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TheMöbiusOrganizationalForm:Make,Buy,Cooperate,orCo-opt?
ElizabethAnneWatkinsandDavidStarkColumbiaUniversity
Abstract.Thispaperexaminestheemergingcontoursofaneworganizationalform, in which firms move beyond the cooperative pacts of alliances to aradicalized, aggressive co-optation of external assets. Taking our point ofdeparture from the literature on the “networked” firm, we point to analternativetothemake,buy,orcooperatedecision:intheMöbiusform,firmsco-opt resources, unsecured by any alliances, formal or informal. Somecompanies are brazen in their co-optation, leveraging external assets sothoroughlythattheymightwellbeconsideredacorepartofthefirm.Enabledby developments in computing technologies, such co-optation challengestraditionalmodelsoforganizational identity.ThesefluidboundariesrecalltheMöbius topological model, which we take as the metaphor for this nascentorganizationalform.Wechartthisnewbehaviorbydiscussingarangeoffirmactivities,includingthefunctionsofmarketing,researchanddevelopment,andmanagerial decision-making, as they are replacedwith assets co-opted fromother firms in the private sector, government agencies, and lastly the firm’sownusers.
Keywords:organizationalform,co-optation,firmboundaries,organizationalinnovation,economicsociology,crowdwork,digitallabor,platform,culturalanddigitaleconomy
Acknowledgements.ResearchforthispaperwassupportedbyagrantfromtheEuropeanResearchCouncil(ERC)undergrantagreementno.695256.OurthankstoElenaEspositoandCeliaLuryforcomments,criticisms,andsuggestions.
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Introduction
Theexplosivevolatilityoftechnologicalprogresshasgivenrisetoneworganizational
forms.Asthepost-industrialeconomyhasshiftedfromtradinginphysicalgoodsto
information,firmshaveswappedheavyindustrialassetsandlocalhumancapitalforthird-
party-enabledcloudcomputinganddispersedlabor.Itfollowsthattheorganizationalformof
thefirmitselfwouldreflexivelyembodythisdistributedarrangement,andmanyfirmshave
experimentedwithnetworkedorganization.Somefirmshaveevengonebeyondcooperation,
co-optingoutsideresourcestoreplacewhatwereoncecoreinternalcapacities.
TheformweanalyzepushespastearlieriterationsoftheMöbiusarrangement.1We
observearadicalizationsofar-reachingthatitliesbeyondthecontinuumoffirmstrategies
betweenhierarchiesandmarkets(PodolnyandPage,1998;Powell,2003;Williamson,1991).
Notjustanothernetworkedorganization,Mobiusfirmsdefythelanguageofcooperationthat
usuallydefinesnetworkedpartnerships.Totheclassic‘make,buy,orcooperate’decision
(Kogut,Shan,andWalker,1992)weaddanewbreedoffirmbehavior:co-optation.Möbius
firmsdon’tmake,buy,orally.Theyco-opt.Aswewillsee,thisisalsonotoutsourcing.Instead
ofpushingcapacitiesout,theypullthemin.Searchingforassetsuponwhichtoerecttheir
operations,firmslocateandintegratevaluefromotherfirms,publiclyfundedresources,and
theirownusercommunities.WerefertothisarrangementastheMöbiusfirm.
FromtheNetworkedFirmtotheMöbiusForm
Firmactivitiesaboutandacrossboundarieshavelongbeenapointofinterestinthe
1CharlesSabelwroteaboutcompaniesfosteringpartnershipstobravetogetherthesteepstart-upcostsandturbulenttechnologicalchangesofthe1980smanufacturingsector(Sabel,1991)
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researchonorganizations.Powell(2003)andSabel(1991)forexampledescribedarrangements
inwhichdifferentcompaniesactivelycooperated.Insucharrangements,firmsagreedtoshare
theburdenofriskaswellasanyfruitfulinnovationsalongtheproductionchain.These
agreementsforgedtheshapeofnetworks,withthenetworkitselfemergingastheresultof
generativerulesofcooperationandcoordination(Kogut,2002).Networkedrelationshipshave
alsobeenseenasanoutcomeofassessingpotentialpartnersfortheirvalueandstatus
(Podolny,2001).
Onekeycontributionofnetworked-firmanalysisistheargumentthatsuchformal
cooperationacrossboundariesanchorstheidentityoffirms,andthattheirpositioninthe
networkemergesfromcollective,dynamicevaluationsofpartners.Organizationalboundaries
areoftenusedbyscholarsasanchor-points,givingshapenotonlytofirmsbeingdescribedbut
alsolendingafoundationtodifferentschoolsoftheory.Weber’srational-legalsystemsassume
asegregationofrationalactivityawayfromtheless-rationalexteriorsocialcontext.Scottand
Davisreliedontheboundaryasacriticalcriteriafortheexistenceofaboundedcollectivityof
socialactors:“allcollectivities-includinginformalgroups,communities,organizations,and
entiresocieties-posses,bydefinition,boundariesthatdistinguishthemfromothersystems”
(2015:152).Intheiroverviewoforganizationtheory,ScottandDavislistedanarrayof
challengestodefiningboundaries,bothempiricalandtheoretical.Somedefinitionsare
cognitive,basedontheperceptionsofrelatedactors(Laumann,Marsden,andPrensky,1983),
ortheirsharedinterests(LaumannandKnoke1987).Networksanalystsrelyonmeasuring
relationsbetweenactors,suchasfrequencyofinteraction(Homans1950),relationalcontracts
(Gibbons,2001),embeddednessinhistoricalorrelationalcontexts(Granovetter,1985),and
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structuralpositioninanetworkoffirms(Kogut,1992),havealsoallbeenpositedas
determinantsoforganizationalboundaries.Stillotherworkhasexaminedtheinfluenceon
boundariesofpoliticalbargaining(Stark,1991)andsocialcapital(Walker,Kogut,andShan,
2009).
Stillothertheoriesarebehavioral:PfefferandSalancik(1978:30)proposedthat
individuals’activities(ratherthantheirmembership)constitutethecontoursofan
organization,andBarnard(1938)proposedthatorganizationalboundariesliealongthelineof
cooperativeactivities.TheMöbiusstrategypresentsachallengeacrossthesedefinitions,asits
actionpatternsbleedacrosstheserational,cognitive,andbehavioraldefinitions,whiledefying
transaction-basedtheoryofthefirm(Coase,1937).
Inthispaperwedescribeasetofcasesinwhichfirmsdefyallofthesemechanismsand
definitions,requiringnewtheory.Theneworganizationalformthatwestudyposesinteresting
challengestoorganizationaltheorybecauseitraisesfundamentalquestionsaboutwhatan
organizationis.Intakingondistributed,interwovenarrangements,thesefirmsstrainthe
methodsandvocabulariesavailabletoorganizationalscholars.Traditionalwaysoftalkingabout
organizations,institutions,andnetworkshavebecomelessusefulastheirtaxonomicdefinitions
haveblurred.Newmodesoforganizingpeople,devices,andinformationdemandrobustnew
analyticaltools,andstudentsoforganizationremainuniquelyequippedtobuildthem.
Ourinterestisinasimilarprocesshappeningatthemacrolevel,whenorganizationsco-
opttheassetsofentireneighboringfirmswithoutrelationalcontracts,bendingnotjust
organizationalboundariesbut,how,asscholars,weuseboundariesasameaning-making
device,to“identify”whichfirmiswhich.Co-optedassetsbringwiththemthelogicsoftheir
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construction,beingproductsoftheirnativeorganizationalaction-patterns(Schreyöggand
Sydow,2010).Itbecomesproblematictoperceiveorganizationsasdiscreteunitsofdecision-
making(MarchandSimon,1958;Ahrneetal.,2016),inthecontextoftheco-optationofsuch
neighboringasset-basedlogics.
Ourresearchalsointroducesflexibleterminologydemandedbytheemerging“platform
economy.”Firmsinthisspacearecharacterizedbyactivitiesbreakingthetraditionaltheoretical
dichotomybetweenmarket-basedandsocialcoordination(Gillespie,2010;Grabher,2017).
Howdoessuchblurringimpacthowweasscholarstheorizestructures?Howdowedelineate
andconceptualizetheboundariesofthosefirmswhoseoperationsarebuiltontopof,and
threadedthrough,theplatformeconomy,contingentastheyareonthird-partyassets?
Traditional,simpleideasofboundariesbetweennetworkedfirms,whetherinertorfluid,donot
capturetheactionpatternsweseehappeninginMöbiusfirms.
Ourpresentationwillanalyzethreedistinctlandscapesinwhichwefindtheemergence
oftheMöbiusform.1)WebeginbytracinghowMöbiusorganizationsco-optassetsofother
firms,withoutcontract,cooperation,orgenerativerulesofcoordination.2)Second,wemap
thecapitalization,byprivateindustry,ofassetsproducedbystateactors.3)Third,weexamine
ofapatternofincreasingprevalence,inwhichfirmsintegrateintotheircoreoperationsthe
managerialdecision-makingoftheirownusers.
Foreachofthesestrategiclandscapes,wewillexaminetwocases(foratotalofsix
exemplars).Forthefirststrategy,ourprimarycaseinvolvesthecouplingofacomparison
shoppingappwithmobile-phonecamerasthatfacilitatedthepenetrationofaninternet
shoppingcompany(Amazon)intoaretailgiant’sstorefronts(BestBuy).Forthesecond
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landscape,ourprimarycaseisTheWeatherChannel,chosentoillustratetheapplicationofa
uniformAPItofederalweatherdatabasesthatfedthegrowthofanentireindustry.The
primarycaseinourthirdstrategyexaminesthecreationofanews-sharingplatform(Reddit)
thatgivesahandfulofusersthetoolstochokeoffthecashflowofalargecorporateentity.
Thesedevelopments,recastingmoreandmoreactorsandobjectsasnodesinnetworked
communications,havebroughtabouttheneedfornewtheoreticallanguagewithwhichto
describeanemergentstrategy.
WebuildourtheoryoftheMöbiusorganizationusingmultiplecontemporarycase
studies(EisenhardtandGraebner,2007)drawnfromaccountsindiversecontextsforseveral
reasons.Conductinganembeddedstudywithinasingleorganizationwouldbeamismatchto
theboundary-challengingnatureoftheactivitieswecatalogue.Moreover,anintra-
organizationalstudywouldstripusoftheopportunitytosurveyhowtheMöbiusstrategyis
emergentacrossseveraldifferentsectors,co-optingassetsbothpublicandprivate.Lastly,
becausetheMöbiusformchallengesexistinglanguageonorganizations,crossingstrategies
acrossseveraltypesoffirmactivity,availabletheoryisill-equippedtousefullyinformthe
designofanembeddedstudy.Ourgoalinthisphenomenon-drivenworkistoextendexisting
theory,bysamplingaccountsofmultipleempiricalcasesdrawnfromdiversesettings.Ourgoals
arebroadinscope,addressingnotanisolatedcase,tocapturethebreadthandreachofanew
operationalmodel.
WecallthisemergingarrangementtheMöbiusfirm,afteratheoreticalobjectcalledthe
MöbiusStrip.TheMöbiusStripwasdesignedtodemonstratemathematicalideasabout
curvature,rotation,andsurfacearea.Resemblingabandofpapercurvingonitself,anypoint
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onthebandis“non-orientable,”meaningitresistsbeingdefinedasrestingoneithertheinside
oroutsideoftheloop.Handily,thisserveswellasametaphorfororganizationsco-optingassets
untiltheycannotbedescribedaseitherinternalorexternaltothefirm.
FirstinourcatalogueofthisnewparadigmishowMöbiusfirmsco-opttheassetsof
otherorganizations.
I.TheOrganizationandOtherFirms
Newcommunicationstechnologiesallowcompaniestopermeateeachothers’
boundariesinnovelways,realigningchainsofproductionanddistributionfromwhichfirms
havetraditionallydrawnvalue.Onecompanythatuseddigitalcommunicationstoleverage
another’sassets,withoutpartnerships,contracts,oreventheinitialawarenessoftheco-opted
party,wasAmazon.
Amazon,foundedin1995,isane-commerceretailcompanyspecializinginconsumer
products.FounderJeffBezos,originallyaWallStreettrader,startedthecompanywithalistof
20potentialproductsonwhichtobuildtheAmazonbrand.OnhislistwereCDs,computer
hardware,andbooks,whichhedescribedas“non-threatening”productswithalowprice-point.
TheveryfirstbooksoldonAmazonin1995was,inabitofbeautifulhistoricsynergy,Douglas
Hofstader’sFluidConceptsAndCreativeAnalogies:ComputerModelsOfTheFundamental
MechanismsOfThought.AsAmazongrewthecompanyexpandedintoothergoods,including
thegrowingmarketfordigitalconsumerelectronics.
TheGoliathinconsumerelectronicsatthattimewasBestBuy.Abrick-and-mortarretail
companycommandingamaterialtheaterofconsumption,BestBuyoccupiedasubstantial
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physicalfootprintwiththousandsofstoresandhundredsofthousandsofemployees
worldwide.Theycateredtothemountingglobaldemandformobilephones,digitalmusic
players,tabletcomputers,andotherhandhelddevices.UnlikebooksorCDs,theseproducts
wereconsideredtobe“experiential”goods(Brakus,2014)featuringsensoryandaffective
attributes;shopperslikedtoseeandtouchbeforebuyingsotheyvisitedphysicalshopstotry
themoutandboughtthemin-store.In2008,Amazonintroducedamobilephoneapplication
linkedtothephone’scamera.Userswereencouragedtotakepicturesofproductsinsidebrick-
and-mortarstores,whichtheappwouldsearchforinAmazon’sstock.Amazon’sofferingswere
typicallyatalowerprice-point,becauseAmazondidnothavetosustaintheoverheadofa
physicalpresence.Thisinsertionoftheirowndigitalpurchasingpathwayintobrick-and-mortar
storesdecoupledtheactionsof“tryingout”consumerelectronicsandmakingapurchase.
ShopperscouldcheckoutthesenewdigitalproductsinBestBuyandthenbuythemfrom
Amazon,allwhilestandinginsideBestBuy.ThissignaledadeliberateeffortonAmazon’spartto
capitalizeonbrick-and-mortarshopsas“showrooms”(TeixeiraandWatkins,2014).Nolonger
didshoppershavetowaituntiltheygothometotheircomputerstocompareprices,andno
longerdidtheyhavetotakeariskonbuyingacompletelyunseenproductonline.Theapp
facilitatedtheriseofshowrooming,inwhichAmazondeliberatelyleveragedBestBuystoresto
educateconsumersinbothhandhelddigitalproductsandonlinepurchasing.
BestBuydidnotbenefitfromAmazon’sapp.In2011itsmanagersannouncedplansto
cutbackonthecompany’srealestateholdingsandpostedafourth-quarterlossof$1.7billion
in2012.Amazonstoodtosufferlittlefromtheillhealthoftheassetfromwhichtheydrew
value,asbythistimethepublichasbeenthoroughlyeducatedinonlineshopping.BestBuy
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abettedtheshoppingpublic’sembraceofe-commerce,assistingAmazon’sgrowthtobecome
thelargestretailerontheplanetwithaAugust2017marketcapof$474billion.Weseeherea
firmthatdidnotattempttoforgeapartnershipwithanother,butrather,co-optedtheir
institutionallogicandassociatedobjects,actors,andsites.
Piggybackingontoothersfirms’investmentsasawaytoachieverapidscalingis
becomingmorecommon.WhatsApp,foundedin2009,isadigitalmessagingappbuiltontopof
thepre-existingcontactlistsinusers’mobilephones.AfterauserdownloadstheWhatsApp
appfromaplatformlikeGooglePlayortheAppleStore,WhatsAppautomaticallyimportsthe
users’contactsfromtheirphone’snativecontact-managementprogram.Theuserdoesn’thave
toinputanyinformationintoWhatsAppdirectly.BecauseWhatsAppusesthesephone
numbersinsteadofproprietaryusernamesorprofiles(likeFacebookandTwitter),users’social
contactsareinstantlyaccessiblethroughWhatsApp.Thiseliminatesswitchingcostsnormally
associatedwithnewnetworkedapplications,becauseauserwouldordinarilyhaveto“re-
connect”toexistingfriendsandcolleaguesoverandoveragainforeverynewmessaging
platformtheyjoined.WhatsAppbypassesthisstep,achievingrapidscalebypiggybackingonto
theinfrastructureofcontact-collectionfurnishedbythephonemanufacturer.Thisstrategyis
similartothatofDropBox,anothercompanyleveragingexistingsocialnetworkstoachieve
rapidscale.2Further,WhatsAppextracts,orwithdraws,novaluefromtheleveragedresource,
2DropBox,acloud-baseddatastoragecompany,isanotherprivateenterprisebuiltatopofexistingsocialnetworks.WhenDropBoxwaslaunched,theyusedreferralincentivesoffreeextrastorageanda“freemium”pricingmodel(themostbasicversionoftheproductwasfree,withfeesonlyforhighertiersofserviceandfeatures),toencourageuserstoshareitwiththeirfriendsandcolleagues.DropBoxdidn’thavetobuildtheirownaudiencesorcraftmarketingcampaigns–theybakedtheexistingsocialnetworksofusersintotheirbusinesspractices,piggybackingontothem.Inearly2013,justfiveyearsafterlaunching,Dropboxwasvaluedatoverfourbilliondollars(TeixeiraandWatkins,2013).
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butrathersimplycopiesthevalueofexistingcontact-managementstructuresintotheirown
digitalecosystem.Therelationshipbetweenthetwoisrelativelysustainable-unlikeAmazon’s
extractionofpurchasingbehaviorfromBestBuysites.
AmazonandWhatsApphavewoventheirfirmsaroundassetsofothercompanies,to
substituteforwhatwereonceinternalpractices.Goingbeyondthesimpleuseofdigital
infrastructuresandaccessingtheircontent,theseandothercompaniesco-optotherfirms’
investmentsandproducts,sidesteppingexorbitantcostsofmarketingdevelopment,network
building,andappdevelopmentwithoutcooperativearrangements.
ThechallengestotraditionalorganizationalliteraturepresentedbyMöbius
organizationswillonlybecomemorepressingwiththeadventofplatformservices.Whilestilla
nascenttopic,effortshavebeenmadetobuildaliteratureofplatforms:howarethesesystems
defined?Onwhatkindsofrelationshipsandnetworksaretheycontingent?Howarethey
governed?Howdotheirparticipantsandpartnersorganize?Whatistheimpactofrelated
organizationalarrangements,suchasopen-sourceandcrowd-basedcommunities?(Eisenmann,
2007;Gawer,2011).‘Platforms,’whilerecognizedasaslipperyterminuseacrossmultiple
territories,canberoughlythoughtofas“acomputationalinfrastructure,[or]atleasta
technicalbaseuponwhichotherprogramswillrun”(Gillespie,2010).Acentralchallengeto
organizationstudies,stillinneedofanalysis,ishowthesethird-partyplatformservicesinteract
withtheinstitutionallogicsofthefirmsbuiltatopthem.Take,forexample,appdevelopers
buildingproductsfortheAppleStore(aplatformthatoperateslikeaprivatemarket,governed
byApple,forthesaleofthird-partysoftwaretousersofApplehardware).Thesethird-party
developersarenotemployeesofApple,yettheymustinterpretandapplyApple’spolicies,such
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asthatofprivacy,withintheirowncompanies,inordertokeepsellingtheirproductsonthe
Appleplatform.Theirinternalorganizationalbeliefsandvaluesare,then,threadedwiththose
ofApple,viaplatformgovernance(GreeneandShilton,2017).
Theriseofcloudcomputingandautomationservicesbuiltwithproprietaryalgorithms,
insidefirmssuchasGoogleandIBMWatson,posechallengestoorganizationalsociology’s
definitionsofcorecapacities,andhowscholarsdefineorganizationalidentity.Inanothertype
ofplatform-basedactivity,thespreadofprivateplatformsfunctioningaspublicmarkets,such
asApple’sAppStore,alsocomplicatethesociologyofmarketsandvaluation.Similarly,another
novelMobiusstrategytroublingtraditionalrelationsbetweenpublicandprivatedomainsisthe
co-optationofstateassetsbyprivateindustry,exploredinthenextsection.
II.TheOrganizationandtheState
Afraughtnarrativedefinestheinterplaybetweenprivateenterpriseandpublic
organizations.Stakeholdersincludetaxpayers,lobbyists,corporations,thelegislature,non-
governmententities-almostinnumerableplayers.WhattheStateprovidesintermsof
infrastructure,subsidies,beneficialregulations,andgeneralsupport,andwhatitasksinterms
oftaxrevenueandotherformsoffederalcooperation,isasubjectofcontinuousdebate.The
politicalinclinationsofelectedofficials,andtheculturalimaginarysurroundingtheroleof
governmentalagenciesinthefreemarket,contributetoafractiouslandscape.Exacerbating
thesediscussionsisthedemandingnatureoftoday’sinformationeconomy.Theunremitting
needforinnovation,anditssteeprequisiteinvestmentsinresearchanddevelopment,
contributestoanorganizationalecologyrifewithrisk.Thisissuchariskyendeavorthatthe
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stateisoftentheonlyentityequippedwiththeneededresources.Stateexpendituresare
criticaltoadvancingmanyindustries.FederalspendingonresearchduringWWIIandtheCold
War,forexample,stillbearsfruit,contributingtowhatweknowtodayasSiliconValley
(O’Mara,2005).Firmsengaginginsuchco-optationofstateassetsareripeforinclusioninour
secondtypeofMöbiusorganizations.
TheWeatherChannel,ourfirstexampleofthistype,isbroadcasttonearly100million
homesacrosstheUnitedStatesandtheirapphasbeendownloadedtotensofmillionsof
smartphones.NBCUniversal,BainCapital,andTheBlackstoneGrouptogetherpaid$3.5billion
in2008toacquiretheWeatherChannelfromLandmarkCommunications.Inlightofsuch
broadcastnumbersandsuchamassivepricetag,readersmightbesurprisedtolearnthatthe
WeatherChannelpaysnofeesatallfortheweatherdataonwhichtheyruntheirservices.They
leveragegovernmentassets,paidforentirelybytheAmericanpublic.Theweatherdatais
gatheredanddistributedwithsatellitesanddatabasesbelongingtotheNationalOceanicand
AtmosphericAdministration(NOAA),datathatcomescoupledwithasuiteofsoftwaretoolsfor
developerstointegratefederalweatherinformationintocommercialapplications.Commercial
entities,whenaddingvalueintheformofservices(suchasmakingthedataeasilyconsumable
forlayaudiencesinspecificlocationsorforspecificpurposes),selltimeandspaceto
advertisers,makingrevenueoffofpublicassets.TheNOAA,inrecentyearsconvertingtheir
datatotheeasilyaccessibleXMLformatandprovidingexistingdatafreeofchargetomost
commercialentities,hasfueledthegrowthofanentireweatherderivativesindustry,inan
inverseofitsfour-letteredcounterpartNASApiggybackingontothegravitationalpullofother
planets.
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WhiletheNOAAprovidesthisdatatomostcommercialentitiesforfree,theyrecognize
theimportanceofreinvestinginthefutureofinnovativeexperimentation.Tothatend,NOAA
embarkedonanewkindofmutuallybeneficialpublic-privatearrangementwithahandfulof
selectpartners.Google,Amazon,IBM,andMicrosoftenteredwithNOAAintotheCooperative
Research&DevelopmentAgreement(CRDA).ThesefewmembersoftheCRDApaymarginal
fees(notforexistingdata,butonlyincrementalcostsforgatheringnewdata),andprovide
supportintheformofinfrastructureandcomputerprocessingmuscle.MariaPatterson,
ScientificLeadoftheOpenScienceDataCloud,describedthegroundbreakingnatureofthis
organizationalarrangement:“theentireprojectitselfisitsownresearchexperiment–asking
howcanNOAAworkwithpartnersinamutuallybeneficialarrangementtoreleasedataintoan
ecosystem.”
QuestionsoflossintheNOAAcaseareblurry.Whileonecouldarguethatthecreation
ofaweatherderivativesindustryisaninvestmentintothelargereconomy,withreturnstobe
reapedoverfuturetaxation,lookingatcontemporaryhistoriesoftaxlegislationintheUnited
Statesshowsadifferentstory:thestatutorycorporatetaxratehasbeenreduced,fromover50
percentinthe1950sto35percentin2013(Hungerford,2013).Thisilluminatesalarge-scale
shiftofwealth,frompublictoprivatecoffers,onlycompoundedfederalagenciesmakingdata
availabletopiggybackingbyprivatefirms.
Examplesaboundofprivatefirmscapitalizingonpublicexpenditures.The
pharmaceuticalindustrypushestheboundariesofhowfarprivateentitiescangoinco-opting
assetstosubstituteforinternalexpenditures,especiallysincethe1980Bayh-DoleAct.The
Bayh-DoleActallowspublicallyfundedresearchtobepatented,sofirmscanprivatizepublic
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expenditures(Mazzucato,2015).Supportedbythislegislation,privatefirmscanleveragepublic
fundsinlieuofspendingoninternalresearchanddevelopment.SinkingfewerdollarsinR&D
meansfirmsdistributevaluebacktotheirshareholders,andraisetheirsharevalueviastock
repurchasing.Pfizerin2011allocatedtheequivalentof90%ofitsnetincometostockbuybacks
(Lazonick,2014).Meanwhile,federalresearchprovidedfully88%ofthemostimportant
pharmaceuticalinnovationsbetweentheearly70sandmid2000s(BlockandKeller,2011),
meaningthepublicismoredependentonfederalsupportofR&Dthaneverbefore,evenwhile
largepharmaceuticalscontinuetoreapextraordinaryprofits.
Businesseshavelongleveragedpublicinvestmentforprivategain.Onemayaskhow
Möbiusoperationsdiffer,forexample,fromhowcommerceutilizesstate-fundedinfrastructure
likeroads,freeways,andbridge.Theoriginsofkeypiecesofinfrastructure,forone,showthat
questionsof“whoisbuildingonwhom?”haveneverbeencutanddry,Theinterstatehighway
system,forexample,whilecriticaltomodernindustry,wasoriginallyfundedthrough
Eisenhower’srhetoricofdefense.
Butwhatdoesthisstrategymeanforthefutureofknowledgeeconomiesonthemacro
scale?We’veseenhowAmazonhelpedshopperssearchforproductsinAmazon’sinventory,
drawingonBestBuyasashowroomingvenue.Amazondidnothavetobuildphysicalretail
spaces.TheybenefittedfromBestBuy’sspending.BythetimeAmazon’stacticsforcedBestBuy
todownsize,thepublichadbeeneducatedinhandhelddigitalgoodsande-commerce
consumptionhabits.Amazon,then,hassufferednoapparentilleffectsfromtheiroperation.
ButtheresourcefromwhichAmazondrewvaluefellintopoorhealth.Asimilarasymmetryin
thepharmaceuticalindustryendangersfutureinnovationfunding.Aslongasvalueisextracted
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fromtheStateandprivatizedtoshareholders,theState’sabilitytofundfutureinnovationand
beartheburdenofriskisweakened.Thisisespeciallypertinentintoday’shigh-riskknowledge
economy,wheresomuchresearchneedstobedonebeforeideascanbecomeprofitable.
UnliketherelationshipbetweenAmazonandBestBuy,theroleoftheStatewillcontinuetobe
criticaltothedevelopmentofinnovativetechnologies,andtheviabilityoftheUnitedStatesas
aglobaleconomicsuperpower.
We’llnextexploresomeofthemostradicalMöbiusfirms,leveragingtheresourcesand
laboroftheirownusers.Inthissegmentwetracetheco-optionofanassetonceatthevery
heartofthefirm:executivelabor.
III.TheOrganizationandItsUsers
Commoditylogichasshapedthedesignandfunctionofonlinecommunication
platforms(Fuchs2014,2015),changingthedistributionandcharacteroflaborinthe
informationeconomyinwaysthatallowfirmstoleverageexternal,unpaidassets.First,the
natureofworkintheknowledgeeconomy(i.e.,hyperconnectedworkinvolvingcomputer-
basedcommunication,ratherthanphysicallabor)isimmaterial(Lazzarato,1996)andabstract
(Marx,1867).Second,mechanismsofeconomicsurveillanceshiftmoredaily-lifeactionsinto
therealmofvalue-producinglabor,troublingboundariesbetween“work”and“non-work”
(Terranova,2000).So,too,theboundariesoffirmsinthissectorbecomenebulousand
dispersed.Themorevaluetheycandrawfromexternalnetworksoraudiencelabor,thefewer
resourcestheymustexpendinternally.Internet-basedplatformscanaskcrowdsofinterested
userstofurnishfeedbackonaproduct,orideasfornewtechnologicalapplications,drawingon
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thevalueof“communitiesofpractice”(WengerandSnyder,2000)for“userinnovation”(von
Hippel,2005).Whiletheconscriptionofdigitallaborisalreadywidelytheorized,keyforour
purposesisourobservationthatsomeMöbiusorganizationsintegrateuserlaborintothe
managerialworkingsofthefirmitself:authorityrelationsrestingatthecoreofthefirm(Bryce
andSingh2001).Thepotentialconsequencesandrisksofsuchleveragingofexternalresources
areunderstudied,andalreadyrenderingsurprisingimpactsonsomeyoungorganizations.
Whilecoordinatingdistributedproductionamongmultiplepartiesisalreadyahurdleevenfor
networkedfirms,whicharecarefullygovernedandincentivized(Kraakman,2001;Demiland
Lecocq,2006),theMöbiusformeliminatesthesesteeringstructures.Suchelimination
compoundsrisksinaudaciousways.WalterPowell,inhisrecenttreatmentofcrowdwork,one
popularMobiustactic,describeditstradeoffsas“Securityandformality...replacedby
opennessandprecariousness”(Powell,2016).
Stillanemergingpractice,crowdworkcanconstitutedifferenttypesofactivities(Schenk
andGuittard,2011).Forthepurposesofthisresearch,wegrouptheseintoroughlythree
modelsweseedominatingmostcrowdworkcompaniesandhowtheyconscriptthelaborof
theirusersondigitalplatforms.Twoarethe“user-as-tinkerer”and“user-as-producer”models.
Thethird,mostthoroughlyprogressive,andarguablyriskiest,isthe“user-as-manager.”The
“user-as-tinkerer”modelincorporatesthelaborofusersasonestageinalongdevelopmental
process.Popularlyknownas“opensource”or“openinnovation”,thisisanincreasingly
pervasivestrategyinthetechnologysector,especiallyinsoftwaredevelopment’siterative
releaseschedule.Onestageofthisprocess,called“betatesting”(NeffandStark,2002)seesthe
firmproduceaproductandthendeploytheuserbaseasatestingground.Softwarepackages
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areincreasinglybeingreleasedearlytospeciallyselectedgroupsofusers(afterinitial“alpha”
testsarecompletedin-house).These“beta”testersareaskedtohuntforbugs,errors,and
areasforimprovementinnewsoftwareproducts,workthatoncewouldhavebeendoneinside
thecompany.Testersarerewardednotwithmonetarycompensationbutwithsocialcapital
(Bourdieu,1986)throughtheirexclusivestatus,andpersonalfulfillmentfromcontributingto
thedevelopmentofaproducttheyliked.Thisstatus,andsenseofbelonging,isusually
establishedwithintheircommunityofsoftwarefansandaficionados.Thesecommunities,ina
worldseeingfallingratesofparticipationincommunityinstitutionssuchaschurches(Putnam,
2000)playsanincreasinglyimportantsocialfunctioninthelivesofthesebetatesters.
Softwareengineeringactsasaninspirationaltemplatefororganizingassetsandlabor,
byembracingiterative,continuousdevelopment(NeffandStark2002).Theadventofcheap
personalcomputersandthepenetrationofaffordable,fastinternetaccessmakethismodel
accessibletomorefirms,asmoremindsareavailableforknowledgeworkthaneverbefore.
Quickenedfurtherbytheprevalenceofinternet-enabledsmartphones,humancomputingis
onesubsetoftheincreasinglyliquidgloballabormarket,facilitatingnovelopportunitiesfor
newboundaryworkfororganizations.Someoftheseexperimentsuseclassicorganizational
arrangementsindigitalform.Amazon’sMechanicalTurk,forexample,isawebsitewherelabor
ispurchasedinthetraditionalsense,justonanewkindofplatformandinsmallerincrements.
Simplypurchasinglaborfromthemarketonacontractbasis,i.e.,Coase’snotionofthe
conditionsunderwhichafirmcanemerge(Coase,1937)isnotanewformoforganization,but
ratheranexampleofaclassicbrokerage.Thereareothertacticsemergingwhich,likebeta
testing,,pushtheboundariesofwhatisconsidered“work”anda“worker.”
18
Convertinguseractivityintovalueblursdistinctionsbetweenworkandnon-workas
unpaidusersindigitalspacesgeneratevaluableinformationanddatacommodities(Fuchs
2014).Apervasivetendencyincontemporarycapitalism,thisisadefiningMöbiustactic.Google
capitalizesoninformationgeneratedbyitspopular“free”services.GOOG411,Google’sfree
directoryservice,waslaunchedinparttotrainspeech-recognitionalgorithms,later
implementedintoitsAndroidphonedevicesandGoogleservicesforiPhones.Anyonewhoused
GOOG411,speakingbusinessnamesoutloudtoGoogle’slisteningcomputers,contributed
valuabledatatothedevelopmentoffuturemoney-makingproducts.Googlefurtherleverages
userlabor(Lazzarato,1996;Terranova,2000;Fuchs2014)inthesign-uprequirementsoftheir
freeemailservice.Whenregisteringforanemailaccount,usersfollowseveralsteps.Inoneof
thesesteps,people“prove”theyarehuman,notrobotsthatahackermightprogramto
registerfakeemailaddresses.Toverifytheirhumanity,userstakeatestcalledreCAPTCHA,the
“CompletelyAutomatedPublicTuringTesttotellComputersandHumansApart.”Inthetest,
scrambledimagesoftwowordsareshownonthecomputerscreen,andusersreadthewords
andtypethemintocorrespondingtextfields.Robotsfailthesetestsbecausecomputerscannot
yet“read”textinsideimages.UnbeknownsttotheGoogleusers,however,thereCAPTCHAtest
onlyneedsthefirstword.Thesecondwordisn’tpartofthetest.It’sawordGoogleneeds
transcribedfortheirdigitalbook-scanningproject.Users,typingoutthewordstheysee,are
actuallydoingtranscriptionworkonbehalfofGoogle
AlawsuitwasbroughtagainstGoogleforthispractice.Thecomplaintwasprimarilywith
Google’slackoftransparency,innotalertingusersthattheyarecreatingprofitsforthefirm:
“Insum,PlaintiffallegesthatGoogledoesnottellusersthatitprofitsfromthereCAPTCHA
19
prompttranscriptions,andthatbymisrepresentingoromittingthatfact,Googleextractsfree
laborfromusers.”Groundedindefinitionsofworkandtheidentityofanemployee,the
plaintiff’sargumentwasthatGoogle’sreCAPTCHApracticeviolatedstateemploymentpolicy,
andthatpeopleshouldbepaidfortheirwork.
Google’sdefensewasmulti-pronged.First,theyarguedthatCalifornia’spublicpolicy
statedonlythatemployeesneedtobecompensatedforservices,thatthedefinitionofan
employeehingedinpartonthemagnitudeoftheirlabor,andthatmeasuredwiththismetric,
theplaintiffwasnotanemployee.MagistrateJudgeJacquelineScottCorleyagreed,writingin
herdecision:
Defininglaboras“labor,work,orservicewhetherrenderedorperformedundercontract,subcontract,partnership,stationplanorotheragreementifthelabortobepaidforisperformedpersonallybythepersondemandingpayment”);§350(defining“employee”as“everyperson...renderingactualserviceinanybusinessforanemployer,whethergratuitouslyorforwagesorpay[]”).Plaintifffailstocitetoanycasethatsupportshertheorythatanon-employeetranscribingasinglewordisowedcompensation…itwouldneedtobeabroadpolicytorequirewhatPlaintiffalleges—thatapersonwhotypesasinglewordasaconditionforreceivingafreeserviceisentitledtocompensationforsuch“labor.”3
JudgeCorleyalsoagreedwithGooglethatreCAPTCHAlaboristoominutetore-classify
employmentstatus.Googlefurtherarguedtheemployeescouldalsobeadministratively
defined,andthattheverylackofanykindofformalizedcontractfurthernegatedtheplaintiff’s
claimstocompensation.Becausethereisnocontractualagreementbetweenthetwoparties,
plaintiffwasnotautomaticallyentitledtoshareinprofitsgarneredfromthatarrangement.The
judgeagreedagain,anddismissedthesuit.
3Rojas-Lozanov.Google,Inc.,15-cv-03751(N.D.Cal.Feb.3,3016)
20
Google’suseofMöbiustactics,leveraginganexternalassetwithoutanyagreementor
contract,wasapillarofsupportintheircase.Möbiusstrategiesbecameboundarywork,
pushingtheborderofhowandwhencompaniescouldusethelaborofusers,reshapingthe
contoursofthefirm.Googleco-optsanassetinsuchanovelwaythatanactor(theuser)in
theirorganizationalnetworkrequiredtheinterventionofalegalinstitutiontoredrawthe
bordersof“labor”andan“employee.”ThecourtfoundinfavorinoftheMöbiusfirm.Inthe
ageofdistributedhumancomputing,whenprivatecompaniescanaggregateindividualdigital
microtasksintosignificantvalue(Fuchs,2014)thislegislationisaripeopportunity.
Othercompaniesdeploythe“userasproducer”(NeffandStark,2002)orcrowdsourced
model,whereinsteadofperforminglaboronthecontentbuiltbythecompany,userssupply
thecontentthemselves.Manysitesharvestcrowdsourcedcontent:Wikipedia,YouTube,
Twitter,Facebook,SnapChat,SoundCloud,Instagram,andPinterest,justtonameafew,all
workonthe“userasproducer”or“prosumer”(Toffler,1981)model.Thelaborentailedin
theseblendingrelationshipshasbeenpopularlytheorized.Anarrayoffieldshaveproduced
literatureondigitallaboranditsimplications,includingstudiesinscienceandtechnology,
mediaandcommunication,sociology,andeconomics(Matias,2016;Lazzarato,1996;Licoppe,
2008;Terranova,2000;Fuchs2014).
Otherfirmsmovebeyondtheuser-as-producermodel,totheuserasmanager.
Leveragingexternalmanageriallaborviaacommunityofuserscancreatenewopportunities;
butitcanalsointroducenovelformsofrisk.Asweshallsee,deployingcommunitymembersas
manageriallaborcanrealignpowerrelationsandfosterunpredictableinteractionsbetween
usersandthefirm.Theserealignmentssparkpotentialstrugglesbetweenusersandfirms,
21
betweencommunityandcapital,strikingattheheartofatheoreticaltensionincommunity-
basedformsofinnovationsopopularlycelebratedbycontemporaryenthusiasts(Benkler,2006;
Castells,2011).PaulAdlerdescribessuchtensionsasapolarizationinthefieldoforganization
studies,between
thosewhoseecommunityasaprimordialfeatureofpersistenthumancollectivities,includingbusinesses…[and]thosewhoseepowerasymmetriesasafundamentalfeatureofsocialstructures…[who]critiqueasessentiallyobfuscatoryanyaffirmationofbondsofcommunitywithinindustry(Adler,2015).Adler’sobservationofclashinginterestsbetweencommunity-basedsolidarityand
capitalistrelationsofproductioncanhaveadestabilizingimpactonfirmswhosevalueis
groundedinthiskindoflabor.Onestarklyvisiblecasestudyinsuchdestabilization,widely
recordedinthepopularpressasawatershedmomentforrethinkingthemanagementof
community-driveninnovation,happenedonawebsitecalledRedditin2015.
Redditisacrowdsourcedinternetplatformresemblingabulletinboard.Mostof
Reddit’suserssubscribetooneoftwotiersofmembership:“users”canuploadlinksandpost
comments,whereasthesecondtier,“moderators,”workamanagementrole,viaamanagerial
toolkitprovidedbytheplatform.ModscanalterthestructureandrulesoftheirgroupviaHTML
codegoverningdesignandinteractivity.Modssetrulesgoverninguserbehaviorthrough
commentetiquettestandardsandbanningpolicies.Tomanagetheirgroups,modscandelete
posts,deletecomments,banusers,andcontrolwhethertheirgroupwasvisibletothepublic.In
theirmanagementoftheplatforminfrastructure,content,andcommunity,modslargelybuild
thesitethemselves.Throughtheirtoolstheytookupmanagerialwork,becomingmanagerson
behalfofRedditthecompany,exceptwithnocompensation.Whilespendingcomparatively
littleoncommunitymanagement,Redditscaleduptoover150millionpageviewspermonth
22
by2016(“TrafficStatistics,”2017).
ThisradicalapplicationofMöbiustactics,however,heldunforeseenrisks.In2011,some
usersengagedinanearlyprotestofwhattheysawasariseinpromotionalmaterialonthesite.
Creatingacommunitycalled“HailCorporate,”usersderidedpoststhattheysawascorporate
advertisementsdisguisedtoresembleorganicconversations.Suchvisibledisassociationwith
corporategoalsembodiesanexternalizationofcynicism,oraformof“symbolicsabotage”ina
reorientationofrelationsbetweentheworkerandthefirm,re-pathologizingtheorganization
byrelocatingthepositionof“defect”inwhathasbeentermedamovefrom“the“tired
employee”tothe“exploitativeorganization””(FlemingandSpicer,2003).
Symbolicsabotagesoonledtotheirfirstactualsabotage.In2014,amodofagaming
subbecameunhappywiththewayagamecompanywasbeta-testinganewrelease.Totryto
influencethecompany’sactions,themoderator“blackedout,”ortooktotallyprivate,the
entiregamingsubreddit-anoftenintegralsiteforword-of-mouthmarketingbygaming
companies.Themodreplacedtheentireboardwithapictureofalockandkey,what’salso
knownas“goingdark.”ItwasonlyafterRedditemployeesintervenedthattheboardwas
restored(Matias,2016).
In2015,frictionbetweenthefirmandusersproducedevenmoreremarkable
dissonance.ThatsummeranemployeeofRedditnamedVictoriaTaylor,thecommunications
managerandoftenonlypointofcontactbetweenmoderatorsandthecompany,wasletgo,
withnowarninggiventothemoderatorswithwhomsheinteracted.Moderatorsofsubreddits
relyingonTaylorprivatizedtheirboards,inthesame“goingdark”strategyusedin2014.Inan
Op-EdfortheNewYorkTimes,twomoderatorswrote:
23
Reddit’smanagementmadecriticalchangestoaverypopularwebsitewithoutanyapparentcareforhowthosechangesmightaffecttheirbiggestresource:thecommunityandthemoderatorsthathelptendthesubredditsthatconstitutethesite....WedonateourtimeandtalentstoReddit,afor-profitcompany,becausewetrulylikebuildingcoolthingsontheInternetforotherstoenjoy....DismissingVictoriaTaylorwaspartofalongpatternofinsistingthecommunityandthemoderatorsdomorewithless.…Weareconcernedwithwhatamovelikethismeansforfor-profitcompaniesthatdependonthefreelaborofvolunteers(LynchandSwearingen,2015).
Theprotestsnowballed,withbothmodsandlower-tierusersbecomingvitriolicwith
theiraccusationsofimproprietyagainstReddit,includingaviolentsurgeofhatespeech
directedinparticularatnewCEOEllenPao.Inwhathasbeenwidelytermedthe“moderator
blackout,”moremodshutdownlargesectionsofthesiteandkeptthemdark,cuttingofftraffic
andadrevenue.Thismovementflippedthefrequentcharacterizationofdigitallabor,thatsuch
workembodies“newformsoflaborbutoldformsofexploitation”(BucherandFieseler,2016;
FuchsandSevignani,2013;Paolaccietal.,2010;Scholz,2013),onitshead.
IntheuproarPaoresigned.Beforeherresignation,shepostedthefollowingcomment
onReddit:
Thebiggerproblemisthatwehaven'thelpedourmoderatorswithbettersupportaftermanyyearsofpromisingtodoso.Wedovaluemoderators;theyallowReddittofunctionandtheyalloweachsubreddittobeuniqueandtoappealtodifferentcommunities.Thisyear,wehavestartedbuildingbettertoolsformoderatorsandforadminstohelpkeepsubredditsandRedditawesome,butourinfrastructureismonolithic,anditisgoingtotakesometime.…Wehired5morepeopleforourcommunityteamintotaltoworkwithboththecommunityandmoderators.…Asaresult,wearebreakingsomeofthewaysmoderatorsmoderate.Wearegoingtofigurethisoutandfixit(Pao,2015).
Togetabroadpictureofcommunityparticipationandmoderatormindset,J.Nathan
Matias,aresearcherattheMITCenterforCivicMedia,conductedextensiveinterviewswith
24
moderatorsandbuiltadatasetofsubredditactivityduringtheblackout.Throughaframework
ofsocialmovementtheories,includingpoliticalopportunityandresourcemobilization,hiswork
affirmedthattheuprisingwasanorganizedactioninresponsetocollectivegrievances.He
foundthemostsignificantpredictorsforamoderatorjoiningtheblackouttobetwofold.First
wastheirworkload.Thelargertheworkloadofthesubreddit,(measuredinnumberof
commentsasaproxyfortheamountof“activity”inthegroup)themorelikelythemoderators
weretojointheblackout.ThisaffirmedthestatementsmadebymoderatorsonRedditandin
thepopularpress:themoredifficulttheirjobs,themorelikelytheyweretorevolt.Thesecond
predictorwasthenumberoftiestoothercommunities,heldbyboththesubredditandthe
moderator.Themorepeopleandboardstheyweretiedto,themorelikelytheyweretorevolt.
Intheirstatementsduringandaftertheblackout,modsdescribedignoredrequestsformore
supportandbettertechnicaltools:‘ThemoderationtoolsonRedditareanotherofthelarger
contentionpointsbetweenthemodsandadmins-theyarefrequentlysaidbythosewhouse
themoftentobeadecadeoutofdate.”
Strifebetweenthesegroupshasonlyincreasedinthetimesince.In2018,special
counselRobertMuellerfiledanindictmentagainstagroupofRussians,includingtheInternet
ResearchAgency,acompanyassociatedwiththeKremlin,forrunningdisinformation
campaignsinanattempttoinfluencethe2016Americanpresidentialelection.Theindictment
mentionedRedditthirty-fivetimesasasiteofsuchdisinformationsowing.SteveHuffman,the
CEO,admittedthatReddithad“foundandremoved”hundredsofaccountsassociatedwith
Russianpropagandaefforts(Marantz,2018),andtheWashingtonPostreportedthatReddit
executiveswerebeingquestionedbyaSenateIntelligenceCommittee(Romm,2018).
25
AtReddit,unpaidusersoccupiedcrucialadministrativeroles.Thisisthekeyleap
forward(andthekeyrisk)intheMöbiusorganizationalmodel:externalactorscouldmanage
Reddit’sexecutiveassets,includinghumancapitalandthefunctionalinfrastructureofReddit
itself,throughwhatCallonandMuniesawouldcallexecutiveorganizationalequipment(Callon
andMuniesa,2005).Grantingmanagerialtoolstouserscreatednewvulnerabilities,allowing
userstoexpresstheirvaluesinwaysthatdivergedfromthebusinessintentionsofthe
designers(Adler,2015).Whentheintentionsoftheorganizationandtheresourcethey
attemptedtoco-opt-theirusers-becamemisaligned,community-basedmoderators
appropriatedaffordances(NagyandNeff,2015)tobringtheactivitiesofthefirmtoahalt.
Later,user-basedcontroloftheplatformwasexploitedbymaliciousactorsrunninga
disinformationcampaign,arguablyleadingtooneofthemostshockingelectionoutcomesin
moderntimes.
Conclusion
Aswe’veobserved,theinformationeconomyhaspushedtheorganizationalformto
novelfrontiers,allowingfirmstoexploitopportunitiesacrosscategoriesoflabor,infrastructure,
andassets.
WehavebroadlyobservedthreedistincttypesoftheMöbiusform:theco-optationof
assetsofotherprivatefirms,thecapitalization,byprivateindustry,ofassetsproducedbystate
actors,andthemanageriallaboroftheirownusers.
ArecentspaceprobemissionbyNASAservesasanothermetaphorforthisprocess.A
resourcethey’veleveragedtotheiradvantageisthegravitationalpullofotherplanets.Orbital
26
mechanics,astheunderlyingscienceiscalled,isalsoknownasGravityAssist,ortheprocessof
usingthegravityofanotherplanetontopoftherocket’sownfuel-basedpropulsion.NASA’s
VoyagermissionswereengineeredusingGravityAssist.In2012,theVoyagermissionslobbeda
manmadeobjectfartherintospacethaneverbeforeinthehistoryofmankind.NASAneededa
propulsionresource,locatedthatresourceinthegravitationalpullofotherplanets,andwove
theirspaceflightplansaroundthatasset.In2016,we’veobservedearthboundfirmssimilarly
foldingtheircompaniesaroundassetstheydon’town,don’tusecooperatively,anddon’tbuy
fromthemarket.
ResemblingGravityAssist,Möbiusfirmsdon’tbuy,manufacture,orcooperatively
exchangewiththeresourcesuponwhichthey’rebuilt.Thisexperimentalnewerafor
organizationswasfacilitatedbytoolsofubiquitouscomputing,connectingmoreactorsthan
everbefore.Thesedigitalinfrastructureshavepermittedorganizationstoco-optexistingassets
inunforeseenways.Inourexamples,theymitigateinternalcostsofmarketingdevelopment,
appdevelopment,andcommunitymanagement.Whiletherearestillcostsinvolved(building
andmaintainingthetechnicallayerofReddit,forexample,requiresinvestmentinpersonnell,
serverspace,andcomputing),theenormoussavingsgarneredbycharginguserswithmanaging
themselves,andthenoveltyoftherelationshipbetweenthefirmandthisco-optedentity,
cannotbeignored.Co-optingsuchassetsallowsthesefirmstopiggybackontoexisting
communitiesofusersandstructuresofaccess,facilitatingeconomiesofscalewithout“meta-
corporate”arrangements(Sabel,1991).TheseadvantagessuggestthattheMobiusformmay
wellrepresentanewoperationalparadigm.
Noorganizationcanbecompletelywithoutboundaries(SchreyöggandSydow,2010).
27
Möbiusfirmsarenoexception.Theyfiletaxes,maintainbankaccounts,andremuneratetheir
employees.Asorganizationsmust,theyembodyprocessesdistinguishingthemfromtheir
ecologicalsurroundings.Ourprimaryinterestisnotonboundaries,perse,buttheactions
takingplaceaboutthem.Withneithermarketcontractsnorpartneringalliances,the
organizational“actionpattern”(SchreyöggandSydow,2010)oftheMöbiusistoco-optthe
organizationalactionsofotherentitiesintheirenvironment.Thisproducesanoveltypeoffirm-
to-firmrelationship,absenttheformalmarkersthatcustomarilydefinethefirm.Suchpractices,
takingplaceover,above,andindefianceof‘boundaries’betweenafirmandotheractorsinits
environment(WhitfordandZirpoli,2009),revealaformmoreradicalthanhasbeendescribed
inthenetworkedorganizationliterature.Theprimaryquestionthatintriguesus,promptingus
toadopttheMöbiusmetaphor,isthis:assetswhicharedoubtlessexternaltothefirm,and
remainexternaltoit(i.e.,theyarenotpurchasedandbroughtinsidethefirm,norarethey
incorporatedbyapartnershiparrangement),arenonethelessvitaltoitsoperationsandits
identity.Thishascreatedtheneedfornewlanguagetodiscernanddescribefirmactivity.
Othercontributionsmadehereincludeanexpandedconceptionofobjectsandactorsin
theeraofBigData,inanovelapplicationofactor-networktheory.BigData,ratherthana
mutableobjecttransferablebetweenoracrossfirms,canbere-conceptualizedasastatic
objectaroundwhichfirmssculptthemselvesandtheirstrategies.Viewedinthisframework,the
boundaryobjectisnotBigDatabuttheorganizationitself.
Futureresearchpotentialsarerich.Oneareaofinterestisthearrayofresponse
patternsoforganizationsbeingco-opted.Inourobservations,co-optedusersleveragedtheir
collectivepowermoresubstantiallythanco-optedfirms,whereasthestatechosetopermitco-
28
optationandevenencouragedit.Whatdotheseresponsessuggestaboutrelationsbetween
firms,theirsharedecologies,andresultingpatternsofpowerandcontingency?Fresh
challengestoorganizationalsociologyarealsopresentedbytheadventofplatform-based
services,andthemigrationofinstitutionallogicsasembeddedinsideco-optedassets.Inthis
vein,anewareaoforganizationalsociologyengagesmicro-sociologicaltheory,particularly
inhabitedinstitutionalism,toexaminehowindividualswithinanorganizationenactacomplex
andmulti-layeredsetofobligations,logics,andbeliefs(McPhersonandSauder,2013).
Farfrombeinganexhaustivecataloguingofanemergingtrend,inthispaperwe’ve
discussedtheshiftingcontoursofthesedevelopmentsbylooselyidentifyingthreetypesofco-
optionleveragedbyprivatecompanies.Traditionaltheoreticallanguageusedtotalkabout
boundariesdoesnotcapturetheactionpatternsweseehappeninghereoforganizations
mutatingtoincorporatenewimaginariesofthefirm,challengingwhatweknowandhowwe
talkaboutdigitaleconomies,networkedorganizationalidentity,andtheroleofthefirminthe
InformationAge.
29
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