JWR-99-002March 1999

The Navy and the Infosphere

Michael Vlahos and Dale Pace

This document may be accessed electronically at<http://jhuapl.edu/cybertech>.

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This report explores implications of the Big Change in society, business, and militaryoperations that is expected to emerge from the Infosphere. After treating broad societalpossibilities, the study narrows its focus to their possible impact on the Navy and onDefense-related research organizations like The Johns Hopkins University Applied PhysicsLaboratory (JHU/ APL).

This report is an occasional paper of the Joint Warfare Analysis Department (JWAD) ofJHU/APL. The ideas in this report are intended to stimulate, perhaps provoke, seriousthinking about the future. Not everyone will agree with its ideas. Therefore, it should benoted that this report reflects the views of its authors and does not necessarily implyconcurrence with those views by JHU/APL or by any other organization or agency, whetherpublic or private.

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ABSTRACT

The Infosphere is a shorthand for the fusion of all the world’s communications networks,databases, and sources of information into a vast, intertwined, and heterogeneous tapestry ofelectronic interchange. This report explores implications of the Big Change in society, business,and military operations that is expected to emerge from the Infosphere. After treating broad societalpossibilities, the study narrows its focus to their possible impact on the Navy and on Defense-related research organizations like The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL).

This report is an occasional paper of the Joint Warfare Analysis Department (JWAD) of JHU/APL. The ideas in this report are intended to stimulate, perhaps provoke, serious thinking about thefuture. Not everyone will agree with its ideas. Therefore, it should be noted that this report reflectsthe views of its authors and does not necessarily imply concurrence with those views by JHU/APLor by any other organization or agency, whether public or private.

The Authors

Michael Vlahos is a consultant to JHU/APLwho has written extensively about the Infosphereand is associated with the United States InternetCouncil. Previously he directed the SecurityStudies program at The Johns HopkinsUniversity School of Advanced InternationalStudies, was Director of the State Department’sCenter for the Study of Foreign Affairs, and hasworked with the Center for Naval Analyses andwith the Progress and Freedom Foundation. Hise-mail address is mevlahos@aol.com .

Dale Pace, a specialist in operations researchand Defense analysis, is a member of the JHU/APL Principal Professional Staff who coordinatedthe first series of the JHU/APL Cyber TechSeminars. Previously he taught in the graduatetechnical management program of The JohnsHopkins University Whiting School of Engineeringand was the JHU/APL liaison with the Naval WarCollege, where he developed and taught an electivecourse on technology and naval warfare. His e-mailaddress is dale.pace@jhuapl.edu .

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CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

What Is the Infosphere? ............................................................................................................... 1

Infosphere as Big Change ............................................................................................................ 3

The Path of Evolution .................................................................................................................. 4Stages of Infosphere Evolution. Phase 1: Business Drives Growth .................................... 5

Stages of Infosphere Evolution. Phase 2: Governance Shapes the Infosphere.................... 8

First Notional Path: International Fragmentation and Ideological Division

Slow Infosphere Development..................................................................................... 8

Second Notional Path: A Highly Regulated U.S./G-7 Managed Infosphere ............... 9

Third Notional Path: An Uncontrolled, Self-organizing Infosphere Ecology ............. 10

Perspective ........................................................................................................................... 11

Infosphere vs. Network Centric Warfare ..................................................................................... 12

The Infosphere’s Impact on Military Operations? ....................................................................... 14

Operating in an Open Battlespace ....................................................................................... 14

Operating in an Open Human Place .................................................................................... 15

The Symbiosis of Physical and Cyber Operations .............................................................. 15

Military Societies Transformed ........................................................................................... 16

And the Impact on the Navy? ...................................................................................................... 16

Relating to the Navy’s Unique Identity ............................................................................... 16

Relating to the Viability of the Ship Itself ........................................................................... 17

Relating to the Navy’s Own Emphasis on Strike Warfare ................................................... 17

Integrated Battlespace Awareness ........................................................................................ 18

Strategic Robustness ............................................................................................................ 18

And On Professional Institutions? ............................................................................................... 19

Concluding Comments ................................................................................................................ 21

Appendix A: Infosphere Aspects—How and When? .................................................................. 22

Appendix B: JHU/APL and the Infosphere—Selected Items ..................................................... 26

Notes ............................................................................................................................................ 28

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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of effective communicationetworks has changed how people connect, hbusiness is done, and how military forceoperate. Everyone seems to understand tglobal networks are changing every aspectlife. But do we understand how these networthemselves are changing? The Johns HopkUniversity Applied Physics Laboratory (JHUAPL) has been exploring the transformation a global network ecology from what was seas a communications medium to a truly socenvironment, with emphasis upon the potentimpact of this transformation on researcorganizations and military operations. Thsocial environment is a new human place whepeople meet, interact, and do business. The pof development—or the rate of “track-layingto use a benchmark image from the IndustrRevolution—suggests the emergence of a matInfosphere Ecosystem within 20 years. Fmilitary forces, this not only enhances traditionmilitary operations but becomes, potentially,new arena of operations, even of battle.1 Thesignificant element of this hypothesis is thpotential for this new place in cyberspace to grointo the focal center of human activity and globbusiness and, by extension, into the decistheater of future military operations. We call thplace the Infosphere.

This report explores how the Infosphemight evolve, how its development might affemilitary operations, how the Navy in particulamight be affected, and, finally, how Defensrelated research and development institutions JHU/APL could be affected. Appendix B lookat some of JHU/APL’s Infosphere activities.

This report makes no apologies for ibreadth and sweep. It is impossible to talk abothe big change the Infosphere brings to the Nawithout talking about the big change thInfosphere brings to the whole Defense worBut big change, even in military societies an

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war, is just a small part of the change ripplingthrough all society: the truly big change that theInfosphere potentially brings to our very reality.So the story of the Navy and the Infosphere ireally three interlocking stories. These storieshould be told together, beginning with thebiggest first, because the story of how societchanges has such potential impact on all aspectsof the Defense community. Only then does imake sense to tell the story of how the Defensworld might change, and then, finally, how theNavy might change.

It might seem simpler, perhaps, to jump righto the Navy story, but the Navy story makes nosense out of context; it looks like a fable or taltale, and its real significance might inadvertentlygo unnoticed. Not catching it all risks missingwhat is really important. So bear with us.

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WHAT IS THE INFOSPHERE?

The Infosphere is a shorthand for the fusionof all the world’s communications networks,databases, and sources of information into a vasintertwined, and heterogeneous tapestry ofelectronic interchange.2 The global fusion ofnetworks changes the character of eachindividual network. Networks will no longerserve simply as the medium through whichpeople in different places can communicate,enhancing their in situ activities. The globalfusion of networks creates a network ecology—literally, a place in which people can gather anddo business. People will be able to conduct theiractivities increasingly in the global networkecology3—the Infosphere.

The Infosphere is a shorthand for thefusion of all the world’s communicationsnetworks, databases, and sources ofinformation into a vast, intertwined, andheterogeneous tapestry of electronicinterchange.

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The Infosphere has the potential to gathpeople and knowledge together in one plaThis is what makes the Infosphere scompelling. The place itself is not “real,meaning that it is not part of our normal, physicworld. Operating in the Infosphere idisconcerting today, but people accept its alenvironment because it offers tremendoadvantages. It gives people the ability to meanywhere, anytime. It gives people accessinformation from everywhere, all the time. Anpeople can meet in groups, talk, trade, and dethings, just like they do in situ. The difference isthat they are not site-bound.

Business transactions and financial exchanare already migrating to the Infosphere. It poised to become the new global marketplaPeople well-equipped to enter the Infosphetoday are finding that they can do business thwhile dramatically reducing onsite overheahappily pruning business travel, anexponentially expanding customer geograpEconomic advantage is driving the evolution the Infosphere.4 Capital expansion andcompetitive awareness means that, in the nfuture, most enterprises in the developed wowill be doing business in the Infosphere. As tInfosphere becomes essential to enterprisewill become essential to most people as weBut people will not make the Infosphere a paof their lives simply because it is business.must also be ratified in the life of society.

Creating societies through busineenterprise is the decisive factor in thInfosphere’s current development. Enterprisare taking their WANs and LANs and movinthem into the ecology of the Internet. Call ththe transcendence of the network, pulling t“office” into the Infosphere. New “intranet”cultures are evolving. Compartmentalizecorporate societies are dynamically reconnectwith themselves and, in turn, with the wide worthrough the relational technology metaphoconstantly being created for the World WidWeb. This means that from coffee mess

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corporate plaza the new meeting ground of eacorporate community will migrate from officeplaces to intranet/extranet places. People wfind they do business more effectively in theintranet and that they feel closer to their firmstheir office-mates now in the ether. The first reacommunities begin here.

A replacement for the industrial-era ethowill be ratified through social relationships inInfosphere enterprise. This leading edge effein cultural adaptation is not new. It was, in factintegral to how American society adapted to thindustrial big change. What happened then, anwhat should happen now, is that microbehaviors, values, and norms established aratified in business enterprise will be melded inta template for the value system of an Infosphercentered society. Business is the conveyor, nthe creator—our core cultural values arembedded in our societies of enterprise—andis a powerfully effective conveyor of values inthe American ethos. In the American experiencthe establishment of norms by business is thpath most accepted by Americans. The way legitimacy for new social patterns in Americanlife will be found in Infosphere enterprise.5

The human migration to the Infosphererepresents an historical shift in several sensof significance. It is a true movement of humasociety to a new place, much like the colonizinof the New World, while still connected to theold. It is thus a migration from, but in additionto, the in situ and material patterns of all humanrelationships to something very different anmore complex. This means a migration fromlong familiar patterns of culture. Human culturehas always adapted to fit new environments. Thchange is often as difficult as it is exhilaratingbecause it involves discarding many cherisheand familiar ways of life. But it is also ultimatelycomforting, because the high stakes we seemaking the change work motivate us to findways to preserve what is really important to u

Peoples’ migration to an alien environmenrequires a shift in social patterns and spirit. Th

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Infosphere seems to be about technology; peoare still taught that the Infosphere is communications network. Then they discoveon entering, that it is really a place—a place fthem. Like any human place, architecture donot make a place, people do. The migrationpeople to the Infosphere depends in part people seeing it as important to their life anwork. But their willing migration also dependon people seeing it as a human place thacomfortable, familiar, and social. When peopcollectively reach this crest of recognition, themigration will quickly bring all of us to a culturawatershed. That is when the Infosphere wbecome suddenly central to the life of societ

The Infosphere changes us through a strablending of technology and culture—strange, bnot alien. We think of technology as somethinapart from us, as creating discrete artifacts twe put to use. But the Infosphere is not discreit is potentially all-encompassing. Technologynetwork ecology brings fundamental changeus. But we do the changing; we will decide whwe want to be in the Infosphere. And thInfosphere is perhaps the most plastic, the mmoldable yet of all human places. Advancesprocessing, networking, and delivering wiallow us to extend and enrich the world of thInfosphere easily, without mortar and brick anbuilding permits. And it is important to note thathe Infosphere exists today, however primitivit feels to some. It exists because the meshnetwork technologies, processing, operating, adata systems has expanded and matured topoint of beginning to create a place we can en

“Place” is essential to understanding thchange. Big changes in human life—themergence of cities and the IndustriRevolution—are expressed through a new wof social relationships and social meaning ththemselves are expressed and understood withe metaphor of a new human place. The ntools build the new place, but what realchanges is human society.6 So the hypothesis thaour new tools, information technology, ar

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building a new place—the Infosphere—isconsistent with the patterns and process periodic historical shifts in human life.

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INFOSPHERE AS BIG CHANGE

Pursuing this human migration, and ththings that make it move, inevitably brings uto thinking about earlier great migrations. Themergence of the Infosphere suggests historical shift, a fundamental change in humalife on the scale of the Industrial RevolutionThis change is so encompassing that it sweeup all subcultures in society, including militarysocieties, as well as affects how thossubcultures do business. This overwhelminprocess needs to be explicitly described, becaumilitary societies today tend to see their path the future as somewhat separate, evecompartmentalized, from changes in the largsociety and spirit of the age. The exact opposrules in times of big change. Military societiesand war itself get swept up in the totality of thbig change.

The Industrial Revolution of the 19th centuryis a good reference point for showing how bichange moves through society and, eventualmilitary society. We remember thattransformation in life as the arrival of newartifacts, what we today like to call “technology.”But these artifacts were simply a tool set thcame to us all at once. The revolution was how people put these new tools to work. Raiand steam were used to transform society. Atransformation came, not from a single-mindeplan but from the creation of a new sociaenvironment. Technology’s tools created a nehuman place, and when people migrated to thnew place, they changed not only how they livebut also how they saw themselves and how threlated to others.

The creation of a new human sociaenvironment was the essential, central featuof the Industrial Revolution. The drivingtechnology element of that transformation wa

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the railroad. The railroad was more than a simtransportation or communications system;quickly became a living network of peopleRailroads made possible a new humorganization built around industrial cities—thhubs—served and sustained by the rail netwo

One dominant social element, set first early 19th century British society, was a cultueagerness to take advantage of the econoopportunities of this network. Equally criticato the interaction of technology and society creating a new human place was the willingneof ordinary people to migrate to the neindustrial cities and endure the hardships thebecause of the expectations that it would leada better life. Technological possibility anhuman aspiration worked in concert.

The fact of big change, combined witpeople’s receptivity to it, ultimately created pattern for change in civilian society. This patteof social adaptation, which included changessociety’s major public and private institutionalso came to include two of its most celebratpublic organizations: the army and the navWhether we look at what happened in Britaor France or Germany or the U.S. or Japan, pattern is unmistakable; military relationshipand organizational patterns in the industrial ecame to mirror similar new patterns in busineand in public institutions.7

• Command structures and militarmanagement were modeled on the nbusiness corporations. The Army and Nareforms of the Progressive Era consciouborrowed from the management style abusiness practice of America’s dominaindustrial corporations.

• Military social organization quickly movedaway from its traditional, familial pattern oidentity and relationship—the way of lifeimmortalized by John Ford movies as thU.S. Cavalry post on the Western frontier—to an operational structure that more closresembled that of the modern factory.

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• The national mobilization frenzy that sweptthe European powers at the beginning of thiscentury soon entranced American militarythought.8 But this idea of mobilizing hadlittle in common with the Levee en Masseof the Napoleonic Era or the American nativetradition of the Militia as nation-in-arms.Rather, it spoke to the industrial vision ofsociety organized around massconstituencies that could be orchestrated bycommand authority from above.

Today’s big change may look very differentfrom the transformations of the industrial era,but two aspects of it may come to look veryfamiliar:

• People are migrating to new places becausof the interaction of technology and society.

• Military societies are already sharing andreflecting the ways that a larger society isadapting to the change.

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THE PATH OF EVOLUTION

The next change to consider is the actual wawe get from here to there: the path of evolutionMilitary societies should recognize that wherethey will end up will to a large extent bedetermined by where American (even world)society ends up. Part of our problem today inconfronting this path is a vision of the futureleashed to today’s agent of change. But today’change agent is merely the dominant forceduring this particular phase of a larger historicaprocess of change. The path of evolution is reallya series of steps, marked by distinct time periodswhen a characteristic change agent dominatethe scene. Today’s change agent is of course thInternet, and so we see change made by thInternet, and where the Internet is taking us, athe change itself. But it is only the change agenfor this phase of the Infosphere evolution.

Instead of the Internet as the instrument oour transformation (the counterpart of therailroad back then), the Internet, which to most

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means the World Wide Web, is only the firInfosphere iteration, an embryo. Its mahistorical role will be seen as having created network foundation for the Infosphere. This an important distinction to make because tInternet is merely an enhancement to our liva supplement. It cannot serve as the agencsocial transformation because its technolobase is too limited, but it leads the way to ttransformation.

There is a useful historical precedent thillustrates what the Internet means to big chanBefore the railroad ever appeared, Britaalready possessed a unique stagecoach/turnnetwork that tied the country together. Hundreof stagecoaches left London daily, and all paof Britain could be reached in timelines reckonin hours.9

This made late-18th century patterns of libetter—better than any other place in the wo—but did not fundamentally change thospatterns. The stages moved people and posnot big cargoes. It created a national netwobut it was limited. But it did do three things:

• It successfully tested and validated a nnetwork concept—rapid, reliable, schedulnational travel.

• Its success helped create a new marketthis network; people now wanted to trav(it had been arduous and dangerous befoand could base much of their business written correspondence.

• This desire created a real surge in demawhich, in turn, pushed technologdevelopments that make the next networkthe railroad—possible.

And the railroad then proceeded to chaneverything. The Internet today is doing the samthree things. Like the late 18th century Britishstagecoach network, the Internet started primaas a people-to-people connection. It began asingle, government-sponsored “backbone” fcommunication between the professional elitethe ARPANET. It evolved into an extended set

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of online “lifestyle communities” amongmembers who were already participatinprofessionally in the Internet.10 E-mail becamean explosive phenomenon, and billions omessages are now sent over the net.11

But also like the stagecoach net, the Internis showing the way to business—the equivaleof the “big cargoes” that the railroad net woulsoon haul as routine. An important insight shoube that the Internet will evolve into theInfosphere as it becomes a primary place business.

We are witnessing the rapid emergence serious business activity on the Internet. It is thactivity, the creation of enterprise environmentthat will drive the evolution of the Infosphereand make it the next human place.

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Stages of Infosphere Evolution.Phase 1: Business Drives Growth

Business enterprise is the force currentdriving the evolution of the Infosphere. Beforit was the Infosphere, it was the Internet, anits original driving force was military-strategicThe earliest progenitor of the Infosphere wathe ARPANET, created by the DefensDepartment’s Advanced Research ProjecAgency. The Internet quickly grew beyond itoriginal academic-military membership buremained an elitist network exclusively until thcreation of the World Wide Web. The Web phaof the Infosphere’s evolution was short budecisive. The Web itself had little quantifiableconomic value, but it was wildly addictingDemand for Web use drove Internet expansifrom single backbone to a global networecology. This laid the foundation for theInfosphere.

The Infosphere, as we are using that concebegan when a significant amount of busineenterprise began migrating there to do busineThe year was 1997. The process, gatherimomentum month by month, can be summarizwith almost elegant simplicity:

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Network → Intranet → Extranet

The process began with the development lient-server networks designed to wire

ndividual office environments, usually in situ.ver time, wider area networks emerged, b

hese were still closed networks, tying togethen enterprise in pristine isolation.

Along came the World Wide Web, whichmmediately offered a new venue for enterpriso advertise to the world. Companies rushed resent themselves on the Web, establishihousands upon thousands of corporate wites. Then they discovered that the Web wasood way to network themselves; utilizing theb allowed a distributed office environmenith unlimited interconnections within annterprise or institution. So corporate networkegan to migrate to the Internet.

Then, suddenly, people saw how companien the net could reach out and do busineutside their intranet environment, by openin

he intranet up and making it an extranet. Thevelopment of extranets means that themerging corporate “worlds” can now connecith each other and with individual clients andustomers.

This model of Infosphere evolution has threspects that make it different from the railroaduilding era. The Infosphere’s enterprise-driveevelopment means a very open, less regulatnd highly complex Infosphere mesh, whicakes it potentially more robust and sustainab

It is in essence being built from the bottomup. The Infosphere is building itself up frombusiness, from what works and is sustaineby the market.Its growth is organic. Overall developmenis unplanned and takes on a kind omicroeconomic aspect, dependent on multitude of individual decisions, eachreflecting what an enterprise can deffectively in the Infosphere. So theInfosphere’s growth will naturally tend toequal its actual business effectiveness.

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• What is forming can be seen as a networecology. As enterprises network with eachother, the demand for business-to-businesand people-to-business transaction capaciwill grow. But this is fundamentally differentfrom the earlier railroad network because thInfosphere’s architecture fostersinhabitation, where the Infosphere becomein itself a human or social ecosystem. It is athat historical moment that it ceases to bsimply a network for communication andexchange, but becomes a place of busineand human gathering in its own right.The Infosphere’s societal evolution will tend

to develop patterns of behavior that grow out obusiness relationships on the net. Business itswill begin to depart from relational frameworksoriginally established for in situ enterpriseenvironments and will reshape, perhaps everecast, social relationships on the basis obusiness conducted in a nongeographicnonphysical, and yet universally accessiblenvironment.

Business will drive the Infosphere’s sociaevolution because it is the serious engine of thnew economy being created there. The prevailinpatterns of social interaction and relationshipwill be tied to business development and use the Infosphere. This is not to say that there anot other, equally important, venues for sociaand interpersonal development of the InfospherThese include perhaps the most famous earexperiments in social exchange in cyberspace—the online community. And this is not to say thathere will not be other drivers eventually of equaor greater force.

The emergence of powerful Internetgateways, or portals, as they are known in thbusiness, suggests that the real affinity in onlincommunity may be in shopping. eBay is atantalizing example of an Internet communitybuilt around barter. The sense of belonging, omembership, flows from affinity througheconomic transaction: people are buying antrading goods from people like them. Consume

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affinity can be enhanced by entertainmeaffinity (where people have fun with people likthem) and news affinity (where people get nefrom and chat with people like them). The porcompanies right now are driving the Internetthis direction just as fast as they can, perhrightly sensing a gigantic marketplace. Hencnot so surprisingly, the heady wave in thNASDAQ.

A special piece to the social evolution of thnew marketplace is the wild popularity ogaming networks, where groups of playeexplore worlds of fantasy and fight monstersor each other!—across this widest area netwof all. The millions of young people hooked oonline gaming are building social inhabitatioin the Infosphere. They are the future inhabitaof this marketplace, and they already live there12

Betting on this future explains some of the wirocketing of Internet stocks.

It should be of supreme interest that thfrenzy of development is fueled by business, tpeoples’ sense of social affinity even seeks a business-market place. This is why businenterprise has been such a driver in the Ameriethos, because business is at the heart of and why Americans congregate, what they when they get together, and how they thinkthemselves. This truth assumes even greaimportance because the U.S., after all, is the prcreator and driver of the developing InfospheAs other cultures engage more extensively in network world of the Infosphere, other existentcultural factors, like religion, still the driver omany societies, will contend for space and right to define the new place.

American business, however, will create tsocial norms and behavioral templates for tfirst Infosphere era. This is how they might plaout:

The millions of young people hooked ononline gaming are building socialinhabitation in the Infosphere.

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• Enterprise work relationships, managemenand business effectiveness will all be closewatched as a potential foundation for hosociety as a whole might change its wayswork successfully in the Infosphere.

• New relational patterns will be vested witsociety-wide authority by their success in thworld of enterprise. This means that socinorms that work in business will tend tbecome norms widely accepted anvalidated throughout society.

• What defines success will be thinking anbehaviors that use the new, Infospheeconomy to fullest advantage to find jobfaster, to do jobs more effectively, and themove on, building the enterprise all the wa

And this means, in anthropologicalsociological terms, building a replacement fothe industrial-era ethos through the demonstraeffectiveness of social relationships in enterprisThis leading edge effect in cultural adaptatiois not new. It was, in fact, integral to howAmerican society adapted to the industrial bchange. What happened then—and what shohappen now—is that micro-behaviors, valueand norms established and ratified in busineenterprise will aggregate and become in time texplicit basis for the value system of the largsociety.

Here is a suggestion as to what three of tnew watchwords that sum up Infosphere socnorms, values, and behaviors might be:

• team—flexibility, openness, less hierarchy• task—organizational fluidity, responsiveness

cross-enterprise• trust—work relationships based on share

value code13

What sociologists would call an emerginInfosphere ethos will develop its sense of culturidentity in a new place, adding to its own senof authenticity and “specialness.” TheInfosphere’s ability to successfully foster a nebusiness culture is critically dependent on thestablishment of a sense of shared participat

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and belonging in a new setting, environment,place.

We must underscore again the intrinsicaAmerican nature of initial Infosphere culturaevolution. The Infosphere is absolutely globand, eventually, American cultural dominanmay recede. We cannot know whether U.established cultural norms will be enshrinedglobal cultural norms or simply come trepresent one of several contending Infosphideologies. This outcome, of course, suggethat the Infosphere, as a human place, briwith it all the baggage of all human placeespecially the clash of cultures—Us vs. Themthat has been at the heart of all human confthrough history.

The Infosphere’s ability to evoke a senseplace is dependent on major, net-globbandwidth expansion. But once it is establishthe Infosphere’s sense of place becomesenabler of social migration: the new environmesupports a new venue of human activity aninevitably, a new ethos.

The Infosphere’s ability to evoke a senseof place is dependent on major, net-global bandwidth expansion.

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Stages of Infosphere Evolution.Phase 2: Governance Shapes theInfosphere

New human places do not organize simpa new environment and new situational factoare mixed with governing elements carrieforward from the old place. There is no suthing as a clean sheet in human culture. As Infosphere matures and becomes more imporin our lives, it will become more and morimportant to traditional governing authoritiealso. Traditional governing institutions will seeto extend themselves into the Infosphere, annew world system, somehow, will root there. T

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wide-open and informal world of earlycyberspace will be replaced by a new web human arrangements we call civilization: thcivic structures of the new place. But in a humaecology without geography, what kind of civicand governing arrangements will we make foourselves? We describe three notional paths teffort to organize might take. They are not meato illustrate actual future histories but, rather, show possible contending dynamics in thevolution of a future world system.

First Notional Path: Internationalfragmentation and ideological divisionslow Infosphere development

This variant, which could be called a Maxed-Out World Wide Web, describes what happens tan Infosphere beset by severe, aninterconnected, problems. We identify threproblems:

• Restraint by government on free and opetransaction in the Infosphere’s generapublic space through taxation, speecrestrictions, encryption controls, andpossibly, capital flow management as wel

• Flattening public demand for Infospherservices in reaction to “below thresholdconfidence in secure transaction, insufficienprivacy safeguards, and telecommunications’enterprise and FCC mishandling obroadband expansion

• International disagreement over issues access, legal remedy, tariffs, privacysecurity, content, and technical standards fthe global Infosphere14

This emerging Infosphere raises a new worsystem but it is fragmented and divided, thInfosphere itself a set of separate placeincluding inaccessible or controlled nationaintranets. Infosphere space realigns essentiainto two camps: the smaller, led by the U.S., more open, believing in free people and fre

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trade in cyberspace; the larger, including maold allies, still believes in terrestrial regulatioof what people say and do there.

A Maxed-Out World Wide Web is instantlrecognizable from today’s vantage. But it is nthe near-term future. It describes an environmwhere many of today’s most breathtakinpossibilities have been cut off or closed down15

It attempts to show, by highlighting the majproblems that the Infosphere faces, what cohappen if all of those problems hit with full forcover the next few years.

For these problems to hit with such forcseveral things would need to happen soon:

• A major rift between the U.S. and thEuropean Union, perhaps surrounding Y2or the conversion to the Euro, or a mabreak with the U.S. over basic taxation aencryption regimes.

• An about-face by the U.S. Government taxes and regulation of the Internet. Thcould mean, for example, that FBI movescounter potential terrorism and organizcrime via the network lead to a perceptiof pervasive surveillance of Americacitizens, effectively chilling Net gatheringOr this could mean a decision to createInternet tax regime that would be equaeffective in chilling Net commerce.

• A mishandling of how bandwidth anservices are delivered to the consumer, whregulatory barriers stifle competition anprice broadband out of the reach of moAmericans.

This is the most constrained Infosphefuture that we discuss; in fact, one could argwhether it is really a global Infosphere at all. many ways, it has remained only an Internetallows people to do research, talk to each otand have fun, much like today, but the systhas stopped short of becoming a globmarketplace. Nor does it offer anything lik“universal access.”

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Second Notional Path: A highlyregulated, U.S./G-7 managed Infosphere

This variant, which we call the GlobalInformation Infrastructure (GII),16 describeswhat might be created by the very steady hanof a world consortium: an internationalorganization emerging from the GII. Thisenvironment both benefits from, and is limitedby, government regulation. The regulatoryregime itself is something of a triumph fortraditional nation states and the old, Cold Waideal of an enlightened international system. ThGII Infosphere could be described as a G-consortium. It is led by the U.S., but itsregulatory spirit is more European and JapanesIt achieves, not surprisingly, the most stable anconsistent system development. But stabilitcomes at the expense of creativity and libertInitiatives not officially approved are forbidden.The U.S. (unquestioned leader of the worlconsortium) is also the world’s unquestionedalmost Olympian policeman. And its authoritybeat—now that the global economy and itknowledge gather there— is not just cyberspacbut everywhere. But challenges to U.S. authoritand the established system come not from thmargins, but from the center, and the challengis not foreign, but domestic.

The GII is instantly recognizable to any ColdWarrior; indeed, it is the Free World alliancecatapulted into the Infosphere. But what is itstrength is also its weakness. The Free Woralliance against the Soviet Empire and its alliedrew its authority from the threat the Sovietsposed to our collective survival itself. Westernelectorates allowed their regimes heightenestate control during the time of dangerContinuing exercise of this same kind ofregulatory control would make for a smoothlycoordinated regime in the Infosphere. Howevein the absence of a legitimizing external threait could soon lack authority among its ownpeople.

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Electorates afraid of the unraveling of thwelfare state might accept controls on Infosphliberty if the comforts of the welfare state wealso protected in the Infosphere.17 In Europeespecially, but not just in Europe, state authorto regulate the Infosphere would be sustainby fearful electoral majorities.

But only majorities. Dynamic groups drivinInfosphere development are angered by the GMany who committed themselves to a new wothat would shake off the controls of industrilife begin to find themselves back in an old worthat has merely migrated to a digital landscaThese builders of the new are not afraid of tfall of the welfare state; many of them wouwelcome it. And if many of them foughearnestly in the technology trenches of the CWar, they see no reason why Cold War authoshould continue to be exercised over America

Specifically, they resist the intrusive stasurveillance that the regime believes is requirto police the net. They resist strongly what thsee as a threat to basic liberty in the restrainspeech and congregation and contract. And tare ready to rebel at the prospect of the kindlaw enforcement and punishment codified in tGII regulations. We might imagine thesInfosphere rebels to be strongest right herethe U.S., where traditions of citizeindependence, not to mention Infospheexpertise, are strongest. But such a rebellcould soon spread to Europe and Japan.

The problem with the GII is that for it towork, it must effectively assert a globaregulatory regime—what many might find a kinof digital tyranny. Hallowed law enforcementraditions tuned to a physical universe quickbreak down in a nonmaterial place where anyocan meet anyone, anytime. Patrolling cybstreets, it becomes clear, can only be effectivit is much more intrusive and if police poweare greatly expanded. But exercise of thepowers would alienate the most dynamic acreative people in the new Infosphere.

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Majority support of a regulated environmentin cyberspace is ultimately less important thanthe support of those who make it run: theInfosphere’s builders and users. To the extenthat they actively resist the GII regime, theregime begins to delegitimate itself. Creatingwhat amounts to a Singapore in cyberspaceespecially in America, might produce a politicalbacklash that could embed rebel factions withinthe group of nation states running the GII (theG-7). This possibility suggests that thisInfosphere, even though it appears orderly ansecure on the surface, would intrinsically be awar with itself. Thus, real safety and securitywould be under persistent low-level attack, withthe added irony that terrorism in this situationwould equate to political rebellion by its owncitizens.

Third Notional Path: An uncontrolled,self-organizing Infosphere ecology

This variant, which we call Byte City,18

represents a truly liberated, or at leasuncontrolled, cyberspace ecology, most likelyif enterprise and entrepreneurs continue tdominate the Infosphere as they do today. In onsense, it plays out the arguments of those whstarted it all; it is revolution through extremelibertarian altruism. All of their theories of howthis new world will leave the industrial world’sstructures of control in the dust, creating a betteplace, can be put to the test. In another sensthis variant offers a chance to explore what complex, unregulated human system mighcome to look like. So the phrase, “complexsystems” is meant here to be suggestivefollowing current schools of thought, of how aninitially chaotic human system might comeeventually to self-organize, to order itself. Butit is also assumed here that the creative force this elusive process keeps coming out of the U.SThis implies the most challenging [cyber-]terrainfor American—national, or tribal?—military

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operations. As the creator not only of thInfosphere but also of its highly open regime, tU.S. must attempt to keep its own desired, bfragile, openness workable in an environment tseems to run on its chaos and conflict.

Byte City (they would proclaim in virtuouscontrast) shows us how humanity, guided aencouraged by a truly transparent marketplacan liberate itself. The “oppressive” sociastructures of the industrial world, as th“digirati” would put it, so necessary to aeconomy of mass production, will not boverthrown; they will simply no longer beneeded. Ideas about Byte City’s social evolutiunwittingly, and metaphorically, mimic recenscientific thinking about human evolutio(especially the school called sociobiology). Thexistential assumption of the digirati is that thtransparent environment of Byte City, like somopen market of the soul, will squeeze out deceit and deception in human relations. Abto see everything, able to hide nothing, meathat people will behave truthfully andresponsibly at all times—or suffer th(completely public) consequences. So true secontrol replaces artificial control from aboveApparent chaos, real order; more civility, actudemocracy.

But this is Byte City as its loudly professe“founders” would have it. Byte City would alsorepresent the most complex human ecosystcombining as it would all human societies in retime and virtual space. If this global sociaecology evolves in the absence of traditionsocial controls, it might well resemble a complesystem whose former order has unraveled. Tidealized Byte City suggests a noble experime

Ideas about Byte City’s social evolutionunwittingly, and metaphorically, mimicrecent scientific thinking about humanevolution.

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The Byte City environment thus offers achance to explore what a complex, unregulathuman system might come to look like incyberspace. Problems in the Maxed-Out WorWide Web result from old authorities creatinobstacles in the Infosphere’s developmenProblems in the GII tend to emerge from staregimes’ attempts to regulate human activity the Infosphere. Problems in Byte City come oof its inherent character—its chaos. Just as tcontrol interventions in the GII are ultimatelyunworkable, so the chaos of Byte City iunsustainable. It is worth exploring the Byte Citvariant also for what it might tell us about howan initially chaotic human system might comeventually to self-organize and order itself.

These are not, however, like the H. G. Welnovel, intended as “The Shape of Things Come.” These three environments are not meato suggest serious or complete glimpses of ofuture. What they try to capture are dynamhuman energy surges that will inevitably vie tshape the character of an emerging Infosphe

So don’t think of these stories, global an“future” as they are, as “outcomes.” They do nrepresent sequential environments, nor do threpresent a spectrum of best, worst, and mlikely. Each “out there” does show how keyevolutionary factors can push and pull thInfosphere in very different directions. We neeto understand just how different those directioncould be.

The breathless building of the Infosphere driven now by business. This is a phase that colast a decade and more. The formalization of tInfosphere, and the creation of a governabsystem, is the work of the next phase, which predominantly civic and political in nature. Thethree alternative new world systems suggest

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here also serve the purpose of reminding us the next world system—in the Infosphere—wnot necessarily hew to traditional models or evthe cherished open paradigms of the digirevolutionaries.

We do know that a system is likely to emergand the mature Infosphere will have rules agoverning contours like our terrestrial worsystem. In other words, it will be at some levestructured and formalized environment in whiequally structured and formalized militaractivity can, and will, take place. But outhinking about future military activity remainrooted very much in what exists today, like othinking about the Internet. That is why peoptalk about “the future of the Internet” rather thathe emergence of something very different, lithe Infosphere. People like to think of what exisas growing and changing, but it is difficult timagine really new developments. So in thsense military people think about the impactthe Internet—and all networks—on war anmilitary operations in much the same way thpeople think about the impact of the Internet their way of life. Military thought now talksabout “network centric warfare,” as though this the future of war. But as we have suggeswith popular views about the Internet, it is ona step along the way.

Our assumption at root is that the impactthe Infosphere on military operations anDefense institutions is ultimately only a subsof the Infosphere’s larger impact on society. Threlationship holds true as well for almost atechnology considerations, where the dominInfosphere flow is from civilian to military.

The mature Infosphere will have rulesand governing contours like ourterrestrial world system.

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INFOSPHERE VS. NETWORK CENTRICWARFARE

The most advanced thinking in the U.SDefense world recognizes the process of netwomigration, where people come to connecprimarily in a network environment. Theybelieve, therefore, that future war and militaryoperations will be conducted in the networ“ecology.” The question is, “Is there a differencebetween these ideas, which are being discusswidely, and the ideas that we are presentinabout the Infosphere, and how are thedifferent?”

The Defense world imagines that somedait will be able to bring data and people togetheto see the entire battlefield and control aoperations from a shared network. This networis called the Grid. The Advanced BattlefieldInformation System (ABIS) represents anadvanced official view of the future DefenseGrid. Here is its definition:

• An “Information Environment,” comprisinga dynamic, adaptive set of mechanismsservices, facilities, and value-added functionthat enable information and knowledge to bdeveloped and exchanged among users asystems in support of their missions.

• Composed of federated systems anelements that can be configured anmanaged to suit the commander’s needs.

• Can be projected globally to support multipleoperational areas.19

What is needed in this definition is the coretruth itself: that the Defense Grid is itself anintranet-extranet that lives as a part of the globInternet. One of the leading thinkers in thDefense world today about these matters, VicAdmiral Arthur Cebrowski, understands this. Healso understands that corporate enterprisepioneering the use of an intranet-extraneparadigm to migrate their business to th

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Infosphere. He wants the Defense world to buiits own interlocking set of intranets to apprehenand control the world of war the way that, saWalMart controls the world of retailing orDeutsche Morgan Grenfell the world of securitietrading. He talks explicitly about how there is “shift from viewing actors as independent tviewing them as part of a continuously adaptinecosystem,”20 showing his understanding ofmigration (“shift”) and human, social place(“ecosystem”). Using his vantage, we mighamplify the ABIS definition, suitably updating it:

• An interwoven ecology of “informationenvironments” that are adaptive andsupportive enough to create a working socicontext for people operating in them so thpeople can do business in these environmemuch as they do in traditional, physicaenvironments.

• Systems and elements in this ecology cabe configured to bring together and suppoany group of people and any knowledgenterprise.

• This environmental ecology is global aninterconnected.

But something is still missing. At its bestthe Defense Grid, a network ecology of militarintranet-extranets (the extranet part to connewith allies), remains simply military. Much ofthe thinking about this in the Defense worlholds as an unexamined article of faith that it by definition aloof and pristine. It is a closedsystem, the “Intersystem,”21 created for Defenseand the conduct of military operations, and thuseparate from other networks. Only a few havbegun to appreciate the impact of the largnetwork ecology on the Defense Grid.

Therefore, for much of the thought abounetwork centric warfare, all military-operationaactivity is constrained to be contained within thGrid. However, the emerging Infosphere ifollowing a pattern of evolution that will absorbthe Defense Grid into its larger ecology. The Gr

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may still operate on its own terms, but it winot be able to operate without reference to tlarger Infosphere environment. In fact, thactual situation this future Defense Grid mainhabit (living within an encompassing globanetwork ecology) may make the Grid acurrently conceived impossible. In other wordthe path to the future described by “NetwoCentric Warfare” is absolutely correct; it simplhasn’t yet gone far enough down the road.

We must add an important codicil to the thirelement of our definition:

• This environmental ecology is global aninterconnected; no element within theInfosphere—not even military elements—can be truly separated from it.This point was made earlier about th

impossibility of isolating the DII from the NIIand GII. Here are some reasons why it hgeneral and broad applicability:

• Client-Server Networks →→→→→ Intranet →→→→→Extranet goes beyond the emerging idea the Intersystem (the military’s Infosphereand how it is used evolves with the largesociety. Business and societies’ migration the Infosphere creates a world in which thmilitary’s Infosphere is but a small piece, compartment somewhat protected from, bcompletely fused to, the larger whole.

• Civilian social changes will be mirroredacross the spectrum of military life aninstitutions and subcultures. A new busineethos means new, and broadly cast, socrelationships, a new zeitgeist that permeatesand infuses the ethos of military societies to

• Integration of a developed Defense intraneextranet (a mature “Intersystem”) into globaInfosphere society also changes the day-day military environment; people areeverywhere in the Infosphere, and militarpersonnel live among this larger throng anare intimately connected individually to thelarger place.22

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THE INFOSPHERE’S IMPACT ONMILITARY OPERATIONS?

Operating in an Open Battlespace

Remember, the Infosphere is a seemininfinite digital ecosystem full of people, and itan open system. Sure, people’s homes businesses are properly locked and the windmay have iron grills, but the streets are fullpeople. The Infosphere is like a city, not becait looks like an earthly city but because peolive and work there in the same ways they hlived and worked in all earthly cities sincJericho. And military forces are right there toNo longer are soldiers stockaded in isolaposts; no longer are sailors truly at sea. TDefense world may inhabit its own wildlcomplex web of military intranets, but they wall be tissue-stitched, inevitably, to the largdigital ecosystem.

This means there will be no one-wayextranet. What do we mean by this? Some hacalled for an “open Intersystem” while stidefining “open” narrowly. There is a tendento assume that the entire Intersystem woremain pristine, a military intranet of such siand structure that it would resemble the larInternet but at the same time be at arms’ lenfrom it.23 But the intranet → extranet evolutionis equivalent to the creation of a trumarketplace/bourse in cyberspace—an infinpublic space. If the Defense world is to reaout and seek true, global situational awarenit must establish itself in this place. As soonit does this, it loses control of the terms of interaction with people there.

And this also means there will be noassured control—as in situational awareness—no coup d’oeil. “Although we believe that ouabsolute mastery and dominance of todabattlefield will naturally evolve into comparabinformation-situation control, the Intersysteoffers tools for a coup d’oeil, the ability ofcommanders to see and grasp a complex tabof interacting forces.”24

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There are, however, three basic problemwith this expectation. First, there is too much tsee: the complexity of the information mass itsewill make it impossible to encompass the whoof the Infosphere, just as it is impossible tencompass the whole of human activity on earThe difference between activity in the Infospheand on earth is important for understandinInfosphere military operations, because earthmilitary operations are geographically boundeand limited. Military operations in theInfosphere, a place without geography, must tainto account the entire digital ecosystem.

Military operations in the Infosphere, aplace without geography, must take intoaccount the entire digital ecosystem.

Second, others will eventually reach oulevel of info-effectiveness, recreating thoffense-defense relationship that hacharacterized all human conflict environment

Finally, human presence in the Infospheris the ultimate complexity. People create aoverlay of motivations, behaviors, andknowledge that is too complex to assess.

A corollary issue to operating in an totallyopen ecosystem will be an increasing relianceon commercial systems to support U.S. militarwhich may create real vulnerabilities. More anmore software for American companies ideveloped abroad. What mischievous code coube embedded there? The consequencesbooby-trapped software to U.S. militaryoperations could be quite serious. Likewise, U.military communications services could bvulnerable to commercial preemption; that is tsay, network services owned by foreign omultinational enterprises could decide, at moment of crisis, to be unresponsive to militarneeds. Denial of military Infosphere connectivitcould be compared to denial of air space by allibut is actually far more central to the corconduct of military operations everywhere. Th

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centrality of the Infosphere to military life marequire creation of a dedicated, if highexpensive, all-military network architecture.25

The problem of the Infosphere is a doubedged sword, benefiting not simply the U.S. its adversaries as well. A mature, developInfosphere environment offers subnationentities world-class C4I.26 This singledevelopment would at one stroke change Uoperational planning and its executioSuddenly, military operations would be plannand would unfold as if in a fishbowl. All coulobserve, in real time or near-real time, elemeof military planning and, perhaps, much of execution, creating obvious opportunities political and military counterattacks to bmounted.

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Operating in an Open Human Place

The open architecture of the digitaecosystem also extends potentially to humsocial behavior there. People living and workiin an environment that prizes transparency aaccess will be everywhere in the way of militaactivity. Military operations in the infinite boursor casbah of the global cyber city will resembmilitary operations in Stalingrad in 1942, oAlgiers 1958, or Hue in 1968. People will beverywhere. We could call this the cominproblem of Infosphere operations as MOCU(Military Operations in Cyber-UrbanizeTerrain).27 This is because, in the digitaecosystem, military operations eventualinevitably, get enmeshed in attacking adefending people—what they do, where thlive, how they work—and the very structureslife itself.

And this raises another problem. Call it t“Wide-Open Town” problem. The global cybecity will bring all cultures and all governingauthorities together in the same place, justsurely as it will bring together all peopleknowledge, and business. Imagine the potenfor constant conflict, all without boundarbetween anyone’s old sense of “foreign” a

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“domestic.” American military forces will likelybe in a state of near-continuous operatiothroughout this environment, and not simply discrete, targeted, protected little “frontlineniches like Bosnia or Haiti or Somalia. The bluof war and peace now extends beyon“unconventional,” “peacekeeping,” “anti-terrorism”; it extends to a constant tempo ofongoing Infosphere operations. For analogies,think of a police department in a greametropolitan city too chaotic to control—likeRio or Cairo; think of colonial administrationin, say, the Congo Free State in 1900, withfew officers to cover a million square miles; oactive, ongoing frontier operations, well belothe threshold of war, but demanding and dead—say, the Northwest Frontier of British IndiaOr just remember the Westerns you usedwatch on TV as a kid and how so many tooplace in that “wide-open town,” not yet reallcivilized, not yet a fit place to raise a familyThat just might sum up the Infosphere in icoming, early days.

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The Symbiosis of Physical and CyberOperations

So far, it might make sense. But perhaps thardest leap of faith required for thinking aboumilitary operations in an Infosphere-centereworld is this: fighting simultaneously in bothdigital and material worlds. In fact, it is hardeeven than that: human activity in the digitaecosystem will be symbiotically intertwinedwith physical activity on earth. There are n“flash of recognition” analogies to help us thinthrough how this digital-physical weave wilactually work; it goes way beyond the telephonor E-mail, way beyond sharing data acrossWAN or LAN. The overriding truth of thesymbiosis means that breaking it becomperhaps one of future war’s most cherishegoals. And the mesh of digital and physical alsmeans that war, and the intense tempo operations that we associate with 20th centucombat, migrates along with us to the Infosphe

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• Evolution of a doctrine of “an initial periodof Infosphere operations.” War becomes ahigh-stakes’ gambit for Infosphere controwith high-intensity Infosphere operations aa concept that might achieve the initial goa

• Development of an “Infosphere defensesuppression campaign.” The strategicproblem of an initial period of Infosphereoperations has its tactical corollary: How tdisable enemy defenses? Defensuppression in the Infosphere is nostraightforward; it is not as smooth as a bofrom Olympus, or from today’s info-warriors—stunning and singeing all beforit in a world where the U.S. rules cyberspac

• An evolving target-set. First stage, today,we think of the Infosphere as advancing oability to hit physical targets; second stagthe physical nodes of the Infosphere; thistage, C4ISR of others in the Infospherfourth stage, the softer elements that suppC4ISR, the civilian information network;fifth stage, the public square that is thInfosphere itself.

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Military Societies Transformed

Does the evolution of a new business etin the context of a new economy or, in shorthaa team-task-trust business paradigm, chanmilitary organization? Without trying to detaoutcomes, some obvious changes mightsuggested, such as a general levelingauthority and a necessary streamliningcommand hierarchies. It will simply not bpossible to maintain multiple layers management and organization when they absolutely unnecessary and, in fact, desbattle efficiency. The Infosphere thus becoma destroyer of intermediate levels of commaFamiliar, even comfortable, commanhierarchies will be brought down, for not onwill they no longer be needed, they will actuaand materially impede the conduct of operatioCommand to front line will be direcinstantaneous, and secure: no intermedia

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required. The challenge then will be: What todo with all those mid-level jobs?

If the Infosphere encourages a new militarenvironment in which war-peace operations arblurred even more than they are today and which MOCUT operations are an inherent parof the total operations’ environment, then severconsequences for personnel can be suggestoo, such as

• Different recruitment sources• Different military-professional profile• Different military lifestyle and social

organization

These could lead to a conundrum thamilitary societies, and the entire Defense worldmust eventually face:

• If the military tries to stay big, then it willbecome increasingly vulnerable to the verworld it must operate within.

• Does a military becoming small need tocreate an ethos separate from the rest society if it is to keep military effectiveness?

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AND THE IMPACT ON THE NAVY?

There is no doubt that moving toward theInfosphere will mean great leaps forward for thNavy. Vice Admiral Cebrowski’s idea of networkcentric warfare shows persuasively how navacapabilities will benefit. But beyond benefit,pure and simple, are other potential impacts othe Navy, and these need to be looked at.

Relating to the Navy’s Unique Identity

Navy identity was existentially shaped byan independence of naval units from shorcontrol. This enforced autonomy defined a navaservice that was distinct not only from the bodof a military organization ashore but also fromthe entire social-administrative structure onational command.28 The telegraph began a longerosion of this tradition. By the end of the 20thcentury, navies seem no different from any othemilitary units in the field. They are naval now

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only in the sense that they operate ships at As the conduct of all military operationmigrates to the Infosphere, some may say ships themselves have become even msubsidiary to central military action. They wiadmit that ships remain essential as mobweapons’ platforms, but a new Defense wodominated by Infosphere operators may thof these platforms as shooters only, a la the larsenal ship. And it will be hard to argue withe new “info-warrior” class, for the Infosphewill have an ever-increasing capacity to achiea local battle picture without relying primarilupon a ship’s onboard sensors and to mtactical decisions without depending primarupon a ship’s own input. Call this the flip sidto the bonus network centric warfare brings tNavy, but it must also be confronted.

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Relating to the Viability of the Ship Itself

The Navy will undoubtedly come undepolitical attack because navies and their shalways seem to come under political attacktimes of great technological change. But thtime, unlike earlier anti-Navy campaigns thfocused on the “obsolescence” or “vulnerabilitof the Capital Ship, this political fusillade witake aim at the ship itself. This in turn may fosa broader, if softer, perception that the ship (athus the Navy!) is a less valued element in national arsenal.

This will be a perception that must bstrongly countered because it will seem on surface to make sense; because, in fact, the wof the Infosphere will be a world exposed. Sennets will proliferate: almost all physical terra(as well as cyber-terrain) will be visible and abto be tracked down, by almost anyone. What regard as “world-class C4ISR” today will baccessible by individuals, not just states, acertainly, not just great powers.

Today’s classic combatants, tracing thlineage back to the beginning of this centumay have to change dramatically to stay via

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in a physical world dominated by a cyber-worldCertainly they will need the most robusdefenses. And they must be convincingly robusnot just to adversaries but to naysayers in tDefense world, the media, and Congress (bumust be remembered that this is not a new especially insurmountable problem; navies habeen dealing with it since the advent of iron ansteam).29 The ships, or at least some of themmay also have to become smaller, stealthier,more deceitful: able to disguise themselves supertankers or commercial carriers.

What we regard as “world-class C4ISR”today will be accessible by individuals,not just states, and certainly, not justgreat powers.

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Relating to the Navy’s Own Emphasison Strike Warfare

By stressing strike warfare and operatioin littoral areas, the Navy may be adding fuel arguments that the Infosphere will diminish thNavy identity. Strike warfare and littoraoperations seemed a perfect way to enhanNavy centrality in a post–Cold War world oMajor Theater Wars (MTWs). However, sincDesert Storm, the compelling possibility oanother imminent MTW has declined. Strikwarfare becomes limited strike operations, alittoral warfare becomes peacekeepinoperations. The Infosphere’s rise lends historicforce to a canonical shift in the business of futuwar, as the Infosphere intrudes itself more amore into human conflict and as the activity ohuman conflict itself migrates to the Infospher

Look just at one dimension of the shifttargets. The “target” came to define industriwar, but look now at how target “sets” changInfosphere targets may become the highest vatargets in a world of highly select target seNaval delivery of ordnance on these targets mstill, in this context, be the preferred deliver

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but how does the Navy begin to redefine itsethe best delivery platform, especially if thaplatform differs fundamentally from traditionaNavy strike platforms?

What the Infosphere’s emerging proponenmay argue is the metamorphosis of a navy independently capable ships to a navy of highcapable, but essentially weapons, platforms. Wsaid earlier that the Navy has been existentiadefined by the ship. If the Navy is to survivbeing “defined down”30 by the Infosphere, itmust adapt to the Infosphere in an existentway. This means that for the Navy to effectiverespond to the Infosphere, it must do more thsimply add on, plug in, or upgrade Infosphefeatures. Much more. The question of the Naand the Infosphere is an existential questionrenewing the society of the ship, and of a sservice. And although this may be a profounquestion, it is not necessarily an unbearabdifficult question.

The answer lies in (1) demonstrating whlocal, on-scene integration of “battlespacawareness” remains important, and (2) showihow distributing Infosphere battle asset(through “Infosphere combatants”!) enhanceoverall strategic robustness.

The question of the Navy and theInfosphere is an existential question ofrenewing the society of the ship, and ofa sea service.

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Integrated Battlespace Awareness

We can imagine an Infosphere-driven worwhere there will be sensors everywhere, awhere galaxies of tiny sensor nets can be cover any theater.31 Tomorrow’s info-warriors willcertainly go even further than this, insisting ththe Infosphere can integrate all local sensors effectively feed their data to local weaponsystems. However, bringing sensors to tenvironment, and connecting sensors surely

18

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the shooter, will always be a special problemespecially when the shooting starts. A warshhas no problem bringing sensors to thbattlespace, nor has it a problem connectisensor to shooter. Warships are packages. Bthere’s more than that involved. The Infospherdriven world will bring new challenges tosituation awareness. Will we always be able determine when information operations arbeing conducted against us? New tools to assthe information environment will be needed, awill new ways of conveying situation awarenesto commanders.

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Strategic Robustness

Talking about ship vulnerability is easy andfamiliar; we have been doing it for centuriesBut talking about Infosphere vulnerabilities willbe very hard, at least until the first bigInfosphere-centric war sorts things out. Ouconfidence in the robustness of U.S. militarassets in the Infosphere will be wholly untestedYes, the Infosphere will be an intensely densand redundant network ecology, but the DefenInfosphere’s ability to sustain a real-timebattlespace picture and necessary target dafeeds will be unknown. We should not forgethat critical Infosphere assets may reside in fixeground-based sites, at half a world’s removfrom American “shooters.” The ship, in contrastremains a mobile sensor-shooter package, abto defend itself and synthesize its own battlpicture on scene. The ship retains the necesson-board skills to both back up and validatlocally the encompassing mosaic picture offereby the Infosphere and its global galaxy of offboard sensors. This will remain importanbecause the larger Infosphere fire controenvironment may be vulnerable, both to sensand network degradation, and to sensor annetwork deception.

But the ship offers more than tomorrow’sbattle backup. The ship, like warfare clay at itmost plastic, can be molded anyway we wan

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not just in terms of HM&E, of course, but incombat system terms as well. The Navy can,it wishes, mold tomorrow’s Infospherecombatant: a warship that exists authoritativein both terrestrial and cyber-battlespace. If thInfosphere environment is without geographthen anyone, anywhere can enter the Infosphwithout regard to geography. This may suggethat military operations can conveniently bcentralized, or it may suggest just the opposiWhy must operations be orchestrated, ancommand exercised, from top-heavy shoestablishments? Why not now do these thinfrom a node as efficient as a ship? The ship is,always, the vessel of a Navy society reinventinitself, adapting as it has time and time again change on land, so it can still stay at sea.

If the Infosphere environment is withoutgeography, then anyone, anywhere canenter the Infosphere without regard togeography.

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AND ON PROFESSIONALINSTITUTIONS?

Research and development institutions in national security arena, such as JHU/APL, wplay a key role in assisting military societiemigration to the Infosphere. But the roles thplay in encouraging Defense adaptation to a nworld will be shaped first by the larger, anfundamental, shifts that the Infosphere will brito military operations and Defense conceptstheir broadest sense.

We have suggested that the maturiInfosphere could change our traditional notioof military operations and national Defenconcepts dramatically. Specifically, thecanonical changes might include:

• The end of a pristine military-informatioenvironment. American Defense informatio“warriors” live today in a mental universof total, assured control. System threats

19

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at once marginal, like the hacker threat, aexist only at our sufferance. If we choose pay attention, and “throw some resourcesthe problem,” it will go away. What we aresaying is that, in the world of the Infospherit will not go away.

• The end of assured U.S. battlespace contIf anything, the sense of absolute control even great among strategic operators, wcannot even begin to imagine that our futuinformation grids might be limited,damaged, or even brought down by enemaction. But that is exactly the historicaprospect that the mature Infosphere holds oto us, and a long-term strategic challenge ththe U.S. must face. That is exactly wh“dumb ships” (platforms than function onlyin traditional “weapon space”) are dangeroand why integrated and distributeInfosphere-sensors-weapons platformsreal warships, to us—will be needed in competitive Infosphere future.

• Military operations in the Infosphere will beshaped by, and unfold within, the global cit(MOCUT). Not only will U.S. militaryoperations be challenged in the Infosphethey will take place in a jostling, crowdednoisy, and compromised social environmethat may be surprising, and even dismayinin its intimacy. U.S. forces will operate anfight cheek-to-jowl with the world, not theCNN broadcast world of Gulf War cliche bua far more intrusive audience of millionsMuch military effort will go to masking themovement of U.S. forces, safeguarding thedeliberations and throwing the scent off theultimate intent.

This is what we mean by fundamentachanges, the kind of changes that force militasocieties to adapt existentially, because the vreality they exist in has changed and becausebe effective in this new human reality, the basof military identity must change too. Existentiaadaptation means that military societies muthink of themselves first and foremost a

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societies and not simply as organizationentities:

• They should see the interplay of technoloand society as the larger process of cultuchange.

• They should see social migration anreconfiguration, also, as a larger, adaptcultural process. They, too, will need adapt, potentially changing basic buildinblocks within their societies, fromorganization, to people’s roles anrelationships, to management.

• They should see that basic changes possible in intra- and internationarelationships, including fundamentachanges in both the American and worsystems.

The technology potential and challengesthe Infosphere in no way obscures the issuethe fundamental change it brings to institutionand how our own organizations, as littsocieties, will eventually deal with the bichange that is sweeping over all society. In Defense world (itself only a subset of our largworld), core change in military societiebecomes a cultural cascade, spilling downaffect the life and roles of technical organizatiowith equal power, showing how the Infosphebrings corollary changes to technical societi

Enterprises are already using the Internespeed products to market by exploiting time zodifferences that allow virtual round-the-clocdevelopment. For example, one company software written in India, which can be reviewin the U.S. while the Indian developers asleeping at home. Work days can be stretcwithout resort to multiple shifts, still speedinproduct development. Other companies are uscollaborative design and engineering on the Nto improve product quality, putting their bepeople on a project, and it doesn’t matter whin the world they live.

This kind of big change in the commerciworld means change in other worlds too. So

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Infosphere will transform people’s roles anrelationships in Defense organizations. We hatreated some of these changes and would likesuggest one additional issue here: the potenimpact of the Infosphere on collaborativeanalysis, design, development, assessment, operational support. Capabilities of thInfosphere will free teams from physical anorganizational “place,” allowing teams to worktogether free from these heretofore immutablimitations. While this allows the activeinvolvement of world-class expertise in pursuintasks, use of the best available tools (such computer simulations), and access to the mocomplete and up-to-date data (regardless where these resources may reside), it also creaentirely new social and management issueAddressing them will be essential not just teffectiveness and efficiency but also to survivin the new world of the Infosphere. But givethe staid character of many in the GovernmeR&D community, and the inertia they can musteto fight change, many may find this transitiodifficult.

Capabilities of the Infosphere will freeteams from physical and organizational“place.”

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CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The Infosphere promises to transform wanot by replacing battle as we know it but bfolding military operations into a new conditionWe use the word, “condition,” because the yunveiled new war is more than a newenvironment; it is a new experience, demandintotally new mindsets and behaviors. That thcondition is not visible makes responding to ipossibility difficult. That this condition willemerge from the larger society and its cultuonly adds to the difficulty. We face a revolutionin war that may equal or surpass the big chanin war brought by the Industrial Revolution, bu

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everything about this change makes it hard military societies to respond.

We can also say that when such a chancomes, decisive response to it is essentAdaptation is survival. So the big question ftoday’s Defense world should be: How do wprepare ourselves for the change? How do learn to adapt, so that when the change comwe can change too?

Fortunately, the big change hasn’t happenquite yet, so there is still time, though perhanot a lot of time, to get ready. And fundamentaladaptation is all about mental attitude. So in time remaining before the transformatiomilitary societies should concentrate thechange efforts on changing their own attitudabout change, rather than trying to machanges. Thinking, not action, is what is neednow.

Why just thinking? Because open thinkinis probably the hardest thing for the Defenworld to do right now, before the changbecause open thinking means being open toconsequences. Everyone knows big chandoesn’t simply end the status quo; it can ewhole rice bowls, whole programs, whoagencies, whole military services. Remembhorse cavalry?

So how do we tackle thinking itself? Wsuggest a mental exercise. Thinking about composition of our military forces is somethinwe all do. Perhaps we can approach timplications of big change by contrastinpossible future military forces. For example,big change was distant, a remote possibilitytime of social and technology stagnation, howould we approach building our forces for thfuture? This is the easy part: threat analysexternal environment assessment, all reasona

We face a revolution in war that mayequal or surpass the big change in warbrought by the Industrial Revolution.

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What kinds of forces and capabilitiesmight the U.S., or the whole U.S.-centricworld, for that matter, need in a worldthat does its business primarily in thedigital ecosystem?

straightline-able, thanks to a stable technolocontext.

Now think about a future military force foan entirely different world. Take our wholbundle of hypotheses and wrap them up in Infosphere. What kinds of forces and capabilitimight the U.S., or the whole U.S.-centric worlfor that matter, need in a world that does business primarily in the digital ecosystem? Tstraightline will not take you there, thank youto the contrary, you must break the line entireand start somewhere else on the chart. Or bestill, make a new kind of chart.

Finally, the future military force path helpus think. We know we face big change, so wcan’t straightline. We don’t know where thchange will take us, or when, or how, so we caactually plan an “Infosphere military force.” Buwe can describe a third path: that of a militaforce for the time right before the change, t“cusp military force,” if you will. It is here thatcrucial thinking must happen, because shapa military force for the time right before a bichange means building in adaptability. Thinkinthrough actual force planning in a time oextreme change is, ultimately, not just aexercise in thinking about how to adapt.

It is adaptation. It is the first step along thpath to change. It is not necessarily the chanwe would like, but it is the necessary change thlets the Navy continue. And by “continue” wmean this: that the Navy gets to keep whatvalues most—its identity, its very self—even aall the physical things around it swirl out orecognition. But the Navy ensures its future onif it confronts the Infosphere now. Because tcrisis of the Infosphere is but a few short yeaaway.32

1

Appendix AInfosphere Aspects — How and When?

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Our discussion of the Infosphere and militoperations needs a suggestion of how and wthe Infosphere might actually emerge. Wfollows is our best sense of the next 10 yewatching the Infosphere evolve, tracking development by using the six relevabenchmarks shown below, the thresholds must be crossed for the Infosphere to rearrive. For each, we speculate on when (starfrom mid-1999), the factors involved, thoutcome of crossing the threshold, and military Impacts.

1. Economic barriers to Infosphere entry2. Majority participation in the Infosphere3. Bandwidth watersheds4. Processing watersheds5. Business application watersheds6. Dominant social acceptance/use thresh

1. Economic barriers to Infosphereentry

When: 2 years; based on industry ramp-upcompetition

Factors: An awaited period begins in which tcomputer and telecommunication industriesfused and recast. This distinct historical prockick-starts a multi-dimensional, passionatcompetitive information market—blurrechaotic, and with impacts much bigger than possible in former markets. This is a higintensity period of industry restructurincharacterized by massive investments and mmergers.

Outcome: All this activity and investment meaequally high levels of bandwidth expansion. L19th century railroad boom periods, frenecompetition means very rapid growth of tnetwork. The peak energy period may

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historically brief, but can result in high growtmultiples in network and in throughput.

Military Impacts: Government spectrum offerthe potential for an enormous expansion military bandwidth. One path to expansion through arrangements that piggyback off civilian investment, trading and swapping fopieces of the new architecture. Also, fearinbeing left behind, explosive growth in civilianinvestment could spur competing Governmeinvestment.

2. Majority participation in theInfosphere

When: 3 years

Factors: (1) Personal computer penetration consumer market: low-end PCs (200+ MHPentium) now crashed the $1000 consum“sweet spot” over 6 months ago, and PCs in sub-$600 and sub-$300 categories are drivpenetration now. This period may be even briethan suggested here. PC penetration into home was forecast in 1998 as 53% by 2000; tlevel was reached in January 1999. The threshfor creating Infosphere connection as a socnorm ideally is about 70%, a market levpossible a year or so thereafter.33 (2) ISPconnection/fast modem costs should be rougequal to cable TV and TV purchase, i.e., ~$3month and $300–$500. In January 1999, AOannounced a planned DSL service for $3month. Entering the Infosphere should be aboas demanding and stressful socially as, say, usa VCR was in the mid-1980s. Then, peopjoked, but people used.

Outcome: Hitting these thresholds creates, effect, a social realignment in society wheInternet use is no longer for college kids a

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elite parents but something everyone does anormal part of everyday life. The ~30% of thonot using will have made the decision to stbehind or will be buying and using very sooInfosphere use as a norm means that it translinto a social pressure that only adds to momentum.

Military Impacts: Once the public passes thsocial threshold of majority use, the military waccelerate toward more emphasis on the larpublic network. This will be because (1) this wbe where the information is, and the high-valeconomic activity, and the “bad guys,” and (this will be where most service personnel ahanging out, both in their job and off duty.

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3. Bandwidth watersheds

When: 3–5 years

Factors: An aggressively competing mix oxDSL (@~1.5 mbps), cable modems (@3–mbps), and wireless (@~1.0 mbps). The era56K and ISDN will be essentially gone.34

Network access will be closing in on universaa faster ramp-up—because of competition—thintroduction of cable TV.35 Forecasts peg xDSLsubscribers at just under 3 million by 2003, w6.2 million cable modem households. Temillion subscribers would be only a fraction oonline households, the narrowness of the sbeing driven in large part by people’s currenexpressed aversion to pay more for broadbaCurrent data show that only 10% of todayonline households would be “very likely” to pa$40/month for high-speed access, while 25% they would be “somewhat likely.” That 10% tiein nicely with current projections on broadbanmarket penetration. It must be stressed, howethat AOL’s announced lowering of the bar ($30/month), and historically decreasinbandwidth costs, could change the collectmind very quickly. Add to this the potentiaappeal of a high-speed connection once sopeople in every neighborhood have it. And

23

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must be said, finally, that for digital subscribelines, the old telecommunications giants habeen very less than agile.36

Outcome: Supports full-motion, high-qualityvideo (30 frames/second); permits smoodelivery and seamless integration of real-timvirtual environment update packets to the use

Military Impacts: Civilian expansionpiggybacking plus USG backbone investmencould mean mega-mip bandwidth for all militaractivities—a capacity that in itself will encouragevolution of the Grid into military Infosphere turf

4. Processing watersheds

When: 5 years

Factors: (1) Multi-processing/1000 MHz as theCPU low end (based on long-established trelines, now apparently continuing, unabated, wicopper in the chip). (2) Modern, stable, multthreaded, multi-tasking operating systemLinux, OSX, NT 5 replace OS crop with rootin the computing world of the late-1970s.37

Then, a second iteration of these will be needethis time emphasizing ubiquity ofcommunication and interoperability in theInfosphere: everything talks to everything! (3Desktop metaphor goes away, with its keyboarcentric, office origins; replaced by metaphor oplace, through which user moves as walkinor in flight. (4) This transition activelyencouraged by appearance of mature, ubiquito3D visualization tools, integrated within the Oand its application suites. The Internet becoma place, with the PC box or HDTV as itgateway; the Internet thus shape shifts into Infosphere, where the PC-space definespersonal reception area, ante-chamber, or lobfor the user, connecting the user’s private spa(office, lounge, etc.) with the outside(Infosphere) world. (5) Software engines threpresent users as virtual humans, rather thcrude avatars, will be widely available. Fullframe, streaming video will be the standard.

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Outcome: People will be able to enter and moeasily within the newly created place. Users walso be able to meet others easily in Infosphere or receive them in their persospaces. The use of virtual human representaalthough available, may not gain immediapopularity. It will be far easier for people accept the Infosphere as a place than it willfor them to accept digital emissaries, avatars,as socially adequate substitutes for their masreal people. It is more likely that high-qualitybig-window video will remain the norm foseveral years.

Military Impacts: The “placeness” of theInfosphere will affect military society in severways. (1) The Infosphere will cease to bemedium for select and specialized “infwarriors”; everyone can go there. (2) The wais used by military groups, and the scopeoperations conducted there, will grow as mand more of the public world’s activities migrathere. (3) Because the network is availableall, it is possible to offer equivalent informatiosets at all command levels. Traditionhierarchies and ways of doing business wencourage leadership to control information aaccess, but, in fact, the opposite will occOperational effectiveness will require hierarcdownsizing, especially in military middlmanagement. It will also require more infsharing across command levels.

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5. Business application watersheds

When: 7 years

Factors: Infosphere growth is being driven bbusiness utility. The rapid growth of enterpriintranets is a result of the immediate productivgains they offer. But as high bandwidth becomthe norm in business, before it is availablethe consumer, its ability to achieve instant, londistance, distributed social connection wencourage enterprises to do more and mortheir internal business in the intranet Infosphe

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The corporate intranet is also rapidly becomia productive avenue for connecting tcustomers—through enterprise extranets. Theyear benchmark is based on 70% of corporbusiness occurring on the intranet and 50%external business on corporate extranets.38

Outcome: (1) Business use established thInternet-Infosphere as a compelling anattractive place. It also creates certain marmomentum, as millions who work daily in highbandwidth offices begin to want the same whthey get home. (2) Business use of the Infosphalso creates a compelling model for non-businapplications and legitimates an aggressimigration to Infosphere by groups aninstitutions that otherwise might have been vereluctant emigres. (3) Business use is also souse. Business exchange and interactionintranet and extranet is creating the parametfor productive social connection there.

Military Impacts: Civilian models forproductive social exchange and interaction in tInfosphere will be adopted by military societMilitary education will model itself on civilianuniversity patterns in the Infosphere; researmethods will follow those pioneered for generuse in the Infosphere; military work patterns wtend to follow the most successful models civilian enterprise. All of these changes aggregate will mean potentially fundamentchanges in military society itself.

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6. Dominant social acceptance/usethreshold

When: 10 years

Factors: When primary/secondary educatiobecomes routine in the Infosphere (following idevelopment in the university); when the typicoffice environment is now defined as aInfosphere office (local physical offices wilincreasingly occupy a declining social statualmost as part of a bygone era); when mocommerce and shopping occur in the Infosph

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(including groceries and other rapid-deliverlow item value consumer markets); when aresearch-oriented communication and dainquiry happens in the Infosphere.

Outcome: The social-cultural flow can belikened to a great, historical migrationTraditional places do not go away but, rathare integrated into a new environmental tapesin which the Infosphere represents the premplace, the place of high value and high statu

Military Impacts: (1) Military society migratesalso to the Infosphere, where most commamanagement, military education, and militaintelligence now take place. Concentratemilitary office complexes are no longer needeand personnel and logistics management

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altered radically. Fewer physical bases arneeded. (2) “Bad guys,” along with everyoneelse, now can aspire to potentially world-clasC4ISR, as it was understood in the late-1990U.S. C4ISR must now recreate itself at a muchigher level of security. Security becomes thmain effort. Active military operations to ensureeffective and secure U.S. C4ISR will be ongoingat potentially demanding levels. (3) U.S. militarypersonnel are, like the rest of American societintegrated personally and professionally into thglobal Infosphere. They are now at risk of casuaand directed attack, wherever they are, all thtime. Defensive and offensive operations indefense of our military people will absorb anincreasing share of investment and energy.

5

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Leaders at The Johns Hopkins UniversityApplied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) beganto wrestle with Infosphere implications in early1997. They could see first-hand how CooperativeEngagement Capability (CEC), which JHU/APLhelped pioneer, is changing naval operations.39

Some from JHU/APL had also taken part in theAdvanced Battlefield Information Systems(ABIS) Task Force,40 which raised proto-Infosphere questions. Their growing awarenessled them to support an Infosphere SeminarProject early in 1997 to think most broadly aboutwhat the future might bring. This project’s verydesign was to expand on issues alreadyaddressed by network centric warfare analysesand publications to bring out the full range ofpossible Infosphere implications for the Defenseworld.

The Infosphere Seminar Project began witha seminar for JHU/APL leadership in April 1997that had three objectives: (1) identification ofInfosphere technology implications; (2)identification of Infosphere technologyopportunities; and (3) implications of InfosphereOperations and Infosphere Warfare. Two generalscenarios offered an operational context fordiscussion: (1) a precision strike mission in apeace-keeping mission, and (2) power projectionoperations in a major regional conflict. ThreeInfosphere variants were considered. These weredesignated as (1) Maxed-out World Wide Web(WWW+), (2) Global Information Infrastructure(GII), and (3) Byte City. They defined a rangeof possibilities in which the impact on military

operations and organizational structures could beexplored. The April seminar was followed by aseminar for JHU/APL cyber-specialists in May.

These seminars developed many insights,both about military operations and about JHU/APL’s own functioning. They underscoredthe importance of working in an Infosphereenvironment. An Infosphere-engaged workforce,and deft leadership, will increasingly determineJHU/APL’s value to the Defense community. Anyeffective research and development organizationwill have to have Infosphere compatibility in itspolicies, organizational and environment.

JHU/APL has shared its insights from theInfosphere Seminar Project seminars with othersin the Defense world, beginning with Infospheresessions at the Naval War College (November1997) and at the Joint National Test Facility(December 1997), and carrying on with thisreport. JHU/APL continued its exploration ofInfosphere implications by the Cyber TechSeminars that started in the spring of 1998. Inthese seminars, leaders from various informationenterprises shared their visions of the future inpublic forums and discussed their implicationsin seminars with their peers. Materials generatedby the sessions can be accessed via theCyber Tech Seminar button at the bottom of theJHU/APL external home page (URL: http://www.jhuapl.edu/) or accessed directly at theCyber Tech Seminar Web site (URL: http://www.jhuapl.edu/cybertech/). The topics andspeakers of the first series of Cyber TechSeminars are shown below.

Appendix BJHU/APL and the Infosphere — Selected Items

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CT-1 (April 8, 1998) Cyber Threats andInformation System Security Semina r

Special Agent James V. Christy, IV (IPTF/AFOSI), Howto Protect Your Infrastructure from InformationAttacks

Mr. Keith Rhodes (GAO), Computer Security Issues &Year 2000 Issues

CT-2 (June 30, 1998) Building the CyberPlace: Internet Bandwidth & ArchitectureIssues

Dr. Stephen Wolff (Cisco Systems), Taking a Guess atTomorrow’s Internet

Mr. Tim Regan (Corning, Inc.), Fiber OpticsMr. Greg Gum (U S WEST, MegaBIT Services), The

Future of Broadband Technologies: An xDSLPerspective

Mr. Douglas Dillon (Hughes Network Services), TheFuture of Satellite Communications in the DigitalWorld

Mr. John Montjoy (GTE Internetworking), SummaryComments

CT-3 (August 6, 1998) A New Window on theWorld

Dr. James Gosling (VP/Fellow, Sun Microsystems ChiefScientist, Java Software), JAVA, Building a ConnectedWorld

Dr. James Waldo (Jini Architect, Sun Microsystems),Decentralized Control in a Federated Network

Mr. Alex Cone (President, Director of Sales, CodeFab),CodeFab

Mr. George A. Spix (Chief Architect, Consumer PlatformsDivision, Microsoft Corp), Concluding Remarks

CT-4 (September 25, 1998) Connecting theWorld

Mr. Mark Kusiak (Technical Director, AdvancedPrograms, Lucent Technologies), Perspectives onNetworking Bandwidth

Mr. John Bowles (President & CEO, ADVOCAST) & Mr.Eric Keith (Vice President, Sales, ADVOCAST),ADVOCAST, The Advocacy Network

Mr. Carl M. Ellison (Senior Security Architect, IntelCorporation), Raising the Security Bar

Mr. Charlie Robertello (Vice President, Mid-AtlanticRegion, SecureIT, Inc. [VeriSign Inc.]), NetworkSecurity Solutions

CT-5 (November 13, 1998) The New CyberLandscape

Dr. David S. Ebert (Professor, Computer Science &Electrical Engineering Department, University ofMaryland, Baltimore County), PerceptuallyMotivated Information Visualization

Mr. Sherman Woo (Director, U S WEST’s Global VillageMedia Center), Imagineering Cyberspace

Dr. Andrew Hunt (Staff Engineer, Speech ApplicationsGroup, Sun Microsystems Laboratories), JAVASpeech API

Dr. W. Bruce Croft (Professor, Department of ComputerScience, University of Massachusetts, Amherst),Information Retrieval in the 21st Century

Dr. Stephen G. Eick (CTO, Visual Insights, LucentTechnologies), Information Visualization

CT-6 (February 9, 1999) Making It Happen:High Performance Computing

Dr. Thomas Sterling (Senior Scientist, NASA JetPropulsion Laboratory), From Toys to Teraflops: TheEmergence of Commodity Supercomputing

Dr. George Paul, Jr. (IBM Thomas J. Watson ResearchCenter), Deep Blue: Chess Rematch

Dr. Jayadev Misra (Professor, Dept. of Computer Sciences,University of Texas at Austin), Computing on theInternet: Concurrency, Distributed Objects and SafetyGuarantees

Dr. John D. McCalpin (Principal Scientist, SystemArchitecture Group Silicon Graphics Inc.).

Dr. Paul Messina (Senior Advisor, Department of EnergyAccelerated Strategic Computing Initiative [ASCI]),Ushering in the Era of Terascale ScientificSimulations

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NOTES1 In a prepared statement before the Senate Governmental

Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1998,Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. Minihan, Director of the NationalSecurity Agency (NSA), emphasized that the U.S. mustregard the threat of cyber attack with the same degreeof intensity as it viewed the potential nuclear threatduring the Cold War <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/di98/di1343.html>. A similar perspective isreflected in the phrase, “Weapons of mass disruptionwill rival weapons of mass destruction”—a sort ofhortatory banner at the Information OperationsTechnology Center (IOTC), an organization sponsoredby both the Defense Department and the IntelligenceCommunity. This phrase might be likened to an earlybattle cry of the digital warrior. Similar sentiments arereflected in the May 1998 Presidential DecisionDirective (PDD) 63 on protection of the nation’s criticalinfrastructure.

2 Throughout this report we use “network” as a shorthandfor the entire spectrum of advances in informationtechnology (computer hardware, software, and all kindsof associated devices, e.g., displays, cameras, speakers)as well as advances in communications, switches, andnetwork architecture that could make the capabilitiessketched here, reality.

3 Thinking of a human network, integrating people andtheir activities, as an ecosystem, is a metaphor firstbequeathed to capitalism by Michael Rothschild inBionomics, New York, Henry Holt, 1990. Theecosystem metaphor has been picked up by leadingmilitary thinkers in this domain. See Vice AdmiralArthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “NetworkCentric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Naval InstituteProceedings, pp. 28–35, January 1998. This modernvariation on the classical comparison with Nature canbe appealingly pasted onto the Infosphere, like anAmazon in the ether—a complete world, from siliconfiber substrate to digital canopy.

4 Military societies are beginning to take this view also.See Rear Admiral Robert M. Nutwell, “IT-21 IntranetProvides Big ‘Reachbacks,’” Naval InstituteProceedings, pp. 36–38, January 1998. However,economic advantage has not always driven the evolvingInfosphere. Initially technology drove its roots for acouple of decades after initiation of the ARPANET,and it is unclear what may drive a more fully developedInfosphere, as we show later.

5 The underpinnings of American ethos are treatedauthoritatively in Rodney Stark, Sociology, 6th Edition,Wadsworth, 1995.

6 Richard A. Barrett, Culture and Conduct: An Excursionin Anthropology, Wadsworth, 1984.

7 Thinking about information operations is alreadyemphasizing this point. At the Third Combat INFOSECSymposium (March 1998) one speech noted that theDefense Information Infrastructure (DII) can beisolated neither from the National InformationInfrastructure (NII) nor from the much larger GlobalInformation Infrastructure (GII). Recent testimony bythe DoD Chief Information Officer (Arthur Money)and Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre to HouseArmed Services Committee Procurement and R&DSubcommittees emphasized that the DII must berestructured into a defendable Global NetworkedInformation Enterprise, Daniel Verton, “DoDRevamping Massive Information Architecture,”Federal Computer World, 1 March 1999.

8 Michael Vlahos, “The War After Byte City,”Washington Quarterly, pp. 41–72, Spring 1997.

9 John Langton and R. J. Morris, eds., An Atlas ofIndustrializing Britain 1780–1914, Methuen, 1982.

10 For testimonials to the brief heyday of the elite “cyber-community,” see Howard Rheingold and John PerryBarlow, “Community in Cyberspace?” Utne Reader,pp. 51–64, March–April, 1995; for a look at the muchmore demotic and commercial-centric online gatheringplaces of today, see Robert Hof, Seanna Browder, andPeter Elstrom, “Internet Communities,” Business Week,pp. 63–85, 5 May 1997.

11 From NUA Internet Surveys: “Email users are expectedto double between now and the year 2000, surpassingthe 108 million mark. These users are expected toreceive more than 7 trillion messages per year.”<http://www.nua.ie/surveys/>.

12 Marc Saltzman, “Super Games!” the net, pp. 21–40,August 1997; Richard C. Waters and John V. Barrus,“The Rise of Shared Virtual Environments,” IEEESpectrum, p. 25, March 1997; or, for a flavor of lifeamong the Quake Clans, see <http://192.41.38.217/thepress/index.htm#Player Profiles> or <http://jord.sbc.edu/dragon/frames.htm>.

13 That these concepts would come to define us in theInfosphere is an argument made most forcefully in alyrical passage from Peter Huber’s, Orwell’s Revenge:The 1984 Palimpsest, The Free Press, pp. 171–181,1994.

14 The European Union Privacy Directive, for example,could effectively create a powerful nontariff tradebarrier for e-commerce between the U.S. and theEuropean Union. See Peter P. Swire and Robert E.Litan, “None of Your Business: World Data Flows,Electronic Commerce, and the European PrivacyDirective,” Brookings, 1997.<http://www.acs.ohio-state.edu/units/law/swire1/noyb.htm>.

29

15 History is replete with technical and social examplesof backward movement, from the loss of Aristarchus’heliocentric view that Copernicus rediscovered nearlytwo millennia later to China’s rejection of Europeanindustrial technology in the 19th century.

16 Details about the GII may be obtained from the GIIwebsite <http://www.gii.org:80/index.html>. It is a“politically correct” expectation of the future, with itsfamiliar National Information Infrastructure (NII) andDefense Information Infrastructure (DII) elements.

17 Why would the U.S. give in to European plans to turnthe Infosphere into a highly regulated environment?Because the U.S., especially its still-traditional ColdWar establishment in Washington, fears loss ofleadership. Major clashes loom between U.S. instinctsto keep the Internet a totally open system anddetermined European Union plans to run the emergingInfosphere as tightly as French cheese. Successivetrade/regulatory wars could be seen as erodingAmerican leadership in Europe over time. Today’sWashington establishment places supreme store inpreserving American military and politicalchieftainship. It might accept European Union Internetregulations in return for law enforcement/nationalsecurity control of the Infosphere. Encouraging this isa trend within the Cold War establishment for assessingnew threats in the Infosphere itself. Terrorism andinternational crime are seen as tomorrow’s threatgrowth areas.

18 Relative to the Byte City concept, see <http://www.usic.org/infosphere>.

19 ABIS Task Force Report, 1-1. The 1996 AdvancedBattlefield Information Systems (ABIS) Task Force<http://www.cs.tamu.edu/zhao/abis/abis.htm> wasa study sponsored by the Director of Defense Researchand Engineering (DDRE) and the Director, Command,Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (J6)of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The charter of the ABISTask Force was to stake out the technology demandedby Joint Vision 2010.

20 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka,“Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” USNaval Institute Proceedings, pp. 28–35, January 1998.

21 Martin Libicki, “The Intersystem: or, The RMAReified,” National Defense University Institute forNational Security Studies, Draft Version 0.5, May 1997.

22 There are antique harbingers of this. During DesertStorm, in the floppy era, at least one military computerwas infected by a computer virus that decreased itsmilitary utility because military personnel inserted aninfected disk into the computer to play a computer game.

23 This assumption is nicely presented in John Garstka,“The Emerging J-6 Strategy for InformationSuperiority,” J63-S&T, “beta version.”

24 Libicki, op cit., p. 33.25 It will probably be impossible to fully support all

military functions with a dedicated, all-militarynetwork, especially if logistics are included, given thedependence of military logistics upon civilian systems.Those nonmilitary aspects of the network wouldbecome vulnerabilities that an astute adversary mightexploit. It makes little difference whether supplies failto reach military commanders because the adversaryhas bombed a bridge or because adversary informationoperations have gridlocked the transportation system.

26 Space does not allow a full description here of futureC4I for small nations, subnational entities, non-government organizations, or individuals. However, theInfosphere’s clear potential to eventually offer thesecapabilities widely means that this possibility shouldbe given serious consideration.

27 This is a play on acronyms, but also a reminder of howquickly basic doctrinal emphases can change. MOUT(Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain) emergedout of the Vietnam War’s wreckage of Americanmilitary thought and the search for a meaningfuldoctrine of war. This culminated in the later 1970s inthe creation of Field Manual 100-5. MOUT was anintegral component of a new conceptual focus on war.

28 Carl H. Builder, “The Masks of War: American MilitaryStyles in Strategy and Analysis,” A RAND CorporationResearch Study, The Johns Hopkins University Press,1989. Builder makes the point well: “Tradition hasalways been an important part of military life, but theNavy, much more than any of the other services, hascherished and clung to tradition. . . . the Navy looks toits traditions to keep it safe. If tradition is the altar atwhich the Navy worships, then one of the icons onthat altar is the concept of independent command atsea, which, like the Holy Grail, is to be sought andhonored by every true naval officer. . . . Independentcommand of ships at sea is a unique, godlikeresponsibility unlike that afforded to commandingofficers in the other services. Until the advent oftelecommunications, a ship ‘over the horizon’ was aworld unto itself, with its captain absolutely responsiblefor every soul and consequence that fell under hiscommand.” (p. 19).

29 Michael Vlahos, “A Crack in the Shield: The CapitalShip Concept Under Attack: 1885–1975,” The JournalOf Strategic Studies, 1979.

30 As used famously by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihanin his philippic,“Defining Deviancy Down,” Miles toGo: A Personal History of Social Policy, 1997.

31 Martin Libicki painted this picture several years ago.32 Two appendixes complete this report. The first explains

when and how we believe various aspects of theInfosphere will manifest themselves. The second

30

provides information about JHU/APL and theInfosphere.

33 “Lower Priced PCs Hit the ‘Sweet Spot,’” Wall StreetJournal, 12 September 1997. Two-thirds of U.S.households will have internet access by 2003,according to research by the Yankee Group(<www.yankeegroup.com/yg.nsf>: “ConsumerDemand for Internet Access Booming,” 23 March1999).

34 U.S. West has already offered xDSL connections in 40cities in the Western U.S. Cable modem bandwidth isshared, so that typical throughput averages in the1.5–3 mips range.

35 From discussions among industry leaders at a summerconference held in Aspen, Colorado, Cyberspace andthe American Dream IV, 15–17 August 1997.

36 Louis Trager, “Broadband Disappoints Customers,”Interactive Week, p. 8, 7 December 1998; Carol Wilsonand Louis Trager, “High Speed Data Deliverance: Is ItDo or Die In ’99 for ADSL?,” Interactive Week, p. 53,1 March 1999.

37 “The Media OS,” Technical White Paper, <http://www.be.com/products/beos/mediaos.html>.

38 From NUA Internet Surveys: “An International DataCorporation market research survey of 175 largecompanies reports 46% are planning to employ E-commerce on their Internet web sites [22 May 1997].ZDNet reports that Forrester Research predicts business-to-business commerce will grow three times faster thanbusiness-to-consumer commerce. CommerceNetpredicts business-to-business transactions will represent25% of all Internet commerce by 2000. A 1997 FIND/SVP survey indicates 60% of all business users get ontothe Web every day [20 May 1997].” <http://www.nua.ie/surveys>.

39 “The Cooperative Engagement Capability,” JohnsHopkins APL Technical Digest, 16(4), 377–396, 1995.

40 As noted earlier, the 1996 Advanced BattlefieldInformation Systems (ABIS) Task Force <http://www.cs.tamu.edu/zhao/abis/abis.htm> was a studysponsored by the Director of Defense Research andEngineering (DDRE) and the Director, Command,Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (J6)of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The function of the ABISTask Force was to explore technology expected for andrequired by Joint Vision 2010.