The Obama Administration’s Policy towards the Syrian Civil War

by

Josh Heine

American Foreign Policy

POS 3100-1

Professor William Pierros

Concordia University Chicago

December 9, 2014

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Executive Summary

Syria has been engulfed in civil conflict since 2011, and the conflict does not appear to be

ending soon. Thousands of soldiers, rebels, and noncombatants have perished in the past two

years, and millions more have been displaced by the violence.

The welfare of Syrian citizens and the removal of President Bashar al-Assad from power

are the primary concerns for the Obama administration. However, it must navigate the situation

delicately as Syria’s allies, China, Iran, and Russia, may feel provoked by actions taken by the

administration. As a result, the original United States policy towards the Syrian civil war

consisted of denouncement of Assad and his government and economic sanctions but eventually

expanded to limited financial and economic support for certain rebel groups and the removal of

Syria’s chemical weapons. However, only the sanctions and chemical weapons removal portions

of the current policy have been effective: therefore, alternative policies are required.

There are three possible policy alternatives that have been addressed in this paper. The

first alternative is to continue the current policy, but to extend sanctions onto Syria’s allies, such

as Iran and Russia and begin covert military training of certain rebel groups favored by the

United States government. This is based on the assumption that there is linkage between Syria

and its allies and that placing sanctions on its allies will lead to them placing pressure on Syria.

The second alternative is to launch military strikes against designated targets, which would

include military bases and formations and weapons facilities. This would allow stronger action

than sanctions or denouncement against the Assad regime, but will be seen as a declaration of

force and may result in collateral damage. The third alternative is to launch a multinational

response with the authorization of the United Nations in order to end the violence. This response,

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however, requires the full support of the United Nations and will be costly in treasure and lives

and may result in hostilities from Syria’s allies.

The recommended course of action is the first alternative. It is the most politically sound

version as military force, a tactic that would possibly receive hostile action from Syria’s allies, is

virtually nonexistent. However, the policy has force through sanctions on Syria’s allies, which

will force them to pressure Assad into surrendering or lessening the conflict.

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Table of Contents

The Current Policy Regarding the Civil War Page 5

Factors Affecting the Policy Page 11

Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Current Policy Page 16

Policy Alternatives Page 21

Works Cited Page 25

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The Current Policy Regarding the Civil War

The Obama administration is concerned about the welfare of Syrian citizens during the

prolonged civil war and desires the removal of President Bashar al-Assad from power and peace

in Syria. However, it has been reluctant to react due to fear of conflict with China and Russia and

due to war weariness from Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the original United States policy

consisted of denouncement of President Bashar al-Assad and his government and economic

sanctions but eventually expanded to limited financial and economic support for certain rebel

groups and the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons.

The first part of the policy towards Syria was denouncement and sanctions. The Obama

administration’s first condemnations of Assad’s government occurred on March 25, 2011 in

response to the brutal repression of protestors by the Syrian forces (Lesch 151). However, the

administration continued to denounce Syrian aggression, including Obama’s comments on April

23 that and harder stances were considered (Lesch 152). On June 1, Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton strongly denounced Assad, stating that he “has a choice, and every day that goes by, the

choice is made by default. He has not called an end to the violence against his own people, and

he has not engaged seriously in any kind of reform efforts” (Lesch 154). Obama stated on

August 18, 2011, that “We have consistently said that President Asad must lead a democratic

transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has

come for President Asad to step aside.” (Sharp, Blanchard 15). However, the administration still

refused to take decisive action, causing uproar from commentators and congressional

representatives regarding the Obama administration’s inconsistent actions in the Arab Spring.

Relations between Syria and the United States continued to erode, especially after Robert Ford,

the US ambassador to Syria, and Eric Chevallier, the French ambassador, visited opposition

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leaders in Hama on July 8, which signaled that the United States and France supported the

opposition movement (Lesch 155). In retaliation, pro-regime protestors organized by the Syrian

government marched on and severely damaged the US embassy and ambassador’s residence in

Damascus, which provoked responses from both Clinton and Obama on July 11 regarding al-

Assad’s loss of “legitimacy” (Lesch 156).

Obama first enacted sanctions against Syria on April 29 with the signing Executive Order

13572, which “imposed sanctions on Syrian officials and government related entities responsible

for human rights abuses and violence towards civilians” (Lesch 152). The sanctions froze assets,

banned travel, restricted business with certain Syrian officials, and revoked licenses for

transportation of US equipment to Syria (Lesch 152). Due to increasing protestor deaths, which

approximated 700, President Obama added al-Assad to the list of Syrian officials being

sanctioned (Lesch 153). The United States and the European Union banned the importation of all

Syrian oil and petroleum products through the Council Implementing Resolution 878/2011 on

September 2 (Lesch 159).

The major part of the United States policy towards the non-governmental entities in Syria

has been humanitarian aid. According to USAID, there are over 6 million people in need of

humanitarian assistance, 5 million internally displaced persons, and 2 million people displaced

abroad (USAID). USAID also states its important role in the care of Syrian civilians:

“On September 24, President Obama announced the United States will provide $339

million in additional U.S. humanitarian aid to support those affected by the ongoing crisis in

Syria. This new announcement brings the total U.S. funding for humanitarian assistance to the

Syrian people to well over $1.3 billion since the crisis began. The United States is providing

food, clean water, shelter, medical care, and relief supplies to over 4.2 million people inside

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Syria, as well as to the more than two million refugees across the region. The United States

remains the single-largest contributor of humanitarian aid for the Syrian people” (USAID).

According to its website, USAID has been providing humanitarian aid to Syrian civilians since

2011 (USAID).

The Obama administration began to address the issue of chemical weapons in August

2013. While there has been evidence since April 2013 that al-Assad’s forces attacked civilian

populations with rockets containing sarin gas, killing hundreds including women and children,

which led to investigations by the United States and the United Nations, proof for the Obama

administration appeared in a sarin attack that killed approximately 1,429 civilians, including

children, in the suburb of Ghouta (BBC: What We Know). Since that day, the Obama

administration has considered airstrikes against Syria. However, on September 13, the United

States and Russia began negotiations regarding a deal to remove and destroy Syria's chemical

weapons after President Vladimir Putin submitted an opinion piece to the New York Times

denouncing the possibility of missile strikes (BBC: Syrian Chemical Weapons). Agreement was

reached on September 14, with Secretary of State John Kerry creating a four page "Framework

for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons" detailing the United States desired approach to

Syrian chemical disarmament. The main points include the submission of a full list of Syria's

chemical weapons stockpile, international inspectors in Syria by November, completion of initial

weapon site surveys and destruction of all production equipment by the end of November, and

the destruction of all chemical weapons material by the middle of 2014 (Department of State).

On September 28, the United Nations approved the chemical weapons agreement and on

September 29, Assad vowed that Syria would adhere to the deal (BBC: UN Resolution).

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War weariness was a primary reason for lack of military intervention in the early stages

of the war, as President Obama would state on September 10, 2013, “But I have resisted calls for

military action because we cannot resolve someone else's civil war through force, particularly

after a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan”. However, the administration also lacked military

options and leverage against Syria, and sought a future balance between rhetoric and action in

order to pressure Assad and delay further criticism from Congressmen of both parties (Lesch

157). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced on March 27 that the United States would

take no action against Syria since there was no international condemnation, no Arab League

response, and no United Nations resolution (Lesch 151).

The Syrian civil war originated in March 2011 after supporters of al-Assad’s regime

brutally attacked young children scrawling anti-government graffiti on city walls in the city of

Dara’a. (Robinson 333). Demonstrations continued throughout April, despite crackdowns from

the government including firing on protestors by soldiers (Lesch 97). Opposition grew due to the

government response, especially after the mutilation of thirteen-year-old Hamza al-Khateeb and

the killing of 120 security personnel in Jisr al-Shughur (Lesch 108, 109). International opposition

mounted after the submission of a Human Rights Watch report entitled “We’ve Never See Such

Horror”: Crimes against humanity by Syrian security forces that detailed ‘“systematic killings of

protestors and bystanders’, as well as extensive arbitrary arrests, disappearances, torture, denial

of medical assistance, executions and mass graves, among other violations (Lesch 110, 111).

Over the past two years, the conflict has intensified: numerous splinter groups fight against the

government and Assad’s forces are now utilizing chemical weapons.

The importance of ending the Syrian civil war is broad, but the destruction alone is

enough reason to end the conflict. Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard commented

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on this in their Congressional Research Service Report Armed Conflict: Background and U.S.

Response:

“Amid extensive damage to major urban areas and reports attributing war crimes to both

government and opposition forces, the war has created a regional humanitarian emergency. Some

estimates suggest more than 100,000 Syrians have been killed since March 2011. As of

September 6, more than 2 million refugees had fled Syria, and the United Nations projects that

the total may reach 3.5 million by year’s end. As many as 4.25 million Syrians have been

internally displaced. U.S. humanitarian assistance to date totals more than $1.01 billion”

(Blanchard, Sharp 2)

Another concern is the ideologies of rebel groups opposing the Assad regime. While the

Free Syrian is a moderate group, others have Islamist or terrorist ideologies. If one of these less

moderate groups emerges victorious, then the new Syrian government could ally with other

Middle Eastern nations such as Lebanon and Iran. Such nations would attempt to destroy Israel,

which would result in war since Israel would do all that is necessary to defend itself. Syria's

future government could also pose an issue for the United States. If the government has pro-

Islamist or pro-Iranian ties, then the United States will have a new enemy in the Middle East that

could hurt U.S. oil imports even further.

The continuation of the civil war could lead to destabilization of the region, as this is a

common consequence of civil wars. This occurred during the Vietnam War when the violence

spread to Laos and Cambodia, leading to the rise of the Khmer Rouge. It is certainly a possibility

that the continuation of the conflict could spread into Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel.

The devastating chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013

led to further action by the Obama administration. An initial U.S. government report determined

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that 1,429 people, including at least 426 children, perished in the attack (Sharp, Blanchard 4).

Further intelligence determined that Syrian chemical weapons personnel were preparing

chemical munitions prior to the attack, the government’s accusations that rebels caused the attack

were highly unlikely, and attacks from a regime-controlled area struck neighborhoods where the

chemical attacks occurred (Sharp, Blanchard 4). In addition, these personnel included those

involved with Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), which is the entity

responsible for the creation and evolution of Syria’s chemical weapons program. The reason that

the chemical weapons issue is so controversial is that The Geneva Convention Protocol for the

Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological

Methods of Warfare states “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all

analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the

civilized world” (Geneva Convention).

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Factors Affecting the Current Policy

Syria is located in the Middle East and is bordered by Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq,

Jordan. Like most Middle Eastern nations, it is composed of semiarid desert and plains, but also

has coastal plains and mountains in the west (CIA). Strategically important nations in the Syrian

crisis are Israel, Turkey, China, Russia, and the United States: Israel and Turkey are enemies of

Syria, China and Russia are its allies, and the United States has made its disapproval of the

regime clear. Its chief natural resources are petroleum, phosphates, chrome and manganese ores,

asphalt, iron ore, rock salt, marble gypsum, and hydropower (CIA).

Approximately 90 percent of the Syrian population is Arabic, while the remaining 10

percent is composed of Kurds, Armenians, and others (Sharp, Blanchard 6). The official

language is Arabic, but many Syrians speak Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian and some

understand French and English (CIA World Factbook). Syria’s religious denominations are even

more diverse: while approximately 74 percent of Syrians are Sunni Muslims, about 16 percent

are other Muslim sects, such as Alawite and Druze, 10 percent are Christian, and a small

percentage is Jewish (CIA World Factbook). The Assad family and Baath Party, which belong to

the Alawite minority, have brutally oppressed the Sunni majority over the years, particularly in

1980 when the regime cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood (Sharp, Blanchard 6).

Syria experienced modest growth and reforms prior to the 2011 uprising, but the

economy is currently suffering. The nation is experiencing reduced domestic production and

consumption and rising inflation, as well as dwindling foreign exchange reserves, rising budget

and trade deficits, and decreasing currency value (CIA World Factbook). Long-term economic

issues include foreign trade barriers, declining oil production, high unemployment, rising budget

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deficits, and increasing pressure on water supplies due to agricultural and population usage (CIA

World Factbook).

The official GDP exchange rate as of 2011 was $107.6 billion, which was a decrease

from past years (CIA Factbook). Exports totaled $3.876 billion in 2012. They primarily consist

of crude oil, minerals, petroleum products, fruits and vegetables, cotton fibers, textiles, clothing,

meat and wild animals, wheat (CIA World Factbook). Iraq is its primary export partner, as it

receives approximately 56 percent of Syria’s exports, but primary export partners also include

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, The United Arab Emirates and Lebanon. Imports totaled 10.78 billion in

2012 and primarily consisted machinery and transport equipment, electric power machinery,

food and livestock, metal and metal products, chemicals and chemical products, yarn, plastics,

and paper. Syria receives the majority of its imports, approximately 21 percent, from Saudi

Arabia, but also receives imports from the United Arab Emirates, Iran, China, Iraq, Ukraine,

Egypt (CIA World Factbook). Syria is currently experiencing a deficit, as its national wealth and

debt as of December 31, 2012 was $4.774 billion and $8.33 billion, respectively (CIA World

Factbook). Its currency, the Syrian pound, is currently worth

Syria is primarily an agricultural state and produces a variety of products such as wheat,

barley, cotton, lentils, chickpeas, olives, sugar beets, beef, mutton, eggs, poultry, and milk.

However, it also has industries in petroleum, textiles, food processing, beverages, tobacco,

phosphate rock mining, cement, oil seeds crushing, and car assembly (CIA World Factbook).

The current political system is a multipolar one, as the power in the international system

is distributed among several powers. The United States, Russia, and China are three world

powers who are currently active in the Syrian crisis and attempting to find a solution, but other

nations, such as Israel and Iran, are involved as well. Israel occasionally launches strikes on

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Syria to destroy weapons platforms and maintain its security and Iran is a firm supporter of the

Assad regime. The United Nations and European Union are active in the crisis through

denouncement and sanctioning of the Syrian government and USAID and the UN have been

instrumental in distributing humanitarian to Syrian refugees. Syria is linked to Russia and China,

as Syria complied with the chemical weapons deal that Russia primarily fostered. However, it is

doubtful whether any pressure placed on Russia would pass on to Syria.

There are several rebel groups currently operating in Syria. The largest opposition to

Assad’s regime is the Syrian National Council (SNC), which is considered the legitimate

opposition organization (Lesch 113). The SNC merged with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which

was created in late April by the defector Colonel Riad al-Assad along with other defecting army

officers and troubled citizens, on November 28, 2011 (Lesch 175, 179). David Lesch quoted

Nicholas Heras of siyese.com in regards to the potential of the SNC-FSA to lead Syria after

Assad:

“As a full-spectrum movement, a Free Syrian Army-Syrian National Council coalition

would be able to claim a political role as the major transition authority in a post-Assad Syria,

with the added assurance to concerned foreign actors that it has the security organization to

combat potential disorder and violence a la Iraq from the first day after the Al-Assad

government” (Lesch 179).

General Salim Idriss founded the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in 2012. He defected

from the Syrian Arab Army because of the deaths of many family members at the hands of the

regime in Homs (Sharp, Blanchard 8). The SMC is one of the primary organizations that the

United States is supporting because its political views appear to be far more moderate than other

groups (Sharp, Blanchard 8).

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There are several terrorist groups resisting the Assad regime. The primary group is the Al

Nusra Front, which Al Qaeda in Iraq, the same group that U.S. military personnel fought in Iraq,

established in 2012 (Sharp, Blanchard 13). In April 2013, some Al Nusra members left the

organization to create the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), which is a jihadist group that

calls for Muslims from across the globe to wage war in Syria (Sharp, Blanchard 13).

The key state involved is Syria. Syria is an authoritarian state currently ruled by President

Bashar al-Assad, whose family has been in control of Syria since the 1970s. Assad’s father,

Hafiz al-Assad, ruled from 1970 until his death in 2000 and the ruling Baath party has controlled

Syria since 1963 (Sharp, Blanchard 6). The current crisis has been shaped by ethnic rivalries

between the ruling Alawite minority and other ethnicities, violence against the populace by

government forces, and the democratization of the Middle East caused by the Arab Spring.

American intervention is perhaps the greatest political factor regarding the Syrian civil

war. President Obama consistently maintained that if chemical weapons became involved, then

the United States would use force to defend the people of Syria. However, the United States has

not utilized any military might. However, Congress has considered proposals for force. The first

authorizes the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be

necessary and appropriate in connection with the use of chemical weapons or other weapons of

mass destruction in the conflict in Syria in order to (1) prevent or deter the use or proliferation

(including the transfer to terrorist groups or other state or non-state actors), within, to or from

Syria, of any weapons of mass destruction, including chemical or biological weapons or

components of or materials used in such weapons; or (2) protect the United States and its allies

and partners against the threat posed by such weapons (Blanchard, Sharp 10). The second

proposal, adopted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 4, 2013, authorizes

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use the Armed Forces of the United States as the President determines to be necessary and

appropriate in a limited and specified manner against legitimate military targets in Syria, only to

(1) respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction by the Government of Syria in the conflict

in Syria; (2) deter Syria’s use of such weapons in order to protect the national security interests

of the United States and to protect United States allies and partners against the use of such

weapons; (3) degrade Syria’s capacity to use such weapons in the future; and (4) prevent the

transfer to terrorist groups or other state or non-state actors within Syria of any weapons of mass

destruction (Blanchard, Sharp 10).

The Syrian crisis has also illustrated the ineptness and weakness of the United Nations

and the European Union. Even though the civil war began in 2011, these organizations have

taken little forceful action apart from denouncing and sanctioning the Assad regime. While the

United States has been criticized for its role as a “policeman”, the inability of the United Nations

and the European Union to act certainly is an argument for greater American involvement in the

globe.

The crisis has also illustrated the hypocrisy of nations in terms of denouncing violence.

While the world was quick to take action against Libya, it did not become concerned with Syria

until allegations that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against citizens came forth. Nor

did it react toward the use of cluster bombs by the regime, which is also banned by the Geneva

Conventions. While chemical weapons certainly earn more reaction from the public than cluster

bombs, the international community should abide by all international laws and bans. However, it

seems that the world refuses to act towards crises unless it can gain sufficient public support or

outrage and the violations of international law are blatant. Even devastating civil war is not

sufficient to elicit a response from the globe.

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Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Current Policy

The original United States policy consisted of denouncement of President Bashar al-

Assad and his government and economic sanctions but eventually expanded to limited financial

and economic support for certain rebel groups and the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons.

The first part of the policy towards Syria was denouncement and sanctions. The Obama

administration’s first condemnations of Assad’s government occurred on March 25, 2011 in

response to the brutal repression of protestors by the Syrian forces (Lesch 151). However, the

administration continued to denounce Syrian aggression, including Obama’s comments on April

23 that and harder stances were considered (Lesch 152). On June 1, Secretary of State Hilary

Clinton strongly denounced Assad, stating that he “has a choice, and every day that goes by, the

choice is made by default. He has not called an end to the violence against his own people, and

he has not engaged seriously in any kind of reform efforts” (Lesch 154). However, the

administration still refused to take decisive action, causing uproar from commentators and

congressional representatives regarding the Obama administration’s inconsistent actions in the

Arab Spring. Relations between Syria and the United States continued to erode, especially after

Robert Ford, the US ambassador to Syria, and Eric Chevallier, the French ambassador, visited

opposition leaders in Hama on July 8, which signaled that the United States and France

supported the opposition movement (Lesch 155).

Obama first enacted sanctions against Syria on April 29 with the signing Executive Order

13572, which “imposed sanctions on Syrian officials and government related entities responsible

for human rights abuses and violence towards civilians” (Lesch 152). The sanctions froze assets,

banned travel, restricted business with certain Syrian officials, and revoked licenses for

transportation of US equipment to Syria (Lesch 152). Due to increasing protestor deaths, which

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approximated 700, President Obama added al-Assad to the list of Syrian officials being

sanctioned (Lesch 153). The United States and the European Union banned the importation of all

Syrian oil and petroleum products through the Council Implementing Resolution 878/2011 on

September 2 (Lesch 159).

The condemnation of the Syrian government has been largely ineffective. While the

official condemnation has been supported by the United Nations and allies of the United States,

President Bashar al-Assad has not abdicated his power as a result of the condemnation.

Furthermore, the condemnation has not eliminated the war and did not lead directly to the

removal of chemical weapons.

The sanctions have been effective in reducing the Syrian GDP. The government’s wealth

is limited and many of its exports are no longer profitable due to sanctions. However, the

sanctions did not result in the removal of Assad from power, the removal of chemical weapons,

and the end of the war either. As time progresses, perhaps they will eventually become effective

as the Syrian wealth reserves dwindle. Until then, the sanctions will not be effective against a

nation determined to destroy its enemies when the international community will not wield force

against it.

The second part of the policy is aid. This includes humanitarian aid to civilians and

economic and military aid to selected rebel groups. The major part of the United States policy

towards the non-governmental entities in Syria has been humanitarian aid. According to USAID,

there are over 6 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, 5 million internally displaced

persons, and 2 million people displaced abroad (USAID). USAID also stated that “the United

States will provide $339 million in additional U.S. humanitarian aid to support those affected by

the ongoing crisis in Syria. This new announcement brings the total U.S. funding for

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humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people to well over $1.3 billion since the crisis began. The

United States is providing food, clean water, shelter, medical care, and relief supplies to over 4.2

million people inside Syria, as well as to the more than two million refugees across the region.

The United States remains the single-largest contributor of humanitarian aid for the Syrian

people” (USAID). According to its website, USAID has been providing humanitarian aid to

Syrian civilians since 2011 (USAID).

The humanitarian aid has been relatively successful in aiding civilians. They are

desperately in need of food, water, and shelter, and the over $400 million that the United States

has provided through USAID has helped many displaced Syrians. This is not only a security

issue, but also a human rights issue, and needs to be continued. “Amid extensive damage to

major urban areas and reports attributing war crimes to both government and opposition forces,

the war has created a regional humanitarian emergency. Some estimates suggest more than

100,000 Syrians have been killed since March 2011. As of September 6, more than 2 million

refugees had fled Syria, and the United Nations projects that the total may reach 3.5 million by

year’s end. As many as 4.25 million Syrians have been internally displaced. U.S. humanitarian

assistance to date totals more than $1.01 billion” (Blanchard, Sharp 2).

The third part of the policy is the removal and destruction of chemical weapons. While

there has been evidence since April 2013 that al-Assad’s forces attacked civilian populations

with rockets containing sarin gas, killing hundreds including women and children, which led to

investigations by the United States and the United Nations, proof for the Obama administration

appeared in a sarin attack that killed approximately 1,429 civilians, including children, in the

suburb of Ghouta (BBC: What We Know). However, on September 13, the United States and

Russia began negotiations regarding a deal to remove and destroy Syria's chemical weapons after

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President Vladimir Putin submitted an opinion piece to the New York Times denouncing the

possibility of missile strikes (BBC: Syrian Chemical Weapons). Agreement was reached on

September 14, with Secretary of State John Kerry creating a four page "Framework for

Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons" detailing the United States desired approach to Syrian

chemical disarmament. On September 28, the United Nations approved the chemical weapons

agreement and on September 29, Assad vowed that Syria would adhere to the deal (BBC: UN

Resolution).

The removal of the chemical weapons has been effective and necessary. It has deprived

the Syrian government of a weapon that it has deployed against the public several times. The

chemical weapons cannot be deployed against Israel as well. Syria is united with its neighbors

such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Iran in a hatred of Israel and would potentially use those weapons

against Israel if such an opportunity proved profitable for Syria.

The overall policy is efficient in some aspects. The humanitarian aid certainly is effective

as it assists those displaced and in need, and the funds have been well-used. The chemical

weapons removal has been the most efficient portion, as the energy involved in negotiations has

resulted in the elimination of a dangerous weapon from a dangerous nation. However, the

majority of it has been inefficient. The condemnations have damaged President Bashar al-

Assad’s reputation and mounted support from the international community against him.

However, they did not remove him from office, remove chemical weapons in Syria, or end the

civil war. The sanctions have devastated the Syrian economy and limited the nation’s wealth,

thus limiting the regime’s resources, but they failed to end any of the significant issues as well.

While the economic and military aid have produced some results for the rebel forces endorsed by

the United States government, the aid still has not produced a victory in the civil war for them.

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While the overall policy of the Obama administration has had some successes, it has far

more failures. It needs to be revised in order to provide more success for the United States and

the Syrian people.

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Alternatives to the Current Policy

The current policy is successful in some aspects. Syria’s chemical weapons have been

removed and are to be destroyed, eliminating a potential threat to Israel as well as the citizens

and opposition forces. The humanitarian aid distributed by USAID has benefitted many of those

Syrians affected by the civil war, and needs to be a continuing part of the policy. However, there

are failures. The condemnations have damaged President Bashar al-Assad’s reputation and

mounted support from the international community against him and the sanctions have

devastated the Syrian economy and limited the nation’s wealth, thus limiting the regime’s

resources. However, both options have failed to remove Assad from office and end the

hostilities. While the economic and military aid have produced some victories for the rebel

forces endorsed by the United States government, the aid has not lead to overall victory in the

civil war for them. Therefore, it is necessary to consider alternatives to the current policies in

order to end the war and remove President Bashar al-Assad from office, who should be tried for

war crimes under the Geneva Conventions.

The first policy alternative is an edited version of the original alternative: while the

overall policy components are essentially the same, their power and scope have been extended.

In addition to condemning and sanctioning the Syrian government, the sanctions and

denouncement would be extended to include nations allied with Syria, such as Russia and Iran.

This resembles former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s notion of “linkage”: since Iran and

Russia are allied with Syria, placing pressure on them will force those nations to pressure the

Syrian government into conceding. In addition, the United States must also appeal to the United

Nations for a more forceful response to Syria, such as sanctions by all member nations. The extra

force provided by the combined international community will force Assad and his government to

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reconsider their actions against the Syrian people. Another change will be the training of selected

rebel groups by United States Special Forces groups and the Central Intelligence Agency, in

addition to continued economic and military aid.

There are several benefits to these alterations. The extended condemnations and sanctions

will be more effective in influencing the Syrian government to cease the violence. While al-

Assad knows that the United States and those opposed to him will not involve themselves in the

conflict due to tensions between them and Russia, pressure from Iran and Russia to end the war

will have far more effect. The training of rebel forces will change the outcome of the civil war.

While the weapons and financial aid are aiding their cause, the rebels continue to struggle against

the forces of the Assad regime. While money and weapons given by the United States have

provided some benefits, it is doubtful that they will be able to continue the fight against Assad

much longer or achieve victory against him. Training from the best of the United States military

would increase the odds of a rebel victory in the Syrian civil war.

However, that there are some difficulties with these changes. The largest challenge is that

linkage between Syria’s allies and its policies are strongly assumed in this alternative. This may

be similar to Kissinger’s failure with linkage in Vietnam: he believed that the Soviet Union could

influence North Vietnam’s decisions. However, in actuality North Vietnam’s policies were

independent of the Soviet Union and its pressures. Another challenge is the global reaction to the

training of Syrian rebels by the United States. It could evoke criticism by the international

community and even evoke hostilities against the United States from Syria, Iran, and Russia.

The second policy alternative includes the use of force by the United States against Al-

Assad’s regime through missile strikes.

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The benefit in this policy is the reduction of effectiveness in the regime’s military

capabilities. The missile strikes would cripple Syria’s armed forces and any other important

targets, such as supply depots, routes, weapons facilities, vehicle factories, military bases and

airstrips, and troop formations. With Assad’s forces crippled, rebel forces could succeed in their

battle against the regime and seize control of the government.

The greatest risk of this alternative is that the missile strikes could be regarded as an act

of war. Iran could intervene in the civil war and declare hostilities against the United States,

while Russia may attempt to confront the United States openly or send troops to assist Assad and

his government. Another risk is the possible successor to Assad’s government. If an Islamist

group seizes power in the absence of Assad, then Syria may become a more virulent enemy of

the United States.

The third alternative is military intervention in Syria. Under authorization by the United

Nations, the United States would either lead a multinational peacekeeping force into Syria in

order to end the war and restore peace to the region. The United States would not proceed to take

force against the Syrian government without the authorization of the United Nations, unless the

situation becomes direr, such as a case of genocide.

The greatest benefit of this alternative will be the end of the civil war. The direct

intervention will force the end of the war through the sheer might of the international

community. A military intervention will also lead to the removal of President Assad from power,

as he has been recently implicated for war crimes and will face a tribunal.

However, there are several issues, particularly with the authorization of the United

Nations. The United States must have the support of the United Nations before it could intervene

in the war through military force. Otherwise, there will be political fallout and backlash from the

Heine 24

international community if the United States intervenes for any reasons other than war crimes.

Another issue is that the United States will not receive authorization from the United Nations

with Russia as a permanent member of the Security Council. Unless the United States can find a

way to limit Russia’s power, it will not be able to act unless there is a humanitarian crisis such as

genocide. In addition, there are the logistical issues of a United Nations peacekeeping operation,

such as organization, coordinating operations, and maintaining security at the conclusion of

operations. The cost of intervening militarily in the Syrian civil war would be expensive, but not

as expensive as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been: “costs could range from $500

million initially to train, advise, and assist opposition forces in a safe area outside Syria to “as

much as a billion dollars per month over the course of a year” (up to $12 billion) to use military

force to establish either a no-fly zone that would prevent the regime from using its military

aircraft or a buffer zone to protect border areas next to Turkey or Jordan” (Blanchard, Sharp 20).

The human cost of either option must also be addressed: a military intervention involving a

multinational force would cost many lives for each of the member nations and possibly lead to a

prolonged conflict, which will result in more loss of life.

The recommended course of action is the first alternative, for several reasons. While

Syria’s allies will not be pleased that they have received sanctions from the United States, they

will not bas as hostile as if the United States had launched missiles at Syria. However, the policy

has force through the sanctions, which will force Russia especially to pressure Syria into ending

the conflict sooner. In addition, the training provided by United States Special Forces and the

Central Intelligence Agency will provide rebel groups a tactical edge over the regime and hostile

Islamist organizations also fighting against the regime.

Heine 25

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