THE MARCH OF WAR

THE INVASION OF SICILY

ON May 13, 1943, the fighting on KorthAfrican soil had como to an end.According to a statement by WinstoLi

Churchill made on June ,the British Firstand Eighth Armies had 10 t 35,000 men inthe course of the fighting in Tunisia (notincluding that in Libya), and on May 28Washington announced the American lossesto have been 18,600. The actual losses of theAllies were probably much higher.

ALLIED PREPARATIO:S

After the elimination of the "\x.is bridge.bead in Tunisia, the Allies, constantlyprompted by Moscow, prepared for themuch·talked-of invasion of Europe. Ail'mids on Italy and her islands, which hadbeen carried out regularly since early thisyear, grew more violent in a 'udden crescendo,while the Anglo.Ameriean 10. ses, especiallyin multiengined bomber, mounted cor­respondingly. A map in the July issue ofthis magazine (pp. 24/25) shows the citieand districts chiefly affected. Sicily. Sardin­ia. and southern Italy were the maintargets, and such places a.s Palermo, Messina,and Naples experienced weeks with one ormore attacks each day.

By the end of May the small islands inthe waters betwoon Sicily llnd Africa hadbecome the main objectives, and afterviolent att.acks Pantelleria., LampeduSB,LinoM, and Lampione were occupied onJune II, 12, 13, and 14 respccti\·ely.

Meanwhile, Axis recOlmaissance planesreported concentrations of warships, trans­ports, and Innding vessels aU along thesouthern Me<litcrranean coast from Gibraltarto •'yTia. The Allied Mcdit rranean fleetwas boL t<-red by a number of units com­prising American warship and aircraft car­riers. It was estimated that sume 44 infantrydivisions, 15 to ~O tank formations, and ~

air-borne land.ing di \Tisions were concentrated.while ample 8upplies were tored in aUimportant embarkation ports. The AlliedprMB mentiolled a force of one million menready to be nnleashed. Enrly in July,

Sicily seemed the most likely object oC aninvasion.

TEtE AXIS POSITION

Since the Axis command had to post thetroops a \-ailabl in the Mediterra·nean a.rea.not only in Sicily but along th whole lengthof the European :outhern flank (as describedin detail in OUI' last issue), only a limitednumber of these troops could be employedfor Sicily. The A..xis also had anotherreason for limiting the number of troop onSicily: if the Allies were t<> decide on a large­scale attack on icily-for which there weremany indioation -by making use of theirsuperior naval and a.ir fleets, tllis islandmight become a trap for the Axis troopHshould the enemy succeed eit.h r in capturingMessina by land or in gaining air supremacyover t.be Strait of Messina.

In every iJlVasion attempt the Allies hadthe advantage of being able to chooso theplace and time and concentrate their forccsin one or two spots, while the Axis had tospread its troops along 60.000 kilometers ofcoast line. This made the d fense of islandssuch as icily and Sardinia a precarioumatter. For while on the Continent, troopscould be rusbed to the points of inva ionwith compara.tive speed and safety, thusituation was less favorable in tbe cas ofi lands in view of the .Allied superiority inships and plane. The Axis ommand wafully awar of t he fact that it would bextremely difficult to hold. 'icily aaainst anall·out Allied attack. Hence the task ofthe Sicilian defense, if it were unable tothrow the invlUlers ba k into t,lle sea, wasto make th Allie-s pay such a heavy prj 0

in men, arlUam nt, and ship that theenemy's eagernc to continu this kind ofwarfare would be 81.'riously affected.

The number ofAx.i . tro ps stationed in. ieil v at the moment of inva ion ha" so farnot been divulged. At any rate, the figureof 300,000 Italians and 100.000 Germansmentioned by the Allies seem gro Iy exag·gerated. At a time when the Allied forcell

190 THE XXtb CE~TURY

landed on Sicily were believed to be 11divisions German sources declared the de·fenders to be outnumbered. This wouldput the number of Axis troops on theisland at Jess than 11 di,ision .

Given the number of troops available forSicily and the fact that the length of Sicily'scoast is 1,115 kilometers (three times thedistance from London to Pari), the Axiswas confronted by the tu k of employing itsforces to the best possible advantage. Itcould either post its troops at various sec·tors along the coast, thereby running therisk, howe"er, that the landings might takeplace at other points, 80 that the neCCll8MYregrouping of forees would cost a lot oftime; or it could concentrate its troops illthe interior of the iBland in order to throwthem from there at maximum speed againstthe enemy wherever he might have lauded.Events have shown that the Axis commanddecided in favor of this second method.The coast itself Wl18 occupied only by weakcoastal units, consisting mainly of secondresenes, while the units concentrated in theinterior waited until the center of gravityof the Allied attack had been ascertainedand could be opposed with full force.

THE L.~"lDING

When on July 9, at 10.20 p.m., the portof 'yracuse on the e&'lt coaat of Sicily waasheUed, the Axis comma nd ordered a generalalert throughout the island. In the earlyhours of the following day, parachute forma­tions were landed in the sparsely populated80utheastern corner of icily. lnlmediatelyafterwards, naval and air attacks weredirected against omparatively long stret{lhesof the eastern, western and 80utbern coastline. Bombs and broadsides from navalgum silenced coastal batteries with a hail offire, and behind the curtain of this barragemen and supplies were put Il hore. The seaswa.rmed with vcasels of aJj sizc8 ami descrip.tion. According to R.oosevelt's speech ofJuly 2 160,000 men with 14,000 vehicles,1,800 guns and 800 tanks were arried toSi ily in 3,000 ship .

Thank to the \igilance of the Axis for esand the population, Dlost of the enemytroops who had landed by parachute wereannihilated-some ,000 men within thefirst 24 hours. The Allied attempt quicklyto expand the bridgeheads toward theinterior by linking up the forCe8 landedfrom ships with those landed from planeswaa thus frustrated. Likewise the foothold.s

which the Allies had gained on the westcoa·t between Marsala and Cape F'eto werecleared by immediate count{lf&Ction on thepart of the coastal defense. On the othertwo sectors-t.he Licata/Gela area of t.hoBOuth coast and the southern thinl of theeast coast-the invaders also met withstubborn resi tanoe. But, by reason ofthe enormous weight of their superior navalILnd air forcos, they managed to hold theirbridgeheads and slowly t.o pre inllllld,while the opem.t.ive reservel:l of the Axisrushed up to oppose them.

THE BATTLE BgGrNS

Reinforced by new divisions, the BritishEighth Army under General Montgomerymade some territorial gains from ita threebridgeheads in Pacbino, Syracuse, andAugusta, where four divisions had beenlanded originally. The right wing of thisarmy aimed north, while the left flank drovetoward Ragusa to effect a junction with thenewly formed American Seventh Armyunder General George Patton. Of this army,three divisiom including 80me Canadianunits had originally lauded between Licataand Cape Scaramania, mainly in Licata andin the Bay of Gela. On July 12 and 13,additional divisions were put aahore. ByJuly 23 German 80urces claimed that a.total of six American and five Britishdivisions had disembarked.

From the strategie point of view, it waa.obvious from the outset which part of theisland would seem the most important to.both side -the northeastern corner, rough­ly forming the triangle Ca.pe Orlando/Cata­niafMessina. It was clear that the AllieswoUld try to reach Mcssina as quickly aspos iLle to cut off the rest of the Axis forces.on tho island and that the Axis, on the otherhand, would make its main stand here.

The task of reaching Messina-the mostimportant object of the entire Sicilian cam­paign-was entrusted to the right wing ofthe Eighth Army, which la.tter was con­sidered the crack force among the invadingtroops. As soon as it had been dis­embarked, the Eighth Army started on itarace toward Catania, the gateway to thenarrow coastal corridor leading to MCBSinabetween the sea a.nd the giant ma.'Yiif ofMount Etna (3,279 meters high). The otherAllied divisions pressed north more slowly.Attempts to speed up the advance by dIeemployment of paratroops in the rear ofthe defenders failed, as they were wiped out.

THE ~L-\R 'R OF WAR 191

THE MEN IN CHARGE

a large number of enemy fighters andbombers were brought down.

In his speech of July 2, Presid ntRoosevelt declared that t,he Allies had beenplanning a whole year for the 'icilian cam­paign. If uch a weU-pr pared attack againstone of the mo 1. distant outposts of Europe,has not, after three weeks of fighting,produced any grea.ter results than thosedelleribed above, then Europe can facefuture invasions with calm confidence.

The Allied operations are under tbesupreme command of General Eisenhower,whose second-in.command is GeneralAlexander. The Allied air fleets are directedby the British Air Marshal .'ir Arthurl;edder, to whom the British Air MarshalSir Arthllr Conningham and Vice Air Mar­shal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd as well as the Ameri­can Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz andMajor General James Doolit.tle, (who com­manded t.he US bomber attack on Japanon April 18, 1942) are subordinated. Navaloperations are being conducted under thecommand of the Admiral of the FleetSir Andrew Browne CuDllingham; theAmerican naval forces are headed byVice-Admiral Henry Hewitt.

Except for the Italian commamlcr of theixth Army, General Gllzzoni, no names of

Axis generals have been announced so far.

•••

HEAVY LOSSES AT SEA

The resistancc of the Axis wa not confinedto land fighting. :From the out t Italian andGerman planes and ubmarines attacked anddestroyed many Allicd war ships, transports,and landing barges off the f:;icilian coast.On July 13 and 14 alone, 5 destroyers weresunk and ~ cruisers heavily damaged, apartfrom the damage sustained by some smallerwa.rships. The Allied air flects were alwcngaged by Italian and German airmen andantiaircraft units. In spite of the greatnumerical superiority of the AlJied air forces,

The most violent fighting broke out when,on July 13, the Briti'h reachcd the plain(about 15 by 20 kilometers in extent) lyingto the south of Catania. As the Axis forc­es, with the Hermawl Goering division astheir backbone, slowly withdrew northward,the Eighth Army found it elf in the flatplain fighting again t an enemy entrenchedin the mountains bordering it on the north.The Briti h a.t·ta ks became co tlier every dayand practically came to a halt by July 25.

Shielded by the forces at Catauia, Axistroops meanwhile evacuated the westernpart of the island, withdra.wing to the north­eo. tern triangle. The Americans followedthe retiring enemy and proudly announcedgreat victories. Real fighting, however,did not begin for thcm until they reachedthe line San Stefano/Agira, approximatelyon July 26. By the end of July the strugglefor the strategic triangle had begtrn.