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The Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security
Interface on NORM Transport:
Experience, Challenges, and Opportunities
Dr. Charles Massey
Detection Science and Technology Team
Division of Nuclear Security
International Atomic Energy Agency
Why are radiation detection instruments needed for
nuclear security and what are some NORM issues?
3
‘The threat of nuclear terrorism is real.’
Response: Countries
have deployed more
than 11,000 radiation
portal monitors…
… and tens of thousands
of handhelds at borders
Decision to hold/release a cargo container, vehicle, or
person needs to be quick and reliable. Must facilitate
trade/movement while ensuring security (and safety).
The sensitivity required to detect nuclear materials results
in RPMs alarming on very small quantities of radionuclides
of natural origin (RNO). The presence of RNO (including
NORM) results in a lot of alarms to be resolved with
more than 99% from non-security concerns.
Equipment used for characterization/identification of
radionuclides is expensive, not always reliable or effective,
requires training, and oftentimes difficult to maintain/
repair/calibrate.
There is a pressing need to convert data into information
useful to a FLO for detecting illicit trafficking in nuclear
materials and determining if an alarm is “real” or “innocent.”
Note: Innocent from a security perspective only.
What causes alarms? You may be surprised.
What is the Division of Nuclear Security
doing to assist Member States?
5
Assist MSs in determining the threat material(s) and quantities of interest
➢ Typically U and Pu for nuclear material and radiological sources possible for RED
and RDD (Neutron source(s) are also of interest)
➢ In addition to detecting “material” also concerned with “masking” using naturally
occurring radionuclides
Initiated Coordinated Research Projects (CRPs) in response to MS issues
➢ 3 CRPs underway relevant to NORM:
• CRP on Improved Assessment of
Initial Alarms from Radiation Detection
Equipment
• CRP on Advancing Radiation
Detection Equipment Used for
Nuclear Security
• CRP on Advancing Maintenance,
Repair, and Calibration of Radiation
Detection Equipment
Research projects proposed by MS
Institutes and coordinated to meet
CRP objectives; periodic meetings
align projects with overall goals
More than
40 countries
participating
CRP on Improved Assessment of
Alarms – Background
Alarmscan be 100s
per hour
Current View for FLOVery difficult and time consuming to interpret.
Requires extensive training but with
inconsistent results.
Innocent or suspicious alarm?
Conclusion should be the same
for all FLOs/experts. 6
CRP on Improved Assessment
of Alarms – Overview
7
Current
Future with CRP and TRACE
Decision?
(Subjective)
CRP Alarm Catalogue
– Database
Parameters set by
State – algorithms, etc.
Data entry by FLO
on commodity
CRP Algorithm
normalizes data –
speed, distance, length
Initial System Recommendation
More effective, efficient, and
objective alarm
assessments. Improved
training!
Commodity Info(HS code, Origin,
Weight, Value)
Spectroscopic Daily File
Handheld Detector (RID)
at Multiple Points
Turning Data into Information
Algorithms and Machine Learning in TRACE and
Assessment Tool
8
TRACE: Tool for Radiation Alarm and Commodity Evaluation
State controlled
information –
feature TBD
Risk Management
Information (e.g.,
trusted shipper)
and input of State
specific data to
over-ride global
data.
MISSING:
MSDS and Other
Information from
NORM shipments
including
radionuclides and
concentrations.
Initial Alarm Assessment Indicator
RPM Daily File
Data analysis hypothesis
Data collected and Alarm statistics
at Yangshan Port
Hypothesis 1：
Maximum radiation count rate ∝ Mass of commodity
Hypothesis 2：
Radiation count rate per unit mass is random variable
and obeys normal distribution
P（-∞，μ+σ） = 84.2%
P（ μ+σ，μ+2σ ） = 13.6%
P ( μ+2σ,+∞ ） = 2.2%
9
Vehicle RPM Alarm Assessment
Project
0
5
10
15
20
0
0.0007
0.0014
0.0021
0.0028
0.0035
459 614 769 925 1080 1236 1391
氢氧化钾，HScode:2815200000
密度函数（离散） 密度函数（连续）
Potassium Hydroxide
10
Potassium hydroxide analysis results
Data Count Unit Mass Count Rate (per ton)
34
Minimum
Value
Maximum
Value
Average
Value
Standard
Deviation
Long Tail
381 1469 925 136 155
Also able to calculate
‘minimum’ values
(0, 1061)
(1062, 1197)
(1198, +ꝏ)
IAEA Mobile App TRACE
11
FREE application
➢ Available in Google and
Apple Stores
➢ Search “TRACE IAEA”
Application Capabilities
➢ Works off-line and on-line
➢ Able to quickly push new
commodities and alerts
Language Availability
➢ Available in IAEA official
Languages
• Arabic, Chinese,
English, French,
Russian (coming soon),
and Spanish
➢ Other Languages
• Georgian, Korean, and
more to come!
Phase 1: TRACE Mobile App
12
More than 140 commodity types (and more added regularly)
Phase 2: TRACE Mobile App
(Underway)
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Process User-Entered Data on Alarms – Secure assessment feature
If the weight and RPM count information was entered correctly AND there is no issue with the shipment paperwork (commodity and shipper), then the alarm appears reasonable to release.
The alarm information entered provides a result that is higher than expected for this commodity. Please check the paperwork for commodity, weight, and shipper information. Also check the RPM data entered. If there are any questionable aspects, then a secondary inspection should be considered.
The alarm information entered exceeds expected results. A secondary inspection with a RID (isotope identification) is highlyrecommended.
➢ Other than what “stores”
collect, IAEA does not
collect information from the
users of the App
➢ New features involving
alarm assessment will
require:
• Registration
• Verification
• Training (on-line)
• Test
How many users and where?
14
iOS
android
more than
40 countries
more than
4000 users
approximately
4000 users
What commodities are in TRACE?
15
How were commodities chosen to be included?
➢ All commodities basically ‘innocent’ with radionuclides of natural origin
➢ For all commodities, we have at least 5 verified/documented alarms on an RPM
➢ Where possible, isotope(s) present come from identification equipment
➢ All commodities investigated using journals, publications, etc., to verify equipment
results
Additional Information to be Collected
➢ Trade and commercial names used for HS Codes
➢ Uses
➢ Packaging
➢ Forms
➢ Any other information that can help check entry
What about TENORM?
➢ Th-232 doped sanitary pads and other commercial products?
➢ Recycled or used piping?
!
Typical Issues with RPMs at Borders
16
❖ Many alarms with suspected RNO cannot be verified with RID for content
❖ Some commodities (e.g., steel) are accompanied with a ‘radiation free certificate’
➢ What does this mean? No alarm at origin?
❖ No information source for many RNO/NORM cargoes
➢ What is ‘reasonable’ or ‘expected?’ ‘High’ alarm may cause delay/rejection.
❖ Little connection to safety concerns on cargo other than operational for FLOs
➢ Unless a high level of radiation from a suspected radiation source device or contamination
❖ Cargo shipments are delayed or rejected as a result of an alarm
➢ Could also be due to presence of U or other isotope (which may be simply naturally occurring and of no security concern)
❖ Alarms on commodities where RNO concentrations sufficient to cause alarms are not expected
➢ What is the cause of the RNO concentration (i.e., many metal products, ingots, steel bars)?
❖ Alarms may be released when presence of ‘just NORM’ identified by RID or suspected when RPM profile seems appropriate and alarm ‘not too big’
➢ However, these are sometimes safety issues (e.g., sanitary pads)
❖ When ‘real’ alarms detected on non-NRO contaminated materials, out of control radiation sources, then what should be done?
Examples of FLO Confusion over
Commodities and Defining NORM
17
Definitions: How to interpret definitions for NORM and radioactive material and how to provide related training?
*Definitions from the IAEA Safety Glossary, 2018
Common
Interpretations
➢ If NORM, it is
‘innocent’
➢ If U (235, 238)
present, then it is a
risk
➢ If Th-232 present,
then ?
➢ If K-40 present, then
innocent (ignores
potential issues such
as masking)
naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM)
Radioactive material containing no significant amounts of
radionuclides other than naturally occurring radionuclides.
• The exact definition of ‘significant amounts’ would be a
regulatory decision.
• Material in which the activity concentrations of the naturally
occurring radionuclides have been changed by a process is
included in naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM).
• Naturally occurring radioactive material or NORM should be
used in the singular unless reference is explicitly being
made to various materials.
naturally occurring radionuclides
• See radionuclides of natural origin.
radionuclides of artificial origin
• See radionuclides of natural origin.
Examples of FLO Confusion over
Commodities and Defining NORM
18
Definitions: How to interpret definitions for NORM and how to provide related training?
*Definitions from the IAEA Safety Glossary, 2018
radionuclides of natural origin
Radionuclides that occur naturally on Earth in significant
quantities.
• The term is usually used to refer to the primordial
radionuclides 40K, 235U, 238U, 232Th and their
radioactive decay products.
• Contrasted with radionuclides of artificial origin,
anthropogenic radionuclides and human made
radionuclides (which all mean the same), and also with
artificial radionuclides (which exclude radionuclides of
artificial origin that are also naturally occurring).
! Radionuclides of artificial origin may include radionuclides
that are also naturally occurring but may not include
radionuclides of natural origin.
Radioactive Material Definition
19
radioactive material
1. Material designated in national law or by a regulatory body as being subject to regulatory control because of its radioactivity.
! This is the ‘regulatory’ meaning of radioactive (2), and should not be confused with the ‘scientific’ meaning of radioactive (1):
‘exhibiting radioactivity; emitting or relating to the emission of ionizing radiation or particles
! The ‘scientific’ meaning of radioactive (1) — as in radioactive substance — refers only to the presence of radioactivity, and
gives no indication of the magnitude of the hazard involved.
! The term radioactive substance is also used to indicate that the ‘scientific’ meaning of radioactive (see radioactive (1)) is
intended, rather than the ‘regulatory’ meaning of radioactive (see radioactive (2)) suggested by the term radioactive material.
! However, in some States the term radioactive substance is used for the ‘regulatory’ purpose. It is therefore essential that any
such distinctions in meaning are clarified.
ʘ In regulatory terminology in some States, radioactive material ceases to be radioactive material when it becomes radioactive
waste; the term radioactive substance is used to cover both, that is radioactive substance includes radioactive material and
radioactive waste.
ʘ Radioactive material should be used in the singular unless reference is expressly being made to the presence of various types
of radioactive material.
2. Any material containing radionuclides where both the activity concentration and the total activity in the consignment exceed the
values specified in [section IV of the Transport Regulations [2]]. (See SSR-6 (Rev. 1) [2].) ! This usage is specific to the Transport Regulations [2], and should otherwise be avoided.
For a small number of basic terms that have two distinct definitions, depending on whether they are being used in a scientific or
regulatory (i.e. standards) context. An important example in the context of protection and safety is the adjective ‘radioactive’.
Scientifically, something is described as radioactive if it exhibits the phenomenon of radioactivity or — in the somewhat less
precise, but generally accepted, usage — if it contains any substance that exhibits radioactivity. Scientifically, therefore, virtually
any material (including material that is considered to be waste) is radioactive. However, it is common regulatory practice to define
terms such as radioactive material and radioactive waste in such a way as to include only that material or waste that is subject to
regulation by virtue of the radiological hazard that it poses. Although the exact specifications vary from State to State, this typically
excludes material and waste with very low concentrations of radionuclides and those that contain only ‘natural’ concentrations of
naturally occurring radionuclides.
How FLO’s may View ‘Alarming
Commodities’➢ Common interpretations from security perspective
▪ If “NORM” detected or suspected, then it is ‘innocent’
• But not always
▪ If Uranium (235, 238) present, then it is ‘real alarm’
• But not always
▪ If Th-232 present, then most likely ‘innocent’
• But not always
▪ If K-40 present, then it is ‘innocent’
➢ Possibly Missing Interface with safety
▪ If NORM detected – could be controlled based on activity/dose and
pedigree
• From security perspective if processed (e.g., depleted U or some
enrichment), then may be of interest
20
Safety issue may not be security issue. Security
issue may not be safety issue.
Radiation Measurements: Applications
for Safety and Security (Illustration Only)
Average
Background
Radiation
¹Nationaldecision
Security Application
Alarm
Threshold¹
Action
Threshold¹
RPM
Units of CPS
21
Radiation Measurements: Applications
for Safety and Security (Illustration Only)
Average
Background
Radiation
¹Nationaldecision
Safety Application
Radiation
Detector
Units of Dose (μSv/h)
or Activity (Bq/g)
Transportation
Limit²
Safety
Limit¹
²IAEA/ internationalstandard 22
Radiation Measurements: Applications
for Safety and Security (Illustration Only)
Security Application
RPM
Units of CPS
Safety Application
Radiation
Detector
Units of Dose (μSv/h)
or Activity (Bq/g)
Correlation?
23
How could an improved security-
safety interface help with NORM?
24
TRACE and other tools could be modified
to assist in addressing NORM issues
‘Expected radiological’ characteristics of shipments from origin to
destination can be harmonized (equalized) for cargo comparison/
verification across detectors and at different backgrounds.
Enforcement of regulation and standards (safety
limits)
Facilitate processing of legitimate trade
Provide consistent basis for evaluating alarms
!
How do we move forward?
25
Work together to understand capabilities and
limitations of nuclear security systems
Share needs and capabilities from safety,
industry (trade), and security perspectives
Participate in CRP activities and
Technical Meetings
Provide data to support TRACE and other tools
and support usage and further improvement
Conclusion
26
The IAEA is excited to be working closely with Member States
and Industry to develop and deploy tools and information
sources that:
➢ Facilitate safe and secure trade for peace and prosperity
➢ Provide the right information at the right time
➢ Support effective, efficient, and sustainable nuclear
security and safety activities
Suspicious Alarm?
28
Suspicious Alarm?
29
Suspicious Alarm?
30
Additional Information
31
You can download the TRACE app from the links on this page:
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/new-app-to-help-customs-officers-improve-radiation-detection-for-nuclear-security
Here is the link to TRACE introduction video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zds6fBJ_w5Y&feature=youtu.be
And here is the link to Sri Lanka story about TRACE:
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/multimedia/photoessays/helping-trade-while-keeping-sri-lanka-secure-the-iaeas-tool-for-radiation-alarm-and-commodity-evaluation-trace
