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The merger TUI – First Choice for staying the world leader in tour operating
Migration from one industry to another industry
Opportunities and threats of mergers
Consolidation process in the field of tour operating
Introduction
Preusssag, a big company of the shrinking coal mining and steel industry in
the German Ruhrgebiet, decided - after a stage of consolidation and diversification –
to enter into the ongoing tourism market by buying the tour operator TUI.
The holding company took over later companies in the field of shipping where it
suffered from heavy losses.
Preussag sold it‘s coal mining and steel shares and became in 2000 a tour
operator with a strong shipping division which was in the meantime sold.
The losses in the field of shipping obliged TUI to merger with First Choice“
for maintaining enough liquidity to invest into the future against the
growing competitor „Thomas Cook“ on the German market.
History matters (1)
1968: Birth of TUI
1970: Integration of Air Tours International et TransEuropa
Participations at the hotel chains Iberotel, RIU and Grecotel
Creation of TUI Nederland, TUI Austria and TUI Switzerland
Integration of AirTour International and TransEuropa
1997: TUI is taken over by Preussag AG
Preussag was a state owned mining and steel company founded in 1923 as a state own, diversification into the shipping industry
With the acquisition of TUI (and at the same time also acquistion of Hapag Lloyd, a shipping and logistic holding), Preussag became a leisure and transport enterprise
History matters (2)
2000: Preussag became TUI Group
Acquisition of Thompson Travel (biggest British TO)
Strategic alliance with « Nouvelles Frontières », biggest TO of France
Acquisition of the Scandinavian TO Fritidsresor
2002: Creation of a shareholder company TUI AG
Acquisition of the container ship company CP Ships, one of the five biggest container ship companies
80% of the European market of tour operating, 21,5 millions of customers a year, 3600 outgoing travel agencies and 37 incoming agencies, 79 TO (in 18 countries), 127 planes with 9 different charter airline companies, 12 hotel chains in 28 countries with 279 hotels
10 cruise ships
History matters (2)
2000: Preussag became TUI Group
Acquisition of Thompson Travel (biggest British TO)
Strategic alliance with « Nouvelles Frontières », biggest TO of France
Acquisition of the Scandinavian TO Fritidsresor
2002: Creation of a shareholder company TUI AG
Acquisition of the container ship company CP Ships, one of the five biggest container ship companies
80% of the European market of tour operating, 21,5 millions of customers a year, 3600 outgoing travel agencies and 37 incoming agencies, 79 TO (in 18 countries), 127 planes with 9 different charter airline companies, 12 hotel chains in 28 countries with 279 hotels
10 cruise ships
2007: Creation of TUI Travel
TUI Travel was formed in 2007 from the merger of the TUI Group’s distribution, tour operator, airline and incoming operations with those of the former British First Choice Holidays PLC.
Strategy of TUI
• External growth and vertical integration in Europe
– Privileged distribution position: lower costs
– Creation of their own transport and accomodation structures:
• Limit the number of intermediaries and increase the margin
• Better control quality
• Equilibrate the accounting
• Multi-channel distribution :
– Traditional travel agency
– Internet
– Websites for « low costs »
• Expansion outside Europe :
– 2003: memorandum of understanding with Chinese travel organisation
– Interest for the Indian market
– Looking for access in the North American market
TUI has a complex holding structure which grew fast but the profits eroded
Volumes in mio Euro 2005 2006 Turnover 16‘619 20‘916
-Tourism 14‘097 14‘084
- Shipping 3‘834 6‘254
Cash flow 707 369
- Tourism 366 401
- Shipping 323 8
Profit Group 496 -847
- in % 2.29 - 3.66
Historic loss in 2006
2006: Turnover of €14,1 billion (tourism) and €6,3 billion (maritime transport)
But loss historic of € 847 million:
– Difficulties with maritime transport – Acquisition of the Canadian TO CP Ships (end of
2005) for €1,7 milliard – Restructuration costs –
First trimester 2007: – Loss of €105,8 million – Decrease of turnover of 2,5% = €4,09 milliards – Increase of tourism activities, good reservations but small
loss of € 237 million
Reason of the merger
Liquidity: merger with a financially strong horizontal partner 51% TUI and 49% First Choice Chairman and CEO: Chairman of First Choice, Peter Long TUI enhance its position as an European market leader Penetrate North American and French markets Pression: merger of Thomas Cook and MyTravel Forecast: Turnover of €17,6 billion and 27 million travellers
Complementary growth of both grouups Possible synergies in the field of costs and receipts Economies of scale and scope: competitif tariffs
Diminition of the competititon Eliminated inefficiencies by division of work and specialisation
The competitors are « tiny »
TUI was obliged to merger with a smaller TO but became under
the leadership of First Choice more profitable
Comparison of the firms TUI Touristik
First Choice TUI Travel*
Turnover (bio €) 13,7 4,0 17,6
Profit (mio €)* 278 200 475
Planes 127 34 161
Employees 32‘000 15‘000 47‘000
Share value 4,6 2,5 5,1
* Objectifs
Creation of an incontrable « financial empire » Lack of a convincing strategy and poor organic growth: forcing
externalgrowth
The merger made the company more transparent
Possible destruction of a part of the entreprise culture
Reduction of working places
Market power
Critics and implications
Question to discuss
Which are the strengths and weaknesses of the business model of TUI?
What were the major threats of the merger of TUI with First choice?
Can the business model of TUI Travel be imitated?
The empire of Expedia
The biggest online tour operator
Innovation such as „priceline.com“
External growth through acquisition
08/12/2012
The empire of Expedia
Why did the company become the biggest full service
online travel agency with products such as priceline.com and trip advisor?
08/12/2012
Index
Introduction
Industrial Environment
Business model
Innovations & competitive advantages
Integration
Intro Industrial
environment Business model
Innovations & competitive advantages
Integration
08/12/2012
Introduction
• Born in 1996 – founded as division of Microsoft- USA
• 1999- quoted on the stock exchange
• Nowadays, presence >60 countries
.
Intro
Industrial environment
Business model
Competitive advantage
Integration
OBJECTIVE:
Leadership in the travel and on-line booking sector
Revenue
1. Financial Highlights:
2011 Gross Bookings: $29.1 Billion
2011 Revenue: $3.45 Billion
08/12/2012
Intro Industrial
environment Business
model Competitive advantage
Integration
08/12/2012
Industrial environment
High competitiveness
Disruptive trends & consumer behaviour comprehension
Time saving : KEYWORD
ICT
Intro Industrial
environment Business
model Competitive advantage
Integration
08/12/2012
Business Model
Intro Industrial
environment Business model
Innovations & competitive advantages
Integration
Suppliers:
Car rentals
Hotels
Cruises
Attractions
Etc…
Internet
GDS
Merchant
Call center
Travel agencies
Internet
Customers
Leisure
Business
08/12/2012
Strategy
Intro Industrial
environment Business
model Competitive advantages
Integration
Hotel
Car rentals
Attractions
Insurance
Low-cost
flights
Cruises
TO Packages
Bigger offer
Unique reference for customers
08/12/2012
Competitive advantage
Offers concentration
Time saving effectiveness (Priceline.com tool)
ICT flexibility and adaption
Trends following
Social aspect (reviews- Trip Advisor)
(Spin off 2011)
Intro Industrial
environment Business
model Competitive advantages
Integration
08/12/2012
Venere.com- Integration
Intro Industrial
environment
Business model
Competitive advantages Integration
1995 1999 2003 2007 2008
Microsoft Launched Expedia NASDAQ DYNAMIC PACKAGING $20 mill. Value Venere acquisition
08/12/2012
Venere.com Integration & Impacts on the main competitor
Intro Industrial
environment Business
model
Competitive
advantages
Integration
Question to discuss
Which is the main business of Expedia?
Why was “priceline.com” an innovation in the field of booking of tourism related
services?
Is “Trip Advisor” still a division of Expedia?
Which is the business model of Expedia?
Swiss International Airlines: Failing acquisition strategy of Swissair and
happy take over by Lufthansa
Liberalisation of the airline market
Volatility of the airline market
Grounding of an airline
Restructuration
Acquisition and integration in a mother company
Swissair was a successful flagship carrier with important airline related services such as “Gate Gourmet” or the airport shops “Nuance”. The external growth strategy through acquisition of other airlines to get a critical size failed. The grounding of the S Air Group was the end of the successful Swissair story. The airline and it’s airline related big industries were bankrupt. The state subsidized a new airline out of the regional carrier “Crossair” owned by the S Air Group which was not concerned by the bankrupt. The money from the Swiss Confederation, the Cantons and the private sector was spent in the first years of the activities of the new airline which had no clear strategy. The government was not willing to give further subsidies. The company was sold to Lufthansa where it is under German CEO’s a real “cash cow” for it’s mother company.
Introduction
The initial situation
Medium sized companies with small home markets are in general:
too small to compete with the big
too big to be regional airlines
too cost-expensive to be a low-cost carriers
The dilemmas of medium sized airline companies with small home markets
Strategies of Swissair since 1992
Project ALCAZAR (alone carrier zigzag at random)
Objective: Merger with similar companies (KLM, SAS, AUA and Swissair)
1996 failure of project ALCAZAR => status quo with 1992
1997: HUNTER strategy
Objective: acquire participations in European carriers to become an important group in Europe benefiting from rights in many nations
finding potential candidates turns out to be harder than expected
big spending on loss-making companies
2001: failure of HUNTER strategy
The aim of the “Hunter Strategie” of the S Air Group was to become a big leader company with subsidiaries
Integration through merger
Strategic Alliances
Global Consolidation
New global brands
Regional brands
Regional Consolidation
Time
Competition
2 October 2001 saw an increased necessity for strong liquidity, as
all suppliers insisted on cash payments of outstanding invoices
following the request of payment delay announced the day before.
Cash reserves of Swissair filed on this day were barely sufficient enough
just to carry out the first morning flights.
During the morning, fuel suppliers refused to fuel the waiting
aircraft. Other accounts were consolidated on the one hand because of
the prior termination of the cash pooling facility from the UBS, on the other
hand due to the threat of favoritism regarding debts.
The sad story of the „grounding“ of Swissair following September 11 (1)
The banks refused a credit increase before the sales proceeded, and
insisted on a formal referral validity of the sale agreement.
At 15:45, CEO Mario Corti announced a cessation of flight
operations due to the security risks caused by the crossing of the
Flight Duty Regulations.
This led to thousands of stranded passengers around the world, including
flight crews. Their corporate credit cards were blocked by the banks, with
some hotels expelling the crews, and having them return home at their
own expense. In addition, all tickets sold were voided.
The sad story of the „grounding“ of Swissair following September 11 (2)
Source: www.wikipedia.org ,Swissair
The political debate about bailing out a national carrier
The arguments of the Swiss economists against a bail out of the national carrier by the state (1)
The point of view of Swiss economists*:
« ... Swissair was not a victim of deregulation but of the
failures in a protected market. »
* Dans « Swissair: limiter les dégâts », E. Baltensperger, S. Borner, M. Bütler, J.P.
Danthine. R. Eichenberger, R.L. Frey, H. Hauser, F. Jaeger, B. Kappeler, J.-C. Lambelet,
R. Leu, J. Marbacher, B. Schips, A. Swoboda, E.-L. von Thadden, T. von Ungern-
Sternberg, C.Wypolsz
The arguments of the Swiss economists against a financial bail out of the national carrier by the state (2)
Maintaining jobs
It’s not the role of the state to maintain certain jobs, rather than other ones.
A flexible job market is the best solution, and should be encouraged by the
state.
Protectionism – Switzerland risks losing it’s position with respect to other nations in aviation industry
Given the over-capacity in the market there’s no doubt other aviation
companies will be interested in guaranteeing flights to and from Switzerland
(conditions: sufficient demand and good regulatory environment)
The arguments of the economists against a financial bail out of the national carrier (3)
Promotion of the Place – Public Good characteristic of national carrier
Good transport infrastructure and connections are necessary to guarantee
the future economic growth of Switzerland. This may justify government
help to airports – infrastructure linked to the place – but not the help to
airlines.
The government didn’t share the point of view of the economists and supported the creation of a new national carrier
After the grounding of Swissair the Swiss Confederation provided massive financial support
Report of the Federal Council (Switzerland’s Federal Government) to the Federal Parliament (Chambers of Representatives and Cantons) of 7 November 2001
« The existence of a active national carrier at international level is of
utmost importance for a economic place. The negative impact on the
economy and the labour market of a absence of a governmental
reaction has forced the Swiss Confederation to participate in financing
a programme for restructuring the national civil aviation and to
contribute to maintain a performing hub in Zurich…»
The Federal state, the cantons and the private sector supported the launch of a new carrier in a big solidarity action for the employees and
the Canton of Zurich where the main Swiss hub is situated
Financial aid for SAir Group and the new « Swiss » (in mio. Frs.)
Source Aim Amount Type
Confederation ** Maintain Swissair until end of march 2002 1’450 Direct payment
Participation Crossair 600 Capital action (stock)
Various costs 39 Direct payment
Cantons and cities Participation Crossair 451 Capital action (stock)
Airport operation 150 Credit, Subsidy
Private sector Participation Crossair 1’672 Capital action (stock)
Total ** 4’317
** without insurance for unemployment and social plan
The launching of a new airline
The state paid the deficit until the launch of the new company
The difficulties for launching a new airline after the grounding
The new airline was launched by enlarging the regional carrier
“Crossair “ with the two letter IATA code LX which was an
independent subsidairy company of the Swissair. This company
didn’t go bankrupt. The start of this company was difficult despite the strong
support from the federal and local goverment, the private sector and the
private sponsors.
The new airline had to overcome the bad image of the bankrupt S Air group.
The new airline had to achieve a strong turn around from zero.
The new airline had to reduce the number of planes.
The fight against the low cost carriers which came into the market after the grounding
Pricing and tariffs
Reorganization of the Swiss national airline and focus on key segments
Reduction operating costs
Reduction of the airline fleet
Competing against low-cost competitors
Typical Swiss quality
Swiss doing better than the mother company Lufthansa before and after the crisis
The positive impact of the merger with Lufthansa
Swiss International Air Lines: the most profitable airline of the Lufthansa Group
• Founded in march 31st 2002
• Serving 90 Destinations with 77 aircrafts in 42 countries
• Fully owned daughter by Lufthansa
– Since the take over by Lufthansa in 2005 for 310 Million Euros, SWISS is operating very successful
– It is today a cash cow for the Lufthansa Group
– It has 45 aircrafts for a sum of 2 billion CHF on order
• Member of Star Alliance since April 2006
Swiss was doing better than the mother company Lufthansa
before and after the crisis and now
Swiss International Airlines as subsidiary company of the Lufthansa Group
Question for discussion
Was is worthwhile that the state subsidized the launch of a new
national carrier? Would it have be better to spend more money of the taxpayer to held ownership in Swiss hands? Why was the acquisition by Lufthansa for Swiss International a success?