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With Quarterly Executive Letter
Volume 2, Issue 3
March 2013
ii© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
March 18, 2013
Capitalizing on a Transitioning Housing Market
In many markets across the country, the spring home-buying season offers the brightest prospects for the
housing industry since 2006. The housing market improved steadily during much of 2012. We counted fewer
foreclosed properties and a declining shadow inventory. At the same time, reductions in the supply of homes
and improving demand drove solid gains in home prices. Importantly, this home price appreciation reduced
the number of borrowers who are underwater, providing them with more options. These are optimistic signals
that the housing market is finally rounding a very long corner and gaining traction.
Other encouraging developments for the longer term include the improving employment picture, more clarity
on important regulatory matters, for example the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s recent definition
of a qualified mortgage, more positive consumer sentiment and spending and finally, the wealth effect from
record-high equity markets.
Nurturing Growth
As conditions in the housing market gradually improve and the unusual conditions of the post-recession
market recede, we anticipate a shift in the drivers behind the mortgage origination market. With interest rates
at record lows over the last few years, many borrowers took advantage of the opportunity to refinance their
loans. We expect the high level of refinancing activity we saw over the past six quarters to subside somewhat as
we exit this year and enter into 2014. Conversely, we expect to see the purchase market increase progressively
as the trend away from homeownership reverses. This improvement in the purchase market will take time and
will not likely, in the short- to medium-term, replace the current boom in refinancing-related volumes.
A healthy purchase market, however, is fundamental to the ultimate turnaround of the broader housing
industry. Although household formation blossomed in 2012, Mortgage Bankers Association research shows
net gains in renter households. While multi-family housing is growing, first-time buyer demand has weakened.
Undoubtedly, some potential buyers will continue to decide that homeownership carries more risk than
they are willing to undertake at this time. We believe that many others will conclude that, with the economy
improving and the affordability of home ownership at very attractive levels, it is the right time to purchase a
home.
In 2013, CoreLogic economists expect the housing market will continue to benefit from increased housing-
purchase demand and importantly, a steadily improving economy. Given these factors, we project home prices
will rise about 6 percent. This increase will further reduce the current negative equity overhang and set up
2014 as a year of transition away from a dependence on refinancing volumes toward a purchase-oriented
originations market.
From the CEO
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Solutions in Shifting Markets
As we transition, all participants in the mortgage industry will benefit from adaptability. Here are some
suggestions to consider as you focus on making your business even more nimble heading into 2014:
Remain flexible. You need the ability to adjust staffing quickly when the refinance boom recedes. Select a vendor
that can provide experienced teams of mortgage experts to help manage fluctuating production volumes. Ideally,
your vendor arranges its teams and processes to mirror the way you do business, and can present solutions in
days, rather than weeks.
Raise the bar. The regulatory environment is more complex than ever with different state and federal requirements.
Skilled and dedicated counsel enhance your ability to respond quickly to regulatory changes and demands.
Could you use more power on your compliance team? As you launch staff training initiatives and programs
to prepare for new quality control measures and legal reviews, a solutions-oriented expert can facilitate your
company’s readiness to meet changing servicing guidelines. Finally, select your vendors and partners carefully
based on quality, delivery and their ability to pass muster with the regulators.
Operate more efficiently. Streamlining your operations is a must in a transitioning market. Are you launching
new automation initiatives by building out and upgrading systems? Have you decided to shift more services
online and go paperless? Look to a collaborative business relationship that increases your ability to implement
these changes. The result? You’ve made the process as simple as possible for your team.
Solid information dramatically improves your ability to make smart decisions in a transitioning market. In this
month’s issue of “The MarketPulse,” Dr. Mark Fleming, our chief economist, shares insights on the status of
the economic recovery and gives an overview of property disposition timelines. You’ll also find Deputy Chief
Economist Sam Khater’s in-depth analysis of the supply constraints that exist in many markets today, with a
chart highlighting short sale and REO growth rates by state.
In closing, thank you for selecting CoreLogic as a prime source for solutions to improve your business
performance, identify and manage growth opportunities, and mitigate risk. You can depend on us to help you
successfully navigate compliance and simplify your workflow, technology and vendor management, all the while
delivering unique insights through property, homeowner and mortgage analytics.
Sincerely,
Anand Nallathambi
President and CEO
iv© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
The Authors
Anand K. NallathambiPresident and Chief Executive Officer
Anand K. Nallathambi is the president and chief executive officer of CoreLogic, a leading provider of consumer, financial and property information, analytics and services to business and government. Nallathambi is responsible for all aspects of the CoreLogic business.
Dr. Mark Fleming Chief Economist
Dr. Mark Fleming is the chief economist for CoreLogic. He leads the economics team responsible for analysis, commentary, and forecasting trends in the real estate and mortgage markets.
Sam KhaterDeputy Chief Economist
Sam Khater is deputy chief economist for CoreLogic. He is responsible for providing in-depth economic, mortgage market and real estate analysis.
Aurora BristorSenior Research Analyst
Aurora Bristor is a senior research analyst for CoreLogic in the Office of the Chief Economist. She develops and delivers mortgage market and real estate analytics in support of CoreLogic and the CoreLogic Academic Research Council.
Table of ContentsFrom the CEO ............................................................... ii
The Authors ................................................................... iv
Media Contacts ........................................................... iv
The MarketPulse...........................................................1
Hidden Costs to Consumers .....................................1
The Cost of Extended Disposition Timelines ............................................2
The Rise of Institutional Investors and the Decline of REOs ...........................................3
Where REOs Have Declined the Most ............3
Institutional Versus Individual Investor ..........3
Impact on Prices .....................................................5
Conclusion ................................................................5
REO Declines Are Not Always a Good Thing ................................................................6
In the News .....................................................................6
National Summary January 2013 .....................7
Largest 25 CBSA Summary January 2013 ............................................................7
State Summary January 2013 ............................8
Home Prices .............................................................9
Mortgage Performance ...................................... 10
Home Sales .............................................................. 11
Variable Descriptions .......................................... 12
Media ContactsFor real estate industry and trade media:
Bill Campbell [email protected] (212) 995.8057 (office) (917) 328.6539 (mobile)
For general news media:
Lori Guyton [email protected] (901) 277.6066
The MarketPulse
1© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
Housing Statistics (January 2013)
HPI® YOY Chg . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9.7%
HPI YOY Chg XD . . . . . . . . . . .9.0%
NegEq Share (Q4 2012) . . . .21.5%
Shadow Inventory (10/2012) . . .2.3m
Distressed Discount. . . . . . . 40.0%
New Sales (ths, ann.) . . . . . . . . . 178
Existing Sales (ths, ann.) . . . . 2,081
Average Sales Price . . . . . . $251,578
HPI Peak-to-Current (PTC). . . -26.9%
Foreclosure Stock PTC . . . .-25.7%
Volume 2, Issue 3
March 18th, 2013
Data as of January 2013
s we enter March and look
forward to the green shoots of
spring, news of modest economic
growth continues. In January, the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimated that
the economy contracted by 0.1 percent.
But thanks to the fact that these economic
numbers are typically revised, the latest
news is better, with fourth quarter GDP
growth estimated at 0.1 percent. Not
much growth, but not negative either!
Many worry that the Federal Reserve’s
extraordinary financial measures to
achieve this modest growth will cause
significant levels of inflation in the longer
run. However, the headline consumer
price index, CPI, which measures
overall inflation, is currently steady and
indicates that consumer prices rose only
1.7 percent over a year ago December. So
for now, this low CPI level and indications
that it is not trending higher alleviates
concern of near-term inflation.
Digging deeper into the CPI data reveals
a hidden cost to the consumer. Prices of
what we eat, where we live and how we
get around are slowly rising. Based on
December data, food prices are growing
at 2.4 percent per year. Energy prices,
including gasoline, while declining since
November 2012, had dramatic rises earlier
in the year. The price of shelter (housing
prices and rents) is also on the rise. To
be clear, these increases are not dramatic,
but still something to watch. As the cost of
life increases, less is left for discretionary
spending. Food and energy prices are
typically set more by global demand and
supply dynamics than domestic drivers.
An American consumer’s costs are in part
determined by the desires and demands
of consumers around the world.
Hidden Costs to ConsumersBy Mark Fleming
A
Cont...
FIGuRE 1. AVERAGE MONTHS IN DISTRESS – SDQ TO REO SALENumber of Months
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Jan
-03
Jun
-03
No
v-0
3
Ap
r-0
4
Sep
-04
Feb
-05
Jul-
05
Dec
-05
May
-06
Oct
-06
Mar
-07
Aug
-07
Jan
-08
Jun
-08
No
v-0
8
Ap
r-0
9
Sep
-09
Feb
-10
Jul-
10
Dec
-10
May
-11
Oct
-11
Mar
-12
Aug
-12
Non-Judicial States Judicial States
Fig 1 avg months in distress
Change in YOY Prices
Source: CoreLogic October 2012
2© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
The Cost of Extended Disposition Timelines
Consumer costs are also likely to rise with more regulatory oversight of mortgage servicing practices. Whether federal or state, such as the California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights, these regulations increase the time it takes to dispose of a distressed mortgage asset.
Extended disposition timelines impose operational costs on servicers, carrying costs on investors in the mortgages, and in some cases, significant legal risk and compliance costs. The likely result is more expensive mortgages and possibly increased rationing of credit based on the additional costs of disposition, which may vary dramatically by local foreclosure process requirements. In some judicial foreclosure states the timelines are long, measured in years instead of months. But what is “normal?” To determine what constitutes a normal timeline, one has to look at disposition timelines prior to the housing crisis.
In this CoreLogic analysis, the disposition timeline starts with a serious delinquency (90 days) and concludes when the property becomes a real estate owned (REO) sale. This includes the amount of time the loan sits in delinquency before being placed
in foreclosure by the servicer, sits in foreclosure while the foreclosure process occurs, and then sits in REO before becoming an REO sale. Therefore, properties are in serious delinquency (SDQ, 90 days or more past due) for a period of time, in foreclosure for a period of time and in REO until finally sold.
Figure 1 shows the average number of months it takes a property to pass through the entire disposition timeline in judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states. While we may expect a longer disposition process in judicial states, this has only been the case since mid-2008. The “cost” of disposition was approximately the same, taking, on average, seven months in the first half of the prior decade. At the end of 2012, the disposition time had risen across all states, averaging 24 months in non-judicial states and 35 months in judicial states. It takes 46 percent longer to complete a distressed asset disposition in judicial states than in non-judicial states. Notably, it also takes almost five times longer to process
a full disposition in non-judicial states today than in 2003 when serious delinquencies were rare, foreclosure could happen quickly and an REO sale was expedient.
Reasons for the increased time to disposition include operational capacity constraints at the servicers
and in the court systems, more complex disposition processes that consider a variety of different alternatives, legal challenges to the process and changing regulations. From a housing market perspective, the increased timelines are helping to constrain supply of the most deleterious assets. In
the short run this actually benefits the housing markets. CoreLogic Deputy Chief Economist Sam Khater discusses this in more detail in his article “The Rise of Institutional Investors and the Decline of REOs” in this issue of The MarketPulse.
Among mortgage lenders, the cost of disposition is better recognized and understood today than ever before. The costs are higher across the board and even more so in judicial states. Recognizing this cost of mortgage lending will lead to differentiated pricing of loans to reflect either differences in disposition timelines, differentiated minimum qualifications for credit or both.
“… it also takes almost five times longer
to process a full disposition in non-
judicial states today than in 2003…”
End.
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
Footnotes
1 The 16 markets analyzed include Atlanta; Charlotte, N.C.; Chicago; Detroit; Las Vegas; Los Angeles; Miami; Minneapolis, Minn.; Oakland, Calif.; Orlando, Fla.; Phoenix; Riverside, Calif.; Sacramento, Calif.; San Diego; Tampa, Fla., and Warren, Mich.
2 Goldstein, Matthew, “The Dollars Keep Rolling In for Foreclosed Home Funds,” Reuters, Feb 20, 2013.
Cont...
uring 2012, real estate owned (REO) inventories fell by 30 percent. This decline
not only triggered a steep rebound in home prices, but renewed optimism about the broader housing market and recovery. However, the decline across markets has been uneven. Midwestern and northeastern markets continue to struggle with REO inventory levels, while some markets in the South and Southwest have experienced massive declines.
Where REOs Have Declined the Most
REOs began to decline in early 2011. Since the flow of completed foreclosures fell by about one-third after 2010’s robo-signing scandal, this was unsurprising. While the co-movements in REO declines across markets were more uniform in 2011, some drastic differences emerged in 2012. Beginning early in 2012, many of the former boom/bust cities began to experience unusually large declines in REOs relative to other markets where REOs remained flat or increased. By far the largest decline in REOs in 2012 occurred in Atlanta (see the Chart of the Month on page 6).
Examining the top five largest REO-decline markets reveals the most remarkable aspect, which was the quick and sudden drop that occurred in early
2012 (Figure 1). REOs in these markets began to decline in 2011 at a moderate, though volatile, pace until early 2012, at which point the level of REOs collapsed. Interestingly, REO levels not only collapsed, but the monthly volatility disappeared. Economic and real estate data indicates a large exogenous shift that has impacted the data and overwhelmed normal volatility.
Institutional Versus Individual Investor
The acceleration in the decline last year suggests that the intensity of investment activity ramped up quite a bit. But was the increase due to individual or institutional investors? To answer that question, CoreLogic created a composite list of 16 markets that include the top five large markets for REO declines, the top 10 markets ranked by the number of REOs, and markets that have been
identified as ones in which institutional
investors are active1.
The media has focused attention on
institutional investors using cash to
invest in single-family residential
properties to rent, but relative to
the overall market, the scale of their
purchases is still very small. For example,
Blackstone is slated to be the largest
purchaser in 2013 with a commitment to
buy about 15,000 properties, compared
to the 600,000 investor-purchased
homes that used first-lien financing in
20122. Institutional investors are rapidly
increasing, however, and given their
focus in a few small selected markets,
their impact is very large. Therefore,
to understand what is driving the
market, both types of investors must
be analyzed.
For a variety of reasons, it is very
difficult to cleanly identify and
The Rise of Institutional Investors and the Decline of REOsBy Sam Khater
D FIGuRE 1. TOP 5 REO DECLINE MARKETSREO Index = 100 January 2010
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Jan
-10
Mar
-10
May
-10
Jul-
10
Sep
-10
No
v-10
Jan
-11
Mar
-11
May
-11
Jul-
11
Sep
-11
No
v-11
Jan
-12
Mar
-12
May
-12
Jul-
12
Sep
-12
No
v-12
Las Vegas Oakland Phoenix Riverside Sacramento
Khater: fig 1 top 5 reo decline markets
Source: CoreLogic December 2012
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
classify individual investors versus
institutional investors. To create a
proxy for individual investor
activity, we defined any investor
that used first-lien financing as
an individual since the majority
of small individual investors
would most likely finance
their purchase3. We defined
institutional investors as entities
that purchased five or more
properties a year using the same name,
or investors that used an incorporated
entity to fund their purchases4.
After collapsing in late 2008 and early
2009, individual investor activity
reached a trough of about 10,000
monthly purchases. It slowly rebounded
in late 2009 and 2010 and continued
to rise in 2011. Since then, individual
investors have consistently been
increasing their presence, becoming
a large force in 2012. In fact, individual
investor transactions swelled to more
than 50,000 units by late fall 2012—
the highest level since March 2006, one
month before the peak in home prices.
While institutional investors are rapidly
entering the market, they are investing
in a targeted manner, selecting some
markets over others. Of the 16 markets
analyzed, CoreLogic classified them
into markets with rapidly rising
institutional investor activity versus
markets with flat or a smaller increase in
institutional activity. Cities with rapidly
rising institutional activity include
Atlanta, Ga.; Detroit, Mich.; Las Vegas,
Nev.; Phoenix, Ariz.; and Los Angeles,
Riverside and Sacramento, Calif. Cities
with flat or lower recent increases
in institutional investor activity
include Charlotte, N.C.; Chicago, Ill.; Minneapolis, Minn.; Oakland and San
Diego, Calif.; Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, Fla.; and Warren, Mich.
The markets with r is ing institutional activity increased their transaction share by more than 50 percent, and the increase primarily occurred in 2012. Markets with flat or smaller increases in institutional investors
increased their share by less than 15 percent. However, the increases in these markets were back loaded in 2012, indicating that institutional investors are beginning to move beyond the core markets where they ramped up activity during 2012.
Even within the markets identified as ones with a rising institutional share, three markets clearly stood above the rest because they had a significant rise and a high share of institutional investors. These markets are Atlanta, Las Vegas and Phoenix. Not coincidentally, they were the markets with the largest percentage of numerical declines in REOs last year. The institutional share of investors in these markets in 2010 and 2011 was flat, but in 2012 they rapidly increased their purchases (Figure 2).
In Phoenix, the share of institutional investors throughout 2011 was 16 percent, but in 2012 it rapidly increased, reaching 26 percent by the end of the year—the largest rise of any market we examined. Atlanta was a close second to Phoenix with a 15 percent
Cont...
“The markets with rising institutional
[investor] activity increased their
transaction share by more than
50 percent, and the increase
primarily occurred in 2012.”
Footnotes3 Individual investor classification excludes borrowers who are buying second homes. While second home activity was up in 2012, the rise was very modest compared to investors' activity.4 Since the majority of institutional investors use cash, CoreLogic used public data to identify those investors, where investors can be identified irrespective of the type of financing.
CoreLogic used a threshold of five or more property purchases within a single year to identify institutional investors. CoreLogic used that threshold to identify institutional investors because the GSEs limit the number of properties that individual investors can finance. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae limit financing to four and 10 properties, respectively. Therefore, the threshold is large enough to remove most individual investors. CoreLogic also included buyers that used a corporate entity name because many institutional investors are continuously renaming their entities, and CoreLogic economists were concerned that the approach would miss some buyers. This approach will also pick up some individual investors but they are a minority.
FIGuRE 2. RISE IN INSTITuTIONAL INVESTORS DRIVE DOWN REOsInstitutional Investor Share of Sales
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
24%
26%
28%
Jan
-10
Mar
-10
May
-10
Jul-
10
Sep
-10
No
v-10
Jan
-11
Mar
-11
May
-11
Jul-
11
Sep
-11
No
v-11
Jan
-12
Mar
-12
May
-12
Jul-
12
Sep
-12
No
v-12
Atlanta Las Vegas Phoenix
Khater: fig 2 rise in institutional investors
Source: CoreLogic December 2012
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
share in 2011 that had reached 24 percent by the end of 2012. In Las Vegas, the institutional investor share was 15 percent in 2011, but reached 22 percent by December 2012. Relative to individual investors, who have been steadily increasing their presence over the last three years, the rise in institutional investment activity has been confined to 2012. The important takeaway is that this is a small class of buyers that has grown significantly over the last year.
The analysis thus far has been concentrated on the movements in the institutional investor share because the movements in investor shares (versus level) typically have more of an impact on prices. However, the level of institutional activity is also very revealing. In Miami, institutional investors accounted for 30 percent of sales in 2012, by far the highest of any market examined (Figure 3). Miami was followed by Phoenix (23 percent), Charlotte (21 percent), Las Vegas (19 percent) and Orlando (18 percent). Clearly, institutional investors are concentrated in five states: Florida, Georgia, Arizona, Nevada and North Carolina.
Impact on Prices
Given the rise of both individual and institutional investor demand, it’s not a surprise REO prices are increasing in high-demand markets. With Phoenix leading the pack and Chicago the laggard, all 16 markets are experiencing increases in REO prices (Figure 4). In Q4 2012, Phoenix REO prices were 37 percent higher than a year ago, followed by Las Vegas (30 percent) and several California markets. All six markets with rising shares of
institutional investors experienced double-digit increases and were among the top nine for REO price appreciation. More importantly, the ripple effects are greatly impacting the broader market. Lower-end home prices in markets with rising shares of institutional investors are up 15 percent from a year ago, compared to only 6 percent for the remaining markets.
Conclusion
Institutional investors accelerated purchases in 2012 in select markets with more activity in the South and
Southwest, while generally being much
less active in California and the Midwest.
The large REO volume declines in Las
Vegas, Atlanta and Phoenix are due
to institutional investor transaction
activity, while the declines in California
markets such as San Diego, Oakland
and Riverside are primarily due to
individual investor transaction activity.
In the Midwest, REOs remain elevated.
Minneapolis and Chicago are drawing
less interest from both types of investors
generally, relative to these other markets.
Only Detroit is garnering interest from
institutional investors.End.
FIGuRE 3. INSTITuTIONAL INVESTORS MOST ACTIVE IN SOuTH AND SOuTHWESTAverage Institutional Investor Share in 2012
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Mia
mi
Pho
enix
Cha
rlo
tte
Las
Veg
as
Orl
and
o
Atl
anta
Tam
pa
Det
roit
Lo
s A
ngel
es
Sac
ram
ento
Riv
ersi
de
Min
neap
olis
Chi
cag
o
War
ren
San
Die
go
Oak
land
Khater: fig 3 institutional investors most active in south and southwest
Source: CoreLogic December 2012
FIGuRE 4. REO PRICES INCREASING FASTEST IN MARKETS WITH RISING
INSTITuTIONAL INVESTORSQ4 2012 REO Price Year-Over-Year
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Pho
enix
Las
Veg
as
San
Die
go
Sac
ram
ento
Oak
land
Lo
s A
ngel
es
Riv
ersi
de
Cha
rlo
tte
Atl
anta
Min
neap
olis
Tam
pa
Mia
mi
War
ren
Orl
and
o
Chi
cag
o
Markets with Rising Share of Institutional Investors
Khater: fig 4 reo prices increasing
Source: CoreLogic December 2012
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
REO Declines Are Not Always a Good Thing
By Aurora Bristor
In January CoreLogic wrote that a drop in REO sales signaled an improving market5. While true for
most markets, a surge in bulk investor
activity can destabilize other markets.
This chart includes the top 10 markets
by REO decline in 2012. It also shows
some outliers to monitor. Atlanta is
a clear outlier at an indexed6 REO
drop from peak to trough of 366. The
second tier in declines is composed of
four western cities: Phoenix, Riverside,
Los Angeles and Las Vegas, ranging
from 236 to 255 lost indexed REOs.
Within this otherwise tight group
and even across all other markets, Las
Vegas distinguishes itself with a much
more dramatic REO shift. It outstrips
the others in the REO decline as a
share of the market (2.8 percent), and
in the peak to trough percent change
(-80.4 percent). While some of these
markets may be recovering, in others,
the REO decline is driven by investors,
and homeowners may be pulled out of
the water into a rocky boat.
REO DECLINESPeak to Trough % Change
-100%
-90%
-80%
-70%
-60%
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Indexed by REO Decline as Share of Market
Atlanta
Riverside
Las Vegas
Oakland
Houston
Phoenix
Los Angeles
Warren
Sacramento
Detroit
COTM reo declines
Las Vegas
Atlanta
Note: Bubbles are sized by REO Decline as Share of Market Source: CoreLogic January 2013
End.
Inman, March 5Home prices take biggest leap in 7 years National home prices in January were up 9.7 percent from a year ago, the biggest annual increase since April 2006, according to data aggregator CoreLogic's home price index.
LA Times, March 5Home prices up 9.7% year-over-year in January, CoreLogic reports"With these gains, the housing market is poised to enter the spring selling season on sound footing," said Mark Fleming, CoreLogic's chief economist.
Dallas Morning News, March 5Home prices see biggest jump since 2006 in CoreLogic reportAnd researchers at CoreLogic Inc. said Tuesday that indicators point to a similar home price gain for February. Home prices across the country were up 9.7 percent in January from the same month in 2012, their report said.
Reuters, March 5Home prices rose in January: CoreLogic
Home prices rose at the beginning of the year, another sign
the recovery in the housing market is gaining traction, data
from CoreLogic showed on Tuesday.
HousingWire, February 28Foreclosures fall 17.8% from year ago levels
Foreclosure activity plummeted 17.8% year-over-year in
January with only 61,000 foreclosures completed last month,
down from 75,000 a year earlier, CoreLogic reported.
Wall Street Journal, February 22Is It Safe to Sell Your House Now?
Seven years after the housing market began to collapse,
rising prices and thinner inventories are presenting new
opportunities for home sellers.
In the News
Footnotes5 Gilberto Méndez, “A Decline in Home Sales That We Can All Appreciate,” The MarketPulse, Vol 2. Issue 1.6 Peak to trough decline indexed to smallest drop among top ten markets, Detroit set to 100.
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
NATIONAL SuMMARY JANuARY 2013
Feb 2012
Mar 2012
Apr 2012
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
Dec 2012
Jan 2013 2010 2011 2012
Total Sales* 3,490 4,303 4,309 4,866 4,931 4,589 4,876 4,163 4,519 4,113 3,686 3,004 4,160 4,000 4,247
— New Sales* 248 313 293 333 341 305 334 302 321 308 282 178 345 291 299
— Existing Sales* 2,241 2,852 2,944 3,397 3,499 3,271 3,484 2,930 3,146 2,771 2,564 2,081 2,689 2,607 2,924
— REO Sales* 664 738 680 703 649 591 606 508 570 597 439 405 801 759 613
— Short Sales* 300 362 358 397 406 394 419 395 448 405 379 318 274 303 379
Distressed Sales Share 27.6% 25.6% 24.1% 22.6% 21.4% 21.4% 21.0% 21.7% 22.5% 24.4% 22.2% 24.1% 25.8% 26.5% 23.3%
HPI MoM -0.3% 1.2% 2.2% 2.4% 2.0% 1.2% 0.5% -0.2% -0.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.7% -0.3% -0.3% 0.7%
HPI YoY -0.6% 1.0% 1.9% 2.9% 3.6% 4.0% 4.7% 5.2% 5.9% 7.1% 8.3% 9.7% -0.3% -4.1% 3.5%
HPI MoM Excluding Distressed -0.3% 0.9% 1.5% 1.8% 1.7% 0.9% 0.4% -0.2% -0.3% 0.2% 0.5% 1.8% -0.3% -0.3% 0.5%
HPI YoY Excluding Distressed -2.8% -1.5% -0.6% 0.5% 1.5% 2.1% 2.9% 3.4% 4.1% 5.3% 6.7% 9.0% -1.7% -3.9% 1.5%
90 Days + DQ Pct 7.2% 7.0% 7.0% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 6.8% 6.7% 6.5% 6.5% 6.4% 6.3% 8.1% 7.4% 6.8%
Foreclosure Pct 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.3% 3.1% 3.0% 3.0% 2.9% 3.2% 3.5% 3.3%
REO Pct 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4%
Pre-foreclosure Filings** 120 134 122 134 130 125 124 114 119 97 107 117 2,097 1,519 1,452
Completed Foreclosures** 66 65 61 70 66 62 68 78 58 49 56 61 1,129 918 774
Negative Equity Share N/A 23.7% N/A N/A 22.3% N/A N/A 22.0% N/A N/A 21.5% N/A 25.3% 24.9% 22.7%
Negative Equity** N/A 11,374 N/A N/A 10,779 N/A N/A 10,574 N/A N/A 10,409 N/A 11,904 11,820 10,925
Months Supply SDQ Homes 10.33 8.18 8.09 7.08 6.95 7.45 6.90 7.98 7.15 7.75 8.54 10.29 10.29 9.77 8.19
* Thousands of units, Annualized **Thousands of units †January Data
LARGEST 25 CBSA SuMMARY JANuARY 2013
Total Sales
12-month sum
Total Sales YOY
12-month sum
Distressed Sales Share (sales
12-month sum)
Distressed Sales Share
(sales 12-month
sum) A Year Ago
SFC HPI YoY
SFCXD HPI YoY
HPI Percent Change
from Peak
90 Days + DQ Pct
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies
YoY Chg
Percent Change Stock of
Foreclosures from Peak
Negative Equity
Share**
Months' Supply Distressed
Homes (total sales
12-month sum)
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL 86,051 23.7% 35.2% 35.9% 0.6% 4.3% -35% 9.9% -12.6% -21.4% 33.3% 16.8
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 90,881 12.8% 34.1% 41.7% 12.2% 12.1% -32% 5.0% -31.9% -57.4% 19.6% 7.7
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 74,682 24.1% 34.5% 37.6% 10.5% 9.1% -26% 6.9% -25.7% -44.0% 38.1% 10.5
New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ 65,315 4.1% 9.4% 10.4% 11.2% 11.1% -9% 8.9% -0.9% -4.6% 11.9% 15.2
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
60,460 1.6% 21.2% 27.7% 7.7% 8.0% -23% 5.3% -12.2% -26.1% 23.1% 8.6
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 101,362 11.4% 18.3% 20.7% 7.0% 8.5% -5% 4.2% -23.0% -41.0% 10.0% 3.9
Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ 107,099 -0.3% 30.4% 48.5% 22.7% 18.8% -40% 4.3% -45.8% -75.6% 36.6% 3.3
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 72,303 -1.8% 44.0% 54.5% 12.1% 13.4% -47% 6.7% -35.5% -69.3% 35.7% 7.3
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 77,731 11.2% 19.2% 21.0% 5.8% 8.1% -8% 4.2% -19.8% -35.7% 10.4% 4.0
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 43,782 7.2% 20.1% 27.5% 10.0% 10.2% -23% 3.8% -24.7% -52.7% 17.6% 6.2
Philadelphia, PA N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.7% 4.2% -13% 6.0% 1.3% -12.8% 10.6% N/A
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 38,649 18.7% 22.8% 29.3% 10.6% 11.4% -26% 5.9% -12.7% -5.1% 17.2% 8.9
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 53,014 22.3% 22.1% 33.1% 11.0% 9.2% -4% 3.1% -30.3% -55.6% 18.2% 3.3
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 42,984 15.4% 34.2% 42.8% 10.9% 12.4% -32% 4.0% -34.5% -62.8% 24.0% 5.1
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 35,459 21.8% 29.2% 35.7% 11.7% 11.5% -30% 3.4% -37.9% -58.0% 15.3% 5.1
Baltimore-Towson, MD 31,165 3.7% 17.3% 22.3% 3.8% 4.6% -23% 8.0% -0.5% -26.6% 18.9% 13.7
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 56,333 2.4% 29.8% 33.0% 8.2% 9.7% -42% 15.3% -16.4% -20.8% 44.1% 14.2
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 22,706 2.0% 6.7% 6.9% 0.4% 0.2% -25% 10.8% 0.9% -5.5% 9.9% 24.7
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 38,050 10.7% 36.5% 46.5% 14.9% 15.4% -37% 4.1% -36.8% -62.0% 26.6% 5.6
St. Louis, MO-IL 44,498 7.9% 26.5% 27.4% 4.3% 3.6% -21% 4.3% -17.9% -35.8% 15.9% 5.0
Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI N/A N/A N/A N/A 12.4% 10.7% -33% 4.3% -31.3% -64.2% 34.9% N/A
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 32,935 15.7% 24.1% 29.7% 8.7% 8.6% -24% 5.1% -11.5% -18.0% 17.7% 7.2
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 39,900 6.6% 43.9% 55.9% 15.3% 15.5% -44% 4.8% -38.3% -64.8% 31.7% 5.4
Edison-New Brunswick, NJ 23,369 -1.9% 12.0% 12.1% -1.2% -1.3% -28% 9.7% 6.0% -1.8% 17.6% 17.8
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 40,879 -8.2% 37.9% 42.8% 10.9% 9.4% -47% 15.3% -21.9% -28.2% 45.3% 15.6
NOTE: * Data may be light in some jurisdictions. †January Data ** Negative Equity Data through Q4 2012
8© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
STATE SuMMARY JANuARY 2013
State
Total Sales 12-month
sum
Total Sales YOY
12-month sum
Distressed Sales Share
(sales 12-month sum)
Distressed Sales Share (sales
12-month sum) A Year Ago
SFC HPI YoY
SFCXD HPI YoY
HPI Percent Change
from Peak90 Days +
DQ Pct
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies
YoY Chg
Percent Change Stock
of Foreclosures from Peak
Negative Equity
Share**
Months' Supply Distressed
Homes (total sales
12-month sum)
Alabama 33,329 -9.9% 17.1% 16.7% 0.2% 0.5% -22.3% 5.5% -9.8% -34.6% 18.3% 10.6
Alaska 10,543 2.7% 11.3% 12.8% 4.6% 5.1% -3.8% 2.0% -14.5% -36.4% 8.5% 1.8
Arizona 145,179 1.2% 30.4% 46.2% 20.1% 16.5% -38.9% 4.3% -41.4% -71.7% 34.9% 3.6
Arkansas 35,608 -15.4% 8.9% 8.7% 2.3% 2.3% -3.7% 5.8% 2.9% 0.0% 12.2% 5.6
California 486,714 8.7% 36.7% 46.6% 14.1% 14.5% -34.8% 4.6% -35.1% -62.0% 25.2% 6.1
Colorado 102,949 16.3% 22.6% 30.5% 9.8% 8.3% -5.6% 3.0% -28.2% -53.1% 17.4% 3.2
Connecticut 38,395 16.9% 19.6% 18.9% 2.3% 4.1% -24.7% 7.5% -1.7% -11.9% 14.8% 11.2
Delaware 8,616 -3.5% 21.8% 18.5% -0.1% 1.0% -23.4% 6.9% -1.4% -21.3% 16.6% 14.9
District of Columbia 7,358 8.9% 8.1% 12.4% 7.9% 7.5% 0.0% 5.7% -3.1% -21.8% 11.2% 8.6
Florida 418,891 2.7% 29.5% 34.0% 9.7% 8.5% -43.0% 14.9% -20.1% -26.7% 40.3% 12.3
Georgia 123,278 16.5% 29.5% 30.7% 9.0% 7.7% -24.5% 6.5% -23.2% -42.1% 33.8% 9.0
Hawaii 15,322 -2.8% 14.3% 20.4% 14.0% 13.9% -18.7% 6.0% -12.9% -14.0% 9.2% 7.9
Idaho 34,478 6.9% 19.7% 31.2% 14.9% 13.2% -29.3% 4.3% -21.9% -31.4% 21.0% 3.4
Illinois 141,334 14.8% 29.3% 27.8% -0.4% 4.1% -32.9% 8.5% -12.4% -21.4% 28.4% 13.2
Indiana 105,437 2.5% 18.9% 18.6% 5.0% 3.6% -11.7% 6.0% -15.4% -26.1% 9.7% 5.7
Iowa 43,374 -8.9% 9.2% 9.7% 2.0% 1.7% -3.4% 3.8% -13.3% -20.8% 9.9% 3.6
Kansas 33,049 14.4% 15.7% 17.7% 4.5% 5.6% -9.2% 4.0% -14.1% -31.0% 10.4% 4.5
Kentucky 42,882 -7.5% 15.1% 14.4% 0.9% 3.5% -9.3% 5.2% -12.5% -30.7% 10.5% 6.3
Louisiana 46,840 -11.0% 15.0% 13.7% 4.1% 4.1% -5.5% 5.7% -11.3% -29.1% 16.4% 6.6
Maine 12,444 16.4% 10.0% 10.2% 1.9% 2.0% -21.6% 7.2% -3.4% -9.1% 7.9% 10.1
Maryland 68,346 1.9% 21.1% 27.0% 4.0% 5.1% -28.1% 8.1% -3.8% -27.0% 23.5% 14.1
Massachusetts 95,174 23.8% 10.6% 13.7% 5.0% 5.3% -20.3% 5.4% -8.7% -22.3% 15.9% 5.8
Michigan 164,044 10.5% 38.4% 37.8% 6.0% 7.5% -37.4% 4.9% -28.2% -58.8% 31.9% 4.8
Minnesota 64,525 -2.1% 17.5% 22.6% 8.3% 8.4% -22.0% 3.6% -23.8% -51.4% 16.4% 5.7
Mississippi 6,350 -22.5% 17.4% 12.9% 3.3% 7.6% -13.9% 7.0% -12.1% -31.7% 22.7% 30.7
Missouri 86,094 9.5% 24.6% 26.1% 3.9% 3.5% -20.3% 4.0% -19.0% -42.3% 15.5% 4.3
Montana 14,244 10.5% 14.2% 15.8% 9.5% 9.6% -13.3% 2.5% -21.9% -43.6% 7.2% 2.7
Nebraska 30,039 1.3% 9.4% 9.9% 5.3% 4.6% -2.1% 2.6% -17.8% -35.8% 10.9% 2.2
Nevada 67,797 -8.3% 46.5% 56.5% 17.4% 17.5% -51.6% 10.8% -23.4% -51.0% 52.4% 8.5
New Hampshire 18,587 17.4% 24.2% 25.0% 3.8% 5.0% -18.3% 4.1% -16.1% -33.7% 20.1% 4.9
New Jersey 77,632 0.0% 14.3% 15.2% 1.5% 1.7% -27.7% 11.6% 5.1% -1.6% 20.0% 21.8
New Mexico 21,648 -3.3% 17.1% 18.7% 4.6% 4.6% -19.6% 5.5% -7.3% -15.8% 12.7% 7.7
New York 152,156 0.4% 6.2% 6.8% 8.6% 6.3% -9.0% 8.5% 2.1% -4.4% 8.3% 12.5
North Carolina 120,334 11.0% 15.6% 15.5% 3.1% 3.4% -10.9% 5.3% -13.4% -26.7% 14.1% 6.8
North Dakota 13,359 5.6% 3.3% 4.3% 7.5% 7.5% -0.4% 1.3% -21.5% -17.4% 5.6% 0.7
Ohio 151,903 6.8% 24.1% 27.6% 3.1% 3.3% -19.2% 6.5% -12.7% -25.6% 25.0% 7.3
Oklahoma 64,525 0.7% 10.6% 10.6% 3.0% 1.3% -2.3% 5.1% -7.5% -9.3% 9.1% 3.6
Oregon 57,040 14.3% 24.7% 29.2% 9.1% 8.5% -24.7% 5.2% -9.7% -17.7% 18.9% 6.7
Pennsylvania 131,479 1.6% 12.9% 12.9% 3.3% 3.9% -11.9% 6.1% 0.8% -12.5% 11.1% 8.0
Rhode Island 12,916 11.8% 22.9% 24.2% 0.1% 1.6% -35.5% 7.4% -6.6% -20.4% 23.4% 8.8
South Carolina 65,666 10.7% 21.8% 23.8% 6.9% 9.0% -14.8% 5.9% -14.7% -25.5% 16.3% 6.7
South Dakota N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.0% 5.5% 0.0% 2.3% -13.9% -28.8% N/A N/A
Tennessee 111,667 11.8% 20.7% 20.8% 2.7% 4.5% -12.1% 5.4% -18.0% -44.7% 16.6% 4.3
Texas 431,889 9.2% 16.2% 17.5% 6.0% 7.6% -6.3% 4.0% -19.9% -36.3% 8.5% 3.2
utah 51,064 12.1% 19.1% 29.2% 10.7% 11.3% -23.9% 4.1% -20.9% -47.5% 17.0% 4.1
Vermont N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.3% 6.1% -6.8% 4.1% -3.6% -4.3% N/A N/A
Virginia 94,379 -2.1% 21.7% 24.6% 6.4% 5.9% -21.3% 3.7% -13.1% -32.6% 19.3% 5.9
Washington 88,336 8.5% 21.9% 26.5% 8.3% 8.9% -25.2% 6.2% -6.6% 0.0% 17.9% 9.5
West Virginia N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.1% 4.4% -28.8% 3.8% -12.8% -39.8% 8.8% N/A
Wisconsin 65,440 -2.3% 17.0% 15.8% 4.5% 4.4% -14.5% 4.0% -16.9% -36.1% 16.5% 5.5
Wyoming 6,958 12.3% 11.9% 14.6% 10.1% 8.6% -11.0% 2.0% -24.6% -66.3% 9.6% 2.4
NOTE: * Data may be light in some jurisdictions. †January Data ** Negative Equity Data through Q4 2012
9© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
Home Prices ► Home prices nationwide, including distressed sales, increased on a year-over-year basis by 9.7 percent in January 2013 compared to January 2012. This change represents the biggest increase since April 2006 and the 11th consecutive year-over-year increase in home prices nationally. On a month-over-month basis, including distressed sales, home prices increased by 0.7 percent in January 2013 compared to December 2012.
► Including distressed sales, the five states with the highest home price appreciation were: Arizona (+20.1 percent), Nevada (+17.4 percent), Idaho (+14.9 percent), California (+14.1 percent) and Hawaii (+14 percent). The five states with the largest peak-to-current declines, including distressed transactions, were Nevada (-51.6 percent), Florida (-43 percent), Arizona (-38.9 percent), Michigan (-37.4 percent) and Rhode Island (-35.5 percent). Nationally, the distressed price discount reached 40 percent. The short sales price discount (a component of the distressed price discount) reached 27 percent, the largest short sale discount since September 2006.
YoY HPI GROWTH FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATES Min, Max, Current since Jan 1976
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
AZ
NV ID CA HI
UT
WY
CO FL
MT
OR
GA
NY
WA
MN
DC
ND SC
VA VT
WV MI
TX
NE IN
Current
2.58x3.65 5pt gothamPrices: yoy hpi growth for 25 lowest rate states jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
HPI BY PRICE SEGMENT Indexed to Jan 2011
95
97
99
101
103
105
107
109
111
113
Jan
-11
Feb
-11
Mar
-11
Ap
r-11
May
-11
Jun
-11
Jul-
11
Aug
-11
Sep
-11
Oct
-11
No
v-11
Dec
-11
Jan
-12
Feb
-12
Mar
-12
Ap
r-12
May
-12
Jun
-12
Jul-
12
Aug
-12
Sep
-12
Oct
-12
No
v-12
Dec
-12
Jan
-13
Price 0-75% of Median Price 75-100% of MedianPrice 100-125% of Median Price > 125% of Median
2.64x3.27 5pt gothamPrices: hpi by price segment jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
HOME PRICE INDEXPct Change from Year Ago Pct Change from Month Ago
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
All Transactions Excluding Distressed All Transactions - Right Axis
2.77x3.66 5pt gotham bookPrices: home price index jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
PRICE TO INCOME RATIO Indexed to Jan 1976
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
Jan
-76
Ap
r-77
Jul-
78
Oct
-79
Jan
-81
Ap
r-8
2
Jul-
83
Oct
-84
Jan
-86
Ap
r-8
7
Jul-
88
Oct
-89
Jan
-91
Ap
r-9
2
Jul-
93
Oct
-94
Jan
-96
Ap
r-9
7
Jul-
98
Oct
-99
Jan
-01
Ap
r-0
2
Jul-
03
Oct
-04
Jan
-06
Ap
r-0
7
Jul-
08
Oct
-09
Jan
-11
Ap
r-12
Price/Income Ratio
2.66x3.52Prices: price to income ratio jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic, BEA January 2013
DISTRESSED SALES DISCOuNT
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
REO Price Discount Short Sale Price Discount - Right Axis
2.72x3.56Prices: distressed sales discount jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
10© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
Mortgage Performance ► At the end of January 2013, there were just under 2.6 million mortgages, or 6.4 percent, in serious delinquency (SDQ, defined as a mortgage 90 days or more past due, including those in foreclosure or REO). Florida continued to lead the U.S. with the highest SDQ rate (14.9 percent). Nationally, the inventory of foreclosed homes stood at 2.9 percent, a 21 percent decrease from a year ago and the largest year-over-year decrease over the last 12 years. The inventory of foreclosed homes is down 25.7 percent from the peak in January 2011.
► In January 2013, there were 61,000 completed foreclosures in the U.S., down from 75,000 in January 2012, which represents a year-over-year decrease of 19 percent. Completed foreclosures are an indication of the total number of homes actually lost to foreclosure. Since the financial crisis began in September 2008, approximately 4.2 million foreclosures have been completed across the country.
CONFORMING PRIME SERIOuS DELINQuENCY RATEBy Origination Year
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
3 m
on
ths
6 m
ont
hs
9 m
ont
hs
12 m
ont
hs
15 m
ont
hs
18 m
on
ths
21 m
ont
hs
24 m
ont
hs
27 m
ont
hs
30 m
ont
hs
33 m
on
ths
36 m
ont
hs
39 m
ont
hs
42
mo
nths
45
mo
nths
48
mo
nths
51 m
ont
hs
54 m
ont
hs
57 m
ont
hs
60
mo
nths
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total
2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
3.34x3.45Performance: conforming prime serious del rate dec 2012
Source: CoreLogic December 2012
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
JuMBO PRIME SERIOuS DELINQuENCY RATEBy Origination Year
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
3 m
on
ths
6 m
ont
hs
9 m
ont
hs
12 m
ont
hs
15 m
ont
hs
18 m
on
ths
21 m
ont
hs
24 m
ont
hs
27 m
ont
hs
30 m
ont
hs
33 m
on
ths
36 m
ont
hs
39 m
ont
hs
42
mo
nths
45
mo
nths
48
mo
nths
51 m
ont
hs
54 m
ont
hs
57 m
ont
hs
60
mo
nths
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total
2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
3.1x3.44Performance: jumbo prime serious del rate dec 2012
Source: CoreLogic December 2012
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
SERIOuS DELINQuENCIES FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATESMin, Max, Current since Jan 2000
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%F
L
NJ
NV IL NY
MD CT RI
ME
MS
DE
GA
OH
WA HI
PA IN SC
LA
AR
DC
NM AL
MA
TN
Current
2.5x3.57Performance: serious del for 25 highest rate states jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
OVERALL MORTGAGE PERFORMANCE
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
0.8%
0.9%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
90+ Days DQ Pct Foreclosure Pct REO Pct - Right Axis
2.53x3.42Performance: overall mortgage performance jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
PRE-FORECLOSuRE FILINGS AND COMPLETED FORECLOSuRESIn Thousands (3mma) In Thousands
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
Completed Foreclosures Pre-Foreclosure Filings - Right Axis
2.69x3.45Performance: pre foreclosure filings and completed
foreclosures jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
11© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 3
Home Sales ► Total home sales decreased by 4 percent year over year in January 2013. New homes sales experienced a year-over-year decrease of 16 percent. However, sales of previously owned homes grew by 5 percent on a year-over-year basis.
► Distressed sales accounted for 24 percent of all homes sales nationwide in January 2013. REO sales (a component of distressed sales) accounted for 13 percent of all sales. While the share of REO sales increased over the previous month, this figure remains far below the 32 percent share of total sales in January 2011. Like REO sales, the short sales share also increased over the previous month to 11 percent. The states with the highest distressed sales share are Nevada (47 percent), Michigan (38 percent), California (37 percent), Arizona (30 percent), and Georgia and Florida (at 29 percent respectively).
HOME SALES SHARE BY PRICE TIERAs a Percentage of Total Sales
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Jan
-00
Jul-
00
Jan
-01
Jul-
01
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
0-100K 100K-200K 200K+
2.54x3.42Sales: home sales vol by price tier jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
NEW HOME SALES TRENDSIn Thousands In Thousands
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
Jan
-02
Jun
-02
No
v-0
2
Ap
r-0
3
Sep
-03
Feb
-04
Jul-
04
Dec
-04
May
-05
Oct
-05
Mar
-06
Aug
-06
Jan
-07
Jun
-07
No
v-0
7
Ap
r-0
8
Sep
-08
Feb
-09
Jul-
09
Dec
-09
May
-10
Oct
-10
Mar
-11
Aug
-11
Jan
-12
Jun
-12
No
v-12
Median Price Volume - Right Axis
2.75x3.51Sales: new home sales trends jan 2013
Feb
-12
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
DISTRESSED SALE SHARE FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATESMin, Max, Current
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%M
I
NV
CA FL IL DE
OH
AZ
MO
NH
GA
MD
OR
CO
WA
TN
VA CT
SC RI
MS
AL
KS IN NC
Current
2.39x3.48Sales: distressed sale share for 25 highest rate states jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
DISTRESSED SALES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Jan
-06
May
-06
Sep
-06
Jan
-07
May
-07
Sep
-07
Jan
-08
May
-08
Sep
-08
Jan
-09
May
-09
Sep
-09
Jan
-10
May
-10
Sep
-10
Jan
-11
May
-11
Sep
-11
Jan
-12
May
-12
Sep
-12
Jan
-13
Short Sales Share REO Sales Share
2.62x3.64Sales: distressed sales as % of total sales jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
SALES BY SALE TYPEAnnualized In Millions
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Jan
-06
May
-06
Sep
-06
Jan
-07
May
-07
Sep
-07
Jan
-08
May
-08
Sep
-08
Jan
-09
May
-09
Sep
-09
Jan
-10
May
-10
Sep
-10
Jan
-11
May
-11
Sep
-11
Jan
-12
May
-12
Sep
-12
Jan
-13
Existing Home New Home REO Short
2.65x3.51Sales: sales by sale type jan 2013
Source: CoreLogic January 2013
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CoreLogic, the CoreLogic logo, and HPI are trademarks of CoreLogic, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries.
17-MKTPLSEQTR-0313-00
Source: CoreLogicThe data provided is for use only by the primary recipient or the primary recipient's publication or broadcast. This data may not be re-sold, republished or licensed to any other source, including publications and sources owned by the primary recipient's parent company without prior written permission from CoreLogic. Any CoreLogic data used for publication or broadcast, in whole or in part, must be sourced as coming from CoreLogic, a data and analytics company. For use with broadcast or web content, the citation must directly accompany first reference of the data. If the data is illustrated with maps, charts, graphs or other visual elements, the CoreLogic logo must be included on screen or website. For questions, analysis or interpretation of the data, contact CoreLogic at [email protected]. Data provided may not be modified without the prior written permission of CoreLogic. Do not use the data in any unlawful manner. This data is compiled from public records, contributory databases and proprietary analytics, and its accuracy is dependent upon these sources.
FOR MORE INFORMATION PLEASE CALL 1-415-536-3500The MarketPulse is a newsletter published by CoreLogic, Inc. ("CoreLogic"). This information is made available for informational purposes only and is not intended to provide specific commercial, financial or investment advice. CoreLogic disclaims all express or implied representations, warranties and guaranties, including implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title, or non-infringement. Neither CoreLogic nor its licensors make any representations, warranties or guaranties as to the quality, reliability, suitability, truth, accuracy, timeliness or completeness of the information contained in this newsletter. CoreLogic shall not be held responsible for any errors, inaccuracies, omissions or losses resulting directly or indirectly from your reliance on the information contained in this newsletter.
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VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
Variable Definition
Total Sales The total number of all home-sale transactions during the month.
New Sales The total number of newly constructed residential housing units sold during the month.
Existing SalesThe number of previously constructed homes that were sold to an unaffiliated third party. DOES NOT INCLuDE REO AND SHORT SALES.
REO Sales Number of bank-owned properties that were sold to an unaffiliated third party.
Short SalesThe number of short sales. A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the sale proceeds fall short of the balance owed on the property's loan.
Distressed Sales Share The percentage of the total sales that were a distressed sale (REO or short sale).
HPI MoM Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series over a month ago.
HPI YoY Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series over a year ago.
HPI MoM Excluding Distressed Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a month ago.
HPI YoY Excluding Distressed Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a year ago.
90 Days + DQ Pct The percentage of the overall loan count that is 90 or more days delinquent as of the reporting period. This percentage includes loans that are in foreclosure or REO.
Foreclosure Pct The percentage of the overall loan count that is currently in foreclosure as of the reporting period.
REO Pct The count of loans in REO as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.
Pre-foreclosure FilingsThe number of mortgages where the lender has initiated foreclosure proceedings and it has been made known through public notice (NOD).
Completed ForeclosuresA completed foreclosure occurs when a property is auctioned and results in either the purchase of the home at auction or the property is taken by the lender as part of their Real Estate Owned (REO) inventory.
Negative Equity ShareThe percentage of mortgages in negative equity. The denominator for the negative equity percent is based on the number of mortgages from the public record.
Negative EquityThe number of mortgages in negative equity. Negative equity is calculated as the difference between the current value of the property and the estimated unpaid principal balance. If the mortgage debt is greater than the current value, the property is considered to be in a negative equity position.
Months' Supply Distressed HomesThe number of months it would take to sell all homes currently in distress of 90 days past due or more based on the current sales pace.
Total Sales YoY Change 12-month sum Percent increase or decrease in current 12 months of total sales over prior 12 months of total sales.
Price/Income Ratio CoreLogic HPI divided by Nominal Personal Income provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
