Research Group MEGA Mobilization, Extractivism,and Government Action

Work ing Paper No.2 | June 2018

Ludovico Feoli

The Policy and Institutional Effects of Resistance in Costa Rica’s Energy Sector: A Case Study

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ThepolicyandinstitutionaleffectsofresistanceinCostaRica’sEnergySector:ACaseStudyLudovicoFeoli,TulaneUniversityAbstractCostaRicahaschampionedastate-ledelectricitymodelpremisedonhydroelectricpower.Thishasenabledthecountrytoproduceareliableenergysupplywithuniversalcoverage,thatisrenewableandlow-carbon,thuscongruentwithitsidentityasaglobalenvironmentalleader.Thestate-ownedelectricalcompany(ICE),whichenjoysanearmonopolyingenerationanddistribution,andanabsolutemonopolyintransmissionandexport,hasdevelopedconsiderableexpertiseandtechnicalknow-howinhydroelectricpower.Thecompanyhasalsohadsignificantautonomyintheplanninganddevelopmentofprojects.SocialmovementscontributedtotheenthronementofICEbuthavealsomobilizedatvariouspointstocheckitspower.Thispaperexaminesthepolicyandinstitutionaleffectsofthisopposition.Itshowshowresistancetoitslatestmegaproject,Diquís,followsalongtraditionofsocialmobilizationintheelectricsectorandhaslaunchedadebateaboutthecountry’senergymodel.Introduction HydroelectricpowerhasbeenacentralcomponentofelectricitygenerationinCostaRicasince

thelatenineteenthcentury.Whenitnationalizeditselectricitysectorintheearlytwentiethcenturythe

countrychosehydroasitscentralaxisofdevelopment.Thestateutilitycompany,Instituto

CostarricensedeElectricidad(ICE),developedthenecessarytechnicalcapacitiesin-house,collaborating

withtheUniversityofCostaRica(ChavezandCortésRamos2013,84).Asthesolerepositoryof

technicalexpertiseandamonopolyoperator,itenjoyedconsiderableautonomyintheplanningand

directionofprojectsandsectoralpolicies.Thelarge-scaleprojectsitdevelopedbecameamatterof

nationalpride,andICEcametobecloselyidentifiedwitha“Tico”modelofdevelopment,basedon

socialsolidarityandenvironmentalprotection(ChavezandCortésRamos2013,72).Todaythecountry

enjoysvirtuallyuniversalcoverageintheelectricsectorwithsomeofthehighestpercentagesof

generationfromrenewablesourcesworldwide.Whenpolicyreformsatthebeginningofthiscentury

attemptedtoprivatizethesector,oneofthemostardentandsustainedsocialmovementsinthe

country’shistory,theanti-Combomovement,organizedindefenseofICE.Aswillbeseenbelow,this

wasconsistentwiththeroleplayedbysocialmovementsatthebeginningofthepreviouscenturyinthe

longchainofeventsleadingtothenationalizationofelectricityandtheestablishmentofstate

leadershipinthatsector.

However,inrecentyearsthecompany’sinfallibilityhasdiminished.Partialreformsinthe1990s

openedaspace,albeitlimited,forprivategeneratorsthat,togetherwithacoopsectorestablishedin

the1960s,havedriveninvestmentintoalternativerenewables.Theyhavecapitalizeduponthegrowing

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affordabilityofsmallerscaledeploymentsforrenewableenergysourcesthatarewelladaptedtothe

country’stopographyandclimate,includingwindandsolar,butalsomicro-hydro.Notonlyhasthis

chippedawayatICE’smarketdominance,butbycreatingapowerfulinterestvyingforgreater

liberalizationofthesector,ithasalsodiminisheditpoliticaldominance.

Atthesametime,ICEhasfounditselfatthecenterofthecountry’semergentsocio-

environmentalconflicts.Asawarenessoftheimportanceofwaterforeconomicdevelopmenthas

growninrecentyears,itscontrolhasbecomeincreasinglycontentious(ProgramaEstadodeLaNación

2013).Localcommunitiesclaimingsovereigntyovertheresourcehaveorganizedtodefendagainstits

usurpation,realorperceived.1Aswillbeseen,thisbuildsonalonghistoryofsocialmovements

assertinganddefendingthecountry’ssovereigntyoverhydraulicpower,andthestate’srolein

harnessingit.Despiteconsiderableinroadsingeothermalenergy,ICE’scontinuedrelianceonmega

hydrodevelopmentshasplaceditsquarelywithintheseconflicts.Abroadsocialmovementcomprised

ofenvironmentalists,localcommunityorganizations,andindigenousorganizationshasrepeatedly

opposedthesemegaprojectsoverthepasttwodecades.Paradoxically,twodecadesafteritsrescue

fromprivatizationbyonesocialmovementICEnowfindsitselfseverelychallengedbyanother.

Aswillbediscussedbelow,socialmovementshavemanagedtostopmegaprojectsinPacuare

andSaavegreandhavedetainedandseriouslyimperiledwhatICEconsiderstobeitskeyenergyproject

forthenext25years,theDiquísproject.AsIwillargue,thisstruggle,asothersbeforeitintheenergy

sector,hashadtangibleinstitutionalandpolicyimpacts.Ithaslaunchedadebateaboutthecountry’s

energymodelandpromptedaninstitutionalstruggleforthegovernanceoftheenergysector.Thefirst

involvesquestioningthecostandsustainabilityoflarge-scaleextractiveenergyprojects,the

consequencesofmonopolypower,andtheroleofprivateplayersintheenergysector.Thesecond

involvesthereassertionofexistentbutlatentpowersintheexecutivebranchtomakeICEamore

accountableplayer.

AsIwillalsoargue,thesedevelopmentscapitalizeonalonghistoryofsocialmobilization

surroundingthecontrolofvaluableenergyresources.Socialmobilizationopposingaprivateelectricity

monopolyintheearlyyearsofthesector’shistoryledtothecreationofapublicone,butsuccessive

mobilizationschippedawayatit,creatingmoreofahybridsectorwithnewmunicipal,coopand,more

recently,privateactors.Whilejusticehasbeenacontinuousmotivationformobilization,thediscourse

articulatedbysocialmovementshasevolvedsequentiallyfromadefenseofnationalsovereigntyover

1ThroughouttheCAFTAratificationprocess,forexample,unfoundedallegationsabouttheprivatizationofwaterwereamongtheissuesthatfueledmobilizationagainsttheagreement.

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powerresources,toaconcernwiththeaffordabilityandrelianceofelectricity,andfinallytoademand

foropenness,accountability,andenvironmentalresponsibility.Throughahistoricallygrounded

descriptionofthesemobilizationsthepresentcasestudyprovidesalongitudinalexaminationofthe

policyandinstitutionalimpactsofsocialmobilizationsintheCostaRicanelectricitysector.

InstitutionalandpolicyimpactsareexaminedintheframeworkestablishedbySilva(2017).

Withoutdiscussingtheframeworkatlength,andattheriskofoversimplifyingit,Iwillassumethat

impactscanbeeitherdirectorindirect.Directeffectsarethosewhereimmediateconsequencescanbe

tracedtotheactionsofsocialmovements,suchasthesuccessorfailureofaproject,ortheinfluencing

ofpolicybasedonmovementdemands.Indirecteffectsarethosewheremobilizationinfluencesallies

orpublicopinion,whichtheninfluencesoutcomesindependently.Effectscanalsobejointormediated.

Injointeffects,movementsinfluencepublicopinion,whichelicitspoliciesthatreflecttheirobjectives

frompolicymakersthataresensitivetopublicopinion.Inmediatedeffects,movementsachievetheir

objectivesbyallyingdirectlywithinstitutionalpoliticalactors.Astotheeffectsthemselves,theyinclude

agendasetting,policyinitiation,formulation,implementation,andfeedbackloops,aswellasformaland

informalinstitutionalchanges,includingnewformsofinclusionorexclusionandimprovementsinstate

efficacyandefficiency.

Historyofsocialmovementsandtheelectricalsector

CostaRicareliedonhydroelectricpowerfromtheearliestperiodofitselectrification.Itsvery

firstplant,inauguratedin1884with50kilowatts(kw)tolightthestreetsofSanJosé,washydroelectric.2

Sowerethosewhichbroughtelectricitytotheotherprovincialcapitals—Cartago(1892),Alajuela

(1895),andHeredia(1897)(delaCruz2004,159).Thecountry’sfirstmajorexpansionofgenerating

capacitywashydroelectric:twoplants(750kw)developedin1900bytheCostaRicanElectricLightand

TractionCompany,whichalsoranelectrictramsinSanJoséandwasownedbyMinorKeith(ofUnited

FruitCompanyfame),withathirdproject(1,000kw)followingin1912.Twolocalcompetitors

appeared,theCompañiaNacionaldeElectricidad(1911)andtheCompañíaNacionalHidroeléctrica

(1922),adding2,500kwand2,720kwofpower,respectively,allfromhydroelectricsources.Whenthe

pacificrailwayconnectingthecapitaltotheportofPuntarenaswaselectrifiedin1928,itwaswith

powersourcedfromanewhydroelectricplantinTacares.Allcapacityexpansionplansconsideredat

thetime,likethoseforelectrificationofthecentralvalley,ortheutilizationofsurplusenergyfromthe

2ItisnoteworthythatthisoccurredascanttwoyearsafterThomasEdisoninstalledthefirst-everpubliclightingandtransportationsysteminNewYorkCity.

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railroadproject,werebasedonhydroelectricpower(JiménezGómez2009,158).Infact,waterwas

increasinglyseenasanationalresource,vitaltothecountry’seconomicdevelopment.Asearlyas1910,

thelegislaturenationalized“allhydraulicforces”,reasoningthatifsuchforces“constitutenational

richessuperiorinvaluetoallotherresourcesofoursoil,itisthedutyofthestatetoconservethemfor

thegeneralinterest”3(JiménezGómez2009,156,RodríguezArguello2000,46).

In1928,theAmericanandForeignPowerCompany,asubsidiaryoftheU.S.-basedElectricBond

andShareCompanygainedfinancialcontrolofallthelocalproducers,infactconstitutingamonopoly,

thatcametobeknownas“theTrust”.4Thisgeneratedconsiderableoppositionandledtothe

mobilizationofdiversecitizengroups.Numerousconcentrationstookplaceinthecapitalandprovinces

todenouncetheforeign-ownedmonopolyasaninfringementofnationalsovereigntyinasectorofkey

strategicimportance.OrganizedbytheComisiónObrera(Workers’Commission)theyweresoonjoined

byothergroupsliketheComitédeDefensadelaRiquezaNacional(CommitteefortheDefenseof

NationalWealth)andtheLigaCívica(CivicLeague)indenouncingthetransnationalmonopoly(dela

Cruz2004,161,JiménezGómez2009,137).TheCivicLeague,whichincludedsomeofthemost

prominentpublicintellectualsandpoliticiansoftheday,ledthecallforthepassageoflegislationthat

wouldempowerthestatetocontrolthemonopolyandregulatetheenergysector(RodríguezArguello

2000,42).Theresultwasthenationalizationofallelectricityderivedfromhydraulicforces—alreadya

reserveofthestate,asmentionedabove—andthe1941creationoftheServicioNacionaldeElectricidad

(SNE,NationalElectricityService),anewstateentitytoregulateandcontrolallaspectsofhydroelectric

extraction.ThisconstitutedCostaRica’sfirstsustainedsocialmobilizationintheelectricsectorwith

directinstitutionalandpolicyconsequences.Itsaffirmationofthestateasthestewardofelectricity

extraction,andhydraulicresourcesasaninherentlynationalenergysource,setthecourseforthe

developmentoftheelectricalsectorthroughoutthetwentiethcentury,andintothetwenty-first.

TheGreatDepressiongreatlylimitedtheinvestmentcapacityofthestate,sononewplants

wereaddedandthesectorcontinuedunderprivatemonopolyfortwoadditionaldecades.Atthesame

time,nationalizationstymiedprivateinvestment,greatlylimitingthequalityandquantityofenergy

supplied(León,ArroyoBlanco,andMonteroMora2016,103).Broaddissatisfactionresultedinnew

civicmobilizations,asinthecaseoftheAssociaciónNacionalparalaDefensadelConsumidorEléctrico

(NationalAssociationfortheDefenseoftheConsumerofElectricity),whichadvocatedfora“national”

3Asinsubsequentcases,translationfromtheoriginalSpanishlanguagesourcesaremyown.4Aformalmergeroccurredin1941withthecreationoftheCompañíaNacionaldeFuerzayLuz(CNFL),sanctionedbytheNationalCongress,witha25-yearconcessionandthegrantofanexclusivepurchaseoptiontotheCostaRicanstate.See(FernándezRobles1985,241-247).

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solutiontotheproblemsofenergysupply,echoingtheearliercallsoftheLigaCívica.Giventheinability

ofthenationalgovernmenttoprovidethissolution,thegroupsupportedeffortsatthemunicipallevel,

resultingintheCarrillosdePoáshydroelectricproject,startedin1946bythecityofHerediaand

completedin1951(ICEUndated-a,ESPH).Thisledtothecreation,in1949,oftheJuntaAdministrativa

delServicioEléctricoMunicipaldeHeredia(JASEMH),laterconvertedtotheEmpresadeServicios

PúblicosdeHeredia(ESPH).

Moresignificantchangescamein1949.Thatyearmarkedtheendofacivilconflictthatbrought

JoséFiguerestopower.5Hismovementespousedasocialdemocraticagenda,withanexplicitrolefor

thestateindirectingeconomicdevelopment.Itmovedswiftlytoimplementitthroughaseriesof

decrees,oneofwhichledtothecreationofICE.6Theneworganization’smandateincluded“taking

advantageofhydroelectricenergytofortifythenationaleconomyandpromotethegreatestwelfarefor

theCostaRicanpeople”(JuntaFundadoradelaSegundaRepública1949,1).Thechargeisclearly

compatiblewith,andcanbeseenasalogicalcontinuationof,thereasoningbehindthe1910

nationalizationofhydraulicresourcesandthe1928nationalizationofhydroelectricenergy.Thus,the

choiceofhydropowerasanationalimperativeandtheviewofitsdevelopmentasasovereignpublic

good,wereingrainedintheorganizationfromitsinception.

ICEdidnotimmediatelydisplacetheCNFL.7Infact,themultinationalcontinuedtoownthe

distributionlinesforalmosttwentyyearsmore,givingitconsiderableleverageoveritsnewborn

competitor,andtheabilitytochargehighelectricitypriceswithfrequentand—inlightofthepoor

qualityoftheservice—seeminglyarbitrarilylargerateincreases.Alvarenga(2005,Ch.3)describeshow

thissituationbecameacatalystforsocialprotestthatwouldbeemulatedinfuturemobilizations.She

portraystheemergenceofabroadsocialmovement,startingin1952,aroundthreekeygroups:The

JuntasProgresistas(ProgressiveCouncils),theAssociaciónNacionalparalaDefensadelConsumidor

Eléctrico(ANDCE,introducedabove),andtheAlianzadeMujeresCostarricenses(AllianceofCostaRican

Women,AMC).TheJuntasProgresistaswereneighborhood-basedcouncilsorganizedtoadvocatefor

localpublicworksandunitedinanationalfederation,althoughtheirmaininfluencewasinthecapital.

5AfteratransitionalperiodattheheadofaJunta,andcedingpowersothatthelegitimatelyelectedOtilioUlatecouldfinishhisperiod,FigueresfoundedtheNationalLiberationParty(PLN)andwaselectedtothepresidencyin1953.Thepartywaslargelydominantuntil1978,includinganadditionaltermforFigueres(1970-74),andhasremainedamongthemainpoliticalactors.6Otherinstitutionalreformsweretheabolitionofthearmy,thenationalizationofthebankingsector,andtheextensionofsuffragetowomen.ThesereformswereratifiedbyaconstituentassemblyandincludedintheConstitutionof1949.7ThebuyoutofElectricBondandShare’sstockinCNFLwouldnotbefinalizeduntil1967.

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TheAMCsoughttoeducatewomenabouttheircitizenshiprightsandadvocateforbetterhousing,

healthservicesandemployment.8

Inresponsetotheratehikes,theJuntasproselytizedonstreetcornerstodrivesupportersto

communitymeetings,whereprotestactionswerediscussed,agreedto,andlaunched.Keyamongthese

actionswerecitizenmarches,paymentstrikes,andapagones(blackouts).Thelattertwostrategies

wereeffortstocoordinateactionatthehouseholdlevelasashowofcollectiveforce.Thestrikeswere

aimedatdenyingpaymenttotheelectriccompany,whiletheapagoneswereintendedtoblackout

entiresectorsofthecitybyleavingthelightsoffatdusk.WhiletheANDCEwentdoor-to-doorcollecting

pledgestorefusepayment,thethreatofdisconnectiondissuadedmanyfromjoining,stymyingthe

paymentstrike.Buttheapagoneswerehighlysuccessful.Themarcheswerealsojoinedbyunion

members,students,andeventhechambersofcommerceandagriculture.Themovement’smessage,

broadcastthroughflyersandinterviewsinthepressandradio,soughttodelegitimizetheratehikesby

highlightingtheirinjustice.Eventually,however,itevolvedintoafull-throateddemandtonationalize

theCNFL.

In1958a45%increaseinelectricityratesdrovethemovementintoactionwithrenewed

strength.Bythisjunctureitsdiscoursewasfullynationalist.Amajorconcentrationwascalledfor

September15,1958,thecountry’sIndependenceDay.Thesymbolismwasunequivocal:itlinkedthe

movement’sstruggleagainsttheforeigncompanywiththefightagainstimperialoppression,wonfirst

duringtheindependencemovementagainstSpain,andthenagainintheNationalCampaignof1856-57

againstthefilibusteringWilliamWalker.“LetthepeopleofCostaRicareclaimwhatbelongstothem

legitimately—thelight,theenergyemanatingfromourrivers”(AlvarengaVenutolo2005,141),readone

editorialincitingparticipants.Allpoliticalforcesinthecountryjoinedthemarch,makingitaresounding

success.EventhePresident,MarioEchandi,spokeattherally,committing,intheheatofthemoment,

tofulfill“anaspirationofCostaRicansmanifestedthroughalltimes”,bynationalizingtheCNFL.Helater

retractedhimselfunderpressurefromtheopposition(PLN).9However,theepisodeissignificantintwo

ways.First,itshowscontinuitywiththeclaimforenergysovereigntyespousedbythesocialmovements

ofthepreviousdecades.Second,thepresident’sverbalvalidationoftheclaimsuggestsarecognitionof

8Thiswasnot,strictlyspeaking,afeministorganization,sinceitembracedtraditionalfemalerolesaspartofitsdiscourse.Whileitwaspluralist—asanalliancewouldbe—itwascloselylinkedto,andembracedby,thefarleftPartidoVanguardiaPopular.AsWickham-CrowleyandEckstein(2015,37)haveargued,womeninLatinAmericamobilizedforavarietyofsocio-economiccauseswellbeforedoingsoforgender-specificconcerns.9ThecommunistleaderManuelMoraspokeattherallyalso,makingEchandisusceptibletocriticismfromanti-communistsectors.ExpropriatinganAmericancompanyin1958entailedacomplexnationalandinternationalcalculusgiventhestageoftheColdWaratthetime.

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itsbroadbaseofpopularsupport,andthatthestate’sroleinsupplyingelectricityenjoyedwidespread

legitimacy.Themovementwasreassertingtheviewthatenergywasintimatelylinkedtopublic

wellbeingandthereforereclaimingitasarightofcitizenship.

Anewperiodofsustainedsocialmobilizationoccurredin1962duringapaymentstrikeagainst

highelectricitypricesintheprovinceofCartago.Overtwenty-fiveconcentrationsofasmanyasfive

thousandresidentstookplaceoverseveralmonths,culminatinginaconfrontationwiththepolicethat

resultedinthreedeathsandmultiplewounded(AlvarengaVenutolo2005,Ch.4).WhilebythistimeICE

hadalreadybecomethelargestgeneratorinthecountry,itcontinuedtodependonCNFLformuchofits

distribution,asituationthatthelattercontinuedtoexploit.Effortswereafoottoincreasecentralization

oftheenergysector,butsignificantfragmentationstillexisted,particularlyattheregionallevel.The

SNEwasofficiallyinchargeofregulatingelectricityrates,butitscapabilitieswerescant,andtherefore

alsoitsauthority.Athermalfactorhadbeenapprovedasasurchargeonelectricitybillstocoverthe

costsoffuelandproductioninbunker-firedplantsconstructedin1958asastop-gapmeasuretodeal

withtheexistingpowershortage.Cartagosubscribersthoughtthemeasureimpactedthemunfairly,

particularlygiventhattheirownsupplyofelectricitywasspotty.Protestorswerethusmotivatedby

whattheysawaspricinginjustice.

Theywereunifiedinrefusingtopaytheirelectricalbillsasaformofprotest,employingteamsof

electricianstoreconnectservicewhenthecompanyseveredit.Themovementreliedonalocalradio

stationtobroadcastananti-hegemonicdiscourseandasarallyingpointforconcentrationsand

mobilizations.Thebasisofthatdiscoursewasregionalist,portrayingthecentralizationeffortsunderway

asausurpationofprovincialpower,exploitingthehistoricalresentmentofCartago’slossofthecapital

aftertheendofthecolonialperiod.Ironically,thecentralgovernmentvalidatedthoseclaimsby

choosingtorepressthemovementbyforce,endinginabloodyconfrontation.10Thecrisiswouldnotbe

fullyresolveduntil1964withtheestablishmentoftheJuntaAdministrativadeServiciosEléctricosde

Cartago(JASEC),thesecondinstance,withHeredia’s,ofamunicipalexceptiontoICE’smandateasthe

solesectoralactor.Itmarkedachangeintheaimsofsocialmovementsintheelectricalsector,where

theobjectofcontentionshiftedfromenergynationalismtopricinginjustice,andthetargetof

mobilizationbecameICE.

Newmobilizationsagainstpriceincreasesoccurredin1983.Whileacontextofsevereeconomic

crisisfundamentallyalteredthenatureoftheprotests,theydrewonthemechanismsdeveloped

10AlvarengapointstoanoverreactionduetoU.S.influenceandfearsofcommunistinfiltrationoftheprotestmovementatatimeofheightenedColdWartensionsduetotheradicalizationoftheCubanRevolution

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historicallyinthesector,especiallythepaymentstrike,whilealsointroducingnewactionrepertoires

likestreetblockages.Yet,theirdiscoursefocusedmoreondemandingaccountabilityfromthestate

monopolythanonnationalistthemes,markingasignificantchange.Theinternationalriseininterest

ratesexperiencedintheaftermathoftheOPECoilembargoesseverelyimpactedCostaRica.Likeother

countriesintheregion,ithadsignificantlyincreaseditsforeignborrowingduringthe1970s,andthe

newconditionsmadeservicingthedebtimpossible.Thenationalcurrencydevaluedby500%and

inflationreached100%,seriouslycurtailingthepurchasingpowerofthecitizenryandplungingmillions

intosuddenpoverty.Thiswasastarkreversionoftrendsintheprevioustwodecades,whichhadseen

increasesinthesizeofthemiddleclassandaveragewages.Therewerefrequentstrikesdemanding

costoflivingadjustmentsbydoctors,teachers,governmentworkers,andagriculturalworkers,much

likeotherconsumerproteststhateruptedthroughouttheregioninthe1980s(Wickham-Crowleyand

Eckstein2015,32).Butthesegroupsunifiedwithothersintoasinglesocialmovementinresponsetoan

increaseinelectricityratesofalmost100%byICE.

Thecompanyargueditneededthehigherratestobeabletoserviceitsowninternationaldebt,

butthereisalsoevidencethatthegovernmentintendedtoreduceitsfiscalchasmbyusingtheratesas

aconcealedtax(Sojo2004,22).Yettheimpactontheaveragehouseholdwassuchthat,intheabsence

ofcorrespondingsalaryincreases,itwasunpayable.Seekingtoimposesuchahikeinacontextoffalling

realwageswasseenashigh-handedandinsensibleonthepartofICE,andtheresponsewasswift

(AlvarengaVenutolo2005,Ch.5).Communalorganizationsinneighborhoodsorganizedmarchesthat

quicklyspreadtotheprovincialandregionallevel.LocalComitésdeLucha(StruggleCommittees)

electedanationalcoordinatingcommittee,theComisiónCoordinadoraNacionalContraelAlzadelos

ServiciosEléctricos(NationalCoordinatingCommissionAgainsttheIncreaseinElectricityRates),

representing52unionsand140communalcommittees.TheCommissionsoonannouncedanational

paymentstrikeandacampaignofcivildisobediencethatincludedreturningelectricitybillstoICEor

publiclyburningthem.Communalcommitteeswenthouse-to-housecollectingthepaperbills,

convincingfamiliestojointhestrike,soreturningordestroyingthebillswasasymbolicdisplayofthe

movement’sstrength.Localcommitteesorganizedsentriesinneighborhoodstospotandobstruct

disconnectioncrewsfromICE,andreconnectionbrigadestoreestablishservicewhentheirpreventive

measuresfailed.ThesloganYonopagoelrecibodelaluz(“Idonotpaymyelectricbill”)wasbroadly

displayedonplacardsinmarchesandhousewindowsacrossneighborhoods.

WhenICEannouncedthatitwouldrespondwithmassdisconnections,themovement

barricadedkeystreetsaroundthecity,groundingactivitytoahalt.Thisnewactionrepertoire

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heightenedthevisibilityofthestruggle,butalsoraiseditsstakes.Sinceblockingstreetsisillegal,it

legitimizedrepressiveactionbytheauthorities.However,themovementwasgrowingnationalinscope

andhadwidespreadpublicsupport,sothatactionnevercame.Afteramajorityofdeputiesinthe

legislatureandmunicipalitiesexpressedsupportforthemovement,thenationalgovernmentordered

ICEtostanddownandreversetheincrease.Whileelectricitypriceswouldeventuallyincrease,the

movementwassuccessfulinassuringitwouldbeatagraduated,manageablepaceandinsettinglimits

totheautonomyofICEthroughtheinterventionofthecentralgovernment.

LikeCartagointhe60s,thismovementwasnotdrivenbyinstitutionalorideologicalfactors

relatedtoownershipofenergyresources,butbyperceptionsofpricinginjustice.UnlikeCartago,

however,itsdenouementwasnotlinkedtolocalautonomybecausethepriceincreasesoriginatedin

externalfactorsandtheirscopewasnational.However,thecrisisuncoveredthepotentialarbitrariness

withwhichamonopolymayact,evenifitisapublicone.Itseemstomarkanacknowledgmentthat

stateownershipisbyitselfinsufficienttoguaranteepubliclyinterestedactionsintheenergysector,that

blindtrustinstateinstitutionsisthereforeunwarranted,andthatitisuptothecitizenrytodemand

accountabilityandtransparency.Thesethemeswouldbecomerelevantagaininmobilizationsagainst

subsequentmegahydroelectricprojects.However,theywouldremainlatentasquestionsof

sovereigntytookoveragaininnewmobilizationsintheyear2000.

Thesemobilizationswereinresponsetothe“Combo”,asetofreformbillsinthelegislaturethat

soughtstructuralchangesintelecommunicationsandelectricity,twoareasthathadbeenthesole

purviewofICEsincethemidtwentiethcentury.11TheplansoughtagradualopeningofICE’stelecom

monopoly,greaterparticipationoftheprivatesectorinelectricitygeneration,andapartialopeningof

ICE’smonopolyinelectricitydistribution(Sojo2004,27).Thepoliticalelitearguedthechangeswere

essentialforraisingcapitalandpromotinginvestmenttosecurethecountry’senergyneedsandits

competitiveness.Unions,academics,andothersocialactorsobjectedtothereductionofICE’sremit,

settingupastruggleabouttheproperuseofpubliccapitalaccumulatedinstateenterprises(Alvarenga

Venutolo2005,269).Aswehaveseen,theideathatenergyresources“belongtoallcitizens”was

ingrainedintoICEfromitsfounding.Thecompanyhadcometobeseenasarepositoryofnationaltalent

thathadrisenaboveforeigninterestsandconquereddevelopmentalchallengesandthereforeasource

11ThebillthatconsolidatedseveralICEreforminitiatives(henceCombo)wasProyectodeleydeMejoramientodelosServiciosPúblicosdeElectricidadyTelecomunicacionesydelaParticipacióndelEstado.Thesereformshadbeenunderdiscussionsinceatleastthemid1990s,includinginanationalforum—ConcertaciónNacional—wheretheirgeneralcomponentswereestablishedwithinputsfrom,thoughnotnecessarilyagreementby,allsocialsectors.

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ofcollectivepride(Solís2002,43).Bythe21stcenturyICEhadbecomecentraltothenationalidentity,a

keyfactorinachievingwhatthecountrysawasitsuniquemodelofdevelopment,centeredonhuman

solidarity.12Asstatedbyitsfoundingdirector,JorgeManuelDengo,ICE“overcametheskepticismabout

theabilityofCostaRicanstocompletegreatworkswhichbeforewereconsideredtheexclusiverealmof

foreigncompanies”(Dengo2004,77).Ithadachievedvirtuallyuniversalcoverage,reachingeventhe

remotestareas—whichwouldhavebeenunlikelyinacompetitivemarket—andhadsuccessfully

developedlarge-scaleandtechnologicallychallengingprojects(ChavezandCortésRamos2013,77).

Whilesometimesatoddswiththecitizenry,ithaddoneallthiswhilesimultaneouslyprovidingenergy

securityatcompetitiveprices.13Tomany,ICE,whilenotflawless,wasanationalpatrimony,theresultof

sacrificesmadebyseveralgenerationsofCostaRicans.Pollsshowedthat72%ofthecitizenryopposed

itsprivatizationatthetime(ChavezandCortésRamos2013,85).

Inthiscontext,theCombowasperceivedasastealthprivatizationeffortthatwaslikelyto

benefitthesamepoliticalelitesthatwerepromotingit(AlvarengaVenutolo2005,277,Chavezand

CortésRamos2013,88,Solís2002,40).14Oneofitsprovisionspurportedlyopenedupnationalparksfor

energyprojects,ahighlyunpopularprospect(Cartagena2010,53).Thebillsparkedangerinmany

sectorsandunleashedamassivesocialmovementthatwasunprecedentedinitsscale(Solís2002,33,

ChavezandCortésRamos2013,89).WhilethevariouslaborunionswithinICEhadacentralrole,this

movementlackedacentralizedcoordinatingmechanismanditsmainactorswerenolongercommunity

basedorganizations.Atitscorewasaloosecoalitionofactorswithdifferingbutnotnecessarily

contradictorydemands,includingecological,feminist,andreligiousorganizations,unions,agricultural

workers,taxidrivers,andstudents.Thesediverseorganizationsarticulateddifferentgoals.Some

marchedtoprotestprivatization,whileothersmarchedtoprotestwhattheysawasself-interestedand

corruptpoliticalelites.Stillothersmarchedtodemandspecificconcessionsincludinghighersalaries

(unions),therepealofspecifictaxes(taxidrivers),orthepaymentofspecialcompensations

12InICE’sspecificcase,profitsfrommorelucrativeareas,liketelecommunications,subsidizedelectricityratesandcostlynetworksthatservicedfewerusersinremoteruralareas(Sojo2004).13Howreasonablepricesare,isamatterofconstantdispute.IndustrialistsclaimtheyarehighandICE,anditsdefenders,thattheyarelow.Bothprovidealternativedatabolsteringtheirclaims.Someevidencesuggestselectricitypricesarelowerthantheregionalaverageintheresidentialmarket,buthigherthanaverageintheindustrialmarket(Sojo2004,30).Asdiscussedbelow,morerecentevidencesuggestspriceshavelosttheircompetitiveness,partlyasaresultofcostoverrunsandinefficienciesinmegaprojects(seeLaNación,August6,2017,“AtaquesInfundadosContraelGrupoICEPretendenDestruirModeloEleéctricoCostarricense”;January5,2018,“CompetitividadEnergéticaseApaga”).DebatealsoragesregardingthecomparabilityofpricesbetweenICWandprivategenerators(see(Castro2008,Alvarado2009,Durán2009)).14Thetwotraditionalpartiesthathadalternatedinpowersincetheendofthe1948civilconflicthadenteredintoa“pact”toadvancethereform,seenbymanyasasuspiciousformofcollusion.

11

(stevedores).Inthisway,themovementdrewstrengthfromnumbersasitgavevoicetodifferent

groupstoventtheirangerandfrustrationagainstthestate,whateveritssource,withtheperception

thatacherishedpublicassetwasfallingpreytoobscuredesignsservingasanamalgamatingfactor(Solís

2002,39,Sojo2004,25).

TheComboprotestersdrewonthememoryof1983andadoptedstreetblockagesandmarches

astheirmainrepertoireofaction.Afterweeksofvirtuallyparalyzingthecountry,thegovernment

relented,scrappingtheproposedreforms,eventhoughtheyhadbeenapprovedbythelegislature.15

Thiswasasignificantturningpointinthehistoryoftheelectricitysector:anelite-drivenliberalization

effortthatwasseveralyearsinthemakingandthatcouldhavefundamentallyaltereditsstructurewas

stoppedshort.Theanti-Combomovementthereforeresultedinasignificantdirectpolicyimpactby

keepingICEunderpublicownershipandpreservingitsroleasaprivilegedactorintheelectricitysector.

ThismeantthecontinuationofICEasadominant,verticallyintegratedentitythatplans,designs,

constructs,generates,transmits,anddistributesthebulkofelectricityinthecountry(Portolés2011).

Aswehaveseen,themunicipalconcessionsgrantedtoHerediaandCartago,16inwhichsocial

movementsplayedasignificantrole,weretwoexceptionstoICE’smonopoly.However,being

concessionstolocalgovernmentstheydidnotalterorchallengetheconceptofenergysovereignty,as

electricalpowerremained,insomewayoranother,inthehandsofthestate.Wenowturntoconsider

twootherexceptions:ruralelectrificationcoopsestablishedinthe1960s,andalimitedopeningto

small-scalegenerationbytheprivatesectorinthe1990s.

Cooperativas

Bythe1960sonlyabout50%ofthepopulationhadaccesstoelectricity.ICEstruggledwiththe

taskofexpandingelectriccoverageduetoashortageofcapitalandthehighlyfragmentednetworkit

inherited.ItwasthereforereceptivetoassistanceofferedbytheU.S.underKennedy’sAlliancefor

Progress,forthedevelopmentofruralelectrificationprojectsusingthecoopmodel,whereruralcoops

purchasebulk-powerfromICEanddistributeelectricityforoff-gridsettlementsandagricultural

businesses(Barnes2011,262).Whiletechnicallyprivate,coopsareconsideredaformof“social

enterprise”,giventheirwidelydistributedownership,wherenoindividualcanexerciseacontrolling

interest,andtheirdirecttiestothecommunity.Thisanalogizestheirroletothatofthestateas

15Asafinalblow,theConstitutionalCourteventuallydeclaredthenewlawunconstitutionalonproceduralgrounds.16Alajuelareceivedaconcessionalso,butitwaslaterabsorbedbyICE.

12

purveyingtothepublicgood.Asaresult,didnotinciteanyformofoppositionandwereseenas

compatiblewiththestate’senergysovereignty.

Fourruralelectriccoopswerecreatedinremoteareasbetween1965and1972:

Coopeguanacaste,Coopesantos,Coopelesca,andCoopealfaroruiz(Madriz-Vargasetal.2016,2).They

operatetodateunderspecialconcessionareaswhichcanbesubstantial.Forexample,

Coopeguanacastecoversanareaof3,915Km2,almost8%ofthenationalterritory,andtodayhasover

70,000members,reachingover100,000peoplewithelectricityprovision.In1989theruralcoops

createdConelectricas,aconsortiumtodeveloprenewableenergygenerationundernewprovisions

enablingprivateactors(seebelow).

PrivateGeneration

AmorefundamentalalterationoftheelectricalregimecamewiththepassageofLaw7200in

1990,andfouryearslaterlaw7508,whichallowedtheparticipation,albeitlimited,ofprivate

generatorsinthesector.Thelawspassedwithoutsignificantoppositiondespitetheirobviousimpacton

ICE’smonopolyandtheirimplicationsforthenotionofenergysovereignty.Ifstatestewardshipofthe

sectorwasasimportantashasbeendescribed,whyweretheselawsunopposed?Apotential

explanationliesinthelimitingconditionsimposedbyeconomiccrisisandtheneedtosupplythecountry

withtheelectricityitneeded.17

Asdiscussedabove,severeeconomiccrisisintheearly1980susheredinaperiodofstructural

reformsandfiscalstringency.Therelativeautonomyenjoyedbydecentralizedstateinstitutionswas

seriouslycurtailed.Wheretherewerefinancialsurpluses,theywerecollectedtohelpreducethe

government’soveralldeficit.Consequently,investmentbudgetswereconstrained,raisingquestions

aboutICE’sabilitytomeetfutureenergydemand(JiménezGómez2009,186).Thelargeleadtimesof

hydroelectricprojects,whichwerealsoincreasinglyquestionedbyenvironmentalgroups,pointedto

thermalback-upsasinevitabletoguaranteeenergysecurity.Therisingcostofoilininternational

marketsmadethisanonerousburdenforthestate.18Underthecircumstances,thenotionthatthe

statehadreacheditsnaturallimitsandshouldconsidercedingspacetoprivateactorsbegantogain

credence,possiblybluntingoppositiontotheapprovalofthetwonewlaws.Movementconcernsand

17Someauthorsarguethatcollusionbetweenpoliticaleliteswithinterestsinthesectorwasadriverofthereforms(GonzálezOandSolísAvendañoo2001,SolísAvendaño2006).However,thatdoesnotexplaintheabsenceofopposition.18Weathervariabilitywouldbeaddedtothesefactorsinthemid2000sasadroughtin2007seriouslycurtailedhydroelectricitysupplies.

13

formationcanbecontingentonshiftingpoliticalandeconomicconditions(Wickham-Crowleyand

Eckstein2015,39).

Law7200authorizedgenerationbycoopsandprivatefirmsbutonlyfromrenewablesources

notexceeding20,000KWperproject.Thelawrequiredatleast65%oftheownershipstakestobe

CostaRican,andcappedtotalenergygeneratedbyallnewregisteredentrantsat15%ofthenational

electricalsystem’stotalinstalledcapacity.ThenewproducerscouldonlyselltheirenergytoICE,andit

inturnwasobligatedtopurchaseit.Law7508expandedthelimitperprojectto50,000KW,andthecap

onoverallgenerationbyanadditional15%ofinstalledcapacity,forcompetitivepublicbidcontracts

underthe“Build,Operate,Transfer”(BOT)modality,whereICEbuystheelectricitygeneratedduringthe

lifeofthecontract,butthephysicalplantistransferredtoICEatitsconclusion.Allprivateprojects

wouldrequireastateconcessionforwaterusewhichwouldbelimitedindurationtotwentyyears19,but

couldberenewed.Hencebypurposelylimitingtheopeningthroughcapitalrequirements,individual

andaggregatecapacitylimits,andmarketrestrictions,policymakerscouldclaimthemantleof

pragmatism,solvingtheproblemofelectricityprocurement,whilestillprotectingthegeneralgoalof

energysovereignty.

Privateactorsmovedquicklytocapitalizeontheopportunitiescreatedbytheselaws.The

momentumproducedbythereformsledtheadministrationofJoséMaríaFiguerestoproposeamore

integralrestructuringofICEin1996.Someofthechangeswereimplementedadministratively,leading

towhathasbeencalledthe“corporatization”ofICE(ChavezandCortésRamos2013,90).Essentially,

theysoughtthefunctionalseparationofthecompany’skeybusinesses—electricityand

telecommunications—andtheintroductionofmanagerialstructuresakintothosefoundinmodern

corporations.Moreambitiouschangesinvolvingprivatizationoftelecommunicationsandabroadening

oftheprivatesector’sroleintheelectricitysector,wouldhavetobetackledbynewlegislation.The

lattersetofreforms,ultimatelytakenupbytheadministrationofMiguelÁngelRodríguez,ledtothe

chainofeventsculminatinginthe“Combo”,asrecountedabove,anddidnotadvanceintheelectric

sector.20

By2014privatesectorgeneratorshadreachedthe15%limitestablishedinlaw7200andthere

were81projectswaitingtoqualifyundertheBOTquota(Sancho2014,Fornaguera2014).Withrecent

capacityadditionsbyICE,theproportionofprivategenerationdroppedslightlytoabout12.2%in

directlyoperatedand12.6%inBOTplantsin2016(Alvarado2017).Numerousbillsinthelegislature19Expandedto25yearsin2009byLaw8723.20Thetelecommunicationssectorwasopenedtocompetition,albeitwithICEretainingitsroleasakeyplayer,asaresultofCAFTAandensuingreforms.

14

havesoughttoraiseoreliminatethislimittoexpandprivateparticipation,buttheyhavenotprospered

(Fornaguera2014).Theviewthatelectricityshouldbetreatedasapublicserviceisstillentrenched,and

therearemanywhoviewthepartialopeningofthesectorasaregrettablebetrayaloftheCostaRican

modelthatshouldbereversed(Álvarez2005,Durán2005).Environmentalorganizationsareamongthe

mostardentadvocatesofthisview,buttheircritiquealsofocusesonICE.Theyaccusetheorganization

ofopaquenessandunaccountability,butalsoofhavingrelinquisheditsstewardshipoftheelectrical

sector.Someblamethisonthevenalityofitstopexecutiveswhotheyaccuseofcolludingwith

politiciansandprivategeneratorstoexploitthesectorfortheirownbenefit(Durán2005,12),echoing

thecritiquesofsocialmovementsduringtheCOMBO.Theycallforre-centeringtheorganizationonits

originalcharge,emphasizingthenotionsofenergynationalism,thatenergyresourcesbelongtothe

citizenryandshouldthereforeneverbeexploitedforprivategain.Whenitis,suchanappropriationof

publicwealthcallsformobilization.

SocialprotestsagainstHydroelectricProjects

Thepartialopeningoftheelectricsectortoprivategeneratorsincreasedthenumberof

hydroelectricplants,andthisresultedinsocialmobilizationsatthenationalandlocallevels(Álvarez

2005,8).Resistancewasnotexclusivelyagainstprivateoperators.ItalsoextendedtoICE.Anditdrew

uponthenotionsofsovereigntyexpressedhistoricallyinthesector,whichheldthatwaterandits

derivedenergyshouldnotbesubjecttoprivateappropriationyetreinterpretingitbyassigningthe

sovereignrightstothecommunitieswheretheresourceswerelocated,notthestate.Thisclaimwas

justifiedbythenotionthatcommunitiesareco-locatedwiththeresourceandhencehaveafirstrightto

it,butalsothattheysuffertheimmediateconsequencesfromitsexploitation.Suchconsequencesrange

fromtheexhaustionofwaterflows,toenvironmentalimpacts,andsometimesthedisplacementof

entirecommunities.

Akeyactiontostopfivehydroelectricprojects(oneofwhichwasICE’s)in1998wasalegal

challengeraisedbythecommunitiesofRivasandGeneralViejo,inPérezZeledón,questioningtheir

constitutionality.Thesomewhatunexpectedresultwasthat,inexaminingtheclaim,theConstitutional

Courtconcludedthatthelegalreformsthathadenabledprivategeneration(laws7200and7508)had,

intheprocess,createdalegalvoidwithregardtotheregulationofwaterconcessions.Aswehaveseen,

theServicioNacionaldeElectricidad(SNE)wasestablishedin1941toregulatehydraulicconcessionsfor

electricitygeneration.ThenewlawsabolishedSNEandcreatedanewregulatoryentity,theAutoridad

ReguladoradeServiciosPúblicos(ARESEP,RegulatoryAuthorityforPublicServices).Whiletheattributes

15

ofthisnewagencypertainingregulationofelectricitygeneration,transportation,anddistributionof

electricitywereclear,theCourtruledthatthenewlawsdidnotprovideanadequatelegalframeworkto

substitutetheSNE’spreviousroleregulatingwaterconcessionsforelectricitygeneration.Interestingly,

theCourtaddedthateventhepreviousSNEframeworkhadbeensupersededbydevelopmentsinthe

ensuingdecades,mostnotablytheadditionoftherighttoahealthyandecologicallybalanced

environmenttotheConstitution.21Insuchacontext,regulatingconcessionswouldrequiremorethan

simplydeterminingthehydrologicalcapacityofabasin:itwouldalsohavetoensurethepreservation

forfuturegenerationsofthewateritselfaswellasrelated,constitutionallyprotectedresourceslikethe

localfauna,ecosystems,climate,navigabilityofwaterbodies,andaestheticandscenicenjoyment(Sala

ConstitucionaldelaCorteSupremadeJusticia2000).22Bydeclaringtheabsenceofsuchaframework

theCourteffectivelycreatedalegalvoidwithnopublicbodyempoweredtoregulateconcessions.This

stoppedthenewprojects,butalsoaffectedthosealreadyinexistencethatwouldatvariouspointsin

timerequirearenewaloftheirwaterconcessions.

Thesituationwasnotresolveddefinitivelyuntil2009(elevenyearslater!)whenthenational

legislatureadoptedtheLeyMarcodeConcesiónParaelAprovechamientodelasFuerzasHidraúlicas

ParalaGeneraciónHidroeléctrica(FrameworkLawforConcessionstoUtilizeHydraulicForcesfor

HydroelectricGeneration),law8723.Itspromulgationcanbeseenasapolicyeffectofthesocial

mobilizationthatledtothepronouncementoftheConstitutionalCourt.Whilethemovement’saimwas

tostopthehydroprojectsinitsimmediatecommunity,initslawsuititexpresslyallegedtheabsenceof

acompetentauthoritytoregulateconcessionsduetotheeliminationofSNE,thekeypoint

acknowledgedbytheCourt(SalaConstitucionaldelaCorteSupremadeJusticia2000).Theresultant

newlawempoweredtheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandEnergytoregulateconcessions,and

modernizedthelegalframeworkbyincorporatingreferencestoenvironmentalandbiodiversitylawsas

wellastothoseregulatingtheelectricalsector.23

AnotherkeyinstanceofresistancewasthedrivebycommunityorganizationsintheSarapiquí

basintoopposea30,000KWhydroelectricprojectproposedbytheESPH(thepublicgeneratorofthe

Herediaprovince,describedabove).Usingahighlyinnovativestrategy,sixteenorganizationspushedfor

amunicipalplebiscitein2000proposingthatthebasinbeelevatedtothestatusof“naturalhistorical

monument”andthereforeofflimitstodevelopment(Vázquez2000).Whileparticipationwaslow(13%

ofeligiblevoters)itpassedbyalargemajority(CorderoUlate2007,LoaizaandVázquez2000).Thiswas21In1994,Article50.22Therulingreferencesthe1992RíoDeclarationonsustainabledevelopmentforemphasis.23Article7,law8723.

16

unprecedentednotonlyinitselfbutalsobecauseitwasthefirstplebisciteofitskindtobeheldinanyof

thecountry’s81municipalitiessincetheyweremadepossiblein1970.24Whilenotbindingwithregard

tonational-levellegislation,itrepresentedastrongassertionbythecommunityofitspositionagainst

publicandprivatedevelopers,politicallylegitimated.Theresultsoftheplebiscitewouldbeusedto

challengeICE’sCariblancohydroelectricprojectaswellasthreeothersbyprivatedevelopersinthe

ensuingmonths.

Theplebiscitestrategywassoonadoptedbyothercommunities.In2001community

organizationsinGuácimoproposedaplebisciteonaruletobananyprofit-drivenuseofitsaquifers.It

passedwiththesupportofover97%ofvoters,effectivelybanningtheintendedhydroelectric

developmentsplannedfortheregion.Athirdplebisciteoccurredin2005inTurrialba,organizedby

community,indigenousandenvironmentalorganizationsinresponsetoICE’slongstandingandhighly

controversialmega-projectonthePacuareriver.Thevotecamedownagainstthehydroelectricproject

by97%andICEdesistedfromit(LaNación2005).However,thisappearedtobemerelyatactical

retreat.Thecompany’sleadership,followinguponitshistoricsuccessandaccumulatedknow-howin

hydroelectricity,wasconvincedthatmega-projectsweretheonlytechnicallyviablealternativetofulfill

thecountry’slong-termenergyneeds,andthatithadtoproceeddespitecommunityresistance,ifnot

byforcethenbyguile(Durán2008,11).Giventhelimitednumberofpotentialsites,theycontinuedto

promotePacuare’sadvancement.Inresponse,themovementopposingtheproject,whichincluded

communal,environmental,andindigenousorganizationsremainedorganizedandvigilant.Sincethe

localplebisciteresultscouldbeoverriddenbynationallegislation,theymobilizedtosecureadecree

fromthenationalgovernmentthatwouldcommittorespectingthatoutcome.Theyalso“nationalized”

theissuebylinkingittoothersocio-environmentalconflictssurroundingwater,mining,realestate

development,andpetroleumextraction(ForoNacional2009).Althoughittookadecade,adirectpolicy

impacteventuallycameintheformofanExecutiveDecreeofficiallyexcludingthePacuareandSavegre

riversfromhydroelectricprojectsfor25years(EFE2015).

AsICEcoexistswithanumberofsmallprivategeneratorstheelectricitymarkethassome

measureofcompetition,butitismonopsonistic,withICEremainingthesolebuyer,andmonopolisticin

theareasoftransmissionandexport.Pricesarenotmarket-determinedbutsetbyaregulatory

authority(ARESEP).Themainpolicyquestiongoingforwardisthuswhethertoreverttoafullypublic

systemorbroadentheremitofthemarkettothoseareascurrentlydirectedbythestate(Vargas2009).

Themainpoliticalcleavageisindeterminingtherelativerolesthatwillbeplayedbythecompeting

24Onlytwootherplebisciteswereheldatthemunicipallevel,bothtodealwithpoliticalboundaries.

17

actors.

WhileICEcontinuestoenjoyconsiderablepopularity,ithasalsocomeupagainstchargesof

high-handednessandinsularity25,anditsinsistenceonmega-projectshasfacedresistancefromsocial

movements.However,thosemovementscontinuetoadvocateforwaterandelectricityas

constitutionallyprotectedrightsandarethereforealsoresistanttoprivategenerators.These

generatorshavebecomewellestablishedandareapowerfulinterestintheirownrightthatenjoysthe

supportofindustryandsomepoliticalsectors.Theyadvocateforgreatercompetitioninthesectoras

thewayforwardtogreaterefficiencyandlowerenergyprices,andamorediversifiedmixofrenewable

sourcesastheroutetoenergysecurity.

ThecampaignagainstDiquís

TheDiquíshydroelectricprojecthasbecomethefocalpointforthedebateaboutthefutureof

theenergysectorinCostaRica.ItisthelargesthydroelectricprojectinCentralAmericawithaplanned

capacityof650MWandanestimatedcostof$2.6billion.Itsdamwouldbe173metershighwitha

reservoircoveringover7,000hectares,915ofwhichwouldbeinindigenousreservations(ICEUndated-

b).Stretchingbackasfarasto2005ithasbeentheobjectofmultiplelawsuitsandprotests.Opponents

objecttotheextractivistnatureoftheprojectanditsenvironmentalimpactsbutalsowhattheyclaim

hasbeenanarbitrary,high-handedandevenillegalapproachonthepartofICE.Thegovernment

decreedtheprojecttobe“ofnationalinterest”in2008,butthecompanyhadalreadybeenonsitefor

threeyears.Itsfootprintwassizeable,withcampsforheavymachineryandlargeworkercrews,and

tunnelsexcavatedtoextractmaterials,allostensiblyaspartofpreliminaryfeasibilitystudies.Tobein

compliancewiththelaw,however,thoseworksshouldhavebeenprecededbythedecree,notthe

otherwayaround.Moreover,thedecreeitselfshouldhavedrawnevidencefromanenvironmental

impactstudy,anenvironmentalstrategicstudy,anevaluationoftheconvenienceofchangingtheland

use,aconsultationprocesswiththelocalcommunity,andaconsultationprocesswithanyimpacted

indigenouscommunities(Sagot2012).ThelatterstemmedfromobligationsacquiredthroughCosta

Rica’sratificationofthe1989ILOConventiononIndigenousandTribalPeoples(#169),butforwhichno

protocolexistedatthetimeofthedecree.26Theabsenceoftheserequirementssuggeststhedecree

25Jokinglyreferredtoas“repúblicasoberana”(sovereignrepublic)insomecircles,asdeclaredbyformerpresidentandNobelPeacePrizeOscarAriastoLaPrensaLibre,August23,2016,“ÓscarArias:‘Somosunmontóndeimbéciles…’”;andasstatedtomebytheMinisterofEnvironmentinapersonalinterview.26Itwouldnotbecreatedbythegovernmentuntil2018.

18

wasinviolationofnationalandinternationallaw.ThegovernmentofOscarAriasseeminglytreatedit

asacursorystepinaprocesswhoseoutcomeithadpredeterminedinfavorofICE.27

Asidefromthequestionablelegalityoftheseactions,thewayinwhichICEproceededalso

generatedabacklash.Itsconductwasseenasdisrespectfulanddismissiveoflocalinterestsand

concerns.Durán(2012,8,12)describesICEasentitledandcondescending,believingitselfableto

“enteranyplace,atanytime”withoutbeingrequiredto“stopthecountry’sprogressforanysmall

groupofpeople”andactingasif“rivers,communities,andthecountrybelongedtoitsothatitcould

imposeonthemwithoutanyqualms.”AsstatedbyMayidHalabi,presidentofSIICE,aunion

representingICEengineersandprofessionals,thisstemsfromaninstitutionalethosdeveloped

throughoutthecompany’slongstandingandundisputedregencyoftheenergysector.28While

groundedinitstechnicalandorganizationalsuccessesithasnowbecomedated.Itsrelianceon

hydropowerhasinhibitedthegrowthofalternativeenergysources,withtheexceptionofgeothermal,

whichisitselflimitedbythefactthatmostunexploitedsourcesareinprotectedareas.29Ithasalso

blindedtheorganizationtothegrowingsocietaloppositiontomegahydropowerprojects.

Organizationsmobilizedtoopposetheprojectatthelocallevelandwerejoinedby

environmentalorganizations,bothnationalandinternational.IndigenousgroupsliketheFrentede

DefensadelosDerechosIndígenasdeTérrabaFDIT(TérrabaIndigenousRightsDefenseFront),the

AssociacióndeMujeresManodeTigre(HandoftheTigerWomen’sAssociation)andtheAsociación

CulturalIndígenaTeribe(TeribeCulturalIndigenousAssociation)ledthelocalopposition,andreceived

supportfrombroaderindigenousgroupsliketheMesaNacionalIndígenadeCostaRica(CostaRican

NationalIndigenousTable),nationalenvironmentalgroupslikeFundaciónNeotrópica,PRETOMA,and

APREFLOFAS,nationalsocialorganizationslikeAsociacióndeIniciativasPopularesDitsö(Popular

InitiativeAssociationDitsö),publicuniversities,andtransnationalorganizationslikeREDLAR(Cordero

Ulate2015).30

However,alocalcommunityorganization,theAsociacióndeDesarrolloIntegraldeTérrabaADIT

(TérrabaDevelopmentAssociation),didnotopposetheprojectandauthorizedICEtoconductstudieson

therightbankoftheTérrabariverin2009,creatingtheappearancethattheprojecthadthe

endorsementofthecommunity(CorderoUlate2015,16).Thiswasloudlydenouncedbyopposing

27SeeRoseSpalding’sstudyoftheminingsectorinCostaRicaforirregularitiessurroundingtheCrucitasdecreeissuedbythesameadministration.28Personalinterview,June28,2017.29TheMinsterofEnvironmentandEnergyreferredtoICEasa“hydrocephalicorganization”duringourpersonalinterview,alsohighlightingthispoint.30SeealsoEnvironmentalJusticeAtlas,http://bit.ly/2GDs867

19

groups,openingastruggletodefinewhowerethelegitimaterepresentativesofthecommunity.

UnderlyingthestrugglewasthefactthatamajorityofthelandwithinCostaRica’sindigenousterritories

isheldbynon-indigenouspersons,mostlyasaresultofsquattersettlements.31Theseterritoriesare

inalienable,andthestateisobligatedtorectifythesedefactoholdingsbutformanyyearshasfailedto

doso.Theindigenousminority,atriskofbeingsilencedandsidelinedfromtheprocess,organizeda

CouncilofElderstorepresentitandchallengethelegitimacyofADIT,workinginconjunctionwithFDIT

andotherorganizationstorequesttheinterventionofJamesAnaya,UnitedNationsspecialrapporteur

forindigenousrights.MeetingwithgovernmentrepresentativesinGenevaAnayaarrangedasitevisit

andpublishedafullreportwithhisfindingsinMayof2011.Thereportnotedhowlandtenureviolated

therightsofindigenouspeoplesandquestionedthelegitimacyofrepresentationbyorganizationslike

ADIT.Moresignificantly,itclearlystatedthatnoprojectcouldgoforwardlegallythatdidnotsatisfythe

rightofpreviousconsultationoftheaffectedindigenouscommunities.Sincenomechanismexistedfor

thatpurposethiswasenoughtostoptheprojectinitstracks,andithasremainedinsuspensesince.

Socialmovements,coalescedaroundtherightsofindigenousgroups,thusmanagedtotemporarilystop

themegaprojectbyappealingtointernationallawandmultilateralagencies.Thisdirectimpactwould

alsoleadtoanindirectpolicyeffect,sevenyearslater,asthegovernmentwasforcedtoissueastatute

regulatingandestablishingtheproceduresforamechanismofpreviousconsultationofindigenous

peoplesininstanceswheretheirterritoriesareimpactedbydevelopmentprojects.

Theresultingdebateaboutthefutureofthesector:diversification,competition,oversight.

YettheprojectremainsatthecoreofICE’sdevelopmentplans.Itsmostrecentlong-term

electricgenerationplanstates:“OuranalysesshowthedevelopmentstrategywiththeDiquís

hydroelectricprojectcomingonlinein2026tobethemostrobustexpansionplantosatisfydemand

growthinthenexttwodecades.TheDiquísstrategyprovidesoptimaleconomicandenvironmental

resultsinanydemandscenario…”(ICE2017,2).Thecompany’sdirectorforplanningandelectrical

development,JavierOrozco,hasmadethecaseforDiquísinmultipleinterviewsandop-edarticles.32

Buttheoppositionfromsocialmovementshasplacedtheprojectonthepublicagenda,generatingan

opendebateaboutitsconvenienceamongvarioussectors—includingthestateitself—andbringing

manyofitselementsintoquestion.

31Someholdersdohavetitlesobtainedingoodfaith,althoughtheirlegalityisquestionableduetothestatutorylimitationsimposedonpropertyinindigenousreserves.32See,forexample,LaNación,August23,2017,“LaImportanciadeElDiquís”;July12,2017,“EmbalsesSustentanDiversidaddeMatrizEléctrica”;June5,2017,“ICEinsisteenqueDiquíses‘Esencial’”).

20

TheMinistryofEnergyandtheEnvironment(MINAE)supersedesICEastheofficialstateentity

responsibleforplanninginthesector,butaspreviouslymentioned,pastministershavebeencontentto

delegatethatroletoICE,allowingitwidelatitude.ThischangedundertheSolísadministration,withthe

ministeractingexpresslytorecoverthatleadershiprole.IncontrasttoICE’sbetonmega-electricity,

MINAE’sNationalEnergyPlan—developedthroughabroadlyconsultativeprocess—openlyembraces

thegoalofamorediversifiedenergymatrixthatcapitalizeson“non-conventionalrenewables”suchas

biomass,wind,andsolar,butalsoadiversifiedgenerationplanthatcapitalizesondistributedaswellas

centralizedoptions(MinisteriodeAmbienteyEnergíaMINAE2015,75,71).Asaresultofthisplan,the

MinisterhasstatedpubliclythattheconstructionofDiquísis“notwritteninstone”33.Thissuggestsa

jointeffectwherebytheactionofsocialmovementsinfluencedpublicopinionregardingtheinadequacy

ofICE’sapproachandtheministerreactedtotheperceivedinadequacies.Thiswasinturncompounded

bytheevidenceputforwardbyindependentpartiesthatchallengesthemodelthatICEinsistsupon.

TworecentreportsbytheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBankhighlightedthelargepotentialthatexists

invariablerenewablesources(windandsolar)anddistributedgeneration(EchevarríaBarberoand

MongeGuevara2017,Ackermanetal.2017).Thestudiesestimatetheexistenttransmissionnetwork

canabsorbanadditional400MWineachofsolar,wind,anddistributedgeneration,whichlessensthe

rationaletoargueforalargecapacityhydroprojectlikeDiquís.

In2015and2016CostaRicageneratedalmost99%ofitselectricityfromrenewablesources.As

hasbeenreported—andcelebrated—worldwide,thecountrytotaled904dayswhereelectricitywas

generatedsolelyfromrenewablesourcesbetween2015and2017,averagingover300daysperyearin

thelastthreeyears.Thepercentageofelectricitygeneratedfromrenewablesourcesgrewfrom90%in

2014to99.7%in2017.34Thepreponderanceofthispower(75%)camefromhydrosources,with

geothermalandwindprovidinganadditional13%and10%,respectively.Biomassaccountedforless

than1%andsolarforapaltry0.01%(RojasNavarrete2017,34).Thishighlevelofrelianceonhydrohas

beencitedbyMINAEasproblematicgivenexistentexpectationsofhighervariabilityinrainfallpatterns.

Atthesametime,thecountryhaslargepotentialcapacityinwindandsolar.Thenortheasternregionof

Guanacastehassomeofthebestwindresourcesworldwidewithaveragewindvelocityof12m/sand

capacityfactorsabove40%,andthepotentialofsolarenergyishighovertheentirecountry(Ackerman

33LaNación,July22,2017,“CostodePlantaHidroeléctricaElDiquísseDuplicóenCincoAños”.ThiswasreaffirmedtomeinaprivateinterviewwiththeMinisterJune26,2017.34Thissignificantachievementwasduetoinstalledrenewablecapacity,butalsofavorableweatherconditions.Overthe2011-14periodrenewablesrepresentedabout90%ofgenerationwhich,whilestillsignificant,meantthecountrygenerated983GWhfromhydrocarbons.Climaticfactors,especiallytheimpactofElNiñoonrainlevels,remainasignificantcontingency.

21

etal.2017,3).Thesesourcescouldbeusedtosubstitutethermalsourcegenerationduringthedry

season,andtoavoidexcessivedrawdownofhydroelectricresourcesduringthewetseason.Ackerman

etal.(2017,10)highlightthat,becausewindandsolararemodularsystems,generationcapacitycanbe

increasedquicklyandgradually,inresponsetoactualdemand.Thisviewisendorsedbyprivate

generatorswhoconsiderthemselveswell-suitedtoprovidethesekindsofprojectsbutarehindered

fromdoingsobytherestrictivelegalframeworkcurrentlyinplace.

Incontrast,largehydroprojectslikeDiquíshavelongleadtimeswithheavyupfrontinvestments

dictatedbyuncertainestimationsofenergydemand.TheevidencesuggeststhatICEhasoverestimated

thisdemandoverthepastfewyears(ICE2017,44,Lara2017,MongeGuevara2017),overshootingthe

scaleofelectricgenerationcapacityrequired.Atthesametime,thecompanyhasunderestimatedthe

costofdevelopingitsprojects,incurringseriouscostoverruns(Díaz2018,Egloff2018b).35The

combinationofbothfactors—overcapacityandrunawaycosts—hasbeenblamedfordrivingelectricity

priceshigher(Lara2017,Egloff2018a).36Ithasalsocontributedtotheerosionofpublicconfidencein

themega-projectmodelchampionedbyICE,callingintoquestiontheneedforDiquís(EcheverríaMartín

2017)butalsotriggeringinquiriesbyaspeciallegislativecommission,ARESEP,andtheGeneral

Comptroller,andcomplaintsaboutICE’slackoftransparencyandaccountabilityaswellasits

administrativecapabilities.37Theshiftinpublicperceptionwasacknowledgedbythecompanyitselfina

full-pageadinwhichitclaimedthat“media,political,andinstitutionalpressures”wereseeking“to

dismantleCostaRica’ssuccessfulelectricitymodel.”38

Thatmodel,reliantasitisonhydroelectricsources,hascomeunderincreasingscrutinyby

environmentalorganizationsandindustrytradegroups.Theoppositionfromenvironmental

organizationsstartedwiththePacuareandSavegrecampaigns,asdescribedabove,andhasnow

generalizedtoopposingalluseofdamsduetotheirpurportedimpactsonecosystemsandrural

communities(CorderoUlate2007,233,2015,11).Theconsensusamongcivilsocietyseemstobefora

moratoriumtoexploitinghydraulicsources(EsquivelRodríguez2014,3,22).Environmentalistshave

gonefromviewingICEasanallyfocusedonnationalandpopularinterests—whichtheystaunchly

35Reventazón,thelatestmega-projecttocomeonline,isestimatedtohavemorethandoubledincost,from$757millionattheoutsetto$1.6billionatcompletion.SeetheeditorialtoLaNación,August21,2017.SeealsoDiarioExtra,December5,2017,“PoromisionesdelICEyJaseccostodeToroIIIsubió$90mills.”36LaNación,January11,“Urgebajarcostodeenergía”;LaNación,April5,2017,“IndustrialesacusanalICEyCNFLdeencarecerelectricidadporineficiencia”.37LaNación,April6,2017,“DiputadospidencuentasaICEyCNFLporimpactodeinversionesentarifasdeluz”;Crhoy.com,January29,2018,“Diputadoslereprochan‘chambonadas’apresidentedelICE”,https://www.crhoy.com/nacionales/diputados-le-reprochan-chambonadas-a-presidente-del-ice/38LaNación,August6,2017,page3A.

22

defendedduringthemobilizationsagainsttheCOMBOandlaterCAFTA—todenouncingitisasellout.

TheyaccuseICEofbeing“productivist,anti-ecologicalandanti-indigenous”,ofwantingto“export

energywithoutregardtotheenvironmentalandsocialimpactswithinitsowncountry”andsacrificing

“itstoutedsocialsolidarityinfavorofcorporatistinterests.”39Onmorepragmaticgrounds,theypoint

totherisksofrelyingsoheavilyonhydropower,whichisexpectedtobenegativelyimpactedbysevere

droughtsinthecontextofachangingclimate(EsquivelRodríguez2014),aclaimechoedbyprivate

generatorsandothersintheprivatesector(Alvarado2017).

Industrytradegroups,ontheotherhand,blamethemodelforthehighcostsofelectricityinthe

country,whichtheyclaimmakesthemuncompetitiveinternationally(Díaz2018,Egloff2018a,b).40A

recentreportfromCEPAL(RojasNavarrete2017)suggeststhatthecountry’selectricityratesareinfact

thehighestinCentralAmerica.TheCostaRicaninvestmentpromotionagency,CINDE,claimsthatthis

hasresultedinlostforeigndirectinvestmentandcallsforopeningtheenergysectortoincrease

competitionandforceICEtoreduceoperationcostsandavoidprojectcostoverruns(Lara2018).

Finally,privategeneratorsalsoquestiontheoverrelianceonhydroandsuggestICEresistsalternative

renewablesnotfromtechnicalreasonsbutentrenchedinterests.Megaplantsareasecuresourceof

employmentforthelargeandspecializedlaborforcethatthecompanyhasdevelopedovertheyears.

Privilegingthemcrowdsoutcapacityinsolarandwind,whichprivategeneratorsclaimtheycould

provideeffectivelyandcompetitively.

Insum,thereappearstobeajointeffectoperating,inwhichsocialmovementshaveimpacted

thepolicyagendabyquestioningICE’sextractivemodel,andstateofficialshaverespondedtothose

impactsbymodifyingtheirapproachtopolicies.AstheProgramaEstadodelaNación(2013,210)has

indicated,socialmobilizationhasbecomeakeyfactoraffectinghowtheCostaRicanstateapproaches

projectsthatimpacttheenvironment.Atthesametime,MINAEhasrecognizedtheneedtogivelocal

groupsgreatervoiceandparticipationindecisionsthataffectthem,throughnewmethodologiesfor

citizenparticipation,guaranteedaccesstoinformationabouthydroelectricprojects,andconsideration

ofcommunityinterestsintheassessmentofsocio-environmentalimpactsandtheirmitigation

(MinisteriodeAmbienteyEnergíaMINAE2015,53-54,87,EsquivelRodríguez2014,3).Ithasalso

acceptedthatpublicregulatoryentitiessuchasSETENA—theentitychargedwithapproving

environmentalimpactevaluations—havebeenlaxintheirscrutinyofICE,alegacyfromdecadesof

uncontesteddominancebythestatecompanyintheenergysector,andanestablishedpracticeofgiving

39Ambientico,September2012,p.2-3.40SeealsoLaNación,April5,2017,“IndustrialesacusanalICEyCNFLdeencarecerelectricidadporineficiencia”

23

ICEconsiderableleewayinplanningandexecutingmajorprojects,settingenergyprices,andself-

regulating.Butaswehaveseen,thisautonomywascontestedbysocialmovementswhenitwas

believedtobeusedarbitrarily,whetherbecauseofitsimpactonenergypricesoritsthreattoriver

basinsandotherprizedenvironmentalassets.Asaresult,thegoodwillandpublictrustthecompany

enjoyedhaserodedandregulatorshavebecomemoreassertive.ARESEP,forinstancehasstopped

rubber-stampingpriceincreasesproposedbyICE,limitingitsabilitytopassontoconsumersprojectcost

overruns.MINAE,foritspart,hasmovedtotakecontroloftheenergyplanningprocesswithina

beefed-upplanningdepartment(MinisteriodeAmbienteyEnergíaMINAE2015,84).41

Conclusions

Thecurrentresistancetolarge-scalehydroelectricprojectsinCostaRicafollowsalong-

establishedtraditionofsocialmobilizationwithintheelectricitysector,datingbacktotheearly

twentiethcentury.Ihavearguedthatthesemobilizationshaveproducedmultiplepolicyand

institutionaleffects,bothdirectandindirect,assummarizedinTable1.Ihavealsotracedtheevolution

oftheprotestdiscoursethatthishistoryreflects,fromanearlyfocusonenergynationalism,toissuesof

energyaffordability,demandsforopennessandaccountabilityfromthestateutility,andfinally,a

demandforenvironmentalaccountabilityandrespectoflocaland,especially,indigenousautonomy.

Thehistoricalexaminationinthisstudysuggeststhatmobilizationhasbeencontinuousacross

timeandthatithasproducedalegacyofrepertoiresonwhichmovementshavedrawnrepeatedly.The

anti-dammovementsstartinginthelate1990sexemplifytherelevanceofsustainedactiontoachieve

movementgoals,andhowachievingsuchgoalsmayrequireadiversityofpolicyimpacts.Whilethe

PacuareandSavegrecommunities,forexample,wereabletostophydroelectricprojectsbychanging

policiesatthelocallevel,ittooktenadditionalyearstoobtainanexecutivedecreethatexcludedthem

atthenationallevel.Andthatexclusionisstillnotpermanent.Intermsofthehistoricalrepertoire,

ideationalfactors,suchasthenotionofenergysovereignty,havebeenusedrepeatedlytodrive

mobilization,forexampleinfavorofthenationalizationofelectricityinthefirsthalfofthetwentieth

century,andthenindefenseofnationalizationattheendofthecentury.Atthesametime,while

nationalistsentimentshavenotdisappeared,theydidnotdriveoppositiontoapartialprivatizationof

electricitygenerationinthelate1980s,suggestingtheirimpactonmobilizationmaybecontingenton

shiftingeconomicandpoliticalcircumstances.Materialgrievancesdrovemobilizationsinthe1950s,

1960s,and1980s,withmovementsrepeatedlydrawingonsuchtacticsaspaymentstrikesandstreet

41WithintheenergysubsectoroftheMinistry(“DirecciónSectorialdeEnergía”),the“SecretaríadePlanificación”.

24

blockagestoopposewhattheysawaspricinginjustice.Theassertionoflocalandindigenousautonomy

toprotectcommunityresourcesagainstdevelopmentdrovemobilizationagainstmegahydroprojects

fromthelate1990stothepresentday.

WhileICEhasawell-establishedreputationfortechnicalexcellencyandhasbeenalongstanding

sourceofnationalpride,thesemobilizationssuggestthatitspowerandautonomyhavebeen,and

remain,contested.Integratedutilitymonopolieshavetheadvantageofacaptivecustomerbaseand

stabledemand,whichallowsthemtoplanwithinalong-termhorizon.Theycanbuildcapacityto

accommodategrowthandrespondtopeakdemand,whilepassingcostsalongtoconsumers,without

risk.Yet,intheabsenceofstrongregulation,thisabilitycanreduceincentivestoremainefficientand

increasethepropensitytospendonmanagementandemployeeperks(Helm2017,207).Projectcost

overrunsandhighelectricitypricessuggestthismayhaveoccurredinCostaRica,andsocialmovements

havemobilizedinresponse.Theiractionshaveresultedindirectpolicyshifts,asthesuspensionof

Diquísshowsmostrecently.Butbyplacingtheseissuesontheagenda,movementshavealsogenerated

abroaderconversationaboutICE’srole,pushingthestatetoexertamoreproactive,butalsomore

representativeregulatoryrole.

Thedebatehasalsospilledoverintoabroaderquestioningofthelarge-scaleextractiveenergy

modelpredominantinthecountry.Movementshavedenouncedthesignificantsocio-environmental

impactsofhydroelectricprojects,rangingfromthedisplacementofentirecommunitiestoalterationsin

riverflows,sedimentation,thelossofforestcover,thedestructionofwetlands,andnumerousrelated

environmentalrisks.Environmentalistshavealsopointedoutthatmegahydroplantshavesignificant

carbonfootprints,andarenotaslow-emissionastypicallyclaimed(AstorgaGatgens2012,24).While

ICEinsistsonthecentralityoftheextractivemodel,criticspointtoitshighfixedcostsandlonglead-

timeswhilehighlightingthemodularityandflexibility,aswellastheuntappedavailability,ofvariable

renewablesourceslikesunandwind.Thedebatereflectsalargeronetakingplaceatthegloballevel,

drivenbyrapidtechnologicalchangeanddecarbonization.Itpositsthattheexistingenergy

architecture,whichiscentralized,command-and-controloriented,andextractive,isbeingreplacedbya

newone,which“willbedistributive,mobile,intelligent,andparticipatory”(Seba2014,3).Thisisan

adversescenarioforcentralizedutilitieslikeICE:“buildingsmall-scaleonshoreandoffshorewindand

fittingsolarpanelsarehardlyskillsthatcompaniesspecializinginlarge-scalepowerstationsarelikelyto

have”(Helm2017,211).Ontheotherhand,itdovetailswiththeinterestsofprivategenerators

clamoringforgreaterparticipationintheCostaRicanenergymarket.

25

WhilesocialmovementshavemobilizedtokeepICEaccountabletheydonotnecessarilyoppose

theinstitutionperse.Muchlessdotheyfavoranexpansionofprivategeneration,whichtheyseeasan

appropriationofwaterandenergy,nationalandpublicresourcestheysaybelongtoeveryone.ICE

remainspopular,steepedinitsidentityasstewardofthecountry’senergysovereignty.Butits

adherencetoamega-extractivemodelseemslikelytocontinueencounteringresistance.Whetherthe

organizationrespondsadaptively,asithasdoneinthepast,willbeakeyquestionforthefuture

developmentoftheelectricitysector.

26

Table1.MovementPolicyandInstitutionalImpactsintheCostaRicaEnergySector

Movement Impact Type

LigaCívica,ComisiónObrera,ComitédeDefensadelaRiquezaNacional

NationalizationofelectricityCreationofSNECreationofICE

DirectpolicyimpactDirectinstitutionalimpactIndirectinstitutionalimpact

AsociaciónNacionalDefensaConsumidoresEléctricos(ANDCE)1949,Cartagocitizens1962

MunicipalelectricitygenerationCreationofESPH/JASEMH

DirectpolicyimpactDirectinstitutionalimpact

JuntasProgresistas,ANDCE,AlianzadeMujeresCostarricensesanti-ratehikemovement1952,1958

CallsfornationalizationofCNFL,reinforcesnotionofenergysovereignty/nationalism

Agendaimpact

Protestmovement1983,ComitésdeLucha,ComisiónCoordinadoraNacionalContraelAlzadelosServiciosEléctricos

GraduatedrateadjustmentsDemandsforaccountabilityandtransparencyofICE,dangersofmonopolyactor

DirectpolicyimpactAgendaimpact

Anti-dammovement1990s Exposedregulatoryvoidregardingwaterconcessions,frozenewprojectsandrenewalsfor11yearsEmpoweredMINAEtoregulateconcessionsandmodernizedlegalframework

DirectpolicyimpactIndirectpolicyimpact

Anti-COMBOmovement2000 StoppedliberalizationandopeningofenergysectorReinforcednotionofenergy/waterassovereignresources

DirectpolicyimpactAgendaimpact

Localcommunitiesmobilizedagainsthydroelectricprojects

UseofmunicipalreferendumforpopularparticipationinextractivedecisionsStoppedprojects:Sarapiquí2000Guácimo2001Turrialba2005Pacuare/SavegreExecutiveDecree2015

InstitutionalimpactDirectpolicyimpactsDirectpolicyimpact

IndigenousmobilizationagainstDiquís,withenvironmentalorganizations

RecourseagainstUnitedNations,SpecialRapporteurReport2011Statuteforpreviousconsultationofindigenouspeoples2018QuestioningofICE’sextractivemodelPortrayalofICEasheavy-handedandunaccountableactor

InstitutionalimpactIndirectpolicyimpactAgendaimpacts

27

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