUB party and the opposition

Kulmiye and UCID regarding the election timetable.

Te elections were postponed ve times, on 14 April

2008 to 31 August 2008, then to 31 December 2008, aer

that to 29 March 2009, then to 31 May 2009, and nallyto 29 October 2009. Tis was mainly due to technical

problems such as lack o planning time, lack o unding

(the Somaliland administration is supposed to al locate

2530 per cent o unds) and problems with the voter

registration process (biometric voter registration, where

ngerprints o al l citizens are saved in a centralised

database, eliminating multiple registration).

Te opposition political parties have continuously

accused the National Election Commission o ignoring

the UDUBs misuse o public media and resources to

advance its political campaign. President Riyales minis-ters, on their part, have accused the opposition political

parties o inciting violence. President Riyales inability

to tackle corruption, lack o job opportunities and rising

ood prices, and disagreement over the appointment o

a presidential nominee have led the UDUB to split into

two actions. Moreover, the administrations intererence

with ree media and civi l society, the arbitrary arrest o

opposition political leaders and over-reliance on police

orce on national security grounds,103 the declaration

in February 2009 o Somaliland v ice-president Ahmed

Yusu Yasin that Somaliland could be ederated withSomalia have all led to general disillusion with the

UDUB. Nonetheless, President Riyale is still regarded

as a politician with wide appeal who delivers inuential

The National Election

Commission has been recently

criticised or being biased in

avour o the ruling party


8/20


speeches and requently conducts oreign travels to

advance Somalilands policy o attaining recognition. Te

National Electoral Commission has ofcially invited the

development agency Progressio to coordinate a team o

election observers. Progressio will be working in partner-

ship with the Development Planning Unit at University

College London, the Forum or Peace and Governance inSomaliland and the Somaliland Focus UK.

SomalIlandS quEStfor rEcognItIon

Proponents o Somalilands right or international

recognition advance a number o arguments which try

to make a clear legal and political case or it. First o

all, Somaliland had gained independence rom British

colonial rule on 26 June 1960 and held the status o an

independent state or ve days, until 1 July 1960. In theprocess, it was properly recognised by the United Nations

and 35 sovereign states. Te US secretary o state,

Christian Herter, sent a congratulatory message, and

the United Kingdom signed several bilateral agreements

with Somaliland in Hargeisa on 26 June 1960.104 Second,

Somalilands voluntary union with ormer Italian

Somaliland to orm the state o Somalia constitutes

a compelling legal basis or its case or international

recognition because, under international law, Somaliland

has the right to abrogate the union into which it

voluntary entered.105

Te political basis or Somalilands claim or recognition

emanates rom two points. For one, the aspiration or in-

dependence is undoubtedly very strong among the bulk

o the Somaliland people, who have constantly tasted the

bitter ruits o discrimination, brutal political repression,

atrocious military attacks and economic deprivation

until 1991, making the prospect or reunication with

Somalia very distant, even i the latter may regain stabil-

ity at some point in the uture. Indeed, thirty years ounullled promises and brutal policies ripped the abric

o the already ragile north-south political compact.106

Te Somaliland people had voiced their opposition by

boycotting the 1961 reerendum, staging a coup dtat

in that same year, and later on engaging in armed

struggle.107 In addition, the May 2001 constitutional

reerendum was eectively a plebiscite on independ-

ence.108 Furthermore, Somaliland already has a distinct

territorial base and is already exercising sovereignty with

the symbols and internal dynamics o a state.109Tus, according to Somalilands authorities, the claim

or recognition seems to be well-grounded. Tey also

argue that Somalilands case is not the secession o a ter-

ritory which was incorporated into a sovereign state but

rather the voluntary withdrawal rom the union between

two entities which were once separate sovereign states.

Indeed, the two territories had been distinct colonial

territories or ragments or over seventy years, and had

grown independently, with widely divergent institu-

tions and legal systems as well as colonial history and

culture.110

In this case, they draw parallels with a prece-dent in Somalilands geographic vicinity, Eritrea. Indeed,

Eritrea, which had led a separate existence rom Ethiopia

or sixty years as an Italian colony, organised by itsel a

reerendum and gained de jureinternational recognition

in 1993.111 Proponents also draw rom international

legal instruments which support Somalilands position,

including the Montevideo Convention on the Rights

and Duties o States. Tis convention ascertains that a

ull-edged state needs to have a permanent population,

a dened territory, a unctioning government, and the

capacity to enter into relations with other states.112

A number o arguments have been advanced to rebut

Somalilands quest or recognition.113 One o the argu-

ments holds that Somaliland, with an inadequate annual

revenue o around US$20 million, is not economically

viable to be independent.114 Furthermore, recognition

would set a bad precedent in a region where weakly

cohesive states struggle to hold together115 in the ace

o multiple secessionist claims rom dierent ethnic

groups. Te Arican Union is even more worried that

accepting Somalilands request would open a Pandoras

Box o secessionist claims across the entire Aricancontinent. Tere are lots o centriugal orces around

Arica which could use the recognition o Somaliland

as a stepping stone to claim recognition, thus standing

against the Organisation o Arican Unity and Arican

Union principle o taking colonial borders as inviolable,

a doctrine which Arican states have a sacred obligation

to uphold. Te other critique pertaining to the argument

or recognition is the act that the eastern part, including

Sanaag and Sool, o Somalilands border is contested.

Moreover, critics hold that the recognition o Somaliland

may culminate in the widening o the recurrent crisisamong the major clans inhabiting Somaliland. Other

critics see Somalilands move towards independence

derailing the peace eorts in Somalia and even triggering

The Arican Union is worried that

accepting Somalilands request

would open a Pandoras Box

o secessionist claims across

the entire Arican continent


9/20


its uncontrollable balkanisation. It could even provoke

conict between Somaliland and Somalia proper, as has

unexpectedly occurred between Ethiopia and Eritrea

barely ve years aer the latters de jureinternational

recognition.116

But some o the above arguments lack conviction in

certain respects. For instance, Somalilands economy isconsidered to be highly sel-sufcient and institutionally

unctioning although the would-be-recognised entity

has absolutely no access to loans and nancial assistance

rom international nancial institutions including the

World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the

Arican Development Bank.117 Besides, ew states are

economically viable in the strict sense o the word.118

Indeed, this oasis o sanity [which] stands out in a

region seemingly locked in a cycle o sel-destruction

exists in a state o limbo, lying between actual and

actual independence. Without de jureinternationalrecognition, this de actostate is prevented rom engag-

ing in any substantial economic development.119

Despite a wide range o contacts and visits, including the

visit to Somaliland o the ormer Assistant Secretary o

State or Arican Aairs Jendayi Frazer in February 2008,

the international community has ailed to extend any

recognition to Somalilands independence.120 As a result,

Somaliland has remained an unrecognised de acto

state just like the Pridnestrovyan Moldovan Republic in

Moldova, the Republic o South Ossetia and the Republic

o Abkhazia in Georgia, and the Nagorno-Karabakh inAzerbaijan, illegitimate no matter how eective.121 Tis

has a number o implications:

Minimising the protection which Somaliland would

receive in case o terrorist attacks like the suicide

bombings which rocked Hargeisa in October 2008, or

even external military aggression

Denying the parliament international assistance or

capacity-building

Damaging the sel-esteem o Somalilands people who

wish to be identied as normal citizens o a properstate in a community o states

Diminishing their chances o getting a good educa-

tion, nding jobs and enjoying medical treatment

abroad because they cannot travel legally without

recognised documents

Hampering the attempts o Somalilands admin-

istration to attract international aid and oreign

investments, which has had a negative bearing on the

development o the entitys inrastructure122

Horn of afrIca gEopolItIcS

Ethiopia had militarily supported the SNM in the orm

o money and weaponry. It then established close bene-

cial economic relations with Somaliland, making use o

the port o Berbera in order to receive imports, establish-

ing banks near their common border and commencing

in 2001 regular Ethiopian Airlines ights between Addis

Ababa and Hargeisa. It even established a diplomatic

ofce in Hargeisa, a quasi-embassy with a sta o twelve

and upgraded in 2006 to ambassadorial level.123

Ethiopia is interested in preventing Ethiopian oppo-

sition orces supported by Eritrea rom engaging in di-

erent types o cross-border operations. Simultaneously,

Ethiopia props up Somalilands oe, Puntland. Tus

Ethiopia is orced to support two client entities which

are in conict with each other, just like the US backs

its two NAO allies urkey and Greece, which are

at odds over Cyprus. It is widely held that Ethiopia

would not benet rom an internationally recognised

Somaliland and would be better o maintaining the

status quo, which will make Somaliland malleable andprevent the emergence o a united and resurgent Somalia

posing a security threat to it at any point in time. Also,

Ethiopia does not want to be seen as trying to balkanise

Somalia, especially in the eyes o its own sizeable

ethnic Somali population, and thus whishes to avoid a

backlash. Somalilands longest border is with Ethiopia

and ethnic Somali nomads on both sides o the border

regularly cross it seeking seasonal pasture. Somaliland

ully understands that its ate will be inuenced by the

diplomatic and military posture o Ethiopia and that

it is a proxy among many others in a rather long andprotracted geopolitical struggle in the Horn o Arica.124

Eritreas sole oreign policy objective is to undermine

the stability o its sworn enemy, Ethiopia, and create

political and strategic discomort or it in its various and

delicate balancing acts in the Horn o Arica. Actually,

in 1999, Eritrea opened a second ront in Somalia by

supporting rival proxies. Anything that Ethiopia sup-

ports, Eritrea goes determinedly against, with Ethiopias

support to Somalias ransitional Federal Government

and Eritreas support to the Union o Islamic Courts

being a case in point. Eritrea had provided training andarms to the Union o Islamic Courts with the objective

o outanking Ethiopia and making Somalia a second

ront against it. Eritrea has also been supplying arms and

The recognition o Somaliland

may culminate in the widening

o the recurrent crisis among the

major clans inhabiting Somaliland


10/20


giving training to armed Ethiopian opposition groups

operating rom Somalia to put additional pressure on

Ethiopia and prevent it rom using the port o Berbera

through which ood aid passed aer 2003.125 Eritrea

has less at stake in Somaliland than Ethiopia, and thus

does not have to pursue a more calculated course. On

the one hand, by recognising Somaliland, Eritrea couldembarrass Ethiopia, which Somaliland sees as an a lly in

its quest or recognition. On the other hand, Eritrea will

resist recognising Somaliland as it is wary o oending

Somali orces which it has been backing as proxies or its

long-standing conict with Ethiopia and which vehe-

mently reject Somalilands independence.126

Djibouti, along with Ethiopia, accepts Somaliland

passports and has a Somaliland diplomatic ofce in its

capital. But, it tends to see Somaliland as a threat to its

port which motors its economy and on which Ethiopia

almost totally depends or its exports and imports.Tere are clan and cultural afnities between Djibouti

and Somaliland, although relations between the two are

not warm and even went sour, occasionally leading to

the closure o their borders. For instance, Somaliland

elt some discomort about Djiboutis initiative which

established the ransitional National Government in

Somalia aer the Arta peace process and also about

Djiboutis ofcial commitment to Somali unity.127

conflIct BEtwEEn SomalIlandand puntland

In 1998, Puntland128 was established as a homeland

or the Harti sub-group o the larger Darod clan. Te

largest Harti subset, the Majerteen, predominates and

is the chie architect o this autonomous entity. More

signicantly, one third o Somalia proper is inhabited by

the Darod. Hence, Puntland avours the reconstruction

o Somalia as a ederal and united state comprising

autonomous regions and within the borders o 1990.129

Puntland is passionate about Darod unity,130 ears

Isaaq domination in borderland regions, and opposes

Somalilands independence.131

On the other hand - asdeveloped extensively in this report - Somaliland sees

itsel as an independent sovereign state. Tere is no

middle ground between the two entities mutually

exclusive political aspirations with regard to statehood,

urther complicating the hostilities which later suraced

between them.132

wo other, smaller Harti subsets, the Warsangeli and

Dhulbahante, live mainly within the colonial borders

o Somaliland and the areas claimed by Puntland. Te

Warsangeli mainly reside in eastern Sanaag, whereas theDhulbahante almost exclusively inhabit Sool region.133

Tere are perpetual tensions, occasionally aring into

armed conict between and within the sub-clans o

Warsangeli and Dhulbahante respectively predominating

Sanaag and Sool.

Sanaag and Sool were part o British Somaliland

when it became independent in 1960. Since 1998,

Puntland has claimed Sanaag and Sool based on the

ethnic composition o the regions inhabitants and their

clan ties to Puntland. Te act that voters in Sanaag

and especially Sool were decidedly less supportive oSomalilands 2001 reerendum on the constitution and

independence is explained by this clan situation.134

Somaliland, which declared independence rom Somalia

in 1991 but is not internationally recognised, claims both

regions on the basis o the clearly demarcated ormer

colonial borders.135 Te dispute over Sanaag and Sool is,

on the surace, an attempt to legitimise political control

by both Puntland and Somaliland, and create the basis

on which to establish new identities and citizenship.136

Te tension between Somaliland and Puntland

reached its climax in 2003 when Puntland orceseectively occupied Las Anod, the capital o Sool.

Furthermore, on 1 July 2007, the subclan that controls

the disputed area in eastern Sanaag proclaimed the semi-

autonomous state o Maakhir in order to distance itsel

rom both Hargeisa and Mogadishu.137 On 15 October

2007 the armed orces o Somaliland and Puntland

clashed, with Somaliland orces regaining the control o

Las Anod, Puntland orces retreating to Garowe, and hal

the towns population eeing. Te Somaliland admin-

istration aimed at avenging the 2003 humiliating deeat

and used the clash in order to divert the attention o thevoters away rom internal problems and towards an ex-

ternal threat.138 It beneted rom persistent clan tensions

in Sanaag and Sool. Indeed, within the Dhulbahante

clan, there were serious dierences over split loyalties

towards either Somaliland or Puntland.

Te clash had, nonetheless, ar wider national and

regional repercussions. It primarily indicated the

persistence o political splits and conicts within the

Dhulbahante clan, which inhabits most parts o Sool

region as well as parts o eastern Sanaag and ogdheer

regions in Somaliland. Te clash accordingly deepenedthe ri between and among clans since they developed

traditional blood euds and brought war to an area which

had not seen serious ghting beore,139 and somehow

The dispute over Sanaag andSool is, on the surace, an attempt

to legitimise political control by

both Puntland and Somaliland


11/20


tarnished Somalilands positive image o peace and

stability that was the basis or its bid or international

recognition.140

concluSIon

Somaliland can be taken as a role model or otherArican post-conict entities and states in terms o

building a peaceul and stable system making use o

local resources. Indeed, peace in Somaliland was entirely

brokered by the initiative and resources o its people, in

contrast to other externally driven peace initiatives in

Arica, including restive Somalia. Incorporating tradi-

tional institutions within the more modern structure

o government makes Somaliland unique. Yet, however

rosy they may seem, Somalilands achievements are

ragile. For one, the lack o international recognition

has undoubtedly deprived Somaliland o the benetswhich a state may claim as a member o the international

system. Available local resources are limited and access

to international economic and commercial interactions is

unortunately blocked.

Second, Somalilands conict with Puntland poses a

serious threat to the hard-won peace in Somaliland.

It could, at least, have very negative implications orSomalilands quest or recognition. Worse, the simmer-

ing conict might escalate into actual war as long as the

situation on the ground continues to be volatile. Tus,

the international community should do its best to nd

rapidly an innovative way o accommodating Somaliland

in the international system and ending the uncertainty

over its status, short o outright recognition which is an

extremely delicate issue o Arican international law and

may indeed set a dangerous precedent. Pertaining to the

SomalilandPuntland conict, the international commu-

nity should apply their tested local conict managementmethods to encourage the two protagonists to establish

a orum to openly discuss common issues and resolve

their territorial dispute. Tus, the SomalilandPuntland

conict may actually provide a avourable backdrop or

constructive involvement in northern Somalia by the

international community.

Finally, Somalilands electoral landscape is character-

ised by a lack o resources, low rates o comprehension o

electoral processes, propensities towards political violence,

and weak institutions including the central and localadministration, the National Election Commission, politi-

cal parties and civil society. More importantly, however,

the Somaliland electorate will only accept the results o the

upcoming elections i it has condence in the institution

which manages the electoral process. Tus, the National

Election Commission should go beyond its previously

disjointed and piecemeal eorts to adhere to standard

rules and practices, thus producing a calming eect on

all stakeholders. In a similar vein, all political parties

should temper their unreasonable political discourse,

especially beore the repeatedly delayed elections whichhave disappointed many and already seem marked by

extreme polarisation. Whether their al legations and

counter-allegations have any substance or not, they could

uncontrollably deepen the already dangerous mistrust

among political parties urther eroding the legitimacy o

the whole electoral system and maybe leading to violence.

Overall, all political parties must accordingly act with a

sense o responsibility, keeping in mind that Somaliland

has made enormous strides in the establishment o a viable

and democratic system o government. Te continuation

o that process will have a ar-reaching eect on themeaningul progress and promise o Somaliland.

notES

1 Iqbal Jhazbhay, Somaliland: post-war nation-building and

international relations, 1991-2006, PhD thesis, University o

the Witwatersrand, 2007, 126.

2 Serekebrhan Fiquremariam and Mirtu Beyene provided

invaluable research assistance or this paper.

3 Te SNM was ormed in 1981 in London by Isaaq migrs and

was engaged in hit-and-run operations: G Prunier, Somaliland:birth o new country, in C Gurdon, Te Horn of Africa, London:

University College London, 1994, 61; Hussein Adam, Formation

and recognition o new states: Somaliland in contrast to Eritrea,

Review of African Political Economy 21(59) (1994), 29 and 32. Te

Isaaq were closely linked to the British and became marginal-

ised aer the 1960 Somali unication, in act becoming a small

minority in a unied Somalia: M Hoehne, Political identity,

emerging state structures and conict in northern Somalia,

Journalof Modern African Studies 44(3) (2006), 401. Te Isaaq

clan indeed ormed the backbone o the SNM and continues

to be the politically and economically predominantly group

in Somaliland: S Kaplan, Te remarkable story o Somaliland,

Journal of Democracy 17(3) (2008), 148; M Bradbury, Becoming

Somaliland, London: James Currey, 2008, 52. Te SNM used

Ethiopia as a sanctuary or ood supply, recruitment, medical

treatment and also as a land base to conduct military operations.

All political parties must act

with a sense o responsibility,

keeping in mind that Somalilandhas made enormous strides in

the establishment o a viable

system o government


12/20


Te war actually served to create a political community among

the Isaaq which was reinorced by the experience o sel-

organisation in the reugee camps in Ethiopia: Mark Bradbury,

Adan Yusu Abokor and Haroon Ahmed Yusu, Somaliland:

choosing politics over violence, Review of African Political

Economy 30(97) (2003), 462.

4 Bradbury et al, Somaliland: choosing politics over violence,

456-457.

5 Current estimates vary greatly, rom 1,7 to 3,5 million, with an

urban population o between 748 000 and 1,2 mil lion: Adan

Yusu Abokor, Steve Kibble, Mark Bradbury,

Haroon Ahmed Yusu and Georgina Barrett, Further steps

to democracy: the Somaliland parliamentary elections of

September 2005, Progressio Report, 2006, 6.

6 Ministry o National Planning and Coordination, Somaliland

in gures, Hargeisa, 2004, 2-5.

7 Hoehne, Politica l identity, emerging state structures and

conict in northern Somalia, 400; Bradbury, Becoming

Somaliland, 52-53.

8 International Crisis Group (ICG), Somaliland: democratisation

and its discontents, Arica Report 66, 28 July 2003, http://www.

unhcr.org/reworld/docid/35218004.html (accessed 31 August

2009).

9 Yusu et al, Further steps to democracy.

10 Ministry o National Planning and Coordination, Somaliland

in gures, 6.

11 Tere are more than a hundred thousand members o the

Somali diaspora living in the US and Europe: Kaplan, Te

remarkable story o Somaliland, 149. For instance, some gures

estimate that more than sixty thousand politically organisedand inuential Somalis, mostly rom Somaliland, live in London

alone and advise the authorities in Somaliland: E Svedjemo, In

search o a state creating a nation: the role o the diaspora in

Somalilands pursuit o recognised statehood, masters disserta-

tion, University o Sussex, Brighton, 2002, 15, 22 and 27.

12 Kaplan, Te remarkable story o Somali land, 150; Svedjemo,

In search o a state - creating a nation, 29. It should be noted

that accurate gures on the sca le o remittances to Somalia

(including Somaliland and Puntland) are vir tually impossible

to obtain: P Little, Somalia: economy without state, Oxord:

James Currey, 2003, 149. Moreover, the international commu-

nity, in an implicit acknowledgment o Somalilands stability,

has awarded it a growing amount o assistance. For instance,

in 2007, the European Union directed approximately 70 per

cent o its aid allocation or Somalia to the north in an eort to

reward progress. Such investment is unnelled through NGOs

to avoid acing the issue o recognition: F Mangan, Somaliland:

a pressing need or recognition,Journal of International

Peace Operations, 2(4) (2007), 17. See also C Rosendahl, Te

European Commission in Somali land: development as-

sistance in an unrecognised state, in E-M Bruchhaus and M

Sommer (eds), Hot spot Horn of Africa revisited, Munster: Lit

Verlag, 2008.

13 Mohammed Fadal, Institutionalizing democracy in Somaliland,

Study sponsored by CRS, York University, 2009, 5.

14 Abdirahman Abdulle Osman and Mohamed Hassan Ibrahim,

Strengthening the role o parliament in constructive conict

management: case study o Somali experiences, 2005, http://

www.parlcpr.undp.org/pwdocs/Somalia.pd (accessed 31

August 2009).

15 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 220-229; U erlinden and

Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim, Somaliland: a success story o

peace-making, state-building and democratisation, in E-M

Bruchhaus and M Sommer (eds), Hot spot Horn of Africa

revisited, Munster: Lit Verlag, 2008, 79-80.

16 Somalilands judiciary is criticised or being mired in incom-

petence, corruption and politica l intererence: International

Crisis Group , Somaliland: democratisation and its discontents,

27. Furthermore, the judiciary suers rom a lack o well-trained

prosecutors and judges, regulation and proessional competence,

and operates in an atmosphere in which the pressure o the

administrations inuence is unmistakable. Tis state o aairs

has rendered judges who are appointed, transerred or removed

at will and are unwilling to reach decisions which might be seen

to mark them out as critical o the administration: erlinden

and Mohammed, Somaliland: a success story o peace-making,

state-building and democratisation, 80. On the judiciary, see

Academy or Peace and Development, Te judicial system inSomaliland, Workshop Report, 2002, 7; and also F Battera

and A Campo, Te evolution and integration o dierent legal

systems in the Horn o Arica: the case o Somaliland, Global

Jurist opics, 2001, http://www.mbali.ino/doc113.htm (accessed

9 September 2008). On the print media, consult M Hoehne,

Newspapers in Hargesa: reedom o speech in post-conict

Somaliland,Afrika Spectrum 43(1) (2008).

17 Abdulaziz Al-Mutairi, Somalilands economy remains steady

and progressive, 2008, http://www.somaliland.org/2008/07/08/

somaliland%E2%80%99s-economy-remains-steady-and-

progressive/ (accessed 10 October 2008).

18 In act, governing organs cannot receive bilateral techni-cal assistance rom other countries; the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund, the Arican Development Bank,

and bilateral development agencies cannot oer it loans and

nancial aid; banks and insurance companies will not set

up branches within the country; the cost o living is higher

because local rms cannot directly import goods without local

banks to issue letters o credit; international investors (and

the jobs that they would create) stay away because insurance

and other investment protections are lacking: Kaplan, Te

remarkable story o Somalila nd,148.

19 Edna Adan, Te case or unitary government, Speech delivered

by the Minister o Foreign Aairs o Somalila nd or theEthnicity and Federalism in Arica Conerence, 2006, http://

www.sirag.org.uk/case_unitary_government_edna_somal-

iland.htm (accessed 4 April 2008).

20 According to the ICG, the real engine o Somalilands recovery

had been neither the administration in place nor international

assistance, but rather the private sector, International Crisis

Group, Somaliland: democratisation and its discontents.

21 Te Somaliland economy was literally crippled between 2000

and 2002 ollowing a livestock ban by Saudi Arabia due to

suspicion o an outbreak o Ri Valley Fever, Bradbury et al,

Somaliland: choosing politics over violence, 458.

22 Te Somaliland authorities had invited US oil companies to

reclaim the 1980 exploration right. Tis development was

downplayed by all sides because o the legal concern about

Somalias claim o sovereignty over Somaliland.


13/20


23 See Adan, Te case or unitary government.

24 For instance, a meat produce complex was constructed

in Burao at an estimated cost o US$160 000: Economist

Intelligence Unit, Somalia: country report, 2008, 11.

25 M orome, Somaliland: Aricas best kept secret, Somaliland.

Org, 2007, http://www.mbali.ino/doc365.htm (accessed 9

September 2008).26 Social services are in less admirable shape, being heavily

dependent on external support: International Crisis Group,

Somaliland: democratisation and its discontents, 6. Te

Somaliland administration, together with Western donors,

international NGOs and the United Nations, has been able

to restore rudimentary education and health care services

throughout Somaliland.

27 Prunier, Somaliland: birth o new country, 65-66.

28 Bonn International Center or Conversion, Demobilisation in

the Horn o Arica, Brie 4, 1995, 12; Jhazbhay, Somaliland:

post-war nation-building and international relations, 128-129.

See also P atchell, Aricas success story: against all the odds,and with international support, Somaliland is well on the road

to stability and democracy, Te Guardian, 2007, http://www.

commentisree.guardian.co.uk/peter_tatchell/2007/04/aricas_

sucess_story.html (accessed 10 October 2008); United Nations

Development Programme, Somalia and Somaliland: strategies

or dialogue and consensus on governance and democratic

transition, Paper prepared or the Oslo Governance Centre,

2003, http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docsoslo/conict%20

prevention/OGC%20research%20paper%20on%20Somalia%20

and%20Somaliland.pd (accessed 17 September 2008).

29 Te navy is endowed with a marine college located at Berbera.

30 Jhazbhay, Somaliland: post-war nation-building and interna-tional relations, 129; erlinden and Mohammed, Somaliland:

a success story o peace-making, state-building and democra-

tisation?, 71; D Shinn, Somaliland: the little country that could,

Center or Strategic and International Studies, Arican Notes

9, 2002, 5.

31 Te Somaliland armed orces are the main military system

in the unrecognised Republic o Somaliland - along with

the Somaliland police orce - all o whom are part o the

internal security orces and are subordinate to the military.

Currently around 5 000 personnel are active in Somaliland.

Te Somaliland armed orces take the biggest share o the

governments budget with the police and security orces. Te

army is organised into 12 divisions which comprise 4 tank

brigades, 45 mechanised and inantry brigades, 4 commando

brigades, a surace-to-air missile brigade, 3 artil lery brigades,

300 eld battalions, and an air deense battalion: Mohammed

Omar, Somaliland: a state o aultlessness, 2008, 5, http://

www.somaliland.org/2008/09/23/somaliland-a-state-o-

aultlessness/ (accessed 20 April 2009).

32 Constitution o the Republic o Somaliland, approved by

reerendum on 31 May 2001, 2001, 38, http://www.chr.up.ac.za/

undp/domestic/docs/c_Somaliland.pd (accessed 17 September

2008).

33 Constitution o the Republic o Somaliland, 30.

34 Fadal, Institutionalizing democracy in Somaliland, 17.

35 Osman and Ibrahim, Strengthening the role o parliament

in constructive conict management, 32. Tere is also a an

omnipotent extrajudicial Security Committee made up o the

Minister o the Interior, the Minister o Justice, the Minister

o Deence, the Commander o the Police, the Commander o

the Armed Forces, the Governor, and the Mayor o Hargeisa,

which has the power to arrest citizens without court order and

indenitely: A Duale Siiarag, A reality check on Rayaales

Somaliland, Waardheernews.com, 2007, http://wardheernews.

com/articles_07/august/04_reality_check_On_riyaale.html(accessed 31 August 2009).

36 I M Lewis, Te modern history of Somaliland: from nation to

state, London: Weideneld and Nicolson, 1965, 40.

37 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 25.

38 Lewis, Te modern history of Somaliland, 47-48.

39 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 26; E H M Cliord, Te

British Somaliland-Ethiopia boundary, Geographical Journal

87(4) (1936), 295.

40 M Hoehne, raditional authorities in northern Somalia:

transformation in positions and powers, Max Planck Institute

or Social Anthropology, Working Paper 82, 2006, 8.

41 British Somaliland had initially achieved independence on 26

June 1960.

42 Shinn, Somaliland: the little country that could, 1.


44 Aer independence, euphoria rapidly soured as signs o state

dysunction mounted. Corruption worsened, electoral politics

became increasingly chaotic, and state programs delivered

little public benet. Clannism inected politics and adminis-

trative organs as each group sought to maximise the spoils that

it could loot rom the system: Kaplan, Te remarkable story o

Somaliland, 146.45 Hussein Mahmoud, Somali nationalism and the new chal-

lenges o identity and citizenship in northern Somalia, Paper

submitted to CODESRIAs Multinational Working Group on

Citizenship in Arica, 2007, 12.

46 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 35-39; Kaplan, Te remark-

able story o Somaliland, 147.

47 Te Somali Salivation Democratic Front (SSDF) was

established in 1979. It was composed o deectors rom

the Somali armed orces and was backed by Darod clans.

Ethiopia accorded the SSDF quite generous support in terms

o money, train ing and weaponry, even though the propor-

tions o this Ethiopian support cannot be precisely estimatedon the basis o available inormation, which is incomplete

and unreliable.

48 Prunier, Somaliland: birth o new country, 61; Kaplan, Te

remarkable story o Somaliland, 148; Shinn, Somaliland: the

little country that could, 1.

49 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 45-46.

50 erlinden and Mohammed, Somaliland: a success story o

peace-making, state-building and democratisation, 70.

51 Prunier, Somaliland: birth o new country, 62; Bradbury et al,

Somaliland: choosing politics over violence, 459. Many o the

non-Isaaq clans had established their own militias in order todeend themselves against the SNM in the late 1980s, Hoehne,

raditional authorities in northern Somalia, 14.

52 Bradbury et al, Somaliland: choosing politics over violence, 456.


14/20


53 International Crisis Group, Somaliland: democratisation and

its discontents, 6.

54 Prunier, Somaliland: birth o new country?, 63; Bradbury et

al, Somaliland: choosing politics over violence, 457; Bradbury,

Becoming Somaliland, 81.


459; Jhazbhay, Somaliland: post-war nation-building andinternational relations, 65.


459; International Crisis Group, Somaliland: democratisation

and its discontents, 9.



its discontents, 9.



60 Te conict, which lasted ten months and killed over 1 000

people, was triggered by the governments rst attempts toextend its authority by reorganising the SNM orces into a

national army and imposing control over revenue and aid

coming into Somaliland through Berbera: Bradbury, Becoming

Somaliland, 87.


62 Jhazbhay, Somaliland: post-war nation-building and interna-

tional relations, 68.

63 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 98; Shinn, Somaliland: the

little country that could, 2.


its discontents, 10.

65 Jhazbhay, Somaliland: post-war nation-building and inter-

national relations, 68; Bradbury et al, Somaliland: choosing

politics over violence, 460.


460; erlinden and Mohammed, Somaliland: a success story o



460; International Crisis Group, Somaliland: democratisa-

tion and its discontents, 10; Kaplan, Te remarkable story o

Somaliland, 148.

68 Bradbury et al, Somaliland: choosing politics over violence, 460.69 Jhazbhay, Somaliland: post-war nation-building and interna-

tional relations, 69.

70 Kaplan, Te remarkable story of Somaliland, 151; International

Crisis Group, Somaliland: democratisation and its discontents, 11.



73 Ibid, 111.


peace-making, state-building and democratisation, 73; Kaplan,

Te remarkable story o Somaliland, 149.


76 Kaplan, Te remarkable story o Somaliland, 148-149; Bradbury

et al, Somali land: choosing politics over violence, 461.

77 International Crisis Group, Somaliland: democratisation

and its discontents, 12; Initiative and Reerendum Institute,

Somaliland National Referendum May 31, 2001, Final report o

the Initiative and Reerendum Institutes Election Monitoring

eam, 2001, 11.


463; Hoehne, raditional authorities in northern Somalia, 16.

79 Aae Ghechoua, Somaliland: et pourtant, il onctionne, Jeune

Afrique 2114 (2001), 28.


its discontents, 12; Shinn, Somaliland: the little country that

could, 2; Initiative and Reerendum Institute, Somalila nd

National Reerendum, 1; Bradbury et al, Somaliland: choosing

politics over violence, 463.

81 Internationa l Crisis Group, Somaliland: democratisation and


82 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 183; Stig J Hansen, R Hollekim

and G M Srensen, Somaliland: elections for the Lower House of

Parliament, September 2005, Nordem Report 3, 2006, 16.





86 Te National Security Service was the primary intelligence

agency o Siad Barres regime, combining internal security and

external intelligence. It was set up in 1969 and was headed by

Brigadier General Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle (Siad Barres son-

in-law who was trained by the KGB and also served as head o

Army Intelligence). It was highly despised in Somaliland.

87 Hansen et al, Somaliland: elections for the Lower House of

Parliament, 11.

88 Kaplan, Te remarkable story o Somaliland, 150.


469-471.


91 Yusu et al, Further steps to democracy: 19; Bradbury,

Becoming Somaliland, 209; erlinden and Mohammed,

Somaliland: a success story o peace-making, state-building

and democratisation, 76.

92 Hansen et al, Somali land: elections or the Lower House oParliament, 46.

93 Yusu et al, Further steps to democracy, 8.





465 and 471; Hoehne, Newspapers in Hargeysa, 99.

97 A Finnish civil engineer who neither served with the SNM

nor held an ofcial position with the Barre government:

International Crisis Group, Somaliland: democratisation and


98 Adan Abokor and S Kibble, Somaliland pre-election assess-

ment o local and presidential elections scheduled or 1 July

and 31 August 2008, 2008, 10.


15/20


99 Ibid, 7.

100 NA, NEC on a rope? Te need or good leadership, Te

Academy oday 1(1) (2007), 1; Fadal, Institutionalising

democracy in Somaliland, 23.

101 Osman and Ibrahim, Strengthening the role o parliament in

constructive conict management, 40.

102 Fadal, Institutionalising democracy in Somaliland, 23-24.

103 Abokor and Kibble, Somaliland pre-election assessment

o local and presidential elections, 6 and 13; Amnesty

International, Human rights challenges: Somaliland facing

elections, 2009, 2.

104 Shinn, Somaliland: the little country that could, 6.

105 Peter Schraeder, Why the United States should recognise

Somalilands independence, 2006, http://www.hiiraan.

com (accessed 16 June 2008); Adan, Te case or unitary

government.

106 Schraeder, Why the United States should recognise

Somalilands independence.

107 Adam, Formation and recognition o new states, 25-26;

Kassahun Addis, Somaliland: politics o recognition, BA

thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2004, 21.


109 Mangan, Somaliland: a pressing need or recognition, 17.

When it comes to the internal aspect o the state, in most o the

literature in social and political sciences, the state is usually

dened as a centralised organisation. Tis organisation is led

by the states leadership, which has won the domestic political

competition. In addition, it is composed o a set o numerous

institutions, which includes the bureaucracy, judicial bodyand the coercive organs such as the police and the mil itary,

as well as the laws and procedures by which they operate. Te

state possesses the authority to make and implement binding

rules or the entire social groups and indiv iduals banded

together within its territorial connes. Te state also has the

monopoly in the use o orce necessary or the sustenance o its

control over the activities and interactions o these groups and

individuals. Final ly, the unctions o the state are basically to

maintain civ il order, settle disputes, provide collective goods

and services, and render external deense.

110 Kaplan, Te remarkable story o Somaliland, 152; Kassahun,

Somaliland: politics o recognition, 20. For close to two

decades, Somalilands authorities have tried hard to gain

recognition rom the international community. Te question

o recognition or them is justiable, since they eel Somaliland

possesses and ulls almost all the legal and practical require-

ments that an entity should have to be accepted as a state.

Tere are even claims that Somaliland had been independent

or thousands o years even beore it became the colony o

Britain. What constitutes Somaliland currently are, accord-

ing to these claims, those territories ounded by the British

colonial power: Ministry o Inormation, Somaliland: demand

or international recognition, Hargeisa, 2001.

111 For an interesting comparative study o Somaliland and

Eritrea, see Adam, Formation and recognition o new states.

112 Kaplan, Te remarkable story o Somali land, 153. Somaliland

has a population o three million; its territory is dened by

three colonial treaties; it possesses a unctioning central

government, which has a capital city, a constitution, dierent

institutions, a ag, currency and elections, and eectively

controls most o Somalilands territory; and Somaliland has

entered into ormal and inormal cooperative agreements in

dierent areas with a number o states: International Crisis

Group, Somaliland: time or Arican Union leadership,

Africa Report110 (2006), 10-11. Kaplan argues that Somalia

proper does not meet the 1933 Montevideo Conventionscriteria: Kaplan, Te remarkable story o Somali land, 153.

Indeed, Somalia, which is stil l a u ll member o the United

Nations, continues to be an imagined state in the absence o

a unctioning administration able to assert eective control

over the capital Mogadishu, let alone a signicant part o

its territory. Te irony o the whole aair is that, lacking de

jureinternational recognition even in the ace o Somalias

internal collapse and ragmentation, Somaliland is a govern-

ment without a state, while Somalia is a state without a

government or the better part o the past two decades: S

Kibble, Somaliland: surviving w ithout recognition; Somalia:

recognised but ailing, International Relations 15(5) (2001).

Somalia has not been able to attain the institutional xtureso statehood and act as a magnet which could be attractive

enough to compel Somaliland to compromise in order to

benet rom the restoration o economic and political relations

and also to share a sense o shared destiny as in 1960.

113 According to reliable sources, elites in Somali land managed to

orge some sort o a consensus in order to protect or maintain

the status quo, in other words the relative peace o the past

eighteen years. Accordingly, these sources do not agree on the

act that about 90 per cent would opt or total independence

rom Somalia. Tey argue that there are certain clans who

eel that they belong to another camp. Politically motivated

co-optation plays an important role in keeping such groups

in check.

114 See Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 253-254. Regarding the

situation in Somaliland, some analysts contend that it is more

or less loose and that there is rampant corruption and disre-

gard or peoples collective interests. Moreover, addiction to

khat and an insatiable struggle or power is there or the long

haul. In a nutshell, these analysts question the very viability o

the administration in Somaliland.


116 Ibid, 153-154.

117 bid, 152.

118 Adam, Formation and recognition o new states, 37.

119 Mangan, Somaliland: a pressing need or recognition, 17.

120 J Craword, Te creation of states in international law, Oxord:

Oxord University Press, 2006, 415. According to Craword,

Somaliland has not been granted recognition or a number

o reasons, some o which are the ollowing: there is strong

international reluctance to support unilateral secession or

separation; even i reerenda conducted in territories wishing

to secede returned substantial majorities in avour, it is a

matter or the government o the state concerned to respond;

and, even in the context o separate colonial territories,

unilateral secession is an exception especially i the govern-ment o the state concerned is opposed to it: ibid, 417-418.

121 S Pegg, De facto states in the international system, Institute

o International Relations, Working Paper 21, 1998, 1. Pegg


16/20


denes a de acto state, within the area o international law,

as a secessionist entity that receives popular support and

has achieved sufcient capacity to provide governmental

services to a given population in a dened territorial area, over

which it maintains eective control or an extended period o

time: ibid.

122 erlinden and Mohammed, Somal iland: a success story o

peace-making, state-building a nd democratisation, 81; M

Hoehne, Statehood as legal/political concept and empirical

reality in the context o state-collapse and state-reconstruc-

tion: the case o Somaliland, 2006, 6; Osman and Ibrahim,

Str

Documents

The Political Development of Somaliland and Its Conflict With Puntland