The Peronist and Alfonsin

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•

The Peronist

Labor

Movement

nd the Alfonsin Government:

An Uneasy Relationship

for

Argentina s Democracy

(1983-1989)

by

Anne-Julie Perrault

Department of Political Science

McGlli University Montreal

September 1992

Copy

1



The

Peronist Labor

Movement nd

the

Alfonsin Government

1983-1989)



•

Acknowle gements

1wish to thank

my

thesI3 SupervlSOr Professor Philip Oxhorn for hls

Invaluable support and thorough advlce whlch he gave

me whlle my

research was

bemg

completed 1

would

also Ilke

to

thank

ail

the

professors who taught me dunng my M A studles

at

McGill and helped

me to

Improve

my

research endeavors

1

have

also recelved considerable mtellectual stimulation

from

two

professors dunng

my

undergraduate studles

Professor

Ducatenzeller

and Professor Korany

to

whom 1 am very grateful

Flnally but

not

least. the encouragement and love of

my

parents.

Annlk and Mark

have

been a source

of considerable support

and

strength throughout

my

studles and research

For the completlon of my M A Studl9S 1 have been fortunate to have

the flnanclal support of the Fe A R fellowship



•

The

alm of

the

thesis IS

to

3nalyw

the

Perorllst

labor

movemenl's

lolf

the

Argentine

democratlc consclldatlon

process

Sl) I l lP scholill s.

1S

Valenzuel3 have underlmed the IrnDortant role of 1 1l1l1r 1ll0Vt:l 1Wl1ls

thp

consolidation of the

"leW

democratlc If'Qlmes rmE'rqlng frum thl) ( nd of

authorltarran r u l , ~ This role

consists

Irl t p l ln l

l

idtloll of I,lbor s

mobillzationai actlvltles and militant dernJIK. s

Ilowcvf l.

t t 1 l ~ , t ~ c t OldrS

have

not sufflclently emphasl7ed

th·e

weakness

and

t h l ~

r ( ~ c i u c t - c i

w t . I ~ J h t

of

some labor movements after mliltalY repressron dJld fX'OnOT1lIC structural

transformations The Ihesls eX3mlnes the A r ç ~ f > n t l l H

dSP

dl1d

demonstrates how the several general

strrkes

org;H1I7ed bv thf' CCI

T

durrng Alfonsrn s

government dld

not

hlnder

Ar

gentlne

dt)tnocri1tlc

consolidation ln the short term The thesls underllnes the wcakenlllg of

the

Peronlst

labor movement

and

explarns

Ils

mlnor role ln

the

consolidation

process

Ce mémoire analyse

le

rôle

du

mouvement

ouvrier

Péronlste

d3ns

le

processus de consolidation démocratique en

Argentine

Certains auteurs,

tel

Valenzuela.

ont souligné

l Importance

du rôle des orqanlsLltlom,



•

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

THEORETICAL ANAL YSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

ORGANIZED LABOR AND DEMOCRATie

REG

IMES 9

1 l abOJ

y 1 o v e m ~ [ t s

and Pol1tlcal Regimes 10

1 The Incorporation of labor movements Into Latin American polltlcal

s y ~ m s

10

1 2 The legacy of popullsm and of corporatlsrn. a hlghly organlzed

labor

mavement, the pohtlclzed state and the emergence of

bureaucratlc-authontanan reglmes 15

2 D ~ J t l O C r a c y and Labor Movements 23

2.1 Post-authorrtanan labor movement contribution to democracy 24

2 2

Post-authorrtarran labor weakness 30

22 1 Valenzuela's framework of analysls 31



•

III OPEN CONFRONTATION UNDER DEMOCRACY

60

1. The LRS ProJect A

D l f f l ç ~ I L S . l Ç l L l J Q . 8 _ 3 . - 8 A 61

1 1

UeR

~ ~ o v r n m n t pnorlty union democratlzatlon 61

1 2 Union no rmallzatlorl 67

2 Atternpts Of

S o C J a L C ~ n c e r t a t I 9 _ 1 J

j \ n g J : . h e J 3 $ ~ t

QLl)b_éI{d1(7/ f11o

71

2 1

The Mesa de Concertaclon and wage

pollcles

3

22

Analysis

of

the objectives of

CGT s

fllst

general

stnkes, the ascent

of Ubaldlnl

and

the Imposslbllty

of

concertation

/7

23

Results

or

the September

1984 and

May

1985

general stnkes

81

3. Plan Austral And UnlQ_n ~ : e ç l o J L Ç l U : - : J E i l l O J L a t l ) f l S _1985-1986 83

3 1 The

Implementation

of the Plan ustral and CGT s strategy

of

confrontation 84

3.2 Sectonal negotlatlons, labor leaders divergent tactlcs

87

4. Attempts Of Cooptlon And Peronlst CGI Weakness

. ~ m J : 8 9 9

4 1 Government strategy of labor fragmentation 91



•

INTRODUCTION

Labor moveménts hlstoncally have been

both

strong and Important

actors ln Latin Amencan polltlCS and

economlc

development. especlally

smce

the popullst penod

of the 1930s and 1940s

1

Organlzed

labor's

attitude and behavlOr have mfluenced conslderably the stabllity

and

legltlmacy of the

reglon's

polltlcal

reglmes The

long hlstory of labor

mobillzatlons wlth destablllzlng effects, such as natlon-wlde strikes,

work

stoppages and demonstratlons, reveals ItS contlnuous struggle against the

rulmg classes'

unwlllmgness

to share political power However, recent

mliltary reglmes

.:;,.trove

to

change

the

labor

unions'

predominant raie

and

undermrne labor's strenglh through massive repression and restrictive

pohcles, such as

dlsadvantageous

labor

leglslatlon

and regresslve wage

pollcles Although Latin Amencan labor movements have been extremely

debrlitated by the represslve pollcles of authorJtanan regimes, as weil as by

the debt and general economlc crises of the 1970s and 1980s, they



•

labor movements' Intense mobillzatlonal actlvltles agaillst autholltanan rule

either facliitated

or

hrndered the process of

polltlcal

change toward

democracy As a result. Latlll Amencan Irlbor rl'lovernt'nts playerl

significant raie ln recent transitions

to

rlernocrdcy Yet, It lerndlllS to hl sepr1

what

role labor

movements will and

Céln

play

ln

thp (;()IlS01Ida IC)fî

p r l ) c e s ~ E s

of

the

new

democratic reglmes

Most Latin American countnes have expellenced dr amatie polltlcal

changes

dunng

the 1980s After a prolonged perrod of authorrt3r r il rule,

transitions

to

democracy exposerl the

varrOLlS

socral and polrtlcal aetors

10

the progressive

learnlng

of

how to

corn

promise and reach consensus

through the use of democratlc Instltut ons However, these forms ot polllicai

practice are often recent and still fragrle Transitions have not sllrrnounlorl ail

the polttlcal

problems

of

the

past The

new

democracles have Inhented

many unresolved soclopolltlcal hurdles tr m the authorrtéHlan and pre-

aut'1oritarian reglmes WhlCh must be overcome to gUélmntee democratlc

consoliaatlon Among these

obstacles, the

legacy

ot strong lélbor



•

Valenzuela has demonstrated

ln

"Labor Movements m Transitions

to

Democracy'· a theoretlcal Interp.:;t

ln

the

question

of

democracy

and

labor

movements·

1

The

author arqued tha the labor

movement s

attitude

and

behavlor

delermmed

the form and

pace

of

polltlcal change

trom

authontanan

rule

to a oemocratlc reglme

He

stressed that the restralnt of

labor's sectonal demands

IS

a necessary step

to

guarantee the success of

democratlzatlon H0wever, the labor movement's polltlcal and economic

welght

was

dlHerent

and

weaker after

the

authontanan expenence Whlle

the self-limitation of labor's sectonal demands can facilltate democratlzation,

It S

not necessanly a determmant

f.qctor

for democratlc consolidation

as

asserted

by

Valenzuela Since organlzed

labor has

been

weakened Where

labor adopted a combative stance

and

dld

not reduce

ItS

mobillzationai

actlVltles, as

It

IS the case ln Argentma under President Alfonsln's

government, democratlc consolidatIon has

not

been Jeopardlzed The thesis

will

argue that

the

weakness

of

post-authontanan

labor

movements reduces

the

Impact

of

thelr behavlor

on the

consolidation process



•

The

Peronlst

CGT has

probabty

been the mast

powedul ,met P,HtISJn

labor movement

ln

Latin America. playmg

bath c1n

Irnport3.nt econOrlllC

c1l1d

politlcal role n the country until 31

le,bl

the 1976 rnllit<lry C O l l ~ î Sifln \ the

advent

of Peronlsm ln the S8corld hait ot thl"' 1940s, .md

e s p l ~ c l d l l y

,lftPI

H'

,

Peronlst govel nment

was

oVE'lthrown 1955. Arq('nllllcl h;Hi hcrr1

charactenzed

by

escalatmg socl,ll

3nd

polltlc3.1

Instabillty ,llld

pconOrlllC

stagnation

The major legacy

of

Peronlsm

was

a stronqly

:nstltutlonalllNj

and

polltlclzed

labor movement and Inefflclent popullst

p ( ) I I C l e ~ , ~ J P I 1 ( ' r a t l n q

antagonlstlc alliances

over dlstllbutlonallssues

After 1955, other SOCI3 1 and

polltlcal actors percelved the strong labor rnovement as one of thp m,llol

factors obstructrng

Algentlne

developmen and

thue;

tlttemptcd

tCl

eradlc<lte

it Argentine pO/ltiCS and econornlcs were tl ~ 1 n s f o r m E ' r J Int ) ;1Il drRnd of

struggle

between

Peronlst

forces and

antl-Peronlst orws,

ent<llllllg

i n ~ r e s e d tnstabtllty and the

well-kllown

sWing

b ~ ' w n ( ' n

CIVlllélll and

authontanan

reglmes

Slnce

the

Peronlst

party

héid

often

been

prOSlrtbf}O

fram partlclpatrng ln ctvllian electlons

fram

1955 onw3rds anrl nxclurled fram



•

dlfferent governments ) Therefore, the Peranlst organized

labor

had greatly

shapeu the configuratIOn and rnfluenced the maintenance of political

reglmes between 1955 and 1976

The 1976-1983 authontanan reglme dellberately sought to annlhilate

Peronlst strength by severely attacklng the plllar of the movement : the

polttlclzed CGT Although not valiquished, the labor movement had been

repressed considerably and weakened The welght of the Peronist

orgamzed labor

ln

Argentlna's polttlcal and economic systems was distinct

n 1983 than ln 1976

Argentlna IS an interestlng case to analyze organized labor's role in

the new democracles for two reasons On the one hand, President Raul

Alfonsln, elected democratlcally n October 1983, recogntzed the problem

posed by

the

labor movement for democracy. The Alfonsin government

stressed that the authorrtarian tendencies and the hlstorically pOlitical

raie

of

Argentine Unlonlsm were one of the princIpal stumbling blocks to the



•

the first time slnce 1928, a democratlc transfer of power occurred trom one

civilian government to another. Has democrélcy survlved becéluse of labor's

role or desplte It?

The thesls

WIll

attempt to understand why and how the new Argentine

democratlc regime was able to mamtam Itself and show

sorne

slgns of

consolidattng itself, desplte the perslstence of strong protests

and

OpposItIon

by the Peronlst labor movement to PresIdent Alfonsm's governmellt S

As

a

working hypothesls, we will suggest

that

the

Alfonsm government was able

to initia te the democratic consol/dation pro cess because the Peromst unions

were consider bly weakened by the polrt/cal nd adverse economlc

conditions durmg nd after the last mil/tary reg/me

Whlle labor's partlcular

vision of democracy and ItS tense relatlonshlp wlth the government could

lead one to belleve that Its consequent confrontatlonal behavlor would play

a determinant role ln hampering ArgentIne democratlc Instltutlonallzatlon as

argued by Valenzuela, the emphasis on the analysls

of

ItS weakness leads

to different conclusIons On

the

one hand, organlzed labor could not be



•

expected to have a slgnlflcant

role ln

the democratlzatlon process

in

terms of

restralnlng

tS

sectonal demands

to

the benefit of polltlcal instltutionallzation.

However, on the other hand, the authontarian legacy and the return to

democracy transformed

the

hlstoncal

role

and position of the labor

movement ln the polltlcal and economlc spheres The weakness of the post-

authontarian labor movement and the dlfferent polltical context brought

some changes

ln

tS organizatlon and weight

ln

the polltical system. These

changes should lead us ta reconsider labor s raie and impact in the new

democracles

The research will flrst discuss sorne theoretlcal Issues concerning

labor s raie in the formation and maintenance of political regimes ln Latin

America to assess its dlfferent raie ln the new democracies after recent

transitions fram authoritarian rule It will focus

in

particular on the politlcal

and destabllizmg role of labor

movements in the

past. Valenzuela s

theoretical framework of analysis on labor s position in transition phases will

a/low us to also understand its position and role

ln the

consolidation



•

relative strength and organizational capaclties were distmctly weaker than

those m 1976.

ln order to examine the Peromst labor movement s evolution and role

in the new Argentine democracy, the research

ill

then analyze the four

broad periods of Alfonsin s mandate, each of them representmg the UeR

government s use of different strategies toward the labor movement and the

latter s changing response to them. Flrst,

trom

1983

to

1984 the government

attempted to democratlze the unions to undermme Peromst control over the

unions From 1984 to 1985, it then sought accomodatlon wlth the labor

movement and to integrate it mto the tripartite negotlatlons to resolve the

country s economic crisis Thirdly, fram 985 to 1986 the government

circumvented the unions to impose its economlc stabillzation program, the

lan

Austral Finally, in the last two years

of

his mandate, between 1987

and 1989, Alfonsin tried to coopt one sector

of

the labor movement Into the

government to fragment

it

further more



•

1. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LABOR

AND POLITICAL REGIMES

The theoretlcal section will flrst examine how labor movements have

been analyzed ln

the

polltlcal Iiterature on Latin merica t will

be

emphaslzed that

It

IS necessary to study the attitude and role of the

organlzed labor ln order

to

understand the poIJtical evolutlon of the region.

More speclflcally, th,s section Will concentrate

on

how labor's confrontational

attitude and strong mobillzatlonal actlvltles could threaten the legitlmacy and

stabllrty of past reglmes.

The second section of the theoretical part will discuss labor

movements' role and position in

democracles

after transitions from

authorrtarian rule

t

Will analyze and qualify the

work

of Valenzuela,

Fishman and Rial for evaluating labor movement's role in democratization

processes

)

These authors argue that unless labor movements pursue a

favourable strategy

of

mobllizatlonal restramt durtng the transition and

consolidation periods, the prospects for successful political change and



•

1. Labor Movements

and

Politlcal Regimes

The

polltlcal Iiterature on Latin America has emphaslzed the

slgniticant role played by labor movements ln the formation and stabl ty of

politieal reglmes slnce the popullst penod

As

argued by Ruth B COlliN and

David Collier, the errlergence of the labor movemenls and the Ir

incorporation Into po

"tiCS

have Influenced Latin Amencan

polltlCLlI

reglrnes

orgamzed labor has been l

pivotai

actor, and tlle cllolcos

made y otllt r

clclo, ln

posltlonlng themselves

vis-à-VIS

orgafllzed labor

has had l crllCI;11 Ifnpact 011 n;1llof1al

pohtlcs (our emphasls)

ln order to appreciate the impact of labor movements on Latin Amenrdn

polltieal regimes, thls section will tlrst examine how the y have been

propelled to the forefront of several eountnes' polltlcal and economlc IIfe

Populism, Industnallzation and state corporatlsm have Incorporated the

working classes ln the polltlco-economlc realms and have had far-reachtng

consequences for the labor movements and thelr relation

to

the polltlcal

systems of the reglon The second part of thls section will concentrate on



•

and Instltutlonallzatlon 12 ThiS penod corresponded to

the

expansion of the

Slze, role and responslbllities of the Latin Amencan state, whlch often

cOlnclded wlth populrst polltlcal systems

Popullsm refers to the multlclass urban-based

movements

which

appeared on the poiltlcal scene between the 1930s and the 1960s.1

3

Popullst

movements

emerged tram the breakdown of

the

traditional

ollgarchlcal hegemany Braadly, rn the early decades

of

the 20th century,

Latin Amencan countrres expenenced a shlft from an agrrcultural export

orrented economy to

an

rncreaslngly urbanrzed and Industnalized one. The

two

most

pramment changes were the rapid Increase of urban workers

and

the emergence of a large mlddle class Whlle workers were denred access

to polltrcal pawer by the ohgarchlcal elltes, desplte the major socioeconomic

structural transformations, the mlddle sectors were gradually incorporated

rnta the politlcal system However, these new

state

elltes percelved the

growlng workrng classes as a potentlal poiltlcal resource

to

use against the

oilgarchy's domination They sought to challenge

the

politlcal monopoly of



•

integrated essentlally through state corporatlst mechanlsms The state elltes

sought

to

structure, control, regulate and sanction labor organlzallons

ln

a

vertical way

As deflned by Schmltter, corporansm IS charactenzed as

a system of Interest representatlon

III

Wlllcll tlle COflstltlll'nt lIllIls

ar

or q,lIll/ec1 IIlln

,\

hmlted number of singular, compulsory,

non

competitive, hlel <1lctllcally

ordere<1

,111c1

functlOnally dlfferentlated categorres, fP.cogllflecl

01

hWllspr (If

Ilot crt',-ltnd)

hy

tH'

state and granted a dehberate representallonal monopoly

WIIIlIIl th('1r

rpspocllvo

categories

III

exchange for obsmvmg

certaIn

controls

on 111l 1I

st'Inclloll

nf

In,Hh'ls

,Incl

articulation of demands

and

supports

14

State corporatlsm thus IImlted the development of autonomous labor

orgamzations whlch could have threatened

the

Interests of the new elltes

ln

power Unions were tled to

the

governments through the intervention

and

scrutmy of the Labor Mlnistry

The

governments h ad Intf d L J c ( ~ d labor

legislations

that granted

state wlth considerable

power ln

union affarrs

Unions were legally recognized by the state and the latter could Interfere ln

ail

union actlvltles and control

the

nghts

to

organlze,

10

stnke and

to

bargaln

with employers,I5



•

urban labor movements

The

popullst political program was accompanled

by

a new economlC model whlch substantlally Improved labor's worklng

and

living conditions The enhancement of workers' role ln the polltlcal

and

economlc realms Increased thelr expectations, and thls will later explain

thelr reslstance

to

subsequent antl-popullst governments

Most popullst governments promoted the economlc program of

1 8 1

(import-substltutmg Industnalizat/on) 16 The world Depression had strongly

affected export eeonomles

of

the reg/on Latin Amencan economies turned

inward

and

began manufactunng goods they had formerly Imported. The

popullst state actlvely promoted mdustnal growth through protectionlsm.

Protect/onlst polleles, such

as

the erectlon of tarnff barners, subventions to

lacallndustnes and the creation of government-run flrms, largely favored

the

labor force and the new entrepreneunal class. In the initiai phase, populist

governments used

the

excedentary resources of mdustnal growth to finance

protection and ralse real wages However, these governmental policies

inereased internai consumptlon, leading to an mflationary spiral Ta hold





•

mdustrlallzatlon process However, these elites percelved the Incorporation

and growmg power

of

the urban labor as a threat to thelr own interests.

The

mterests of the national bourgeoIsie and the worklng classes, advantaged

under the proteetlve tutelage of the stat8,

we e

rartly fultilled at the expense

of the elltes linked to international capital and to the external market ln order

to Implement thelr own economlc program IInked to the international market,

elltes would support mllitary intervention to overthrow popullst and

protectlonlst coalitions Thus, the incorporation of the labor movement,

popuhsm

and

the 1 1 eeonomlc pro gram sowed

the

ground for the

confrontation of antagonlstlc alliances The followlng section

will

analyze n

more detall

how

populism generated such confllctlng interests

1.2 The illgacy of popullsm and of corporatism. a hlghly organized labor

movementl.- the polltlc lzed state and the emergence of bureaucrat ic

authontanan

reglm es

Popullsm,

the

S 1 model of economlc development,

and

the workmg

class Incorporation through corporatlst mect,amsms had two major impacts



•

adopted by most Latin Amencan countnes presented some df flr.18ncles

Stable state corporatlsm wou

d

have reqUired strong Institutions and/or the

continuous growth ln Income for labor movements to accept subordrnéllion

to

the state Most countnes lacked both. and consequently

ttw

stale lost Its

corporatlst control on labor movements Incluslonary corporatlsm worked

against its Initial purpose

of

subordlnatlng the labor

rnOV rnent 10

state

control Instead,

It

created a more autonomous. orgafllzed and polltlclzed

labor movement. Labor leaders pnvlleged tles wlth the state

ln

the populist

era had glven

them

a real taste of

power

and had Increaseci thelr

expectatlons

VVhen

anti-populist governments came to power. labor

movements

had

acqUired sufflclent orgamzatlonal strength to élggresslvely

defend thelr interests Moreover, unions had more than mere syndlcallst

functions: they

were

converted IIlto the polltlcal representatlves of the

working classes ln certam countnes,

such

as Argentma and Peru, n

addition to state regulatlon, workers had been rnobillzed and Incorpomted

through a polltlcal party or polltical movement, the Peronlst movement ln



•

Popullsm

also

created adversary alliances

and

contnbuted to politlca

Jnstabliity

s

analyzed abov8, popullst governments had satlsfied the

polltlcal and economlc Interests of the worklng class and domestic

bourgeoIsie to

the

detnment of export elltes This arrangement entalled

balance

of

payment deflclts that eventually led to mllitary Intervention to

overthrow the popultst governments and solve distnbutlonal conflicts When

confllcts Over

the

scarcer surplus Increased, most populist reglmes

collapsed and were replaced by authoritanan ones.

ln

ail

81ght

countnes [Argentma, Brazll, Chlle, Colombla, MexIco, Peru, Uruguay,

Vene7uela] the incorporation penod produced a strong pohtlcal reactlon, and ln most

countnes thls reactlon culmmated ln the breakdown of the national pohtlcal reglme

uoder WhlCll

the

Incorporation polreles

h d

been Implemented

R

These authontanan reglmes ln the 1950s and 1960s (those

precedlng the bureaucratlc-authontanan reglmes dlscussed further below)

reacted agamst

the

prevlous social and polttlcal order The armed forces,

ailled wlth the export-onented elttes, vlewed labor movements' polltical

activatIon as hampertng ove rail development. They had to overcome capital



•

these stabillzation pragrams could not be fully IInplemented sl 1ce they

generated strong reslstance fram labor movements

and

some sectors

of

Ole

national bourgeoIsie whose mterests were

damaÇJed

Glven labor

movements' organlzatlonal and polltlcal force, as weil l1S tllelr pl t'domillant

position ln LatIn Amer/can economles, they destabllized gov81 nments thl1t

Implemented stabillzation and antl-popular polleles Then, a nE"W pellod nf

economic reactlvatlon was launched wlth Increases of

wl1ges,

of

II1dUStllcll

production, pnces freeze mevltably followed by Inflation and forelgn

exchange reserves depletlon Although thls cycllcal pattern of pconoJnlc

crises and polltlcal Jnstabliity mostly appl18s ta the Argentine case, othel

Latin Amencan countrres also experrenced, to a lessel dpgree, sharp

conflicts between the elltes Imked to international market and 111bor

movements eventually leadlng ta the reversai of reglmes

The presence

ot

hlghly mobllized and antagonlstlc social forces, none

strong enough to Impose

Its

rules of

the

game on the o hers, Impeded thû

institutlonallzatlon of legltlmate norms or rules to resolve dlstnbuflonu/



•

own rules for the pol/t/cal game The polltlcal cycle seemed to fluctuate

simu1tr,neously wlth

the

economlc cycle Economlc policles satlsfied short

term mterests and constantly altered the share of the Income dlstributif'ln by

rewardlng the groups

ln

power and excluding other sectors This situation

led to polanzatlon, praetonanlsm and the pohtlclzed nature of the state

21

Douglas Chalmers mtroduced the concept of the pohtlclzed state after

observlrrg the several and recurrent changes of reglmes in most Latin

American countnes

22

This polltlcal Instabliity was related ta the

tentatlveness of pohtlcal Institutions

23

Slnce the latter were perceived by

the

major pohtlcal actors

as

mere Instruments for politrcal power, Latin

Amencan reglmes have been charactenzed

by

the lack of Institutionallzed

medl8tlons between the state and civil society Chalmers argued that there

were no institutions because there

was

no consensus in Latm America as ta

what a good government

IS

Vanous conflictlng social groups of slmilar

welght were unable

to

create the necessary consensus for a stable regime.

Thus, social groups acted outslde the Institutions and, as a result, they



•

redlstributive populist polleles. v n though they were eoncelved at the

expense

of

other groups' Interests. led them

to

pressure the state dlrectly

wlth

no

intermedlanes and delegltlmlze any governrnent that was

not

responslve to labor's sectonal Interests Union leadership was confident

enough

to

defend the economlc and social gr/evances of Its rnembers by

any means. Labor organlzed strong mobillzationai actlvltles (wlldcat stnkes,

work stoppages. demonstratlons,

etc)

to threaten governments wlth thelr

destabllizlng power ln order to

have

thelr demands satlSf 8d .

This

pattern lof tabor pohtlcal incorporation] had a number of consequences t ~ t

probably have, over the years, undercut any predispositions on the part of labm

leaders and other ehte groups to glve pnmacy ta democratlc

modes

of

rule

1

On

the other hand, Latm Amencan elltes' international

entrepreneurial class ~ m the agncultural exporters) and mlddle classes'

behavior contributed to pushing labor leaders

ta

act outslde the Institutions

and radicalize their movements By denymg labor's demands and/or by

excluding them fram the pohtical system, they forced labor ta

act

outslde

the

legal institutions. Elites saw the proper functlomng of democratlc polltlcal



•

labor strikes.2

5

Especlally the ln the 1960s and 1970s countries such as

Brazll, Chlle, Uruguay,

and

Argentma expenenced an escalation of labor

mobllizatlOns

and

stnkes Labor had suffered

in

these years the costs of

worsened economlc cnSIS, low growth

and

hlgh mflatlon rates

The

policles

Implemented

to

resolve economlc cnsis had lowered wage earners'

standards

of

living Labor Increased the mihtancy of the

rank

and

flle to

defy

governments that were recalcitrant ln meeting their demands Elites

percelved increasing labor indiscipline

and

social unrest

as

major threats to

thelr mterests.

6

ln the same penod, they actively supported milltary

intervention and the Implementation

of

bureaucratic-authontarian regimes in

order to defmitively annihllate labor's destabilizing role and economically

devastating strikes Hlghly repressive regimes emerged to destroy the

collective power of workmg class

The thorough scholarly work of Guillermo O'Donneli on bureaucratic

authontananism

(BA)

and the general literature

on

regime breakdown have

emphasized

the role

of labor mobihzations. t stressed elites' perception of



•

America, ln the 1960s untll the 1970s (Brazii 1964, Argentlna

1966

and

1976, Chile 1973, Uruguay 1973)

has

been

to dlsrupt the pieexlstll1g

pattern of development based on popullst policles whlch gave considerable

power to the worklng-classes Analyzing the orrgll1s of burenucratlc

authoritanan reglmes, begtnlllng

wlth

the

1964

mliitary coup Brazll,

O Oonneli asserts that.

the

declslve antecedents to the BAs Implemented

ln ArÇJentllla

and other Latlll

American countnes dunng the 19605 and the 1970s. (began) wlth the emerqüllc.ü

1

the popular sector [pnnclpally composed by the worklng classes) as an Important actor

dunng the penod that followed the collapse of ollgarchlc dOlntnatlon

Labor movements were held responsible of the soclopolttlcal crises affectlng

their countries Therefore,

the

core

of

B

polrtlcal

and

economlc program

focused on organized labor as a prrmary target of exclusion and represslon

Without proceding to an overvlew

of

BA regimes, the pOll1t to remember IS

that

the attention given to labor movements revealed thelr considerable

weight

and

capacity

to

influence and destabilrze the polttlcal systems

of

the

region as demonstrated by thelr radicallzatlon ln the 1960s and 1970s ln



•

hardshlp and dlssatlsfaetlon The power of organized working classes hao

generated fears among Latin American elltes who sought

to

exclude labor

movements and restriet the Ir actlvltles n order to proteet their vested

Interests ln the wake of transitions

to

democracy, what Will be the claims of

long-tlme repressed labor movements r pohtlcally opened and legitimated

democracles? Will labor s accumulated demands be a destabilizing element

for the new democratlc regimes, especlally ln the context

of

severe

economlc

crrses?

Or

has

labor

be

weakened under the last perrod

of

labor

repressive authoritarran r :Ie so that ItS eventual mobilizational activities will

not hamper dernocratlc consolidation?

2 Democracyand Labor Movements

This section Will analyze two major arguments on the issue of labor

movements and democracy Both arguments will take into account the

context of reeent transitions trom authoritarran ru le and the authoritarian

legacy Flrst, It will examine Valenzuela s and other scholars argument on



•

The second section will quallty Valenzuela's argument and question

the impact

ot

labor's behavlor

on

the consolidation process

By

stresslng the

weak

pOSition of labor movements ln the nascent democracles

we will

argue that while labor restr l,rt an facliitate the democratlc

Instltutlonallzatlon, the lack of restralnt Will not necessanly destabillze

democracy. Democracles

emerged trom

hlghly

labor-represslve

authoritarian regimes. The latter severely attacked labor's strength and as a

result weakened unions' organlzatlonal potentlal and welght as an

economic and polltlcal actor ln the early consolidation process, even

If

labor

movements do not support democracy and engage ln mobillzationai

activities,

do

they still have

the

capaclty to destabillze governments as

ln

the

past?

2.1 Post-authontanan labor movement's contribution to demQQJflçy

Speciahsts on Latin Amencan polltlcs have shown growlng Interest

ln

democratization processes and on the Issue of democratlc C' ,sohdatton



•

be

aware) that thelr momental y confrontations, expedlent solutions, and contingent

compromises are ln effect defmmg rules whlch may have a lasting but largely

unpredlctable effect

on

how and by whom the "normal" pohtlcal game will

be

played in

the

future

lI

The collapse of mliitary reglmes and the general antl-authoritarian

consensus that prevalled dunng the transition penod were necessary, albeit

not sufflClent, conditions for the consolidation of polltlcal democracy.3\

Uncertalnty was related

to

the often fragile commltment

by

key actors

to

new

"rules of

the

game" and to the very eXistence of soclopoiltical problems

nerther solved by the authontanan reglmes nor by the transition. Garreton

has emphaslzed,

ln

hls analysis on

the

distinction between transition and

consolidation processes, that "transition to democracy does not solve the

many deep-seated and longstandlng problems of a soc:ety."32 Transition

covers the penod startlng wlth the terminatlon of the military reglme until the

tlrst democratlc electlons It refers

to

the "shlft trom one type of regime to

another whlch need not

be

accompanied by any substantive social

changes

n



•

overtlme

and

command

the

alleglance of cltlzens

q The

new constltutlonal

governments have ta establlsh new rules ta overcame the resistance

of

certain groups whlch struggle

ta

mamtaln thelr prtvllüges and have

to

contront thelr polltlcal tradition of resolvlIlg social confllcts through channels

other than democratlc Institutions (through

the

polltlclzed state) Labor

movements that had hlstortcally bypassed democratlc Institutions to satlsfy

their demands would appear to

be

one

of the

Important reslstant social

groups demacratlc gavernments had ta face for the cansaltdatl0n process

The

prevlous

section has hlghllghted the centrallty of labor

movements for the legltimacy

and

stablltty of former reglmes

ln

the past

when labor

was

politlcally

or

economlcally dlssatlsfed,

Il

engaged strong

mobihzational actlvltles for the governments

to

meet thelr demands

However, transitions to democracy dld not solve labor dlscontent Labor

has

lost a lot dunng the last hlghly represslve authontanan reglmes Therefore,

with

the

return

of

polltlcal freedom,

It

can

be

expected that an explosion

of

pent-up demands could occur ln

the

post-authontanan penod and that labor



•

Valenzuela's principal Ihesis 18 that unless the narrow objectives of

the labor movement

are

compatible wlth

the

general support for democratlc

consolidation, the latter could be hampered Democracy's success

IS

dlrectly

Irnked to the relative welght labor movements asslgn to thelr sectonal

rnterests, on

the

one hand, and to thelr efforts 10 sustain democratizatron,

on

the other hand 1')

And

the latter lmpiles the dellberate restramt of labor s

mobillzat/Onal actlvlt/es and moderation of

the

sectorial demands,

sornethlng

whlch

has been lacklng hlstoncally

ln

Latin Amenca The excess

of

labor demands

can

clash wlth democratic Institutlonaltzatlûn The latter

reqUlres negotfatrans and moderatfon

amol,)

the var/ous soc/al actors ln

order ta deflne

the

rules

of

polit/cal bargarnlng Contrary ta the "pol/tlclzed"

state ln whlch conf lctrng Interests confronted each other dlrectly and

generated constant Instabllrty, democratlc institutlonalizatlon requires a

soclopolrtlcal consensus over new

mechanlsms

of polltlcal confllct

resolut/on Each soc/al actor must I m t some of

ItS

sectorral demands

rn

arder ta reach a common agreement and promote larger l o n g ~ t r m polrtical



•

Thus, Valenzuela ascnbes a fundarnenta: role ta labor rnovements ln

democratlzation

pro

cesses

He

argues that the

labor

rnovement's attitude

toward democracy and ItS behavlor

durmg

the transition pro cess will

determine the democratlc outcomes

Therefore, a combinaI/on of hlgh labor dnd popular

mol)lli;

Itlon

dl

CPI

.llll clltlcal

moments

of

breakdown of the authontanan Iflstltutlons (that IS, whell the option fOI

,i

course of redemocratlZî\tlon becomes possible but Stllle elltes have Ilot yat COllllTlitteo

Ihemselves

10

Il), followed by Ihe declme

of

Ihat

mobllizallon and by the

wllhngness

and

capaclty of

the

labor movement's union and polltlcal

leadershIps

to

show

restralnt

when

the

pollt lcal

agenda

shlfts ln

favor

of

redemocratlzation, would seem 10 provlde the Ideal ITliX III Imm')

lI

I,Ü)()I's

contnbutlon 10 ensunng

the

latter's success (our cmpllasls)

1 jTranslttons

are

most successful ln lerms

of

produclng il consolid.lln<1

dOfllocrdtu:

reglme

when

there IS a compatlbllity between the narrow oblectlves of 111 slqlllllC,lIll

segments

of

society

and the

newly evolvlng overall politlcal IllslllutlOm, 1(,

Two

other authors corroborate Valenzuela's argument Fishman and Rial,

analyzing the Spanlsh and Uruguayan democracles, respectlvely, undE;, :,ne

the

Importance of examtntng labor movement's polltlcal VISion and attitude

toward

democracy

37

ln

Uruguay and m

;)pam,

labor's support

of

democracy

and

the

dellberate limitation of

labor

demands

plaYHd

a

signlficant part

ln the

democraltzatlon

pro

cess of both countnes If orgamzed



•

the

labor leadership ln tact wounded

ItS

own orgamzatlonal potentlal

ln

pursUit of a

pohtlcal strategy

of

moderatlon 9

ln order to secure polltlcal transition, Spanish

and

Uruguayan labor

leaders constralned thelr organlzatlonal objectives, that IS seeking support

of

workers by defendrng thelr Interests (through strikes to obtain wage

Increases for example) for economlc

and

polltlcal reasons ln a context of

economlc cnsls and hlgh unemployment, labor leaders limlted thelr sectorial

demands to assure Job secunty and economic recovery They

also

adopted

a positive attitude toward regime transition

and

followed a strategy of

moderatlon to reach consensus wlth other social actors for broader political

goals feanng a return of authoritanan

rule

Ali three scholars concluded that organized labor s moderation and

commltment ta democracy were essential for

and

contributed directly to the

consolidation of the new reglme For example. In the Spanish case,

the

capaclty of labor, to the extent necessary,

to

IImlt demands ln arder to advance a

broad

and

long-term pohtlcal agenda, ln thls case the consolidation of democracy ln a

country wlth a hlstory of repeated authontanan rule [andl Labor s moderatlon



•

confrontational force to democratlc governments They restralned thelr

demands in order

to

partlclpate

rn

the

democratlc

Irlstltutlonallzatlen

process Rial underlrned that the Uruguayan laber movement's restrarned

Its

moblltzational activltles because it was a strong supporter of the dernocratlc

politlcal order

Whlle conttnUlng w th thelr d/scourse of social/sm and revollitlOnary ch,lIlqe thpsû

sectors [predommant Communlst sect ors

of

the

labor

movomontl

lIonûtholnss

sought to

be

part of

the

democrat c order

and

gave

sorne assllr lIlces

of

loyalty and moderat/on

for

the future 4 (rny emphasls)

However

some

labor movements

do

not percelve democracv as the besl

regime alternative

and

therefore are less wllllng to restraln thelr demands,

as

It

was the case of

the

Argentme CGT

ln

1983

Only

ln

these cases laber

movements could

represent

a reslstant actor to the democratlc

governments. Yet, before concludlng that these labor movements' behavlor

could

be

a determlnant factor ta the consolldatton process, the analysls

should concentrate on the relatIve capacltles of these labor movements to

destabilize the reglmes they do not support ln a state of dlsorganrzatlon

and



•

capaclty

to

defend workers demands

was

reduced. Furthermore,

the

transitions have opened

the

way

to

the

competition among polltical parties

wlth no proscrrptlon he labor movement s political functlon is no longer

justtfled since popularly legitimated politlcal parties could channel labor

dlscontent If the labor movement has

been

considerably weakened

by

the

represslve authori tarian rule

and

plays a less important

role

in the political

arena

wlth the

emergence of alternative institutionalized channels

of

expression (mostly political parties), its behavlor will not destabilize

new

democratic reglmes Therefore, it

IS

important to analyze not only

the

attitude

of labor movements toward democracy, but also theïr position in the new

democracles ln order

to

assess their contribution

to

the

latter. Valenzuela s

framework of analysis offers a good starting point for understanding labor s

impact on the consolidation process.

2.2 1 Valenzuela s framework of analysis

Valenzuela s theoretlcal comparative

framework

provides important





•

role durlng the transition and consolidation processes By contrast,

If

they

are weak, elltes may Ignore thelr demands during the transition

his

situation may lead

to

labor radlcallzatlon

ln

the long-term and

to the

delegltlmatlon t the new reglme If the movement regains strength.

Therefore Il should be Important

ta

analyze the relative strength

or

weakness of the labor movement ln the consolidation process ln order ta

examine If thelr demands will be satlstled by the democratic government

and

If

not,

If

they Will engage

in

destablllzing actlvltles However, ln the

short-term

It

should be equally Important to analyze the relative weakness of

the labor movement ln order ta assess the Impact of thelr eventual

mobllrzatlonal actlvltles If thelr demands are not met by the democratic

governmant

If

labor

S

too weak

to

defend thelr mterests and do es not

receive massive support from the rank-and-file,

ItS

militant demands will not

hamper the early consolidation phase

2

he

centralizat on or decentralization

nd

polit cal unity or division

of

the

labor movement

If labor movements

are

decentralized (those with a



•

negotlations

and

have a greater Influence

ln

the transition and consolidation

proeess, these labor movements

Will

hmlt

thelr sectorial demands ta assure

labor peaee

and

facllltate multisectorial negotlatlons However, as S the

case in Argentina, even though the labor movement S centrallzed and

politlcally united, labor leaders'

poltt/cal tact/cs

can

be

a source of divIsion

within labor movement and lead to the use of Increaserl moblllzatlOn

McGulre underlined that internai union dissenSion can be related

to

the

vanous politleal tactles used by ItS leaders ln order to establlsh relations wlth

the government in power and gain power wlthm the labor movement over

their rivals.

45

Analyzing the Argentine labor movement,

MeGUIre

observed

that tensions and divISions arose among labor leaders desplte the

hegemony

of the

Peronlst ideology. Thus, even though the Argentine labor

movement is relatively centralized and united Ideologlcally, thls dld not

restram its mobihzational aetlvlties because tensions among labor leaders

existed

on

the cholce

of

tactlcs

ln

the consolidation phase the centrallzatlon

or decentralization and polltlcal unit y

or

divISion of the labor movement Will



•

consolidation penods CJ Transition to democracy IS not IIkely to reverse the

long trend of decllnlng worklng

and

living conditions of wage earners

in

a

context of sharp debt and economlc crises Thus,

ln

he consolidation

process, workers Will continue

to

press the government

to

have thelr

repressed demands satlsfled and be compensated for ail the losses they

suffered under the authorttartan reglme Nevertheless, military reglmes'

treatment of labor movements Influence the nature of labor organization that

Will eXlst and operate ln the transition and consolidation phases Most labor

movements expertenced a state of disorganization and of economic

weakness after authontanan repression The long-term effects on Latin

American labor movements of the dlsadvantageous labor leglslation and

other antl-Iabor policles, as weil

as

the structural transformations of the

economy and of the labor market - ail deliberate policies followed by

authontarian reglmes -

Will

have

to

be analyz d ln order to understand the

labor movements' position and capacity of action ln the new democracies

The modalities of transitIOn to democracy nd l bor movement s



•

various segments of the labor movements Will confllct wlth secLlrlng the

transitions

ln

the longer term

48

By

contrast.

In

the

reform

type

of

change.

the mobi llzation followed by

1

estramt sequence

IS

more probable

Mobilizations are often Inltlated dunng the Ilberahzation of authorltanan r

ule

and labor movements can have sorne of thell sectonal derlé1nds reallzed

By the tlme the democratlc the transition beglns. labor leaders are therefore

more likely

to

moderate their orgamzatlon's moblhzatlons ln order to sec ure

the overall politlcal change

ln addition to the ruptur or a reform models, the analysls should

also distingUish between countnes whlch followed transitions wlth

or

wlthout

negotiated pacts

t9

Labor movements ln countnes whlch have undergone a

political reglme change wlth transltlonal pacts,

as ln

the Spanlsh and

Uruguayan cases,

are

more hkely to adopt a strategy of restr alnt to ensure

the objective of democratlzatlon stlpulated

ln

the paets they endorsed The

lack of a transItion pact blndmg different actors, partlcularly labor.

1

established

ru

les of the game, as in Argentlna, Imphes Ihat the prronty to



•

The labor movement's attitude dunng the transition and consolidation

phase

IS

also Influenced by

ItS

relationshlp

wlth

the elites of transitions and

the governmental elltes of consolidation As asserted by Valenzuela, the

labor movement should feel more commltted to contnbute restramt to the

transition If

the

process IS led by elites wlth whom labor has a good worklng

relationshlp because the labor movement's sectonal goals are less likely to

be Ignored

by

the elltes of transItion 5 On

the

contrary,

If

the process is led

by elltes that labor dlstrusts, the latter may build a hlgher confrontational

attitude and be less Incllned

to

compromise and moderate its mobilizational

activities for the

t r n s ~ t l o n

project Valenzuela underltnes that

for

the

Argentlnlan

and

Peruvlan transltlonal elltes,

the

most confrontational forces

they

had

to face were labor leaders.

The same applies to the consolidation period Unions may support or

dlscredlt the newly democratir government's projects according to their own

perception

of

democracy

é.nd

to

the

satisfaction of their own sectorial

demands. However, the government may use strategies to fragment the



•

labor movement restrained tS organlzatlonal mterests

to

facliitats

democratlc consolidation? If not.

f

the narrow objectives of the labor

movement clashed wlth the process of democratlc Instltutlonallzatlon. why

dld this not destabllrze the consolidation process? Valenzuela. Fishman and

Rial argued that the labor movements have

Ll

determlnant role

ln

the

consolidation process wlthout emphaslzrng the state of general weakness of

most labor organlzatlons after the authontarran rule The study of the

Argentine case will reveal that the we kness of the Peronlst labor

movement reduced the Impact of

tS

behavlor on the democratlc pohtlcal

project and did not Impenl the consolidation process, at least ln the short-

term. The analysis of the Argentine labor s role

n

democracy

Will

thus stress

the weakness of the labor movement by studymg the four van ables

presented in Valenzuela s framework of analysls



•

THE ARGENTINE LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE TRANSITION TO

DEMOCRACY

The section will analyze the charactenstlcs of the Argentine labor

movement before and after the roceso m order to assess ItS relative

strength and distinct role

ln

the new democracy It will flrst examme the labor

movement's strength before the dlctatorshlp through the study of Its

mobillzationai capacltles and the polltical power of

ItS

leadership Then It

Will

analyze how labor's power has been undermlned and

ItS

organizatlon

weakened between 1976 and 1983. The thlrd section will then focus on

labor n the transition phase uSlng Valenzuela's four variables offenng new

mSlghts on Peronlst labor's changed welght

and

weaker role

in

the

Argentine consolidation process.

The Peronlst Labor Movement's Power Before The

roceso

5

Argentme labor movement's strength before 1976 was expressed in

Ils capaclty to mobillze workers n order to hamper government policies that



•

movement's organlzatlonal charactenstlcs and leglslatlon. 3) the labor

movement's assets, and

4)

structural aspects of Argentlna's economy

1) Union leaders acted as both th economlc and polltlcal

representatives of the worklng class

S2

Along wlth thelr syndlcJ.lIst functlon

of channellng workers' economlc demands. labor leader

S

t'ssentlally

fulfilled a pohtlcal role on behalf of the Peronlst rnovement

T h ~

100tS

of

unions' polltlcal role are to be found

ln

the pohtlcal InCOlporatlon of

the

worklng classes by Peron and

ln

the Peronlst party's proscription after

195[)

The reorganlzatlon of the CGT by Peron ln

1945

under a new set of rules

had stimulated a sharp Increase

ln

union membershlp whlch Increased the

welght of organlzed labor 5 Between

1946

and

1955.

Peron had granted

labor leaders the nght

to

polltlcal participation by provldlng them wlth

Important positions ln hls government

By

Incorporatlng the worktng class

through state corporatlst mechanisms, Peron recelved the polltlcal support

he needed

to

Implement hls popultst program

By

the same token, Peron

instilled the taste of authontanan power

ln

labor leaders





•

votes of workers for dominant positions in the government ln 1958, for

example, the "62" mobihzed workers' votes

for

the electlon of Arturo Frondizi

and obtamed major positions wlthln hls administration However, as soon

as the government's economlc and union pollcles hampered the labor

movement's Interests, the CGT urged workers to partlclpate

III

militant

mobllizatlons

to

undermme government's power and make the country

ungovernable.

59

Between Peron's ouster

ln

1955 and hls retUi n ln 1973, the

CGr labor leadership orchestrated several Planes de Lucha ("struggle

plans") whlch consisted of wlldcat stnkes, mobllizations and factory

occupations ln order to destabillze the successive antl-Peronlst

governments and have thelr Interests satlsfled

6

To

mention only a few

examples, the CGT camed out a massive wave of stnkes and

demonstrations in 1959 agalnst the Radical Frondizi government hl The

CGr also opposed Radical president IIha dunng hls whole term, 1963-1966

This opposition was manlfested through IIlcreased moblhzatlon and

It

created the favorable conditions for the 1966 coup d'état, whlch It Inltlally



•

of

Argentlna determmed the fate of General Onganla's reglme.

6

Therefore,

the functlonmg

of

a polltlcal party system distorted by Peronism's exclusion,

as weil

as the legacy of corporatlsm

and

popullsm, gave too much political

power to the labor movement

2 The labor movement's strength also derived

from

ItS orgamzational

structure and the favorable labor legislation.

The

Argentine labor movement

was organlzed

ln

a pyramidai structure wlth the declslon maktng power

concentrated

at the

top of the

hierarchy.64

The power

was

monopolized

by

a

small group

of

leaders which gradually began a process of oltgarchlsation .

Labor leaders' control of union electlons procedures contributed to the

maintenance

of

the verttcal

and

central/zed structure

of

the organization,

s

weil as Impedlng any challenge from internai opposition. This abllity of

leadershlp's control of elections was based on the Law 14 455.

65

The latter

estabhshed

that the

wlnntng list took control \

t

ail unions of

the

Industrial

branch Wlth such a system, there

w s

no provision for minority

representatlon t was dlfflcult to dlslodge lhe eXistent leadership because il



•

The fundamental labor leglslatlon whlch conferred Instltutlonal power

to

the CGT was the Law of Professlonal AssOciations

no

14 445 passed

ln

1958. The Law establtshed the system of smd/cato

Un/CO

that IS

It

legally

recognized only one union for each economlc sector Three levels of union

organizatlon

and

structure were taken Into consideration The unions of flrst

degree organlzed workers of

the

same Industnal branch The unions of

second degree were the federatlons whlch united the unions of flrst degree

trom ail provinces. Ftnally, the thlrd level of organlzatlon was the

confederation comprrsing ail the federatlons'

the

CGT Nevertheless, s'nce

the law allowed for elther a federatlve or centrallzed structure, the most

important unions in Argenttna adopted the last form Unions ln metal

working (UOM), rallroads, textile and construction had strongly centrahzed

structures This centralizatlOn gave the bulk of power ta the central

leadership eleeted at the national level

3

ThiS type

of

organlzational structure was Important

ln

ftnanelal

terms. The Perontst labor movement

ran

its own expanded welfare system,



•

fmanclal w e ~ l t h labor leaders sought to protect Peronlst Interests

and

their

own

power by

ail

means

to

the detnment of the country's politlcal stablhty:

union bosses [ 1 played a declslve role ln the orientatIOn toward short-term

considerations and dlsregard for Instrtutlonal consolidation

69

ln addition to ItS polltlcal role, the ownersh.p of considerable

economlc assets had allowed the leadership substantlal control over the

rank and flle.

7o

Leaders had won the allegiance of the rank and file by

prom.s.ng the defense of thelr economlC, social and pohtlcal Interests

Workers JOlned unions to benef.t trom the extended welfare programs but by

the same token

fell

under the authontanan rule of

ItS

leaders. Money was

also

a source of patronage and of personal corruption at the internai level,

.ncreaslng union leadershlp's authonty over the rank and file. Both the high

level of centrahzatlon and frnanclal power had facllttated th e labor

movement's moblhzatlonal capacitles. Workers had no

other

politlcal

representatlves than the powerfully orgamzed Peronlst labor movement.

The Improvement of the.r working

and

living standards depended entirely

on



•

political Impact of unions' mobillzationai actlvltles slIlce employers could not

count on a large reserve of unemployed workers ready to

act

as

strikebreakers.

72

Second, the denslty of

w o r k r ~

ln the capital 'l'as tllgh

More than 50 percent of unlonlzed workers were concentrated ln Buenos

Aires, enhanclng the capaclty for mobillzation Thlrd, as mentloned above.

the most powerful unions headed by the 62 Organrzallons , belonged to the

most prospero us economlc sector' Industry Therefore, the mythlcal slogan

when the CGT stops workmg, ail the country S paralyzed

was an

ongotng

reallty in Argentlna.

7J

2. The Labor Movement and the

ProcesQ

Se/dom m

tS

hlstory had the Argentme workmg

class suffered a bloodlel offensIve than the one

unleashed between 976 and 983

74

The last Argentine mlhtary dlctatorshlp has drastlcally undermmed the

labor movement's strength The 1976 mlhtary coup d état had overthrov'n

Isabel Peron's government ln whlch unton leaders

had

galned considerable



•

Argentlna's economy by openlng the country

to

the international capital and

market

This

restructunng

Implled the eradlcatlon of Peronlsm and

especlally Its backbone that perpetuated ItS eXistence

the

Unions, also

known

as

Peronlsm's columna vertebral

-.,

The

Argentine labor movement

has

undergone several forms

of

represslon under the last dlctatorshlp

The

Proceso sought to infllct a

permanent defeat on the Peronlst organlzed labor To accompllsh ItS

obJective, the armed forces not only used physlcal represslon against the

labor

movement. but also intervened

ln

both the polltlcal

and

economlC

rea/ms

to

erode the bases of unions' power 76 The mliitary reglme radlcally

modltled labor leglslatlon and

the

labor market through the transformatIOn of

Argentlna's productive structure m order to reduce the socIal welght of the

workmg class and Its "combative capaclty" 77

Two major mliltary decrees, no

22 105

and no

22

269, shaped the

new Argentme represslve labor leglslatlon

78

The latter expressly prohibited



•

The new Law dlssolved ttle CGT, restncted ttle attributions of fet1era lons, 1 J

Increased the power of the Mlnlstry of

Labor

wlth reqard

to

unions

took over

Hum

economlc

assets and

prohlbrted ail pohtrcal ac rvrty

on

part

of

labor

l

The abolition of the CGT, the pillar of the Peronlst labor movement.

gave

a

senous blow to ItS organlzatlon and actlVItles A few rnonths later, August

1980,

the new

Law

of

Social Services decree

no 22

269, removed labor's

control

of

ail union social services

and

securlty funds By Intervenlng

the

obras socIales, the milltary reglme cut the labor movement off fram ItS most

Important flnanclal resources

The

Argentine labor movement has

also

been weakened by major

structural economlc changes The

Proceso

's major ec

n

r'0mlC objectIve was

to

transform

the Argentine market ln arder

to

annlhllate populrsm

According to the armed

forces

and the economlC elltes, papulism had

produced a tao powerful

labor

movement, a bloated public sector

and

protected Industnes he==ivlly

subsldlzed

by the state, dnvlng the Argentine

economy and society downward To resolve these economlc and social



•

The monetary and economlc reforms implemented by the mihtary's

economlC team transfered economic activity fram the productive sector

ta

the

financlal sector

of

the economy The Immediate consequence was

the

dlsmanthng of the Argentine Industnal sector. Vanous Indlcators underhne

this dramatlc phenomenon of detndustrialization.

81

The manufacturrng

sector's

share

of gross domestlc product shrank under the dlctatorshlp'

ln

1974, manufactunng Industry accounted

for

o\ler 29 percent of gross domestlC

production, after 1976, Industry's share fel l to 26 6 percent ln 1979, to

25

4 percent ln

1980,

and to

only 22 1 percent ln 1981

8

This phenomenon of del'ldustnalization increased

the

levels of

unemployment and underemployment. By the end of 1981, the number

of

unemployed was estlmated

at

around 1 5 million, the equivalent of

2 ta 25

percent of

the

labor force.

83

These sharp ris es in

the

levels

of

unemployment denved trom

an

important contraction

of

industrial

employment The number

of workers employed

in

manufacturing Industry

declined from 1 030 000

ln

1976

ta

790

000

in 1980.

84

High levels

of

unemployment created a larger reserve

of

unemployed workers, therefore

_

..



•

of new

Job

creation between 1970 and 1980 corresponded to Independent

worker jobs

86

Wage earners' purchaslng power

and

living standards also dWlIldled

as the consequence of the wage reductlon pollcy After the 1976 coup,

wages were reduced by 50 percent

n

less than a

year

x A drastlc

regressive income dIstribution poltcy was

also

designed

to

wlden wage

differentlals.

This process of atomisation of the labor movement has

especially affected Industrial wage earners who lost thelr heretofore

important position ln the wage dlstnbutlon

These structural economlc changes entailed important modlflcattons

in the social structure of labor organlzatlons. By the same token they

debilitated unions' economlc and polltlcal power The most

VISible

change

has been the decltne of tndustnal employment affectlng

the

heretofore

hegemonic unions of thls sector Since the 1950s, the number of Industrral

unions had outnumbered service unions ln the labor movement H .) Industnal



•

percent m 1965 to 3 percent ln 1984/86.

In

the same penod, the

participation of unlonlzed workers

ln

commerce

and

services increased

from

4 to 5 percent

9

Other sources mdlcate that

ln

1976, Industnal workers

constltuted 52 percent

of

the workers of

the

10 blggest Argentme unions. In

1986,

the

Industnal wage-earners only represented 35 percent of the same

population }

The

creation of a segmented labor market and

the

alteratlon of

the social compositIOn of union membershlp contnbuted

to

increase the

heterogenelty of the workmg cl ss nd consequently reduced its

mobillz tion i c p cltles The heterogenelty

contnbuted

to the

dlsorgamzatlon

of

the labor movement untll then under the hegemony of

large tndustnal unions The loss of homogenelty and the wldenmg

differentlals among unions due to dlfferent expenences contributed

to

the

ernergence of new union tendencies wlth dlfferent orientations nd

clai

ms

than the tradltlonal Industnal ones Thus, the support to the mdustnal unions'

tradltlonal

use

of militant stnkes was lessened glven the increasmg

divergence

of

interests (and to the m"itary represslon)



•

important polltlcal groups of the country seemed to have laid down dlfflcult

bases

for

Argentma s democratlzatlon However.

the examlnatlOn of

Valenzuela s three other variables. labor s relative strength or weakness.

labor s politlcal diVISion or unit y and the authorltanan legacy. IS essentlal to

quallfy the extent of labor s Influence over the polltlcal system

3 1

The UCR-Peron/st confrontation

The Argentme Proceso collapsed after ItS defeat m the 1982

Falklands/Malvmas war

Facmg

shattered self-confidence

as

weil

as

undermined legltlmacy, the armed forces

called for

Immediate clvlltan

electlons and for the restoratlon of

democracy

Between 1982 and 1983

political

parties

reorganlzed themselves and competed for the scheduled

October 1983 democratlc electlons

One

of the

key elements ln

the

UCR candidate Raul Alfonsln s

electoral

campalgn

success was hls denunclatlon, ln April 1983,

of

the

eXIstence

of

a mllrtary-unron pact 9

Aifonsin

asserted that a s e c r ~



•

union normallzatlon that would lead

to the

election of a new labor

leadership

This denunclatlon was used to severel}> dlscredlt Peronlsm ln the

electoral campalgn Alfonsln presented

that

pact

as

a threat

to

Argentine

democracy

9

The Radlcals thus Irnked Peron/sm to authontarianism,

somethlng the population deeply shaken by seven years of dlctatorship

strongly rejected

By

denounclng the Peronist union leadership the UCR

related Peronrst's polttlcal strength not to

its

party

but to

ItS labor movement.

Therefore, Alfonsm adopted a confrontatlonal attitude toward those who

supported the adversary party' the Peronist union leaders By stresslng the

authontanan and polttlcal nature of

the

Peronist Union apparatus, Alfonsin

underltned that Its transformation

Into

a

more

democratlc organization would

constltute one of the flrst efforts of

the

UeR government

ln

the labor area.

Furthermore, th,s denunclatlon offered shaky grounds for a UCR-Peronist

agreement or polttlcal pact

to

support the

new

democratlc regime.

At the same tlme, sorne labor leaders attacked the legltlmacy of the



•

ln 1983 what was labor attitude toward democracy? The Argentine

case reveals

labor

leaders' amblguous attitude toward democracy

ln

the

transition penod. thus addlng another element of uncertalnty for democratlc

consolidation Whlle most labor leaders malntamed a clear anti-mllitary

position, thelr commltment to democracy was undetermmed Thelr stance

against military dlctatorshlp was

undoubtedly

related

to

the

strong

represslon the labor movement expenenced dunng the ro

ce

a

1 /

The

labor movement's antl-authontananlsm was expressed

ln

the April 1979.

July 1981 and March 1982 general stnkes and demonstratlons agamst the

military government.

98

Nevertheless, union leaders backed Peronlst

president ai candIdate, Italo Luder, and the candIdate

for

the governorshlp

of Buenos Aires, Hermmlo Igleslas, both of whom were Ilnked to

the

violent

events of the mld-1970s.

99

The last Peronlst government's (1973-1976)

corrupt

and authontanan management had aggravated the country's social

and political Instability. Its sad performance

had

offered the Argentine

electorate weak expectations on the capaclty of Peranlsm to sustaln



•

Luder's

4

percent

1 1 The

October 30,1983, elections eVlnced major

politlcal changes

n

Argentlna It seemed

ta

mark the end of bath the

hlstoncal confrontation between the Peronlsts and the Radlcals and

of

the

myth

of

Peronlst InvmclbllJty

ln

fair and open electlons.

102

The results

represented the

flrst Peronlst defeat

n free

democratlc electlons

1 3

Peronlsts could no longer clalm

ta

represent the natlon's sole legltimate

maJonty

party or protest agamst an "llIegltlmate" government

104

ln 1983,

they would have to face a popularly elected non-Peronlst government and

confme themselves ta

the

unaccustomed raie

of

democratlc

OPPos tlon.

Although the sWlftness and the modalities of

the

transition process left

many Issues unresolved for

the

consolidation period

and

the tense

relatlonshlp

ot

the labor movement

wlth

the UCR's future govermng elites

forebode a dlfflcult start for the consolidation process, the major politlcal

changes unvelled

n

the October 1983 electlons underhned the weakness

of

Peronlsm and of extra party modes of polttlcal actlvlty

It

IS

true that

no

pact

had

been

forr,lUlated between the clviltan elltes

of

the transition

and

the



•

underlined the lack of a common agreemerlL among these two actors Thus .

no

formai consensus on the commltment to the same new ru les to resolve

social

and

dlstnbutlonal confllcts

had

been reached The support

of

the

pnncipal social and polltlcal groups for the new government s polltlcal

program, especlally to the democratlc instltutlonallzatlon proJect. remamsd

an

undetermmed factor. Nevertheless, the defeat of Peronlsm m democratlc

elections underllned the lack of legitimacy of thelr pol/tlcal

rulmg

and the/r

relative weight ln the pohtlcal system

3.2 Labor s weakness

The harsh repression experienced by Argentine organlzed labor

under the dictatorsh/p and the transition to a democrat/c reg/me opened the

way for strong mobllizations around pent-up demands.

In

1983, the

mlhtary

government was obliged to abrogate the law prohlb/tlng the

rtght

to

stnke

and allow the formation of national union orgamzatron (the CGT IO l With

the return

of

democracy and after suffenng from seven years of

harsh

repression, the Peronlst laboT movement could demand relief for thelr



•

defeat on the labor movement.

I06

Two

general strikes were organized by

the combative sector of the CGT

ln

1979 and 1981, as weil

as

a

demonstratlon on March 30th 1982 against the dlctatorshlp. But it did modify

the

tabor market, weakemng the leadlng sectors of the labor movement and

reducmg union membershlp ln 1983, the labor movement had

appraxlmately 3.5 to 4 million members compared

to

7 million in 1975.

1 7

Milltary labor leglslatlon and economlc pollcles also fragmented the

labor movement The armed

forGes

maintained relations with certain labor

leaders in order to heighten Internai divIsions withln the labor movement.

108

ln 1982-83, the labor movement was dlvided Into two broad wings. One

sector,

the

hardhne Peromst

CGT-BYazll,

headed by Saul Ubaldlnl (leader of

the beer workers and

of

the umon sector rupo de los 25) and by Lorenzo

MIguel (leader of the

UOM

and of the 62 Organizatlons ) firmly reslsted any

negotlations wlth the dlctatorshlp and used unions' mobilization power to

contrant the government

ln

order

to

satlsfy their ImmedIate interests (such

as

wage rncreases) On the other side, the more conc,IIatory CGT-Azopardo



•

•

Factions, however, were not created around Ideologlcal Imes both

groups

supported Peronism. Peronlst labor leaders' nvalry stemmed

essentially from thelr dlsagreement over the adoption

of

polltlcal tact/cs for

gaimng access to the government ln power, whether

by

negotlallons wlth

the authorities or by open confrontation

110

ln the democratlzatlon process,

how would

these

tensIons among leaders affect labor s contribution

to

democracy? Glven

the

expected pent-up

labor

demands rn the post

authoritarian

period and

the diVisions among labor leaders, would

one

sector of

the

leadership still use the capaclty of workers' mobllrzatlon agamst

the government to satlsfy thelr demands

and

to solidlfy the support for Its

own organization?

And

how would the mobllizationai capacltles

of

the

confrontational

labor

sector

be

affected

by

the changmg relatlonshlp

between state and labor in the democratlc reglme and

by the non support of

rival labor

sectors?

ln the context of a

democratlcally

legltlmated

government with

legitlmate

polltlcal institutions to

channel

dlfferent

demands, how would the use of labor threats ta destabllrze an unpopular



•

foreseeable and could conflict wlth the restoration of democracy what

would

e

the

Impact of

the

mobillzation activlties of a labor movement which

h d been conslderably deblhtated?



•

III.

OPEN CONFRONTATION UNDER DEMOCRACY

The democratlc consolidation process

tn

Argenttna

has

been

charactenzed by sharp conflicts between the Alfonsln government and the

unions The Alfonstn government s polltlcal

and

econornlc programs

constantly clashed wlth

the

Interests

of

the labor movement

On t

le one

hand, the Radical government placed pnonty on democratlc polttlcal

institutionalizatlon ln order to overcome the chronlc polttlcal Instablltty the

country had expenenced slnce 1955 This polltlcal task reqUired union

democratlzatlon, whlch

met

wlth strong labor leadership reslstance.

According to

the

UeR

government, Ule union question was one

of

the malor

determinants

of

the tnstltutlonal stabiltty and democratlc consolidation

of

the

country.

n

the other hand, it could not avold workmg out solutions to

resolve the

debt

and economlC crises hampering Argentlna s development

The authontarian regime s financlal and economlc reforms had squandered

the country s wealth

and

bequeathed an unprecedented forelgn debt

to

the



•

SOCial

economlc and polltlcal expectatlons

ln the

new democracy with very

Ilmlted resources to satlsfy

them.

The resources left

to

the

new

democratic

government to satlsfy sectonal Interests were weaker than

at

any time in

Argentlna's hlsto ry.

Valenzuela, Fishman

and

Rial argued that

ln

the countnes where

democratlc consolidation

was

successful (Spain, Uruguay) labor leaders

dellberately restralned thelr organrzatlons' sectonal Interests ln order to

promote pohtlcal democratlzatlon However

the

Argentine organized labor

dld not seem to actlvely support democracy and nevertheless did not

threaten democracy The CGT dld adopt a confrontational attitude toward

the UeR government. The thlrteen national stnkes agamst the

SOCloeconomlC

pollcles of the government were indicators of

the

hlgh level

of conflict between both actors Yet the labor movement's capacity for action

and to defend workers' demands

was

weakened because of

the

authontanan legacy and Internai rivai

ries

and

It

became further fragmented

under Alfonsm government.



•

government as incompatible

wlth

democraey One crucial pnonty

on

Alfonsin's polltical agenda was to demoeratlze the Argentine labor

movement and transform

It

mto

an

apolitlcal movement by breakmg Its

historical link with Peronism.

112

A few days after assummg power, the

government sent

to

Congress

the

Law of Union Reorganlzatlon,

LRS

Ley

de

Reordenamiento Smdical ), also ealled the Mueel law (beanng the

name of the government's first Labor Mlnlster) III Alfonsm asserted that

Argentine democracy eould be strengthened by Increasmg the participation

of workers ln their union organizations and assunng the competition among

dlfferent candidates to select representative leaders The project was wntten

unilaterally

by

the government, but still

had

to

be

approved by the

legislature. The Mueei team had been opposed to any sort of negot/ahon

with the unions since

It

dld not recognize the representatlvlty

or

legltlmacy of

the Peronrst

CGT 114

The project of LRS focused on the neeessity

of

formlng demoeratlc

unions

and

attaeked the authoritarian tendeneies of the labor movement Il )



•

The UCA government proJect called for Immediate elections at ail

union levels. The

LAS

establlshed new regulations for internai union

electlons

ln

order to democratlze the mechamsms of regulatlon and control

of union organlzatlons The electlons would proceed from the bottom up ,

startlng wlth the electlon of enterpnse delegates and endlng wlth the

alactlon of the leadership of national unions The criteria for candidate

selection were IJberallzed, only a minimum number of signatures was

raqUired

to

be a candidate The LRS stressed

the

necesslty of minonty

representatlon.

Any

of the mlnontles that obtalned more

th

an 20 percent of

the votes would be represented Flnally, union electlons would be controlled

by the Labor Mlnlster to avord union fraud

116

The UCR's proposed labor

law promoted democratlc practlces wrthln the labor movement to Increase

workers' participation ln union affalrs Internai union democratlzation was

expected to undermlne Peronlst exclusive control of the unlons.

117

Regular

and competitive alectlons and the guarantee of mlnopty representatlon

would allow for greater union pluraltsm. Union democratlzatlon would



•

Whlle the LRS

proJect

was debated

ln

Congress, the labor movement

started a reunrflcatlon process

ln

January 1984

l S

The two broad wlngs of

the labor movement temporanly reconclled thelr dlfferences

to

form a four

r.1ember labl 'r leadership The new labor direction had a provisionai

character untll the deflnltlve normaltzatlOn of the

CGT

(that would take

place ln November 1986, after the resolutlon of the dlsputed proJect on

union electlons)

119

The CGT Umflcada (CGT-U) was composed of

representatlves of 35 untons, 18 belonged to the CGT-A.lopardo and 17 to

CGT-Brazll 12

The

leadershIp was constltuted of four general secretanes,

two for each former organlzatlon, Saul Ubaldlnl and Osvaldo Borda (of the

CGT-Braztl) and Jorge Tnaca and Antonio Baldasslnt (from the CGT

Azopardo). The process of unification was determlned by two factors The

first was the necesslty to present a untfled labor front agalnst the UeR

government's proJect for union reorganlzatlon The CGT-U wanted the

norrnalizatlOn of unions wlthout state Intervention or the represslve laws of

the

Proceso

They demanded the abolition

of

ail labor laws dlctated by the



•

authontanan rullng These new labor grouplngs, such

as

AGA

Asamblea

Grem/al Argentma ),

ENTRA

Encuentro Nac/onal de TrabaJadores )

and

MNRS

Mov/m/ento NaclOnal de RenovaclOn Smdical ),

supported the

officiai

proJect

of union normallzatlon

121

They argued that those leaders

who were agamst Alfonsln's proJect were ln fact opposed to the

democratlzatlon of the labor movement Peronist leaders feared losing thelr

positions, sometlmes acqurred under the mlhtary government.

122

Although

these new union orgamzatlons were

yet

numencally marginai ln relation to

old Peronlst unions, thelr eXistence underhned the begmnmg of changing

attitudes concermng the role of the labor movement in Argentlna's society.

ln

addition

to

the emergence of new non-Peronist umon groupings

that could eventually challenge the Peromst CGT's control of labor, some

internai dlsagreements dlvlded and weakened the labor movement.

Lorenzo MIguel and the 62 Organlzatlons he headed were excluded from

the CGT-U.I21 Lorenzo Miguel had been dlscredrted

by

hls peers for the

Peromst party's electoral defeat The leadership of the 62 Organizatlons



•

democratic procedures than the orthodox sect0r and It challenged labor

unit y in the long-term

The proJect

of LRS was unacceptable for Peronlst unions

It

slgmfled

the loss of control over the e'ectoral process and consequently the

POSSlbllity of lostng thelr positions ln democratlc electlons ln alliance wlth

Justlclalist deputles, the CGT-U mounted a strong campalgn agalnst the

proposed Union bill Early ln 1984 the CGT-U submltted

to

the Justlciallst

deputles a prOpO.5ltlon of union normaltzatlon

Ih

The major pOints of

confltct between the UCR government's proJect and the labor movement's

proposai concerned the provIsion

for

mlnonty representatlon and state

intervention ln union internai affalrs. Labor leaders argued li lat the LAS

restricted union autonomy and went agalnst

the

statutes of most

organlzations.

26

However, the statut es of the maJority of unions had been

established under Peronlst governments and allowed Peronlst leadership

excessive power over the rank-and-flle







•

percent of the electlons the Opposition Iists won over the eXistent ol

Peronlst leadership Il') And

ln

50 percent of union electlons, mtnortt,es

succeeded ln wlnntng over

30

percent of the votes and obtatned some

representatlon (however representatlon was not proportlonal to the votes

obtatned) J \l> Yet. most eleetlons were won by the Peronlsts who

malntalned thelr hegemony wlthln the labor movement J 7 The competition

took place malnly between Peronlst candidates Nevertheless the Peromst

labor movement had lost Its homogenelty and was dlvlded tnto three distinct

tendencles a the orthodox whlch represented the hard-llne Peronlst

unions

b

the renovators and c the dlalogulst

The orthodox sector

was

led by the 62 Organizatlons whlch had

constltuted the hegemonlc force of the labor movement

As

mentloned

above, the 62 had matntatned the authontanan structure of Peronlsm t

supported the vertlcallsm

of

labor leadership and ellmlnated competltors

through an authontanan exerclse of power Hovvever,

It

had been polttlcally

weakened

by

the electoral fallure of Peronlsm ln 1983 The orthodox



•

the dictatorshlp t was constltuted of former leaders of the 62 and of the

combative unions of the 1960s and 1970s that were struggllng agamst the

authontanan and hlerarchlcal nature of the Peronlst labor rnovement Aftar

Peronlsm's 1983 defeat, the 25 started differentlatlllg tllemselves from the

orthodox sector and presented an alternative

ta

reorgamze the labor

movement. They were fundamenta y upposed ta the leaders of union

orthodoxy who had contro ed the electoral campalgn and had hlstoncally

prevented

the

democratlzatlon of the labor movement The 25 supported

the renewal Peronlst wlng ln the Perontst party that advocated Internai

democratlc rules The latter resulted trom the split

ln

1984 between the pro

Miguel faction

and

the antl-Mlguel faction, the orthodox versus renewal Il

revealed the eXistence of internai struggle agamst the ollgarchlzatlon and

authontanan practlces by the old Perontst guard and sorne tendencles

toward more democratlc forms of union organlzatlon

Flnally. the

dialoguist

sector was mamly formed

by

leaders of

estion

TrabaJo that would later form the Grupo de los 15

estion





•

negotiatlons between both actors ln the economlc and social

flt1lds

The

Alfonsin government made efforts

to

encourage the labor movement's Input

ln

concerted polleles to resolve the economlc crrsls and eonsolldate

democracy by changlng labor's role Faelng a monthly average Inflation rate

of 18% since the beglnnlng of 1984, the Alfonsln government stressed the

necessity of findrng new mechanlsms for negotlatlons and confltet resolutlon

wlth the prrnclpal socIal actors

1 N

Begrnnrng rn August

1984

the UeR

government called for trrpartlte negotlatlons

ln order to

restraln the

maxlmahst demands of each sector, especlally to lmlt the labor movement's

demands of wage Increases,

and

reaeh a common agreement on pollcy

formation.

140

The

Mesa de Concertacfon

was

thus rnaugurated

However, concertation proved unworkable The falled attempts of

concertation ongrnated

rn

the dlfflcult relatlonshlp between

the

Alfonsln

government and labor, and the latter's partlcular conception of democracy

Wage pollcfes

became the major theme of confltet between both actors and

thls untll the end of Alfonsln's mandate

The

CGT and espeelally

Its

most



•

polltlcal Opposition under the CGT's aegls and question the UCR

government 's legltlmacy Were the purpose of union stnkes to defend

workers' real demands

or

were they polttlcal stnkes Intended to weaken

the UCR government? What was Ubaldlnl's VISIon of democracy? And what

was

the Impact of the general stnkes? After analyzlng the two general

stnkes, thelr results and the attItude of the labor movement toward the

government and democracy, new Iight will be shed on t ~ l Impossibiltty

of

concertation between the UCR government and the CGT but also on the

latter's weakness.

2.1

Ihe

Mesa de Concertacion

and wage pollcles

ln 1983,

the

democratically elected Alfonsln government inhented a

staggenng economy

ln

deep recesslon burdened with the huge foreign debt

problem. Several years of low and Inadequate levels of Investment and the

Ineftlclency of hlghly protected Industnes had generated a structural

economlc cnsls 142 ThiS cnsls was aggravated by the authoritarian legacy of

a 46 billion forelgn debt that represented 80% of the The debt





•

of

negotlatlons

147

Dlstnbutlonal confllcts refer

ta

a situation

ln

which each

sector defends

ItS

maxlmallst demands (for labor movement, wage

Increases and

for

business sectors, hlgher prlces) regardless of the resulting

negatlve consequences on economlc growth

and

on rnflatlon The hlgh

Inflation rates were fueled by dlstnbutlonal confllcts between employers and

labor organlzatlons rn a context

of

an unprecedented economic and

debt

crrses The government's objective conslsted ln transforming the unions

into

a "responslble" actor Ilmltlng Its sectonal demands for national concerted

polle les Concertation could thus open sorne space for negotlatlons and

participation to make the country more govern ble than ln the past

Furthermore,

ln

a context

of

acute economlc

cnSIS,

concertation

nd

the

wllllngness of key actors to share economlc responsibllities and costs (by

IImltmg thelr partlculanstlc demands) could help the democratlc government

ta legltlmlze unpopular austenty pollcles

148

However, thA CGT suspended Its participation several tlmes trom the

Mesa de ConcertaclOn when

Its

demands for wage Increases were not



•

307 sanctloned by the mlhtary government

141}

It conferred

ta

the Executive

the monopoly of fixing wages wlthout labor's participation The government

was flrmly

opposed

to reestabllshlng

the mechanlsms of

collective

bargalnrng (Law 14

250

of the last Peronlst government) clalmeci by

the

labor movement ISO

For

the government.

free negotlatlons

wlth no

government control, could hlnder stabillzation pollcles that were necessary

to hait splrallng Inflation The

government

thus flxed wages Increases by

decree. In early 1985, a new system of wage adJustment was drawn by the

economlc team Wages were

ta

be adJusted ta 90 percent ot

the

rnflatlon

rate of

the

prevlous month ln

that

situation,

real

wages suftered Cl steady

decline 151 Unions were dlssatlsfled wlth government wage polreles and

more generally wlth the overall economlc pollcles that Impair ed workers

standards of irving

n February 1985, the Mesa e ConcertaclOn became a sprrngboard

for

a temporary alliance between bUSiness groups and CGT ta flght agalnst

government economlc pollcles and unrlateral decls'f')n-makmg They formed



•

strategy culmlnated r the second general stnke launched

ln

May 1985

The

latter clearly mdlcated labor's radical Opposition

to

the government polltlcal

economlc program and ItS unwlllingness ta compromise

2.2 ~ n Ç l t y ~ ~ _ o t

t t l e . - 9 J 2 1 ~ ~ 1 . y e s

of CGTs

f l r ~ e n e r a l

stnkes. the ascent of

UbgJdJfll ano the

I m . . Q J ) ~ s J Q l 1 y . of concertatlQ.D

The

CGT

used the threat of wlthdrawrng

ItS

support fram concertation

and

of

launchlng mobillzation actlvltles

Plan de Lucha)

If ItS demands were

not satlsfled by government pollcles

The

CGT called for two general stnkes

ln Sept\lmber 1984 and May 1985 The major objective of the two general

stnkes

was to

protest agalnst and change the government's

SOCloeconomlC

program

1 1) The

CGT dld not to partlclpate ln the antl-Jnflatlonary officiai

pollcy, but Ils strategy was to contront It completely The strategy of labor

confrontation toward the government was essentlally deslgned by

one of

CGTs combative leaders. Saul Ubaldlnl

The prrnclpal rnstlgator of the general stnkes, Saul UbaldJnl, came



•

power

rnterests

55

HIs populanty allowed

hlm

to undermll1e Tnaca's

position as CGT leader (one of the four secretary generals and fOI mer

leader of

the

concrllatory sector Gestion y Trabajo)

ln

September 1985.

Ubaldrnl

was

appornted as the CGT's srngle secretary-gener

al

,,, 0

The

objective of Ubaldlnr was

to

transform the CG

r nta

the main

(Joie

of

pohtlcé,ll

opposition to the democratlc government

Ubaltdml's d/scourse and organ/zatlon of

the

two general str/kes led

the Alfonsrn government to underlrne the polltlcal charaeter and

destabllizlng objective of CGT's moblllzatiOnal aetlvltles

It

cntlc/zed the

flrst

general stnke as resultlng tram the sole decision of leaders and not

supported by the rank and flle 1') J Thus the government questroned the

leg/tlmacy

of

lhe

CGT

that was not

yet

nnrrnallzed and the real union

content of the stnke The UeR government denounced the rnethod of para

activo

of the CGT by companng

It

ta

t ~ e

polrtlcal stnkes

useeJ

by the labor

movement

ta

struggle aJarnst authorrtarran qovetrl,lients

l »);

For

the

government, the para activa was not Justlfled ln a demoeratlcally eleeted



•

Ubaldlnl openly declared

10

the government durmg the second general

stnke- elther

they

can change the SOClo-economlC program

or they

have ta

leave

tt 1 ) )

It seemed as

If

the CGT was threatenlng the UCR government

If It

dld not respond

to

labor's dernands, elther the government had te modlfy

ItS

economlc pollcles to satlsfy labor's Interests or resign

Labor's questlomng of the legillmacy of the popularly elected Aifonsin

governrnent ralsed the Issue of labor's conception of democracy For the

labor movement, democracy was not based

on

t'le functlonmg

of

polltlcal

institutions,

but

was equated wlth

Ihe

satisfaction of workers' Immediate

economlc mterests We are struggllng for a democracy that can guarantee

us the liberty li live wlth economlc Independence and social Justice and

Democracy ':'; SOCial Justice " CIl The CGT dld not

conslder

the

consolidation

of

new Instltutlonal mechamsms

as

essentlal to democracy,

Democracy was Ilmltee to the satlsf2ctlon of wage mcreases

However concertation could work only as long as there was

1)

an





•

bUylng

power was lower than

ln

1975 The Index had fallen from 100 m

1975 to 63 9

ln

1983 and to 69 1 ln 1985 166 ln a context of economlC

recesslon and hlgh inflation the tensions between the government and

unions Increased Both union intransigeance vis-à-vIs economlc pohcles as

weil

as

the penchant of the Alfonsln government for unilateral decislon

makmg ln the economlc realm Impeded any attempts

of

concertation

Involvmg government. busmess organtzatrons and labor leaders 167

The success of both stnkes was Irmlted 16 - The partial results and

Impact underhned labor's weakness Frrst of

ail,

there has been a relatlvely

low adhesron to bath stnkes The evaluatlon of workers' participation ln

gbf:eral slnkes by the government and the CGT dlffered,

as

It dld for the

followmg ones The CGT always percelvea

:ts

general strrkes as an éXlto

total (complete success) wlth the participation of more than 95% of the

worker On the contrary, the government s calculatrons Ilmlted to





•

economlc

Cr/SIS 171

The successive falJures of concertatIon and the

confrontatlonal attitude

of

the CGT

had

led

the

government

to

govern

wlthfl Jt

the

latter's Input Could the labor movement mamtaln ItS strategy of

confrontmg the government through general

stnkes

to obtam wage

Increases or dld the tnvlal success of ItS mobillzationai actlvltles underllne

ItS weakness and push sorne union organlzatlons to adopt a more

concllmtory attltude

r

)

3

P I ~ J J

AlJsJr_é Ll\Jld UnIon Sector/al Negotiatlons: 1985-1986

The Plan Austral,

an economlc stablllzatlOn

program, was

Implemented by the government's economlc team ln June 1985 The

new

Altonsrn government economlc program had been negotlated wlth some

Important business organlzatlons Unions however had been excluded tram

ItS

elaboratlon 1/4 The government thus clrcumvented the CGT and acted

mdepenclently

fram

labor's demands

175

The

CGT

completely reJected the

Plan Austral Between August 1985 and January 1987, the

CGT

organlzed



•

3 1

The

implementatlon of the

Plan Austral

and _ QTs_

strgtegy

Of

confra ntation

The depth of the economlc CriSIS and the restrictions Imposed by the

negotiatlon of

the

external debt had Impeded

the

UeR government trom

reachmg

Its

objectives

of

hait mg mflatlon. reactlvatll1g the economy and

Improvlng wage redistribution

ln

the flrst yeal and a hait of ItS Rdrnmlstratlon

President Alfonsln appomted a new Econo,nlc Mlnlster

n

February 1985,

Juan

Sourou"le,

who was flrmly declded to . ~ 1 n c \ î a

war

agalllst

mflatlon 176

The Plan

Austral

was

a government Initiative

to

(;ut off the

mflationary spiral through a priee and wage freeze Tho econornlc packagE-}

also Ineluded a pollcy to cut the fiscal deflclt (by ralslng tax(;\s), a rnonet3ry

reform, a new currency, the austral. and a program

for

the forelqn debt

renegotlatlon The Initiai success of the Plan Austral was perceptlblf:, III the

slgnlflcant reductlon of the mflatlon rate ln the flrst

SIX

months of the:

program's ImplementatIon,

the

monthly inflatIOn dld not

exceed

3 2

percent.

ln

The early effectlveness of the economlc program allowed the

government

ta slgn

a

new

agreement wlth

the IMF ln

July 1985 IX



•

nature of the stnkes culmlnated ln January 987 wlth the elghth general

stnke, whlch was dehned by Ubaldlnl as a plebiscite of the workers agamst

the Plan Austral 1xo

ln

August 1985, the CGT called for Its thlrd national stnke, sinee the

begtnntng of Alfonsln's mandate, to entlelze

the

government's

eeonomlC

program ln whlch labor had no Input and ask for a moratorium on the

extel nal debt payment 1x1 However labor falled

ta

convlnce the government

to alter any of ItS economlc goals Moreover the Aifonsin government

was

confident ln the contlnuous ImplementatIOn of the Plan Austral after the

populatlon's endorsement of Its pragram ln the

September

1985

congresslonal electlons The

UeR

outpolled ItS rivai, the Peronlst party,

by

wlnntng 43 percent of the votes agalnst 34 percent for the Peronlsts

182

The

government's wage freeze was th us matrltamed desplte labor's oppostlon

Wage poltcy st,II constltuted a thorny Issue between the government

and the CGT Sy early 1986

the

QOve

r

:lment began

to use

more flexiblltty in



•

launched on the wage Issue, Alfonsm stressed that

the

governrnent would

not respond to CGTs demand

ln

order to avold a new dlsastrous Rodngazo

as had occurred under Isabel Peron's governrnent

1S·I

The Alfonsm

government rnamtamed the flxat , , .. of wages by decree and subordmated

the mcreases to the objectives of the antl-tnflatlonary program

Sy March 1985. the government tntroduced

new

mechantsrns

to

tlX

wages. The percentage of wage Increases would

be

hnked to

the

estimation

of the next month's tnflatlon rate and would be done between a "tloor" and a

"ceiling"

185

The "floor" and the "celllng" represented respectlvely the

mmlmum

and the

maximum percentage dllowed for wage Increases

Furthermore, a partial translation of these Incmases to the priees would be

conceded. Smce the CGT was unwllllng ta negotlate on the establishment of

the "floor" and "celltng" wlth the government. the latter flxed thern by decree

The CGT called for flve general stnkes,

ln

January. March . .June, October

1986 and January 1987

ta

express

Its

dlscontent

on

ail wage Increases

offlclally decreed.



•

3 2

Sec191lalJllliLQtlatjQns

labor leaders' dIvergent tactlcs

Several unIon leaders came to the conclusIon by 1986 that the CGTs

general strlkes and cOllfrontatlonal strategy

had

not been successfui 1 1

Improvrng workers' Ilfe condItIons The use

of

stnkes

had

not brought any

posItIve effects for workers ln

the

two flrst years of Alfonsm's mandate nor

any substantlal change or concessIons fram the democratlc government.

Real wages

had

dropped slnce 1983 and general workers' lIving standards

deterrorated between 1985 and 1986

as

a consequence of governrnent

polrcles

IX I Sorne

bIg union sectors began to use a positIon of moderatlon

wlth the government and to cntlclze the confrontatlonal behavlor of Ubaldlnl.

Labor's dIvIsIon between a conf ontatlonal and more moderate sectors was

the reflectlon

of

profound internai dlsagreements. The analysls of these

rnternal conflrcts WI" glve a new sense to the real objectIves and

effectlveness of CGT's general strrkes

By

mld-1986, sorne bIg unIon sectors became less supportlve of



•

year 189

Sy

the end

of

January 1987, after the elghth general stnke had

been undertaken, 25 unions representmg approxlmately half million workers

had signed wage

agreements respectlng

tho tloor dnd c811Ing

estabilshed by

the

government 190 The

logle

of

wage

negotlatlofl seemed ta

gain strength over the logle of po tlcal confrontation wlth the government To

what extent were

Ubaldlnl's stnkes

ulllOnlst strlkes?

he

polltlcal

objectives seemed

to

predomlnate

over the

saClo-economlC objective

of

defendrng workers' Interests. slnce these were better satlsfled wlth the

strategy of negotlatlons

ln fact, the

stnkes

had been

led ln

a context of Internai labor

fragmentation. Labor leaders dlsagreed on whether to pessure the

government from Inslde , by seekrng Instltutlonal forrns of Influence, or trom

outslde , through extra-Instltutlonal channels

such as

the national stnkes

and mass demonstratlons.

9

Whlle Ubaldtnt and sorne of the n?5

supported the strategy of confrontation,

the

62

and

leaders of the orthodox

sector (Tnaca, Miquel) malntalned the

Will ta

negotlélte wlth the qovernment



•

to break the dialogue wlth the government

IIH D u n n ~ l

the

str

Ikes. Ubaldlrll

also cntlclzed the relations of certain labor leaciers wlth government

officiais

94

The October 1986 stnke generated further diVISions wlthln the

labor movement. especlally between the "62".

the 25

and the

ubaldll1lstas

The stnke

was

reallzed one month before

the

normahzatron congress

ot

the

CGT Although the No\/ember 1986 electrons ln the CGT were mtended

to

elaborate the

new

general union strategy

and

ta

unlfy

the labor

m o v e m ~ . n t .

they could not hlde the mternal divIsions 9 The 62 and the "25' \Nele

skeptical about the effectlveness of general stnkes They

no

longer beheved

in the eventual positIve results of the stnkes that seemed to retlect

the

will

of

Ubaldlm to Impose himself

as

the hegemonlc leader

of

the labor movement.

The internai fragmentation of the labor movement and the success of

sectonal negotlations underhned orgamzed labor's weakness The CGT no

longer had the capaclty to defend workers' livrng standards Ubaldinl's

SIX

general stnkes had falled to alter the government's economlc pollcles

Moreover, the Increasmg lack of support for CGT's pursUit of general stnkes



•

government ta get closer ta the more moderate unIon sectors ln order to

further fragment the

labor

movement and defeat CGT's confrontatlonal

strategy

4 U ~ m Q l ~ Qf CQ9J21J9ILAnO Peronlst CGT Weakness:1987-89

By the end of 1986, a new spIral of hypennflatlon had underlined the

fallure

of the

Plan ustral and had worsened the economlc crrsls The

government recognlzed that

ItS

Inablilty to cut ItS fiscal detlclt and cope wlth

the deepened economlc cnSIS had revealed the inefflclency of excessive

state Intervention ln the economy From 987 untll the end of

ItS

mandate,

the Alfonstn government would Implement yet another economic strategy to

restructure Argenttna's reellng economy

1< 7

The government followed a

neoltberal program by opentng Argentma's seml-autarklc economy to the

International market and support mg a massive

wave

of pnvatlzatlon of stat8-

owned enterpnses

and

of

r l ~ r e g u l t l o n

of

the market

199

ln concrete terms

for the labor movement, ',hese pollcres rmplled the

IOS5 of

jobs and drop in



•

tactlc was Intended to further fragment tlle ' bor movement and obtaln some

labor support

to

Its new economlc pollcles

When the government s economlc mlsmanagement led ta the UCR's

defeat

ln

the

September 1987 electlons,

the

pact

betwetm

the qovernment

and the Peronlst union sector 15 broke

down

Il l Although the government

had

made sorne slgmflcant Instltutlonal

concessions

to

thE)

labor rnovemfmt

after the resignation

of

Alderete, Ubaldlnl called for tlve general

stnkes

between November 1987 and September 1988 agamst

the

governrnent's

economlc

program However, none

succeeded

ln changmg any of the

offiCiai poltcles

The

government contmued to Irnplement Its neoliberal

poltcles

that

mevltably

harmed

workers' wages

and buymg

power

And

desplte

CGT s

confrontation, the government carned out Its mandate untll

the

989 President ai electlons and guaranteed a democratlc transfer of

power

to another clvlhan

government

Why dld the CGT's mobillzationai

actrvltres

have

no Impact

on

the

UCR s

pol/tlcal proJect

It

dld

not seem to

support? And was CGT's support ta democratlc consolidation essentlal

for





•

confrontation by negotmtlons 204 ln return the government conHlllttecl Ilself

to supportmg sectonal wage agreements as those reached III F el1ruary

1987 The government's strategy was relatlvely successful Slncp the"

15"

acted Independently of

the

CGT Ttle government underllneci t h l ~ dlfferences

between these two labor sectors and the mefflclency

of

CGl's strategy l

he

government's ratification of Its economlc measures of deregulatlon and

pnvatlzatlon

ln

July

1987

had generatect

an

hostile reactlon of the

ClîT

President Alfonsm accused the CGT of '3.doptlng a "reactlonary" and "antl-

worker" attitude whlle

the

Implementation

of

these oconomlc

pOllCl8S

were

almed at overcomlng the fiscal deflelt and Improvtng the dlstnbutlonal

capacitles 205 The government stressed that the strategy of the "15" was

more effective ln defendmg workers' Interests than CGT's confrontatlonal

behavlor.

206

However sorne bitter confllcts emerged between the new Labor

Mintster Alderete

and

the

Economlc Mlntster Sourouille concernmg the

implementatlon of the economlc and especlally wage pollcles Slnce Hle



•

the stabillzatlon polle les

and

hls advocacy for pnval.zatlon and Ilberalization

of pm es, whlch Ilmlted the posslbilltles of

concIliation

wlth the Labor

Mlnlster and the labor movement Sourouille reJected Alderete s demands

of wage Increases and especlally of the restoratlon

of the

law on collective

bargalnlng The latter wouJd represent a major hlndrance to the government

stablillzation and economlc emmgency measures to hait 1nflatlon

By the end of 1987, glven the ImposslbJlty to compromise wlth the

economlc team of Souroullle, Alderete renounced

as

Labor Mlnlster.

Nevertheless,

Alderete

had demanded the approval

of

a senes of

parllamentary labor bills - the laws covenng free collective bargammg,

minImum wage and of Professlonal Associations - that became effective by

the end of 1987 and early 1988 after hls resignation

ln December 1987, the law covenng free collective bargaming

was

passed ln Parllament ThiS law Inltlally allowed negotlatlons between

unions

and employers

wlthout goverllment-lmposed restrictions

on wage





•

Indlcated that the weakness and deep rlivisions

of

the labor movement

underlmed tS decreaslng welght

ln

the Argentine economlc and polltlcal

systems

Desplte

the

restoratlOn of Instltutlonal mechanlsms

to

negotlate labor

Issues

and

the Peronlst party vlctory

ln

the

September

1987

electlons, the

G still used the tactlc of polltlcal stnkes to have

ItS

dema nds satlsfled.

After the renunclatlor of Alderete,

new

labor divIsions emerged around the

Issue of labor representatlves ln the forthcomlrig Presldentlal

989

electlons These dlsagreements affected

ItS

reorganlzatlon and weakened

the orgamzed labor ln splte

of the

contlnuous use

of

mobillzationai

actlvltles.

the

stnkes

had no

rerercusslons on the governablilty of the

country and gcnerated

no

positive beneflts for the workers They revealed

the Ineffectlveness

of

labor's confrontatlonal strategy ln

the

context

of

democracy and

an

acute economlc cnsis

wlth

hypennflatlon.



•

continue Implementlng

the

deflned wage pollcles

II

And the

CGT's

use of

stnkes slnce

the

beglnnmg of Alfonsm's mandatt? dld not entail positive

results for the workers Were

the

strlkes only

3 taetle

llsed

by

sorne Inbor

leaders ta Increase thelr power over

ttwlr

labor rivais anl1 to prtlsent <

polltlcal alternative ta

the gavernmenP

Labor's mter nal contllcts were

clearly reflected ln the stnkes and conflrmed the lack of J comlllon labor

strategy and the fragmentation

of

the labor movement over pol/tlcal Issues

ln the Deeember 1987

stnke,

an 31lianee was formed between the

25 and the

ubaldmfstas

ta

present an

altmnatlve to the 62 1 1

Nt"lw

allgnments were formed wlthln the labor movement wlth ttle preparation of

the

1989 Peronlst party

E

leetoral eampalgn l

he

leader of the pohtlclzed

"6(>

Organlzatlons ,

Lorenzo

Miguel.

wanted ta

unlfy the Peronrst

labor

movement under hls hegemony and play a central role ln

the

eleetoral

process to aeqUire new polltleal space after the PJ tnumph 1Ir However, the

25

were opposed to the integration of

the

15 ln

the labor unification fhe

25 supported the Peronlst party and cntlclzed

the whlch h3d



•

sharp c.onfllcts

ln

the union leadership

217

Ubaldmi was no

longer

supported

by

the 25 , the

62

and by the 15 , now k 1 .)wn as the

Mov m ento Smd cal

enem

Pres dente (MSMP) 21X The absence of these

union organlzatlons m the general stnkes

and

low levels of worker

participation (the percentage

of

labor partiCipation

was

lower than

ln

ail

precedent stnkes) revealed that the strategy of confrontation was used by

Ubaldml

to

leglt/mate hls personailst/c leadership

The

emergence and

growlng

power of the MSMP underlrned the

declme of

Ubaldlnl's

confrontatlonal strategy and of the orthodoxy of the 62 Organlzatlons . The

MSMP supported the Peromst candidate for the 1989 electlons, Carlos

Menem

21()

Menem and other Peronlst politlclans had dlstanced themselves

from union leaders ta strengthen the party's polltlcal wrng and reorganlze

internai democratlc rule

to

present a viable polltlcal alternative to the

UeR 220

ln a slmllar vern, the MSMP sought to act independently trom the

62 Organ/zat/ons and the CGT 221 The MSMP pursued ItS strategy of

sectonal wage agreements through negotlatlons and was wllllng to discuss



•

CGT.

to

assure a democratlc transition

of

powei Ali

the

polltlcal partlcs were

wlllmg to make effolts to support

the

contlnUity of UCR governélllCf' untll the

electlons 222 ln May 1989. Menem becarne the new President of Arqentlna

ln fair

and

democratlc electlons The Aifonsill

ç J o v e r n m t ~ n t

had

accompllshed

an Important

step

ln democratlc

consolld ltlon by

guaranteelng a democratlc transition tram one constltutlonal governrnent to

another The CGT played no slgmflcant raie

ln

these electlons

To what extent dld the lack

of

restramt of the

CGT

under the Alfonsm

government affect the stabliity of the reglme? The CGTs Incapaclty ta

defend workers' demands revealed

Its

profound state of dlsorgamzatlon and

the inefflclency of ItS hlstoncal strategy of confrontation m a country that

guaranteed regular democratlc electlons and that offered other channels of

polltlcal representatlon to the workers Varrous

factors

of weal-.ness

underllned that the labor movemer.t was no longer a powerful actor ln the

economlc

and polltlcal

balance

These factors of

weakness

will

be

recapitulated through Valenzuela's framework of analysls



•

unemployment and underemployment Increased slgnlflcantly trom 11 2 ln

1985 to

16

ln

1989 thereby reduclng the level of union membershlp 225

d) The drop ln real wages am purchaslng power underlined

the

decllnlng

living standards

of

the

Argentine workers and the Incapaclty of the CGT to

defend Ils rank-and-flle Interests From 100 ln

1983 the

real wages fell to

92.2 ln

1986

and ta 5 ln 1988 and the annual variation of purchaslng

power

was mostly negatlve

h

The levels

of

wages

and

purchaslng power

were eroded by the hlgh inflation rates of

the

penod

227 e)

DE3spite the

government s concession to labor wlth the commission on minimum wages

ln 1988

the urban

real

minimum wages annual average Index decllned

trom 100 ln 1980 to 956 ln 1988 and 69.9

ln

1989 228

The mdlcators

of

low levels of wages

and

of employment revealed

that workers fundamental Interests had not been protected by the CGT

under Altonsm s government The lack

of

labor homogenelty, direct result of

the econOnllC pollcles of the

last

authontanan reglme, Increased the

dlvergency of labor Interests and consequently reduced

the

participation

of



•

sector

(UOM.

SMATA)

dld

not support

the

last general strlkes

-The

CGT

no

longer seemed to represent the malonty

of

Argentme workers

2 he centrallzatlOn

or

decentralrzatlOn and polit cal

urllty

or divIsIOn

of the labor movement The labor movernent expenencl3d I 1CredsmÇ1

fragmentation undel ttle Altonsln gaver nlllcnt

111bOI W S

dlvldeo hctwE'ell

four major sectors. the

"62",

the 25 ,

the uba dlrllstas

and thp 1

(01

MSMP

ln the last years) Although the Peronlst CGT contllllJE.'d o represent Ihe

central labor orgamzatlon under Alfonsln,

It

was rlven

by

Internai contllcls

The CGT and Its strategies weakened

as

sorne union sector s dlstanced

themselves fram the CGT and adopted other tactlcs On the one hand, I e

rise

of

the renovator wlng,

the

25 , ln the 1985 union elcC'tlons and the

Ir

support to mternal democratlc forms

of

organlzatlons challerH]0d the

Peronlst authontanan orthodoxy The declllltn9 of Ubaldtnl

<md

Miguel

power by the end

of

Alfonsm's mandate proved the weakentng

of

t h ( ~

orthodox sector

On

the other hand some unions such as the "1 and the

62 began by 1986 a proeess of negotlatlon wlth the governrnent and the



•

consequence of the UCR government's Implementation

of

unpopular

stablhzatlon policles

to

resolve the economic cnsls The antl-Iabor pohcies

had severely debrlitated the labor movement and had represented a break

for

labor reorganrzatlon under Alfonsln. ft took flve years to the democratlc

government

of

Alfonsln to Implement a

new

labor leglslatlon and repeal

ail

the m,IItary labor laws

4

he

modalltles of transItion to democracy nd labor movement s

relationshlp wlth the elttes of transitIOn:

Although the lack

of

a transition

al

pact between the

key

social actors had added an element

of

uncertainty for

the consolidation process, the analysis

of

the three prevlous variables

underlmed that the weakness of the labor movement had reduced its

Influence

ln

the Argentme economlc and polltical systems. The tensions

between the UCR

and

Peronlst labor dunng the transition process (the

UeR

had denounced

the

eXistence of a mllitary-umon pact) led

the

government

to

negotlate

wlth

other unron ispresentatlves (under

the Mesa de Concertacion

and wlth the Incorporation of the

Grupo

de los 15 in 1987) in order to further



•

legit imate polrtlcal channels for workers. weakened CGT s strategy

o

confrontation nd credlblhty s a labor organlzatlon

Contrary to Valenzuela s argument on the necesslty o labor s

restramt in the consolidation process. the several Argentine organlzed labor

mobihzatlons dld not Impede the democratlzatlon project of the Aifonsin

government ln the short term. labor s support of democracy was not

determlnant for the latter s consolidation



•

CONCLUSION

The Peronlst labor movement

has

not played a slgmflcant role in the

Argentrne democratlc consolidation process ln splte of thlrteen general

strrkes organlzed agalnst the officiai polrtlcal economlc policles and the

democratlc Alfonsln government, the latter succeeded

in

undertaking the

democratlc transfer of power

to

another clvllran government

ln

May 1989.

Whereas Valenzuela, Fishman

and Rial

argued that the restralnt of labor's

sectorral demands was necessary to promote politlcal democratizatlon, the

Argentine study case leads us to qualify thelr argument.

The

Peronlst CGT has been hlstorrcally

one

of the strongest and most

polrtlclzed labor movements ln Latin Amerrca. The popuhst and corporatist

experiences had bequeathed a powerful labor organlzation but had also

generated the elltes' fear of the growing power

of

the worklng classes. The

post-populrst reglmes attempted but falled to eradicate the Peromst labor

movement and Impose thelr

own

rules of the game. After Peron's overthrow



•

movement. The represslon that was mostly dlrected agamst the worklllg

class and its leaders, the antl-Iabor polleles and the slgmflcant structural

changes of the Argentine economy ail debliltated the organlzatlon and

capaclty of action of the CGT

ln the wake of transitions to democracy, several scholars stressed the

crucial role of the hlstoncally powerful labor movements The Inevitable

pent-up labor demands, after the authontanan represslon and

ln the

context

of an economlc

cnSIS,

were expected to confllct wlth the project

of

democratization Scholars such

as

Valenzuela, Fishman and Rial stressed

that labor's limitation of Its mobillzationai actlvltles was a positive

contribution to the consolidation

of

democracy Nevertheless these scholars

did

not emphasize the extreme we kness of the labor movements after the

expenence of authontanan rule and consequently the reduced Impact of

thelr behavlor on the polltlcal system rn the short term The study ot the four

variables of Valenzuela's framework of analysls on labor's role

ln

the

democratlzatlon process helps ln understandmg the changrng role and the



•

slnce ItS electoral campalgn the problem posed by the Peronlst organlzed

labor to the new democracy

It

was a movement wlth authoritanan

tendencles that l c ~ e d elected and legltimate representatlves. The

government was determmed to democratize the unions and remove the

Peronlst control

of

the labor movement. Therefore the non-democratlc

nature of the orgamzatlon and the hostile attitude of the UCR government

toward the CGT antlclpated that the labor movement would adopt a

confrontatlonal behavlor

and

not restram its sectonal demands. In fact, the

Argentine Peronlst CGT dld not seem to support democracy and did

organlze several mobllizatlonal actlvities between 1983 and 1989.

However,

why dld

the lack of CGT's restralnt not hamper the beginning of

Argentine consolidation

to

democracy? The reasons are to be found

in

the

profound divIsions, disorgamzatlon and weakness of the labor movement

after the authontanan legacy that made It a less determinant actor in the

polltlcal system.

The labor leadership was

nven

by mternal confllcts and fragmented



•

eVldent that the general stnkes falled ln convlnclng

the

government

t

alter

its economlc pollcles and entalled

no

beneflts to the workers The

government's economlc pollcles had done IIttie to bolster workers' real

income. Wage-earners' living standards detenorated under the Aifonsin

government and underllned the Incapaclty of the CGT

ta

defend workers'

Interests. Although the government had made some slgnlflcant Instltutlonal

concessions to the labor

movement

ln

1987 and 1988 wlth the restoratlon of

favorable labor laws such as those for free collective bargalnlng, minimum

wage and of Professlonal ASSOCiations Ubaldlnl contmued uSlng hls

strategy of confrontation and workers only obtalned small gains The

GT

stnkes seemed more polltlcal than syndlcahst ln nature and were used by

sorne

of

Its leaders to Increase thelr internai power By the end of Alfonsln

mandate, Ubaldlnl's and Lorenzo Miguel's pOSition wlthln the labor

movement had declined

The 25 had represented a democratlc challenge to the orthodoxy of

the 62 . It had won many votes ln the union electlons

ln

1984 and 1985



•

negotlatlons underlinmg the weakemng of

tS

position

as

central organizer

of the labor movement The general httle repercusslon and small union

participation ln the three last general stnkes stressed that most union

leaders were no longer willing to support the CGT nor tS general stnkes as

form of protest to gov rnm nt

Thus,

ln

the aftermath of transitions to democracy, the consolidation

process could be Inltlated and sustamed because the histoncal unions

polltlcal role and strength had decllned By focuslng on

th

labor

movements weakness after the authontanan rule, the thesls underhned that

the success of the new democratlc reglme s consolidation

ln

the short term

at least,

no

longer seemed dependent on labor s role More speclfically,

labor mobillzationai actlvltles no longer seemed to compromise the stabihty

and legltlmacy of the democratlc reglme

Further research should be undertaken on the changing role of the

labor movements after the authontanan expenence

to

assess thelr relative



•

democratic governments, they could become a source of dlsloyalty and

affect the consolidation process

If they

grow stronger

or

look for ailles and

for a destablllzlng coalition Whlle the lack of labor restratnt IS not essentlal

ln the short-term, It can become necessary ln the longer-term

The thesls would be ennched by further research

on

the development

of

new

non-Peronlst union grouplngs

and

the Peronlst union sectors that

have been differentlatlng tnemselves trom the CGT (the 25 and the MSMP)

and their attitude toward democracy _ ln the past forty-flve years, the labor

movement had been domlnated

by

Peronlst Ideology and authontanan

labor leaders. However, startlng

ln

the 1960s and 1970s, sorne new union

sectors began to cntlclze

nd

challenge the undemocratlc nature of the

labor leadership

nd

the subordination of workers' tnterests

to

thelr own

power Interests Will these rnovements contnbute to the reorganlzatlon of the

Argentine labor movement wlth more democratlc norms of functlonlng and

by democratlcally representlng and defendll1g workers' demands?



•

strongly polltlclzed 80th labor leadershIps had polltlcal objectIves ln thelr

actions. The presence of a revolutlonary left wlthrn

the

Chllean labor

leadership could have hlndered the process of democratlc consolidatIon, as

argued

by

Campera and Cortazar However

tS

welght

has

decreased with

the emergence and growlng power of a market-onented union sector. The

latter S depolltlclzrng the labor movement and confrnrng it to tS

organlzatlonal and syndlcallst objectives The negotlatrng grouprngs

of

Argentine unlonrsm, such as those belonglng to the

rupo

e

os

15 or

MSMP,

may represent a more market-onented sector slnce they

are

aware

of the declinlng Impact of the polrtfcfzed CGT on the Argentine polltrcal

system and on workers' irving standards.

The emergence of more democratrc and less politicrzed union

grauprngs S presentlng new developments in the changrng raie of the labor

movements

ln

Latrn Amerrca The progressive reorganrzation of the labor

movement may transform t nto a key socral actor for the long-term

consolidation of the Latin Amerrcan democracies



•

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nO.3

(Summer 1988) 357-377



•

McGUIRE, James W Union Polltlcal Tactlcs and Democratlc

ConsolIdatIon ln Alfonsln's Argentlna, 1983-1989 Latm

American Research Revlew 27, no 1 (1992) 37-74

MUNCK, Ronaldo The Modern Mliltary Dlctatorshlp

ln

LatIn

Amenca

The Case of Argentlna (1976-1982) Latm Amencan PerspectIves

12, no 4 (Fall 1988) 41-74

Labor Studles ln Argentlna Latm Amencan Research Revlew

21,

no. 3 (1986). 224-230

O'DONNELL. GUIllermo. State and AllIances ln Argentlna, 1956-1976

Journal

of

Development Studies,

15,

no 1 (1978)

3-33

PALOMINO, Hector. Les syndicats dans les premières années du

gouvernement constitutionnel. Notes et Études Documentalfes.

Problèmes d'Aménque Latme. no 82, 4e tnmestre (1986) 41-55

POTASH, Robert A. Alfonsln's Argentma

ln

Hlstoncal Perspective

l

Paper

presented ln Faculty LectUle Senes Bowker AuditOrium University

of Massachusetts

at

Amherst, Nov 19,

1987.

Latm Amencan

Studles Program. Occaslonal Papers Number 21, 1988,

26p

POZZI, Pablo

A.

Argentlna 1976-1982' Labour LeadershIp and Mlhtary

Government. Journal

of

Latm Ameflcan Studies Vol

20

(1988)

111-138.

RANIS, Peter. Argentme Workers and

the

Nature of Democratlc Values

l

Latin Amenca Paper Senes, no.

17,

Columbia University TheInstltute of Latin Amencan and Ibenan Studles, 1990, 23p





•

Periodicals

Latin American Weekly Report 1982-1989

El Bimestre Politico

y

Economlco

1983 1989

ewspapers

New York Times 1983-1989

La Nacion 1983-1989



NNEX



•

TABLES

Table

:

Table Il :

Table

III

:

Table

IV:

Table V :

Table VI:

Table

VII

:

Table VIII:

Selected Economlc Indlcators 1975-82

Dlstnbutlon of Argentine wage earners by sectors of

actlVlty Evolution

1949-1980

Distribution of Union Membershlp by economlc actlVlty

sector. Evolution

1936-1984

Unemployment and Underemployment

In

the Federal

Capital and Greater Buenos Aires)

1975-1989

Real Average Wages ln Argentma s Manufactunng Sector

1981-1989

The Evolution

of

Real Wages . 1982-1983

Real Wages, Inflation Rate and Purchasing

Power

1983-1988

Membershlp Trends

ln

the Pnnclpal Umon Federations

1960-1986

• •



Table 1

Gross

domestlc

product

Industnal

production

Inflation

PubliC

deflclt ( of

GDP)

Real

per

caplta GDP

Selected Economic 1ndicators

1975 82

( varratlon)

1974

1975 1976

1977

65

1 4 -3 1

48

6 1

-30

-4 4

242

1827

44 176 2

82

162

11

2

52

40

1 8

-2 1

48

1978 1979 1980

1981 1982

-5 4

68

1 1 -61

5

2

-105

9 1 -37

-152

- 4 7

1754 1595

1008

1045

1648

72

8 85 90

80

-4 7

54

-05

-73 -69

Source. William C. Smith

Authontariamsm

and the

risis

of

the Argentine Polltical Economy Stanford,

Ca ifornla. Stanford University Press, 1989, p. 248.







•

Table IV Unemployment and

Underemployment

(in the Federal

Capital and Greater Buenos Aires)

Unemployment

Underemp Qy.ment TotgJ

April

Oct.

April

Oct

Apnl Oct

1975 2.4 2.8 4.7

49

7.1

7.7

1976 4.8 4.0

4.7

5.0

9.5 90

1977

3.4 23

3.3 3.1 67 5.4

1978

3.9 1.9

5.4 3.0

93

4.9

1979

2.0 2.1

3.2

3.2

5.2

5.3

1980

2.3 2.3

4.7 4.5

7.0

6.8

1981

4.0 5.0

4.6 5.8

8.6

10.8

1982

5.7 3.7

6.4 56

12.1

9.3

1983 5.2 3.1

4.6 4.9 9.8 80

1984

4.1

3.6

4.5 4.7 86 83

1985 5.7 4.9

55

66

11.2 11.5

1986 4.8 4.5 6.4

6.3 11.2

108

1987

5.4 5.2

8.0 7.8 13.4

13.0

• •



Table V Real

Average

Wages in Argentina's Manufacturing Sector

1981

1982

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Annual

Average

894

80 1 101 5 1295 107 2

108 1

996 95 7

81

5

Indexes

1980=1 ot

PercentageVanatlon

-106

-104 26 7 276 172

08

7 9 -3 9 -148

Source

tatlstlcal Yearbook For Latm Amenca

and

he Canbbean

1989 Edition Economlc

Commission

for

Latin

Amenca

and

The Canbbean

United NatIons Publication. 1990. p 27

Table VI

The Evolution of Real Wages

(Dec 1983

=

100)

Manufactunng

Public

Administration

t g t ~ Entergnses

Level Percent Level Percent Level

Percent

van atton varlatton

vanatton

1982

73.5

-52 823 254°/0

706

-224

1983

934

270 903 9

947

34 1

1984

1124 204

91

9 1 7

979

34

1985

903

-197

71

1

-226

865

-11.6

1986

922

2 1 67 1 -5 6

929

74

1987

867 -5 9

663 1

3 860

-7 4

1988

745 -125

787 332

900

-04

Source: William C. Smith. Authoritananism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political

conomy

Stanford. Caltfornia: Stanford UniversIty Press, 1989, p. 289.



•

Table VII : Real Wages,

Inflation

Rate

and

Purchasing Power:

983· 988

Real Av Monthly

Purchasing Annual

Wages* Inflation

Power* Vanatlon of

Purchasmg

Power

( )

1983

934 150

1045

235

1984

112.4

188 123.3

180

1985 90.3

14

1 101 6

-174

1986

92.2

5.1

1090 74

1987

867

88

1004

-79

1988

82.5 14.1 92.8

-7.6

• •



Table VIII

Membership Trends in the Principal Union Federations: 1960-1986

Orgamzatlon

Sector*

1960

1970

1980 1986*

Confederaclon

de

Empleados Commerce

200 000

171.000 260.000 450.000

de Comer:lo (Retail Workers)

Union Obrera Metalurgica

Industry

125,759

180,000

300,000

280,000

(Metalworkers)

Union of Workers of Educatlon*

Services

n a

n.a

na.

250 000

Union Ferrovlana (Railroad Transport 183 043

168.978 164.200

143.304

'.Norkers)

Asoclaclon Bancaria (Bank

Finance 75,000

77,620

83,000 137.707

Workers)

Union dei Personal Civil de

la

Services

106,041

50 100 75.835 133.188

Naclon (Government Workers)

Union Obrera de

la

Industry 75,000

75,000

250,000 128.507

Construcclon (Construction

Workers)

Asoclacion de Trabajadores dei Servlcas 150,000

70,000 115,000

86.000

Estado (Government Workers)

Union de TrabaJadores

Services

26 500 56 500 64 816 85,481

Gastronomlcos (Food Workers)

Source: David R Decker. he

Political Economie and Labor Climate in Argentina.

Multinational Industnal

Relations Series, No.

4:

Latin American Studies. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. 1983,

p

84.

*

The

data for 1986,

the data for the Union of Workers of the Education and the classification of the economic sectors

to whlch each union belongs, have been taken from Graclela Ducatenzeller, Ouverture politique, transition

démocratique et classe ouvnère

en

Argentine. Politique no 12,1987,

p

78

1

Documents

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