The political aspects of monitoring radioactive

materials in the environment of our region

E. Wirth, M ZähringerFederal Office for Radiation Protection, Freiburg, Germany

Topical Day on monitoring of radioactivity in the environment12-13 April 2011, Oslo, Norway

•The political aspects of monitoring radioactive materials in the environment and

•The special aspects of the Baltic Sea Region.

(man made radioactivity only)

Limitation of the dose to the public: 1mSv per year from nuclear installations

Derived maximum permissible releases per year fro NPP:Atmopsphere 3 x 1010 Bq/a arosolbound radionuclides10 x 1010 Bq/a iodine-13110 x 1015 Bq/a noble gases (+ C-14 +H-3)

Waste water5 x 1010 Bq/a fission and activation products5 x 1013 Bq/a H-3

Similar limits are specified for enrichment plants, fuel fabrication plants, research reactors or repositories accordingly.

Site specific monitoring

Monitoring of effluents (stack and waste water)

Environmental Monitoring

Licencee has to demonstratre that dose limits are met. Emission monitoring ensures that maximum permissible releases are not exceeded.

Conservative environmental dose model uses the measured annual release rates as input to prove that dose limits are met.

The regulator has to control the measurements. Immission monitoring ensures that maximum permissible releases are not exceeded.

The measurement program is not dense and frequent enough for a proper dose estimation of man but gives an independent additional check that doses calculated from emissions are indeed below the limit.

According to “Richtline zur Emissions- und Immissionsüberwachung kerntechnischer Anlagen“

General environmental monitoring

Decided in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident

Purpose:

1. assess contamination in the environment and

2. dose

From recognizing

1. unknown sources

2. from accidental releases with impact in longer range (>25km)

Goal: Keep doses as low as reasonably achievable, i.e. be precautionary

According to: „Strahlenschutzvorsorgegesetz“

IMIS Routine Monitoring Program

External radiation 1800 Dose rate monitoring probes

Inhalation 40 Air measurement stations (DWD)

Ingestion 10000 samples of food, animal feed, drinking water.

Measurements carried out by „Länder“

Additional measurements

Mobile in-situ systems,

River water, North- and Baltic Sea,

Trace analysis

Purpose also: Excersise and Training

IMIS Accidential Monitoring Program

During plume passage 1800 GDR probes report every 10 minutes + automatic nuclides specific measurements

Sheltering, evacuation, thyroid blocking

After plume passage 1800 GDR probes + 27 mobile in-situ systems + 4 airborne systems,

Food and feed sampling, particularly where contamination is of the order of EU limits

Late evacuation, recovery, identification of critical areas, enforce food bans

Late phase Decrease of measurement frequency,

Recovery, observe succss of countermeasures

German network of 1800 GDR probes

Great interest of the public after the Fukushima accident, though no signal to be expected.Timeliness important, not verified data (!)

Trace analysis

• 1953 first detection of weapon test fallout at Schauinsland

• Kr-85 monitoring since 1973 -> Global fissile material inventory (reprocessed Weapon-Pu)

• Participation in CTBT verification• Strong CTBT support of EU (Joint

action)• Strong support for scientific and

civil use of CTBT data

Aspects for the Baltic Sea Region

Densitiy of German GDR network comparable to NL, A, CH, B but much more than F,E,GB and others. This shows different aproaches, i.e equal distribution vs. focus on populated areas

The EU monitoring program

Dense network Sparse network

= IMIS Routine monitoring program in Germany

Few samples /sampling sites with high sensitive measurements

Asses relevant contamination and representative levels in different media

Observe low levels and trends, measure above MDC

How to overcome differences

• Agree on common objectives, not on unified programmes

• Clarify what can be achieved by environmental monitoring (and what cannot …)