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This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil War Battlefields

S E R I E S E D I T O R S

Brooks D. Simpson

Arizona State University

Mark Grimsley

The Ohio State University

Steven E. Woodworth

Texas Christian University

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THE PENINSULA AND SEVEN DAYS

A BATTLEFIELD GUIDE

BRIAN K. BURTON

•

Cartography by Christopher L. Brest

University of Nebraska Press

Lincoln and London

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© 2007 by the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska

All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

��

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Burton, Brian K., 1959--

The Peninsula and Seven Days : a battlefield guide / Brian K. Burton.

p. cm. — (This hallowed ground)

Includes bibliographical references.

isbn-13: 978-0-8032-6246-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)

isbn-10: 0-8032-6246-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Peninsular Campaign, 1862.

2. Seven Days’ Battles, Va., 1862.

3. Battlefields—Virginia—Guidebooks.

4. Historic sites—Virginia—Guidebooks.

5. Virginia—Tours.

6. Virgina—History, Local. I. Title. II. Series.

e473.6.b87 2007

973.7�32—dc22

2006017252

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Acknowledgments vii

Introduction ix

How to Use This Guide xiii

The Road to the Peninsula 1

The Peninsula Campaign, April 4–May 15, 1862 4

introduction to the tour of the early peninsula campaign 7

stop 1 Johnston’s Headquarters 8

stop 2 Young’s Mill 11

stop 3 Lee’s Mill 14

stop 4 Skiffes Creek 17

stop 5 Dam No. 1 19

stop 6 The Lines at Yorktown 23

stop 7 Hancock’s Fight 26

stop 8 Fort Magruder 30

stop 9 Hooker’s Fight 33

optionalexcursion 1 Fort Monroe 38

optionalexcursion 2 Warwick Court House 41

optionalexcursion 3 Gloucester Point 44

optionalexcursion 4 Drewry’s Bluff 47

The Peninsula Campaign, May 15–June 24, 1862 51

Richmond National Battlefield Park Visitor Centers 55

overview of the first two days, june 25 and 26, 1862 56

stop 1 Lee’s Headquarters 58

stop 2 Lee’s Plans 62

stop 3 The Attack at Mechanicsville 65

overview of the third day, june 27, 1862 68

stop 4 Walnut Grove Church 70

stop 5 The Battle of Gaines’s Mill 73

5a The Union Line 74

5b The Breakthrough on the Union Left 75

Contents

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5c Hood’s Breakthrough 77

5d The Union Center 78

stop 6 Cold Harbor 81

stop 7 Grapevine Bridge 84

stop 8 McClellan’s Headquarters 87

overview of the fourth and fifth days, june 28 and 29, 1862 90

stop 9 The Mess at Savage Station 92

overview of the sixth day, june 30, 1862 95

stop 10 The Fizzle at White Oak Swamp 97

stop 11 The Action on Long Bridge Road 101

stop 12 The Second Union Line at Glendale 104

overview of the seventh day, july 1, 1862 107

stop 13 Jackson at Malvern Hill 109

stop 14 Magruder at Malvern Hill 112

stop 15 The Union Line at Malvern Hill 114

15a The Union Left 114

15b The Union Center 116

15c The Union Right 118

The Peninsula Campaign, July 2–Au gust 26, 1862 121

Secondary Tour: Stonewall Jackson in the Seven Days 122

optionalexcursion 1 Polegreen Church 123

optionalexcursion 2 Confusion on the Farms 126

optionalexcursion 3 Malvern Cliff 129

optionalexcursion 4 Harrison’s Landing 131

appendix a Early Peninsula Campaign Orders of Battle 135

appendix b Seven Days Orders of Battle 141

appendix c Organization, Weapons, and Tactics 151

Sources 163

For Further Reading 167

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Acknowledgments

I have long thought of writing a guidebook to the Seven

Days, having covered the ground several times and gone on

tour with Ed Bearss and Will Greene once. My companion

on most of those tours was my father, Joseph Burton, who

is always the first reader of my work and whose companion-

ship and comments have always been helpful and pleasant.

My colleague at Western Washington University, Peter Haug,

accompanied me on one trip; his interest in the Seven Days

dates back at least as far as mine.

One of the coeditors of this series, Steven Woodworth, was

very encouraging when I first proposed this book and has

helped at every step of the way, including reading the manu-

script and making helpful suggestions. Robert E. L. Krick of

Richmond National Battlefield Park, an accomplished histo-

rian and guide, went above and beyond the call in helping

me, patiently answering e-mails and touring the fields with

me as well as reviewing the Seven Days part of the manu-

script. I hope his belief that this guide will help the park will

be fulfilled. J. Michael Moore of Lee Hall in Newport News

gave exceptional help in guiding me to interesting sites on

the lower Peninsula and in reviewing that part of the man-

uscript. I found him through the assistance of another col-

league at Western, Sandra Mottner, and her friend Fred Boelt.

Tom McMahon, who is writing what promises to be the defin-

itive history of the battle of Williamsburg, was very gracious

in sharing his knowledge and reviewing the Williamsburg

stops. His map of the redoubts near Williamsburg was most

helpful as well. Richard Ray and his wife, Heather, graciously

agreed to spend much precious free time driving these tours.

I owe much to them, although perhaps some of my debt to

Richard will be erased if Heather (who’d rather read fiction

than history) agrees to take more battlefield tours.

Finally, and most importantly, my wife, Lori, and sons, An-

drew and Joshua, have put up with my sitting on the living

room floor typing while they were doing other things, my

occasional disappearances to print something out or look

something up, and my less frequent trips to the east coast.

Andrew accompanied me on my last trip to the Peninsula—

which I hope will be the first of many battlefield excursions

together. To all of them, my gratitude is undying.

All illustrations reproduced in this book first appeared in

the four volumes of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, edited

by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel

(New York: Century, 1887– 88). The volume and page number

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from which each illustration was taken are indicated at the

end of each caption.

For my parents, who are always with me on battlefields and

elsewhere.

viii Acknowledgments

Confederate sharp-shooter. blcw 2:202

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Introduction

The Seven Days Battles have been considered by British mili-

tary historian J. F. C. Fuller to be one of the decisive battles in

world history. They marked the end of the last chance for the

Union to win the Civil War while Northern objectives were

still modest—the restoration of the status quo ante. For that

reason alone they are worth study. But the series of engage-

ments in late June and early July 1862 also marked the first

campaign in which Robert E. Lee led the Army of Northern Vir-

ginia, as well as the first campaign in which Lee and Thomas J.

“Stonewall” Jackson worked together as part of that army.

And they were the real battle test of George B. McClellan,

the commander of the Army of the Potomac.

The Seven Days were different from Chickamauga or Gettys-

burg, the first two battles covered by the guidebooks in the

This Hallowed Ground series. Gettysburg began as a meeting

engagement, and to a lesser extent the same is true for Chick-

amauga. Both developed into multi-day set-piece battles. In

contrast, the Seven Days was a running series of engage-

ments, as Lee tried to first flank McClellan out of his position

and then destroy at least part of McClellan’s army on its move

to the James River. No major battlefield saw action on more

than one day, and in fact the fields typically were separated

by a few miles. Major parts of both armies were on the march

on each of the seven days. Thus, although the armies during

the Seven Days were about as large as during the Gettysburg

campaign, and larger than those at Chickamauga, the forces

engaged on each day were substantially smaller.

This difference has two effects on the visitor’s tour of the

Seven Days sites as compared with Chickamauga or Gettys-

burg. First, the battlefields themselves are much smaller

than either of the other two battles. Thus, they can be seen

relatively quickly. Second, the distances between sites are

longer, meaning there is more driving on the tour. These two

effects mean it is possible to complete the tour in one day,

but for those who have more time this book provides sev-

eral optional excursions. Also, much of the driving is on the

region’s historical road network, which to a large extent is

little changed from Civil War times in this part of Virginia.

This means that the tourist can better understand the armies’

movements by following the tour presented in this book.

The Seven Days are different from Chickamauga or Gettys-

burg in another way. The latter two battlefields are largely,

if not perfectly, preserved in the sense that the key areas

of each are protected as National Park Service land, along

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with most of the positions that each army held. The Seven

Days, by contrast, show both the promise and the peril of

battlefield preservation. The National Park Service does own

key parts of three battlefields—Mechanicsville, Gaines’s Mill,

and Malvern Hill. The last-named battlefield is substantially

preserved in large part because of the work of the Associa-

tion for Preservation of Civil War Sites and its successor

organization, the Civil War Preservation Trust. Also, at Mal-

vern Hill and Gaines’s Mill, substantial Park Service efforts

have restored the ground as much as possible to its 1862

appearance.

On the other hand, a substantial part of Gaines’s Mill

and almost all of Glendale remain privately owned. Though

much of the land is close to its condition in 1862, it is in

danger of being lost as a battlefield site. Much of the Union

position at Mechanicsville has been developed, for example.

The entire battlefield at Savage Station has been lost to an

interstate interchange, and the Oak Grove battlefield has

been lost to Richmond International Airport. Further, al-

though this guidebook includes a tour of sites that are con-

nected with the Peninsula Campaign before the Seven Days,

little mention is made of the battle of Seven Pines. That is

because the entire field has been lost, except for a national

cemetery.

The tour of the early Peninsula Campaign is well worth

the effort for those visiting the area. It includes some of the

best-preserved Civil War earthworks extant. Fort Monroe and

Drewry’s Bluff, though optional excursions because of their

distance from the rest of the tour, are of great historical im-

portance. Though the stone Fort Monroe is on an active army

base as of this writing (the base is scheduled to be closed), it

is quite accessible, and Drewry’s Bluff contains the extensive

works of Fort Darling. Sites such as Lee’s Mill, Dam No. 1, and

part of the Yorktown entrenchments are publicly accessible

areas of a large, extant network of Union and Confederate

earthworks from the siege of Yorktown, and they contain

most of the important sites connected with that siege. How-

ever, the battlefield at Williamsburg either has disappeared

or is in danger of doing so.

The roads in this part of Virginia are not always well

marked. For this reason, it is very important to pay attention

to the approximate mileage figures in the Directions sections

of the tour, particularly when you are on some of the less-

well-traveled parts of the tour. Be aware, of course, that the

mileage figures down to the tenth may vary slightly in your

experience.

x Introduction

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It is hoped that this guide will not only afford readers the

opportunity to study the Peninsula Campaign on the ground

itself, but will also encourage efforts to preserve the remain-

ing ground of the battles, one of the most important cam-

paigns in American history.

xi Introduction

Trooper of the Virginia

cavalry, 1861. blcw 2:271

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Confederate skirmish-line

driven in by the Union

advance. blcw 2:349

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How to Use This Guide

This book is divided into two main sections. The first is a

guide to sites connected with the early Peninsula Campaign,

the second to those connected with the Seven Days Battles.

The Peninsula Campaign guide is divided into 9 main stops.

These proceed from one part of the campaign to another in

chronological order. That is, the tour follows the campaign

as it progressed, from the Army of the Potomac’s arrival on

the Peninsula through the battle of Williamsburg. The Seven

Days guide is longer, with 15 main stops covering the action

from June 26 to July 1, 1862. Each tour, including driving

times, can be completed in about six hours. Most stops re-

quire about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. Only a few stops

require you to walk more than 50 yards from your car.

Two of the main stops in the Seven Days guide are divided

into three or four substops. Substops are designed to develop

the action at each point in a clear, organized fashion. In this

guidebook, each substop has a section of text that is “mar-

ried” to a map. This technique enables you to visualize the

troop dispositions and movements at each stop without hav-

ing to flip around the guide looking for maps.

The stops and substops follow a standard format: Direc-

tions, Orientation, What Happened, Analysis, and/or Vignette.

The Directions tell you how to get from one stop to the

next (and sometimes from one substop to another). They not

only give you driving instructions but also ask you, once you

have reached a given stop, to walk to a precise spot on the

battlefield. When driving, keep an eye on your odometer;

many distances are given to the nearest tenth of a mile.

Orientation. Once you’ve reached a stop, this section de-

scribes the terrain around you so you can quickly pick out

the key terrain and get your bearings.

What Happened. This is the heart of each stop. It explains

the action succinctly without oversimplifying, and when-

ever possible it also explains how the terrain affected the

fighting.

Analysis. This section explains why a particular decision

was made, why a given attack met with success or failure,

and so on. The purpose is to give you additional insight into

the battle.

Some stops have a section called Vignette, whose purpose

is to enhance your emotional understanding of the battle by

offering a short eyewitness account or a particularly vivid

anecdote.

Although each basic tour can be completed in about six

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hours, you can also take Excursions to places of special inter-

est. These sections use the same format as the basic stops. The

sections for a few stops in this guide provide suggestions for

further exploring the site of that specific stop.

A few conventions are used in the guidebook to keep con-

fusion to a minimum. We have tried not to burden the text

with a proliferation of names and unit designations. They

are used as sparingly as a solid understanding of the battle

permits. Names of Confederate leaders are in italics. Union

corps numbers are given in roman numerals. The full name

and rank of each individual is usually given only the first

time he is mentioned; the Order of Battle in the back of the

book can remind you of commands when needed.

Directions are particularly important in a guidebook, but

we know that they can often be confusing. We have there-

fore tried to make them as foolproof as possible. At each stop

you are asked to face a specific, easily identifiable landmark.

From that point you may be asked to look to your left or

right. To make this as precise as possible, we may sometimes

ask you to look to your left front, left, left rear, or such, ac-

cording to the system shown below:

straight ahead

left front right front

left right

left rear right rear

behind/directly to the rear

Often, after the relative directions (left, right, etc.), we add

the compass directions (north, south, etc.) in parentheses.

The maps can also help you get your bearings.

Although this guidebook is intended primarily for use on

the battlefield, it also contains information helpful for fur-

ther study of the campaigns. The guide begins with a cam-

paign introduction that describes the events leading to the

initial confrontation on the Peninsula. The Peninsula guide

has an overview outlining the main developments of the

six weeks that began with the siege of Yorktown. Between

the two guides is another overview of events from May 15

to the beginning of the Seven Days. The stops for each one-

or two-day period are preceded by an overview of the main

actions of the period. At the end of the Seven Days guide a

section summarizes the remaining events of the Peninsula

Campaign.

This guide also includes appendices that give the orders

of battle for both the Siege of Yorktown and the Seven Days,

along with a third appendix that discusses organization,

weapons, and tactics of Civil War armies. Suggestions for fur-

xiv How to Use This Guide

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ther reading will help increase the reader’s understanding of

the campaigns and personalities.

We hope you enjoy your battlefield tours of the Peninsula

and Seven Days campaigns.

Mark Grimsley,

Brooks D. Simpson, &

Steven E. Woodworth

series editors

xv How to Use This Guide

On the skirmish line. blcw 3:31

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A view of mainstreet,

Yorktown, the Union

troops marching in. From

a sketch made May 4, 1862.

blcw 2:173

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The Peninsula and Seven Days

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Skirmish at Lee’s Mill before Yorktown, April 16, 1862. From a sketch. blcw 2:193

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The Road to the Peninsula

On July 22, 1861, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan received or-

ders to come to Washington and assume command of the

Union army, which the day before had retreated in disorder

from the first major battle of the Civil War. McClellan, who

had campaigned successfully in western Virginia earlier in

the month, was viewed as a savior by the North after the

surprising and disappointing debacle at Bull Run. Naming

his force the Army of the Potomac, the youthful West Point

graduate immediately set to reorganizing and training his

men, a process that would take some months.

While discussions of blame and resolutions to avoid such

misadventures again occupied people’s time in the North,

in the South Gens. Joseph E. Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard

strengthened their army’s position near Bull Run and Manas-

sas Junction. The new Confederate States of America had won

its first important contest, and elation in the Confederacy

was accompanied by some wonder that the army did not fol-

low up its success by advancing on Washington. A strategy

conference in the fall of 1861 confirmed the army’s basical-

ly defensive stance. However, friction over various seemingly

minor incidents strained the relationships of Johnston, Beaure-

gard, and Confederate president Jefferson Davis.

In Oc to ber, McClellan ordered a reconnaissance across the

Potomac River upriver from Washington. That foray turned

into the battle of Ball’s Bluff, a mismanaged affair that would

have had few consequences if not for the death of Union colo-

nel Edward Baker, a U.S. senator from Oregon and a friend

of President Abraham Lincoln. Baker’s death led to investi-

gations and fault-finding. McClellan escaped any blame for

the incident, and in No vem ber became general-in-chief of the

U.S. Army, replacing Mexican War hero Winfield Scott. He

continued to train his troops and resist demands to begin

active operations. In De cem ber he consulted with Lincoln

about possible moves, but at the end of 1861 he fell ill and

was incapacitated for more than a week. Once McClellan re-

covered, he had several meetings with Lincoln but refused to

divulge his plan for offensive operations.

While McClellan struggled with politicians, Jefferson Davis

won a conflict with a general when he transferred Beauregard

to the western theater of operations. That left Johnston in sole

command of the Confederate army in Virginia. Johnston and

Davis did not get along well either, however, and their rela-

tionship would deteriorate over time.

In late Janu ary, just after Beauregard was sent packing, Lin-

coln attempted to send McClellan’s army packing to Virginia.

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2 The Road to the Peninsula

He issued the President’s General War Order No. 1, ordering

all Union armies to advance on Feb ru ary 22—the 130th anni-

versary of the birth of George Washington, the first U.S. presi-

dent and an icon to both sides, as well as the day of Jefferson

Davis’s inauguration. Lincoln’s action was probably meant

more rhetorically than literally, and was almost certainly a

sign of his frustration with the inaction on all fronts. Mc-

Clellan then presented his plan to move on Richmond by

water, and Lincoln countered with his desire that the move-

ment be overland to protect Washington. McClellan was get-

ting ready to advance, however, at what seemed to many to

be long last.

The Confederates knew this. Johnston and Davis agreed that

the Manassas position was vulnerable. Davis told Johnston

to prepare for retreat, saving as much matériel as possible.

Johnston waited until McClellan began his movement, over-

land toward Manassas, in early March, then left his lines and

“Quaker guns”—logs painted and mounted to look like heavy

artillery. The Confederates retired to Rappahannock Station

west of Fredericksburg, and the Yankees occupied the South-

ern lines briefly before returning to their camps near Alexan-

dria, Virginia, across the Potomac from Washington.

McClellan claimed this move as a victory, but he suffered

what his supporters considered a defeat shortly after, when

Lincoln removed him as general-in-chief. Maj. Gen. Henry

Halleck, under whose watch Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had

captured the important points of Forts Henry and Donelson

in Tennessee, gained overall command in the west, and Maj.

Gen. John C. Fremont took command in western Virginia.

McClellan then unveiled a new plan to transport his army

to the Virginia Peninsula between the York and James rivers.

The Peninsula led directly to Richmond, on the north bank

of the James, and a quick movement would allow McClellan

to steal a march on Johnston, who would have to march over-

land to meet the Army of the Potomac. This plan was made

possible by the uss Monitor, a revolutionary ironclad warship.

The Monitor was able to protect the Union transports and

supply ships that McClellan needed against the css Virginia,

its ironclad counterpart for the South. The two ships fought

to an epic draw in early March, allowing Lincoln to approve

McClellan’s plan.

He did so with the proviso that enough troops stay in the

Washington area to keep the capital secure. In the middle of

March, McClellan began moving his men. At about the same

time, Confederate major general Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jack-

son began to advance on Federals in the Shenandoah Valley

of Virginia. His attack at Kernstown in late March showed

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3 The Road to the Peninsula

Lincoln the danger of keeping Washington uncovered, as

he believed McClellan had, and the president held back one

army corps (Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell’s I Corps) from the

movement to the Peninsula. Johnston began his march to

the Peninsula to reinforce Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, who

commanded no more than 15,000 men on the lower Pen-

insula. McClellan got there first and began to move toward

Magruder, who had prepared several lines of defense across

the Peninsula. The Southerner moved his men from an ad-

vanced line to his main line, anchored on the Revolutionary

War fortifications near Yorktown. The stage was set for a cli-

mactic engagement, the second one in 81 years to be fought

at Yorktown.

Major-General George

B. McClellan. From a

war-time photograph.

blcw 1:92

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The Peninsula Campaign, April 4–May 15, 1862

McClellan began his advance up the Peninsula on April 4

with two columns—each stronger than Magruder’s entire de-

fensive force. One column left from Fort Monroe, heading

directly toward Yorktown. The other left from Newport News

on the road to Williamsburg. McClellan intended this col-

umn to flank the Rebel force at Yorktown, which he assumed

would fall back to entrenchments to protect the town itself.

He then would send his other mobile force, the I Corps, to

take the Southern position at Gloucester Point across the

York River from Yorktown, completing his encirclement of

the latter city’s defenders. That accomplished, he would con-

tinue up the Peninsula until met by Joe Johnston’s main army

nearer to Richmond. Although his use of the James River was

stopped by the Virginia and shore batteries, his use of the

York was protected by the Monitor and would be assured by

the capture of Yorktown and Gloucester Point.

The Yankees immediately ran into obstacles McClellan

had not expected. The first was the roads, which turned al-

most impassable after rains. The second was the Confeder-

ates, who were in line across the Peninsula along the War-

wick River and impeding further advance. The third was the

holding back of the I Corps by Lincoln. The first two caused

McClellan to entrench himself for a siege of Magruder’s line;

the third caused him to believe he had no choice but to con-

tinue the siege. He reached this decision without observing

all of the Rebel entrenchments and despite his advantage of

nearly 70,000 men to fewer than 15,000.

Johnston, meanwhile, headed from north of Richmond to

the Peninsula with his army. After a look at Magruder’s lines,

Johnston advocated a withdrawal from Yorktown, but Gen.

Robert E. Lee, Davis’s newly named general-in-chief, argued

that the army should hold as long as possible. Davis sided

with Lee but told Johnston to withdraw when he could no lon-

ger hold the line. So the entire Army of Northern Virginia,

totaling finally about 55,000 troops, moved into position,

arriving in mid-April. McClellan also added troops, with his

total eventually reaching 110,000.

The two sides dug and skirmished as McClellan brought

his siege guns into position. The largest skirmish took place

on April 16 at Dam No. 1, one of three dams that Magruder

had built on the Warwick River to flood avenues of approach.

McClellan wanted to keep the Southerners from improving

their works behind the river. Artillery and infantry from Brig.

Gen. William Brooks’s Vermont brigade skirmished with men

from Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb’s brigade. Then some of Brooks’s

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men crossed the river, held it for a bit, and then were forced

back. McClellan had not wanted to start a general engage-

ment, and he had his wish.

By the end of April McClellan’s men had dug so well and

so far that Johnston knew the game was up. He announced

that he would need to withdraw soon, and he did so on the

night of May 3– 4, just more than one day before McClellan’s

planned artillery bombardment. Most of the Army of North-

ern Virginia headed up the Peninsula, but after Union cav-

alry caught up with the retreating Southerners at Williams-

burg on May 4, Maj. Gen. James Longstreet’s division occupied

Magruder’s entrenchments there to slow the Army of the

Potomac’s pursuit. Brig. Gens. Joseph Hooker and William F.

“Baldy” Smith advanced on May 5, and a struggle of several

hours ensued, with Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early’s brigade of Maj.

Gen. Daniel Harvey Hill’s division reinforcing their fellow

Confederates and Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny’s Union division

reaching the field as well. Their movements yielded little re-

sult, however, except to allow the rest of Johnston’s army to

continue its retreat. Two days later, in an attempt at a flank-

ing movement, Brig. Gen. William Franklin’s division (which

had been on transports, then unloaded, then loaded again

onto the transports) landed at Eltham’s Landing on the south

bank of the York River. However, Johnston’s army had retreated

far enough that Franklin could not flank it, and Brig. Gen.

John B. Hood’s brigade forced the Yankee forward units back

to the main body.

Two days later Southerners under Maj. Gen. Benjamin

Huger abandoned Norfolk to the Federals, and two days after

that the Rebels scuttled the Virginia, which had nowhere else

to go. The James River was now open to Yankee ships. The

Monitor, uss Galena (another ironclad), and other gunboats

steamed up the river toward Richmond. On May 15 they en-

countered the Rebel defense at Drewry’s Bluff, on the south

bank of the river seven miles south of Richmond. The Galena

was seriously damaged, and the Monitor could not reach the

Confederates on the high bluff. The attack was a complete

failure; the James was closed to the Yankees at that point.

On the same day, Johnston ordered his men to cross the

Chickahominy River east of Richmond to set up his final de-

fensive line, where he had wanted to fight in the first place.

The stage was set for Seven Pines, Johnston’s wounding, Lee’s

assumption of command, and the Seven Days.

5 The Peninsula Campaign

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Introduction to the Tour of the Early Peninsula Campaign

This tour takes you to some of the sites associated with Mc-

Clellan’s siege of Yorktown and advance up the Peninsula in

April and May 1862. Particularly in the area of the siege of

Yorktown, the Civil War–era towns have since mushroomed

into cities, and today the sites are disconnected. However,

key areas where skirmishes and engagements occurred are

at least partially preserved, the anchors of the Confederate

defensive line at Yorktown are preserved (including sections

of earthworks at Colonial National Historic Park’s Yorktown

unit), and portions of the battlefield at Williamsburg can still

be seen. Further up the James River and on its south side, the

key site of Drewry’s Bluff is well preserved by the National

Park Service as part of Richmond National Battlefield Park.

The tour starts at Lee Hall, headquarters for John Magruder

and Joseph Johnston during the siege of Yorktown. Lee Hall

has been restored and, because of its exhibits on the Penin-

sula campaign, serves as a good visitor center for this tour.

Check Lee Hall’s hours of operation as you plan your visit.

From Richmond take Interstate 64 east to exit 247 (about 55

miles from the center of Richmond). From the off-ramp turn

left at the stop sign onto Route 143. Proceed 1.2 miles on Route

143 to its intersection with Route 238, yorktown road. Turn

right onto Route 238, and proceed 0.4 miles to Lee Hall on

your right. Turn onto the entrance road, and park in the park-

ing lot.

7 Early Peninsula Campaign Tour

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STOP 1 Johnston’s Headquarters

Directions Walk to the earthworks in front of the house, and face to-

ward the house.

Orientation You are standing at the headquarters of John Magruder and

then Joseph Johnston during the siege of Yorktown. Lee Hall,

the mansion in front of you, was built just before the Civil

War. The main Confederate line stretched from your left

front to your left rear, and the Union entrenchments paral-

leled them further to your left.

What Happened From this mansion first John Magruder and then Joseph John-

ston directed the Confederate forces opposing McClellan’s

army during March and April 1862. Located just to the rear of

Magruder’s main line of entrenchments, Lee Hall was owned

by Richard Decauter Lee, who helped Magruder during the lat-

ter’s placement of the line of entrenchments and then evacu-

ated the house with his family. Magruder conducted the de-

fense of the main line until mid-April, when Johnston arrived

8 Stop 1

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with the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia. Magruder re-

luctantly handed over command of the assembled force to

Johnston.

Johnston was skeptical about the line’s usefulness against

an assault, more skeptical than Magruder. Neither thought

the line should be held at all hazards. At a conference with

Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, among others, Johnston ar-

gued for abandoning the position. Lee, however, argued in

favor of contesting McClellan’s advance up the Peninsula,

and Davis ordered Johnston to hold the line as long as practi-

cal. Johnston then commanded his army from this house. On

April 17 a Confederate hot-air balloon lifted off from where

you are standing to observe Federal activity. By late April it

was obvious to Johnston that McClellan’s preparations for a

grand assault were nearly complete, and he ordered a with-

drawal from the lines. The Rebels withdrew on the night of

May 3– 4.

Analysis Magruder had begun forming this line in the fall of 1861, but

he didn’t mean for it to be used for anything other than a

hasty defense. In fact, he suggested to Johnston in March 1862

that it could be used as a base from which to launch an at-

tack against the Yankees. However, when McClellan began to

advance with his entire army from the area around Fort Mon-

roe, Magruder abandoned the idea of an attack and worked to

improve the line. It was useful as a way to delay McClellan

long enough for the Confederates to decide how they should

defend the Peninsula.

The arguments on each side of that debate were good

ones. Johnston, supported by Longstreet and Maj. Gen. Gustavus

Smith, argued for a concentration of forces along the eastern

seaboard so he could fight McClellan nearer to Richmond.

As an alternative, he suggested that Magruder hold McClel-

lan (who didn’t seem inclined to attack) at Yorktown while

Johnston marched the rest of his army toward Washington,

making McClellan come to its defense. Combined with Stone-

wall Jackson’s force, Johnston might have been able to accom-

plish this.

Lee and Secretary of War George Randolph argued that giv-

ing up Yorktown would mean leaving the ironclad Virginia

high and dry since its base at Norfolk would be lost, that the

Confederacy needed time to reform and reinforce its army,

and that stripping the rest of the seaboard of troops would

mean the loss of cities such as Charleston and Savannah.

These arguments also were cogent. Perhaps that is why the

debate lasted for hours, into the night on April 14–15.

9 Johnston’s Headquarters

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Further Reading Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 83, 88–

92, 94–111, 130–35; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 24–27,

46– 48, 59– 62.

Optional Excursion If you have time, you may wish to visit Fort Monroe—still

an active U.S. Army installation as of this writing. Because

of that, if security levels are high enough the fort will be

closed, so check first. If the base is open, the Casemate Mu-

seum in the Civil War–era fort will be open to the public;

also, you can drive through the old fort. From Lee Hall, return

to yorktown road and turn left. Proceed on yorktown road

0.2 miles to its junction with Interstate 64 East. Turn right onto

the on-ramp, and proceed on Interstate 64 to Exit 268. From

the off-ramp turn left onto mallory street. Proceed on mallory

street 0.4 miles to its intersection with mellen street. Turn

right on mellen street, and proceed across the bridge a total

of 0.7 miles to a Y intersection. Bear right onto mcnair drive.

Stop at the gate for a day pass. All adults will need a picture id

to gain access to the base. Proceed 0.8 miles on mcnair drive

to its intersection with ingalls road. Turn left and proceed on

ingalls road 0.2 miles, then turn right to the main gate of

the Civil War–era fort. After entering the fort, turn right and

follow the signs to the Casemate Museum.

10 Stop 1

Major-General John B.

Magruder, C.S.A. From a

photograph. blcw 2:209

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STOP 2 Young’s Mill

Directions Return to yorktown road. Turn right and proceed on yorktown

road about 0.6 miles to its intersection with warwick boule-

vard (Route 60). Turn left onto Route 60 east, and proceed

about 7.0 miles to old grist mill lane. Turn right and then

immediately right into the parking area for Youngs Mill His-

toric Site. Cross old grist mill lane, and climb the hill to the

earthworks. Face southeast so that warwick boulevard is on

your left.

Orientation You are facing toward Hampton Roads and the Union ad-

vance. The roads from the end of the Peninsula came from

straight ahead. Other Confederate works were scattered

throughout the lower Peninsula.

What Happened Young’s Mill was the site of one of a series of works built by

Magruder as a first defensive line to keep the Yankees at bay

while he built his second, main line at Yorktown. Other areas

fortified included Big Bethel, the site of the first battle on

11 Young’s Mill

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the Peninsula in June 1861. The Big Bethel site was meant to

block the road from Fort Monroe to Yorktown. The Young’s

Mill entrenchments blocked the road from Newport News,

where the Federals had an encampment, to Williamsburg.

The Southerners occupied this area through the winter,

building winter quarters, and several skirmishes took place,

but they abandoned the line on April 4 when McClellan’s

army began its advance. The Yankees advanced in two col-

umns. Two divisions under Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman

in the right-hand column moved through Big Bethel directly

toward Yorktown, and two divisions under Brig. Gen. Eras-

mus Keyes in the left-hand column moved through Young’s

Mill to flank Yorktown itself. McClellan believed that only

Yorktown itself was being held.

Analysis Magruder’s first line was meant to be a base for watching the

Union forces and preventing scouts from moving up the

Peninsula. As long as their opponents were not numerous,

the Rebels in this area were relatively secure. Magruder then

could work in peace on his more important defensive lines at

Yorktown and Williamsburg. In fact, Magruder had a thought

of attacking the isolated Newport News encampment but

gave it up because it would be too easy for the Yankees at

Fort Monroe, commanded by Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler, to

close on him from the rear. Union warships also helped deter

a Confederate attack.

Once McClellan started to move to the Peninsula in late

March, it was obvious to all that the forward defenses were

not to be held. They had served their purpose, however, for

the Northerners were ignorant of the Yorktown defenses, an

ignorance that showed itself in McClellan’s plan to flank them

and that was exacerbated by poor Union maps. In fact, the

Yorktown defenses could not be flanked by land. This miscal-

culation by McClellan would have important consequences.

Vignette When Keyes’s column passed through Young’s Mill, Col. Phil-

lipe Regis de Triobriand of the 55th New York remembered

coming upon the Young plantation. Its owner was serving

in the Confederate army. De Triobriand noted that the man

“was a sort of lord in that part of the country. The house was

his; the farm and mill were his; the fields and the forests

were his; his were the cattle and the slaves. It seemed as

though we could not get out of his domain.”

Further Reading Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 83; Sears,

To the Gates of Richmond, 35–36.

12 Stop 2

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Optional Excursion If you wish, you may stop to explore Erasmus Keyes’s head-

quarters during the siege of Yorktown and the site of some

of Prof. Thaddeus Lowe’s balloon launches. To do so, return to

warwick boulevard, turning right from old grist mill lane.

Proceed 0.2 miles to its intersection with oyster point road

(Route 171). Make a legal U-turn here, and proceed north on

warwick boulevard (Route 60) 2.6 miles to its intersection

with old courthouse road. Turn left and proceed 0.2 miles to

grissom way. Turn right onto grissom way, then immediately

left into the parking area. Turn in this guide to optional ex-

cursion 2, Warwick Court House.

13 Young’s Mill

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STOP 3 Lee’s Mill

Directions Return to warwick boulevard (Route 60), and turn right. Pro-

ceed on warwick boulevard for 0.2 mile to its intersection with

oyster point road. Make a legal U-turn, and proceed approxi-

mately 5.4 miles on warwick boulevard to lee’s mill drive. As

you drive on warwick boulevard you are following the route

of Keyes’s soldiers. Turn left on Lee’s Mill Drive, and proceed

0.1 mile to river’s ridge circle. Turn left, proceed 0.3 mile,

then turn left into Lee’s Mill Park. Get out of your car, walk

along the trail (reading the signs) to the wooden deck over

the earthworks, and face toward the Warwick River. After

reading the stop, continue along the interesting and infor-

mative trail.

Orientation You are in the position of Confederate soldiers viewing the

Union advance on April 5. Route 60 basically follows the 1862

road through this area. The Confederate works extended to

your right rear, as well as to your left.

14 Stop 3

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What Happened Keyes’s column, on the road from Young’s Mill, continued

its march on April 5 through the mud that passed for roads

on the Peninsula. As the Yankees approached Lee’s Mill,

they found an unexpected sight—Rebel earthworks manned

by Southerners. The 7th Maine, deployed as skirmishers,

stopped nearly 1,000 yards from these works, the rest of Brig.

Gen. John Davidson’s brigade fell into line, and artillery was

brought forward. A duel of batteries continued off and on for

several hours while more of Keyes’s column fell into line and

Keyes and others reconnoitered. They found strong works ex-

tending to the James River and a seemingly large number of

Confederates manning those works. Keyes believed the works

could not be carried by assault and informed McClellan.

Those works were manned by Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws’s

division, with the 10th Georgia as skirmishers. But Magruder,

believing (correctly) that he was substantially outnumbered,

moved troops around and called for sounds, such as the beat-

ing of drums, shouting of commands, and tramp of march-

ing soldiers, to suggest the movements of large bodies of

troops. This accounted for Keyes’s belief that he was facing a

substantial number of Rebels.

When McClellan heard of Keyes’s discovery and the resis-

tance Heintzelman’s column had found near Yorktown, he

examined the ground and deciding the works could not be

carried he ordered his siege guns moved to the front. Then

he heard from Washington that McDowell’s corps would be

withheld from his army to keep the Union capital secure. He

had intended to use McDowell’s force to clear the north side

of the York River of Confederates. What McClellan had envi-

sioned as a speedy flanking operation was now turning into

something else. After reconnoitering the ground over the

next two days, he began what was to be a monthlong siege.

Analysis McClellan’s plan was to flank Magruder’s defenses at York-

town, besiege Magruder there if the Confederate did not with-

draw first, and use McDowell’s corps (the largest in the army

at that time) as a massive mobile force to take batteries at

Gloucester Point across the river from Yorktown. He would

repeat the strategy at any point necessary until he reached

Richmond.

This plan hinged on two assumptions. First, McClellan

needed good roads for fast movement. He knew the Confed-

erates would bring Johnston’s army from north of Richmond to

the Peninsula, and he wanted to advance as speedily up the

Peninsula as he could to meet Johnston as near to Richmond

as possible. He thought, based on reports, that he would have

15 Lee’s Mill

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those roads. Second, he would need an opening in the South-

ern defenses to be able to flank Yorktown by land. Again

based on reports he had received, he thought the road from

Newport News past Young’s and Lee’s mills to Williamsburg

would be open.

Neither assumption held. The Peninsula roads almost

universally turned into a mire after a heavy rain, which Mc-

Clellan was plagued with on April 4 and 5. And Magruder’s line

extended from the York to the James, covering the road past

Lee’s Mill. Thrown off by these two discoveries, McClellan ap-

parently decided he needed to commence full-scale siege op-

erations after observing the ground, though not Magruder’s

strength. He had good estimates of that strength (fewer than

15,000 men), and so believing he outnumbered the Rebels

substantially (his force was nearly 70,000 men) he could have

ordered an assault. Magruder believed that in such a case he

would not be able to hold his lines. However, there is no evi-

dence that McClellan considered the idea. Perhaps Magruder’s

attempts at deception, as conveyed in Keyes’s report, ban-

ished any such thoughts from the beginning by encouraging

McClellan to suspect his estimates of Confederate numbers.

A third problem with the execution of McClellan’s plan was

the lack of cooperation by Flag Officer Louis Goldsborough,

who commanded the Union navy’s North Atlantic Blockad-

ing Squadron. McClellan expected Goldsborough to operate

against Yorktown and Gloucester Point, but the navy did not

do so. This lack of cooperation contrasted markedly with the

cordial cooperation of Grant and Capt. Andrew Foote during

the Fort Donelson campaign in Tennessee earlier that year.

The final blow for McClellan on April 4–5 was the with-

holding of McDowell’s corps. Without McDowell, McClellan

did not believe he could spare a force substantial enough to

accomplish McDowell’s task of taking Gloucester Point. It is

true that a detachment from the army risked being caught be-

tween Magruder and Johnston’s army on its way north of Rich-

mond. However, a quick turning movement probably could

have been executed before Johnston reached the Peninsula,

forcing Magruder out of his lines and enabling the army to

be reunited. McClellan had plenty of men to hold his lines in

front of Yorktown and conduct the turning movement. Again,

however, there is no evidence that he considered the idea.

Further Reading Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 85; Sears,

To the Gates of Richmond, 36–39.

16 Stop 3

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STOP 4 Skiffes Creek

Directions Return to river’s ridge circle. Turn right, proceed 0.3 mile,

then turn right on lee’s mill drive. Proceed 0.1 mile to war-

wick boulevard (Route 60). Turn left on warwick boulevard,

and proceed 1.0 mile to enterprise drive. Turn left, and proceed

0.4 mile on enterprise drive to the Skiffes Creek Redoubt

Historical Park. Turn left into the parking area. Walk to the

redoubt, and face into its interior.

Orientation You are on the right of Magruder’s Yorktown line, on Mulberry

Island, a spit of land bordered by the Warwick River to your

left and Skiffes Creek to your right. Lee’s Mill is about one

mile to your left, and more redoubts existed to your right

in 1862.

What Happened Magruder’s line was potentially strong against a frontal as-

sault along the Warwick River, but it could be turned by wa-

ter easily via either the James or York rivers. Gloucester Point

on the York protected Magruder’s left, and the line at which

17 Skiffes Creek

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you are standing protected his right. These entrenchments

ran from about Lee’s Mill to near Skiffes Creek. This part of

the Confederate defenses saw very little action during the

siege.

Analysis What happened at Skiffes Creek is not as important as what

did not happen. Magruder (and later Johnston) could do very

little on land to stop a determined Union passage up the

James River, which at this point is about two miles wide. For

that they had to rely on the css Virginia. But a flanking move-

ment could use Mulberry Island; since that point of land was

west of the Warwick River, an advance up it would be into the

Confederate rear, and troops could cross the Warwick out of

range of the guns at Lee’s Mill. The work at which you stand

was designed to contest such an advance. However, no effort

was made, perhaps as a result of the report by Keyes after the

skirmish at Lee’s Mill. Keyes had sent scouts and then troops

along the Warwick and had received word of entrenchments

along its course. These entrenchments may have been enough

to keep McClellan from attempting a turning movement.

Further Reading Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 26.

18 Stop 4

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STOP 5 Dam No. 1

Directions Return to enterprise drive. Turn right and proceed 0.4 mile

to warwick boulevard (Route 60). Turn right onto warwick

boulevard, and proceed 0.7 mile to the off-ramp for Route

105 East (fort eustis boulevard). Take the off-ramp, merge

onto fort eustis boulevard and proceed 1.1 miles to jeffer-

son avenue (Route 143). Turn left onto jefferson avenue, and

proceed 0.2 mile to the entrance for Newport News Park on

your right. Turn into the park, taking advantage of the fa-

cilities at the visitor center just inside the park boundary if

you wish, and follow the signs for 1.0 mile to the Discovery

Center. Park there and proceed to the end of the bridge over

Dam No. 1. Face the water and the works beyond. If you wish,

take the White Oak Trail from the parking lot to see Union

earthworks built after the engagement.

Orientation You are looking across the Warwick River, now Lee Hall Res-

ervoir, at the Confederate defensive line from the point of the

Union advanced position at the dam. The dam itself is just to

your right, where both ends are visible. To your left the water

19 Dam No. 1

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would have been somewhat lower in 1862, although a dam

existed at Lee’s Mill.

What Happened On April 6, Brig. Gen. Winfield Hancock, commanding a bri-

gade in Baldy Smith’s division, conducted a reconnaissance

at this position, then held by the 14th Alabama. Hancock,

with the 6th Maine and 5th Wisconsin, drove in the Rebel

pickets and took some prisoners. He was ordered to stop,

however, as McClellan did not want to initiate any action un-

til he knew what he was up against. Both Hancock and Smith

thought they could have taken the works at Dam No. 1 at that

point, although Magruder soon reinforced the area.

Magruder considered Dam No. 1 to be the weakest point in

his line, and the Confederates worked to strengthen it. That

bothered McClellan, as such strengthening might interfere

with his efforts to construct siege works. McClellan decided

the Confederate efforts should be stopped, and he ordered

Smith to do so, adding that no general engagement should

be brought on. Smith sent some artillery and Brooks’s Ver-

mont brigade to do the job. The skirmishers from the 3rd and

4th Vermont and two guns silenced the Southerners (one gun

and pickets from the 15th North Carolina).

Once the fire stopped, Lt. E. M. Noyes of Brooks’s staff

crossed the river below the dam, getting within 50 yards

of the Confederate works without being discovered. When

he reported the results of his scout, Smith asked McClel-

lan (who was on the field) if he could move a force across

the river. McClellan agreed, and Smith ordered part of the

3rd Vermont across the river to examine whether the works

could be taken. Four companies crossed, gained the rifle pits

on the other side, and forced the Tar Heels away from the

forward works. Their ammunition got wet during the cross-

ing, however. The soldier who was to wave a handkerchief

(which would have triggered reinforcements) was mortally

wounded crossing the river, and although others in the de-

tachment did what they could, they failed to get anyone’s

attention on the Union side of the river. The commander of

the detachment then sent a courier, who failed to find any

general. No reinforcements came.

What did come was a Confederate counterattack. The 15th

North Carolina, along with the 7th, 8th, and 16th Georgia

and part of the 2nd Louisiana, advanced on the Vermonters.

The Yankees withdrew back across the river. Later, three com-

panies of the 4th Vermont and four companies of the 6th

Vermont attempted to cross the river, the 4th at the dam and

the 6th below it, but the newly arrived Rebels stopped both

advances before they could cross the river. Smith’s men kept

20 Stop 5

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their positions near the dam, however, until the end of the

siege.

Analysis Smith’s April 6 movement was fortunate and unfortunate. It

was fortunate because it hit the point Magruder thought his

weakest, and in fact Hancock found it so. The Yankees had

the advantage of terrain, with the ground on the Union side

commanding the ground on the Confederate side. Smith’s

move was unfortunate because McClellan didn’t want any en-

gagement, so the movement was stopped before it was fairly

started, and that gave Magruder time to strengthen the area.

Magruder used the 10 days well, and in fact brought the

April 16 action on through his own activities. Still, Mc-

Clellan did not want a general engagement, as he was intent

on the siege. The result of this fact was a bungled operation

on April 16. The first part, which was intended to force Con-

federates to cease work, went well. The second part, Noyes’s

reconnaissance, went even better, as he seemed to find a

true opportunity. Instead of taking immediate action on

the chance that the opportunity indeed was genuine, how-

ever, the Yankees only put four companies across the river

to reconnoiter. That gave the Southerners time to counterat-

tack. Moreover, even if the four Vermont companies had had

functional ammunition it is hard to see how they could have

stayed on the Rebel side of the river. The ultimate blame for

the 165 casualties suffered by Brooks’s men (including 83 in

the 3rd Vermont) must go to McClellan, for allowing a re-

connaissance that was doomed to failure. He thought the op-

eration was a success, however, because he gained positions

from which he could ensure that the Confederates would

not cross their own dam to attack him. The Confederates lost

about 75 men in the engagement.

Vignette Smith was at Keyes’s headquarters on April 6, informing his

corps commander that he had ordered Hancock forward,

when the order from McClellan forbidding any engagement

was received. “Very much chagrined,” Smith had to order

Hancock back to camp. He later wrote that except for that

order, “there would have been no siege of Yorktown in 1862.”

Further Reading Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 116–18;

Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 42– 43, 55–56.

Further Exploration Newport News Park offers an extensive series of trails, many

of which include Civil War earthworks. To cross to the Con-

federate side of the river, simply cross the bridge in front of

you. The Twin Forts loop, reached by following the left fork af-

21 Dam No. 1

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ter you cross the bridge, is less than a mile in length. You can

see more fortifications by taking the right fork at the bridge.

Another trail, substantially longer, leads to the Wynn’s Mill

loop. A trail map is available at the visitor center.

22 Stop 5

A tempting breastwork. blcw 2:196

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STOP 6 The Lines at Yorktown

Directions Return through the park to jefferson avenue (Route 143).

Turn left and proceed 0.3 mile on jefferson avenue to fort

eustis boulevard (Route 105). Turn left and proceed on fort

eustis boulevard 3.6 miles to its intersection with george

washington memorial highway (Route 17). Turn left on Route

17, and proceed 0.6 mile to cook road (Route 704). Turn right

on cook road, and proceed 2.3 miles to ballard street. Turn

left, then immediately right following the sign to the York-

town Visitor Center. Park in the parking area, and walk to any

of the earthworks that were on your right as you drove to the

visitor center. Face south, away from the visitor center.

Orientation You are in the works first built by Charles Lord Cornwallis in

1781 and reworked by John Magruder in 1861– 62. The Con-

federate works protecting Yorktown extended to your left,

right, and right rear. The rest of the Rebel line ran farther to

your right. The Union lines were straight ahead and to your

right front, nearly one mile in front of you. Gloucester Point

is across the York River to your left.

23 The Lines at Yorktown

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What Happened When Magruder took command on the Peninsula in 1861 he

began to fortify Yorktown, at which point the York River nar-

rows to less than one mile in width. Using the remnants of

the British fortifications from 1781, he built earthworks to

protect Yorktown from land assault and water batteries to

prevent Union vessels from moving up the York. At the same

time, he had a water battery and earthworks built across the

river at Gloucester Point.

As 1861 passed into 1862, Magruder worked on a defensive

line from Yorktown to the James River. By the time McClel-

lan began his advance in April, the fortifications at Yorktown

had become much stronger than they had been in 1781. The

earthworks stretching to the west were in various states of

repair.

McClellan’s right-hand column approached these defenses

by the road from Hampton to Yorktown on April 5. The ad-

vance, Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter’s division, was stopped by

fire from the fortifications and a series of earthworks to the

west. McClellan that day ordered siege operations to begin,

and the Federals built their own works and approaches, in-

cluding batteries for siege guns. The Confederates readied

themselves as best they could for the bombardment they

knew would come. Joe Johnston, commanding those Confed-

erates, knew the Union superiority in artillery would put

Yorktown, Gloucester Point, and the entire defensive line

in danger, so on the night of May 3– 4—two days before Mc-

Clellan planned to open fire with his siege guns—the Rebels

abandoned their works and marched up the Peninsula.

Analysis Magruder followed the general line of the British works, in

many cases using their remnants, because he was protecting

Yorktown from a land attack on the water batteries he set up

to block the York River. Those lines were never designed to

protect the Peninsula against a Yankee advance. That’s why

most of the line at Yorktown proper was parallel to both the

river and the Union line of advance.

Magruder realized that such a position would not protect

against a broad advance, and his construction of the War-

wick River line, though haphazard, at least allowed for a de-

fensible line. It probably would not have held against a deter-

mined Union assault in April, although the line of advance

against Yorktown proper would have run into stiff opposi-

tion from the works here and to your right. McClellan’s deci-

sion to stop his advance and start siege operations stemmed

not from the level of resistance but from the fact that his

expectations were not fulfilled.

24 Stop 6

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All Confederates realized, however, that the Union ad-

vantage in ordnance would tell in a siege, particularly be-

cause the Union batteries were well placed and inaccessible

to Southern sorties. Johnston never planned to try to defend

the works; instead, he used whatever time McClellan would

give him to strengthen his army. Once the Yankees guns were

ready—signaled by the opening of Federal Battery No. 1 on

April 30—Johnston knew the time to leave was nigh.

Further Reading Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 88–91;

Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 59– 62.

Further Exploration The National Park Service has prepared a brochure describ-

ing the Civil War sites on its main (Revolutionary War) battle-

field tour of Yorktown. If you have time, pick up the brochure

at the Yorktown Visitor Center to see more of the siege area,

as well as the site of the climactic engagement of the Ameri-

can Revolution. For further discussion of other Civil War

sites in Yorktown, see Dr. Thomas Adrian Wheat, A Guide to

Civil War Yorktown (Knoxville tn: Bohemian Brigade Bookshop

and Publishers, 1997).

Optional Excursion If you wish, you may see the site of the batteries at Glouces-

ter Point across the York River. To do so, go straight onto the

Colonial National Historical Parkway from the parking lot

at the Yorktown Visitor Center. Proceed 0.6 mile on the park-

way to the off-ramp for the george washington memorial

highway (Route 17 North). At the end of the off-ramp turn

left and proceed across the toll bridge 0.9 mile to lafayette

heights drive, which is the first stoplight after the river.

Turn left and proceed on lafayette heights drive about 0.2

mile to river view street. Turn left and then immediately left

again onto battery drive, which bears right and becomes

vernon street. Proceed about 0.3 mile to Tyndall’s Point Park

on your right. Park, walk to the Civil War Trails marker facing

the earthworks, and turn to optional excursion 3, Gloucester

Point.

25 The Lines at Yorktown

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STOP 7 Hancock’s Fight

Directions Return to your car. Leave the parking area, and proceed straight

onto the colonial national historical parkway. Continue on

the parkway 9.2 miles until you reach an overlook on your

left, next to Jones Pond. Turn into the overlook. A sign there

details how Lt. George Custer led Hancock’s first contingent

of men across the dam here. Get out of your car, and face

the pond.

Orientation You are standing at the crossing point for Hancock’s men as

they moved to flank the Confederate left at Williamsburg.

The parkway crosses the pond on the historical dam. Just

ahead of you on the hill across the pond is Redoubt 14, the

left-most redoubt of Magruder’s Williamsburg line. About

half a mile farther down the parkway is Redoubt 11, which

occupied the crest of a hill overlooking Williamsburg and

from which the Rebel line could be turned. These redoubts

were part of the left flank of a line that stretched from Tut-

ters Mill Pond near the James River to the mouth of Queens

Creek to your right rear.

26 Stop 7

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What Happened While parts of the two armies clashed just east of Williams-

burg, a local slave revealed to Union commanders that re-

doubts 11 and 14 were unoccupied. Baldy Smith recognized

the potential for flanking the Rebels, and he talked Brig.

Gen. Edwin Sumner, the II Corps commander and de facto

Union commander at Williamsburg, into ordering several

regiments to take Redoubt 14. Smith then selected Hancock

to command the detachment, which consisted of the 6th and

7th Maine, 33rd New York, 49th Pennsylvania, and 5th Wis-

consin, plus two batteries of artillery.

Hancock marched across the dam next to the overlook,

occupied Redoubt 14, then advanced to Redoubt 11, which

overlooked the rest of the Confederate line. He placed artil-

lery in advance of the redoubt, with half the 5th Wisconsin

deployed as skirmishers and half supporting artillery. The 6th

Maine and 49th Pennsylvania took positions to the redoubt’s

left. The 7th Maine protected Hancock’s right flank. The por-

tion of the 33rd New York not holding the redoubts acted as

skirmishers in the woods on Hancock’s right front.

Sumner, concerned about his left, ordered Hancock back

about the same time that Hancock asked for reinforcements

to secure his flanks. Hancock protested Sumner’s order, as

did Smith, but Sumner was firm, and Hancock reluctantly

made ready to retire.

Meanwhile, his artillery had been bombarding the Confed-

erate works. Longstreet had recalled D. H. Hill’s division, and

Jubal Early, commanding one of Hill’s brigades, was resting

on the campus of the College of William and Mary at the west

edge of Williamsburg. Early marched his men to a field north

of Fort Magruder. As he listened impatiently to the sound of

Hancock’s guns, Early formed a plan to take what he thought

was the unsupported Yankee artillery. He talked Hill into it,

and Hill then got Longstreet and Johnston to approve it. Long-

street told Hill to proceed with caution, since no one knew

exactly what forces accompanied the artillery.

As Early’s brigade moved through the dense woods and

underbrush below the guns’ position, the regiments became

separated. When Early and his old regiment, the 24th Vir-

ginia, emerged from the woods, he saw he had miscalculated

by bringing his men into line too far to his right. Wheeling

the 24th Virginia into a wheat field, Early led its charge, but

he was wounded almost instantly. The Virginians continued

the attack and forced the Federals back to Redoubt 11. The

5th North Carolina, on the same maneuver, came out of the

woods even farther from the Union line, and it too wheeled

to the left to connect with the 24th Virginia. The 23rd North

Carolina and 38th Virginia, Early’s other regiments, could not

27 Hancock’s Fight

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make it through the woods to provide support, and although

the two charging regiments made it to a fence within 70

yards of the Yankees, they were decimated by Hancock’s su-

perior numbers. Hill then withdrew Early’s men, and Hancock

countercharged to clear the field of Confederates.

Analysis Sumner, known in the army as a straight-ahead fighter, had

no strategic vision—at least, not on this field. Smith and

Hancock had that vision, and vigorous support from Sumner

would have given Smith’s division a chance to roll up the

Confederate line from north to south.

This possibility was the result of Longstreet’s lack of knowl-

edge of the extent of the earthworks Magruder had built as

well as the mist and rain on May 5, which prevented Long-

street from seeing those works (including redoubts 11 and 14).

Johnston had sent Magruder’s force off as the leading unit of his

retreat, including McLaws’s men holding the redoubts. When

McLaws left the redoubts around midnight, no one took his

place. Apparently, no one thought to leave information with

Longstreet or Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, Longstreet’s desig-

nee as field commander, about the ground on which he was

to position his force. Without that information Longstreet and

Anderson left their left wide open.

Hancock didn’t take better advantage of that fact because

Sumner lacked the will to reinforce him. In fact, Hancock

delayed obeying the order to retire by sending numerous

staff officers to plead with Sumner to cancel the order and

reinforce him. He knew one brigade might have been able

to accomplish something, but it might also be cut up. One

division, on the other hand, would stand a good chance of

routing Longstreet.

The Confederate failure to occupy these redoubts was ex-

acerbated by the Rebel response to Hancock’s appearance.

Early, perhaps spoiling to get into a fight, formed a plan with

no knowledge of the true situation. His superiors acted in the

same ignorance. Early then ignored Longstreet’s proviso to pro-

ceed with caution; instead he advanced without either a re-

connaissance or regard for position and suffered heavy losses

in two regiments as a result. Only a combination of circum-

stances kept Hancock from turning his countercharge into a

full-fledged counterattack to finish what he had wanted to

start. Early lost about 450 men out of 1,000 engaged in his

ill-advised 20-minute charge (including 260 men of the 415

in the 5th North Carolina). Hancock’s casualties amounted

to a mere 120.

28 Stop 7

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Further Reading Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 139– 45;

Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 73–74, 78– 81.

29 Hancock’s Fight

Major-General Winfield

S. Hancock. From a

photograph. blcw 3:286

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STOP 8 Fort Magruder

Directions Return to your car. Proceed west, toward Williamsburg. Proceed

on the parkway 1.9 miles to the exit for Queens Lake. Turn

right onto the off-ramp, then right on what becomes hubbard

lane. Proceed 1.0 mile until hubbard lane intersects with pen-

niman road. Turn left onto penniman road, and proceed 0.4

mile to its intersection with queens creek road. Pull into

the grass parking area on the right at Fort Magruder across

from the church. At the time this was written the remains

of the fort are fenced off from public access, but plans are in

place to restore the site and open it to the public. Face along

penniman road in the same direction you were driving.

Orientation You are next to what remains of Fort Magruder, the keystone

of the Confederate line. Redoubts 3, 4, and 5 were to your

right, and redoubts 7 through 14 were to your left rear. The

1862 intersection of the Yorktown and Hampton (or Great

Warwick) roads, the intersection that made Fort Magruder

important, lies just ahead of you. The old city of Williams-

burg is to your right rear. The Federals approached the posi-

30 Stop 8

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tion on Hampton Road, which at this point follows Penni-

man Road.

It is difficult to visualize the open fields and woods the

combatants encountered around Fort Magruder given the en-

croachment of urban development from modern Williams-

burg. Try to imagine the area in front of you cleared to create

fields of fire for the cannon and muskets in this earthwork.

It is also a bit difficult to envision Fort Magruder itself. Only

the southern bastion remains—about one quarter of what

was a very large earthen fort built around the intersection

of Penniman Road (then Williamsburg Road) and Queens

Creek Road.

What Happened Fort Magruder, constructed in the winter of 1861– 62, held the

most important point of any in Magruder’s third and last line

of defense on the lower Peninsula, the Williamsburg line. It

commanded the intersection of the Yorktown and Hampton

roads. On May 4 McLaws had occupied the fort in addition

to the redoubts on either side after Brig. Gen. James Ewell

Brown Stuart’s cavalry troopers were cut off by advancing

Yankee cavalry. McLaws’s troops skirmished with that cavalry

and held the line of earthworks. That night, McLaws pulled

out, and Longstreet put two brigades, those of R. H. Anderson

and Brig. Gen. Roger Pryor, into line, with his other brigades

in reserve. Anderson, in overall command of the line, put his

own brigade (eventually commanded by Col. Micah Jenkins)

into the fort, redoubts 5 and 7, and intervening rifle pits.

Pryor was spread out to Jenkins’s right in redoubts 1 through

4. Several pieces of artillery also were posted in the fort.

Early the next morning, Joe Hooker approached this area

with his division and pushed in the Confederate pickets. Ar-

tillery and infantry from the fort opened on his lead units.

This fire continued all day with varying intensity. No Yankee

assault seriously threatened the fort, leaving the Confeder-

ates to fire on those moving to the right. Later, when Hooker’s

men had to retreat before a Confederate counterattack, Fort

Magruder’s guns added their enfilading fire. Only nightfall

stopped the fire from the fort.

Analysis Magruder’s third line (the first was the Bethel–Young’s Mill

series of positions, and the second was his main line on the

Warwick River) was in a sense his strongest. It was the short-

est, covering only about three miles due to its placement at

the Peninsula’s narrowest point, and there were few good

approaches. The two main roads, from Yorktown and Hamp-

ton via Lee’s Mill, converged before they reached Williams-

burg, and only a few other roads (including the one along

31 Fort Magruder

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which redoubts 11 and 14 were built) led to Williamsburg.

It is interesting to speculate on how long such a line, with

water batteries covering the rivers, could have held if it had

been defended by an entire army—say, the Army of Northern

Virginia.

However, the Confederates in fact almost lost this line to

Union cavalry on May 4 because it was not garrisoned, and

they had on May 5 a force large enough only to slow the

Yankees without stopping them completely. Fort Magruder

was still the key in this delaying action. Loss of control of

the main road into Williamsburg could have led to a faster

Union pursuit (and that pursuit already had been a bit faster

than Johnston apparently expected), putting the main army in

danger. The fort’s field of fire allowed it to support the other

redoubts, and its obvious strength kept Federal advances

(particularly by Brig. Gen. John Peck’s brigade) from progress-

ing far. Jenkins, in charge of the fort’s defense, operated well

in his supporting role.

Further Reading Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 138–39;

Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 70–72.

32 Stop 8

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STOP 9 Hooker’s Fight

Directions Return to your car and to penniman road. Turn left onto pen-

niman road, and proceed 0.6 mile to its intersection with

Route 143. Turn right on Route 143, which turns into 2nd

street (Route 162). Proceed on 2nd street 1.1 miles to its in-

tersection with page street (Route 60). Turn left, cross the rail-

road tracks, and in 0.2 mile bear left onto york street (Route

60). Follow Route 60 East (which becomes pocahontas trail)

to the Fort Magruder Hotel and Conference Center. Turn right

into the parking lot. Park and walk through the hotel to the

courtyard in its rear. Enter the earthworks preserved there,

and face the hotel.

Orientation You are in what remains of Redoubt 3 of the Confederate

line. Redoubts 1 and 2 are to your right, and the remains

of Fort Magruder are out of sight to your left front. The old

city of Williamsburg is to your left rear. Hooker approached

on Hampton Road, which crossed modern Route 60 to your

right front and continued on to become what is now Penni-

man Road. As at Fort Magruder, it takes some imagination

33 Hooker’s Fight

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to visualize the terrain at the time of the battle— open fields

and woods along small streams.

What Happened This redoubt, along with redoubts 1, 2, and 4, was held on the

morning of May 5 by Pryor’s brigade. Hooker approached this

area with his division early that morning. Reconnoitering

the area, Hooker found the works, with nearly half a mile of

cleared terrain in front of them. Losing no time, he ordered

his lead brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover, to

advance, and he put first one, then another battery into ac-

tion. Meanwhile, Hooker extended his line to the south with

Brig. Gen. Francis Patterson’s New Jersey brigade. His men,

however, stopped before assaulting Fort Magruder or the rest

of the earthworks.

Meanwhile, Anderson organized an attack of his own. Call-

ing on Brig. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox’s brigade, Anderson directed

it to his right. Wilcox’s 19th Mississippi advanced first, then

the 9th and 10th Alabama fell into line on either flank. They

engaged with Patterson’s men and the Excelsior Brigade’s

New Yorkers, usually commanded by Brig. Gen. Daniel Sick-

les but at this fight led by Col. Nelson Taylor. Confederate re-

inforcements, including Brig. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill’s brigade,

part of Pryor’s, and all of Brig. Gen. George Pickett’s, went into

battle from the area around Redoubt 3.

As Hooker realized his situation, he called for reinforce-

ments to strengthen his left—which by then was an un-

equal contest, four Rebel brigades against his two. Sumner,

however, refused any reinforcements from his area. Hooker

would need to rely on Phil Kearny’s division, which was on

Lee’s Mill Road several miles behind Hooker, to strengthen

his left—if the Confederates let him.

Eventually, the weight of numbers told, and the Southern-

ers pushed Hooker’s men past Hampton Road and captured

the artillery. More artillery on the road stopped the Rebels,

while Heintzelman rallied the Federals by having regimental

bands play, and Peck’s brigade of Brig. Gen. Darius Couch’s di-

vision reinforced Hooker’s right. Kearny arrived just in time

after a hard march in the rain and counterattacked with

his exhausted men. They pushed the Confederates, many of

whom were low on ammunition, away from the road and

the six Yankee guns still there (the Rebels had dragged off

four others). The rainy day came to an end with the lines

essentially where they had been at the start of the fighting,

although firefights lasted into the evening. The Confederates

withdrew from their lines and continued their retreat that

night.

34 Stop 9

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Analysis Hooker seldom shied away from a fight, but he was care-

ful in reconnoitering the ground first and did not launch a

heavy attack. His men fought hard against superior numbers,

particularly in the Confederate assault, but were giving way.

Without timely arrivals by Peck and Kearny the Union line

would have been in serious trouble.

The Confederate command structure was a bit strange.

Johnston was on the field but demurred to Longstreet, who in

turn assigned responsibility for operations to Anderson. Wil-

cox, in command of the brigade first selected for the coun-

terattack, asked for reinforcements, but other commanders

waited for orders from Anderson or Longstreet before fully com-

mitting their men.

However, the day’s truly strange behavior belonged

to Sumner. In command of this part of the army, Sumner

seemed paralyzed. He could think only of protecting his

center—a reasonable thought if any threat had been made

there. However, the threat was on his left (and opportunity lay

on his right). He noted in his report that he did not have many

troops until Peck’s men arrived, but he could have hurried

them up the night before, or earlier on the 5th. Depending on

estimates, between 25,000 and 40,000 Federals were within

easy supporting distance of Hooker’s division that morning.

Casualties in this part of the battle of Williamsburg were

much more heavy for the Union than in Hancock’s area.

Hooker, as might be expected, was particularly hard hit.

Taylor’s brigade suffered 772 casualties, Patterson’s 527, and

Grover’s 253. Kearny, in brief work, lost 417 men. Peck’s ca-

sualty total was 127. The Confederates lost more than 1,000

men in the area themselves, including more than 300 in A. P.

Hill’s brigade and nearly 250 in Wilcox’s brigade.

Vignette The first battery of Hooker’s division to go into action was

Battery H, 1st U.S. Artillery. This battery had been at Fort

Sumter, but Williamsburg was its first action in the field.

Maj. Charles Wainwright, Hooker’s chief of artillery, watched

as two officers and two men were shot while the battery po-

sitioned itself. Seeing this, many of the men ran from the

guns as Wainwright and Capt. Charles Webber, the battery’s

commander, tried without success to rally them. “Never in

my life was I so mortified, never so excited, never so mad,”

Wainwright wrote in his journal. Near him was Battery D, 1st

New York Artillery, his old command. He appealed to the New

Yorkers, and they responded by running to man four of the

six guns. Webber turned some of his men around to work the

other two, and the battery opened fire.

35 Hooker’s Fight

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Further Reading Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 137– 40,

143; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 70–78.

Further Exploration At the time this was written a park was being planned that

will include redoubts 1 and 2 of the Confederate line. These

redoubts had no part in the battle, but they are good exam-

ples of the earthworks built by Magruder. To view them turn

left onto Route 60 from the Radisson Fort Magruder Hotel and

Conference Center. Proceed to its intersection with quarter-

path road (Route 637). Turn left and proceed on quarter-path

road to the sign for the park, which at this writing is ten-

tatively named Redoubt Park, on your right. Turn into the

parking area, and follow the signs to the redoubts.

Optional Excursion If you wish to see Drewry’s Bluff, the site from which Con-

federates denied the Union navy an easy route to Richmond

and thus changed the nature of the campaign (and if you are

headed back to Richmond it is well worth the small detour),

you have several routes from which to choose. The most sce-

nic is Route 5, which is called River Road closer to Richmond.

To proceed via this route, return to your car and return to

Route 60. Turn right and proceed 1.1 miles down Route 60 to

its intersection with Route 199. Bear right on the off-ramp to

Route 199 West, merge onto Route 199, and proceed 4.5 miles

to its intersection with john tyler memorial highway (Route

5 West). Turn left onto Route 5, and proceed 45.1 miles to its

junction with labernum avenue. Take the off-ramp that leads

to Route 895, the pocahontas parkway (which is a toll road),

and then in 0.5 mile take the on-ramp for Route 895 West.

Proceed on Route 895 3.3 miles to its intersection with Route

1/301. Take the off-ramp for Route 1/301 south, and proceed on

Route 1/301 2.5 miles to bellwood road (Route 656). Turn left

onto bellwood road, and proceed 0.5 mile to fort darling

road. Turn left onto fort darling road, proceed 0.4 mile to the

Drewry’s Bluff unit of Richmond National Battlefield Park,

park in the parking area, walk to a point among the earth-

works from which you can see the river, and turn to Optional

Excursion 5, Drewry’s Bluff, in this guide.

The quickest route to Drewry’s Bluff is via Interstate 64.

To proceed via this route, return to your car and to Route 60.

Turn right on Route 60, and proceed about 1.0 mile to Route

199. Take the off-ramp for Route 199 East, and proceed on

Route 199 about 1.0 mile to its junction with Interstate 64.

Take the off-ramp for Interstate 64 West, and proceed on Inter-

state 64 to its junction with Interstate 295 (exit 200). Take the

off-ramp for Interstate 295 South, and proceed to its junction

36 Stop 9

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with the pocahontas parkway (Route 895). Take the off-ramp

for Route 895, and proceed west. You will reach Route 895’s

junction with Route 5 in 4 miles. From there, follow the di-

rections above to Drewry’s Bluff.

37 Hooker’s Fight

Uniform of non-commis-

sioned officer of the

1st New York, Berry’s

Brigade, Kearny’s

Division, 3rd Corps.

blcw 2:399

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OPTIONAL EXCURSION 1—FORT MONROE

Orientation Face the Casemate Museum. You are looking at the Civil

War–era fort and the heart of a still-active military installa-

tion. As the time this guide was written the fort was sched-

uled to be closed, but that may not occur for several years.

In any case, it is quite likely that the Civil War–era fort will

remain open to the public after the base’s closure.

What Happened Construction of Fort Monroe, the largest fort in the United

States during the Civil War, was begun in 1819 and finished

in 1834. Several prominent soldiers were posted there in the

antebellum years, including Joseph Johnston and Robert E.

Lee. At the war’s beginning many coastal forts were seized

by Southerners, but Fort Monroe’s strength prevented any at-

tempt being made on it. That enabled the fort—commanding

Hampton Roads, the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, and the

mouths of the York and James rivers—to both shut those wa-

terways to Confederate shipping and become a base of op-

erations for Union forces coming to the Peninsula by water

or land.

38 Optional Excursion 1

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McClellan used the fort as the primary disembarkation

point for the Army of the Potomac in March 1862. Troops

camped around the fort until all was ready for the move up

the Peninsula. McClellan communicated through Fort Mon-

roe to Washington throughout the campaign, and it was

from Fort Monroe that the last of the army left the Peninsula

in Au gust after the campaign’s failure to take Richmond. It

would be 1864 before a substantial army used Fort Monroe

as a starting point for a campaign against the Confederate

capital.

Analysis Fort Monroe’s great strength was necessary, as it commanded

one of the most important areas of the antebellum U.S. coast.

The Hampton Roads area is the gateway to Washington,

Baltimore, and Annapolis, Maryland, as well as Richmond.

After war started the area became even more important, as

Chesapeake Bay offered many places for blockade runners to

hide. But once the garrison at Fort Monroe was reinforced, it

would have been suicidal to attack the fort, located as it was

on a small neck of land called Old Point Comfort.

McClellan considered the fort a possible base of operations

but was concerned about the css Virginia’s ability to run ram-

pant among the transports as they were unloading soldiers

and supplies. Once assured of the Monitor’s ability to stop her

adversary, and getting intelligence that the Virginia would

be unlikely to try to pass the guns at Fort Monroe, McClellan

could proceed with confidence to the Peninsula.

The fort’s command of the mouths of the James and York

rivers kept the Virginia based in Norfolk, where she had been

constructed. Once Johnston retreated and Norfolk was given

up, the ironclad had no place to go, for it could not chance

running past the fort’s guns, and its deep draft kept it from

retreating up the James River. The ship’s scuttling allowed

McClellan to use the James as a supply line, although he did

not take advantage of that opportunity until after the Seven

Days. The fort served as a safety net for McClellan, secure in

the knowledge that he could always retreat down the Pen-

insula to it in the event of disaster. It was not disaster but

orders, however, sent by Halleck in the face of Lee’s move to

confront Pope in northern Virginia after the Seven Days, that

brought the Army of the Potomac back to Fort Monroe in Au-

gust 1862. The wisdom of those orders is debatable, but the

reality was the Peninsula Campaign was over. Fort Monroe

thus was the beginning and ending point for the campaign.

Vignette Virginia agricultural innovator and fire-breathing secession-

ist Edmund Ruffin, in Norfolk in March 1862, recorded in his

39 Fort Monroe

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diary his impressions of the Army of the Potomac’s landing at

Fort Monroe: “It was impossible to count the vessels, though

aided by a glass.”

Further Reading Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 18–20, 27–28.

Further Exploration If you have time, be sure to tour the Casemate Museum,

where Jefferson Davis was held after his capture in 1865, and

see more of Fort Monroe by walking the grounds and driving

around the inside of the fort.

To Return to Return via the Civil War–era fort’s main gate to ingalls road.

the Main Tour Turn left on ingalls road, then in 0.1 mile right on fenwick

road. In 0.2 mile, turn right on mcnair drive. In 0.7 mile you

will reach the modern main gate. Bear left, returning the way

you came, onto mellen street. Proceed 0.7 mile on mellen

street, then turn left onto mallory street. Proceed 0.3 mile

to the on-ramp for Interstate 64 West. Turn right onto the on-

ramp, merge onto Interstate 64, and proceed to exit 256. Take

the off-ramp for Route 171 West. Once on Route 171 (oyster

point road), proceed 2.1 miles to its intersection with war-

wick boulevard (Route 60). Turn right onto warwick boule-

vard, and proceed 0.4 mile until you can make a legal U-turn.

Do so and proceed south on warwick boulevard 0.2 mile to

old grist mill lane. Turn right, then turn into the parking

area, and open to stop 2, Young’s Mill, in this guide.

40 Optional Excusion 1

Sally-port, Fort Monroe.

From a war-time

photograph. blcw 2:145

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OPTIONAL EXCURSION 2—WARWICK COURT HOUSE

Orientation From the parking area, the 1810 Warwick Court House is on

your left. Facing the courthouse, you are also facing in the

same direction as advancing Union soldiers on April 5. Lee’s

Mill and the main Confederate defensive lines were straight

ahead on Warwick Boulevard.

What Happened Erasmus Keyes occupied this building on April 5 as his IV

Corps advanced up the road from Young’s Mill. The court-

house was looted by the soldiers, and Keyes used it as his

headquarters. On April 10, Prof. Thaddeus Lowe set up a

camp for his men and the observation balloon Constitution,

which made ascents from here during the rest of the siege.

Analysis Because McClellan selected Fitz John Porter to run the siege,

Keyes’s role was somewhat limited, although the major ac-

tion of the siege, the fight at Dam No. 1, was initiated by his

troops. The importance and interest of Warwick Court House

lies more in its role as a staging area for Lowe’s Constitution,

41 Warwick Court House

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one of the first balloons used for observation during warfare

by the United States.

Balloons had been used during battle during the French

Revolution, but not in the Western hemisphere. In early

1861, however, several men approached the War Department

with plans for military use of balloons. After a protracted

political struggle, Thaddeus Lowe, an experienced aeronaut

with political and scientific connections (including with the

young Smithsonian Institution), was given an official posi-

tion with the army (first the Topographic Engineers, then

with the Quartermaster Department).

Lowe’s first efforts occurred near the Potomac in observa-

tion of Johnston’s works at Manassas. Lowe came to the Penin-

sula in March 1862. A large balloon, the Intrepid, was the first

Lowe used (on April 5) and was based near Yorktown. Constitu-

tion, a smaller balloon, was brought by McClellan’s orders to

Keyes’s headquarters five days later.

Both balloons were used daily by Lowe, generals, and en-

gineering officers to observe the Rebel earthworks, troop

movements, and the ground itself for mapping purposes.

Telegraphs often were used in the balloons in attempts to

communicate information. Confederates tried to shoot down

the balloons with artillery but never succeeded. They did,

however, raise their own balloon from Lee Hall. In a strange

coincidence, Fitz John Porter and the Confederate aeronaut,

John Bryan, were each in their side’s balloon, alone, when

their balloons broke loose from their single tether ropes, put-

ting each man in danger of drifting into the enemy’s line.

Neither did; Porter eventually got back into the saddle, so

to speak, but Bryan never did. Lt. George A. Custer, on Baldy

Smith’s staff, used Constitution to ascend over Warwick Court

House.

Lowe’s final ascent from Warwick Court House came on

May 3. On the morning of May 4 he lifted off from his other

base near Yorktown to confirm that the Confederates had

evacuated their lines. Eventually, the balloons moved nearer

to Richmond with the army and were used until the change

of base to the James River during the Seven Days. Confeder-

ates used their balloon until July 4, when it was captured

(Maj. E. P. Alexander, in the gondola that day, barely escaped

the same fate). Lowe continued operating with the army until

after the battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863.

Balloons were less effective than you might think. The

aeronauts sometimes found it difficult to see details of enemy

positions through the trees, and they needed military knowl-

edge to interpret what they did see. Communication was dif-

42 Optional Excursion 2

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ficult, as telegraph lines frequently broke during ascents.

However, commanders did gain some useful information.

Vignette McClellan was writing his wife when he heard of Porter’s ad-

venture. He termed it “a terrible scare.” After hearing that

Porter had been blown into Confederate lines, he saw Porter

himself walk into his office “just as cool as usual. . . . You

may rest assured of one thing: you won’t catch me in the

confounded balloon, nor will I allow any other generals to

go up in it.”

Further Reading Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 41, 54–55, 62, 125–26, 196,

216, 255, 278, 289, 342.

To Return to Return to grissom way, and turn right, and then immediately

the Main Tour turn left onto old courthouse road. Proceed on old court-

house road 0.2 miles to its intersection with warwick boule-

vard (Route 60). Turn left onto warwick boulevard, and proceed

2.8 miles to lee’s mill drive. Turn left, proceed 0.1 miles to

river’s ridge circle, and turn left. Proceed on river’s ridge

circle 0.3 mile to Lee’s Mill Park. Turn left into the parking

area, and turn to stop 3, Lee’s Mill, in this guide.

43 Warwick Court House

Professor Lowe’s military

balloon “Intrepid.” From a

photograph. blcw 2:321

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OPTIONAL EXCURSION 3—GLOUCESTER POINT

Orientation Straight ahead of you is the York River and Yorktown. Hamp-

ton Roads and Fort Monroe are to your left.

What Happened Gloucester Point was the site of some of the first shots of

the war in Virginia, when Confederate artillery outdueled

a Union steamer, the uss Yankee, on May 9, 1861. Magruder

built earthworks and a water battery at Gloucester Point to

complement the batteries at Yorktown, across the York River.

They were intended to stop any Yankee flanking moves up

the river. For months the batteries accomplished that goal.

When McClellan arrived on the Peninsula he planned to

have the I Corps, the last to arrive, land on the north bank

of the river and take the Gloucester Point defenses. However,

after McClellan settled into a siege and the I Corps was with-

held from him, the Gloucester Point defenses were safe until

late April. Then, on April 30, the Federals opened from Bat-

tery No. 1, on the south bank of the river. It soon became ob-

vious that the five 100-pound cannon and one 200-pounder

could blast the Confederate batteries into nothing.

44 Optional Excursion 3

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When Joe Johnston evacuated Yorktown on the night of

May 3– 4, he ordered the battery at Gloucester Point held for

a few hours longer in hopes of stalling any Yankee flanking

move up the York. The evacuation took place later that night,

and the York was open to McClellan.

Analysis As with the earthworks at Skiffes Creek, what happened

at Gloucester Point is less important than what did not.

Gloucester Point was never attacked by land during the siege

of Yorktown, at a time when McClellan had many thousands

of men to do the job. Although the water battery was pro-

tected by the earthworks here, it would have been relatively

easy for the Federals to capture.

McClellan’s initial plan in fact called for the point’s cap-

ture, by the I Corps, as part of his overall strategy of flank-

ing Confederate strong points. However, when Magruder’s

defense was stronger than McClellan expected, the Union

commander decided on a siege. Then, when Lincoln with-

held the I Corps to protect Washington, apparently McClel-

lan postponed using another force to take Gloucester Point

until late in April, when William Franklin’s division of the I

Corps arrived. That division was kept on board ships, ready

to launch an amphibious assault on the point, until early

May, when McClellan planned an assault on Magruder’s Pen-

insula line.

That plan was never implemented because of the Confeder-

ate withdrawal. Johnston’s decision to withdraw was hastened

by the opening of Battery No. 1 and the probability that its

fellow batteries would open soon. He knew his army could

not survive intact against such bombardment, so he got the

army ready and moved as soon as he could. He was also wor-

ried (appropriately) about Yankee advances along both rivers.

The Virginia could guard the James as long as the ironclad

was afloat, although once Norfolk was taken (a certainty af-

ter Johnston withdrew) she would need to be destroyed. The

Gloucester Point batteries could not hold the York as long as

the Virginia could hold the James, but they might give John-

ston enough time to meet any flanking force with at least

part of his army.

Further Reading Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 83, 130–

33; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 26, 31, 61.

To Return to Return to Vernon Street. Turn left and proceed to battery drive,

the Main Tour then turn right onto river view street, and proceed 0.2 mile

to lafayette heights drive. Turn right on lafayette heights

drive, and proceed 0.3 mile to its intersection with the George

45 Gloucester Point

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Washington Memorial Highway (Route 17). Turn right onto

Route 17, cross the river, and proceed a total of 1.9 miles on

Route 17 to its intersection with the Colonial National His-

torical Parkway. Turn right onto the on-ramp for the parkway,

and at the parkway turn right. Proceed 8.6 miles to the over-

look by Jones Mill Pond on your left. Turn into the overlook,

park, and turn to stop 7, Hancock’s Fight, in this guide.

46 Optional Excursion 3

Union mortar battery before Yorktown.

From a photograph. blcw 2:194

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OPTIONAL EXCURSION 4—DREWRY’S BLUFF

Orientation You are standing in Fort Darling as it was expanded after

1862. The James River below you flows from your left. Rich-

mond is to your left, about eight miles by river. The stretch of

the James River straight ahead is just under a mile in length,

after which the river twists and turns to your right front be-

fore emptying into Hampton Roads.

What Happened Even before the css Virginia was scuttled, Commander John

Rodgers and some of his ships, including the ironclad uss

Galena (not on the Monitor’s design), had safely passed by the

Confederate ship on their way up the James River. After the

Virginia passed into history, the Monitor herself and another

ironclad, the Naugatuck, joined the Galena and wooden gun-

boats Port Royal and Aroostook on their procession up the James.

The gunboats bombarded shore batteries as they passed, and

the Galena’s constant fire allowed the wooden boats to pass.

Rodgers was looking to engage the Southerners’ James River

gunboat squadron and then reach Richmond, perhaps even

to force its surrender.

47 Drewry’s Bluff

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Meanwhile, the Rebels were hastily improving the de-

fenses at Drewry’s Bluff, the last likely place for a stand be-

fore Richmond. Drewry’s Bluff was named for the family of

Au gustus Drewry, who owned the land and also was captain

of the Southside Heavy Artillery, which had been organized

in Janu ary as part of the 2nd Virginia Artillery. In March,

Drewry persuaded Robert E. Lee to build a battery (called Fort

Darling) on the bluff, which towered over a narrow spot in

the river, as another in a series of batteries along the James.

Three guns were emplaced there, and work continued off and

on until Johnston retreated from Yorktown, at which point

the bluff assumed a greater importance and gained priority.

Five more guns were taken from gunboats and mounted on

the bluff, and other cannon were placed at Chaffin’s Bluff

across the river and downstream from Drewry’s Bluff. Men

from all over, including more gunners from the 2nd Virginia

Artillery, two companies of Confederate marines, and men

from the scuttled Virginia, came to the bluff. There was little

cooperation among the commanders of these detachments,

but still work continued. A gunboat was sunk in the chan-

nel, and other obstructions were placed in the river to close

it to vessels of any substantial draft. Sharpshooters prepared

to pick off any working parties. The Yankees would have to

neutralize the artillery on the bluff so they could remove the

obstructions before proceeding to Richmond.

They began the attempt early on the morning of May 15.

Rodgers steered the Galena to within 600 yards of the bluff

and began firing at 7:45 a.m. The ironclad was already under

fire when she stopped. The Monitor steamed to within 400

yards of the obstructions, but she could not send out par-

ties to remove them because of the sharpshooters, and her

guns could not elevate enough to reach Fort Darling. She

then moved away from the obstructions and opened a de-

liberate fire. The Confederate guns caused as little damage

to her in May as the Virginia had caused in March, hitting

her only three times, but she was of little use to the Feder-

als. The Naugatuck stayed at longer range and suffered only

minor damage by her enemy, but her 100-pound rifled gun

burst, putting her out of the fight. The two wooden gunboats

stayed out of range and also contributed little.

Because of these events, the battle came down to the Con-

federates against the Galena. It was an unequal contest. The

ironclad’s fire killed seven and wounded eight. But the Reb-

els hit her 44 times, causing severe damage and briefly set-

ting her on fire. Just after 11 a.m. Rodgers signaled a retreat.

The Union navy’s attempt to seize Richmond had failed.

48 Optional Excursion 4

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Analysis The Confederates may have put too much stock in the Virgin-

ia’s ability to close the James River. As she moved relatively

slowly, she had to rely on firepower to stop any Union ships,

and another ironclad could draw her fire and then outrun

her, also allowing wooden gunboats past her. The Confeder-

ates’ James River squadron, by this time stationed upriver,

would provide the last waterborne defense against the Feder-

als, and some land-based batteries were built.

This seeming reliance on the Virginia, and disagreements

between the Confederate army and navy, led to relative ne-

glect of the position at Drewry’s Bluff, an almost-fatal defect.

Without obstructions in the river the Union ships could

have run the battery there. Without the battery they could

have removed obstructions at their leisure. Yet neither the

obstructions nor the guns were in place until after Norfolk

was abandoned. After the engagement the Confederates en-

sured that Drewry’s Bluff would remain strong, but the effort

would have been worth even more in April 1862.

The strength of the Drewry’s Bluff position was revealed

fully on May 15. The bluffs, reaching 100 feet or more above

the river, were too high for some ships (like the Monitor) to

reach with much effect. Yet any boat in the water was an

easy shot for the gunners on the bluff, and only a well-built

ironclad like the Monitor would withstand the blows. The

Galena was not that well built. She was a wooden gunboat

with iron bars and plates bolted to her sides, with boilerplate

inside. She could not stand up to the pounding the Southern-

ers gave her.

Rodgers called off the engagement, and the naval officers

eventually decided that Drewry’s Bluff could not be passed

without the army’s assistance. That assistance was not forth-

coming. Whether or not the gunboats could have forced

Richmond’s surrender or just caused a nuisance, the garri-

son at Drewry’s Bluff had given the beleaguered Confederacy

something to cheer about.

Vignette As the Union vessels retreated, the Confederate guns fell si-

lent. One, however, was cleaned, and William Clopton of the

gun’s crew said to Lt. Dickerson Wilson, “Let us give them

a parting salute.” Wilson agreed, and the gun was loaded

and fired. The shot fell short but ricocheted into a gunboat

thought to be the Naugatuck. As the men celebrated, Drewry

said, “Don’t a man leave for the quarter, for I want you to fix

up these parapets that have been knocked down, and those

sandbags torn to pieces, must be replaced and get ready

for them, for the boats will probably be back here again in

49 Drewry’s Bluff

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two hours.” Drewry was wrong, however; the boats never

returned.

Further Reading Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 156– 60;

Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 93–94.

50 Optional Excursion 4

Fort Darling, looking down the James. From a photograph. blcw 2:269

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The Peninsula Campaign, May 15–June 24, 1862

George McClellan’s plans seemingly were working well in the

middle of May 1862. Although the navy had not been able to

force its way past Drewry’s Bluff to Richmond, McDowell’s

I Corps had been reinforced and actually began its march

from Fredericksburg to Richmond.

Those plans changed as the result of Stonewall Jackson’s

campaign in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. Jackson de-

feated Union forces and advanced as far as Harper’s Ferry on

the Potomac. Lincoln, acting in effect as his own general-in-

chief, tried to capture Jackson’s force as it moved southward

again, and one of his pieces was McDowell’s corps. McDowell,

Fremont, and Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Banks failed to catch Jack-

son, and McDowell’s men were lost to McClellan.

Nonetheless, McClellan was in position to besiege Rich-

mond, although his army was split by the Chickahominy

River northeast of the capital. Heavy rains in late May, mak-

ing the Chickahominy difficult to cross, gave Johnston an

opportunity. He determined to take advantage by attacking

the two Union corps on the south bank of the river. But the

Confederates did not coordinate their assaults well, and Ed-

win Sumner’s Yankees used rickety bridges to cross the river

and aid their comrades. The Union line held, and late in the

day Johnston was severely wounded. Although more fighting

occurred the next day, nothing of consequence came of the

battle except that Davis chose to replace the wounded John-

ston as commander of the army with Robert E. Lee.

By this time, McClellan was convinced that the Confeder-

ates outnumbered him substantially, although the reality was

quite the reverse. Nonetheless, McClellan thought his siege

guns would be the great equalizer and allow him to pound

Richmond into submission. A more aggressive general than

Johnston, Lee decided that the only way to prevent this from

happening was to attack with his army. To help determine

the best way to do that, Lee sent J. E. B. Stuart and most of

his cavalry on a reconnaissance in force. Stuart, known as

“Jeb”, and his men rode completely around the Army of the

Potomac, giving Lee the information he needed and the South

a reason to cheer. Lee decided to bring Stonewall Jackson’s men

from the Valley to Richmond to join most of the Army of

Northern Virginia in an assault on McClellan’s right flank on

the north bank of the Chickahominy. That flank, only one

corps strong after Seven Pines, was commanded by Fitz John

Porter, who had a series of strong positions but no anchor for

his right. Porter’s corps covered McClellan’s supply line from

White House (owned by one of Lee’s sons) on the Pamunkey

N4084.indb 51N4084.indb 51 1/15/07 10:09:15 AM1/15/07 10:09:15 AM

River to the main forward depot at Savage Station between

the Chickahominy and Richmond. If Lee could accomplish his

objective, McClellan would need to retreat from the gates of

Richmond to maintain his supply line. As Jackson moved his

men toward Richmond, Lee readied his men for the most cru-

cial engagement yet in the Confederacy’s brief history.

52 The Peninsula Campaign

Confederate retreat through Mechanicsville before the advance of McClellan’s

artillery, May 24th. From a war-time sketch. blcw 2:322

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N4084.indb 54N4084.indb 54 1/15/07 10:09:16 AM1/15/07 10:09:16 AM

Richmond National Battlefield Park Visitor Centers

Richmond National Battlefield Park covers not merely the

Seven Days Battles but also part of the 1864 contest between

Grant and Lee, including the battle of Cold Harbor (fought

over some of the same ground as the battle of Gaines’s Mill)

as well as some important locations of the city of Richmond

at war. Two sites in particular focus on Richmond’s roles as

armer and healer of the Confederacy. The Civil War Visitor

Center is located at 470 Tredegar Street, on the site of one

of the Confederate military’s most important assets, the

Tredegar Iron Works, which produced nearly 1,100 cannon

for the South as well as armor plating for several Confeder-

ate ironclads, including the Virginia. The visitor center has

three floors of exhibits focusing on Tredegar and the Rich-

mond home front, women in the war, African Americans,

and prisons; an audiovisual presentation concentrating on

the battles around Richmond; a self-guided tour of the Tre-

degar site; and a bookstore.

The other site, the Chimborazo Medical Museum, is the

former park visitor center. It is located at 3215 E. Broad Street,

on the former grounds of the Chimborazo Hospital, one of

the largest military hospitals during the war, with a capac-

ity of more than 3,000 patients. From its opening in Oc to ber

1861 it treated more than 76,000 sick and wounded soldiers.

The museum itself has exhibits and a film that describe hos-

pital life at Chimborazo as well as another bookstore.

A third visitor center is the Cold Harbor Battlefield Visitor

Center, on Route 156 northeast of stop 5. Although, as the

name indicates, the focus at this visitor center is the battle of

Cold Harbor, the electronic battle map there also describes

the battle of Gaines’s Mill (very helpful in understanding that

battle), and still another bookstore is located there.

Finally, the Glendale–Malvern Hill Visitor Center is lo-

cated on Willis Church Road at stop 12. It is only open sea-

sonally, but if it is open it is well worth a stop to see exhibits

and an electronic battle map showing the action at Glendale

and Malvern Hill.

55 Visitor Centers

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Overview of the First Two Days, June 25 and 26, 1862

Lee had planned to attack, but the first major engagement in

more than three weeks was initiated on June 25 by McClel-

lan. The Union commander planned to bring his siege guns

into position just south of the Chickahominy River, near Old

Tavern, an intersection at which the ruins of a tavern then

existed. To do so he needed to take Old Tavern, but before

accomplishing that he wanted the left flank of the assault-

ing troops to be secure. So he ordered an advance along the

Williamsburg Road from the area around Seven Pines. Bri-

gades from the divisions of Phil Kearny and Joe Hooker en-

gaged Confederates from Benjamin Huger’s division. Charges

and countercharges rolled across the area around King’s

Schoolhouse, a grove of oak trees, and an orchard, all of which

gave names to the engagement (most commonly called the

battle of Oak Grove). At the end of the day, however, the lines

were pretty much where they had been at its start.

The day’s fighting initially worried Lee, but the Confeder-

ate commander dismissed McClellan’s attack and kept with

his plan. Stonewall Jackson was behind schedule but still get-

ting into position for the advance on the 26th, and at night

A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and James Longstreet moved their men to

positions near bridges across the Chickahominy. McClellan,

hearing of Jackson’s proximity, ordered his army to stand on

the defensive.

As June 26 dawned, Jackson’s men were marching, but they

were hours behind schedule. As the day passed, Lee waited—

as did his army—for word of Jackson’s approach, but it never

came. The Army of the Potomac was quiet as well. Finally, at

3 p.m., A. P. Hill moved his division across the Chickahominy

at Meadow Bridges and swept down the north bank of the

river to the settlement of Mechanicsville. This forced the Yan-

kee pickets back and uncovered the Mechanicsville Turnpike

bridge so D. H. Hill and Longstreet could use it to cross the

river.

Lee’s plan had been for Jackson’s approach to Fitz John Por-

ter’s right flank to force Porter out of a prepared position so

the two Hills and Longstreet would not have to launch a frontal

assault. Jackson was not in position, however, so Porter stayed

put, and attacks made on the Union lines behind Beaver Dam

Creek had no real chance of success. Stonewall made it to

Polegreen Church, his objective, late in the afternoon, and he

camped within the sound of the guns at Beaver Dam Creek.

The battle there was a decided repulse of Lee’s first attack as

commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.

56 Overview of the First Two Days

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That night, McClellan conferred with Porter, then or-

dered him back to another strong defensive position behind

Boatswain’s Swamp, which he was to hold the next day. Boat-

swain’s Swamp was chosen not only for its strength but be-

cause the position protected the major bridges that Porter’s

men would need to cross the Chickahominy. The rest of the

army was to stay in place on the Chickahominy’s south side,

while supplies were transferred to the James River. Lee’s pres-

sure had accomplished one thing—the Army of the Potomac

was going to abandon its base, retreat from Richmond, and

head to the James. It would be Porter’s job to hold off the

Confederate force on the north bank of the Chickahominy so

McClellan could get started.

57 Overview of the First Two Days

Major-General Fitz John

Porter. From a photograph.

blcw 2:333

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STOP 1 Lee’s Headquarters

Directions From the Civil War Visitor Center return to tredegar street

and turn left. In 0.2 mile take the left-hand road out of the

roundabout, which is 7th street. Proceed about 0.5 mile to

broad street (Route 250, then Route 60). Turn right and con-

tinue on broad street 1.1 miles to 25th street, which be-

comes Route 33. Turn left and proceed 0.7 mile to where Route

33 bears to the right. Follow Route 33 (now nine mile road)

1.5 miles. Turn left at the County of Henrico sign, and park in

a public space. Get out of your car, and walk to the markers

in front of the three flags in front of the antebellum white

house.

From Chimborazo Medical Museum, turn left onto broad

street, and proceed about 0.5 mile to 25th street. Turn right

and proceed 0.5 mile to where Route 33 bears to the right. Fol-

low Route 33 (now nine mile road) 1.5 miles. Turn left at the

County of Henrico sign, and park in a public space. Get out of

your car, and walk to the markers in front of the three flags

in front of the antebellum white house.

58 Stop 1

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Orientation You are facing High Meadow, the house of the widow Dabbs.

This was Lee’s headquarters before and after the Seven Days.

It has been added to since the war, but the basic character of

the main part of the building is still visible. The road behind

you, Nine Mile Road, led in 1862 to Old Tavern to your right,

through Fair Oaks Station to Seven Pines.

What Happened Here Robert E. Lee first set up command of the Army of North-

ern Virginia. Here he formed the basic plan for the campaign

that would become the Seven Days and also conceived the

idea for the expedition that became Jeb Stuart’s first ride

around the Army of the Potomac. Most importantly, High

Meadow was the site of the June 23 conference at which fi-

nal plans were made for the initial Confederate attacks of

the campaign. Meeting with A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Jackson, and

Longstreet, Lee outlined the basic plan in which Jackson ( joined

eventually by Stuart and D. H. Hill) would sweep down from

the northwest, flanking Fitz John Porter’s position, while A.

P. Hill and Longstreet would hit Porter’s retreating men from

the rear. Eventually, McClellan would be cut off from his sup-

plies and subjected to a severe beating. Magruder and Huger,

south of the Chickahominy River, would hold off the Yan-

kees long enough for the Rebels on the north side to uncover

New Bridge, northeast of where you are standing and behind

Magruder’s line.

Once Lee had outlined his plan, he left the details to his

subordinates. Those details were not recorded at the time,

but Jackson, Longstreet, and the two Hills eventually settled on

June 26 as the day that Jackson would reach Porter’s flank.

Lee moved his headquarters from the Dabbs house when

the campaign began. After it ended, Lee returned to High

Meadow to plan his next campaign, in which he would move

his army north to confront Brig. Gen. John Pope and the

Union Army of Virginia.

Analysis Lee’s plan was sound but had flaws. For one, it depended on

timing that could not be guaranteed. Jackson was moving

several thousand men on uncertain roads to the vicinity of

Richmond, and the time of his arrival was difficult to pre-

dict. In the event, the date was set one day too soon. The date

wasn’t the only difficulty, however; the timing would depend

on communication and coordination among men who had

never directed large numbers of men together and who had

few staff officers.

Another flaw in the plan was that it depended on McClel-

lan’s remaining passive with eight divisions south of the

59 Lee’s Headquarters

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river while his three divisions north of the river and his sup-

ply line were threatened by a numerically superior force. The

uncertainty of this element of Lee’s plan was demonstrated on

June 25 at Oak Grove; a postponement to June 27 of Jackson’s

arrival might have allowed McClellan to continue his plan

to attack Old Tavern, throwing Lee’s plan into question. In

particular it might have made New Bridge, the road that led

to Old Tavern, useless to the Confederates from the north

bank, possibly forcing them to retrace their steps and cross

at Mechanicsville or Meadow Bridges.

However, it is likely that Lee believed he had no alternative

because he knew McClellan’s siege guns would blow his men

out of any prepared positions. If he did nothing, he eventually

would need to evacuate Richmond. He was risking little un-

less the disruption of his plans resulted in the capture of part

of his army along with the capital. Lee probably thought that

scenario was unlikely, however. And his reward for proper

execution would be great—not only the breaking of the siege

of Richmond but a major and possibly decisive victory.

Vignette Some 20 years after the battles D. H. Hill wrote about his sum-

mons to Lee’s headquarters at the Dabbs house (which he mis-

takenly put on the Mechanicsville Turnpike). “On approach-

ing the house which the general occupied,” Hill remembered,

“I saw an officer leaning over the yard—paling, dusty, travel-

worn, and apparently very tired.” As the officer straightened,

Hill recognized with a start his brother-in-law Stonewall Jack-

son (they had married sisters), “who till that moment I had

supposed was confronting Banks and Fremont far down the

Valley of Virginia.” Jackson reported he had ridden 52 miles

that day, starting at 1 a.m.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 34–39; Dowdey, The Seven

Days, 148–59; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 175–77.

To Proceed with Return to nine mile road, and turn left. Proceed 0.8 mile to its

the Secondary Tour intersection with laburnum avenue north, and turn left onto

laburnum avenue, which becomes Route 197. Proceed about

6.0 miles to its intersection with brook road. Turn right and

proceed on brook road (which becomes Route 1) 11.4 miles

to the stoplight at ashcake road (Route 657). Turn right onto

ashcake road, and proceed 4.1 miles to sliding hill road

(Route 656). Turn right and proceed 1.1 miles to new ashcake

road (Route 643). Turn left on new ashcake road, which turns

into rural point road. As you drive you will be following

Jackson’s march route on June 26 and passing over (at about

60 Stop 1

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7.0 miles) Totopotomoy Creek, where Jackson’s advance skir-

mished with Union cavalry. After a total of about 7.6 miles,

turn left into the Polegreen Church site. Park at the Civil War

Trails marker turnout, and turn to optional excursion 1,

Polegreen Church.

61 Lee’s Headquarters

General Thomas J.

“Stonewall” Jackson.

From a photograph.

blcw 1:121

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STOP 2 Lee’s Plans

Directions Return to nine mile road and turn left. Proceed 0.8 mile to

its intersection with laburnum avenue north, and turn left

onto laburnum avenue. Proceed 2.9 miles until laburnum

avenue intersects with the mechanicsville turnpike (Route

360). Turn right and proceed 0.5 mile to the Chickahominy

Bluffs unit of Richmond National Battlefield Park. Turn right

(this turn is easy to miss, so be prepared), and proceed to the

parking lot. Get out of your car, and walk to the observation

platform. Face northeast, toward the Chickahominy River be-

yond the trees.

Orientation You are standing in the general vicinity of Robert E. Lee’s

headquarters on June 26. Lee waited here for his plans to

develop. Straight ahead, across the river, are Mechanicsville

and the Union position at Beaver Dam Creek. To your right

front, Porter’s other units were in reserve. To your left and

left rear waited Longstreet’s and D. H. Hill’s divisions, and far

to your left, at Meadow Bridges, waited A. P. Hill’s division.

Longstreet and D. H. Hill crossed the Chickahominy on the

62 Stop 2

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Mechanicsville Turnpike, which follows its 1862 trace. In

1862 the area straight ahead was much more open, giving

Lee a good view of his troops across the river.

What Happened Lee arrived here on the morning of June 26. Confederate presi-

dent Jefferson Davis came soon after, and they, Longstreet, D. H.

Hill, and their staffs waited through the morning and most of

the afternoon for word of the arrival of Stonewall Jackson on

Porter’s right flank and of the North Carolinians of Brig. Gen.

Lawrence O’B. Branch nearer the river. As the day wore on, the

assembled Confederates grew more and more concerned. Fi-

nally, sometime after 3 p.m., A. P. Hill’s division could be seen

advancing down the opposite bank of the Chickahominy. Hill’s

men quickly uncovered the Mechanicsville Turnpike bridge,

and D. H. Hill’s division began crossing the river about 4 p.m.

Artillery fire quickly began, and Lee himself crossed just after

the artillery duel started. All the Confederates moved out by

the end of the day, ready to do their part in Lee’s plan—which

already had been thrown off by the events of the day.

Analysis Lee’s plan was that Jackson’s arrival on Porter’s right flank early

in the afternoon would force the Yankees out of their lines at

Beaver Dam Creek. At the same time, Branch’s advance would

uncover Meadow Bridges for the rest of A. P. Hill’s division,

and Hill’s advance would then uncover the Mechanicsville

Turnpike bridge for Longstreet and D. H. Hill. Longstreet and

the Hills could then pursue the retreating Porter, while Jack-

son could continue to flank the Federals and possibly cut the

Richmond and York River Railroad, McClellan’s supply line.

Porter’s corps might be defeated or destroyed, and McClel-

lan’s supplies almost certainly would be cut off.

Unfortunately for Lee, his plan never had a chance to be

implemented. Jackson’s march from the Shenandoah Valley to

the vicinity of Richmond was delayed for many reasons. He

was five miles short of where the plan called for him to be on

the morning of June 26. Instead of arriving on Porter’s flank

around noon, he didn’t achieve his objective of Hundley’s

Corner until about 5 p.m., too late to turn the Northerners

out of their lines. Jackson’s delay also meant that Branch, who

was to march in concert with Stonewall, was late, so A. P. Hill

was also late and in fact crossed at Meadow Bridges before

Branch arrived. There is some question whether Lee had or-

dered Hill to cross despite Branch’s delay, but it seems certain

that even if Lee had issued that order, Hill did not receive it

but moved on his own. Even though Hill moved before Lee’s

original plan stipulated, he was sufficiently late to prevent

63 Lee’s Plans

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all of Longstreet’s men from crossing at Mechanicsville before

dark.

The prime result of this delay was that Porter was still in

his lines at Beaver Dam Creek, and a combination of further

mistakes led to a Confederate attack on Porter’s lines that

Lee had tried hard to avoid. It would be the first of several

Confederate mistakes that Southern soldiers would pay for

in blood.

Vignette As Magruder expected to hear the sounds of battle and had

not by 2 p.m., he sent Maj. Joseph Brent, Magruder’s chief of

ordnance, to report to Lee and to see what was happening.

Brent found Lee anxious: “His eyes were restless with the look

of a man with fever,” Brent remembered in his memoirs. “His

necktie or cravat had slipped around until the bow rested

under his ear, and one leg of his trousers was notably dis-

placed.” Brent also reported that he had “never in my life seen

more gloomy faces” than the ones of President Davis and Sec-

retary of War Randolph as they waited for the action to start.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 36–37, 59, 64– 65; Dow-

dey, The Seven Days, 174–75; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond,

194–96, 200–201.

64 Stop 2

Lieutenant-General

Ambrose P. Hill, C.S.A.

From a photograph.

blcw 2:626

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STOP 3 The Attack at Mechanicsville

Directions Return to the mechanicsville turnpike (Route 360, then

Route 360 Bypass), and turn right. As you drive this route you

will be following Longstreet and D. H. Hill’s route. Cross the

Chickahominy River, and about 1.6 mile after leaving Chicka-

hominy Bluff exit at cold harbor road (Route 156). Turn right

at the end of the ramp, and proceed about 0.6 mile until you

reach the Beaver Dam Creek unit of the Richmond National

Battlefield Park. Turn right and proceed to the parking lot.

Walk to the marker near the parking lot and face east, look-

ing across the bridge.

Orientation You are standing near the historical trace of the road from

Mechanicsville to Ellerson’s mill. The road continued on to

become Cold Harbor Road. The Confederate attackers mostly

stopped behind you and to your left rear, although the 38th

North Carolina and the 44th Georgia reached the creek just

to the left of your present position. The supporting Rebel ar-

tillery was on the hills to your left rear. The Union positions

were straight ahead and to your left front along the bluffs on

65 The Attack at Mechanicsville

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the east side of Beaver Dam Creek and a little to your right

front, with infantry near the swamp and artillery higher up

on the bluffs. The current Route 156 crosses the creek to your

left at about where the 3rd North Carolina and 48th Georgia

made their attack. At the time of the battle the area on both

sides of the creek was open farmland.

What Happened Once A. P. Hill’s division cleared the Mechanicsville crossing

of the Chickahominy, the Confederates continued to advance

toward the Union position behind Beaver Dam Creek, held

by Brig. Gen. George McCall’s division of Pennsylvania Re-

serves. From Mechanicsville, the division fanned out from

the Old Church road (the continuation of Route 360 north-

east of Mechanicsville) south past Cold Harbor Road. Brig.

Gen. Joseph R. Anderson’s brigade moved north of the Old

Church road to attempt to flank the Union position. Some of

his men charged the north end of the Yankee line and were

pushed back across the creek. Just north of your position, the

38th North Carolina of Brig. Gen. William D. Pender’s brigade

charged the Federal line at Ellerson’s mill and was beaten

back 100 yards from the Union positions. Lee ordered Brig.

Gen. Roswell Ripley’s brigade of D. H. Hill’s division to turn the

Union left, but Ripley’s regiments were diverted by D. H. Hill

to support a second frontal assault by Pender. The 3rd North

Carolina and 48th Georgia attacked at a point near the cur-

rent Route 156, while the 1st North Carolina and 44th Geor-

gia attacked toward Ellerson’s mill. At both points, Ripley’s

men ran into overwhelming infantry and artillery fire from

the 7th, 8th, and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves. Some of the

44th Georgia reached Beaver Dam Creek just north of the

bridge, but none crossed to the other side. The failure was

complete, although firing continued until dark.

Analysis A battle Lee did not want to fight, Mechanicsville was wholly

mismanaged on the Confederate side. Southern commanders

did not know the topography of an area fewer than 10 miles

from their capital. Anderson’s brigade got into the wrong posi-

tion as a result. Too many Rebels, including Lee, Davis, A. P.

Hill, and D. H. Hill, were giving orders, which (as one would

expect) sometimes contradicted each other. Pender gave D.

H. Hill bad advice, and Ripley headed to the wrong area. The

most important mismanagement, however, was the lack of

communication between Lee and Stonewall Jackson. What Lee

would have done if he had known Jackson’s position is open

to question. It is certain, however, that he would have pre-

vented a frontal assault at Mechanicsville that cost him 1,400

66 Stop 3

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casualties (335 from the 44th Georgia of Ripley’s brigade) and

accomplished little.

The Federals defending at Beaver Dam Creek had an ex-

cellent position, with a swampy watercourse fronting steep,

high banks and open ground over which attackers would

advance. They took advantage of the ground to construct a

defense that would not be broken by any direct assault. To

the south, the ground became flat but very swampy and dif-

ficult to traverse. The position would need to be flanked to

the north, as it finally was by Jackson’s advance to Hundley’s

Corner. As a result, Porter pulled his men from the lines that

night, and they fell back to another position on steep banks

behind a swamp to fight another day.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 66–75; Dowdey, The Seven

Days, 168–96; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 201–7.

Further Exploration If you have time, you may wish to cross the bridge over Bea-

ver Dam Creek to the vicinity of Ellerson’s mill. The Federals

used the mill race as shelter for their first line of infantry.

The National Park Service owns more land on the east side of

the creek, but when this guide was written (2005) no access

was possible. However, the Park Service has been working to

provide visitor access to the remaining intact portion of the

Union line, and by the time you read this that access may be

possible. If so, follow the signs to more closely examine the

strength of the Northern position.

Optional Excursion If you have time, you may wish to visit the ending point of

Stonewall Jackson’s march on June 26. To do so, return to cold

harbor road (Route 156), and turn left. Cross Route 360, at

which point the road changes to atlee road (Route 638). Pro-

ceed a total of about 2.4 miles to the intersection with mead-

owbridge road to your left and pole green road to your

right (Route 627). Turn right. After about 0.8 mile you will

pass Shady Grove Methodist Church, which marks the cor-

ner where Maj. Gen. Richard Ewell’s division of Jackson’s com-

mand turned toward Polegreen Church after marching from

the north. Proceed a total of about 3.5 miles until you reach

the intersection of pole green and rural point roads. Turn

left, proceed 0.5 mile on rural point road, and pull into the

turnout on the right for the Civil War Trails marker. Turn to

optional excursion 1, Polegreen Church, in this guide.

67 The Attack at Mechanicsville

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Overview of the Third Day, June 27, 1862

On the morning of June 27, the Confederates under A. P. Hill,

D. H. Hill, and James Longstreet found just a token force op-

posing them near Beaver Dam Creek. They also found that

Stonewall Jackson had arrived on their north flank. Lee was

ready to carry out a revised version of his plan of the day

before. Acting on an assumption that Fitz John Porter’s men

were behind Powhite Creek, not the more distant Boatswain’s

Swamp, Lee sent Jackson and D. H. Hill on a flanking march to

the intersection of Old Cold Harbor, northeast of Porter’s sup-

posed position. Once again, Lee figured that Jackson’s approach

would force Porter out of his lines, and A. P. Hill and Longstreet

could attack a retreating force outside entrenchments.

But Porter was not where Lee thought he was, and Jack-

son’s march—held up by a wrong turn and obstacles in the

road—met up with Union troops in position just beyond Old

Cold Harbor. By that time, A. P. Hill’s division had charged

the center of Porter’s line just south of New Cold Harbor

along Boatswain’s Swamp and had been bloodily repulsed. As

Jackson’s men approached the battlefield they formed a line

to connect with and attack past A. P. Hill’s men, but those

attacks also failed to move Porter’s line, now reinforced by

Brig. Gen. Henry Slocum’s division.

Longstreet, south of A. P. Hill on the right of the Confeder-

ate line, at first prepared a diversionary attack but then con-

verted it into a full-scale assault. At that point, all the Con-

federates north of the Chickahominy were in line, and those

who weren’t already exhausted from heavy fighting charged

at about the same time. On the Confederate left, D. H. Hill

forced back Brig. Gen. George Sykes’s division of mostly regu-

lar troops. On the Rebel right, Longstreet broke through part

of Brig. Gen. George Morell’s line. Near the center of the line,

John B. Hood, at the head of his old regiment, the 4th Texas,

and part of the 18th Georgia, broke another part of Morell’s

line. Union artillery tarried too long trying to hold the line,

and many guns were captured. An ill-advised Yankee cavalry

charge also failed to stop the Southerners. Only darkness,

and perhaps two brigades from Brig. Gen. Israel Richardson’s

division, saved Porter’s gallant men, who had withstood

charges for more than five hours. The battle of Gaines’s Mill,

as it has come to be known, was the second-largest battle of

the war thus far (after Shiloh) and would be the largest battle

of the Seven Days.

While the fury of battle raged on the north bank of the

Chickahominy, on the south bank quiet reigned for most of

the day. McClellan had a substantial numerical advantage

68 Overview of the Third Day

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over Huger and Magruder, but he could not bring himself

to order an assault, especially when his corps commanders

were reporting heavy Rebel troop movements. Close to sun-

down, some of Magruder’s Confederates charged entrench-

ments held by Baldy Smith’s division near Garnett’s Farm,

with no tangible result.

Once McClellan knew that Gaines’s Mill was lost, he or-

dered the Army of the Potomac to ready itself to move to the

James River. All that could not be moved was to be destroyed,

including the supplies at White House Landing and Savage

Station. Elements of the army began moving that night. Just

after midnight, McClellan wrote a telegram to Secretary of

War Edwin Stanton that ended with the sentences, “If I save

this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or

to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best

to sacrifice this army.” Those sentences were deleted before

Stanton saw them, but they became fodder for more than a

century of debate about the proper blame for the necessity

of the Union retreat. Necessary or not, retreat was what the

Union soldiers began to do.

69 Overview of the Third Day

Lieutenant-General Daniel

H. Hill, C.S.A. From a

photograph. blcw 2:214

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STOP 4 Walnut Grove Church

Directions Return to cold harbor road (Route 156), and turn right. Pro-

ceed 1.4 mile until you reach Walnut Grove Baptist Church

on your left. Turn into the parking lot, and walk to the stone

marker. Face toward the intersection.

Orientation You are standing in the general vicinity of the meeting of

Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson on June 27. The road run-

ning from your left to the intersection straight ahead is the

road on which Jackson’s men marched that morning. The road

running straight ahead from the intersection is the road on

which Jackson’s men marched toward Old Cold Harbor, their

destination. The road coming from behind you is Cold Har-

bor Road, on which A. P. Hill arrived from Mechanicsville. The

road from the intersection to your right front is the continu-

ation of Cold Harbor Road, and it leads past Gaines’s mill

and through New Cold Harbor to Old Cold Harbor. A. P. Hill

marched his men down this road in pursuit of Porter’s corps

as the latter retreated from Beaver Dam Creek. Longstreet used

a road to your right, closer to the Chickahominy River. The

70 Stop 4

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older of the two church buildings here, on your immediate

left, dates to before the Civil War.

What Happened This churchyard was the site of the first battlefield meeting

of Lee and Jackson, who during the next 10 months would

form a dynamic strategy team. The two generals met here af-

ter Jackson’s men had accidentally shelled A. P. Hill’s advance;

Stonewall and Hill met here briefly before Hill continued

with his men. Lee and Jackson, walking in the churchyard

out of earshot of anyone else, discussed the plan for the day,

which turned out to be a continuation of the general plan.

Stonewall and D. H. Hill would move to the Old Cold Har-

bor intersection, from which Lee believed they would flank

Porter’s position, again forcing Fitz John to retreat and giving

A. P. Hill and Longstreet a chance to defeat him in the open.

The two generals then parted, with Jackson leading his men

on their flank march and Lee following A. P. Hill toward the

Federals.

Analysis Jackson would flank Porter at Old Cold Harbor on June 27

only if Porter had stopped behind Powhite Creek, a small

watercourse west of New Cold Harbor. In fact, however, Por-

ter had positioned his men behind Boatswain’s Swamp, an-

other small watercourse apparently not on Lee’s map but east

of Powhite Creek and tracing an arc, the top of which ran

from west to east. Any Confederate force at Old Cold Harbor

would thus not be flanking Porter’s real position. The bad

Confederate maps, inexplicable given the area’s proximity to

the Southern capital, again caused Lee a major problem. They

also cost Jackson, as did his habitual reticence; a guide heard

Stonewall’s instruction to head to Cold Harbor but did not

know of the need to take a roundabout route, so he made a

wrong turn that cost Jackson time. For a second day in a row,

Lee’s troops would be in wrong positions and suffer from poor

timing.

Vignette Lee and Jackson kept out of earshot from their staffs, despite

efforts by at least one staffer to listen in on the conversa-

tion. The two men presented a stark contrast. Lee was in full

dress uniform, his handsome face and distinguished bear-

ing impressing all who came into contact with him. Jackson

was as dusty as one would expect after days on the road, his

preferred cadet’s cap as dirty as any other part of his uni-

form. Even their horses were strikingly different—Lee’s grey

Traveller appeared healthy and fit, while Jackson’s Little Sorrel

looked as if it had suffered under its master’s two previous

months of intense campaigning. As historian Stephen Sears

71 Walnut Grove Church

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has put it, “The Defender of Richmond and the Hero of the

Valley, it was agreed, appeared as unalike as it was possible

to be.”

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 83– 84, 102; Dowdey, The

Seven Days, 204– 6, 211–13; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond,

217–19, 227–28.

To Proceed with the From the intersection, proceed 2.0 miles northeast on

walnut

Secondary Tour grove road, which begins as Route 636, then turns into

Route 615. Turn right on colts neck road (Route 1507), and

continue about 0.7 mile until that road reaches sandy valley

road (Route 635). Turn left, proceed about 0.5 mile, then turn

right onto beulah church road (Route 633). This follows the

general route that Jackson took on his march. Continue on beu-

lah church road 1.4 miles, passing Beulah Church itself at

0.6 mile, to the Cold Harbor intersection. Turn right on Route

156, and pull into the parking area for the old garage on your

right. Turn to stop 6, Old Cold Harbor, in this guide.

72 Stop 4

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STOP 5 The Battle of Gaines’s Mill

Directions Return to cold harbor road, and turn left. Proceed 0.1 mile to

the intersection of Routes 643 and 156. Turn right onto Route

156 (still cold harbor road, even though you must turn). As

you drive you will be following A. P. Hill’s route to the battle

of Gaines’s Mill. At about 1.4 miles, off the road to the right,

is Selwyn, Lee’s headquarters during the battle. At 2.1 miles

is Powhite Creek. Proceed a total of 2.9 miles to watt house

road (Route 718), which is straight ahead of you as Route 156

turns to the left. At this point you are in the area called New

Cold Harbor. Go straight on watt house road, and proceed to

the parking lot. Walk down the historic trace marked by the

fence to your left front up to the cannon. Face in the direc-

tion that the cannon are facing, toward Boatswain’s Swamp

(which you crossed on the drive down Watt House Road).

73 The Battle of Gaines’s Mill

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Stop 5a The Union Line

Orientation You are standing near the Union left during the battle of

Gaines’s Mill. The Union line followed Boatswain’s Swamp

from your left to your right, which was originally held by

Morell’s division (later reinforced by parts of McCall’s and

Slocum’s divisions). Sykes’s division (later reinforced by the

rest of McCall’s and Slocum’s divisions) stretched to your

right rear along a rise. Artillery was lined up near the Watt

house and to the east of it to your immediate right rear. The

ground was substantially as you see it, open fields with trees

lining the swamp itself.

What Happened During the battle Porter directed reinforcements to threat-

ened points throughout his line. The artillery posted here

mostly engaged the enemy at long range and supported

infantry when the Confederates charged, firing over their

comrades’ heads. Porter was busy. Attacks by A. P. Hill’s divi-

sion to your right front and right, and by Ewell’s division to

your right, were beaten back, but the effort cost Morell’s and

Sykes’s men dearly.

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Once the Confederate breakthrough occurred, in the late

afternoon, the Rebels came up the hill and charged the Yan-

kee cannon. Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke, commanding

Union cavalry, ordered a charge to try to save the cannon, but

it (the troopers coming from your rear) failed miserably. The

gunners did what they could, but the Southerners captured

23 guns at Gaines’s Mill.

Analysis Porter’s work on the defensive at Gaines’s Mill was excellent.

He had set up his line in a strong position, which will be bet-

ter seen in the next stops, in a matter of hours. He also was

able to get reinforcements to the most important spots at op-

portune times. If reinforced by more troops more promptly,

he might have been able to prevent the final Confederate

breakthroughs, which came (at least in the area near the

Watt house) against units that had been in line all day and

for which no relief could come. Those breakthroughs, and

the resulting disruption of the Union infantry, left the artil-

lery wide open for capture, and it was too late in the day for

fresh Northern troops from Richardson’s division, sent at last

by McClellan, to attempt to recapture the guns.

The wisdom and effect of the cavalry charge were greatly

debated after the war. Suffice it to say that it could have ac-

complished nothing, and that was its result.

Vignette A French nobleman, the Prince de Joinville, served with his

two nephews as a volunteer aide to McClellan. With Porter

during the latter part of the battle, the prince described the

scene around the Watt house after the breakthrough, where

the Rebels on the plateau were “closing in upon the confused

masses of the Federals. Such is the fury of the cannonade and

the musketry fire that the cloud of dust struck up from the

ground floats steadily over the battle.” He continued, “The

artillery horses were killed, and I saw, with painful emotion,

the men working with the courage of desperation at guns

which could no longer be removed. They dropped one after

another. Two alone were left at last, and they continued to

load and fire almost at point-blank range.”

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 86– 87, 108–9, 111–13,

132–34; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 224, 234–35, 239– 42; Sears,

To the Gates of Richmond, 213–15, 226–27, 232–34, 244– 46.

Stop 5b The Breakthrough on the Union Left

Directions Continue on the historic trace until another trail diverges to

the right. If you wish, you may first follow the fenced road

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trace another 100 yards or so to the top of the hill, where

there is an overlook to the Chickahominy River’s floodplain.

If so, retrace your steps when you are finished at the over-

look. Otherwise, turn right and proceed along the trail to

the stone monument for Wilcox’s brigade. Face toward the

swamp.

Orientation You are in the position of Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield’s bri-

gade of Morell’s division, which held the left of Porter’s line

during the battle. Across the swamp straight ahead of you,

in the fields beyond, Longstreet’s division formed its lines of

battle. This position is near the left of Butterfield’s line. Here,

as elsewhere, the Northerners defended in three lines, from

near the swamp to this position near the top of the hill, fell-

ing trees to form breastworks and digging rifle pits such as

the one you passed along the trail.

What Happened Butterfield saw little fighting during much of the day. Late

in the afternoon, however, as part of the charges launched

along the entire Confederate line, Longstreet’s division as-

saulted the Union left. The brigades of Cadmus Wilcox, Roger

Pryor, and Brig. Gen. Winfield Featherston hit Butterfield’s

men, and their combined weight forced the Yankees out of

their lines. To your right, Brig. Gen. George Pickett’s brigade

and part of R. H. Anderson’s brigade hit and broke elements

of Butterfield’s brigade and that of Brig. Gen. John Martin-

dale. The Union defenders in this part of the line streamed

toward the Chickahominy River, giving the Confederates the

ground.

Analysis Longstreet, who was not involved in the earlier assaults to

his left by A. P. Hill and Ewell, had his division well in hand.

Despite the relative inaction of Butterfield’s men, the Con-

federates had a large numerical superiority—12 regiments

(Wilcox, Pryor, and Featherston) to 3 (16th Michigan, 44th New

York, and 83rd Pennsylvania), since Butterfield had sent one

regiment to Martindale’s support earlier in the afternoon.

Despite the strength of the Union position, evident from

this vantage point, the power of the assault was too much

to stop—especially when the smoke of battle obscured the

Yankees’ view late in the day. To the right, Pickett’s brigade

hit regiments that had been repulsing assaults since early in

the battle and had received little relief. The numerical odds

weren’t as great, but the Northerners were worn through

after hours of fighting and could not withstand the final

attack.

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Vignette Lt. Robert Miller of the 14th Louisiana, in Pryor’s brigade,

charged with his men. As he charged, a bullet passed through

his scabbard and killed one of his soldiers. When he wrote his

father of the attack, he said, “The bullets came so thick that

I felt a desire to see how many I could catch with my open

hand stretched out.” Miller survived the Seven Days but was

killed at Second Manassas later that summer.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 129–32; Dowdey, The

Seven Days, 235–36; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 239– 43.

Stop 5c Hood’s Breakthrough

Directions From the Wilcox Brigade monument, follow the trail along

Boatswain’s Swamp. Stop at the interpretive marker for

Hood’s assault where the trail forks. Face up the hill, with the

swamp behind you.

Orientation You are standing at about the first line of the Union defense.

The final Confederate attack came from directly behind you

and broke through the defense in the area straight ahead.

You can see that the slope in this area is not as steep as in the

areas to your front left and front right. This terrain feature

probably is partly what led Brig. Gen. John B. Hood to advance

as he did with the 4th Texas and part of the 18th Georgia, as

the relatively level ground would allow the attackers to keep

more of their momentum as they moved up the slope.

What Happened The first actions of the battle of Gaines’s Mill occurred to your

left, across the road on which you entered the park, when A.

P. Hill attacked the right of Morell’s line and Sykes’s left. Hill’s

brigades, as they attacked, fell into line to their right. The

area directly to your left saw several charges by the brigades

of Brig. Gens. James Archer, Charles Field, and J. R. Anderson on

Martindale’s center. All were repulsed, though one assault

got within 50 feet of the Union lines. All of Hill’s charges saw

basically the same result, although the first charges (to be

detailed at stop 5d) gained more success initially.

Later in the afternoon, Brig. Gen. William Whiting’s division

arrived on the field from its march with Stonewall Jackson.

Whiting, in deploying his men, had run into Lee, who directed

him further to the Confederate right, into the area between

A. P. Hill’s and Longstreet’s divisions. In the final charges, Whit-

ing advanced on Pickett’s left. Hood, one of Whiting’s brigade

commanders, originally was on the left of Whiting’s line, but

he saw an opening to the right and moved his old regiment,

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the 4th Texas, along with part of the 18th Georgia into the

space. Ordering that no one should stop to fire, Hood led the

Southerners on the double-quick down the slope behind you,

through the swamp, and through the New Yorkers and Michi-

ganders holding this part of Morell’s line.

Analysis A. P. Hill’s assaults came against fresh Union infantry and ar-

tillery in a prepared (albeit hastily) position. They had little

chance of success. What Hill’s men accomplished through

their sacrifice, however—and they continued to fire at the

Yankees after their charges were stopped—was to sap the

defenders’ strength. Hill’s attacks in this area came early

enough, and the firefights afterward were light enough, that

few reinforcements came to the defenders.

By the time Longstreet and Whiting launched their assaults,

the men of Martindale’s brigade had been defending their

position for several hours. Many were low on ammunition,

and Civil War rifles were hard to work. The time was ripe for

Confederate success, particularly as their fresh troops had

(in Hood’s case) somewhat favorable terrain. It is hard to fault

any Federal for the failure, after a long and difficult day, to

hold his position in the face of the determination Hood’s men

showed.

The Confederates argued long after the war about who

first broke the line at Gaines’s Mill. The best resolution of this

dispute is that the breakthroughs likely came at about the

same time, or near enough that no one can claim sole credit

for the ultimate success that Lee’s army gained.

Vignette During the 4th Texas’s charge, Val Giles of that regiment was

severely wounded. Giles fell directly in front of a Union bat-

tery and, as the guns probably spat canister, was staring di-

rectly at death. Then a Southerner grabbed Giles by the collar

and dragged him a few yards behind an apple tree. “He han-

dled me without gloves and hurt me fearfully, and in return

for that act of humanity I cursed him,” Giles remembered.

“He made no reply, but hurried on.” In his memoirs Giles

credited the unknown Rebel with saving his life.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 97–99, 127–30; Dowdey,

The Seven Days, 219–28, 236–39; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond,

226, 240– 42.

Stop 5d The Union Center

Directions You have two options at this point. You may proceed up the

hill, following Hood’s charge, or you may proceed on the trail

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along Boatswain’s Swamp. The second option gives you a

good view of the strength of the Union defenses in the area

attacked by some of A. P. Hill’s troops. In either case, once you

emerge into the field at the top of the slope, proceed to the

cannon on the east side, across the parking lot. Face the field

straight ahead of you as you walk. If you wish, you may pro-

ceed further to the fence at the edge of the park property.

Orientation You are looking over the Adams field, as it was known at

the time of the battle. This is private not park land, but it

looks much as it did in 1862. The road from New Cold Harbor

angled from your left rear to your left front about a quar-

ter mile distant in the trees you see, then headed straight

to the road from Old Cold Harbor to Grapevine Bridge. Most

of Sykes’s division initially deployed parallel to this second

section of the road though in front of it. Col. Gouverneur

Warren’s brigade was in the trees on the other side of the first

section of the road, and Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin’s brigade

of Morell’s division was to your left and left rear on this side

of the road. The area defended by Warren and Griffin looked

substantially the same at the time of the battle as the park

land does now: open fields with trees lining the swamp.

What Happened Warren’s brigade took the first blow of the battle of Gaines’s

Mill. Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg’s brigade of A. P. Hill’s division

advanced against the 5th New York—the famous Duryee Zou-

aves—and the 10th New York. The 1st South Carolina Rifles

of Gregg’s brigade lost 297 killed and wounded in the assault,

but Gregg failed to break Warren’s line.

A. P. Hill’s other brigades, led by Branch and Pender, also

charged in the area to your left, hitting the 10th New York

and Griffin’s brigade. After the Yankees repulsed these

charges, they had little respite, as Ewell’s division attacked

shortly afterward. These assaults hit some U.S. regular army

troops from Sykes’s division who were relieving Warren as

well as Griffin’s brigade. None of the Rebels, including the fa-

mous Louisiana Tigers just to the left of your position, could

dent the Union line.

As part of the final charges, elements of Ewell’s and Whit-

ing’s divisions advanced in the same general area. They broke

the Federal line (Brig. Gen. John Newton’s brigade and Brig.

Gen. George Taylor’s brigade, both of Slocum’s division) and

captured the 4th New Jersey and 11th Pennsylvania Reserves

almost whole.

Analysis Warren’s men fought hard in defense, and their combat with

Gregg’s troops was one of the most savage of the war. Warren

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initiated one of the few Union counterattacks of the battle in

pursuing Gregg’s men. Finally, Warren was relieved, but the

supporting troops, mostly from McCall’s division, retreated

because of pressure on both flanks.

The pressure on the left side came after Slocum’s worn-out

men were finally forced back from Boatswain’s Swamp. They

had marched to the field and blunted Ewell’s initial assaults,

but the final charge was too much.

Much of the credit for the final Confederate success must

go to A. P. Hill’s men. Their attacks in the area to your left

and left rear, though unsuccessful, forced Porter to commit

reserves early, setting the stage for the later victory.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 91–96, 104–10, 117–27;

Dowdey, The Seven Days, 221–23, 228–31, 239– 40; Sears, To the

Gates of Richmond, 223–25, 229–30, 237–39, 246– 47.

80 Stop 5

Uniform of the 83rd

Pennsylvania of

Butterfield’s Brigade,

Morrell’s Division,

5th Corps. blcw 2:336

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STOP 6 Cold Harbor

Directions Return to cold harbor road, and turn right. If you wish, you

may stop at the Cold Harbor Visitor Center after about 0.2

mile. Proceed a total of about 1.2 miles to just before the in-

tersection of Routes 156 and 633. Pull off at the old garage to

your left. Face to the east along rockhill road.

Orientation You are at the intersection of Old Cold Harbor, often just

called Cold Harbor, named for a tavern located there. The

road to your left runs by Beulah Presbyterian Church and was

used by Stonewall Jackson to march to the battle of Gaines’s

Mill. The road to your right leads to Grapevine Bridge. The

road straight ahead could be taken to reach the sites of Tun-

stall’s Station, on the Richmond and York River Railroad, and

eventually White House Landing, McClellan’s primary supply

depot. The road network and terrain is basically the same as

in 1862.

What Happened This is the intersection toward which Lee directed Jackson

on June 27. Jackson, joined by and eventually preceded by

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D. H. Hill, made his roundabout march to Old Cold Harbor,

and Hill’s leading elements arrived early in the afternoon.

Hill paused briefly here and then proceeded south on Cold

Harbor Road, running into the right end of Sykes’s division

less than a mile from the intersection. Most of Jackson’s men

headed southwest from Beulah Presbyterian Church before

they reached the intersection to form Stonewall’s line of

battle.

The center and right of Sykes’s division received its first

blows from D. H. Hill’s men. The effects were minor, however,

and Sykes was able to shift some regiments left to assist in

the defense there for a couple of hours. Most of the action

on this front occurred later, during the final charges, when

most of Hill’s division plus elements of Stonewall Jackson’s di-

vision advanced on the Union line. An epic combat between

the 20th North Carolina and 16th New York regiments over

a battery took place during those last charges. The Rebels

lost 272 killed and wounded, while the Yankees lost 194.

The weight of Hill’s assault finally forced the New Yorkers

back, along with the rest of Sykes’s division and Col. Joseph

Bartlett’s brigade of Slocum’s division.

Analysis Old Cold Harbor seemed to Lee to be the key intersection in

this area of Virginia. If he controlled it, he thought he would

be closer to McClellan’s supply line and depot than was Por-

ter, forcing Porter to fall back and giving the Confederates a

chance to attack a retreating enemy. This was the reason Lee

had pinpointed the intersection as Jackson’s goal in his origi-

nal plan for the campaign.

The reality was different. McClellan was not planning to

defend his supply line as Lee expected, and on June 27 Porter

was further east than Lee supposed. For this reason, Old Cold

Harbor did not become the important intersection in 1862

that it became 23 months later, when Grant and Lee ended

their Overland Campaign on the same ground.

Sykes’s men did not have ground as advantageous as

Morell’s division, but they were not assaulted seriously un-

til the final Confederate efforts. The regulars and Bartlett’s

men were outnumbered but retreated slowly without being

broken. The Southerners became jumbled in their assaults,

but since they were all going forward the confusion didn’t

matter.

Gaines’s Mill cost the Confederates about 8,700 killed and

wounded. About 4,000 Federals were killed and wounded,

and another 2,800 were missing.

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Vignette The 16th New York went into battle at Gaines’s Mill wearing

white straw hats, which Col. Joseph Howland’s wife had sent

from Albany earlier in the month. The hats helped the men

withstand the summer sun and gave them a distinctive ap-

pearance. Before the battle, the men enjoyed that; during the

battle it made them a little too easily seen by Southerners

with rifled muskets. By the time the battle was over, many

of the hats were gone—some from being thrown away, but

many because their owners were either killed or wounded.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 102–3; Dowdey, The Seven

Days, 213–16; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 227–28, 234.

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STOP 7 Grapevine Bridge

Directions Turn right at the intersection, and proceed south on cold har-

bor road (Route 156). As you drive this stretch of road, you

will be following first D. H. Hill’s line of march at Gaines’s

Mill, and then Jackson’s route after the battle. At about 0.7

mile there is a historical marker noting Sykes’s advanced

line during the battle of Gaines’s Mill. A second historical

marker at 0.9 mile and old quaker road (the remnant of the

road from New Cold Harbor) at the 1.0 mile mark indicates

the right end of Sykes’s main line. Proceed a total of about

3.4 miles until just after you cross the Chickahominy River,

where a large parking area lies on your right. Pull into the

parking area, and face the river. If you wish, walk to the

bridge for a better view.

Orientation You are a few hundred yards upstream of a historical ford of

the Chickahominy River called Grapevine Ford because the

river twists and turns so much in this area. A bridge erected

across the Chickahominy in this area took the name Grape-

vine Bridge, though, as we will see, it no longer existed when

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the Army of the Potomac reached the area in the middle of

May. At this point, where Route 156 crosses the river, stood

Alexander’s Bridge, another important bridge during the

Seven Days, if less well known than Grapevine Bridge. If you

are here at low water, you’ll note that the Chickahominy

presents few obstacles. If you are here at high water, you will

see what the armies faced in the spring of 1862.

What Happened In late May 1862, men from Edwin Sumner’s corps built sev-

eral bridges, including one officially known as Sumner’s Up-

per Bridge but usually referred to by soldiers as Grapevine

Bridge for the old one that had occupied the spot. They then

used Grapevine Bridge to cross a rain-swollen river during

the battle of Seven Pines just before it was washed away. It

was rebuilt in June, at the same time as Alexander’s Bridge

was built. The two bridges became a focal point during two

days in late June. On June 27, they were the points at which

Porter’s corps would cross the Chickahominy after the bat-

tle of Gaines’s Mill. Porter arranged his line to cover them,

and both were used by the weary Yankees on the night of

June 27–28.

The second day during which the bridges became impor-

tant was June 29. Lee’s pursuit of the retreating McClellan was

by then in full swing. Stonewall Jackson’s part was to cross at

Grapevine Bridge, keep close to the Chickahominy, and at-

tempt to turn the Federals’ eastern flank. To do any of that,

Jackson had to use Grapevine and Alexander’s bridges, which

the Northerners had destroyed after they had crossed. Jackson

employed various bands of people to attempt the construc-

tion of both bridges, but it took most of the day to get Grape-

vine Bridge repaired and all day to get Alexander’s Bridge

repaired. His men would not cross the Chickahominy until

dawn on June 30.

Analysis McClellan’s plan for Porter’s withdrawal meant Grapevine

and Alexander’s bridges were vital to Porter’s safety. If a

Confederate force could reach at least one, Porter would be

in danger of being cut off from the rest of the Army of the

Potomac. An early breakthrough would have accomplished

that, but by the time the breakthrough did come it was too

late, and the Rebels were too exhausted and disorganized to

try to seize the bridges. The crossing took most of the night.

Much has been written about Jackson’s delay at Grapevine

Bridge (actually both Grapevine and Alexander’s bridges) on

June 29. Most of the words have been critical of Stonewall.

Also, much has been said about Jackson’s failure to support

Magruder on June 29. Stonewall told Prince John that he had

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“other important duty.” That phrase, which has caused much

comment, was the result of Jackson’s need to support Jeb Stu-

art’s cavalry in the unlikely event that McClellan tried to re-

treat down the Peninsula instead of to the James River.

The simple truth has been obscured by this commentary.

Jackson was attempting to rebuild two bridges, both of which

had been damaged. Alexander’s Bridge had taken the Yan-

kees five days to build, so getting it repaired in one day was

an accomplishment, and Jackson needed both bridges for a

swift crossing. Even Grapevine Bridge, not as sturdy a struc-

ture, would take several hours to repair. In reality, if Lee had

wanted Jackson to cross the river on June 29, the bridges

should have been repaired on June 28—but Yankees were in

position south of the river to disrupt any bridge building on

June 28.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 149–50, 206–11; Sears, To

the Gates of Richmond, 252, 268– 69.

Optional Excursion To view the north end of the Union line south of the Chicka-

hominy, as well as the area of the actions at the Garnett and

Gouldin farms, return to Route 156, which is now airport

drive north. Turn right and proceed about 1.3 miles to north

washington street. Turn right, and continue about 0.6 mile

until where washington street makes a left turn. The road

is wide here, but the land is private, so park in a convenient

spot but stay on the side of the road as you get out. Turn to

optional excursion 2, Confusion on the Farms.

To Proceed on the Return to Route 156. Turn right and proceed 0.2 mile to old

Secondary Tour hanover road. Turn left and then in 0.1 mile turn left onto

grapevine road. Proceed 1.3 miles to meadow road. Turn left

and proceed on meadow road as it crosses under Interstate

64 and intersects with Route 60. Continue straight on meadow

road, now Route 156, as it turns into elko road. As you pass

portugee road on your right at about 5.8 miles you are pass-

ing the area in which Jackson’s artillery was located. After a

total of about 6.3 miles turn into the pull-off on your right

just before the bridge over White Oak Swamp. Get out of your

car, and turn in this guide to stop 9, The Fizzle at White Oak

Swamp.

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STOP 8 McClellan’s Headquarters

Directions Return to Route 156. Turn right and proceed 0.2 mile to old ha-

nover road. Turn left and then in 0.1 mile turn left onto grape-

vine road. Proceed about 0.3 miles until you see the Civil War

Trails marker. Pull off at the marker to your right, get out of

your car, and face toward the two-story house on the right of

the road. The house and grounds are private property.

Orientation You are facing the Trent house, McClellan’s headquarters

from the middle of June until after the battle of Gaines’s

Mill. Behind you and slightly to your left rear, about one mile

distant, is Grapevine Bridge. The Gaines’s Mill battlefield is

about two miles behind you and slightly to your right rear.

The northern end of the Union line south of the river is about

two miles to your right, and the Savage Station area is about

one and a half miles straight ahead.

What Happened McClellan moved his headquarters here from the north side

of the Chickahominy when Franklin’s corps shifted to the

south bank of the river. Before the Seven Days began, this

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area would have looked like a typical army headquarters,

with couriers and generals coming and going, telegraph lines

extending, and the hustle and bustle of running an army.

On the night of June 26, after Mechanicsville, McClellan

returned to the Trent house after meeting with Porter. It

was then that he set in motion what he called the “change of

base” but what would in reality be a retreat from the gates

of Richmond. The next day McClellan heard reports from

his commanders on the south side of the river of possible at-

tacks—evidence of the success of the Rebel demonstrations.

He did send Slocum’s division and two brigades of Richard-

son’s division to Porter, but he stopped Slocum before eventu-

ally ordering the move, and the other two brigades were too

late to affect the outcome of Gaines’s Mill.

In the evening of June 27, his camp already relocated from

the Trent house, McClellan sat on a stump awaiting word of

the outcome at Gaines’s Mill. After getting it from several

sources, he then called his corps commanders together to tell

them they would be heading to the James River. Keyes’s men

would lead the way, followed by Porter and the Artillery Re-

serve. Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin would hold their

positions on June 28, then begin their retreat. The meeting

broke up, and McClellan left for Savage Station.

The Trent house had not seen everything, however. Por-

ter’s exhausted men crossed the Chickahominy during the

night of June 27–28 and camped, if it could be called that,

around the Trent house before leaving in the afternoon and

evening of June 28.

Analysis McClellan’s decision deserves consideration from two dif-

ferent points of view. The first is his. He thought Lee out-

numbered him nearly two to one. Therefore, if Porter was

substantially outnumbered on the north bank, he also was

substantially outnumbered on the south bank. He could ac-

complish nothing by attacking toward Richmond and in fact

risked annihilation if he did so, with the Rebel host north of

the river ready to pounce on his rear. He couldn’t try to move

everyone north of the river—there weren’t enough crossings,

and nothing could be done against an enemy that had the

roads to White House Landing covered. He had to move to-

ward the James, and so he decided to move his base as far

forward on the James as possible and race the Confederates

there. He would have a head start, and perhaps he could beat

the Southern hordes.

The second perspective is that of reality. If Lee did outnum-

ber McClellan, he did so by at most a few thousand men.

Porter was outnumbered, but McClellan’s advantage on the

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south bank was about three to one. A movement toward

Richmond would have forced Lee into a very tight spot and

perhaps have led to the annihilation, not of the Army of the

Potomac, but of the Army of Northern Virginia, if McClellan

had been willing to live off the land and as many of his accu-

mulated supplies as his men could carry for a few days.

No simple explanation for McClellan’s belief concerning

the relative strengths of the two armies is convincing. It is

likely a combination of factors. Whatever its cause, that be-

lief almost certainly prolonged the war and led to its meta-

morphosis from a conservative restore-the-Union objective to

a more revolutionary abolish-slavery mission.

Vignette During the battle of Gaines’s Mill, parts of the south bank of

the Chickahominy, including the Trent house area, were cov-

ered by an acoustic shadow (when the movement of sound

waves is affected by vegetation, wind, or other atmospheric

conditions). People only two miles from the battlefield at the

Union headquarters heard no musketry throughout the day.

They could see the artillery shells bursting, but they could

hear little. This was not unusual along the Chickahominy, ap-

parently; a similar phenomenon prevented Joe Johnston from

hearing the sounds of the battle of Seven Pines. However, in

Richmond the sounds of the battle were plain.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 79– 81, 88–91, 147–50;

Dowdey, The Seven Days, 206–10, 253–55; Sears, To the Gates of

Richmond, 215–17, 227, 233–34, 250.

89 McClellan’s Headquarters

Woodbury’s Bridge across

the Chickahominy. From

a war-time photograph.

blcw 2:383

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Overview of the Fourth and Fifth Days, June 28 and 29, 1862

June 28 was to be a day of rest for most Confederates but

a day of movement for many Federals, as McClellan’s army

began its retreat and Lee waited to see which way his op-

ponent was retreating. Signs of the retreat were obvious to

the Confederate commander—including smoke from the

various fires set by the Yankees—but he needed to be sure

of the direction before he moved his force. Aside from some

reconnaissances, including sending Richard Ewell’s division

and Stuart’s cavalry to Dispatch Station on the railroad from

White House Landing to Savage Station, he could do little

but wait. Stuart continued along the railroad to the vicinity

of White House, where he saw the flames from the burning

house and supplies. Ewell moved to Bottom’s Bridge over the

Chickahominy, where he was shelled by Union artillery.

South of the Chickahominy, another confusion-wrapped

Confederate attack occurred near Garnett’s and Gouldin’s

farms, close to the site of the previous day’s attack. This was

no more successful than the one of the night before. Other-

wise, the day saw much of Erasmus Keyes’s corps crossing a

small watercourse called White Oak Swamp so as to cover

the Army of the Potomac’s trains. Porter’s men started to-

ward the James River in the afternoon. The Artillery Reserve

rolled out during the night, and the rest of the army moved

back to a position covering Savage Station during the night

of June 28 and the early morning of June 29.

Lee had formed his plan for pursuit on the evening of

June 28. Longstreet and A. P. Hill would march south and east

to cut off the Yankees from the James River. Jackson and D. H.

Hill would cross the Chickahominy and stay north and east

of the Federals, herding them toward Longstreet and A. P. Hill

and perhaps flanking them. Magruder and Huger would, on

June 29, slow the Union retreat by fixing the Army of the

Potomac’s rear guard as much as possible.

As happened often during the Seven Days, Lee’s plans were

imperfectly carried out. Through a mix-up in orders, Jackson

perceived his duty to be to stay north of the Chickahominy

so as to protect against a Union move straight east instead

of southeast. Longstreet and A. P. Hill did their jobs, position-

ing their troops to cut the Union line of retreat by marching

nearly 20 miles in the stifling heat. Huger spent much of the

day marching back and forth between roads in response to

various orders. Magruder was alternately too cautious and too

aggressive. The aggression finally won out when he ordered

an attack on the Federal position in front of Savage Station.

90 Overview of the Fourth and Fifth Days

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McClellan had left both Sumner’s and Heintzelman’s corps

and Baldy Smith’s division in place at Savage Station as the

rear guard, so Magruder’s attack could have been a disaster

for the Confederates. Fortunately for them, Heintzelman had

decided there were plenty of Yankees at Savage Station, so he

moved his men south of White Oak Swamp. When Magruder

attacked, the result was a bloody draw.

Meanwhile, the rest of the Army of the Potomac was mov-

ing toward the James River. Keyes’s men continued south past

Malvern Hill, along with the trains. Porter’s corps reached

the Glendale crossroads, joined in the area by Heintzelman’s

corps and Slocum’s division. After Savage Station, the rest

of the army pulled out and headed for White Oak Swamp,

the last units crossing the swamp early in the morning of

June 30.

91 Overview of the Fourth and Fifth Days

Union field-hospital at Savage’s Station. From a photograph. blcw 2:387

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STOP 9 The Mess at Savage Station

Directions Continue on grapevine road about 1.0 mile until it runs into

meadow road. Turn left, proceed 0.1 mile, and park at the his-

torical markers on your right. Face southeast, over the fields

bounded by Interstate 295, meadow road, and the railroad in

the distance.

Orientation You are facing Savage Station on the Richmond and York

River Railroad. Savage Station, actually the Savage house,

was located at the far corner of the field marked on your left

front by a line of evergreens. The station was McClellan’s pri-

mary forward supply depot and the location of a large Union

field hospital in the fields you can see before you. To your

right front, on the south side of the railroad, was the location

of the battle of Savage Station. The Federals retreated and

the Confederates advanced from your right between the rail-

road and Williamsburg Road farther south. Unfortunately,

the battlefield has been altered forever by the interchange of

Interstates 295 and 64 to your right front, where the bridge

is, and this is as good a view as there is. The construction led

92 Stop 9

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to the relocation from their original spots of many of the

historical markers you see here, so they now provide inac-

curate distances and directions. At the time this guide was

written, for example, the Civil War Trails map places you in

the wrong location—you are to the right of the 42nd New

York’s position.

What Happened During the night of June 28–29 the remaining Federals pulled

back from their lines west of Seven Pines and retreated to

the area around Savage Station. Their mission was to delay

the Confederate pursuit. This would allow more time for the

rest of the Army of the Potomac to march toward the James

River and the supplies at the station to be destroyed before

the complete evacuation. The Confederates moved forward

slowly and with much confusion among the commanders.

Huger was first ordered to pursue along Charles City Road,

south of Williamsburg Road. Then he was ordered to assist

Magruder’s advance along Williamsburg Road, if needed, but

to return to Charles City Road if not. He finally moved down

Charles City Road, but the confusion cost valuable time.

Magruder also waited for Stonewall Jackson’s support, but it

was not forthcoming, as Jackson was busy repairing bridges

across the Chickahominy.

Similar confusion marred the Union command. Heintzel-

man considered his command to be independent of Sumner’s

orders, while Sumner considered himself the commander on

the field, since McClellan was farther along with the retreat-

ing forces. Sumner ordered Heintzelman to cover Williams-

burg Road, but Heintzelman decided there were too many

troops in the Savage Station area and withdrew.

When Magruder moved forward, his force—Brig. Gen. Jo-

seph Kershaw’s brigade and the 1st Georgia Regulars—ran

into a picket force composed of the 5th New Hampshire

and 53rd and 71st Pennsylvania near Allen’s farm. Once

that encounter was over, Magruder waited until late after-

noon. Then, with Huger gone and Jackson’s bridge building

continuing, Magruder launched an attack on the Yankees at

Savage Station. North of Williamsburg Road, the 2nd, 3rd,

and 7th South Carolina of Kershaw’s brigade initially made

headway against the 72nd and 106th Pennsylvania, but the

5th New Hampshire, 15th Massachusetts, 1st Minnesota,

82nd and 88th New York, and 69th Pennsylvania helped

drive the South Carolinians back. South of the road, the 10th

Georgia, 5th Louisiana, and 32nd Virginia of Brig. Gen. Paul

Semmes’s brigade slugged it out with the Vermonters of Wil-

liam Brooks’s brigade in a savage close-range musket fight. Fi-

nally, the Confederate attacks stopped, and during the night

93 The Mess at Savage Station

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the Northerners continued their retreat, leaving thousands

of wounded comrades to be captured by their enemy. The

battle had produced nearly 1,400 casualties, about 450 Rebel

and more than 900 Yankee.

Analysis The day of Savage Station showed the best side of few high-

level commanders on either side. However, particularly on

the Rebel side it is hard to imagine that much more could

have been done than was actually achieved, which was to

pin the Yankees down as much as possible. Heintzelman’s ini-

tiative was all that prevented three Union corps from being

held in the Savage Station area all day. On the other hand,

his withdrawal eliminated the possibility of a counterattack

and a severe handling of Magruder’s smaller force. Huger’s de-

lay slowed the pursuit, which was an important part of Lee’s

plan. And the engagement at Savage Station was a useless

sacrifice of life.

Vignette The Rev. J. J. Marks, a chaplain in Kearny’s division, was a

prominent figure at the field hospital at Savage Station. Told

of the retreat, he agonized over what to do, even consulting

Samuel Heintzelman—who told Marks no orders kept the

chaplain at the hospital. Even so, Marks decided to stay with

the wounded but advised every man who could walk to leave

before the Rebels captured the place. Leaving to get supplies,

he saw a long line of wounded, some supporting each other,

others carried by two men, some falling and struggling back

to their feet. Later, when Heintzelman and his staff departed,

all realized that the invalids were to be left. Fathers parted

with sons, and friends with friends. The invalids cried out,

and some struggled with renewed strength to escape cer-

tain capture. Marks later remembered, “Poor fellows! they

thought this was the last drop in the cup of bitterness, but

there were yet many to be added.”

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 151–52, 212–21; Dowdey,

The Seven Days, 256–57, 266– 81; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond,

250–51, 266–74.

94 Stop 9

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Overview of the Sixth Day, June 30, 1862

By mid-morning of June 30, all of McClellan’s men were

south of White Oak Swamp, but they were stretched from

just south of White Oak Swamp Bridge to Haxall’s Landing

on the James River, a distance of more than five miles. Seven

of the army’s 11 divisions and one brigade of another were

posted around the Glendale crossroads. This position was

critical to the Army of the Potomac because any troops north

or northwest of the crossroads would need to march through

it to reach the James River, and it was at least possible that

capturing the crossroads would mean capturing part of the

army’s trains.

Lee recognized Glendale’s importance, and his plan

for June 30 was an attempt to capture it and ruin half of

McClellan’s army. Jackson and D. H. Hill, having crossed the

Chickahominy early that morning, would march to White

Oak Swamp Bridge to at least fix in place the Union force

guarding it. Huger would march down Charles City Road to-

ward Glendale and engage any force in his front. Longstreet

and A. P. Hill, supported by Magruder if the latter’s men could

reach the field in time, would drive for the crossroads in an

attempt to cut the vital Willis Church Road that ran from

Glendale southward to Malvern Hill. Maj. Gen. Theophilus

Holmes, with troops from the Department of North Carolina,

would advance down River Road to engage the Yankees on

Malvern Hill. If all went as planned, Longstreet and A. P. Hill’s

attack would cut off many of the Union divisions around

Glendale.

Unfortunately for Lee, very little went as he planned on per-

haps the most crucial of the Seven Days. Jackson launched a

surprise artillery barrage on men from Smith’s, Richardson’s,

and John Peck’s divisions at White Oak Swamp Bridge. Wil-

liam Franklin, in charge at the bridge, at first thought a full-

scale attack was coming, and he called for reinforcements

from the Glendale area. In McClellan’s absence—the Union

commander was on a gunboat on the James River examining

possible campsites—Sumner and Heintzelman rushed troops

to Franklin. But Jackson never attacked with infantry. Indeed,

exhausted by his exertions the previous two weeks he fell

asleep during the engagement.

Huger encountered obstacles both human and nonhuman

on Charles City Road. He made a half-hearted attack on Slo-

cum’s division after spending much of the day cutting a new

road through the forest because trees obstructed the main

road. Holmes failed in a situation where failure was the only

option—as he approached Malvern Hill the Federal artillery

95 Overview of the Sixth Day

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on top of the hill broke and scattered his men. Magruder,

caught in a web of countervailing orders, marched all over

this section of the Peninsula but never got in position to help

the Southern cause.

As a result of these failures, the Yankees at Glendale did

not need to send reinforcements to other threatened areas,

and in fact were able to receive reinforcements. That became

important when first Longstreet’s division and then A. P. Hill’s

division attacked at Glendale. McCall’s division took the first

blows, and (fought out after hard work at Beaver Dam Creek

and Gaines’s Mill) was forced back, in some cases in disorder.

At one point, Confederates approached the Willis Church

road. But reinforcements from Franklin at White Oak Swamp

Bridge and Slocum on Charles City Road arrived just in time

to force the Rebels back. Lee had struck hard at Glendale and

had almost succeeded without any other part of his plan

working, but almost was not close enough.

For the second night in a row and the third thus far in

these series of battles, the Army of the Potomac withdrew

from a field it had held during battle. Hooker’s division, the

last to leave, vacated its position at daylight on July 1, march-

ing toward Malvern Hill.

96 Overview of the Sixth Day

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STOP 10 The Fizzle at White Oak Swamp

Directions Proceed on meadow road. The farm lane to your right at 0.1

mile is the historical road trace to Savage Station. Continue on

Meadow Road as it crosses over Interstate 64 and intersects

with Route 60. Continue straight on meadow road, now Route

156, as it turns into elko road. You are following Jackson’s

route to White Oak Swamp. As you pass portugee road on

your right at about 5.5 miles you are passing the area in

which Jackson’s artillery was located. After traveling a total

of about 6.0 miles, turn into the pull-off on your right just

before the bridge over White Oak Swamp. Get out of your car,

proceed to the markers, and face south toward White Oak

Swamp.

Orientation You are seeing what Stonewall Jackson and his men saw on

June 30. They had marched down the road you followed on

the route from Savage Station, as had many of their Yankee

opponents. Those Yankees were straight ahead and to your

right front on the hills south of White Oak Swamp. Aside

97 The Fizzle at White Oak Swamp

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from some modern houses, the area along and south of the

swamp today looks much as it did in 1862. However, north of

the swamp the ground was relatively open in 1862 compared

with today.

What Happened Stonewall Jackson’s basic task on June 30 was the same as the

day before: to follow Lee’s orders to keep the Federals from

escaping to the east and, if possible, engage them. This day,

however, he was able to cross the Chickahominy and move

south and east. He found the Federal rearguard here. Set-

ting up about 30 guns undetected by the weary Northerners

(many of whom had marched all night), he opened fire in the

early afternoon. After much confusion, the Yankees began

to fire back, and a sometimes energetic, sometimes desul-

tory artillery duel waged for the next several hours. Jackson

tried to repair the bridge across the swamp, but his pioneers

wouldn’t work under the artillery and infantry fire. Several

fords were available, including one to the east, discovered by

Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, at which Jackson ordered a bridge

built. However, no Southerners crossed the swamp perma-

nently on June 30.

Analysis Jackson’s performance, or lack thereof, at White Oak Swamp is

the single most criticized event of his military career. Stone-

wall’s overall performance during the Seven Days came un-

der intense scrutiny almost from the time of the battles, but

most of these criticisms are easily countered. His inaction on

June 30 is not. He did not press the issue at a time when pres-

sure was necessary. He did not take advantage of the fords.

He did not follow up the surprise he had gained. He did not

reward his subordinates’ energy. In short, he failed utterly to

accomplish anything. The result was that 10,000 Federals un-

der Franklin’s command were able to move from the swamp

area to reinforce their comrades at Glendale, possibly saving

McClellan from a disastrous defeat.

Vignette After Hampton had built a bridge at the ford he had found east

of White Oak Swamp Bridge—a ford that apparently flanked

the Federals south of White Oak Swamp—he returned to re-

port to Jackson. The bridge was finished, Hampton said, and

the Yankees were there waiting to be attacked. “He sat in si-

lence for some time,” Hampton wrote later of Jackson, “then

rose and walked off in silence.”

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 251– 63; Dowdey, The

Seven Days, 308–15; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 285– 89.

98 Stop 10

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To Proceed with the Proceed on elko road about 1.3 miles until you reach charles

Secondary Tour city road. Turn right (following Route 156), and proceed

1.2 miles to the intersection of charles city, darbytown,

and willis church roads (the Glendale intersection). Turn

left onto willis church road (Route 156), and proceed 2.2

miles to the parking lot for the Parsonage. Turn left into the

parking lot, and then turn in this guide to stop 13, Jackson at

Malvern Hill.

99 The Fizzle at White Oak Swamp

“Captured by Stonewall

Jackson himself.”

blcw 2:360

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STOP 11 The Action on Long Bridge Road

Directions Proceed on elko road. At about 0.5 mile you will pass the

Union position at White Oak Swamp. At 0.6 mile, turn left

onto hines road. At 2.0 miles, hines road will intersect with

charles city road. Turn right onto charles city road. As

you are driving on charles city road you are in the rear of

the Union position at Glendale. At 0.4 mile you will cross

a stream, and in another 0.3 mile you will see a field on

your right. In this field Slocum’s division was positioned

on June 30. After turning onto charles city road, proceed

about 1.9 miles and then turn left onto gill dale road. Pro-

ceed 1.7 miles until gill dale road intersects with darby-

town road. Turn left and proceed 1.0 miles on darbytown

road until its junction with carter’s mill road. Turn right

onto carter’s mill road, and proceed 0.6 mile to a Y inter-

section at which carter’s mill road turns into long bridge

road. Take long bridge road 0.1 mile to the Gravel Hill

Recreation Center on your left. Turn into the recreation cen-

ter, and face down long bridge road, now the right fork

in the Y.

Orientation You are on the line of advance of Longstreet’s and A. P. Hill’s

divisions toward the battle of Glendale. They approached on

Long Bridge Road from directly behind you. The Union line

was straight ahead of you and to your right front about a half

mile distant.

What Happened Lee’s plan called for Confederate forces to concentrate around

the Glendale crossroads, with Jackson approaching from the

north, Huger from the northwest on Charles City Road, and

Longstreet and A. P. Hill (after an all-day march on June 29)

from the southwest up Long Bridge Road. Huger was delayed

by several factors, including his own caution and Slocum’s

division, which was posted on Charles City Road in the area

you drove through on the way to this stop.

When Longstreet attacked, he met McCall’s division on the

front line. The first attacks came from Micah Jenkins, leading

R. H. Anderson’s brigade. The South Carolinians hit the 1st and

9th Pennsylvania Reserves. A savage struggle ensued over a

Union battery, which eventually was left standing and silent

between the two exhausted armies.

Brig. Gen. James Kemper’s Virginia brigade then attacked on

Jenkins’s right, breaking the 12th Pennsylvania Reserves and

capturing some guns. Countercharges from the 5th, 8th, and

10th Pennsylvania Reserves forced the Confederates back,

101 The Action on Long Bridge Road

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but Branch’s and Pickett’s men (Pickett’s brigade commanded by

Col. John Strange) broke the Yankees again.

Wilcox’s brigade advanced on Jenkins’s left. The 9th and

10th Alabama regiments supported Jenkins, while the 8th and

11th Alabama engaged the 4th, 7th, and 11th Pennsylvania

Reserves in another hand-to-hand, back-and-forth struggle

for another Federal battery. Again, the guns ultimately re-

mained silent between the two spent lines. Further to the

left, Pryor and Featherston advanced to engage elements of

Kearny’s division.

With Longstreet’s division committed, A. P. Hill’s men

formed the next wave. Archer’s and Pender’s men charged over

the ground fought over by the brigades of Kemper, Branch, and

Pickett. J. R. Anderson’s men drove along Long Bridge Road, and

Gregg’s and Field’s brigades advanced to the left of the road.

Field’s Virginians retook the Union batteries, but all of these

attacks were stalled by Union reinforcements and darkness.

Analysis Lee’s plan hinged on Jackson and Huger at least keeping the

forces in front of them occupied while Longstreet and A. P.

Hill drove toward Willis Church Road with a numerical ad-

vantage. Neither Jackson nor Huger did the job, however, and

Longstreet and Hill wound up fighting at a numerical disad-

vantage. Fighting as hard as any soldiers in the war, their

men succeeded in pushing back and at times breaking the

Federal front line. They simply did not have the manpower

to exploit their advantage.

Confederate problems were almost equaled by the Yankee

line of battle, which put McCall’s exhausted division in the

front lines. McCall’s men had fought hard at both Mechan-

icsville and Gaines’s Mill, losing nearly 2,000 men in those

battles, and they had marched as hard as anyone else in the

army. They should have formed the reserve, not the advance

post. They fought as long as one could reasonably expect, and

in many cases they did not break completely. Nevertheless,

fresh troops might have been able to hold out longer. This

mistake almost cost the Yankees the battle.

Vignette Near the end of the battle, McCall rounded up some men in

an attempt to retake several Union guns. As they rode ahead

on Long Bridge Road, they encountered some soldiers. “What

command is this?” McCall asked. “General Field’s, sir,” came

the reply. “General Field! I don’t know him,” McCall said. “Per-

haps not, as you are evidently in the wrong place,” answered

Lt. W. Roy Mason of Field’s staff, promptly taking McCall pris-

oner—the highest-ranking general on either side to be cap-

tured during the Seven Days.

102 Stop 11

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Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 266– 67, 275– 85, 288–

97; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 298–303; Sears, To the Gates of Rich-

mond, 293–99, 302– 6.

103 The Action on Long Bridge Road

Major-General Benjamin

Huger, C.S.A. From a

photograph. blcw 2:212

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STOP 12 The Second Union Line at Glendale

Directions Return to long bridge road, turning right out of the recre-

ation center and proceeding straight through the intersection

with carter’s mill road. As you drive, you will be traveling

through the Glendale battlefield. At about 0.6 mile, a stone

marker on the right will mark the approximate area of the

Union artillery discussed in stop 11. After a total of about

1.1 miles from the recreation center you will reach darby-

town road. Turn right on that road, and proceed 0.4 miles to

the intersection of the charles city, darbytown, and willis

church roads. This is the Glendale intersection. Turn right

onto willis church road (Route 156), and proceed about 0.7

mile. On your left will be the Glendale–Malvern Hill Visitor

Center of the Richmond National Battlefield Park and Glen-

dale National Cemetery. Park there, get out of your car, and

walk to a convenient point where you can see both north and

west. Face west, toward willis church road.

Orientation You are looking across toward what became the second

and main Union line at the battle of Glendale. In this area,

Hooker’s division was positioned west and southwest of

Willis Church, which is on your left front. Brig. Gen. John

Sedgwick’s division and elements of Richardson’s division

eventually formed on your right front. The ground in 1862

was a bit more open than it is today, although as one moved

west through the battlefield straight ahead the trees became

thicker, more as they are now. The ground is rolling, with

small streams coursing through the low areas.

Unfortunately, this orientation, along with the drive along

Long Bridge Road from stop 11 to this position, is as much

as you can easily see of the battlefield at Glendale. Few ma-

jor Civil War battlefields are in the condition of Glendale.

Though most of the battlefield largely resembles its appear-

ance in 1862, much of it is in private hands and inaccessible.

The National Park Service does own land on the southern

part of the battlefield and hopes to open access to it. Check

with the National Park Service at the beginning of your tour,

and if access is possible by all means take advantage of the

opportunity to see part of one of the most important battle-

fields in the Civil War.

What Happened Hooker attacked Strange’s men in the flank and forced them

back. Sedgwick’s division, which originally had been in re-

serve at Glendale but moved to reinforce Franklin at White

Oak Swamp, moved back to Glendale at the double-quick

104 Stop 12

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when fighting started there. Sedgwick’s men advanced across

the fields to your right to stop Branch’s advance. The Confeder-

ate brigades had come close to taking Willis Church Road but

could not sustain their positions against the counterattacks.

During A. P. Hill’s assault, some of Hooker’s men, partic-

ularly the 1st Massachusetts and 26th Pennsylvania, along

with the 15th Massachusetts, battled Archer’s brigade to a

standstill across the road and past Willis Church to your

left front. Pender’s attack to your right front was stopped by

Sedgwick’s force, particularly the 1st Minnesota and 72nd

Pennsylvania. Anderson’s advance most likely was stopped by

George Taylor’s New Jersey troops, who moved from Slocum’s

line on Charles City Road to help stop the Rebels at Glen-

dale. At the end of the day, the Confederates held McCall’s

old positions and some guns, but little else had changed. In

particular, Willis Church Road—the vital Union line of re-

treat—remained in Federal hands. That night, the Yankees

withdrew south to Malvern Hill.

Analysis Cooperation among the Union corps commanders in the

area helped keep Glendale from becoming a Union defeat.

Again, McClellan was not in the important area. No one was

in overall command, but Sumner, Heintzelman, and Frank-

lin did not stand on ceremony and worked well together. In

particular, Franklin (once Jackson’s artillery barrage proved to

be relatively harmless) released four brigades to reinforce the

force at Glendale—Sedgwick’s and Richardson’s men. These

brigades kept the battle from being a Union disaster by arriv-

ing just in time to stop the most serious breakthrough of the

day by Branch and Strange. The day had cost the Northerners

about 2,800 killed and wounded and the Southerners about

3,500. The Federals lost 16 guns in the battle.

The importance of Glendale lies in what it could have ac-

complished. If Lee could have taken a position across Willis

Church Road and held it, he could have seriously hurt or

even destroyed more than three full army corps. He had set

the situation beforehand as well as he could. He was let down

in part by his choice of where to position himself—he stayed

with Longstreet and A. P. Hill, only moving south to Holmes’s

sector along River Road. He easily could have traveled north

and checked with Huger or Jackson. Mostly, however, he was

let down by the failings of others—and at least partially by

the valor of the Army of the Potomac. The Confederate artil-

lerist E. P. Alexander later wrote of his belief that “no one day

of the whole four years would seem to [Lee] more unfortu-

nate than June 30, 1862.”

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Vignette As the 15th Massachusetts moved from White Oak Swamp to

help hold the line at Glendale, it passed Edwin Sumner, who

was helping to direct units near Glendale. When he saw the

Bay Staters, Sumner shouted, “Go in, boys, for the honor of

old Massachusetts! I have been hit twice this afternoon, but

it is nothing when you get used to it.”

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 285–97; Dowdey, The

Seven Days, 293–303; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 293–306.

106 Stop 12

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Overview of the Seventh Day, July 1, 1862

As Lee moved his army south toward Malvern Hill on the

morning of July 1, he was confronted with a united Army of

the Potomac, artillery and infantry at the ready. Lee decided

to investigate before he attacked. Malvern Hill was a low hill

when viewed from the north, but it was steep on the east,

west, and south, and the northern approach was through

cleared fields, giving guns of all sorts clear lines of sight in

almost any direction. It was the most formidable position

that Lee’s men had faced during the Seven Days, and the com-

mander wanted to be sure there was a vulnerable place in the

Union line before he ordered an advance.

There were very few such places. Artillery was spread

throughout the line, spaced far enough apart that the pieces

could be oriented in several different directions easily. In-

fantry rested behind the frontline artillery, with larger guns

in the rear. Navy gunboats were ready to add their fire if

needed.

The Confederate reconnaissance, conducted by Lee and

Longstreet as the Rebels continued to arrive, showed the Yan-

kees’ strength. But it seemed possible, if enough Confederate

guns could be gathered, to bring a converging fire onto the

top of the hill and force the Federals off it. They could then

be attacked by infantry. The Southerners tried to gather the

guns, but the Union artillery prevented the needed concen-

tration by quickly knocking the guns out of action.

Lee had also ordered the Southern infantry to charge when

they heard a cheer from a forward-placed unit. Through a

combination of unfortunate circumstances, some of Magrud-

er’s troops charged the line, an unplanned cheer was raised,

and D. H. Hill, hearing the yells, ordered his division to the

attack.

The result was a slaughterhouse. Successive Confederate

brigades attacked without coordination, and the Union de-

fense, well handled by Porter and Darius Couch of the infan-

try and Col. Henry Hunt of the Artillery Reserve (McClellan

again being absent from the field most of the day), broke

every assault relatively easily. Union reinforcements were

summoned and arrived at the right place at the right time

in every area of fighting. Only once did the Rebels get to the

Union line, and then just briefly before they were thrown

back. The battle continued until after dark, and the result

was one of the most complete defeats suffered by any army

in the war.

Porter and others wanted to use the victory as a basis for

attacking Richmond. But McClellan, worried about supplies

107 Overview of the Seventh Day

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and burdened with the illusion of great Confederate num-

bers, ordered the Army of the Potomac to continue its march

to Harrison’s Landing on the James River. The fighting of the

Seven Days was over.

108 Overview of the Seventh Day

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STOP 13 Jackson at Malvern Hill

Directions Proceed on willis church road south about 1.5 miles until

you see the sign for the parsonage. You are following the path

of Jackson’s men to Malvern Hill. Turn left into the parking

area. Cross the road to the marker near the ruins of the Wil-

lis Church parsonage. Face southwest toward Malvern Hill.

Orientation You are standing near the right of Stonewall Jackson’s line dur-

ing the battle of Malvern Hill. The line stretched out to your

left through the Poindexter farm. The Confederate artillery

deployed to your left in the same field. D. H. Hill’s division

took its place straight ahead of you and to your left front, and

Magruder’s force was to your right across Carter’s Mill Road.

The Union line was on top of the hill to your left front and

straight ahead. The area is much as it was at the time of the

battle, wooded to the right of Willis Church road and open

to the left of it.

What Happened Lee’s plan for July 1 was to bring Jackson’s, Magruder’s, and

Huger’s relatively fresh troops to the front lines, probe for

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a weak spot, and capitalize on it if found. Jackson marched

down Willis Church Road. When his lead unit, Whiting’s divi-

sion, reached the parsonage it began receiving shells from

the Yankee artillery. At that point, Jackson received an order

from Lee to mass artillery on his front. This was part of an ef-

fort, devised by Longstreet and Lee, to bring more than 100 can-

non together on Magruder’s and Jackson’s front so as to place

the Yankees under a converging fire. Success would mean the

Northerners would need to withdraw.

Jackson tried to do his part, eventually running parts of six

batteries into the Poindexter field. However, these 20 guns

were ineffective against the Union artillery already in place

on Malvern Hill. They all had been withdrawn by the end of

the day.

As part of his plan to take advantage of any opportunities,

Lee had ordered his generals to advance their units if they

heard a yell from Brig. Gen. Lewis Armistead’s brigade, well ad-

vanced on the right side of the line. D. H. Hill and his brigade

commanders were in conference when a yell was heard. Hill

launched attacks from this general area toward the Union

line on the east side of Willis Church Road. Those attacks

were uniformly decimated by the Yankees, and Hill lost more

than 1,700 men.

Hill called for reinforcements, and Jackson sent Ewell’s di-

vision and his own division, now commanded by Brig. Gen.

Charles Winder. Ewell sent Jubal Early’s brigade to support Hill

but ordered it not to charge. The 6th, 7th, and 8th Louisiana

of the brigade commanded by Col. Leroy Stafford, along with

part of the 13th Georgia of Brig. Gen. Alexander Lawton’s bri-

gade of Jackson’s division, got to within 20 paces of the Union

line on Malvern Hill before they were stopped. Brig. Gen.

Isaac Trimble’s brigade reached the field late and did not ad-

vance on the Federals.

Winder’s own brigade fragmented during the advance, as

did Lawton’s. Few of these troops actually charged the North-

ern line. None of the rest of Jackson’s men did either, although

some took position on Malvern Hill late in the day.

Analysis Malvern Hill has sometimes been characterized as a battle

brought on by Lee’s frustration over his failure the day be-

fore. It is better described as a tragedy of errors. Lee was cau-

tious. He did not order a general assault on the obviously

strong position before him. He put his freshest troops in the

front line, the best decision regardless of what would hap-

pen during the day. He agreed with Longstreet’s suggestion to

attempt to shell the Yankees out of their position because if

it didn’t work little would be lost. The resulting effort to con-

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centrate guns was bound to fail, but it probably was worth

the attempt.

Lee’s order to advance was to be followed only if the artil-

lery achieved success. Unfortunately, the order was terribly

crafted, relying as it did on a yell from Armistead’s advanced

force—which could come for any reason. The yell came from

other Confederates attempting an advance, and it triggered

D. H. Hill’s attack. The rest of Jackson’s moves in this area

were a result of Hill’s repulse, as Stonewall attempted to re-

inforce Hill.

Vignette Late in the day, Trimble readied his brigade to charge the

Yankee line. Jackson happened to come by and asked, “What

are you going to do, General Trimble?” Trimble responded, “I

am going to charge those batteries, sir.” Stonewall looked at

Trimble and said, “I guess you better not try it. General Hill

just tried it with his whole division and has been repelled.

I guess you better not try it, sir.” Jackson rode away, and one

soldier wrote, “We were more than delighted.”

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 316–19, 337– 40, 347– 48,

354–56; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 327–30, 341; Sears, To the

Gates of Richmond, 316–20, 333–34.

Further Exploration If you wish, this stop is a good place to embark on a walking

tour of the Malvern Hill battlefield. The tour takes about 45

minutes. You can follow the order of the rest of the stops in

this tour by heading to your right, or west, along the National

Park Service trail. You will come to the sites of stops 14, 15a,

15b, and 15c in order, then follow the trail back to the par-

sonage area. Many National Park Service markers along the

route will give you more detail about the battle. It is possible

that by the time you use this guide the Park Service will have

more trails open. If you have time, they will be well worth

exploring.

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STOP 14 Magruder at Malvern Hill

Directions Return to willis church road, and turn right, the way you

came. Proceed 2.2 miles to the Glendale intersection. Turn left

onto darbytown road, and proceed 0.5 mile to its junction

with long bridge road. Turn left onto long bridge road,

and proceed 1.1 miles to where carter’s mill road comes in

from the left. Turn left onto carter’s mill road, and proceed

1.1 miles to the turnout on the right. Pull off at the turnout,

and face southeast toward Malvern Hill. At the time this was

written the National Park Service planned to build a small

parking lot here. If it has been built, park in the lot, and walk

to the cannon in the field straight ahead.

Orientation You are standing in the area of Magruder’s attempted concen-

tration of artillery. Magruder’s infantry formed in the areas to

your left and right as well as straight ahead after advancing

down Carter’s Mill Road from behind you. The front of the

Union line was straight ahead and to your right front. The

ground here appears much as it did at the time of the battle,

although the area to your right front was open in 1862.

What Happened Magruder was ordered by Lee to march to Malvern Hill via the

Quaker Road. Unfortunately, although Lee’s map showed Wil-

lis Church Road as the Quaker Road, Magruder’s local guides

identified a different road as the Quaker Road. By the time

Magruder, Longstreet, and Lee identified the correct road and

Magruder headed down Carter’s Mill Road, Armistead’s brigade

and Brig. Gen. Ambrose Wright’s brigade, both of Huger’s divi-

sion, had filed into position along the same road.

To help concentrate the Rebel artillery, Longstreet worked to

assemble guns near this spot. Only parts of three Confederate

batteries got into action at the beginning of the battle, and

they were quickly silenced by the Northern artillery. Then

Armistead advanced the 14th, 38th, and 53rd Virginia, and

Wright followed with his brigade. Armistead got close enough

to observe Union movements easily, which is why Lee selected

him to give the signal if the artillery concentration worked.

Not only did the artillery concentration fail, but some Yan-

kee movements were misinterpreted as a retreat. As a result,

Lee ordered Magruder to move forward with his whole line,

including Huger’s division. The first charges were made by

Armistead’s men on the Union left-center. Then the 3rd and

4th Georgia, part of the 22nd Georgia, together with the 1st

Louisiana of Wright’s brigade, and followed by Brig. Gen. Wil-

liam Mahone’s brigade, aimed at the far left of the Union posi-

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tion. Then came the 16th and 24th Georgia, 2nd Louisiana,

and 15th North Carolina of Howell Cobb’s brigade and the

9th and 57th Virginia of Armistead’s brigade. These units were

either charging or firing at Yankees throughout the day, but

they achieved no lasting success.

Following this attack, Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs, Col. G. T.

Anderson, Col. William Barksdale, Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom,

Semmes, and Kershaw (in roughly that order) led their bri-

gades to the charge from this general area. None succeeded,

although some from Semmes’s 10th Louisiana reached the

Union line. Only Wright, Mahone, and Ransom aimed more or

less at a relatively vulnerable point in the Union line, near

the Crew house, and their power was not enough to put the

line in danger.

Analysis Magruder’s part in the battle of Malvern Hill was a fiasco, but

it was not all his fault. Lee’s bad maps cost the Confederates

again by sending Magruder off on a wrong road. Huger pouted

because his units were being taken from his command. Lee

ordered Magruder to attack when he should never have given

that order. However, Magruder himself was partially respon-

sible for that order by informing Lee of a Union retreat that

had not occurred.

The attacks started as simultaneous but quickly became

a series of uncoordinated assaults as Magruder fed brigades

into the attacking column. It is hard to see how even coordi-

nated attacks could have broken the Federal line. Uncoordi-

nated attacks had no chance.

Vignette As Magruder’s men waited that afternoon, Major Brent de-

cided to investigate the battlefield. Riding on ahead, he came

to a knoll on which a sentry post had been established. Brent

climbed a tree at the knoll, from which he had a panoramic

view of the field, including the entire Union line. Figuring

he’d seen enough, Brent climbed back down. The sentry

standing there said, “I was very anxious about you, as the

enemy’s sharpshooters are in the bottom just below, and I

was half expecting to see you tumble out of the tree.” Brent

remembered, “I would have preferred his warning before I

climbed, to his expression of surprise that I had escaped.”

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 319–20, 324–37, 341–53;

Dowdey, The Seven Days, 331–34, 336– 43; Sears, To the Gates of

Richmond, 320–25, 331–34.

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STOP 15 The Union Line at Malvern Hill

Directions Turn right from the turnout onto carter’s mill road. Pro-

ceed on carter’s mill road 0.4 mile to its junction with wil-

lis church road. Bear right onto willis church road going

south, and continue for about 0.4 mile. Turn right into the

parking area at the National Park Service exhibit. Walk to

the area near the house to your left on the west side of the

road. Continue to the right of the house, and proceed to the

stone marker. Face down the hillside.

Stop 15a The Union Left

Orientation You are standing near the site of the Crew house, a landmark

during the battle (the current structure was built after the

war), as well as the site of the northwest corner of the Union

line. Sykes’s division held the line to your left rear, and Grif-

fin’s brigade formed the front line to your right, supported by

Martindale’s and Butterfield’s brigades. The attacks of Wright

and Mahone came up the hillside straight ahead. Ransom’s

attack came from your left. The other Confederate attacks

114 Stop 15

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were directed to your right. The 12th and 14th U.S. were po-

sitioned to your left rear during the latter part of the battle.

At the time of the battle the area was open fields.

What Happened The Union regiments in this area for most of the battle

were the 13th and 14th New York. These regiments received

Wright’s and Mahone’s attack and stopped it after a moment’s

wavering. The Confederates stayed in position down the

slope all day, engaged in a firefight with the Yankees.

Later in the day, Ransom’s men charged this part of the line.

The New Yorkers were still there, and they were supported by

the 12th and 14th U.S. of Col. Robert Buchanan’s brigade. The

Regulars hit Ransom’s men in the flank, and the New Yorkers

fired in their front, stopping the Southerners. That ended the

combat in this area.

Analysis The New Yorkers were not numerous, but they had an excel-

lent position from which to fight—at the top of a relatively

steep slope with open fields of fire. Wright and Mahone had

relatively small forces on the attack, and Ransom faced not

only the New Yorkers but flanking fire from Union regulars.

A larger force earlier in the battle might have been able to

dent the Union line, but reinforcements from Sykes’s divi-

sion were available, making any permanent breakthrough

very difficult.

As might be expected, casualties were lopsided. The Con-

federates lost about 1,200 men, including almost 500 from

Ransom’s brigade. The 14th New York, the primary defenders,

lost 121.

Vignette John W. Lash had enlisted in 1861 in what became Company

C of the 16th Virginia. That regiment charged the Union left

along with others in Mahone’s brigade. During the charge,

Lash was hit, but the ball passed through a picture of his in-

fant son (born in June) and did not cause a serious wound.

After the battle, Lash wrote home that the boy should be re-

named Malvern Hill in honor of the event. Malvern Hill Lash

became a successful owner of furniture stores in Hampton

and Newport News.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 334–35, 345– 46, 348–50;

Dowdey, The Seven Days, 339– 40, 343; Sears, To the Gates of Rich-

mond, 325, 332.

Further Exploration If you wish, you may continue along the crest of the hill to

your left to a spot that overlooks the low ground to the west

of Malvern Hill. From this spot you can see the general area

115 The Union Line at Malvern Hill

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Holmes occupied on June 30, and get an understanding of

why Holmes could not have been expected to accomplish

anything either on June 30 or July 1. Warren’s brigade and a

battery were posted to your left front in the low ground on

July 1.

Stop 15b The Union Center

Directions Turn around and walk back the way you came. Stop by the

artillery on the same side of willis church road. Face down

the gentle slope to the north.

Orientation You are standing at the left-center of the Union front line.

Artillery was posted up front, and the infantry supports

were behind you. The Confederate assaults on this part of

the line came from your left front and from straight ahead.

The ground in this area looks now much as it did in 1862,

although the trees to your left front were not there. This is an

excellent place from which to view the effects of the terrain

on the battle of Malvern Hill.

What Happened Griffin’s brigade, the front infantry line of the Union defense,

supported two batteries in this area at the beginning of the

day. These batteries, set up with spacing to allow the guns

to face in any direction, fired on and broke up Longstreet’s

attempted artillery concentration. They then focused on the

Southern infantry.

Armistead and Cobb attacked first and were stopped by the

9th Massachusetts, 4th Michigan, and 62nd Pennsylvania.

The Yankees then were supported or replaced by the 16th

Michigan, 12th New York, and 83rd Pennsylvania. These

forces stopped Barksdale’s charge, and they were reinforced

by the 2nd Maine, 22nd Massachusetts, and 1st Michigan

of Martindale’s brigade as well as additional artillery. Fitz

John Porter, in overall command of the Northern front line,

asked Sumner and Heintzelman for more men, and Brig.

Gen. Thomas Meagher’s Irish Brigade came to this part of the

line. They met Semmes’s assault, and in a battle of Yankee and

Rebel Irish units the 69th and 88th New York bested the 10th

Louisiana. With that outcome the battle in this part of the

line ended.

Analysis In this area Malvern Hill is gentle and unbroken, at least in

comparison to the Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines Mill bat-

tlefields. However, it was a better defensive battlefield than

either of those fields, and it’s easy to see why from this van-

tage point. The artillery on the front line had clear fields of

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fire over open fields from an elevated position. And since

the Union guns typically had longer range than Confederate

guns, the Yankee artillery could dominate the battlefield. In

fact, some Southern charges were broken up simply by artil-

lery fire.

The artillery’s success was helped by its formation and by

the actions of the Union infantry. Instead of forming wheel

to wheel to maximize the number of guns, the Northern

guns were placed much as you see them, so each could shift

its angle of fire without endangering gunners manning an-

other piece. A maximum of 38 guns held the north side of the

line from your left to your right. This wide spacing didn’t al-

low for any more guns, but it was more effective than would

have been a greater number of guns crowded into the line.

These 38 guns were supported by others to your left and right

rear, including siege guns. The Yankee infantry, in contrast to

the battle at Glendale, mostly maintained discipline, staying

behind the guns until ordered to charge and then retreat-

ing quickly behind them to give the artillery clear shots at

enemy infantry.

Another factor in the Union’s success at Malvern Hill was

its field command. Henry Hunt, unlike any Confederate com-

mander, had direct command of most of the Union batteries

and thus could move guns without going through chains of

command. The field commanders cooperated well through-

out the battle, moving troops to beleaguered areas and re-

placing fought-out units quickly and without hesitation.

Thus, fresh units were always ready to confront the repeated

Rebel attacks.

It should be noted that Union gunboats fired from their

positions on the James River to your rear during the battle,

but their effect was more negligible than is often thought.

Most of the damage done by heavy guns came from the

Union siege train, also to your rear, which was dragged up

the southern slope of Malvern Hill.

Casualties in this area also were in favor of the Union,

although less so than on other parts of the field. Armistead

and Cobb lost 800 men total, while Griffin’s three regiments

posted here lost fewer than 400. Butterfield, Martindale, and

Meagher lost about 700 total, but Barksdale and Semmes lost

more than 500 in much briefer work.

Vignette One of the regiments in the last charge on the Yankee left at

Malvern Hill was the 10th Louisiana, a largely Irish regiment.

The 10th’s commander was Lt. Col. Eugene Waggaman, a de-

vout Catholic who had made confession to the regimental

priest the night of June 30. The 10th charged at the double-

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quick, Waggaman at its head, and reached the Union cannon,

where it ran into the 69th New York of the Union Irish Bri-

gade. As the sons of Eire fought hand to hand, Waggaman

reached the second Union line, with cries of “Kill him” and

“Bayonet him” all around. Waggaman survived the battle but

was captured with several other Louisianans. He also sur-

vived the war, living until 1897.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 335–36, 344– 45, 350–52;

Dowdey, The Seven Days, 337–39, 343; Sears, To the Gates of Rich-

mond, 324–25, 331–32, 334.

Stop 15c The Union Right

Directions Continue walking along the trail across willis church road

to the artillery positioned on the east side. Face, as before,

straight down the slope.

Orientation You are standing at the point of the Union line commanded

by Darius Couch. Here the infantry was in front of the artil-

lery, stretching from straight ahead to your right front. The

Confederate attacks in this area came from your left front

and from straight ahead. The ground looks much as it did

in 1862. The West house, to your rear, was a battlefield land-

mark (the current structure was built after the war). Here

the slope is a bit steeper than it is at stop 15b, which prob-

ably accounts for the difference in the way the lines were

configured.

What Happened Couch’s initial front line consisted of the 10th Massachu-

setts, 36th and 55th New York, and 93rd and 98th Pennsylva-

nia. Other elements of his division formed a second line. Five

batteries were in position just behind the infantry. D. H. Hill’s

division attacked this area. Ripley’s brigade charged on the

Yankee right, but the 102nd Pennsylvania came from the sec-

ond line to help force the Rebels back. The brigades of Cols.

John Gordon and C. C. Tew charged the center of this line but

were stopped and then pushed back by the 10th Massachu-

setts; 36th, 65th, and 67th New York; and 31st and 61st Penn-

sylvania. Hill’s other two brigades made even less progress.

Couch’s line was reinforced by Brig. Gen. John Caldwell’s

brigade and parts of Brig. Gen. John Robinson’s brigade. Artil-

lery also came forward to replace batteries that had been in

action all day. Toombs’s Rebels headed toward this reinforced

line but made little headway. Kershaw’s men also moved for-

ward but couldn’t launch an attack. Daniel Sickles’s brigade

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formed the final reinforcements to Couch, and it helped stop

Stafford’s assault, the last one on this part of the Federal line.

Analysis Couch’s work at Malvern Hill was excellent. He handled his

own men effectively and used the reinforcements given him

well. The Union infantry and artillery, as on the other side of

Willis Church Road, had an excellent position and used it to

its fullest extent. Hill’s men didn’t stand a chance, given that

they were outnumbered by their foe. Because of the continu-

ous reinforcement of Couch and the fragmented nature of

the rest of the advances against Couch’s front, no other at-

tacks stood a chance either.

Confederates here suffered far more than did Yankees. D.

H. Hill lost more than 1,700 men. In Couch’s division total

casualties were about 600.

Vignette The 5th New Hampshire of Caldwell’s brigade came to

Couch’s support with the rest of the brigade. For awhile it

waited near the West house. Just as the regiment received the

order to support a battery (not a particularly plum mission,

normally), Confederate guns found its position. Lt. Thomas

Livermore yelled out to his commander, “Captain, we might

just as well go across under the fire as to lie here, for we shall

get killed here; so let us go!” The captain ordered an advance

at the double-quick to get his men away from the fire. “Shells

flew all around us, and the wonder was that more were not

hurt,” Livermore wrote years later.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 338– 42, 352–56; Dowdey,

The Seven Days, 340– 41, 343; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond,

325–29, 333–34.

Optional Excursion Although this is the last stop on the tour, if you have time you

may wish to continue on to two other sites of some impor-

tance to the campaign, Malvern Cliff and Harrison’s Landing.

To proceed to Malvern Cliff, return to willis church road.

Turn right and proceed about 1.1 miles to just before its junc-

tion with new market road (Route 5). Turn into the parking

area to the left, and then turn in this guide to optional excur-

sion 3, Malvern Cliff. Directions from that point to optional

excursion 4, Harrison’s Landing, are provided at the end of

that stop in this guide.

To proceed directly to Harrison’s Landing, return to wil-

lis church road. Turn right and proceed about 0.2 mile to

its junction with carter’s mill road (Route 606). Continue

straight onto carter’s mill road, and proceed about 2.7 miles

119 The Union Line at Malvern Hill

N4084.indb 119N4084.indb 119 1/15/07 10:09:29 AM1/15/07 10:09:29 AM

until its junction with new market road (Route 5). As you

drive on carter’s mill road you will pass the positions of

the II and III Corps on July 1 in the fields to your left. Turn left

and follow Route 5 about 6.3 miles to herring creek road

(first Route 640, then Route 633). Turn right and follow the

signs to Berkeley Plantation. Park and turn to optional excur-

sion 4, Harrison’s Landing.

120 Stop 15

Berdan’s Sharp-shooters (of Morrell’s Division) skirmishing in the

Meadow Wheatfield. blcw 2:413

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The Peninsula Campaign, July 2–Au gust 26, 1862

Throughout the night of July 1 and early morning of July 2

the Army of the Potomac left its positions on and around

Malvern Hill, headed for Harrison’s Landing. On July 2, a hard

rain made the march of eight miles or so a miserable experi-

ence for almost every Union soldier, but the army did eventu-

ally set up camp by the end of the day.

Lee chose not to follow McClellan with his entire army on

July 2, although Stuart’s cavalry harassed the Federals’ retreat

and scouted the roads past Harrison’s Landing. They found

the Yankees at Harrison’s Landing, and they found that Evel-

ington Heights (named for the Evelynton plantation owned

by fiery secessionist Edmund Ruffin) commanded the North-

ern camps. Lee, meanwhile, had started Jackson, Longstreet,

and A. P. Hill in pursuit of McClellan early on July 3, and later

that day he put them on the road to the heights to try to trap

the Union army.

But Stuart had fired with his artillery on the Yankee posi-

tions. Quickly realizing what a sizable force on the heights

could do, McClellan sent infantry to run Stuart off and take

possession of the heights. By the time Lee got there, on July 4,

he could do McClellan no damage. In a few days he withdrew

his infantry, and the Seven Days really did come to an end.

The Army of the Potomac stayed at Harrison’s Landing for

more than a month. In that time, very little happened except

many Federals became sick in the Tidewater Virginia summer

and occasionally a scout and skirmish occurred. In mid-July,

Lee began to move his troops north to deal with the Army of

Virginia, a Union force composed of veterans of the Shenan-

doah and new recruits commanded by John Pope. In late July,

Halleck, appointed general-in-chief earlier in the month, or-

dered McClellan to evacuate his sick and wounded. McClel-

lan wanted to cross the James River and move on Petersburg,

an important rail junction south of Richmond, but Halleck

ordered the Army of the Potomac to return to its namesake

river to work with Pope’s army. In early Au gust, the Confeder-

ates heard of this order, and Lee moved the rest of his army

north before McClellan even started moving from Harrison’s

Landing to Fort Monroe in mid-Au gust. By Au gust 26 every

member of the Army of the Potomac had embarked from

Fort Monroe, and the Peninsula Campaign came to an offi-

cial end. McClellan had not succeeded in his aim of ending

the war at a stroke. Instead, the conflict would increase in

severity and consequences far beyond his desires or dreams,

becoming instead, in Lincoln’s words, the “remorseless revo-

lutionary struggle” of history.

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Secondary Tour: Stonewall Jackson in the Seven Days

If you have a special interest in Stonewall Jackson or if you

have more than one day, you might wish to follow this tour

route, which basically follows Jackson from the planning of

the campaign through July 1 and Malvern Hill. It starts at

stop 1, Lee’s Headquarters, and includes the following stops:

—Optional excursion 1, Polegreen Church;

—Stop 4, Walnut Grove Church;

—Stop 6, Cold Harbor;

—Stop 7, Grapevine Bridge;

—Stop 10, The Fizzle at White Oak Swamp;

—Stop 13, Jackson at Malvern Hill.

Directions are provided where necessary in the narrative.

122 Secondary Tour

A straggler on the line of

march. blcw 2:515

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OPTIONAL EXCURSION 1—POLEGREEN CHURCH

Directions If you choose to get out of your car, walk to the marker and

face southwest, to the right of the Rural Point Road.

Orientation You are standing in the area where Jackson’s men camped the

night of June 26. Mechanicsville and Beaver Dam Creek are

straight ahead. Jackson arrived at this point from the road be-

hind you. Richard Ewell’s division came here from the road

to your right front, which is the extension of the road from

Meadow Bridges that A. P. Hill used to cross the Chickahom-

iny River.

What Happened Jackson arrived at Hundley’s Corner in the late afternoon of

June 26, after a march during which his men were harassed

by Union cavalry almost constantly. He was soon joined by

Ewell, who had marched down a road closer to the Chicka-

hominy and had turned east at Shady Grove Church. Gunfire

could be heard from Hundley’s Corner, and Jackson weighed

his options—march to the sound of the guns or stay in this

position, to which he had been ordered by Lee. Jackson decided

123 Polegreen Church

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to stay in his position, and his men did not march until early

on the morning of June 27.

Analysis Stonewall Jackson’s men became known for quickly covering

a lot of ground during the Valley campaign. Much of their

marching in that campaign, however, had been on good

roads. Their march to Richmond was over relatively bad

roads that turned to mud in rainy periods. Jackson was slowed

by the need to bring his men together after they straggled

over miles of Virginia countryside. Even so, the rate of march

wasn’t bad, but it was wishful thinking to expect Jackson to

reach Hundley’s Corner early on June 26.

Once Jackson’s advance reached Polegreen Church and

Hundley’s Corner, he had to decide whether to stop or keep

marching. His orders were to head toward Polegreen Church,

turning Porter’s flank, whereupon D. H. Hill would move to

Stonewall’s support. Then, Jackson and Hill would head to-

ward Cold Harbor. The sound of firing in Jackson’s front could

have been interpreted in two ways—as an indication of battle,

which Lee did not expect and did not mention in his orders,

or an indication of an action to delay the Rebel crossing of

the Chickahominy.

If Jackson chose to proceed toward the gunfire, he would

face a march of at least 90 minutes, getting his advance in

position about 6:30 p.m. Visibility at that hour would still be

good, but the rest of his troops would not be in position un-

til much later, probably too late to do any real damage to

Porter. Jackson had not heard of any change of plans from Lee,

so Stonewall was operating under his original orders, which

specifically tasked him to turn the Beaver Dam Creek line.

He therefore took the prudent action of halting at Hundley’s

Corner.

The worst decision of the entire day of June 26 was the

decision—made by both Lee and Jackson—to not communicate

with the other. Communication would not have been impos-

sible; Stuart’s cavalry had men who could have made the ride,

as did Lee. With proper communication, the events of June 26

might have been very different.

Vignette Col. Bradley Johnson of the 1st Maryland Infantry reported to

Jackson and Ewell that a firefight was underway with Union

skirmishers located in a thicket. When Stonewall asked,

“Why don’t you stop them?”, Johnson replied, “Can’t do it, sir,

without charging them, or shelling the place.” “Well, sir,”

Jackson persisted, “you must stop that firing; make them keep

quiet!” Johnson took two cannon and shelled the offending

Federals out of their position.

124 Optional Excursion 1

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Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 59– 62, 75–77; Dowdey,

The Seven Days, 193–202; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond,

197–200.

To Return to the Main Proceed on rural point road 0.4 mile to the intersection of

Tour or Proceed with pole green road and rural point road. Turn right on pole

the Secondary Tour green road (Route 627). Proceed 0.4 mile until its intersection

with lee davis road (Route 643). Turn left and proceed on lee

davis road about 2.7 miles to the intersection with cold har-

bor road (Route 156). Turn right at the intersection, and in 0.1

mile turn right again into the Walnut Grove Baptist Church

parking lot. Park and turn in this guide to stop 4, Walnut

Grove Church.

125 Polegreen Church

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OPTIONAL EXCURSION 2—CONFUSION ON THE FARMS

Directions Face the area beyond washington street that lay in front of

you as you drove to this stop.

Orientation You are on the right end of the Union line south of the Chick-

ahominy River. To your left are the remains of Redoubt 6,

the anchor of the Union right. The remainder of the Union’s

prepared positions stretched out farther to your left. Straight

ahead, across the ravines, was the Garnett field and, farther

in that direction, the left of Magruder’s line. Out of sight to

your right rear is the Gouldin (sometimes known as Golding)

house, a landmark during the Seven Days. This is an area

of ravines, some with creeks flowing at the bottom, and the

Northern line took full advantage of this terrain. The ground

in 1862 was more open than it is today. Much of it was farmed

fields, although trees stood in the ravines near the creeks.

What Happened Most of the activity south of the river on June 26–27 con-

sisted of Confederate demonstrations and Union worrying.

126 Optional Excursion 2

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However, on the evening of June 27 a demonstration became

something more. Magruder ordered Robert Toombs to get in-

formation concerning the Federal lines by advancing a regi-

ment, the 2nd Georgia. The Georgians moved on Winfield

Hancock’s men of Smith’s division, posted just east of the

Garnett field. The rest of Toombs’s brigade as well as the 4th

and 6th Vermont of William Brooks’s brigade joined the fight,

which lasted until dark. This engagement was called the bat-

tle of Garnett’s Farm.

That night, the Federals moved back near Redoubt 6, the

anchor of their prepared lines. The next morning, the 28th,

they continued to move, as Smith’s division prepared to act

as the Army of the Potomac’s rear guard. Brig. Gen. David

Jones interpreted the movements as a retreat and opened with

artillery. He also ordered an attack by Toombs, supported by

G. T. Anderson’s brigade. Toombs countervailed that, however,

and Anderson became the attacker. His men, specifically the

7th and 8th Georgia, charged parts of the 33rd and 77th New

York and 49th Pennsylvania just southwest of Redoubt 6. No

support from Toombs was forthcoming, however, and Ander-

son received an order to withdraw his regiments, ending the

battle of Garnett’s and Gouldin’s Farm.

Analysis On June 27, Magruder had accomplished his mission of hold-

ing McClellan’s attention without provoking an attack. He did

not need to send Toombs’s men out early that evening in an

information-gathering mission that would almost certainly

lead to a fight since information could have been gathered

by a scout after dark. On June 28, a series of snafus led to

Anderson’s attack. Jones misinterpreted a Federal movement,

Toombs changed an order, and Magruder had orders from Lee

not to attack an occupied position. It was confirmation of

those orders that caused Anderson’s withdrawal, after an ad-

vance that never should have occurred.

Vignette Pickets of the 49th Pennsylvania were forced back by the Con-

federate advance. One of them, Joe Robbins, described by a

fellow soldier as “rather an old man,” began to retreat when

Rebels shouted for him to surrender. He answered, “Surren-

der hell!” They yelled back that if he didn’t surrender they’d

shoot at him, and he replied, “Shoot and be damned.” They

did, but they missed.

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 143– 46, 168–73; Dowdey,

The Seven Days, 263– 66; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 247,

258–59.

127 Confusion on the Farms

N4084.indb 127N4084.indb 127 1/15/07 10:09:31 AM1/15/07 10:09:31 AM

To Return to the Make the left turn, and follow north washington street for

Main Tour 0.6 mile until its intersection with east washington street.

The Union line of prepared positions was on your left as you

drive. Turn left on east washington street and then turn left

again immediately onto airport drive. Proceed 2.0 miles to

old hanover road, where you turn right. In 0.1 mile, turn left

onto grapevine road. Proceed on grapevine road 0.3 miles to

the turnout on the right. Turn in this guide to stop 8, McClel-

lan’s Headquarters.

128 Optional Excursion 2

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OPTIONAL EXCURSION 3—MALVERN CLIFF

Directions Get out of your car and face northeast, to the left of Route

156 and toward Malvern Hill.

Orientation You are at about the farthest point of Holmes’s advance down

what was then known as River Road. Holmes’s artillery prob-

ably was in a wood to your left. The Federal position was

along the ridge line straight ahead. The ground in 1862 was

much as you see it today, except that Malvern Hill was open

ground.

What Happened Holmes’s role in Lee’s plan for June 30 was to do anything he

could to disrupt the Union retreat. His men, mostly from

the Confederate Department of North Carolina, had crossed

the James River from Drewry’s Bluff on June 29, and they

marched down River Road on the morning of June 30. Holmes

met Lee near this intersection. Lee told Holmes to go ahead

with plans to set up six rifled guns to shell the Union posi-

tion, as he had seen the Yankee supply trains rolling along

129 Malvern Cliff

N4084.indb 129N4084.indb 129 1/15/07 10:09:31 AM1/15/07 10:09:31 AM

the top of Malvern Hill and probably thought Holmes might

create a bit of havoc at little cost.

Holmes in fact was able to get only five guns in position.

When he opened fire, he did so on a Union line containing

more than 40 guns set up by Fitz John Porter in an elevated

position. Supplementing that was fire from two of the Union

navy’s gunboats. The result was predictable, although the

Confederates kept up the fire for about an hour. That night,

Holmes withdrew his men a couple of miles up River Road. He

would advance again on July 1 but accomplish nothing.

Analysis Any idea that Holmes could have contributed positively to the

Confederate cause from his position is eliminated by a glance

at this terrain and a review of the numbers. He had about

7,000 men. He was facing more than 20,000 Northerners with

eight times the number of guns. More than that, he literally

was looking up at his enemy. Malvern Hill slopes sharply in

this area, in contrast to its north end, and any move Holmes

might make would be seen immediately and countered.

Vignette Holmes, who was hard of hearing, was in a house when the en-

gagement began. His artillery commander had succeeded in

reforming some men after their initial panic under the shell-

ing and was getting ready to report when Holmes emerged

from the house, put his hand to his ear, and said, “I thought

I heard firing.”

Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 267–71; Dowdey, The

Seven Days, 304– 6; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 290–92.

Optional Excursion If you have time, you may wish to visit Harrison’s Landing,

the Army of the Potomac’s headquarters after the Seven

Days. To do so, head southeast on new market road (Route 5).

Proceed 8.5 miles to herring creek road (first Route 640, then

Route 633). Follow the signs to Berkeley Plantation. Park and in

this guide turn to optional excursion 4, Harrison’s Landing.

130 Optional Excursion 3

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OPTIONAL EXCURSION 4—HARRISON’S LANDING

Directions After getting out of your car, walk past the plantation house,

and stop anywhere on the grounds of Berkeley Plantation

near the James River. Face away from the river.

Orientation You are standing in what, in July and Au gust 1862, was the

headquarters of the Army of the Potomac after the Seven

Days. To the right, the James River flows to the Atlantic Ocean.

To the left, upriver, lies Bermuda Hundred, Drewry’s Bluff,

and eventually Richmond. The army was camped through-

out this area.

What Happened McClellan picked Harrison’s Landing, as the plantation land-

ing was called after its original owners, as the army’s safe

haven on June 30. The first units reached it early on July 2,

and the rest of the army, except for a small rear guard, also

arrived that day. They had marched from Malvern Hill in a

driving rainstorm.

Jeb Stuart soon showed McClellan his vulnerability by

shelling the camp with a solitary cannon on July 3 from Eve-

131 Harrison’s Landing

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lington Heights, the area northeast of Harrison’s Landing

that contained the Evelynton plantation of Southern fire-

brand and agricultural reformer Edmund Ruffin. The heights

dominated the Harrison’s Landing position, and Stuart’s can-

non made clear that Lee’s presence there would mean great

trouble for the Yankees. However, McClellan acted quickly,

driving Stuart from the heights and fortifying them. As a re-

sult, when Lee arrived on July 4, after resting on July 2 and

marching on July 3, he could find no weak point. The cam-

paign was over.

For the next six weeks, the Federals made Harrison’s

Landing and the surrounding area home. The hot Virginia

summer took its toll on the army, and much sickness was

reported. Meanwhile, Lee moved his army north to deal

with the new threat of John Pope’s Army of Virginia. By mid-

Au gust the Army of the Potomac was evacuating the Pen-

insula, and the last units left on Au gust 26. The Peninsula

would not see Union soldiers in force again for nearly two

years.

Analysis Harrison’s Landing actually was McClellan’s second choice,

after Haxall’s Landing nearer to Malvern Hill, but the navy

could not guarantee safety at Haxall’s. Harrison’s Landing

was a good position from a supply standpoint, and once Eve-

lington Heights was occupied the Federals were secure. Jeb

Stuart helped the Yankees by firing at them harmlessly with

one gun, instead of staying quiet and reporting the position’s

strategic potential to Lee. McClellan had planned to occupy

the heights in any event, however, so it is possible that this

“missed opportunity” was really no opportunity.

The Harrison’s Landing site would allow McClellan to cross

the James River and move on Petersburg, the important rail

junction south of Richmond. That plan was rejected by Hal-

leck, but it was substantially the same plan that Grant even-

tually followed in June of 1864. Whether McClellan could

have carried it through as Grant did, or even better, is a for-

ever-unanswerable question.

Vignette Baldy Smith arrived at Harrison’s Landing early in the after-

noon of July 2, in the middle of the rainstorm, and found the

ground there under water. He tried to walk his horse down a

slope, but he slipped at the start, let go of the bridle, and slid

to the bottom. “On reaching the bottom I looked up and saw

my dejected horse with head down and a picture of woe,”

Smith later remembered. He had no chance of getting back

up the slope, but fortunately a soldier happened along and

brought the horse to him.

132 Optional Excursion 4

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Further Reading Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 368– 69, 378– 84; Dowdey,

The Seven Days, 347– 48, 350–52; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond,

337– 41.

133 Harrison’s Landing

Dummies and Quaker guns left in the works at Harrison’s Landing on the

evacuation by the Army of the Potomac. From a sketch. blcw 2:428

N4084.indb 133N4084.indb 133 1/15/07 10:09:32 AM1/15/07 10:09:32 AM

Map of the Battle of Malvern Hill. blcw 2:412

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Appendix A: EARLY PENINSULA CAMPAIGN ORDERS OF BATTLE

Union Forces ARMY OF THE POTOMAC (McClellan)

Abbreviations:

art: artillery

bde: brigade

bn: battalion

co: company

s.s.: sharpshooters

II ARMY CORPS (Sumner)

Sedgwick’s Division

gorman’s bde burns’s bde dana’s bde

15 ma 69 pa 19 ma

ma s.s. (1st co) 71 pa 20 ma

1 mn 72 pa 7 mi

34 ny 106 pa 42 ny

82 ny

artillery: 1 ri Light, Battery A; 1 ri Light, Battery B; 1 ri Light,

Battery G; 1 U.S., Battery I

Richardson’s Division

howard’s bde meagher’s bde french’s bde

5 nh 63 ny 52 ny

61 ny 69 ny 57 ny

64 ny 88 ny 66 ny

81 pa 53 pa

artillery: 1 ny Light, Battery B; 1 ny Light, Battery G; 2 ny,

Battery A; 4 U.S., Batteries A and C

corps cavalry: 8 il

III ARMY CORPS (Heintzelman)

Porter’s Division

1st bde (Martindale) 2nd bde (Morell) 3rd bde (Butterfield)

2 me 9 ma 12 ny

18 ma 4 mi 17 ny

22 ma 14 ny 44 ny

13 ny 62 pa 16 mi

25 ny 83 pa

ma s.s. (2nd co)

artillery: 3 ma (C); 5 ma (E); 1 ri, Battery C; 5 U.S., Battery D

sharpshooters: 1 u.s.

cavalry: 8 pa, co a

Hooker’s Division

1st bde (Grover) 2nd BDE (Taylor) 3rd BDE (Starr)

1 ma 70 ny 5 nj

11 ma 71 ny 6 nj

2 nh 72 ny 7 nj

26 pa 73 ny 8 nj

74 ny

artillery: 1 ny, Battery D; 4 ny; 6 ny; 1 U.S., Battery H

N4084.indb 135N4084.indb 135 1/15/07 10:09:32 AM1/15/07 10:09:32 AM

136 Appendix A

Hamilton’s Division

1st bde ( Jameson) 2nd BDE (Birney) 3rd BDE (Berry)

87 ny 3 me 2 mi

57 pa 4 me 3 mi

63 pa 38 ny 5 mi

105 pa 40 ny 37 ny

artillery: 1 nj, Battery B; 1 ri, Battery E; 2 U.S., Battery G

corps cavalry: 3 pa

V ARMY CORPS (Keyes)

1st Division (Couch)

peck’s bde graham’s bde briggs’s bde

55 ny 65 ny 7 ma

62 ny 67 ny 10 ma

93 pa 23 pa 36 ny

98 pa 31 pa 2 ri

102 pa 61 pa

artillery: 1 pa, Battery C; 1 pa, Battery D; 1 pa, Battery E; 1 pa,

Battery H

Smith’s Division

1st bde (Hancock) 2nd bde (Brooks) 3rd BDE (Davidson)

6 me 2 vt 7 me

43 ny 3 vt 33 ny

49 pa 4 vt 49 ny

5 wi 5 vt 77 ny

6 vt

artillery: 1 ny, Battery E; 1 ny; 3 ny; 5 U.S., Battery F

Casey’s Division

1st bde (Naglee) 2nd BDE (Keim) 3rd BDE (Palmer)

11 me 96 ny 81 ny

56 ny 85 pa 85 ny

100 ny 101 pa 92 ny

52 pa 103 pa 93 ny

104 pa 98 ny

artillery: 1 ny, Battery A; 1 ny, Battery H; 7 ny; 8 ny

sykes’s regular bde

2 U.S.

3 U.S.

4 U.S.

6 U.S.

10 U.S.

11 U.S.

12 U.S.

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137 Early Peninsula Campaign Orders of Battle

14 U.S.

17 U.S.

5 ny

ARMY CAVALRY RESERVE (Cooke)

emory’s bde blake’s bde

5 U.S. 1 U.S.

6 U.S. 8 pa

6 pa

mcclellan dragoons

artillery reserve (Hunt)

1 U.S., Battery E

1 U.S., Battery G

1 U.S., Battery K

2 U.S., Battery A

2 U.S., Battery B

2 U.S., Battery E

2 U.S., Battery M

3 U.S., Battery C

3 U.S., Battery F

3 U.S., Battery G

3 U.S., Battery K

3 U.S., Battery L

3 U.S., Battery M

4 U.S., Battery G

4 U.S., Battery K

5 U.S., Battery A

5 U.S., Battery I

5 U.S., Battery K

1 bn ny, Battery A

1 bn ny, Battery B

1 bn ny, Battery C

1 bn ny, Battery D

5 ny

cavalry

9 ny

siege train

1 ct Heavy art

volunteer engineer bde (Woodbury)

15 ny

50 ny

bn u.s. engineers (Duane)

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138 Appendix A

CONFEDERATE FORCES ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA ( Johnston)

Left Wing (D. H. Hill)

rodes’s bde early’s bde rains’s bde

5 al 5 nc 13 al

6 al 23 nc 26 al

12 al 24 va 6 ga

12 ms 38 va 23 ga

King William (va) art Jeff Davis (al) art

ward’s command (attached)

2 fl

2 ms bn

crump’s command (Gloucester Point)

46 va

9 va Militia

21 va Militia

61 va Militia

Eastern Shore co

3 va Cavalry (1 co)

Mathews Light Dragoons

4 bn va Heavy art

Mathews (va) art

CENTER (Longstreet)

1st bde 2nd bde 3rd bde (A. P. Hill) (R. H. Anderson) (Pickett)

1 va St. Paul’s (la) 8 va Foot Rifles

7 va 4 sc bn 18 va

11 va 5 sc 19 va

17 va 6 sc 28 va

Loudoun (va) art Palmetto s.s. (sc) Lynchburg

Fauquier (va) art (va) art

4th bde (Wilcox) colston’s bde pryor’s bde

9 al 3 va 8 al

10 al 13 nc 14 al

11 al 14 nc 14 la

19 ms Donaldsonville Richmond Fayette

Richmond (va) (la) art (va) art

Howitzers,

3rd co

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139 Early Peninsula Campaign Orders of Battle

RIGHT WING (Magruder)

McLaws’ Division

semmes’s bde griffith’s bde kershaw’s bde cobb’s bde

10 ga 1 la Zouave bn 2 sc 16 ga

5 la 13 ms 3 sc 24 ga

10 la 18 ms 7 sc Cobb’s Legion (ga)

15 va 21 ms 8 sc 2 la

Noland’s va bn 1st co Gracie’s al bn 17 ms

1 la bn Richmond Alexandria 15 nc

Williamsburg (va) Howitzers (va) art Morris Louisa

(va) art (va) art

Halifax (va) art

division artillery: Peninsula (va); Manly’s North Carolina Battery; Pulaski (ga);

Henrico (va)

D. R. Jones’s Division

toombs’s bde g.t. anderson’s bde

1 ga Regulars 7 ga

2 ga 8 ga

15 ga 9 ga

17 ga 11 ga

20 ga 1 ky

RESERVE (Smith)

hood’s bde hampton’s bde whiting’s bde

18 ga 14 ga 4 al

1 tx 19 ga 2 ms

4 tx 16 nc 11 ms

5 tx Hampton sc Legion 6 nc

Madison (la) art Staunton (va) art

Rowan (nc) art

s.r. anderson’s bde (attached)

1 tn

7 tn

14 tn

Fredericksburg (va) art

pettigrew’s bde (attached)

2 ar bn

35 ga

22 nc

47 va

1 md art

N4084.indb 139N4084.indb 139 1/15/07 10:09:33 AM1/15/07 10:09:33 AM

140 Appendix A

ewell’s command

17 va (1 co)

32 va (1 co)

52 va Militia

68 va Militia

115 va Militia

carter’s command

10 bn va Heavy art

Rambaut’s va Heavy art

Bedford (va) art

cavalry bde (Stuart)

1 va

3 va

4 va

Jeff Davis ms Legion

Wise’s va Legion

Stuart Horse art

ARTILLERY RESERVE (Pendleton)

pendleton’s corps

2nd co Richmond (va) Howitzers

Hanover (va) art

Albemarle (va) art

Troup (ga) art

James City (va) art

Hampton (va) art

Magruder (va) art

walton’s corps

Washington (la) bn, 1st co

Washington (la) bn, 2nd co

Washington (la) bn, 3rd co

Washington (la) bn, 4th co

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Appendix B: SEVEN DAYS ORDERS OF BATTLE

Union Forces ARMY OF THE POTOMAC (McClellan)

Abbreviations:

bde: brigade

bn: battalion

s.s.: sharpshooters

co: company

art: artillery

II ARMY CORPS (Sumner)

1st Division (Richardson)

1st bde (Caldwell) 2nd bde (Meagher) 3rd bde (French)

5 nh 29 ma 52 ny

7 ny 63 ny 57 ny

61 ny 69 ny 64 ny

81 pa 88 ny 66 ny

53 pa

2 de

artillery: 1 ny Light, Battery B; 4 U.S., Batteries A and C

2nd Division (Sedgwick)

1st bde (Sully) 2nd bde (Burns) 3rd bde (Dana)

15 ma 69 pa 19 ma

1 mn 71 pa 20 ma

ma s.s. (1st co) 72 pa 7 mi

34 ny 106 pa 42 ny

82 ny

Russell’s s.s.

artillery: 1 ri Light, Battery A; 1 U.S., Battery I

corps artillery: 1 ny Light, Battery G; 1 ri Light, Battery B; 1 ri Light, Battery G

corps cavalry: 6 ny, cos D, F, H, and K

III ARMY CORPS (Heintzelman)

2nd Division (Hooker)

1st bde (Grover) 2nd bde (Sickles) 3rd bde (Carr)

1 ma 70 ny 5 nj

11 ma 71 ny 6 nj

16 ma 72 ny 7 nj

2 nh 73 ny 8 nj

26 pa 74 ny 2 ny

artillery: 1 ny, Battery D; 4 ny; 1 U.S., Battery H

3rd Division (Kearny)

1st bde (Robinson) 2nd bde (Birney) 3rd bde (Berry)

20 in 3 me 2 mi

87 ny 4 me 3 mi

57 pa 38 ny 5 mi

63 pa 40 ny 1 ny

105 pa 101 ny 37 ny

artillery: 1 ri, Battery E (Randolph); 2 U.S., Battery G

(Thompson)

N4084.indb 141N4084.indb 141 1/15/07 10:09:33 AM1/15/07 10:09:33 AM

142 Appendix B

corps artillery: 6 ny; 2 nj; 4 U.S., Battery K

corps cavalry: 3 pa

IV ARMY CORPS (Keyes)

1st Division (Couch)

1st bde (Howe) 2nd bde (Abercrombie) 3rd bde (Palmer)

55 ny 65 ny 7 ma

62 ny 67 ny 10 ma

93 pa 23 pa 36 ny

98 pa 31 pa 2 ri

102 pa 61 pa

artillery: 1 pa, Battery C; 1 pa, Battery D

2nd Division (Peck)

1st bde (Naglee) 2nd bde (Wessells)

11 me 81 ny

56 ny 85 ny

100 ny 92 ny

52 pa 96 ny

104 pa 98 ny

85 pa

101 pa

103 pa

artillery: 1 ny, Battery H; 7 ny

corps artillery: 8 ny; 1 pa, Battery E; 1 pa, Battery H; 5 U.S.,

Battery M

corps cavalry: 8 pa

V ARMY CORPS (Porter)

1st Division (Morell)

1st bde (Martindale) 2nd bde (Griffin) 3rd bde (Butterfield)

2 me 9 ma 12 ny

18 ma 4 mi 17 ny

22 ma 14 ny 44 ny

1 mi 62 pa 16 mi

13 ny Brady’s co mi s.s.

25 ny 83 pa

ma s.s. (2nd co)

artillery: 3 ma (C); 5 ma (E); 1 ri, Battery C; 5 U.S., Battery D

sharpshooters: 1 U.S.

N4084.indb 142N4084.indb 142 1/15/07 10:09:34 AM1/15/07 10:09:34 AM

143 Seven Days Orders of Battle

2nd Division (Sykes)

1st bde (Buchanan) 2nd bde (Lovell) 3rd bde (Warren)

3 U.S. 2 U.S. 5 ny

4 U.S. 6 U.S. 10 ny

12 U.S. 10 U.S.

14 U.S. 11 U.S.

17 U.S.

artillery: 3 U.S., Batteries L and M; 5 U.S., Battery I

3rd Division (McCall)

1st bde (Reynolds) 2nd bde (Meade) 3rd bde (Seymour)

1 pa Reserves 3 pa Reserves 6 pa Reserves

2 pa Reserves 4 pa Reserves 9 pa Reserves

5 pa Reserves 7 pa Reserves 10 pa Reserves

8 pa Reserves 11 pa Reserves 12 pa Reserves

13 pa Reserves (1 Rifles),

cos A, B, D, E, F, K

artillery: 1 pa, Battery A; 1 pa, Battery B; 1 pa, Battery G; 5 U.S.,

Battery C

cavalry: 4 pa

corps cavalry: 8 il

ARTILLERY RESERVE (Hunt)

1st bde (Hays) 2nd bde (Getty) 3rd bde (Arndt)

2 U.S., Battery A 1 U.S., Battery E 1 bn ny, Battery A

2 U.S., Batteries B & L 1 U.S., Battery G 1 bn ny, Battery B

2 U.S., Battery M 1 U.S., Battery K 1 bn ny, Battery C

3 U.S., Batteries C & G 4 U.S., Battery G 1 bn ny, Battery D

5 U.S., Battery A

5 U.S., Battery K

4th bde (Petherbridge) 5th bde (Carlisle)

md, Battery A 2 U.S., Battery E

md, Battery B 3 U.S., Batteries F and K

siege train: 1 ct heavy art

VI ARMY CORPS (Franklin)

1st Division (Slocum)

1st bde (Taylor) 2nd bde (Bartlett) 3rd bde (Newton)

1 nj 5 me 18 ny

2 nj 16 ny 31 ny

3 nj 27 ny 32 ny

4 nj 96 pa 95 pa

artillery: 1 ma (A); 1 nj; 2 U.S., Battery D

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144 Appendix B

2nd Division (Smith)

1st bde (Hancock) 2nd bde (Brooks) 3rd bde (Davidson)

6 me 2 vt 7 me

43 ny 3 vt 20 ny

49 pa 4 vt 33 ny

5 wi 5 vt 49 ny

6 vt 77 ny

artillery: 1 ny, Battery E; 1 ny; 3 ny; 5 U.S., Battery F

cavalry: 5 pa, cos I and K

unattached cavalry: 1 ny

ARMY CAVALRY RESERVE (Cooke)

6 pa

1 U.S., cos A, C, F, H

5 U.S., cos A, D, F, H, I

6 U.S.

volunteer engineer bde (Woodbury)

15 ny

50 ny

bn u.s. engineers

troops at white house, va (Casey)

11 pa Cavalry, cos B, D, F, I, K

1 ny Light art, Battery F

93 ny, cos B, C, D, E, G, I

troops at general headquarters

McClellan Dragoons

Sturges’ Rifles

Oneida NY Cavalry

93 ny, cos A, F, H, K

2 U.S. Cavalry

4 U.S. Cavalry, cos A and E

8 U.S., cos F and G

CONFEDERATE FORCES ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA (Lee)

JACKSON’S CORPS

Whiting’s Division

1st bde (Hood) 3rd bde (Law)

18 ga 4 al

1 tx 2 ms

4 tx 11 ms

5 tx 6 nc

Hampton (sc) Legion

artillery: Staunton (va); Rowan (nc)

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145 Seven Days Orders of Battle

Jackson’s Division

1st bde (Winder) 2nd bde (Cunningham) 3rd bde (Fulkerson) 4th bde (Lawton)

2 va 21 va 10 va 13 ga

4 va 42 va 23 va 26 ga

5 va 48 va 37 va 31 ga

27 va 1 va bn (Irish) artillery: 38 ga

33 va Hampden (va) art Danville (va) 60 ga (4th bn)

Allegheny (va) art 61 ga

Rockbridge (va) art

Ewell’s Division

4th bde (Elzey) 7th bde (Trimble) 8th bde (Taylor) md Line ( Johnson)

12 g a 15 al 6 la 1 md

13 va 21 ga 7 la Baltimore (md) art

25 va 16 ms 8 la

31 va 21 nc 9 la

44 va 1 nc bn 1 la Special bn

52 va Henrico (va) art Charlottesville (va) art

58 va

(D. H.) Hill’s Division

1st bde (Rodes) 2nd bde (G. B. Anderson) 3rd bde (Garland)

3 al 2 nc 5 nc

5 al 4 nc 12 nc

6 al 14 nc 13 nc

12 al 30 nc 20 nc

26 al 23 nc

4th bde (Colquitt) 5th bde (Ripley)

13 al 44 ga

6 ga 48 ga

23 ga 1 nc

27 ga 3 nc

28 ga

artillery: Jeff Davis (al) art; King William (va) art; Hardaway’s

(al) Battery; Hanover (va) art

MAGRUDER’S CORPS

1st Division ( Jones)

1st bde (Toombs) 3rd bde (G. T. Anderson)

2 ga 1 ga Regulars

15 ga 7 ga

17 ga 8 ga

20 ga 9 ga

11 ga

artillery: Wise (va); Washington (sc); Madison (la); Dabney’s

(va) Battery

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146 Appendix B

McLaws’ Division

1st bde (Semmes) 4th bde (Kershaw)

10 ga 2 sc

53 ga 3 sc

5 la 7 sc

10 la 8 sc

15 va Alexandria (va) art

32 va

Manly’s (nc) Battery

Magruder’s Division

2nd bde (Cobb) 3rd bde (Griffith)

16 ga 13 ms

24 ga 17 ms

Cobb’s Legion (ga) 18 ms

2 la 21 ms

15 nc 1st co Richmond (va) Howitzers

Troup (ga) art

artillery: Magruder (va); Pulaski (ga); James City (va)

Longstreet’s Division

1st bde (Kemper) 2nd bde (R. H. Anderson) 3rd bde (Pickett)

1 va 2 sc Rifles 8 va

7 va 4 sc 18 va

11 va 5 sc 19 va

17 va 6 sc 28 va

24 va Palmetto s.s. (art) 56 va

Loudoun (va) art

4th bde (Wilcox) 5th bde (Pryor) 6th bde (Featherston)

8 al 14 al 12 ms

9 al 2 fl 19 ms

10 al 14 la 2 ms bn

11 al 1 la bn 3rd co Richmond

Thomas (va) art 3 va (va) Howitzers

Donaldsonville

(la) art

artillery: 1st co Washington (la); 2nd co Washington (la); 3rd co Washington (la);

4th co Washington (la); Lynchburg (va); Dixie (va)

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147 Seven Days Orders of Battle

Huger’s Division

2nd bde (Mahone) 3rd bde (Wright) 4th bde (Armistead)

6 va 44 al 9 va

12 va 3 ga 14 va

16 va 4 ga 38 va

41 va 22 ga 53 va

49 va 1 la 57 va

Portsmouth co D, va Light art 5 va bn

(va) art Fauquier (va) art

Lynchburg Goochland (va) art

Beauregard

(va) art

A. P. Hill’s (Light) Division

1st bde (Field) 2nd bde (Gregg) 3rd bde ( J. R.

Anderson)

40 va 1 sc 14 ga

47 va 1 sc Rifles 35 ga

55 va 12 sc 45 ga

60 va 13 sc 49 ga

14 sc 3 la bn

4th bde (Branch) 5th bde (Archer) 6th bde (Pender)

7 nc 5 al bn 2 ar bn

18 nc 19 ga 16 nc

28 nc 1 tn 22 nc

33 nc 7 tn 34 nc

37 nc 14 tn 38 nc

22 va bn

artillery: 1st md Battery; Charleston (art) German Battery;

Fredericksburg (va); Crenshaw’s (va) Battery; Letcher (va);

Johnson’s (va) Battery; Masters’ (va) Battery; Pee Dee (sc);

Purcell (va)

DEPARTMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA (Holmes)

2nd bde (Ransom) 3rd bde (Daniel) 4th bde (Walker)

24 nc 43 nc 3 ar

25 nc 45 nc 2 ga bn

26 nc 50 nc 27 nc

35 nc Burroughs’ 46 nc

48 nc Cavalry bn 30 va

49 nc Goodwyn (cavalry)

artillery: Branch’s (va) Battery; Brem’s (nc) Battery; French’s

(va) Battery; Graham’s (va) Battery; Grandy’s (va) Battery;

Lloyd’s (nc) Battery

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148 Appendix B

wise’s command

26 va

46 va

4 va Heavy art

Andrews’ (al) Battery

Armistead’s (va) Battery

French’s (va) Battery

Nelson (va) art

RESERVE ARTILLERY (Pendleton)

1 va (Brown)

Williamsburg (va)

Richmond Fayette (va)

2nd co Richmond (va) Howitzers

jones’ bn

Long Island (va)

Orange Richmond (va)

Rhett’s (sc) Battery

nelson’s bn

Fluvanna (va)

Amherst (va)

Morris (va)

richardson’s bn

Fluvanna (va)

Milledge’s (ga) Battery

Ashland (va)

sumter (ga) bn (Cutts)

co D

co E

co B

co A

Hamilton’s Battery

cavalry (Stuart)

1 nc

1 va

3 va

4 va

5 va

9 va

10 va

Critcher’s bn (va)

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149 Seven Days Orders of Battle

Cobb’s Legion (ga)

Hampton Legion (sc)

Jeff Davis Legion

Stuart Horse art

Chew’s (va) Battery

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N4084.indb 150N4084.indb 150 1/15/07 10:09:35 AM1/15/07 10:09:35 AM

Appendix C: ORGANIZATION, WEAPONS, AND TACTICS

You will get much more from your battlefield tour if you take

a few minutes to become familiar with the following infor-

mation and then refer to it as necessary.

The Organization of Civil War ArmiesFollowing is a diagram of the typical organization and range

of strength of a Civil War army:

army(40,000–120,000 men)

corps(10,000–30,000 men)

division(3,000–8,000 men)

division(3,000–8,000 men)

division(3,000–8,000 men)

brigade(1,500–3,000 men)

brigade(1,500–3,000 men)

brigade(1,500–3,000 men)

regiment(300–800 men)

corps(10,000–30,000 men)

corps(10,000–30,000 men)

regiment(300–800 men)

regiment(300–800 men)

regiment(300–800 men)

regiment(300–800 men)

The Basic Battlefield Functions of Civil War LeadersIn combat environments the duties of Civil War leaders were

divided into two main parts: decision making and moral sua-

sion. Although the scope of the decisions varied according

to rank and responsibilities, they generally dealt with the

movement and deployment of troops, artillery, and logistical

support (signal detachments, wagon trains, and so on). Most

of the decisions were made by the leaders themselves. Their

staffs helped with administrative paperwork but in combat

functioned essentially as glorified clerks; they did almost no

sifting of intelligence or planning of operations. Once made,

the decisions were transmitted to subordinates either by di-

rect exchange or by courier, with the courier either carrying

a written order or conveying the order verbally. More rarely,

signal flags were used to send instructions. Except in siege

operations, when the battle lines were fairly static, the tele-

graph was almost never used in tactical situations.

Moral suasion was the art of persuading troops to per-

form their duties and dissuading them from failing to per-

form them. Civil War commanders often accomplished this

by personal example, and conspicuous bravery was a vital

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152 Appendix C

attribute of any good leader. It is therefore not surprising

that 8 percent of Union generals—and 18 percent of their

Confederate counterparts—were killed or mortally wounded

in action. (By contrast, only about 3 percent of Union enlisted

men were killed or mortally wounded in action.)

Although any commander might be called upon to inter-

vene directly on the firing line, army, corps, and division

commanders tended to lead from behind the battle line, and

their duties were mainly supervisory. In all three cases their

main ability to influence the fighting, once it was underway,

was by the husbanding and judicious commitment of troops

held in reserve.

Army commanders principally decided the broad questions—

whether to attack or defend, where the army’s main effort(s)

would be made, and when to retreat (or pursue). They made

most of their key choices before and after an engagement

rather than during it. Once battle was actually joined, their

ability to influence the outcome diminished considerably.

They might choose to wait it out or they might choose, tem-

porarily and informally, to exercise the function of a lesser

leader. In the battles of the Civil War, army commanders con-

ducted themselves in a variety of ways: as detached observ-

ers, “super” corps commanders, division commanders, and

so on, all the way down to de facto colonels trying to lead

through personal example.

Corps commanders chiefly directed main attacks or super-

vised the defense of large, usually well-defined sectors. It was

their function to carry out the broad (or occasionally quite

specific) wishes of the army commander. They coordinated

all the elements of their corps (typically infantry divisions

and artillery battalions) in order to maximize its offensive

or defensive strength. Once battle was actually joined, they

influenced the outcome by “feeding” additional troops into

the fight—sometimes by preserving a reserve force (usually

a division) and committing it at the appropriate moment,

sometimes by requesting additional support from adjacent

corps or from the army commander.

Division commanders essentially had the same functions as

corps commanders, though on a smaller scale. When attack-

ing, however, their emphasis was less on “feeding” a fight

than on keeping the striking power of their divisions as com-

pact as possible. The idea was to strike one hard blow rather

than a series of weaker ones.

The following commanders were expected to control the

actual combat—to close with and destroy the enemy:

Brigade commanders principally conducted the actual busi-

ness of attacking or defending. They accompanied the attack-

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153 Organization, Weapons, and Tactics

ing force in person or stayed on the firing line with the de-

fenders. Typically, they placed about three of their regiments

abreast of one another, with about two in immediate sup-

port. Their job was basically to maximize the fighting power

of their brigades by ensuring that these regiments had an

unobstructed field of fire and did not overlap. During an at-

tack it often became necessary to expand, contract, or other-

wise modify the brigade frontage to adapt to the vagaries of

terrain, the movements of adjacent friendly brigades, or the

behavior of enemy forces. It was the brigade commander’s

responsibility to shift his regiments as needed while preserv-

ing, if possible, the unified striking power of the brigade.

Regiment commanders were chiefly responsible for making

their men do as the brigade commanders wished, and their

independent authority on the battlefield was limited. For ex-

ample, if defending they might order a limited counterattack,

but they usually could not order a retreat without approval

from higher authority. Assisted by company commanders, they

directly supervised the soldiers, giving specific, highly con-

crete commands: move this way or that, hold your ground,

fire by volley, forward, and so on. Commanders at this level

were expected to lead by personal example and to display as

well as demand strict adherence to duty.

Civil War TacticsCivil War armies basically had three kinds of combat troops:

infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Infantrymen fought on foot,

each with his own weapon. Cavalrymen were trained to fight

on horseback or dismounted, also with their own individual

weapons. Artillerymen fought with cannon.

infantry

Infantry were by far the most numerous part of a Civil War

army and were chiefly responsible for seizing and holding

ground.

The basic Civil War tactic was to put a lot of men next

to one another in a line and have them move and shoot to-

gether. By present-day standards the notion of placing troops

shoulder to shoulder seems insane, but it still made good

sense in the mid-nineteenth century. There were two reasons

for this: first, it allowed soldiers to concentrate the fire of

their rather limited weapons; second, it was almost the only

way to move troops effectively under fire.

Most Civil War infantrymen used muzzle-loading mus-

kets capable of being loaded and fired a maximum of about

three times a minute. Individually, therefore, a soldier was

nothing. He could affect the battlefield only by combining

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154 Appendix C

his fire with that of other infantrymen. Although spreading

out made them less vulnerable, infantrymen very quickly

lost the ability to combine their fire effectively if they did so.

Even more critically, their officers rapidly lost the ability to

control them.

For most purposes, the smallest tactical unit on a Civil

War battlefield was the regiment. Theoretically composed

of about 1,000 officers and men, in reality the average Civil

War regiment went into battle with about 300 to 600 men.

Whatever its size, however, all members of the regiment had

to be able to understand and carry out the orders of their

colonel and subordinate officers, who generally could com-

municate only through voice command. Since in the din and

confusion of battle only a few soldiers could actually hear

any given command, most got the message chiefly by con-

forming to the movements of the men immediately around

them. Maintaining “touch of elbows”—the prescribed close

interval—was indispensable for this crude but vital system

to work. In addition, infantrymen were trained to “follow

the flag”—the unit and national colors were always conspicu-

ously placed in the front and center of each regiment. Thus,

when in doubt as to what maneuver the regiment was trying

to carry out, soldiers could look to see the direction in which

the colors were moving. That is one major reason why the

post of color-bearer was habitually given to the bravest men

in the unit. It was not just an honor; it was insurance that

the colors would always move in the direction desired by the

colonel.

En route to a battle area, regiments typically moved in a

column formation, four men abreast. There was a simple ma-

neuver whereby regiments could very rapidly change from

column to line once in the battle area, that is, from a for-

mation designed for ease of movement to one designed to

maximize firepower. Regiments normally moved and fought

in line of battle—a close-order formation actually composed

of two lines, front and rear. Attacking units rarely “charged”

in the sense of running full tilt toward the enemy; such a ma-

neuver would promptly destroy the formation as faster men

outstripped slower ones and everyone spread out. Instead,

a regiment using orthodox tactics would typically step off

on an attack moving at a “quick time” rate of 110 steps per

minute (at which it would cover about 85 yards per minute).

Once the force came under serious fire, the rate of advance

might be increased to a so-called double-quick time of 165

steps per minute (about 150 yards per minute). Only when

the regiment was within a few dozen yards of the defending

line would the regiment be ordered to advance at a “run” (a

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155 Organization, Weapons, and Tactics

very rapid pace but still not a sprint). Thus, a regiment might

easily take about ten minutes to “charge” 1,000 yards, even

if it did not pause for realignment or execute any further

maneuvers en route.

In theory, an attacking unit would not stop until it reached

the enemy line, if then. The idea was to force back the de-

fenders through the size, momentum, and shock effect of

the attacking column. (Fixed bayonets were considered in-

dispensable for maximizing the desired shock effect.) In re-

ality, however, the firepower of the defense eventually led

most Civil War regiments to stop and return the fire— often

at ranges of less than 100 yards. And very often the “charge”

would turn into a stand-up firefight at murderously short

range until one side or the other gave way.

It is important to bear in mind that the preceding de-

scription represents a simplified idea of Civil War infantry

combat. As you will see as you visit specific stops, the reality

could vary significantly.

artillery

Second in importance to infantry on most Civil War battle-

fields was the artillery. Not yet the “killing arm” it would be-

come during World War I, when 70 percent of all casualties

would be inflicted by shellfire, artillery nevertheless played

an important role, particularly on the defense. Cannon fire

could break up an infantry attack or dissuade enemy infantry

from attacking in the first place. Its mere presence could also

reassure friendly infantry and so exert a moral effect that

might be as important as its physical effect on the enemy.

The basic artillery unit was the battery, a group of be-

tween four and six fieldpieces commanded by a captain.

Early in the war, batteries tended to be attached to infantry

brigades. But over time it was found that they worked best

when massed together, and both the Union and Confederate

armies quickly reorganized their artillery to facilitate this.

Eventually, both sides maintained extensive concentrations

of artillery at corps level or higher. Coordinating the fire of

20 or 30 guns on a single target was not unusual, and oc-

casionally (as in the bombardment that preceded Pickett’s

Charge at Gettysburg) concentrations of well over 100 guns

might be achieved.

Practically all Civil War fieldpieces were muzzle-loaded

and superficially appeared little changed from their coun-

terparts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In

fact, however, Civil War artillery was quite modern in two

respects. First, advances in metallurgy had resulted in can-

non barrels that were much lighter than their predecessors

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156 Appendix C

but strong enough to contain more powerful charges. Thus,

whereas the typical fieldpiece of the Napoleonic era fired a

6-pound round, the typical Civil War–era fieldpiece fired a

round double that size, with no loss in ease of handling. Sec-

ond, recent improvements had resulted in the development

of practical rifled fieldpieces that had significantly greater

range and accuracy than their smoothbore counterparts.

Civil War fieldpieces could fire a variety of shell types, each

with its own preferred usage. Solid shot was considered best

for battering down structures and for use against massed

troops (a single round could sometimes knock down several

men like ten pins). Shell—hollow rounds that contained an

explosive charge and burst into fragments when touched off

by a time fuse—were used to set buildings afire or to attack

troops behind earthworks or under cover. Spherical case was

similar to shell except that each round contained musket

balls (78 in a 12-pound shot, 38 in a 6-pound shot); it was used

against bodies of troops moving in the open at ranges of from

500 to 1,500 yards. At ranges of below 500 yards, the round of

choice was canister, essentially a metal can containing about

27 cast-iron balls, each 1.5 inches in diameter. As soon as a

canister round was fired, the sides of the can would rip away

and the cast-iron balls would fly directly into the attacking

infantry or ricochet into them off the ground, making the

cannon essentially a large-scale shotgun. In desperate situa-

tions, double and sometimes even triple charges of canister

were used.

As recently as the Mexican War, artillery had been used ef-

fectively on the offensive, with fieldpieces rolling forward to

advanced positions from which they could blast a hole in the

enemy line. The advent of the rifled musket, however, made

this tactic dangerous—defending infantry could now pick off

artillerists who dared to come so close—and so the artillery

had to remain farther back. In theory, the greater range and

accuracy of rifled cannon might have offset this a bit, but ri-

fled cannon fired comparatively small shells of limited effec-

tiveness against infantry at a distance. The preferred use of

artillery on the offensive was therefore not against infantry

but against other artillery—what was termed “counterbat-

tery work.” The idea was to mass one’s own cannon against a

few of the enemy’s cannon and systematically fire so as to kill

the enemy’s artillerists and dismount his fieldpieces.

cavalry

“Whoever saw a dead cavalryman?” was a byword among

Civil War soldiers, a pointed allusion to the fact that the bat-

tlefield role played by the mounted arm was often negligible.

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157 Organization, Weapons, and Tactics

For example, at the battle of Antietam—the single bloodiest

day of the entire war—the Union cavalry suffered exactly 5

men killed and 23 wounded. This was in sharp contrast to the

role played by horsemen during the Napoleonic era, when a

well-timed cavalry charge could exploit an infantry break-

through, overrun the enemy’s retreating foot soldiers, and

convert a temporary advantage into a complete battlefield

triumph.

Why the failure to use cavalry to better tactical advantage?

The best single explanation might be that for much of the war

there was simply not enough of it to achieve significant re-

sults. Whereas cavalry had comprised 20 to 25 percent of Na-

poleonic armies, in Civil War armies it generally averaged 8

to 10 percent or less. The paucity of cavalry may be explained

in turn by its much greater expense compared with infantry.

A single horse might easily cost ten times the monthly pay of

a Civil War private and necessitated the purchase of saddles,

bridles, stirrups, and other gear as well as specialized cloth-

ing and equipment for the rider. Moreover, horses required

about 26 pounds of feed and forage per day, many times the

requirement of an infantryman. One might add to this the

continual need for remounts to replace worn-out animals

and that it took far more training to make an effective cav-

alryman than an effective infantryman. There was also the

widespread belief that the heavily wooded terrain of North

America would limit opportunities to use cavalry on the

battlefield. All in all, it is perhaps no wonder that Civil War

armies were late in creating really powerful mounted arms.

Instead, cavalry tended to be used mainly for scouting and

raiding, duties that took place away from the main battle-

fields. During major engagements their mission was princi-

pally to screen the flanks or to control the rear areas. By 1863,

however, the North was beginning to create cavalry forces

sufficiently numerous and well armed to play a significant

role on the battlefield. At Gettysburg, for example, Union cav-

alrymen armed with rapid-fire, breech-loading carbines were

able to hold a Confederate infantry division at bay for several

hours. At Cedar Creek in 1864, a massed cavalry charge late

in the day completed the ruin of the Confederate army, and

during the Appomattox campaign in 1865, Federal cavalry

played a decisive role in bringing Lee’s retreating army to bay

and forcing its surrender.

Appreciation of the TerrainThe whole point of a battlefield tour is to see the ground

over which men actually fought. Understanding the terrain

is basic to understanding almost every aspect of a battle. Ter-

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158 Appendix C

rain helps to explain why commanders deployed their troops

where they did, why attacks occurred in certain areas and

not in others, and why some attacks succeeded and others

did not.

When defending, Civil War leaders often looked for po-

sitions that had as many of the following characteristics as

possible:

First, it obviously had to be ground from which they could protect

whatever it was they were ordered to defend.

Second, it should be elevated enough so as to provide good obser-

vation and good fields of fire—they wanted to see as far as possible

and sometimes (though not always) to shoot as far as possible. The

highest ground was not necessarily the best, however, for it often af-

forded an attacker defilade—areas of lower ground that the defend-

ers’ weapons could not reach. For that reason, leaders seldom placed

their troops at the very top of a ridge or hill (the “geographical crest”).

Instead, they placed them a bit forward of the geographical crest at a

point from which they had the best field of fire (the “military crest”).

Alternatively, they might choose to place their troops behind the crest

so as to conceal their size and exact deployment from the enemy and

gain protection from long-range fire. It also meant that an attacker,

upon reaching the crest, would be silhouetted against the sky and

susceptible to a sudden, potentially destructive fire at close range.

Third, the ground adjacent to the chosen position should present

a potential attacker with obstacles. Streams and ravines made good

obstructions because they required an attacker to halt temporarily

while trying to cross them. Fences and boulder fields could also slow

an attacker. Dense woodlands could do the same but offered conceal-

ment for potential attackers and were therefore less desirable. In ad-

dition to its other virtues, elevated ground was also prized because

attackers moving uphill had to exert themselves more and got tired

faster. Obstacles were especially critical at the ends of a unit’s posi-

tion—the flanks—if there were no other units beyond to protect it.

That is why commanders “anchored” their flanks, whenever possible,

on hills or the banks of large streams.

Fourth, the terrain must offer ease of access for reinforcements to

arrive and, if necessary, for the defenders to retreat.

Fifth, a source of drinkable water—the more the better—should

be immediately behind the position if possible. This was especially

important for cavalry and artillery units, which had horses to think

about as well as men.

When attacking, Civil War commanders looked for differ-

ent things:

First, they looked for weaknesses in the enemy’s position, especially

“unanchored” flanks. If there were no obvious weaknesses, they

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159 Organization, Weapons, and Tactics

looked for a key point in the enemy’s position— often a piece of el-

evated ground whose loss would undermine the rest of the enemy’s

defensive line.

Second, they searched for ways to get close to the enemy position

without being observed. Using woodlands and ridge lines to screen

their movements was a common tactic.

Third, they looked for open, elevated ground on which they could

deploy artillery to “soften up” the point to be attacked.

Fourth, once the attack was underway they tried, when possible,

to find areas of defilade in which their troops could gain relief from

exposure to enemy fire. Obviously, it was almost never possible to find

defilade that offered protection all the way to the enemy line, but

leaders could often find some point en route where they could pause

briefly to “dress” their lines.

Making the best use of terrain was an art that almost always

involved trade-offs among these various factors—and also

required consideration of the number of troops available.

Even a very strong position was vulnerable if there were not

enough men to defend it. A common error among Civil War

generals, for example, was to stretch their line too thin in

order to hold an otherwise desirable piece of ground.

Estimating DistanceWhen touring Civil War battlefields, it is often helpful to

have a general sense of distance. For example, estimating

distance can help you estimate how long it took troops to get

from point A to point B or to visualize the points at which

they would have become vulnerable to different kinds of ar-

tillery fire. There are several easy tricks to bear in mind:

Use reference points for which the exact distance is known. Many

battlefield stops give you the exact distance to one or more key points

in the area. Locate such a reference point, and then try to divide the

intervening terrain into equal parts. For instance, say the reference

point is 800 yards away. The ground about halfway in between will

be 400 yards; the ground halfway between yourself and the midway

point will be 200 yards, and so on.

Use the football field method. Visualize the length of a football

field, which of course is about 100 yards. Then estimate the number

of football fields you could put between yourself and the distant point

of interest.

Use cars, houses, and other common objects that tend to be

roughly the same size. Most cars are about the same size, and so are

many houses. Become familiar with how large or small such objects

appear at various distances—300 yards, 1,000 yards, 2,000 yards,

and such. This is a less accurate way of estimating distance, but it

can be helpful if the lay of the land makes it otherwise hard to tell

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160 Appendix C

whether a point is near or far. Look for such objects that seem a bit

in front of the point of interest. Their relative size can provide a

useful clue.

Maximum Effective Ranges of Common Civil War WeaponsRifled musket 400 yds.

Smoothbore musket 150 yds.

Breech-loading carbine 300 yds.

Napoleon 12-pounder smoothbore cannon

Solid shot 1,700 yds.

Shell 1,300 yds.

Spherical case 500–1,500 yds.

Canister 400 yds.

Parrott 10-pounder rifled cannon

Solid shot 6,000 yds.

3-inch ordnance rifle (cannon)

Solid shot 4,000 yds.

Further ReadingCoggins, Jack. Arms and Equipment of the Civil War. 1962; re-

print, Wilmington NC: Broadfoot, 1990. The best introduc-

tion to the subject: engagingly written, profusely illus-

trated, and packed with information.

Griffith, Paddy. Battle Tactics of the Civil War. New Haven CT:

Yale University Press, 1989. Argues that in a tactical sense,

the Civil War was more nearly the last great Napoleonic

war than the first modern war. In Griffith’s view the in-

fluence of the rifled musket on Civil War battlefields has

been exaggerated; the carnage and inconclusiveness of

many Civil War battles owed less to the inadequacy of Na-

poleonic tactics than to a failure to properly understand

and apply them.

Jamieson, Perry D. Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States

Army Tactics, 1865–1899. Tuscaloosa: University of Ala-

bama Press, 1994. The early chapters offer a good analysis

of the tactical lessons learned by U.S. Army officers from

their Civil War experiences.

Linderman, Gerald F. Embattled Courage: The Experience of Com-

bat in the American Civil War. New York: Free Press, 1987.

This thoughtful, well-written study examines how Civil

War soldiers understood and coped with the challenges

of the battlefield.

McWhiney, Grady, and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack and Die: Civil

War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage. Tuscaloosa:

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161 Organization, Weapons, and Tactics

University of Alabama Press, 1982. Although unconvinc-

ing in its assertion that their Celtic heritage led Southern-

ers to take the offensive to an inordinate degree, this is an

excellent tactical study that emphasizes the revolutionary

effect of the rifled musket. Best read in combination with

Griffith’s Battle Tactics.

Feeling the enemy. From a war-time sketch. blcw 3:224

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Inspection. From a

war-time sketch.

blcw 2:153

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Sources

In general, the works cited in the “For Further Reading” sec-

tions of each stop provide information, interpretation, and

insight. The citations of those works in that section should

in every case be taken as an attribution of credit for the ma-

terial presented there. The sources for specific items in each

stop are provided in this appendix.

EARLY PENINSULA CAMPAIGN

Stop 2 The quotation in the vignette is from Richard Wheeler, Sword

over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan’s Peninsula Cam-

paign (New York: Fairfax Press, 1986), 118–19.

Stop 5 The quotations in the vignette are from William F. Smith,

Autobiography of Major General William F. Smith 1861–1864, ed.

Herbert M. Schiller (Dayton OH: Morningside, 1990), 34–35.

Stop 9 The quotation in the vignette is from Charles S. Wainwright,

A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wain-

wright, 1861–1865, ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Harcourt,

Brace & World, 1962), 47–52.

Optional The quotation in the vignette is from Edmund Ruffin, The

Excursion 1 Diary of Edmund Ruffin, Volume 2: The Years of Hope, April, 1861–

June, 1863, ed. William K. Scarborough (Baton Rouge: Louisi-

ana State University Press), 269–70.

Optional The quotations in the vignette are from George B. McClellan,

Excursion 2 McClellan’s Own Story (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1887),

309–10.

Optional The quotation in the vignette is from William I. Clopton,

Excursion 4 “New Light on the Great Drewry’s Bluff Fight,” Southern His-

torical Society Papers 34 (1906): 94.

SEVEN DAYS

Stop 1 The quotation in the vignette is from Daniel H. Hill, “Lee’s

Attacks North of the Chickahominy,” in Battles and Leaders of

the Civil War, 2:347.

Stop 2 The quotation in the vignette is from Joseph L. Brent, Mem-

oirs of the War Between the States (N.p.: Privately printed, 1940),

160– 62.

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164 Sources

Stop 4 The description and quotation in the vignette are from Ste-

phen Sears, To the Gates of Richmond (New York: Ticknor &

Fields, 1992), 218.

Stop 5a The quotation in the vignette is from the Prince de Joinville,

The Army of the Potomac: Its Organization, Its Commander, and Its

Campaign (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 1862).

Stop 5b The quotation in the vignette is from Robert H. Miller, “Let-

ters of Lieutenant Robert H. Miller to His Family, 1861–1862”

(ed. Forrest P. Connor), Virginia Magazine of History and Biogra-

phy, Janu ary 1962, 88.

Stop 5c The quotation in the vignette is from Val C. Giles, Rags and

Hope: The Recollections of Val C. Giles, ed. Mary Laswell (New

York: Coward-McCann, 1961), 111.

Stop 6 The story in the vignette is from Newton M. Curtis, From Bull

Run to Chancellorsville (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1906),

120–26.

Stop 9 The quotation in the vignette is from Rev. J. J. Marks, D.D.,

The Peninsular Campaign in Virginia, or Incidents and Scenes on

the Battle-fields and in Richmond (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott,

1864), 248.

Stop 10 The quotation in the vignette is from Charles Marshall, An

Aide-de-Camp of Lee, ed. Sir Frederick Maurice (Boston: Little,

Brown, and Company, 1927), 112.

Stop 11 The quotation in the vignette is from James Longstreet, “ ‘The

Seven Days,’ Including Frayser’s Farm,” in Battles and Leaders

of the Civil War, 2:402n.

Stop 12 The quotation in the analysis is from E. P. Alexander, Military

Memoirs of a Confederate (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,

1907), 155. The quotation in the vignette is from Andrew E.

Ford, The Story of the Fifteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer

Infantry in the Civil War (Clinton MA: W. J. Coulter, 1898), 176.

Stop 13 The quotations in the vignette are from Austin C. Dobbins,

Grandfather’s Journal (Dayton OH: Morningside, 1988), 89.

Stop 14 The quotations in the vignette are from Brent, Memoirs,

p. 211.

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165 Sources

Stop 15c The quotations in the vignette are from Thomas L. Livermore,

Days and Events, 1860 –1866 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920),

96–97.

Optional The quotations in the vignette are from Bradley T. Johnson,

Excursion 1 “Memoir of the First Maryland Regiment, Paper No. 5,” South-

ern Historical Society Papers 10, no. 4 (April 1882): 150.

Optional The quotations in the vignette are from Robert S. Westbrook,

Excursion 2 History of the 49th Pennsylvania Volunteers (Altoona PA: Altoona

Times, 1898), 115.

Optional The quotation in the vignette is from Daniel H. Hill, “Mc-

Excursion 3 Clellan’s Change of Base and Malvern Hill,” in Battles and

Leaders of the Civil War, 2:390.

Optional The quotation in the vignette is from Smith, Autobiogra-

Excursion 4 phy, 48n.

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N4084.indb 166N4084.indb 166 1/15/07 10:09:37 AM1/15/07 10:09:37 AM

Suggestions for Further Reading

The Peninsula Campaign has been written about more in

the past 15 years perhaps than in the previous 125. Stephen

W. Sears’s To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (New

York: Ticknor & Field, 1992) was the first major study of the

campaign as a whole since the 1800s. Many different aspects

of the campaign are admirably covered in the three volumes

edited by William J. Miller entitled The Peninsula Campaign of

1862: Yorktown to the Seven Days (Campbell CA: Savas Publish-

ing, 1993, 1995, 1997), as well as the volume on the campaign

in the Military Campaigns of the Civil War series edited by

Gary W. Gallagher: The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Penin-

sula & the Seven Days (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina

Press, 2000).

Steven H. Newton has written two volumes that help fill

the niche of studies on the early Peninsula campaign. Joseph

E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (Lawrence: University

Press of Kansas, 1998) is an interesting and somewhat re-

visionist account of the Confederate side of the campaign

through Seven Pines. That battle itself, not discussed in this

guidebook because the battlefield itself does not exist, is the

subject of Newton’s The Battle of Seven Pines: May 31–June 1,

1862 (Lynchburg VA: H. E. Howard, 1993).

The battle of Williamsburg is also the subject of two books.

A Pitiless Rain: The Battle of Williamsburg, 1862 (Shippensburg PA:

White Mane, 1997), by Earl C. Hastings Jr. and David S. Hast-

ings, focuses on the battle itself. Carol Kettenburg Dubbs’s

Defend This Old Town: Williamsburg during the Civil War (Baton

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002) devotes exten-

sive coverage to the battle as part of a history of the colonial

capital during the Civil War.

The Seven Days battles were the major focus of Clifford

Dowdey’s The Seven Days: The Emergence of Lee (Boston: Little

Brown, 1964), although that book devoted much of its space

to events leading up to Lee’s assumption of command of the

Army of Northern Virginia. My own Extraordinary Circum-

stances: The Seven Days Battles (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-

sity Press, 2001) is a detailed study of the battles.

The leading generals on the Confederate side all have

multiple biographies, and only one or two for each man

will be listed here. For Robert E. Lee, the standard is Doug-

las Southall Freeman’s four-volume R. E. Lee (New York:

Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), in which volume two con-

tains coverage of the campaign. A more recent biography

is Emory M. Thomas, Robert E. Lee: A Biography (New York:

W. W. Norton, 1995). Craig Symonds has filled several gaps

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168 Suggestions for Further Reading

in the Civil War literature with his works, one of which

is Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (New York: W. W.

Norton, 1992). John Magruder, who played a crucial part

throughout the Peninsula Campaign, is profiled in Paul D.

Casdorph’s Prince John Magruder: His Life and Campaigns

(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996). Another Confeder-

ate with an important role through most of the campaign

is James Longstreet. Jeffry D. Wert’s General James Longstreet:

The Confederacy’s Most Controversial Soldier—A Biography (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1993) is the most recent exami-

nation. Stonewall Jackson, whose role in the Seven Days

began to be dissected as soon as the campaign ended, has

many biographers. For years, the standard life was Lenoir

Chambers’s two-volume Stonewall Jackson (New York: Wil-

liam Morrow, 1959), of which volume two includes cover-

age of the Seven Days. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier,

The Legend (New York: Macmillan, 1997), by James I. Robert-

son Jr., has set the new standard for Jackson biographies.

With the exception of George McClellan, the important

Union generals in the Peninsula Campaign have received

less extensive treatment, but then McClellan should right-

fully be the main focus on the Union side of the campaign.

Of his numerous biographies, the two most recent and best

are Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon

(New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1988), and Ethan S. Rafuse,

McClellan’s War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the

Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).

Finally, studies of both armies are useful in examining

the Peninsula Campaign. For the Army of Northern Virginia,

Douglas Southall Freeman’s Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Com-

mand (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1942) is an exhaus-

tive study; volume one covers this campaign. Davis & Lee at

War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), by Steven

E. Woodworth, focuses on the titular relationship. Kenneth

P. Williams analyzes the Army of the Potomac’s command

in Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War (New

York: Macmillan, 1949); again, volume one covers the cam-

paign. Jeffry D. Wert’s The Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Po-

tomac (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005) is the most recent

history.

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In This Hallowed Ground: Guides to the Civil War Battlefields series

Chickamauga: A Battlefield Guide

with a Section on Chattanooga

Steven E. Woodworth

Gettysburg: A Battlefield Guide

Mark Grimsley and Brooks D. Simpson

The Peninsula and Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide

Brian K. Burton

Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide

Mark Grimsley and Steven E. Woodworth

Wilson’s Creek, Pea Ridge, and Prairie Grove: A Battlefield Guide,

with a Section on Wire Road

Earl J. Hess, Richard W. Hatcher III, William Garrett Piston, and William L. Shea

A disorganized private.

From a photograph.

blcw 2:556

N4084.indb 169N4084.indb 169 1/15/07 10:09:38 AM1/15/07 10:09:38 AM

university of nebraska press

Also of Interest in the series:

ShilohA Battlefield Guide

By Mark Grimsley and Steven E. Woodworth

Designed to lead the reader on a one-day tour of one of the most

important battlefields of the Civil War, this guide provides precise

directions to all the key locations in a manner reflecting how the

battle itself unfolded.

isbn: 0-8032-7100-x; 978-0-8032-7100-5 (paper)

Wilson’s Creek, Pea Ridge, and Prairie GroveA Battlefield Guide, with a Section on Wire Road

By Earl J. Hess, Richard W. Hatcher III, William Garrett Piston, and

William L. Shea

Wilson’s Creek, Pea Ridge, and Prairie Grove were three of the most

important battles fought west of the Mississippi River during the

Civil War. This is the first book to provide a detailed guide to these

battlefields and it takes the visitor step-by-step through the major

sites of each engagement.

isbn: 0-8032-7366-5; 978-0-8032-7366-5 (paper)

Order online at www.nebraskapress.unl.edu or call 1-800-755-1105.

Mention the code ”BOFOX” to receive a 20% discount.

N4084.indb 170N4084.indb 170 1/15/07 10:09:38 AM1/15/07 10:09:38 AM