The New Cambridge Modern History Vol. 09 - War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval,1793-1830

7/27/2019 The New Cambridge Modern History Vol. 09 - War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval,1793-1830

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THE NEWCAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY

ADVISORY COMMITTEEG.N .C L A R K J .R .M.B U T L E R J .P .T .B U R Y

THE LATE E.A.BENIANS

VOLUME IXWAR AND PEACEIN AN AGE OF UPHEAVAL1793-1830

Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press, 2008


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THE NEWCAMBRIDGE MODERN

HISTORYVOLUME IX

W A R A N D P E A C EI N AN AGE OF UPHE AVAL

1793-1830EDITED BY

C. W. CRAW LEY

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESSCAMBRIDGE

LONDON NEW YORK MELBOURNE



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Published by the Syndics of the Cambridge University PressThe Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CBz IRPBentley House, 200 Euston Road, London NWi 2DB

32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022, USA296 Beaconsfield Parade, Middle Park, Melbourne 3206, AustraliaLibrary of Congress catalogue card num ber: 57-14935

ISBN: o 521 04547 9First published 1965Reprinted 1969, 1974, 1975

Printed in Great Britainat the University Printing House, Cambridge(Euan Phillips, University Printer)

rnroios* u r n i*



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CONTENTSCHAPTER I

INTRODUCTIONBy C. W. C R AWLEY, Emeritus and Honorary Fellow of Trinity Hall and ormerlyLecturer in History in the University of Cambridge

Some problems pages 1-3Economic and social change . . . . . . . . . 3-7The political m ap 7-11The political climate 11-13Forms of government and constitutions 13-20

France and her influence 13-14Prussia and Germany 14-16Austria and Italy . . . . . . . . . . . 16-17Spain, Portugal and the smaller States 17-18Russia 18-19The Americas 19-20

International relations of governments 20-23International conservatism and radicalism 23-26Education and public opinion 26-28Science and Technology 28-29Religion and the Arts 29The intuitive and the positivist spirit 29-30

CHAPTER IIECONOMIC CHANGE IN ENGLAND AND EUROPE, 1780-1830

By R . M . H A R T W E L L , Fellow ofNuffield College and Reader in recent Socialand Economic History in the University of Oxford

Fhe growth of populations 31-33Agriculture and food supply . 33-37Communications 37-40England the'engine of growth' 40-47

Industry 40-45Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . 45-46International finance . . . . . . . . . . 46-47

Economic conditions in Eur ope generally 47-48Italy, Spain, Russia, Austria , Scandinavia 48-52Germany 52-53The Netheilands 54-56France 56-57Combined effect of industrial and political change 57-59



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CONTENTSCHAPTER IIIARMED FORCES AND THE ART OF WAR

A. ARMIES

By N. H. G I B B S , Fellow of All Souls College and Chichele Professorof the History of War in the University of Oxford'The nation in arms' more revolutionary than technical progress: Clausewitz pages 60-61The French revolutionary and imperial armies . . . . . . 61-65The Prussian revival 65-66Size of armies 66-67Weapons 67The roles of artillery, cavalry an d infantry 67-74Supplies 74-75Napole on's personal role 75-76

B. NAVIESBy C. C. L L O Y D , Formerly Professor of History at the Royal Naval College, GreenwichNew scale and decisiveness of warfare 76British advan tag es: fighting and mercha nt navies ; overseas bases . . . 77-78The Fren ch navy 78-80British naval administr ation 80-82Ships and their armament . . . . . . . . . . 82-84The supply and training of officers and seamen 84-86Impressment, and the right of search; privateering 86-90

CHAPTER IVREVOLUTIONARY INFLUENCES AND CONSERVATISM INLITERATURE AND THOUGHT

By H. G. S C H E N K , Fellow of Wolfson College and Senior Lecturer in EuropeanEconomic and Social History in the University of OxfordV o i c e s of w e l c o m e t o l i b e r t y a n d f r a t e r n i t y . . . . . . . 91-94T h e i d e a of e q u a l i t y ; t he m o v e m e n t a g a i n s t s l a v e r y 9 5 - 9 9P a t r i o t i s m a n d n a t i o n a l i s m ; t he r o m a n t i c r e v u l s i o n 9 9 - 1 0 4T h e F r e n c h emigres 1 0 4 - 0 5d e M a i s t r e ; B o n a l d ; v o n H a l l e r 1 0 5 - 0 7T h e n e w r e v o l u t i o n a r y g e n e r a t i o n . S h e l le y a n d B y r o n . . . . . 1 0 7 - 0 8R e a c t i o n s t o i n d u s t r i a l c h a n g e 1 0 9 - 1 2S a i n t - S i m o n . T h e e a r l y F r e n c h socialistes 1 1 2 - 1 6T h e i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d b y L a m e n n a i s 1 1 6 - 1 7

CHAPTER VSCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

B y C. C. G I L L I S P I E , Dayton-Stockton Professor of History, Princeton UniversityT h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m E n l i g h t e n m e n t t o P o s i t i v i s m : f r o m C o n d i l l a c t o C o m t e . 1 1 8 - 1 9F r e n c h a c h i e v e m e n t s in s c i e n c e and its o r g a n i s a t i o n 1 1 9 - 2 6

T h e Institut national a n d o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s 1 1 9 - 2 1T h e Ecole polytechnique: a n e w s p i r i t in e d u c a t i o n 1 2 1 - 2 3T h e i n f l u e n c e of L a p l a c e a n d o t h e r s 1 2 4 - 2 6

N a p o l e o n ' s ' c u l t u r a l i m p e r i a l i s m ' . . . . . . . . . 126B e r l i n , an d the G e r m a n U n i v e r s i t i e s . . . . . . . . 1 2 6 - 2 9B r i t i s h e m p i r i c a l a c h i e v e m e n t s . R u s s i a an d the U n i t e d S t a t e s . . . . 1 2 9 - 3 1T h e g o l d e n age of a n a l y s i s: m a t h e m a t i c s a n d p h y s i c s 1 3 1 - 3 4

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C O N T E N T SThe way of experiment: laboratories pages 134-41

Chemistry and Physics . . . . . . . . . . 134-36Biology: an organic or a physical science? 136-38Cuvier and Lamarck 138-40Geology 140-41

Technology: th e links with pure science still slender 141-45engineers and chemists 141-43the iron industry; machine too ls; dyes; heat engines 143-45

Electricity and the marriage of science with industry 145

CHAPTER VIRELIGION: CHURCH AND STATE IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS

By J O H N W A L S H , Fellow of Jesus College, OxfordC r o s s a n d T r i c o l o u r i n F r a n c e . . . . . . . . . 1 4 6 - 5 4F r o m t h e C i v i l C o n s t i t u t i o n t o s y s t e m a t i c ' d e c h r i s t i a n i s a t i o n ' . . . 1 4 6 - 4 7T h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c u l t s a n d t h e i r s y m b o l i s m 1 4 7 - 4 9T h e s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n C h u r c h a n d S t a t e ( 1 7 9 4 - 1 8 0 2 ) . . . . 1 4 9 - 5 1T h e C o n c o r d a t b e t w e e n N a p o l e o n a n d P i u s V I I ( 1 8 0 0 - 2 ) . . . . 1 5 2 - 5 4

S e c u l a r i s a t i o n i n G e r m a n y ( 1 8 0 3 - 6 ) . I t a l i a n C o n c o r d a t ( 1 8 0 3) . . . 1 5 4 - 5 5F r o m N a p o l e o n ' s c o r o n a t i o n t o t h e P o p e ' s a b d u c t i o n ( 1 8 0 4 -9 ) 1 5 5 - 5 7R e s i s t a n c e b y t h e c l e r g y i n I t a l y , S p a i n , B e l g i u m a n d F r a n c e . . . . 1 5 8 - 6 0T h e r e l i g i o u s r e v i v a l . R o m a n t i c a n d o t h e r i n f l u e n c e s . . . . . 1 6 0 - 6 3P r o t e s t a n t c o n f e s s i o n a l i s m a n d p i e t i s m : o n t h e C o n t i n e n t , i n B r i t a i n a n d A m e r i c a 1 6 3 - 6 5P r o b l e m s o f b i b l i c a l h i s t o r y a n d a u t h o r s h i p . S c h l e i e r m a c h e r . . . 1 6 7 - 6 9P r o b l e m s o f ' r e s t o r a t i o n ' i n C a t h o l i c E u r o p e a n d S o u t h A m e r i c a a f t e r 1 8 1 5 . 1 6 9 - 7 2F r o m ' t h r o n e a n d a l t a r ' t o w a r d s c o e x i s t e n c e o r s e p a r a t i o n . . . . 1 7 2 - 7 5T h e c o n f l i c t i n F r a n c e 1 7 5 - 7 6P r o t e s t a n t v a r i a t i o n s i n r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n C h u r c h e s a n d t h e S t a t e . . . 1 7 6 - 7 7T h e s i t u a t i o n i n E n g l a n d 1 7 7 - 7 8

CHAPTER VIIEDUCATION, AND PUBLIC OPINION

By J O H N R O A C H , Professor of Education in the University of Sheffield andFellow of Corpus Christi College, CambridgeT h e f e r m e n t o f v o c a l o p i n i o n : a t t e m p t s t o c o n t r o l i t , a n d t o f o r m i t . . 1 7 9 - 8 0E n g l a n d : p r e s s , p e r i o d i c a l a n d p a m p h l e t 1 8 0 - 8 3F r a n c e : g r o w i n g s e v e r i t y o f c o n t r o l s o v e r t h e p r e s s , 1 7 9 3 - 1 8 1 4 . . . 1 8 3 - 8 5C e n t r a l E u r o p e : g o v e r n m e n t s d i st r u s tf u l o f p o p u l a r s e n t i m e n t a g a i n s t N a p o l e o n 1 8 5 - 8 7T h e b a t t l e s f o r t h e c a p t u r e o f o p i n i o n a f t e r 1 8 1 5 : i n F r a n c e . . . . 1 8 7 - 8 9

i n E u r o p e g e n e r a l l y . . 1 9 0 - 9 2C o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n l i b e r a l a n d i d e a l i s t w a y s o f t h i n k i n g 1 9 2 - 9 3E d u c a t i o n a l t h e o r i e s a n d p r a c t i c e : P e s t a l o z zi , R o b e r t O w e n . . . . 1 9 3 - 9 5W i l h e l m v o n H u m b o l d t : G e r m a n U n i v e r s i t i e s a n d s c h o o l s . . . . 1 9 5 - 9 6S t a t e c o n t r o l s o v e r e d u c a t i o n : G e r m a n y , F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a . . . . 1 9 6 - 2 0 0E n g l i s h e x p e r i m e n t s i n e d u c a t i o n : t h e r o l e o f t h e C h u r c h e s . . . . 2 0 1 - 0 3E u r o p e a n c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n C h u r c h e s a n d t h e S t a t e i n e d u c a t i o n . . . 2 0 3 - 0 6M e t h o d s o f t e a c h i n g : B e l l a n d L a n c a s t e r 2 0 6 - 0 7T h e p r o b l e m o f t h e p u r p o s e o f p o p u l a r e d u c a t i o n 2 0 7 - 0 8

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CONTENTSCHAPTER VIIISOME ASPECTS OF THE ARTS IN EUROPE

A. THE VISUAL ARTSBy D A V I D T H O M A S , Former Lecturer in the Courtauld Institute of Art andAssistant Director of Art, Arts Council of Great BritainPainting pages 209-22France . . . . 209-16England 216-20Germany 220-21

Spain 221-22Sculpture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222Archi tecture 222-28

France 222-25England 225-28

B. MUSICBy F. W. STERNFELD, Fellow of Exeter College an d Reader in Musicin the University of Oxford

The social role o f music and its composers . . . . . . . 228-30Ha yd n, an d va n Swieten 230-33Beet hove n: earlier wor ks 233-38Opera, and Beethoven's Fidelio 238-42Beeth oven : later wor ks 242-44Sch ube rt: the songs, an d oth er work s 245-49

CHAPTER IXTHE BALANCE OF POWER DURING THE WARS, 1793-1814By G E O F F R E Y B R U U N , formerly Professor of History, New York University

The powers i n 1789: apparent weakness o f France 250-52Confused posit ions, 1789-93 252-54Th e first coali tion again st Fra nce , 1793-7 254-55The French i n Eg yp t: th e second coalition , 1798-1801 256-60The Peace o f Ami ens an d its rup tur e, 1801-3 260-64Events leading t o the third coal i t ion and t o its collapse, 1803-6 . . . 264-66The Peace o f Tilsit and the continental blockade, 1807-8 . . . . 268-69French invasion o f Spain, and defeat o f Austr ia, 1808-10 . . . . 269-70The breach with Russia and the tragedy of 1812 270-72The victories o f the Grand Alliance (fourth coalition), 1813-14 . . . 272-74The Napoleonic hegemony i n historical perspective . . . . . 2 7 4

CHAPTER XTHE INTERNAL HISTORY OF FRANCE DURING THE WARS, 1793-1814

By J A C Q U E S G O D E C H O T , Professor of History in the University of Toulouse-Le Mirail an d Honorary Dean of the Faculty of LettersInte ract ion betwe en inte rna l politics an d war 275-76The Convent ion's three phases . . . . . . . . . 276-86'Girondin' (21 September 1792 t o 2 Ju ne 1793) 276- 78'R evo l u t i ona ry ' ( 2 June 1793 t o 27 Jul y 1794) 278- 84G overnmen t b y Committees and the reign o f Terror . . . . 279-81

T h e levee en masse, and economic controls; the cl imax . . . . 281-84Th erm ido ria n' (27 July 1794 t o 31 Oc to be r 1795) 284 -86

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CONTENTSCHAPTER XIII

GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1795-1830By W. H. B R U F O R D , Formerly Fellow ofSt John's College and Emeritus Schroder

Professor of German in the University of CambridgeGermany at the outbreak of the French Revolution . . . . pages 367-73Reforms in Pruss ia, 1797-1806 373-76Prussia after Jena: method of dealing with serfdom 376-78

reform of the administr ation 378-82military reorganisation . . . . . . . 382-85

A new spirit in Pruss ia: educa tional reforms 385-87Reforms in Germany outside Prussia, to 1815 387-92Germany after 1815 392-94

CHAPTER XIVT H E A U S T R I A N M O N A R C H Y , 1 79 2- 18 47

B y C . A . M A C A R T N E Y , Formerly Fellow of All Souls College, OxfordT h e E m p e r o r F r a n c is a n d t h e b u r e a u c r a c y 3 9 5 - 4 oR e l a t i o n s w i t h H u n g a r y , a n d t h e f inancial cri s is 40 0- 03The d i f f i cu l t yea r s a f t e r 1 8 1 5 : t h e E m p e r o r F e r d i n a n d ( 1 8 3 5 - 4 8 ) . . . 4 0 3 - 0 6E c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l c h a n g e s . . . . . . . . . 4 0 6 - 0 7N a t i o n a l i s s u e s : M a g y a r , S l a v , I t a l i a n , P o l i s h , B o h e m i a n . . . . 4 0 7 - 1 0T h e G e r m a n s i n t h e M o n a r c h y . . . . . . . . . 4 1 0 - 1 1

C H A P T E R X VI T A L Y , 1 7 9 3 - 1 8 3 0

By J. M . R O B E R T S , Fellow and Tutor ofMerton College and Lecturerin Modem History in the University of Oxford

Italy on the eve of the invasion of 1796 412-15The French in Italy and the restoration of 1799-1800 415-20The reorganisation of Italy by Napoleon 420-22Economic effects of French domination 422-25The effects on men' s minds 425-26Sicily, 1806-14: Murat and Italy, 1813-15 426-28The restorations in Italy 428-30Revolut ionary movements after 1815 431-35Significance of the period in Itali an history 435-37A note on the main territorial changes in Italy, 1793-1814 . . . . 438

CHAPTER XVISPAIN AND PORTUGAL, 1793 to c. 1840

By R A Y M O N D C A R R , Warden ofSt Antony's College and ormerly Professor ofthe History of Latin America in the University of OxfordThe Enlightenment, the aristocracy and the Church 439-41

The middle classes. Agrarian conditions 441-43Feebleness in foreign policy, 1789-1808: Godoy 443-44National and popular resistance to France 444-45The Cortes and the Constitution of 1812 445-46



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C O N T E N T SPatriots and Afrancesados in Spain pages 446-47Reaction a n d revolutionary movements after 1814 447-49The Revolutions o f 1820-23 i n Spain a n d Portugal . . . . . 449-52Popular royalism a n d moderate liberalism t o 1833 452-55Moderates a n d Progressives in Spain, 1833-40 455 -58The soldier-politicians 458- 59The defeat of Carlism a n d Miguelism 459-61

CHAPTER XVIITHE LOW COUNTRIES AND SCANDINAVIA

A. T H E L O W CO UNT RI E SBy J . A . VA N H O U T T E , Professor in the Faculty of Letters in theUniversity ofLouvain

Conservative and democra tic Patriots 462-64The French in Belgium (to 1796) 464-65The Batavian Republic (to 1798) 465-66Political resignation and economic development in Belgium (1797-1813) . . 466-69Dutc h reactions to assimilation and annexation; the restoration (1798-1814) . 469-72The kingdom of the United Netherlands created (1814-15) . . . . 472-73Difficulties of amalgamation 473-78Conflict with th e Belgian Chur ch 473-76Attempt to 'dutc hify ' Belgium 476-77William I, the 'merc hant kin g' 477-78

Union of oppositions in Belgium (1828-30) 478-79Reasons for the failure of amalgamation 479-8oB. SCANDINAVIA

B y T . K . D E R R Y , formerly Taberdar of The Queen's College, OxfordT h e A r m e d N e u t r a l i t y ( 1 7 8 0 - 3 ) , a n d t h e S w e d i s h c o n f li c t w i t h R u s s i a ( 1 7 8 8 - 9 0 ) 4 8 0 - 8 1S c a n d i n a v i a o n t h e e v e o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y a g e 4 8 1 - 8 3The e f f e c t s o f t h e w a r s u p o n S c a n d i n a v i a ( t o 1 8 0 8 ) 4 8 4 - 8 7T h e s u c c e s s i o n q u e s t i o n i n S w e d e n a n d t h e l o s s o f F i n l a n d . . . . 4 8 7 - 8 8D i s t r e s s i n N o r w a y 4 8 8 - 8 9S w e d e n a t w a r , a n d i n a l l i a n c e , w i t h B r i t a i n ( 1 8 1 0 - 1 4 ) . . . . . 4 8 9 - 9 0T h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f N o r w a y i n S w e d e n . . . . . . . 4 9 0 - 9 1S c a n d i n a v i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d c u l t u r e a f t e r t h e w a r s . F i n l a n d . . . . 4 9 1 - 9 4

CHAPTER XVIIIRUSSIA, 1789-1825

By J .M.K. VYVYAN, Fellow of Trinity College, CambridgeE x t e n t a n d p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e E m p i r e : p r e v a l e n c e o f s e r f d o m . . . . 4 9 5 - 9 7I n d u s t r y a n d t r a d e 4 9 7 - 9 8T h e n o b l e s : p r i v i l e g e d , b u t s u b s e r v i e n t t o t h e C r o w n 4 9 8 - 5 0 0R e a c t i o n s t o t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . N o v i k o v a n d R a d i s h c h e v . . . 5 0 0 - 0 1C a t h e r i n e I I a n d P a u l I . A l e x a n d e r ' s e a r l y e x p e r i e n c e s . . . . . 5 0 1 - 0 6T h e y o u n g E m p e r o r A l e x a n d e r I a n d t h e ' u n o f f i c i a l c o m m i t t e e * o f h i s f r i e n d s . 5 0 7 - 0 9A d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d l e g i s l a t i v e r e f o r m s . . . . . . . 5 0 9 - 1 1

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CONTENTSThe Polish question and the ascendancy of France pages 511-12Speranskii's constitutional, financial and legal projects (1808-12) . . . 512-14The reaction against France and t he war of 1812 514-16The 'Congress 'Kingdom of Poland (1815) 516-17Alexander I and Arakcheev: the military colonies 5i 7- J 9Origins of the Decembrist conspiracy, an d its suppression . . . . 519-21The reign of Alexander I : military and diplomatic prestige; economic growth . 521-24

CHAPTER XIXT H E N E A R E A S T A N D T H E OT TO MA N EM PI RE , 1798-1830

B y C . W . C R A W L E YEurope and the Nea r East 525~27Islam and the Ott oma n Empir e 527~29Egypt and its neighbours: Muhammad Ali . . . . . . . 529-34The Adriatic and Dlyria 534-36The Dan ubi an Principalities (Rouma nia) 536-40Rumel ia CBulgaria) 540-4*Serbia 541-44Greece: the revival 544-47

the Wa r of Independence 547-5The Peace of Adrianople (1829) 550-5"

CHAPTER XXEUROPE'S RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

By K. A. B A L L H A T C H E T , Professor of the History of South Asia in theUniversity of LondonP r e v a i l i n g c o n f i d e n c e i n W e s t e r n i d e a s a n d m e t h o d s f o r I n d i a . . . . 5 5 2 - 5 3E x p a n s i o n o f C o m p a n y r u l e i n I n d i a : s u b s i d i a r y a l l i a n c e s . . . . 5 5 3 - 5 8B r i t i s h f o o t h o l d s i n M a l a y a , C e y l o n , B u r m a 5 5 8 - 6 0P r o b l e m s o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d l a n d - s e t t l e m e n t 5 6 0 - 6 3

i n I n d i a 5 6 0 - 6 5T h e B r i t i s h i n C e y l o n . T h e D u t c h i n J a v a 5 6 3 - 6 5T h e C o m p a n y l o s i n g c o m m e r c i a l p r i vi l e ge s 5 6 5T h e C o m p a n y a n d s o c i a l c h a n g e : m i s s i o n a r i e s a n d e d u c a t i o n . . . . 5 6 5 - 6 9E u r o p e a n i n t e r e s t i n I n d i a n c u l t u r e 5 6 9 - 7 1

CHAPTER XXIEUROPE'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH TROPICALAFRICA

By J .D . F A G E , Director of the Centre of West African Studies andProfessorof African History in the University of BirminghamLimited development of strategic and commercial interests . . . . 572-7'4South Africa, and the east coas t 574-77Commerce and the West African slave trade 577-78The effects of abolition 579-82Exploration of the interior; missionary activity 582-84Political involvement on the coas ts: Britain, Franc e 584-86South Africa under British rule 586-87Livingstone: Central and Eas t Africa 587-90

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CONTENTSCHAPTER XXII

THE UNITED STATES AND THE OLD WORLD, 1794-1828By F . T H I S T L E T H W A I T E , Vice-Chancellor of the University of East Anglia

andformerly Fellow of St. John's College, CambridgeJohn Quincy Adams and the Republican posture . . . . . pages 591-93Population, boundaries and an open frontier 593-95Cotton and the Atlanti c economy 595-98Manufactures a n d ' t h e American System' 598-602Sectional Politics 602-07The Constitution in practice 607-10A republican nation 610-11

CHAPTER XXIIITH E EMANCIPATION OF LATIN AMERICA

By R. A. H U M P H R E Y S , O.B.E., Professor of Latin American Historyin the University of London

The French in the Peninsula (1807-8) 612-13Civil strife in Spanish Americaloyalism, autonomy or independence? . . 613-18Disintegration of the Viceroyalty of the Ri o de la Plata (1810-16) . . . 6 1 8 - 2 1Bolivar in the north and San Martin in Chile (1811-18) 621-23Events leading to Bolivar's ascendancy (1815-22) 623-26Bolivar's triumphs and despair (1823-30) 627-28Reconstruction in Spanish America . . . . . . . . 628-30BrazilPortuguese colony; king dom; empire (1807-31) 630-33The Spanish Islands and Central America (1810-24) 633-36The roles of Britain and of the United States 636-38

CHAPTER XXIVTHE FINAL COALITION AND THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, 1813-15

By E. V. G U L I C K , Elisabeth Hodder Professor of History,Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts

Castlereagh's Instructions (October 1813), and the negotiations at Chatillon . 639-41The Allies in Paris and the Bourbon Restoration (March-April 1814) . . 642-43The first Peace of Paris (30 M ay 1814) 644-45The Netherlands and other problems in the Summer of 1814 . . . . 645-46Sovereigns and ministers at Vienna: organisation of the Congress . . . 646-48The conflict over Poland and Saxony (October-December, 1814) . . . 648-54The deadlock resolved (December 1814-January 1815) 654-55The settlement of Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia . . . . 656-57The settlement of Italy and Switzerland 657-58The Acte finale (9 June 1815). The slave trade and other problems . . . 658-59The 'hundred days ' and the second Bourbon restoration 659-61The second Peace of Paris (20 Nov ember 1815) 661-63The Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance 663Review of the settlement: the balance of power 664-65The roles of the leading statesmen 666-67

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CONTENTSCHAPTER XXV

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1815-30By C . W . C R A W L E Y

Issues aris ing from the 1815 sett lem ent. Perso nal an d natio nal postur es . pages 668Ge nera l desire for a balan ce of pow er. Conferences of Gr eat Powers . . 669-70A lexander I : ' H ol y A lliance* o r 'G e ne ra l A ll ia nc e' (1815-19) . . . . 670-73Unres t in I ta ly , Ger ma ny and Eur ope an Turk ey (1819) 673-74Plan s for collective interventio n against revolutio ns 674-77

Con dem ned by Bri ta in in Spa in and Por tu ga l (1820) 674-75Single A us tr ia n in te rv en tio n i n I ta ly ap pro ve d (1820-1) . . . . 675-77

Efforts to isola te Ru sso-T urki sh disputes from th e Gr eek question (1821-3) . 677-79Th e Spanish colonies , an d the Fre nch interve ntion in Spain (1822-3) 679-81Spanish Am erica , Br i ta in , the Uni ted S ta tes and the Euro pean Al l iance . . 681-84Braz i l , Por tu ga l and Bri ta in 684-85Th e Gre ek ques t ion 685-89

A d i lemma for bo th Russ ia and Bri ta in ( I823-5) 685-87Ru ssia , Brita in an d Fr anc e a ll ied (1826-7) 687-88Th e ba t t le o f Nav ar ino and the Russo-T urk ish war (1827-9) 688-89

A balan ce of pow er preserved by varying m eth ods 689-90APPENDIX: No te on the Fren ch Repu bl ican Ca lend ar 691-92I N D EX 693

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CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

N age so full of dramatic reversals of fortune and so big with con-sequences as tha t of 1793 to 1830 m ay seem to defy any a ttem pt to1 -Lcompose in one volume a survey of Europe and some of its linkswith distant regions. Yet the very effort to survey the field in per-spective, astride the 'natural frontier' of 1815, presen ts a challenge andprovokes questions sometimes obscured. This volume is intended tooffer a portrait or survey rather than a compressed record . Stirringepisodes, locally decisive battles, comm anding person alities may receiveno more than passing mention or may even be sought in vain in theindex. But the problem of compression is not the only or the mostinteresting one. More surprising is the uncertainty about some of thefoundations. There is still plenty of room for debate. The printed re-cords are bulkier than for the eighteenth century, but many of themrelate to kaleidoscopic changes, blurred for us by political scene-shift-ing and by the fog of war. Moreover, the voices of articulate con-temporaries were m ore strident, m ore at cross-purposes with each o ther,than in the apparently calm and confident age before 1789, more eventhan in the short period when the Rev olution in its first stages seemed,not only in French eyes, to signify clearly a few universal principlesapplicable to all Europe and perhaps to all mankind. On the otherhand, in the following period after 1830, aptly described as thezenith of European power (Vol. X), the records, though even bulkier,were becoming more systematic, and the basic social data were eithermore regularly collected or at least collected in ways more capable ofstatistical analysis.In spite of recent efforts to test sweeping assertions by detailedsampling, man y central questions abo ut this age of wars and revolutionsin Eu rop e are still no t precisely answ ered. How exactly was the wide-spread growth of population connected with some fall in the rate ofmortality and with increases in food supply or in commercial andindustrial activity? W hat was the balance-sheet for 'lib era ted ' peoples,materially and in their own generation, between release from oldobligations and violent subjection to spoliation by new armies and newofficials ? How many men fought in the wars, how many of them diedby battle or disease, and ho w m any just disappeared as deserters ? Couldany general statement be made about the effect of compulsory militaryservice in the field up on the outlo ok of thou sand s of survivors who werenot disabled, or did individuals react to it as variously as to any other

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WAR AND PEACE IN AN AGE OF UPHEAVALexperience in life? W as the peace-settlement a t Vienna jus t an episodein power politics, or did the attempt to stabilise it foreshadow a lastingchange in the cond uct of internatio nal relations? Did th e hostilitybetween the French Rep ublic and trad itional religion help or hinder thesurvival of each ? Ho w far did Napo leon's treatment of the Popeeffectively, through the clergy, alienate masses of people from theimp erial regime tow ards the en d? An d what were the long-term effectsof these conflicts up on C hurch an d State alike? Did they indeed reflectirreconcilable differences between religious and secular philosophies,or did they rather spring from the fact that the higher clergy were in1789 almost everywhere so inextricably embedded in the old socialorder that the Churches were still only beginning to disentangle them-selves from it arou nd 1830? Such questions might be mu ltiplied.The fall of Napoleon has often been a watershed for historians whosespecial field of study either reaches from 1789 (rather than 1793) to1815 or else leads on from 1815 to 1848 (rather than 1830). Either peacebecomes a preface and an epilogue or else the wars are only the back-grou nd. It may be held tha t the 'u nsu llied ' and truly significant ideas of1789 would best be studied in the previous volume, while the enduringconsequences of the great upheaval are revealed more clearly in thesucceeding one: in short, that the period from 1793 to 1830 is only thefilling of a sandwich, unevenly spread with violent stimulants andartificial tranquillisers. Yet a sandwich has no flavour withou t its filling.It has been said that from 1789 to 1815 France 'made war on history',an d also tha t after 1815 the conservative alliance tried to 'p u t back th eclo ck '. If so, bo th attemp ts were bo un d to fa il; b ut the contrast is ofcourse much over-simplified. Th e claims of trad ition began to minglewith those of innovation very early in the first period; and, conversely,many conservatives after 1815 understood that history, on which it wasdangerous to make war, included the history of the 'enlightenment',and now th at of the past thirty years too . The metap hor of the clock isnot really very apt, for it suggests a regularity which restoration govern-men ts might be excused for n ot recognising in the 'partie s of m ovem ent'at tha t time. They saw themselves as trying rath er to lower a feverishpulse of revolutionary conquest than to put back a clock of progress.Their diagnosis and their remedies were often crude, but during theseyears a process was going on of filtering and digesting rather thantotally rejecting the mixed fare with which a whole generation hadbeen forcibly fed.

Th is age of wars and their immed iate aftermath has a character of itsown , even if it is no t tha t of fulfilment. Apa rt from its dramaticqualities, it presents us with the question whether we are to see in it,prevailingly, ideas at the mercy of violence or violence in the service ofideas, and with the problem of the role of war itself in shaping the



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I N T R O D U C T I O Ndirection of change and determ ining its extent. Techn ically, this wasnot a revolutionary age in warfare by land or sea (Chapter III); but thescale and persistence of warfare, and the methods used to meet theseconditions (conscription, blockade, fiscal devices, propaganda) wereominously capable of mu ch greater exploitation in future. Somechapters in this volume may help to bridge the ba rrier of 1815, and thismay be salutary even if nobody would pretend to erect new barriers in1793 or in 1830. Th e choice of a perio d which begins with a state ofgeneral war on the execution of L ouis XV I, and end s with the avoidanceof war on the abdication of Charles X, echoes the preoccupation ofEurope with France in that age, and possibly also marks a stage in theinoculation of Eu rope to internal revolutions. Later revolutionarychanges have mostly been initiated during or after wars and have notdirectly caused wars by intervention from outside.In Chapter II some facts and figures are presented which mark thechanging economic structure, together with an estimate of the forceswhich were changing it, rapidly in England, but unevenly and even stillobscurely on the continent. Th e connection of these changes withpolitical developments is indicated in chapters on the several countries.In retrospect, the most striking fact was the con tinued, accelerated andalmost universal growth of popu lation a process no t everywhere opento accurate measurem ent and still no t fully explained. All over E uro peagriculture still predominated, overwhekningly in the south and eastand much of the centre. The age of farm m achinery was no t yet, andthe pattern of life in the coun try was everywhere traditional. Yetchanges in m ethods , thoug h no t dram atic, were various, widespread andcum ulative; yields were improved , crops were more v aried an d m arketswere becom ing less loca l. It seems difficult to p lace in any definiteorder of cause and effect three concurrent factsrising prices, morefood, more mouths to feed.

Communications, too, were traditional, but again with a difference.Governments could now use the semaphore system in clear weatherfor signalled messages between im po rtant centres. Some ro ad s werebetter, and passage over these was quicker and smoother for mails, forofficials and for travellers who could afford it; but merchandise hardlymoved faster by roa d tha n before. Some waterways were imp roved,and in a few industrial regions a web of new canals meant somethinglike a local revolution in transpo rt. In th e twenties, the use of steam inharb ours and for coast-wise shipping had begu n. In and arou nd somemines, the stationary steam engine for pumping water, and the horse-drawn railway truck, were already separately familiar before 1790;by 1830 the steam-locomotive, marrying the engine to the railway, wasa proved experiment and was certain to go further a nd faster. Th e longhaul for passengers or freight was still untried, and even in 1837

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WAR AND PEACE IN AN AGE OF UPHEAVALParisians seem to hav e regarded as little more tha n a new toy their firstsuburban passenger line, just opened to St Germain; but five yearsearlier the Globe carried articles prophesying th at steam w ould not onlyobliterate ocean barriers and barriers between oceans (Suez and CentralAmerica) but also reduce the frontiers between nations to meremunicipal boundaries (Vol. X, p p. 434-5).The same optimism was expressed by some writers as to the levellingof barriers between nation s and between classes tha t would accompanythe expansion of comm erce with its attendan t division of labou r and re-distribution of resources in the most econom ical way. Industrialiststhemselves were more apt to fix their attention on securing protectedmarkets within the reach of their own government's influence; theyfavoured breaking dow n protective walls only if their own ho me mark etswere too small, or if their own methods of production were so far inadvance of their neighbours' that they had, for a time, little to fearfrom foreign co mpetition as a result of reciprocally freer trade. It wasnatural that English manufacturers should try by every means topenetrate the self-blockade imposed on the Continent by Napoleon,and to take advantage, when peace came, of the expected opportunityto flood the continental m arke t. It was equally natura l tha t Frenc h andBelgian industrialists, lately accustomed to having an open marketover half the Con tinent, should seek prote ction after 1815 against thisflood, and th ey were no t slow in securing it. Ye t the big start enjoyedby British coal, iron and textiles was not in the long run a threat but astimulus to industrial change in Europe.

It is impossible to summarise the evidence for Britain's lead or thediscussion of some of the explanations for it (Chapter II, pp. 39-43).In any case, the lead was already established before 1790; what needsexplaining in this period is that it was maintained and even increased.Other countries were not lacking in inventivenessscience and tech-nolo gy were given mo re official recognition in Fra nce tha n elsewhereno r lacking in comm ercial or indu strial enterprise. But, if no countrywas so continuously at war as was Britain, most countries sufferedgreater dislocation by war when it cam e, and greater uncertainty abou tthe future. T o catch up quickly with Britain, they needed much m orefinancial stability th an they ever achieved during the wa rs. Whateverthe combination of reasons may be, it would be wrong to speak of anindustrial revolution in Europe before 1830, except in Belgium and in afew bu t impo rtan t French and o ther scattered centres. Some govern-ments were in no hurry to promote industries which might disturb thesocial ord er (as in Vien na and R om e). M ost were still mercantilistrath er th an in dustrial in their policies, even if academ ic econom ists werealmost everywhere disciples of Ada m Sm ith and J. B . Say. Only oneruler, Muhammad Ah' in Egypt, was experimenting, not very happily,



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I N T R O D U C T I O Nin development of commerce and industry by thorough-going statemonopolies intended to finance his army an d navy. Altho ugh govern-ments were usually keen to encourage new sources of wealth andrevenue, they might well be concerned about the social consequences ofheadlong change and sudden fluctuations arising from the introductionof the new machines, especially in the man ufac ture of textiles. Trad i-tiona l craftsmen could no t be expected to see the virtues of new m etho dswhich might throw them out of work and replace them by women andchildren as minders of mach ines in factories. They might resort t oviolence like the Lud dites, or becom e helplessly dep endent on pub lic o rprivate charity. Co un try people, crowding into cities growing faster tha ntheir housing, might be affected in health or morals and might easilybecome destitute during a commercial slump. One of the earliestdetailed studies of these conditions outside Britain was made in 1829by a conservative and Catholic prefei1 of whom Louis XVIII had saidthat he wished he had such a m an for every departm ent. H e was not,like some royalists, a rom antic advo cate of a retur n to the old guilds andcorporations, nor a critic of manufacturers from social prejudice, buthe was shocked as an adm inistrator. In F rance , relief of poverty hadbeen regarded largely as a work for the Church, and there was nothinglike the tradition of public assistance from local rates that had followedthe dissolution of the monasteries in England in the sixteenth century.Th at system was now un der fire in En gland, and in any case the survivalor revival of charitable religious ord ers in F ran ce after 1790 could no tcope any better than the old English poor-law with problems arisingunpredictably in rapidly growing centres of pop ulatio n. Th e prevailingschool of economists sincerely believed that attempts to moderate thespeed of change or sm ooth the transition would only pro long th e agonyand delay the eventual distribution of the fruits of ever-growing opu lenceover the whole people. Soon , in the 1830's, Louis-Ph ilippe's m inisterswere to be studying, with the help of the English economist NassauSenior, the new English poor-law of 1834. It was no t until 1839 th atPrussia did something to mitigate the evils of children's labour infactories, on lines that had already been traced in England from 1801but with effective inspection only after 1833.

One mechanical invention threatened in this age to create a morethan temporary problem for a nation and even for its civilisation: EliW hitney's cotton-g inning device directly caused an extension of th e slavetrade (Chapter XX I), and of slavery in the U nited States, as startling asthe leap in prod uction that went with it. An d this happ ened at themoment when both the trade and the institution were being condemnedby the French Constituent Assembly in the name of reason and natural

1 F.P.A. de Villeneuve-Bargemont, conomie politique chretieme, ou recherches sur lanature des causes du pauperisme 3 vols. (Paris, 1834). Based on a rep ort made in 1829.



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WAR AND PEACE IN AN AGE OF UPHEAVALrights, by ph ilanth rop ists in the nam e of humanity and , most effectivelyin England, by zealous Christians in the nam e of religion. In the longrun, economic arguments were to chime with the others in predictingthe decline of slavery; but in this age the impetus came from men whowere insisting tha t righ t should p revail in spite of private vested interestsor national economic gain.Some of the fluctuations in industry were due to changes in fashion o rin the tariff policies of governments, or to transitions between war andpeace; but many were caused, or their violence was increased, by thedifficulties of both state and private banks in coping with any suddencrisis of confidence. These prob lem s were very far from solved, and th epotentially stabilising influence of great financial houses was seen notso much in comm erce and indu stry as in transactions with governments,legitimate and revo lutionary. Ou vrard , the mo st spectacular of thefournisseurs (army contractors), had big contracts with the Directoryand was alternately employed and imprisoned by both Nap oleon and th erestored B ourb ons. His own larger schemes for financing governmentswere too speculative to make for stability; but after 1815 there weremoments when both the Bourbons in France and some of the SouthAmerican republics may have owed their survival to foreign bankers,whose profits were com men surate with the political risks. M etternichacknowledged his own and his emperor's debt to the House of Roth-schild by supporting in the G erm an Diet an imp rovement in the status ofthe Frankfurt Jews (1817) and by helping to secure the title of baron forall five Rothschild brothers (1822).

Measured by every economic test, Britain emerged from the wars asthe richest and m ost stable of the great states of the world with Lon donas the great international centre for banking and insurance, with themost powerful navy protecting the largest number of merchant ships,which in turn carried the most varied commerce all over the world, in-cluding the swelling output of the first modern industrial revolutionand the primary pro duce of her expanding empire overseas. At thesame time, British agriculture, partly protected by the corn laws fromthe possible effect of peace upon prices, could boast of high farming aswell as high ren t-rolls. Th e farm labo ure r shared even less tha n theunskilled factory worker or the ordinary seaman in all this prosperity,but perhaps few of these would have been pleased to change placeswith their counterparts on the continent; and the engineering artisansof the mechanical age were a new class of men, numerous enoughalready in England to be conscious of their importance, and madem ore aware of it by the demand for their services abroad. JosiahWedgwood had great difficulty in persuading his skilled potters not tobe tempted by glittering offers of emp loyment on the continen t. N owonder that the spirit of enterprise would soon be matched in England



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I N T R O D U C T I O Nby a general spirit of complacency; many were completely left behindin the race, bu t most economists and m en of substance believed that thiswas the price of progress. Britain had been more fortunate than mostother countries in tackling the prob lem of a balance between liberty andauthority; she was faced, earlier than others, with that of creating abalance between over-all economic progress, as measured by statisticalaverages, and those hardships of individuals, groups and even classes,which would be concealed in works like Porter's Progress of the Nationbut must fill the whole horizon for those who had to endure themthroughout their lives. In short, the upward surge in production ofwealth was not yet matched by much skill in regulating its pace or dis-tributing its m aterial benefits so as to pro m ote stability. N o r was mu chattention yet paid by 'p rac tica l' m en to these problem s, which thereforebecame the happy hunting ground of Utopian or fanciful men UkeCharles Fourier. The acuteness and relevance of many points in theirdiagnosis was obscured by the ridicule showered upon the quaintnessof some of their remedies. M uch m ore effective, u p to a poin t, was thedemonstration by Robert Owen at New Lanark that in certain condi-tions successful business could be married to humane considerations.

In 1830-1, the political map of Europe was surprisingly like that offorty years earlier. Fren ch conquests proved t o be as imp erm anen t asthey had been drama tic, and few traces remained of Fren ch experimentslike the Kingdom of (northern) Italy, the Con federation of the Rhine orthe Saxon Duchy of Warsaw. The frontiers of France itself werealmost the same as before, and so were the outer lines which enclosedthe states of Germ any . If Italy was still only a ' geograph ical exp ression ',it was not differently bo un ded ; the disappearance of the pro ud republics,Venice and Genoa, was the most radical change that survived the war.Spain and Portugal had lost most of their overseas empires, but theirown frontiers were unchan ged. Th e outward shape of Switzerland washardly altered, and the newly united Kingdom of the Netherlands wasbreaking up into nearly the same two components that had beenfamiliar on the m ap for more than 200 years. In the north , Sweden ha dlost Finland to R ussia (1809) and gained No rwa y from D enm ark (1815),but these were transfers of areas that had long been dependent and didno t lose their identity by a change of sovereign; an d Sweden was merelyrecognising the end of a n era w hen she failed to reco ver in 1815 he r lastsmall foothold across the Baltic in Pom erania. W ithin Germ any , anold and decayed framework which had for centuries been too rotten tobear renovation, though it might still give a little shelter, had suddenlycollapsed at the touch of Na poleo n. Th e Ger m ans were by no mean sready for political unification, for their thinkers and reformers mostly



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WAR AND PEACE IN AN AGE OF UPHEAVALcombined soaring universal ideas with an extremely limited, oftenparochial, outlook in current politics; but nothing could reverse theradical change of 1803-6, by which the big fish had swallowed up mostof the smaller fry, so that Austria and Prussia, in their potential rivalryfor domination, were confronted by a manageable collection of lessthan forty states instead of more than 300.Austria, more securely based than ever outside Germany, with herapparently unshakable hold on northern Italy and the opposite Adriaticcoastlands, planned to prevail in Germany (at least in foreign policy),not by direct rule or by reviving an elective imperial title which she hadagreed to discard as obsolete in 1806, but by the kind of influence thatshe also exerted in central and southern Italy, and by her presidency ofthe new Ge rm anic Confederation. Prussia, on the other han d, radicallydismembered by Napoleon after Jena and compensated fully butdifferently in 1815, could only ho pe to prevail by further direct acquisi-tions or by very close contro l. Her provinces consisted of a large easternblock, thinning out to the west, and a smaller western block, the twoseparated by Hanover, Brunswick and Hesse in a belt nowhere lesstha n 30 miles wide and m ostly m uch m ore. She had problems ofreinstatement in those parts of her shares in the partitions of Polandthat she recovered in 1815, after losing them in 1806 before they had beenfully digested; problems, too, of new rule in the northern part ofSaxony, and in a large Rhineland province made up of former ecclesi-astical and secular principalities which had all undergone the directinfluence of Fran ce. M any of these new Prussian subjects were R om anCatholics; like the Silesians (now Prussians of the third generation),they were not readily absorbed into a Lutheran-Calvinist state whichuntil the time of Frederick the Great had never since the Reformationbeen diplom atically represented at the Vatican . A government whichcould in 1817, by royal decree, make an administrative union betweenthe Lu theran and Calvinist Churches in Prussia (C hapter VI, pp . 176-7),would no t find it easy to treat the R om an Catholic hierarchy in the samebrusque fashion.

Nobody dreamed in 1815 of restoring the political map of oldGermany; and, even if Rome publicly deplored the injustice of secularis-ing the great ecclesiastical principalities (Cologne, Mainz and Trier hadprovided three of the seven or eight Electors to the imperial title), yetthe Po pe's secretary of state, Cardinal Pacca, had not failed to recognisethat they would, if restored, be an embarrassment rather than an asset,embedded as they had been in the aristocratic social order, withprivileges which Rome was beginning to see as an obstacle to the unityand discipline of the Chu rch. The G erm an bishops had lately beeninclined to Josephist ideas of a national state church, but 'if they areless rich and powerful they will lend a more willing ear to the voice of

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I N T R O D U C T I O NRome ' .1 But neither Rome nor her friends were yet ready to considerwhether her own temporal power in Italy (other than a necessarypied-a-terre) might soon be an embarrassment to o : the bulk of the papa lstates was restored almost without question in 1814.Russia's apparently formidable resources had been swollen in alldirections. Finland w as a small bu t strategically imp orta nt gain. Th eCongress Kingdom of Poland (1815) embraced the Austrian andPrussian shares in the partition of 1795, and about half the Prussianshare in tha t of 1793, while the whole of the Russ ian shares rem ainedwithin Russia. Until 1831, the kingdom was no t yet fully p art of Ru ssia:it was separated by a customs frontier and it had a na tiona l army w hosecommander-in-chief, the tsar's brother Constantine, refused in 1828-9to send any Polish troop s for the war on T urk ey ; but oth er pow ers werevirtually excluded from any influence there, and Polish patriots werevery soon to p rov ide the excuse for a harsher policy of Russification.In the south, Russia now planned, by necessity more than by choice, topreserve Turkey in Europe as a weakened and dependent client rathertha n directly to advance her own frontier on that side. Bu t in 1812 shehad annexed Bessarabia (a part of Moldavia), and the Treaty ofAdrianople (1829) was the last of a long series which completed theadministrative separation of Wallachia and Moldavia from Con-stantinople; whatever the eventual fate of these 'Danubian Princi-palities'the future Roumaniamight be, a Russian army was inoccupation until 1834. On the Asiatic side of the Black Sea, Russia'sEuropean allies could not so easily impede her expansionat theexpense of Turkey in the Caucasus (1801) and in Armenia (1829), andof Persia arou nd the Caspian Sea (1813, 1828). Her gradual penetrationthrough Siberia had continued to the eastern sea; in 1799 the tsargranted a monopoly to a 'Russian-American Company' to controlexisting and future settlemen ts (mostly for seal-fur) on b ot h sides of theBering Sea. Conven tions with the United States (1824) and with Britain(1825) denned the southern boundary of the Alaskan settlements at540 40': and the Company's settlement much further south, in SanFrancisco Bay, was not formally liquidated until 1839. But difficultiesof supply, friction with other powers, and mismanagement (*it was fineto be a director, but very dangerous to be a stockholder'), were alreadyby 1830 disapp ointing any hopes of a great future in this region. Th eCompany lingered on until the sale of Alaska to the United States in1867.2

For Turkey, the direct cessions to Russia had been less alarmingthan in the time of Catherine II . Even the restrictions o n sovereignty1 J. Schmidlin, Papstgeschichte der n euesten Zeit, (1800-46), 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1933),vol. 1, p. 207, n. 5.2 S. B. Okun, The Russian-American Company, English translation. (Harvard, 1951.)



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WAR AND PEACE IN AN AGE OF UPHEAVALin the Principalities were tolerable, for these were hardly made as yet inresponse to an effective Ro um ania n nationa l movem ent. M uch mo reominous for the future were the facts that the sultan had been obligedto allow a real autonomy to the Serbs (1817) and to recognise theexistence of a small bu t ambitious Greek kingdom (1830). An d,although Mahmud II had some success in tightening his control overhis Asiatic provinces, he was now no more than a nominal suzerain inEgypt. Yet the long norther n frontier in Eu rope was unchanged, and allthe European powers paid at least lip service to the principle of the'independence an d integrity' of the Ottom an E mpire (Chapter XIX).If the frontiers of Russia and Turkey reached far outside Europe,those of British rule had been mightily extended, far beyond the reachof Na po leon . A t the nearest po int, the legislative Un ion of Ireland w ithGreat Britain (1801) hardly affected the political map, though its in-direct cause was the war and the influence of the Revolution on therising of 1798. Th e genuine prospec t of a healing effect was clouded by along delay in granting the expected political rights to the RomanCatholics (1829), and the redress of agrarian grievances was hardly yetbeing considered. Tim e was to show the full unh app y effect of the unionon British domestic politics, and also on the reputation of Britain inEurope and the United States; already Metternich had been counteringCanning's arguments for Greece by reference to Ireland; and belief inPalm erston's sincerity as a champion of n ational an d hberal causes wasno t to be enhanced by the fact tha t he was an Irish landlord. Neverthe-less, the enthusiasm of Belgian (and some French) Catholics forO'Connell's successful new method of agitation was indirectly a tributeto the fact that British institutions were adaptable enough eventually torespond to opinion or bow to necessity.Britain's sea power was much reinforced: in European waters bypossession of Malta (1800) and Heligoland (1815), and by occupation ofthe Ionian Islands (1815-64) as a 'Septinsular Republic', with completestrategic control over this protectorate; along the approaches to India,by footholds and treaties at the mouth of the Red Sea and in thePersian Gulf (Chapter XIX), or again by her possession of the CapeProvince and the islands of Ascension and Mauritius (1815); and stillfurther east, by the acquisition of Ceylon (1815), Singapore andthe Straits Settlements (1819), and by the gradual development of herrecent settlements in Au stralia . The spectacular growth of Britishpower in India is described in Chapter XX. Across the Atlantic, short-lived hopes during the w ars of footholds in South A merica wereabandoned before the peace, but a part of Dutch Guiana gave Britainone small colony south of the Isthmus (1815). The war with the UnitedStates (1812-14) produced no change in the frontier with Canada, andthe way was open for settling (1818) an artificial but stable boundary

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I N T R O D U C T I O Nwestwards to the Rockies before settlement had proceeded far on bothsides of it. Britain's West Indian islands, with the addition of Trinida d,St Lucia and Tobago (1815), were strategically important to her in fore-stalling unwelcome schemes of European powers in Central or SouthAmericaand they were indirectly valuable to the United States alsowhile its own navy was still weak . Com mercially, the startling expansionof Britain's trade with the United States after the separation, and soonthe more speculative but substantial growth of her exchanges with Sou thAm erica, me ant tha t the West Indies were not so much as of old the hu bof Atlantic trad e; bu t, still in 1830, they were m ore im po rtan t to Britainthan India was as yet, and their own trade with the United States,restricted since 1783, had just been made easier by British legislation(Chapter XXII).

Thus, broadly speaking, the age presents a contrast in political map-making. W ithin Euro pe, the bewildering changes of the war years leftcomparatively few traces and, except in Germany, and to a lesser extentin Italy, did no t po int clearly along th e lines that were to be followed inthe next half-century. In the outer world, great changes were also seen,bu t most of them were m ore perma nent or led on to further changes inthe same general direction (India, Malaya, Australasia, South Africa,N orth and South Am erica). But the force of the French explosion isnot to be measured in Europ e by its effects o n the m ap . Even thou gh abalance of power was achieved in 1815 along lines foreshadowed byPitt at least ten years earlier (Chapter XXIV), and even though severalfallen dynasties were restored, yet 'restoration' is a misleading des-cription in all other respects for the condition of Europe after 1815.M uch of wh at the Frenc h, and the wars, did to Eu rop e, by direct actionor by the stimulus of provo cation, proved to be irreversible. Th e genera-tion after 1815 is usually said to have lived in a period of reaction,associated with the name of Metternich. It is true th at there was astrong reaction against 'irregular' governments, and some attempt tolink government not with experiment or opportunity but with tradi-tional supports. But some of this goes back to 1799 or earlier, to Burkeand his admirers, to the quick disillusionment of the intellectuals in the1790's, to the young de Maistre and Bonald, and to General Bonaparterecalling and employing emigres and ordering a Te Deum of thanks-giving in Milan Cathedral for French victories in Italy (1800)agesture which shocked some members of the Directory and led on bystages to the Concordat (April 1802) and all that it seemed to imply.W ith the Consulate and E mp ire, the brief age of the revolution militantbegan to look like an interlude between systems of continuous powerrelying in pa rt up on tradition for their stability. On the othe r han d, most

II



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WAR AND PEACE IN AN AGE OF UPHEAVALof the adm inistrative a nd social changes th at were made effective before1815 survived, while those which had only been initiated did not losetheir imp etus. N on e of the rulers of this generation would have beendescribed as 'rea ctio na ries ' in the eighteenth century: the new currencyof the word implies a radical change in the criteria commo nly applied togov ernm ent. Before 1776/89, acquiescence in governm ent was norm al,uph eaval exceptional. Th e word 'rev olu tio n' was used to describe aturn of the wheel of fortune in politics, and another turn of the wheelmight bring something familiar or something different to the top;the wo rd 'r ea cti on ', if used at all, ha d a neutral meaning, as a pendulum're ac ts ' by swinging to and fro. Tho se who believed in the improvementof mankind did not as a rule connect it with a crusade against theestablished ord er. After 1789, however, 're vo lu tio n' was generally heldto be an unco mp leted process which could hardly be reversed and couldperhaps continue indefinitely; 'reaction' was anything that wouldimpede this process, and commonly took on a sinister meaning.'Conservatives', themselves newly so labelled, who resented thisstigma of 'reaction', were preaching resistance to change regarded as aprocess, not just asserting their right or power against an enemy of themoment .

This new vocabulary, which still colours much of what is written(not only about politics), may be connected with the notion of the per-fectibility of man and the revolt against it (Chapter IV): withoutinsisting that any such doctrine was widely prevalent, we may detect ahint of Utopia round the corner in much political thought and actionof the early nineteen th century. It is tru e that a subtle transition seems tohave been und er way by 1830: 're ac tio n' is contrasted, no t so much w ith'rev olu tion ' as with 'libera lism '. This implies tha t the goal is no t toreplace one regime summarily by another, but to ensure that in anyregime the process of reaching decisions is conducted by means of publicdiscussion and no t simply by decree or by violent subversion. Never-theless, most early nineteenth-century liberals carried a Utopian flavourabo ut w ith the m ; so did some rom antic conservatives who idealised thepast, and some of the earliest 'socialists' (still in 1830 not so labelled).Even the Utilitarians, contemptuous as they were of natural rights andnatural duties, saw at first hardly any limits to the benefits which theprinciple of the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' might bringto mank ind . Th is principle was a m ost effective enginefrom CesareBeccaria to Jeremy Bentham and his disciplesfor attacking institu-tions which might ap pear to co mm on sense to be obstacles to happiness,particularly in the fields of law and fiscal policy; to inflict unnecessarypa in is as senseless as to impose self-contradictory taxes. Unfortunately,it was easier to detect pain and even to mitigate its causes than it was todefine or create positive happiness; but the shallowness of the Utilitar-

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I N T R O D U C T I O Nians' philosophy need not obscure the vigour of their weapons, at leastnegatively, in removing hindrances to well-being. Their assumptionthat 'institutions make the man' is untenable; but, although goodinstitutions cannot m ake men good or happy, we may allow that bad orobsolete or ill-functioning institutions make it more difficult for men tobe good or happy. The question 'what is the use of it?' was moreeffective than the question 'what are the rights of i t ? ' for clearing whatappeared to be an administrative jung le.

In France itself, the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (Vol.VIII) had demolished, along with privilege, most of the existing in-stitutions in army, navy, local government, taxation, church, schoolsand universitiesand had left a builder's yard in which, along withmuch rubbish, some materials for new construction were beingassembled, at least on paper. What followed is told in Chapter X.Unhappily, of the Constituent's most impressive constructions, onethe elective system of local governmentwas overtaken by war andemergency methods until Bonaparte took over the framework of thenew departements (with their neutral names intended to obliteratehistoric provincial loyalties) and himself appointed the eighty or moreprefets; these were shorn of the judicial and fiscal power of the oldprovincial intendants, but all the powers of local government were moreformidably centralised than of old. The other construction, the CivilConstitution of the Clergy (1790), was based on the principle of anelective national church, incompatible with Roman hierarchy anduniversality; it never won wide acceptance, and was replaced, first by akind of separation between Church and State (1794-1801), uneasybecause born in hostility, and then by Napoleon's Concordat (1802),which, just because it reflected the gallican C atholicism of 'the majorityof Frenchmen', outlived the Restoration and lasted for a century.

The men of the Convention (1792-95) concentrated pow er at home asmuch as their predecessors had dispersed it, but their inoperativeConstitution of 1793 showed that dispersion was still the aim, and thatconcentration was regarded only as the means of survival in emergency:'without Virtue, Terror is useless; without Terror, Virtue is power-less' (Robespierre, 5 February 1794). The emergency was partlycreated by the Convention itself; it attempted too much in 'making waron history' not only at home but at the same time beyond the frontiersby offering 'succour to all peoples who wish to recover their liberty'.Out of the conflicts which followed, arose the fierce patriotism ofFrenchmen, at first revolutionary in sentiment but soon just militantand acquisitive. With the collapse of the paper currency (assignats), theDirectory had to leave its armies to live by private plunder and publicexactions in liberated countries; with the fading of exalted hopes at



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WAR AND PEACE IN AN AGE OF UPHEAVALhome after Thermidor, the national pride of civilians too in Francecame to be centred in the exploits of the armies and their generals. Th eDirectory needed a civilian-minded general as a mascot, and found inBonaparte a master.The N apoleonic adventure is sketched in Ch apter XI , Napoleon's rulein Franc e as consul and as emp eror in Chapter X . These were years offulfilment for adm inistrator s, whe ther soldiers or civilians, whether newmen enjoying the 'carriere ouverte aux talents' or men to whom moreprosaic careers would have been open under the old regime, includingmany men of noble family, often royalists at heart, who rallied to theRepublic of the First Consul, to the republican Empire of 1804-8 orfinally to the hereditary dynastic Em pire of the last years. In 1814, verylittle was restored except the dynasty, which made, inevitably, far moreuse of me n who had served Nap oleon than of 'p u re ' royalists. LouisXV III himself had never bowed the knee to the 'u su rp er', but m any ofhis ministers and prefets and magistrates had done so, and those whosubmitted again during the Hundred Days were mostly not disturbedafter W aterloo if they ha d no t positively abetted Nap oleon . Politicaldeba te, and the public exchange of ideas in the press, in pamphlets andin books, were much more free than they had been at any time duringthe wars; and the constitutional charter of 1814, with all its limitationsin the eyes of later generations (and in those of contemporaries whowanted nothing less than the overthrow of the dynasty, or would notbe shocked by that), was no sham . In the words of a con stitutionallawyer of the Third R ep u bl ic :' our adm inistration dates from the empire,our politics date from the R e s to ra ti o n .. . . The role of the Revolutionhas been imm ense, bu t it has remained negative. It destroyed the oldregime; it cleared the ground for modern institutions, and on thatground Napoleon erected his edifice of d es p o ti sm .. .. To the Restora-tion belongs the honour of having introduced in practice that funda-mental principle of modern constitutions: the alliance between libertyand authority. Its wo rk has endured .'1 The experiment of constitu-tional monarchy in France, before and after 1830, is sketched inChapter XII.Elsewhere, except in some of the smaller states, the practice of repre-sentative governm ent m ade little headway before 1830, or indeed before1848; bu t neither had it m ade any real headway before 1815. The greatmajority of men in Europe were still occupied in traditional agriculture,and ma ny of them were illiterate. The men of science and learningwere not m uch impeded by forms of government, so long as these werefairly stab le, although the prestige of the exact sciences and of technologywas much increased in France, while that of philosophy and philology

1 J. Barthelemy, Vintroduction du regime parlementaire en France sous Louis XVIII etCharles X (Paris, 1904), Avant-propos.14



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I N T R O D U C T I O Nwas higher than ever in Germ any (Chap ter V). Th e de m and for con-stitutional liberties came from men of the administrative, professionaland commercial classes; it was to be made irresistible, more by thegradual revolution in industry and the transfer of wealth (or thecreation of new wealth) associated with it, than by the active politicalagitation which itself reflected the contrast between new facts and oldtradition. Th e work of adapting institutions so as to fit a changingsocial patte rn was inevitably slow. Political seers like Saint Sim on a ndhis often dissident followers (among whom Auguste Comte wasoriginally numbered) might announce the coming of a technocratic,positivist, era in place of the long ages when land had been the pre-vailing source of wealth and power and also (as it still was) the mostdesirable evidence of wealth derived from other sources; but suchprop hets seemed eccentric or fanciful to m en engaged in the hurly-burlyof current affairs. N or w ere these seers pro ph ets of dem ocracy in th esense in which the 'Ja co bin s' had un derstood it. Am ong those who had'learned nothing and forgotten nothing' since 1789 were not only thesurvivors of the age of privilege (and the inherito rs of privilege where ithad been little disturbed), but also the 'men of 1792', who constantlyexpected, in vain, to rehearse anew the scenes of the Revolution, ifpossible without its violence at home but not without its gloriousadventures abroad.

The 'new look' given to Prussia from 1807 (Chapter XIII) was noteffaced after 1815, even if constitutionalist hopes were disappointedmore than in some of the other German states; but the emancipation ofthe serfs proved initially to be of less benefit to them th an to th e greaterlandowners, some of whom foresaw a t the time that, if the peasan t wasno longer bound to the soil, neither would the soil be bound to thepeasant. A strict adm inistration, and a prosp ect of econom ic adv an-tage, were the greatest attractions that Prussia could offer to her old ornew subjects and to her weaker neighb ours. Th e first of these adv an-tages was rooted in earlier tradition a nd w as reinforced by the pro duc tsof the Prussian universities, administering the Prussian Landrecht(state law) which had been codified in 1794 (bu t com mercial law was notcodified until 1845). The second advantage was provided by themoderate Prussian tariff of 1818 and by the tariff union now beginning(from 1828) to be offered to ne ighbo urs willing to be included. Th e lawof 1818 reversed the old system of discouraging exports of corn, andlowered tariffs all ro un d. It also gave Prussia for the first time a singlesystem for all the provinces, but the ratio of frontier-line to area wasstill very high. Tariff unio ns wou ld therefore give an immediate savingof expense in addition to the prospect of positive gain and p erhap s m oredistant political advan tage. At the same time, roads were designed t o



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WAR AND PEACE IN AN AGE OF UPHEAVALavoid or minimise tariff barriers: for example, from Halberstadt toCologne between Hanover and Hesse (1819), with a branch fromPaderborn southwards (1829), and from Magdeburg to Hanover (1829).

Am ong the provincial Diets set up in Prussia from 1823, tha t of theRhineland province was the most active, but no central system ofrepresentation existed. Han ove r was oddly 'rea ctio na ry ' after 1815,considering its long connection with En glan d; b ut m any of the states ofcentral and south Germany had constitutions based (as in France) on anarrow franchise but protecting civil rights, for example Nassau (before1814), Weimar, Bavaria, Baden, Wiirttemberg and Hesse (all these1816-20). Th e keyno te of these, especially the Bavarian, was tha t of theenlightenment rath er than of liberalism. Th e Fed eral Act (1819) didindeed envisage constitutional systems in each state; but very soon thestate governm ents and th e Federal D iet were confronted by m ovementswhich seemed to them n ot constitutional but revolutionary. There wasindeed a good deal of froth on th e beer of these early Germ an liberals orradicals, but the governments of states which had working repre-sentative constitutions were not, on the whole, more dangerouslythreatened than those of states which had none.

Th e doctrine of imm obility was partly imposed o n the Confederationby the presidency of Au stria. This was no t uncongenial to M etternichin constitutional matters, resourceful and pliant though he was indiplomacy an d ad m inistratio n; bu t in any case the personal views of theemperor, and the peculiar situation in the monarchy, left little room forany alternative to imm obility (Ch apter XIV). The peculiarity of Austriawas that none of the historic 'nations' in it coincided with the justemerging racial and linguistic nationalities; moreover the emperor'sgovernment had no experience of a working constitution except that ofthe kingdom of Hungary, designed to preserve the ancient privileges ofthe Magyar nobles, whose ideas were more like those of the barons ofRunnymede than those of contemporary liberals. It is not surprisingthat the emperor avoided summoning the Hungarian Diet from 1812to 1825. Ab ove a ll, it was in his interest after 1815, financially andpolitically, to avoid wars, for the 'parties of movement' in Europegenerally were likely to profit by war: the Greeks counted on a Russianwar against Turkey in the 1820's, and the French Left in 1830-1 wantedto push Louis Philippe towards intervention in Italy or Belgium orPola nd. Rev olutionary mo vemen ts might also prov oke war by neigh-bours fearing infection: Metternich felt obliged to intervene in Naples,while Russia offered, and France decided, to intervene in Spain.Metternich also held that rulers could help to forestall such embarrass-ing situations. It is well know n th at King Fe rdinan d of Naples promisedhim not to make constitutional changes without Austrian approval, but



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I N T R O D U C T I O Nless well known that the king was also warned against trying to undothe changes introduced by Murat in law and administration (ChapterXV, p. 429). The Austrian government in the north did not comparebadly with those of the rest of Italy (except perhaps for a 'libera l oa sis 'in Tuscany). It was not more foreign th an F rench gov ernment ha d been,and the number of those who objected to foreign rule as such was small,even if they held the future. It was difficult to jud ge th e government ofthe papal states by current standards, with its unique blend of easy-going paternalism and cruel inefficiency; but while Cardinal Consalviwas secretary of state, its intentions could hard ly be called 're ac tio na ry '.Consalvi was well aware of the danger of look ing ba ckw ard s; in a letterof Augu st 1814 to the future C harles X of F rance , he was already urgingthe king and his brother to imitate Solon's work of reconciliation, andnot the example of Charles II, 'who, after promising to forget the past,forgave nobody, poisoned his own reign, and prepared for the Stuartdynasty a new downfall, which came about under his brotherthistime irrevoc ably'.1 But, on the death of Pius VII (1823), Consalvi m adeway for the zealots in Rome, and throughout Italy the movements of1821 in Naples and Piedmont intensified police activity, which mostdirectly affected comparatively small bu t well-to-do and vocal gro ups ofeducated men (Chapter XV).

Although it was Spain (Chapter XVI) which gave to the n a m e ' Lib eral 'a specifically political significance, the character of liberalism in thePeninsula was from the first peculiar, determined by the un ique positionof the Church and connected with officers in the army and soon withrival groups within the royal families and at cou rt. Between 1812 an d1830 the reluctance of all parties to let go of overseas empire over-shadowed all other issues. The Spanish constitution of 1812uni-cameral, cumbrous and without any provision for amendmentwas arallying cry for Liberals in the twenties, but after 1830 the much moreviable constitution of Belgium began to fill that role.The smaller states of Europe had the best opportunity after 1815 ofdeveloping parliamentary institutions, and some of them used it, tho ughin different ways (Chapter XV II). The ir relative freedom from th e over-riding preoccupation of other governments with international politicshad varying effects. Th e state constitutions within Germ any havealready been mentioned. The Baltic was no longer so much a focus ofgreat rivalries, and the Scandinavian countries were all hard hiteconomically by the peace. In D enm ark, the tranquillity of a burea u-cratic but not reactionary government was hardly disturbed until theproblem of Schleswig and Holstein began later to create a popularagitatio n; bu t both the Swedish estates under the system of 1809 and the

1 Consalvi to Artois, August 1814. P. Rinieri, // Congresso di Vienna, pp . 271-2 , citedin Fliche et M artin, Histoire de VEglise, vol. xx, by J. Leflon (Paris, 1949), p . 309.2 17 NC M H ix



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WAR AND PEACE IN AN AGE OF UPHEAVALsingle popular Chamber of Norway (1814) had a genuine existencewithin the union under their tactful foreign ruler Bernadotte, first ascrown prince and then as Charles XIV (1818-44). Th e independence ofthe Netherlands and Switzerland was secured by the interest of theirgreater neighbours in a balance of power and in the containment ofFrance, although both countries underwent the pressure of foreigngovernments against the activities of political refugees within theirbo rders . Swiss politics were still ma inly municipal and patrician un til1847-8, but in the Netherlands the uneasy marriage between ProtestantHo lland and Catho lic Belgium was a spur to organised political parties,and this impetus survived the crisis of separation which was beginningbefore 1830. Belgium, already the spearhead of the indu strial revolutionin Europe (Chapter II, pp. 54-5), was soon also to be regarded, underits sagacious king Leopold I, as the model constitutional monarchy onthe Continent (Vol. X, p. 191). Its unique separation between Churchand State worked tolerably well, and its French culture (after twentyyears as part of France) concealed as yet the popular Flemish founda-tion which (in more than half the country) underlay the politicallyeducated classes. W illiam I, dur ing the period of Un ion (1814-30),found no popular response when he tried to promote, as a counter toFrench influence, not the Flemish language but the Dutch, which theFlemings of that day could not readily use or even understand.

The significance of the reign of the emperor Alexander I of Russia(1801-25), a n a < of the 'D ece m br ist' episode on his death, is discussed inCh apter X VI II. Th e reign began, like several earlier ones, with a palacerevolution in almost oriental style, and ended in a mystery deepenedby unnecessary, but again not unprecedented, secretiveness within theimp erial family as to the succession. Ye t during this reign Ru ssiabecame more than ever before a pa rt of Eu rope . A t hom e the Slavophilreaction ag ainst the 'w estern isers' w as only just b eginning in the 1820'sand was officially suspect; abroad, Russophobia was still the exception,not the rule, at least until the Tu rkish war of 1828-9. As a young m anAlexander w as steeped in the ideas of his tuto r L a Harp e, a French-Swissrepublican; for some years he leaned on the advice of the CatholicPolish grand seigneur, Prince Adam Czartoryski; in the last period hewavered, in foreign policy, between the counsels of other non-Russians:Nesselrode, a professional diplom atist of Ger m an origin; C apodistrias, aCorfiot educated in Italy, Greek in sentiment but also feeling more athom e in Switzerland th an in St Petersbu rg; and, intermittently, M etter-nich, whose influence on Alexander always faded on the emperor'sreturn t o R ussia. All these were comparatively young menwell underfifty in 1815and Alexand er himself was only forty-seven when his reignended in 1825.



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I N T R O D U C T I O NIn spite of all these 'western' influences, or perhaps because they wereforeign influences on a man whose environment was Russian, there wasanother side to Alexander autocratic, wilful an d m isty; in the internal

government of the Empire his chief personal advisers, though far frombeing elder statesmen, were wholly Russian. Speranskii, son of anOrthodox priest and himself educated in a seminary, was inclined toadministrative reform within a traditiona l framew ork; bu t after his dis-grace in 1812 the stage was held by the strange and violent Arakcheev,whose character has never been very intelligible to western observers.Catherine II, a German princess, had been cheerfully cynical enough tokeep her balance in an alien world; but a Russian ruler who took him-self as seriously as did Alexander I was likely to be mentally dividedbetween his mainly western education and the primitive realities of lifearoun d him. W hen the Russian armies swept across Eu rop e in 1813-14,the current image in the West was th at of savage ho rdes an d th e 'ru le ofthe knout'; but Russia could no longer be represented as the 'giantwith the feet of clay' (Diderot); and soon Parisians, who in any casewanted to cultivate the tsar's good will, were astonished by his owncaptivating charm and by the intelligent good m anne rs of his entourag e.The R ussian occupying army was not specially un po pu lar after the firstmonths; many of its younger officers were welcome in the most'advanced' salons, and some of them carried home ideas and hopeswhich led them after December 1825 to the scaffold or to Siberia.Joseph de Maistre's posthumous Soirees de Saint Petersbourg (1822)was a best seller (not only in France), with its brilliant and intimatepicture of aristocratic society and its prophecies of an eventual re-volution which would mak e Russia far mo re powerful th an before. Th efirst solid background was provided by the seven volumes (each quicklytranslated) of Karamzin's Histoire de Vempire russe (1819-26).1 Therewas some force in Metternich's comment on the death of Alexander I,before the succession was settled: 't h e histo ry of Ru ssia will begin wh erethe romance of Russia ends.'2

In republican North America (Chapter XXII) constitution-makingfollowed a successful revolution instead of preceding it or beingentangled in the process. Th e direct influence of the United Statesupon Europe was less noticeable during the wars and their aftermaththan in the previous twenty years or in the twenty years after 1830.Frenchmen w ere immersed in the stream of their own revolution and nolonger needed to cite an example which was less relevant in its detailed

1 R. T. McNally, 'Das Russlandbild in der Publizistik Frankreichs, 1814-43', inForschungen zur osteuropaischen Geschichte, Bd. 6 (Berlin, 1958), pp . 82-169 .s Metternich to Ottenfels, 18 December 1825. Memoirs (Engl. trans., 1889), vol. rv,p. 261.19 2-2



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I N T R O D U C T I O Nrevolutionary F rance. But their activity was half-hearted: two yearslater, Prussia, Ho lland an d Spain ha d m ade peace (Ap ril-July 1795); an dCatherine II, though nominally allied to Austria, Prussia and England,kept Russia out of the war while she was completing the partition ofPoland. Her successor, Paul I, seems to have been moved by resent-ments and enthusiasms more than by cool policy; his personal interestin Malta, and his anger at British treatment of neutrals at sea, warredagainst his disapproval of France and the desire, which inclined himtowards Britain, to check French pow er in Italy and the M editerran ean.Nevertheless, in 1799 a Russian arm y in Italy and a Russian squ adro n atCorfu were new porten ts, almost equally alarm ing to th e governm ents ofFrance and Britain.

With the consolidation of Napoleon's power as consul and then asemperor, it was only the disinherited princes like the king of Sardiniawho never ceased to regard him as a revolutionary usu rper. Th e futureLouis XVIII might protest against the recognition of Napoleon's titlesby the Pope and later by the sultan, but France was no longer subjectto any ideological boycott by governm ents. They m ight fear theexcessive power of the French Empire, as they would later fear that ofthe Russian, but their course was mapped by the exigencies of themom ent. They might feel dou bts ab ou t the perm anence of Na po leon 'spower, but in January 1806 the king of Bavaria gave his daughter inmarriage to Napo leon's stepson. Fo ur years later, ano ther of the oldestdynasties (and the first to have been at w ar with revo lutionary France )was directly linked by marriage to Napoleon as the founder of a newdyn asty; and A ustria was reluctant in 1814 to exclude the heir. EvenEnglishmen, most consistent in their enmity, welcomed the Peace ofAmiens in 1801-2, and could not know for certain in advance, for alltheir suspicions, that it was to be no more than a short-lived truce;nor did the government make a Bourbon restoration into an officialaim of the renewed war, as Pitt had virtually don e until then. Fo rAlexander I, the alliance with Napoleon at Tilsit (1807) needed nomore to be excused than the coalition against him two years earlier; itis true that the ensuing negotiations which dragged on between them onlyshowed how deep and unresolved were the differences in their ideasabout Turkey and the Straits, but these differences were not advertisedas ingredients in a 'co ld war '. Th e tsar, after rebuffing N ap ole on 'soverture for a Russian prince

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The New Cambridge Modern History Vol. 09 - War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval,1793-1830