The Limits of Language Propositions And

8/17/2019 The Limits of Language Propositions And

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THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE:

PROPOSITIONS AND CATEGORIES

José Carlos Bermejo Barrera

Senior Professor of History and Philosophy

University of Santiago de Compostela


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Ich verstand die Stille des Aethers,

Der Menschen Worte verstand ich nie.

Friedrich Hölderlin

Da ich ein Knabe war

In des Herzens heilig stille Räue

Muss du !liehen aus des "eben Drang.

#reiheit ist nur in der Reich der $räue,

%nd das Sch&ne bl'ht nur in (esang.

Friedrich Schiller

Der Antritt des neuen )ahrhunderts

I understood the silence of the Ether,

But the ords of man!ind I never understood"

Friedrich Hölderlin

When I was a *o+

Into the heart of #uiet sacred rooms

$ust you flee from life%s urge"

Freedom is only in the realm of dreams,

&nd the 'eauty of floers only in song"

Friedrich Schiller

$he Start o! the ew -entur+


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Absra!

(he last fe decades have found philosophy 'eitched 'y the charm of linguistic e)pression,

itself a product of its on internal evolution and a faithful reflection of the tendency toards

ver'alism, hich has alays 'een one of its capital sins" In this essay e offer a ne

proposal for the theory of propositions and the theory of categories, starting off from to

'asic ideas"

(he first of these is that every proposition, regardless of its type, is structured into four

components* reference, sense, tone and e)pression" (hus, e can e)plain the function of

language much more simply, hile ta!ing into account all of its possi'le uses" (his idea is

insepara'le from a ne formulation of the categories, starting out from its &ristotelian and

+antian definition in other ords, as a 'ase of everything that can 'e said and thought

hich is no given a ne structure in the systems of categories of #uantity, ethics, action

and e)pression"

(his 'oo!, folloing the philosophical tradition of the analysis of the relationship 'eteen

thought processes and language, integrates not only linguistic and epistemological

perspectives, 'ut also attempts to include the latest discoveries in the fields of neurology,

psychiatry and the social sciences as essential instruments for the understanding of human

thought processes, language and conduct"

Table o" Co#e#s

Introduction

-um'ers and (heir Categories

Propositions and Categories in Ethics

Propositions and Categories of E)pressionPropositions and Categories of &ction

Propositions that .ac! /eference

0n the Impossi'ility of Comparing E)pression and /eference

E)pression and Silence

E)pression, Pain and Fear

0n the Impossi'ility of Propositions .ac!ing E)pression

0n the Propositions that E)press E)pression, or the Internal .anguage

CodaBi'liography


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 5

I#ro$%!&o#

$ost human !noledge must evidently 'e e)pressed orally6 nevertheless, a large

part of this !noledge is 'eyond the limits of language" (his fact tends to receive little

attention from philosophers and scientists ho cultivate the various types of !noledge

'ecause they live in a predominantly ver'al orld, a orld hich 'elieves that everything

hich can 'e !non must necessarily 'e communicated ver'ally" Furthermore, the prestige

of philosophers, scientists and the supporters of the humanities depends on the ver'al

success of their or!"

(he situation is actually much more comple), since, as ell shall soon see, all

attempts at developing theories on scientific 7mathematical, logical8 propositions ith the

o'3ective of giving faithful descriptions of reality, have resulted in failure and have fallen prey

to their on contradictions" 9e ill thus attempt to sho that all languages, hether formal

or not, in hich a num'er of propositions can 'e generated, are 'ased on the use of systems

of categories ithout hich it ould not 'e possi'le to put those propositions together"

(he study of the categories e are referring to could 'e interpreted as a partial

defense of transcendental analysis, as defined 'y +ant in his -ritiue o! /ure Reason 0Kriti1

der reinen 2ernun!t3" Here, 'ased on &ristotle%s ta'le of the different types of 3udgments a

ta'le hich could 'e thought of as a thorough system providing an e)planation of all possi'le

types of propositions +ant attempted to design a draft of the internal structure of the

thin!ing process, going from a logical or linguistic point of vie to a gnosiological or

epistemological one, in such a ay that it ould go from the sphere of that hich can 'e said

to that of hat can 'e conceived"

9e say that the study of the categories can only 'e interpreted as a partial defense

'ecause it is not a #uestion of ma!ing an assessment of +ant%s thin!ing process and its

evolution" &gainst his harmonious architecture of reason, e shall propose another model

'ased more on the discontinuous than the continuous" & model in hich the sovereignty of

3udgment 7i"e", the propositions structured around the ideas of truth or falsehood hich have'een enthroned 'y the sciences8 give ay to a more comple) reality in hich language ends

up esta'lishing not only the limits of the orld, 'ut also the limits of the spea!er"

0ne of the reasons e have chosen Immanuel +ant is that e ill attempt to apply

our theory to four fields* the fields mathematics and ethics 7studied 'y +ant and sharing the

common element of 'eing composed of systems of propositions hich can 'e lin!ed in such

a ay that some can 'e deduced from the others8, and the fields of e)pression and action

7studied 'y +ant only indirectly8"

9e 'elieve that every proposition has content and form" (he form of a propositiondepends on the system of categories that allos for their enunciation ithout ma!ing


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 :

reference to any content" & proposition%s reference is determined 'y to types of factors*

ontological and formal"

(he ontological factors are those hich give content to a proposition and depend

'asically on the types of real o'3ects it refers to, !eeping in mind that e cannot define as

real only that hich 'elongs to the physical orld, 'ut all that hich can 'e stated as a

thin!a'le reality at a collective level"

(he formal factors as defined 'y the terminology e are using are those that

ma!e a proposition conceiva'le and conse#uently provide it ith a definite content" (hose

factors, hich e call ;categories< in the four e)amples e ill develop, are previous to the

enunciation of a proposition" -ot in a chronological sense, since they are simultaneous ith

it, nor in the ontological sense 'ecause they possess the property of reference 'ut in the

structural sense" In other ords, they designate the field in hich a type of proposition is

possi'le" Utili=ing the +antian language* they are conditions of possi'ility of a definite type of

proposition"

(he categories as defined in these four cases are neither irrational nor intuitive"

(he thin!ing process can occur ithout 'eing conscious of them, 'ut not ithout them"

-evertheless, 'eing conscious of the categories hich e can%t actually say e)ist 'ecause

e)istence is a property 'elonging only to cognosci'le o'3ects lets us to avoid the

development of futile efforts, as has 'een the case in large measure in the field of

mathematics ith the attempt to deduct all 'ranches of mathematics starting off from logic or

arithmetic, or in the field of ethics ith the esta'lishment of unilateral ethical theories hich

attempt to e)plain all possi'le human conduct"

Being conscious of the e)istence of those categories not only saves us the effort of

developing glo'al theories that attempt to e)plain comple) systems of facts or theories, 'ut

also allos us to avoid metaphysical complications involving the study of such themes as the

e)istence or non4e)istence of num'ers, or of a universal legislator, or >od, or the meaning of

human life, the latter 'eing an omnipresent theme elcomed or not of ethical reasoning"

9e shall no go on to our first e)ample* the theory of num'ers, in hich e descri'ethe value and the limitations of to of the most important attempts developed so far in this

field"


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 ?

N%mbers a#$ T'e&r Cae(or&es

In this section e shall start out from the 'asic ideas developed 'y .a!off and -@Ae=

7.a!off and -@Ae=, :8 in their 'oo! Where Matheatics -oe #ro. &ccording to these

authors, mathematical reasoning is 'ased on a series of notions rooted ithin our

sensorimotor system" -evertheless, their 'oo! does not include the relationship 'eteen

propositions and categories hich e ill no attempt to develop"

54 By ;theory of num'ers< e are referring to a collection of propositions or a)ioms

that can provide an e)haustive definition of their on properties"

:4 Until no, all theories of num'ers have centered upon the pro'lem of succession,

attempting to e)plain the system of num'ers starting from and 5"

?4 (hese theories are inade#uate 'ecause they confuse hat is 'eing defined ith its

on definition 'y accepting the intimate connection e)isting 'eteen the idea of num'ers

and the idea of succession"

4 (his is so in the case of Peano%s a)ioms*

a" Dero is a num'er"

'" (he successor of any num'er is another num'er"

c" -o to num'ers have the same successor"

d" Dero is the successor of no other num'er"

e" &ny property 'elonging to =ero and also to the successor of any num'er hich

possesses said property 'elongs to all the num'ers"

4 &nd also ith Frege and /usell%s theory, according to hich*

a" ;< is the num'er of those classes containing no mem'ers"

'" ;5< is the num'er of those classes containing only one mem'er"

c" ;:< is the num'er of those classes containing to mem'ers, and so on"

4 In these to cases the notion of num'er is assumed, ithout defining it, starting

out from the idea of succession 7Peano8, or of succession in e)tension 7Frege and /usell8,

hich ould 'e e#uivalent 'ecause each class contains the previous one"G4 (he categorical theory of num'ers, on the contrary, starts off from the folloing

a)ioms*

a" &ll num'ers form a system"

'" (he system of num'ers is necessarily e)pressed 'y means of propositions"

c" &ll propositions regarding num'ers have form and content* synta) and

semantics"

d" (he definition of the system of num'ers refers to the form of the propositions

hich refer to the num'ers, 'ut not to the num'ers themselves"


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4

e" Since the definition refers to the form of certain propositions, there is no need

to pose the #uestion of the e4istence or the idealit+ of num'ers"

f" &ll the propositions hich e)press a num'er are 'uilt upon three categories*

54 Unity"

:4 Plurality"

?4 9holeness"

g" (hose categories cannot 'e defined in isolation 'ecause they form part of a

system" (he philosophy of mathematics has centered its concerns only on

defining plurality, considering it more pro'lematic" -evertheless, plurality is

nothing more than a correlate of unity and holeness, and num'ers cannot 'e

thought of ithout ta!ing those categories into account6 thus, any attempt to

define plurality is a tautology"

4 9e can therefore define the system of all num'ers 'y means of the folloing

a)ioms*

a" ;< refers to the num'er that has unity and holeness, 'ut lac!s plurality"

'" ;5< refers to the num'er that has unity and totality, 'ut in hich unity and

plurality coincide"

c" &ny num'er different from , 5 or the infinite may 'e defined as a unity and a

holeness endoed ith plurality"

d" (o num'ers hich comply ith the condition of 'eing different from , 5 and

the infinite are differentiated only 'y their plurality"

e" (he difference 'eteen to num'ers differing from , 5 and the infinite in their

plurality is not a difference hich can 'e e)plained 'y the idea of succession

or e)tension, 'ut instead 'y having a different relationship ith the categories

of unity and holeness"

f" & num'er is e#ual to itself due to the relationship e)isting ithin its unity,

totality, and plurality"

g" ;Infinite< refers to a num'er hich has unity and holeness, 'ut in hichholeness and plurality coincide"

4 (he systematic theory of num'ers is a theory a'out the form of the propositions

hich e)press the num'ers"

54 (he systematic theory of num'ers and all e)isting theories of num'ers are not

mathematical theories 'ut, instead, meta4mathematical theories"

554 (he content of propositions referring to num'ers cannot 'e entirely deduced from

the form of those same propositions, and thus it cannot 'e assumed, as as maintained 'y

Frege, folloing +ant, that the propositions of arithmetic are analytical and a 5riori 7Frege,5 J5K8"


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5:4 (he propositions of arithmetic and mathematics in general possess form and

content" (he content of the propositions of mathematics must 'e understood as a semantics

hich is structured in different fields"

5?4 (he semantic fields of mathematics follo a relationship of intersection, not of

inclusion"

&s in the case of num'ers, e can apply this theory to the field of ethics"


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Pro)os&&o#s a#$ Cae(or&es E'&!s

Since the 'eginnings of ethical reasoning in the 9estern orld, philosophers have

tried to develop all4em'racing systems that permit the e)planation of each and every aspect

of human 'ehavior ta!ing a small num'er of principals as a starting point" &n e)ample of this

ould 'e the field of geometry in &ncient >reece 7Legetti, 58"

It is not our purpose here to develop a draft of the history of ethics6 hoever, ta!ing

history as a starting point 7Camps, 556 $cIntyre, 5G8, I 'elieve e can say that the

various non4analytical theories of ethics have 'ased themselves on three types of principles

hich have 'een considered contradictory* duty, pleasure, collectivity" (hese three principles

ould 'e related to to 'asic notions over hich ethical propositions are 'ased, such as the

notions of good and evil to notions ithout hich it is not possi'le to put forard the

moral propositions, 3ust as it is not possi'le to put forard the other propositions ithout the

notions of truth and falsehood"

Ethical theories 'ased on the notion of duty may 'e either religious or laical,

depending on their metaphysical presuppositions 7$urdoch, 5:8, and on the e)istence or

not of non4human legislators* $ardu! in $esopotamia, Deus in >reece, Maheh in 1udaism,

>od in Christianity, etc", 'ut they all give privilege to the notion of duty or o'ligation, as ell

as advocating the need of su'3ugating every individual to the ill of a poer hose purpose

is the su'ordination of individual interest or personal pleasure to the interest or good of

the community, hether it 'e merely an earthly interest or one conceived as other4orldly,

such as in the case of religious ethics"

Ethical theories 'ased on pleasure do not try to utili=e the notion of duty or

su'mission to a ill outside the individual, 'ut they cannot ignore the notion of good and evil,

not even hen they try to do so 'y esta'lishing the e#uivalence 'eteen good and utility or

good and pleasure 7Edards, 5G8" (hey cannot leave aside the notions of good and evil,

needing to esta'lish the e#uili'rium 'eteen personal pleasures and utility and 'eteen

collective pleasures and utility" (he only pleasures considered to 'e good are those that can'e compati'le ith collective pleasures, or those that can increase collective pleasures,

conse#uently having to e)clude all the others" &s part of this process of e)clusion, it might 'e

necessary to apply coercive measures ith the purpose of adapting the conduct and

interests of certain individuals to the interests of the collectivity" (hus, ethics of a hedonistic

and utilitarian nature, even though they may have 'een created 'ased on the notions of

pleasure and utility of the individual more than that of the collectivity, continue employing the

notions of collectivity, coercion and duty, although structured in a manner different from that

of the religious or laical ethics 'ased on the notion of duty"


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 G

Finally, if e ta!e a third type of ethics 'ased on the notion of collectivity as a

privileged and e)planatory instrument, such as the Hegelian ethics 79alsh, 5G8, or the

ethics of more sociological or historical orientations such as those of Her'ert Spencer

7Spencer, 5G J5GK8, 1ohn Neey 7Neey, 5?8 or Edard 9estermarc! 79estermarc!,

58, and from hich more recent attempts at ethical thin!ing are derived 7such as

socio'iology or all the efforts at e)plaining human 'ehavior 'ased on neurology or

'iochemistry8, e shall see that, even though some of its authors can often fall into the

naturalistic fallacy 7hich ould e)clude ethical thin!ing8, their or! incorporates su'stantial

empirical investigations that attempt to e)plain ho the 'ehavior of those human 'eings

might 'e understood as a comple) homeostatic mechanism in hich there ould 'e an

endeavor to attain the e#uili'rium of each human collectivity in itself in its interior and in

its relationships ith other human collectivities, or ith the physical or ecological

environment"

Still, those authors ho favor the notion of collectivity continue thin!ing in the same

terms as other philosophers of ethics, since hat they call adaptive 'ehaviors is similar to

hat could 'e accepta'le 'ehaviors correct or good 'ecause they can generate more

'enefits 7in other ords, more pleasure8" (hese are 'ehaviors that may 'e imposed 'y

means of persuasion and, if necessary, coercion, a coercion hich ould pursue the same

o'3ective* the common good, hich, ecologically, ould 'e defined as the e#uili'rium ith the

environment 7Ponting, 5:6 Niamond, :8"

Having provided these 'rief e)planations, e can continue 'y defining the ethical

categories hich ma!e the enunciation of the moral propositions possi'le"

(he term ;ethics< refers to a theory or set of theories that attempt to e)plain human

'ehavior su'3ected to rules, or moral 'ehavior, hich is a physical or 'iological 'ehavior

'ecause humans live in a physical orld" (his 'ehavior encompasses different types of acts

hich can 'e classified and stated more or less formally in systems of propositions that can

'e moral or legal" (he moral and legal propositions have in common their normative and

'inding character, and in certain cases 'oth may impose themselves upon and interfere ithvarious types of precepts that are neither legal nor moral 'ut, instead, normative, as in the

case of religions"

(hose precepts hich are neither legal nor moral tend to 'e of a ritualistic or sym'olic

nature, and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish among these three fields, especially hen

there are religious communities or institutions ith ritual and legal systems esta'lished and

codified 'y e)perts, such as the 1eish ra''is, the $uslim ulama and the Catholic

theologians"

Even so, and in spite of the fact that those three systems may interfere among eachother in their propositions, si) categories ill alays 'e used to 'uild up the moral


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propositions" -evertheless, for the sa!e of simplicity, e shall leave aside religious notions

such as pureOimpure or sacredOprofane, to retain only that hich is common to all the ethical

and moral propositions"

&nalytical philosophers have rightly pointed out that a special type of proposition

e)ists those of ethics 7Broad, 5?6 $oore, 58" (he fact that ethics are 'uilt upon a

specific type of proposition different from the propositions of the sciences and to hich e

cannot apply the notions of truth and falsehood, does not imply that those propositions lac!

content" &ll ethical propositions have reference" (he reference corresponds to the field of

human conduct hich can also 'e descri'ed 'y other systems of propositions using notions

of truth and falsehood, such as 'iology, ecology or the social sciences"

(he ethical propositions, hoever, can 'e differentiated from other types of

propositions referring to human conduct 'y the system of categories upon hich they are

'uilt" (hese categories form an indivisi'le system, such as the category of #uantity" & moral

proposition and an ethical theory can only ac#uire significance from a complete system"

(hese categories are*

54 >ood and evil"

:4 Pleasure and pain"

?4 Individual4collectivity"

&ll ethical theories employ these categories, illingly or not, and they are present in

every moral proposition"

.et%s provide an e)ample" (he non4eudemonistic theories 'ased on the notion of duty,

hether or not religious, do not in any ay rule out the notion of pleasure and pain" Even

hen critici=ing the corporal pleasures as ell as all other orldly pleasures, they cannot

deny the principles of pleasure and pain" (hey simply transfer them from this orld to a

future and hierarchical orld, esta'lishing superior and inferior pleasures, using a type of

calculation not too different from the utilitarian4style calculation of pleasure and pain"

Utilitarian ethics, as previously mentioned, employ the notions of good and evil of the

individual and the collectivity, in the same ay as collectivity ethics do ith the first togroups of categories"

&ll ethical propositions are 'uilt upon the si) categories, hich are relative in form 'ut

not in content or reference" (he ethical propositions do not refer to anything different from the

physical or 'iological orld, in hich all human acts ta!e place6 they only confer a particular

meaning to certain types of events that unfold in the orld of physics or 'iology"

Events that ta!e place in the physical orld have e)istence6 the propositions that refer

to them do not, at least not in the same sense" Fran= Brentano called this property

intentional ine4istence 7Brentano, 5 J5?K6 55 J5??K8" If a proposition had the same


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e)istence as the event to hich it referred, it ould 'e that same event and not the stated

proposition" In this sense, the old metaphysical realism ould 'e unsustaina'le"

Propositions in general, and the ethical propositions in particular, can only 'e stated

'ased on the e)istence of something other that the actual proposition and cannot coincide

ith it, neither in e)tension 7'ecause a fact or an o'3ect cannot 'e e)hausted 'y a finite set

of propositions8, nor 'y its nature 7'ecause the nature of a proposition includes the property

that it cannot e)ist in the same form as the o'3ect it refers to8"

&ccording to Frege, a proposition has reference, sense and coloring" (he sense of a

proposition is the means 'y hich a proposition incorporates itself into a set or system of

propositions 7thus, an arithmetical proposition incorporates itself into arithmetic8" (he coloring

of a proposition is the property hich the proposition has of esta'lishing non4e)plicit

connections ith other propositions of the same system"

9e 'elieve that in the to cases e have studied the theory of num'ers and the

theory of ethics a ne notion should 'e added to Frege%s notions, and this ould 'e the

notion of e)pression hich could 'e defined as follos*

6ver+ 5ro5osition has a re!erence to soe t+5e o! ob7ect 0which does not necessaril+

have to be 5h+sical3, sense and coloring. *ut in addition, within ever+ 5ro5osition 0regardless

o! its t+5e3 there is a certain agnitude o! e45ression.

(he e)pression contained ithin a propositon is related to the mechanisms over

hich all types of reasoning is 'uilt, and these are associated to different systems of

categories hich are rooted in our sensorimotor systems 7.a!off and 1ohnson, 5:6 56

.a!off, 5:8"

(hose systems 7in hich discursive reasoning plays a fundamental role along ith

metaphorical reasoning8 is here the glo'al sense of the different theories is esta'lished,

and of human reasoning in general"

-o proposition or system of propositions can e)ist hich esta'lishes the glo'al sense

of human reasoning, or of 'asic #uestions of metaphysics and ethics such as the meaning of

life, the orld, or the #uestion of immortality 7hich is simply a ay of shifting the #uestionsof the meaning of life and the orld to an imperfect future8"

For these reasons it is not possi'le to pose #uestions such as if the orld can 'e

e)plained, or hether or not it is rational, or if ithin the human orld good should

predominate over evil, or vice versa, 'ecause good and evil are to categories upon hich

the propositions of ethics are 'uilt, and not properties of the physical orld nor of human

'eings as physical or 'iological realities" Similarly, e)plaina'ility and rationality are properties

that refer to the sets of propositions, 'ut not to the o'3ects"

.anguage and the language of morality, !noledge in general, and all types ofscientific theories possi'le refer to the orld and its o'3ects, 'ut they are not the orld, nor


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do they e)plain the orld, 'ecause the orld as +ant stated long ago is nothing more

that the idea of reason and not a concept of complete understanding, nor can these su'3ects

confer any sense to it"

.anguage, the language of morality, !noledge and the sciences are as a result of

their very nature a'solutely outside the orld they refer to 7otherise, they ould 'e that

same orld8" (hey can only ma!e sense to those ho spea!, thin! and formulate those

su'3ects" (hus, as humans e do not insert ourselves into the orld 'y means of the process

of spea!ing and thin!ing, and here the old idealism as indeed partially correct" 9e are fully

inserted into that same orld, hether e ant to or not, and this is something hich that

same idealism did not ant to see"

0n the other hand, it could 'e parado)ically stated that the more e tal!, thin! and

formulate theories, the further e are 7if that ere possi'le8 from a orld in hich thin!ing

and language could never 'e due to their on definition the o'3ects or properties of that

same orld"

-evertheless, all this 'e as it may can only 'e spo!en of"


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Pro)os&&o#s a#$ Cae(or&es o" E*)ress&o#

(here is a class of propositions in hich the e)pression shapes the correlation

'eteen e)pression, coloring, sense and reference in a specific manner" 9e call them

;propositions of e)pression"<

54 (o the propositions of e)pression e cannot apply the notions of truth or falsehood

7&ustin, 5:6 Searle, 58"

:4 &ll the arts are created from the propositions of e)pression" (he use of propositions

of e)pression is 'asic to the functioning of social life 'ecause they are fundamental in the so4

called ordinary language or the language of daily life"

?4 &ccording to the previous criterion, the propositions of e)pression can 'e divided

into to groups*

a" (hose united to the development of the action"

'" (hose that serve no practical purpose, as is the case of all those developed 'y

the various arts, hich are structured, as e)plained 'y Immanuel +ant, around

the concept of !inalit+ without end 7+ant, :8"

8 (he propositions of e)pression are indissolu'ly united to the propositions that allo

for the performance of any type of human action ithin the physical orld" (hese latter ones

are !non as propositions of action and are rooted in our sensorimotor corporal

mechanisms"

4 (hat same sensorimotor root e)plains the fact that there are arts in hich language

has no role, as in music or in the plastic arts" -evertheless, e could apply to these arts

ith the o'3ective of understanding their ay of functioning those categories 'ased on the

propositions of e)pression of group ?4'"

4 (he categories of e)pression are*

a" $yself4ourselves

'" E)terior4interior

c" Pleasure4pain &ll e)pressive propositions related to the arts and to social action are 'uilt upon these

e)pressions"

G4 In order to understand the propositions of e)pression in case ?4a 7united to action8

as ell as in case ?4' 7the propositions of the arts8, e must ta!e into account the fact that

the system of the si) categories of e)pression is developed ithin to frameor!s* the

spatial and the temporal"

4 (he spatial frameor! is related to the corporal rooting of all the categories of

e)pression, and may function in the case of the plastic arts ithout 'eing completelycoordinated ith the temporal frameor!" -evertheless, the spatial and temporal frameor!s


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 5:

although structured differently ill alays 'e interrelated in the case of type ?4a

propositions as ell as type ?4'"

4 (he temporal frameor! forms the 'asis of arts such as music, as stated 'y E"

>aviln 7>aviln, :8, 'ut it is alays present in all the propositions of e)pression 'ecause

the category ;myself4ourselves< cannot 'e understood ithout ta!ing into account the

temporal character of conscience, hich is structured upon the system* past4present4future"

54 (he triple structure of time is insepara'le from the structure of conscience itself,

hich, according to Edmund Husserl, is shaped around the notions of retention and

protention, hich come together in the formation of identity and self4conscience 7Husserl,

::8"

554 (he self4conscience of ;myself< is insepara'le from the perception of ;ourselves<

7$ead, 5?8" (his process in addition to ta!ing place ithin the social orld also ta!es

place ithin the 'iological and physical orld to hich e 'elong 'ecause e are physical

'odies"

5:4 (he interrelation 'eteen 'ody and conscience ta!es place through the dou'le

mechanism of the interior perception of our on 'ody and the e)terior perception of the

physical orld" 9ithout an ade#uate e#uili'rium 'eteen these to perceptions, the

e)istence of conscience is not possi'le 'ecause conscience is 'ased primarily on physical,

spatial and temporal orientation"

5?4 (he 'asic mechanisms of the functioning of the human 'ody are stimulus and

response, pleasure and pain" Human pleasure and pain, hoever, is different from those of

other living organisms 'ecause it is sociall+ and linguisticall+ coded 6 thus, the functioning of

pleasure and pain is very comple) and can only 'e partially understood 'y the various

sciences* the social and human sciences, psychology and neurology"

54 (he study of the propositions of e)pression at the action level is the 'asic

o'3ective of psychology and neurology, and here the role of linguistics stands out"

54 (he study of the propositions of e)pression in the fields of the arts corresponds to

esthetics and to the theories and history of the various art forms"(he 'asic e)pressive functions ta!e place ithin our daily life, hich is a social life"

(hose functions may 'e complemented ith the e)pressive functions performed 'y means of

the ela'oration and perception of the various arts" Hoever, e must !eep in mind that the

e45ressive !unction o! the arts is not their basic !unction, since artistic e)pression must 'e

performed 'y means of some type of matter sound, plastic materials, language, the ritten

ord so that the or! of each author can 'e socially understood"

(he arts do not erel+ e45ress the !eelings o! the artists or their 5ublic " (he arts

describe and anal+ze that which can be collectivel+ e45ressed "


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 5?

& or! of art hich analy=es and descri'es one or various feelings or affections may

'e utili=ed in different ays to achieve the e)pression of its author and of each and every one

of its recipients, ays hich are usually of a historical and collective nature and thus change

ith the passage of time"

(he propositions of e)pression in the arts can 'e differentiated from the propositions

of e)pression in action not only for their lac! of practical purpose, 'ut also for their mimetic

character" It could 'e said that in the perception of the arts, a !iction 5act e)ists 'eteen

authors and the pu'lic" & pact that, as in the case of the cele'ration of rituals, allos for the

differentiation of or!s of art from the o'3ects that e use in daily life 'y means of the

mechanism of transfiguration hich has 'een analy=ed 'y &rthur Nanto 7Nanto, ::8"

Every art creates its on orld ith a specific space and social time to perceive it"

(hat space and time in the arts is integrated ithin the spaces and times of daily life and the

physical orld, 'ut e gain access to them only occasionally as long as e accept the

mimetic pact" -o life can 'e completely transfigured into art, even though some artists have

affirmed this to 'e so and have even attempted to transform their lives into a completely

transcendental reality" (his is impossi'le not only in the field of art, 'ut also in that other field

in hich the o'3ective is even more systematic* the field of religion, a field in hich the

o'3ective has led to all !inds of a'errations, as mentioned 'y Blaise Pascal, a religious

thin!er, hen he said* ;man is neither an angel nor a 'east, and misfortune has it that

hoever ants to play the angel, 'ecomes a 'east< 7/ens9es, ?:8"

(he orld of e)pression is insepara'le from the orld of action and is nothing more

that a part of it" (he orld of action and e)pression constitute hat Edmund Husserl called

"ebenswelt, a notion of a sociological value hich as made evident 'y &lfred Schut=

7Schut=, 5G8"

&ll the propositions of e)pression, ethics or science are no more than an aspect or

part of the orld of human life and can only ma!e sense and 'e of significance for humans,

since humans live mainly ithin the world o! action"


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4 Performative propositions are insepara'le from the field of gestural and 'ody

language, and thus language ta!es root in the 'iological and physical orld"

G4 9ithin the human physical and 'iological orld, action predominates over

e)pression, 'ut this action often needs to 'e stated hen it is a #uestion of descri'ing,

analy=ing or transmitting s!ills, or of improving sensorimotor mechanisms"

4 9hen it is a #uestion of enunciating those mechanisms that permit action over

matter 7techni#ue8, or over the 'ody itself, propositions of action are developed 'ased on the

folloing categories*

a" /eciprocal action"

'" Cause4effect"

c" Possi'ility and impossi'ility"

d" -ecessity4contingency"

4 (his system of categories forms the 'asis of the notion of physical and social

real&+, a notion hich is insepara'le from the notion of conscience, and it is through

conscience that human 'eings are oriented ithin the physical orld"

& orld from hich e cannot e)it, of hich e form only a part, and to hich e try

to give some meaning, even if !noing that the meaning, as such, is totally 'eyond the

orld, although for us this meaning may 'e a'solutely necessary 'ecause it is the only ay

e can integrate ourselves in the orld, the only ay of forming part of a reality of hich e

hope to 'e more than merely a part, and thus it is often necessary to deny that same reality

and utili=e a ne type of propositon"


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Pro)os&&o#s 'a La!, Re"ere#!e

Every proposition must have reference, sense, coloring and e)pression, regardless of

its nature" -evertheless, it can 'e said ithout fear of falling into a contradiction that certain

types of propositions do e)ist hich lac! reference"

54 &ll propositions lac!ing reference share the property of 'eing lies"

:4 & proposition is said to 'e a lie henever the spea!er voluntarily or involuntarily

denies a specific reference"

?4 Propositions can 'e of to types* constative or performative" Constative

propositions may 'e true or false, hile performative propositions may 'e ade#uate or

inade#uate"

4 & constative proposition is said to 'e a lie hen it is not true"

4 & constative proposition may 'e untrue for to reasons* either 'ecause it does not

descri'e a state of fact, or 'ecause it contradicts itself"

4 If the spea!er ho ma!es a constative proposition is incapa'le for hatever

reason of perceiving a state of fact, or does not have sufficient a'ility to 'uild syntactically

the proposition or propositions, it is said that the false proposition is an error or an involuntary

lie"

G4 If the spea!er ho states a constative proposition ishes to hide a state of fact

hich he is capa'le of perceiving or manipulates the synta) of the propositions ith the

intention of deceiving listeners, then the proposition is a straightforard lie"

4 In the case of constative propositions, the lie presupposes the e)istence of one

spea!er and at least one listener"

4 & lie cannot e)ist ithout the ill to lie, and that alays ta!es place in relation ith

another person6 thus, it can 'e said that a lie is 'asically a social event"

54 (he social nature of a lie is the result of the social nature of the language itself"

554 .ogic and linguistics tend to forget the social nature of language in their endeavor

to 'uild perfect theories, hich due to their very nature must 'e pure theories" (he desire forsystemi=ation of 'oth disciplines can lead to the concealment of the 'asic facts of the nature

of propositions, such as their social, pragmatic and historical aspects"

5:4 (he truthfulness or falsehood of constative propositions is a su'class of lies, and

not vice4versa, as has 'een the tendency to 'elieve since the days of &ristotle, ho favored

3udgment and syllogism over enthymeme, and favored logic over rhetoric"

5?4 (his is so 'ecause the possi'ility of enunciation of true constative propositions

depends on the e)istence of a common ill that ma!es possi'le the creation of a social

space hich is characteri=ed 'y the disinterested search for the truth"


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 5G

54 (hat space as the school of philosophy in &ncient >reece6 in the $iddle &ges it

as the university or convent, and in modern and contemporary times the scientific societies

hose fundamental means of e)pression has 'een the printed ord in its various modalities"

54 Philosophers and scientists tend to confuse those artificial spaces of the truth that

is searched for and reached 'y consensus ith the nature of the human species itself 7hich

is sometimes defined as the animal endoed ith logos, or the rational animal, or the animal

ith the gift of speech8, usually assuming that the spo!en language is 'asically that of

constative statements"

54 (he social spaces for the search for truth have 'een and continue to 'e

precarious, fragile and provisional, and can disappear hen changing historical

circumstances 7economic, political or military8 so re#uire" 9e could thus metaphorically state

that the ;/epu'lic of the .etters< or the ;/epu'lic of the -oumenon< is 'asically a fiction

hich can 'e tolerated only provisionally"

5G4 Being that a lie is a social event, e can distinguish 'eteen to types of lies*

individual lies, and shared or collective lies"

54 &n individual lie is one in hich an individual conceals information, creates

fictitious information, or alters logical synta) ith the o'3ective of o'taining a 'enefit from

others"

54 Since societies are 'ased on the e)istence of hierarchies and on the une#ual

distri'ution of goods, it could 'e said that lies are consu'stantial ith the e)istence of human

societies and even among animals"

:4 In animal societies lies do not occur as propositions, 'ut in deceptive strategies

hich are essential for survival, as e)plained 'y Lol!er Sommer 7Sommer, 58"

:54 In human societies there are spheres that share truths and lies" (hus, it could 'e

said that a human society can only 'e 'uilt ith the help of a common language that lays

don the dou'le space of shared truths and lies at each historical moment"

::4 (he articulation of the social space of truths and lies is insepara'le from the

values of any given society":?4 (his is the socially articulated space hich permits enunciating a class of

constative propositions that may 'e true or false, and also ma!es it possi'le for the

enunciation of other propositions to ta!e place"

:4 (his is so, furthermore, 'ecause the means of perceiving the orld including the

physical orld are conditioned 'y a society%s physical and technical resources, as ell as

'y the voca'ulary and synta) of its language, hich only ma!es possi'le the communication

of a minimal part of hat each person perceives"


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'" Inade#uate performative lies may 'e associated ith false constative

propositions"

c" &de#uate performative lies may 'e associated ith a portion of true or false

constative propositions"

?4 9hether a performative lie is ade#uate or inade#uate does not necessarily

depend on the proportion of true or false constative propositions that go along ith it, 'ut on

the success o'tained generating a consensus 'eteen to or more persons"

?4 9hen spea!ers ho are lying find success in creating a consensus around their

lies, they esta'lish control over others hich they ill use for their on 'enefit"

?4 9hen spea!ers ho lie do not find success in creating a consensus around their

lies, they fall into a socially unfavora'le position that can end up ith marginali=ation and

loss of prestige"

?G4 9hen spea!ers ho are lying fail socially, they ill have to read3ust their conduct

and language ithin the frameor! of socially shared truths and lies ith the purpose of

social reinstitution" If they succeed, they ill 'e a'le to once again produce ade#uate

performative statements6 if not, they ill 'e socially handicapped"

?4 Inade#uate performative lies are a result of the folloing*

a" Stating false constative propositions"

'" Stating inade#uate e)ertive propositions 7derived from the e)ercise of poer8"

E)ertive propositions are not credi'le unless the spea!er holds a certain level

of authority"

c" Stating inade#uate perpetrative propositions 7hich refer to actions that the

spea!er ill 'e una'le to perform8"

d" Stating propositions related to a social conduct hich may signal the

'eginning or end of an inade#uate action that the spea!er is una'le to

perform"

e" Stating propositions in hich spea!ers inade#uately e)plain their reasons

'ecause those are not socially shared reasons"?4 9hen spea!ers lie inade#uately in fields a, ', c, d and e, e say they are

suffering from delusions6 hen they do so ade#uately, e say they are leaders"

4 & delusion is nothing more than an inade#uate system of truths and lies that are

not socially shared" Spea!ers ho hold on to such systems have 'een traditionally

considered to 'e mentally ill" 0n the other hand, a socially shared delusion 'ecomes the

'asis of a social group or even a hole political system, and this is hat $ar) called an

;ideology"<

54 (he spea!er ho states a delusion tends to end up 'eing a victim possi'ly afterhaving first 'een a master as happens in the case of paranoia"


23/63


:4 (he spea!er ho states an ideology 'ecomes the founder of a religious or

political system, and in some cases of 'oth as Sigmund Freud pointed out"

?4 (here are several spheres ithin hich it is necessary to create constative and

performative statements hich are necessarily lies" (hose are the spheres of art, religion,

and personal relationships of an affective nature"

4 &ffective relationships, as ell as religion and the various arts, share the need of

using the imagination for creating a orld of fiction"

4 (he creation of a orld of fiction, than!s to the use of the imagination in ver'al or

'ody language, or in the different plastic and artistic languages, is hat allos the creation of

feelings, ithout hich human 'eings could not live"

4 (he search for feelings, therefore, could 'e thought of as a system of ade#uate

lies in hich constative and performative propositions achieve a certain e#uili'rium"

G4 (he use of lies is necessary in the search for feelings" -evertheless, there are

differences 'eteen various types of lies 7in regards to their poer as ell as to their social

e)tent8*

a" (he lies constative and performative hich provide us ith the meaning of

life that each of us creates for ourselves and are only partially shared 'y our

closest social group, in hich each one%s lies and illusions are mutually

recogni=ed 'y all the others, 'ut ith no pretensions of having them

recogni=ed outside the group"

'" (he lies and fictions hich characteri=e all the arts and are the o'3ect of study

of esthetics, and hich can 'e understood under the &ristotelian concept of

iesis, or the +antian concept of !inalit+ without end " (hese lies re#uire a

social complicity that may 'e, and aim to 'e, very 'road, 'ut ill alays 'e

considered a provisional fiction ithin the space and time of daily life6 in other

ords, they ill alays 'e seen as a game, an e)ample 'eing the lies of

religion, systematic theology and great political ideologies hich demand

unconditional acceptance, as in the case of the individual delusion, 'ut that,unli!e individual delusion, achieve their goal 'y means of the imposition of

poer and the creation of a consensus"

4 (he field of ideologies and theologies is here ade#uate lies have achieved their

greatest success"

4 Ideologies and theologies re#uire the enunciation of multiple false constative

propositions hich ill never 'e su'3ect to a test or protocol that may 'ring a'out their

re'uttal" (hose propositions, hoever, 'ecome accepted due to the simultaneous use of

force and authority and the generation of a consensus"


24/63

1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 :5

4 (he false constative propositions of ideologies and theologies cannot 'e re'utted

'ecause they do not refer to any fact or o'3ect found in this orld" If they did, they ould 'e

in danger"

54 (he false constative propositions of ideologies and theologies could 'e said to

share the folloing characteristics 7hich continuously set them up against the ordinary

re'utta'le propositions8" (o understand this, it ill first 'e necessary to esta'lish certain

definitions*

a" 9ith the term ;orld< e refer to all the o'3ects and states of fact that have

the common property of e)istence" Ideologies and theologies maintain,

hoever, that there can 'e an e)istence e)ternal to the orld, thus

contradicting the definition of the orld itself, and forci'ly granting it a dual

structure hich is neither re'utta'le nor percepti'le"

'" Every e)isting 'eing 'elongs to the orld, and constative propositions can 'e

enunciated regarding this 'eing" (here can 'e no e)isting 'eing e)ternal to

the orld, unless e accept the e)istence of a dual orld"

c" (he e)istence of a dual orld is inconsistent 'ecause if such a orld e)isted,

then, according to Plato, the authentic orld could 'e nothing more than copy

of that other imaginary orld" It ould 'e li!e saying that the orld, hich 'y

definition can only 'e one, is actually dou'le"

d" For that same reason, it cannot 'e asserted that >od, the gods, or those

'eings descri'ed in various mythologies and theologies throughout history

could possi'ly e)ist apart from the orld"

e" (he e)istence of a 'eing or an o'3ect is not a predicate that can fit into its

on definition, 'ut the property possessed 'y o'3ects and the states of fact

that 'elong to the orld"

f" &s a result of the a'ove reasons, theologies and ideologies cannot 'e stated

in constative propositions" If they are stated in constative propositions, it can

only 'e through the creation of systems of lies for the purpose of 3ustifyingsome type of domination" -evertheless, theologies and ideologies cannot

renounce to 'eing formulated as systems of constative propositions 'ecause

if they did, they ould not 'e a'le to claim their un#uestiona'le validity"

:4 Ideologies and theologies, hoever, have e)isted and continue to e)ist as

linguistic facts" (hus, e can state that theologies and ideologies are real linguistic facts"

?4 (he reality of theologies and ideologies is not derived from the constative nature

of their enunciations 7since they are all necessarily false8, 'ut from the adaptation of their

performative statements"


25/63

1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 ::

4 (he performative statements of ideologies and theologies are ade#uate in to

ays* individually and collectively"

a" (hey are individually ade#uate as long as they help give sense to people%s

lives, a sense hich is not possi'le to achieve ithout the creation of an

illusion or a lie"

'" (hey are socially ade#uate 'ecause they have 'een essential historically for

structuring systems of political domination and economic e)ploitation"

4 (he performative enunciations of ideologies and theologies can 'e ade#uate

hen they allo for the e)pression of 'asic human feelings 7love and hate, fear and anguish,

anger and compassion, happiness and sadness8 'y means of rites, te)ts or various arts"

4 Human and religious feelings in general are neither true nor false, only ade#uate

or inade#uate" (hose feelings are not generated in a vacuum6 they have a social nature and

conse#uently form part of the social netor!s of domination and poer"

G4 In the life of the individuals and of small groups and ithin the sphere of the

different arts, it is not possi'le to impose the feelings and tastes of one individual over a

hole collectivity, or force an entire society to accept a particular fiction as artistic" &rt is, 'y

its very nature, a free game"

4 (heologies and ideologies, hoever, impose and induce certain types of

sentiments among a collectivity, forcing large groups of people to accept false systems of

constative propositions"

4 Ideologies and theologies have thus 'een and continue 'eing essential

instruments for esta'lishing economic, social and political domination, since they not only

force a collectivity to comply ith all sorts of o'ligations, 'ut also attempt to control the

perception hich individuals have of themselves, and to control their feelings and thoughts"

4 Ideologies and religions are insepara'le in different ays and proportions

from the human condition, a condition here illusion alays reigns supreme over reality, a

condition here thought and language are no more than a minuscule part of the physical and

'iological life, a condition here feelings have alays 'een and ill continue 'eing the 'asisof thought"

54 & condition, finally, here some human 'eings attempt to capture the orld and

spea! a'out it to delude themselves into thin!ing that they can a'andon it, at least

momentarily, finding it impossi'le to comprehend ho they can 'e outside and inside that

orld and outside and inside themselves at the same time"

:4 & condition in hich it is difficult to comprehend ho everything e thin! refers to

something e)ternal ill alays end up referring to ourselves, since there is no one outside

ho can confirm it or deny it"


26/63

1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 :?

O# 'e Im)oss&b&l&+ o" Com)ar( E*)ress&o# a#$ Re"ere#!e

54 Every proposition ta!es place ith an act of speech, and every thought ith and

act of thin!ing" -evertheless, it is necessary to distinguish the act of speech from the content

of the proposition, and the act of thin!ing 0noesis3 from the o'3ect of thought 0noea3.

:4 &long the course of the history of 9estern philosophy, hoever, the attempt has

'een made to e#uate the act of speech ith the hole array of all the possi'le propositions,

and it has even 'een considered possi'le to capture 'y means of language and thought the

essence of everything considered real"

?4 (hat as the essence of realism and later of materialism, to conceptions of

philosophy hich in their appeal to the non4linguistic components of philosophy and the non4

su'3ective components of thought, ended up 'elieving that the language of philosophy or

science could a'sor' the e)terior reality"

4 (his occurred 'ecause those philosophical currents 3ust li!e the spontaneous

conceptions of science start out from the implicit principle hich states that it is possi'le to

say everything and to e)haust reality 'y means of language, 'elieving that if it as not so,

speech and self4e)pression ould 'e annulled"

4 Self4e)pression, or the a'ility to spea! and conse#uently to thin!, characteri=es the

spea!er%s meaning of life"

4 9e must ma!e a distinction 'eteen the sense of a proposition and the spea!er%s

meaning of life" 9hat 'oth have in common is that they allo for the connection of one

proposition ith other sets of propositions, thus fully capturing the value of the reference" But

hile in the case of an isolated proposition the connective value only allos for the

esta'lishment of the relationship 'eteen that specific proposition and others, in the case of

the spea!er%s meaning of life it is that same capacity of connection 'eteen propositions

hich ma!es the spea!er feel he or she has the a'ility to tal!, i"e", the linguistic competence"

G4 &ccording to +arl BQhler, all spea!ers structure their language around a deictic

nucleus 7BQhler, 58" (he nucleus is itself structured in to ays* egocentric andtopomnesic"

4 & deictic egocentric structure refers to the fact that spea!ers alays spea! situating

themselves in space in an oriented manner and fully conscientious of that orientation"

4 & deictic topomnesic structure refers to the fact that spea!ers position themselves

in time as ell as in space"

54 (he deictic egocentric structure e)plains the structure of propositions 'uilt upon

the su'3ect4predicate relationship"

554 (he topomnesic structure e)plains the importance of tense in language concerning ver's as ell as adver's"


27/63


5:4 &ll language is e)terior to the spea!er, hich does not mean that language is an

a'sent structure, nor that language spea!s through the su'3ect as a ventrilo#uism as once

thought 'y structuralism"

5?4 Spea!ers handle language as a tool that allos them to adapt to reality ith the

purpose of 'iological and social survival" (hus, &ristotle defined humans as zoon l


28/63


::4 (he a'ility to e)press oneself glo'ally considered together ith a general

feeling of security and the satisfaction of the 'asic physical and 'iological needs, constitute

the so4called ;meaning of life"<

:?4 >iving meaning to life at its highest level is similar to 'eing a'le to manage

the connections 'eteen the essential propositions and the control over the language" (he

recovery of this a'ility constituted the 'asis of psychoanalytical therapy, from hich all

current psychotherapies evolved 7Ellen'erger, 5G8, here the essential factors are

language, dialogue and communication"

:4 In almost every culture, each person has a proper name"

:4 (he spea!er can add the pronoun of the first person singular to the proper name*

;I am )"< &lthough, according to Fran= Bor!enau, this is an Indo4European construction,

specifically of the >ermanic languages 7Bor!enau, 558"

:4 (he use of the proper name together ith the pronoun of the first person singular

ould 'e the !ey to understanding, according to Bor!enau, the 9estern idea of identity and

the 'irth of individualism"

:G4 It could, therefore, 'e assumed that the e)istence of proper names presupposes

that the e)pression of the spea!er can 'e o'3ectified ith one reference ;my name is

o'3ectively ),< or ;I am really ),< thus ma!ing individual identity o'3ective"

:4 (his is not so, hoever, 'ecause proper names lac! significance6 in other ords,

they possess no reference"

:4 If proper names had reference, people could 'e defined"

?4 But people cannot 'e defined, only descri'ed6 thus, from a proper name only a

definite description can 'e given"

?54 9hen e give a definite description of a person, hat e are doing is analy=ing

the relationship 'eteen that person and others ithin his or her social and historical conte)t

7is the son ofR, the father ofR, lives inR8" For this reason, most onomastic systems re#uire

terms descri'ing the relationships of family, residence, and social roles in general"

?:4 (he e)istence and possession of a proper name is no guarantee of personalidentity, as Bor!enau maintains, 'ut is the !ey instrument of the individual%s mem'ership

ithin a social group"

??4 (he possession of a proper name and its use 'y that community of spea!ers

hich the name%s holder forms part of is 'oth a !ey instrument of social recognition and of

the group%s control over the individual"

?4 (he relationship 'eteen the individual and his or her proper name is similar to

the relationship 'eteen the spea!er and his or her language" Each individual has a proper

name, 'ut is at the same time oned or dominated 'y it 'ecause that particular namecan 'e the !ey to the individual%s social identity"


29/63


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 :G

ithout hich it is not possi'le to state the propositions" -o one can continue spea!ing after

having said everything hich can possi'ly 'e said"

4 In addition, since every spea!er spea!s from a deictic egocentric and topomnesic

field, it ould 'e a contradiction in terms to conceive a spea!er outside time and space,

unless e 'elieve the Platonic fiction of a dual orld, ith its original and its copy"

4 If it is not possi'le to conceive a universal spea!er, neither is it possi'le to

conceive a 'eing ho thin!s in an a'solute manner, since the !noledge of everything

cognosci'le assumes the cancelation of the authentic notion of !noledge and ould lead to

nothing, as Hegel himself noted in his Science o! "ogic "

G4 (hus, the a'solute spea!er and the a'solute thin!er to re#uirements of

theology and metaphysics are nothing 'ut a contradiction in terms"

4 (hese contradictory propositions, hoever, could 'e interpreted as follos* ;(he

fact that there is a 'eing ho can !no everything and can say everything is the guarantee

that I can thin! and e)press myself safely, and conse#uently feel secure"<

4 (he conception of a 'eing as a fully e)isting and omnipresent god capa'le of

saying everything, diverts the capacity of e)pression to the reference of the propositions

the one that states the e)istence of o'3ects"

4 E#uating e)pression and reference leads to a contradiction in terms 'ecause

each and every one of the possi'le propositions has reference, sense, coloring and

e)pression, even though each type of proposition is generated from its on type of category"

54 (he development of that type of association, hoever, seems to have 'een

historically necessary, and ill continue 'eing so until it is recogni=ed that the value of lies is

insepara'le from the nature of the propositions"

:4 .ies are necessary for life itself"

?4 (he lies of every spea!er and of small groups of humans are necessary for the

e)istence of those groups and tend to 'e assumed 'y consensus, either 'y admitting them

as fiction as in the case of the various arts or as shared 'eliefs"

4 ;9e entertain ideas6 e live according to 'eliefs,< rote 1os2 0rtega y >asset70rtega y >asset, 58" 9e could thus say that the lie is a consu'stantial element of

spea!ers, since lies can 'e a fundamental mechanism for adapting to a reality hich ould

aspire to 'e stated as a truth"

4 .ies are the denial of the reference"

4 .ies are necessary for ma!ing possi'le the e)pression of truth, not only 'ecause

truth and falsehood are to complementary terms, 'ut also 'ecause the reference cannot 'e

e)hausted"


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G4 Each proposition contains a 'asic nucleus of reference and differential fragments

of reference, hich connect each proposition ith other sets of propositions 'y means of the

mechanisms of sense and coloring"

4 &s long as sense and coloring do not constitute full references, the value of truth

cannot 'e applied to them"

4 -evertheless, ne truths may emerge from them 'y connecting a true proposition

ith others that may also 'e true as a result of non4formali=a'le protocols that 'ring a'out

the true advance of !noledge"

4 (he advancement of !noledge may 'e accomplished in to ays*

a" By increasing ac#uired !noledge folloing an esta'lished protocol"

'" By the creation and discovery of ne fields of !noledge due to scientific,

philosophic, or artistic creativity"

54 Creativity cannot 'e formali=ed, planned or regulated 'ecause it is rooted in the

deepest e)pressive mechanisms of language 7+oestler, 58"

:4 9e could thus say that scientific, philosophic and artistic creativity 'eing rooted

in the mechanisms of creation of the individual spea!er and the social group originates

more in falsehood than in truth"

?4 .ies are not a denial of truth, 'ut, on the contrary, truth is only a precipitate of the

lie, as stated 'y Friedrich -iet=sche in his essay =n $ruths and "ies in a onoral Sense"

4 (he most systematic representation of lies hen supported 'y the eight of civil

and religious authority are theology and religion"

4 /eligion, li!e art, may 'e a necessary lie 'ecause it can serve as a mechanism

for the creation of meaning" But since religion can 'e imposed, it goes from 'eing a

mechanism of e)pression and li'eration into 'ecoming a mechanism of oppression"

4 It could 'e claimed, as +arl 1aspers did 71aspers, 58, that religious ideas and

language are necessary as forms of e)pression of that hich cannot otherise 'e said" (his

need, hoever, 'ecomes an o'stacle the moment religion tries to 'ecome a socially

endorsed institution"G4 &ll religions, as Henri Bergson emphasi=ed 7Bergson, 5?:, ith .oisy%s

commentary, 5??8, move 'eteen to poles* that of free creation and e)pression and that

of social consolidation and imposition" (heir institutional need can therefore 'e placed in

dou't 'ecause as &rthur Schopenhauer pointed out the functions of religion can 'e

performed 'y the arts 7Schopenhauer, :?8"

4 It must 'e emphasi=ed that each one of the aspects of the propositions cannot 'e

reduced to any of the other three" (he most e)treme case is that of reference and e)pression

'ecause they are their most e)treme poles traditionally indentified ith the o'3ective andsu'3ective orlds"


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4 (he attempt to o'3ectify the e)pression is a desperate ay of trying to attain

meaning out of individual or collective life, hich is moved 'y the fear of the insecure and the

un!non"

G4 (he fear of insecurity, pain and death is insepara'le from the human condition,

and thus it could 'e said that a great part of human history has 'een, and ill continue to 'e,

an endless search for security, pleasure and life through language, contemplation, art,

religion and multiple forms of social life"

G54 -evertheless, e can never manage to feel fully secure, and thus e conclude

this te)t ith the ords of a poet ho !ne ho to e)press fear, insecurity and dou't*

(o 'e, or not to 'e* that is the #uestion

9hether tis no'ler in the mind to suffer

(he slings and arros of outrageous fortune,

0r to ta!e arms against a sea of trou'les,

&nd 'y opposing end themT (o die* to sleep6

-o more6 and, 'y a sleep to say e end

(he heartache and the thousand natural shoc!s

(hat flesh is heir to, tis a consummation

Nevoutly to 'e ished" (o die, to sleep6

(o sleep* perchance to dream* ay, there%s the ru'6

For in that sleep of death hat dreams may come

9hen e have shuffled off this mortal coil,

$ust give us pause"

9illiam Sha!espeare, Halet , &ct III, Scene I"


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E*)ress&o# a#$ S&le#!e

54 9ith the term ;silence< e refer to the a'sence of any proposition"

:4 Since only propositions can have reference, silence lac!s any type of reference"

?4 For the same reason, silence has no sense or coloring"

4 But e cannot deny the possi'ility that some type of e)pression may 'e possi'le in

silence"

4 Every proposition is possi'le due to an act in hich a statement is made"

4 (he act of stating a proposition and the content of that proposition are not of the

same nature"

G4 & propositon has a linguistic nature"

4 & declarative act does not have a linguistic nature 'ecause an act is not a

statement"

4 Every declarative act 'elongs to the set of all possi'le acts, and thus forms part of

the categories of action"

54 $ost possi'le acts do not have a linguistic correlate" (hey are, therefore, acts that

are non4predicative or pre4predicative"

554 (he performance of any type of act presupposes the e)istence of a feeling of

certainty"

5:4 (here are to types of certainties* that hich is sensitive, and that hich is

sensitive and enuncia'le 7Berme3o Barrera, :8"

5?4 & certainty accompanied 'y silence can only 'e a sensitive certainty"

54 By means of the sensitive certainty it is possi'le for us to !no that e form part

of the orld"

54 (he perception of 'eing integrated into a totality is called ;feeling of 'elonging"<

54 &cts of speech are not necessary for the feeling of 'elonging to ta!e place"

5G4 9ithin the feeling of 'elonging, e must distinguish 'eteen to different

aspects* 'elonging to the orld in general, and 'elonging to the orld of human 'eings"54 &cts of speech are not strictly necessary for the e)istence of the feeling of

'elonging to the physical orld" (he same occurs ith the feeling of 'elonging to the

common human orld, hich Husserl and Schut= called Mitwelt 7the orld of my

contemporaries8 7Schut=, 5?:8.

54 (he common orld is the orld of lived e)periences, hich these authors called

"ebenswelt 7the mundane ;lifeorld


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 ?5

::4 (ime in life is a flo" (ime in the physical orld is not"

:?4 (he flo of time past, present and future come together in the act hich

ma!es possi'le the feeling of certainty that e are immersed in the time of life, something

hich is not possi'le in the inorganic orld 7Berme3o Barrera, :8"

:4 If the orld of life is a common orld, the time of life is also, conse#uently, a

common human time"

:4 &ccording to Schut=, common human time is structured into 2orwelt 7the orld of

my predecessors8 and #olgerwelt 7the orld of my successors8" In other ords, the time of

those human 'eings that preceded us and the time of those human 'eings ho ill

presuma'ly follo us"

:4 (he feeling of 'elonging in time is one of the classes of certainty and can

therefore 'e or not 'e formulated ver'ally"

:G4 (he feeling of 'elonging in time, 3ust li!e the feeling of 'elonging to the human

orld, is structured in circles of greater and lesser magnitude, such as family, place of

residence, and different types of communities"

:4 In each and every case the feeling of 'elonging can 'e formulated ver'ally, or

not" Hoever, it cannot 'e ver'ally formulated if a feeling of pre4predicative 'elonging does

not previously e)ist"

:4 0riginal certainty and 'elonging do not necessarily have to 'e stated6 thus, it

could 'e said that certainty and 'elonging may have some characteristics in common ith

silence"

?4 9e should not consider silence as an entity, only as the negation or a'sence of all

types of propositions"

?54 Silence, thus, cannot 'e stated as that ould 'e a contradiction in terms 'ut

can 'e lived and felt"

?:4 9e could, therefore, include silence ithin the frameor! of sensitive certainties"

??4 Having the certainty that silence e)ists 7and since silence presupposes the

impossi'ility of acts of speech8 is the same as having the certainty that language has aninsurmounta'le limit"

?4 (he certainty of the e)istence of language%s insurmounta'le limit is fundamental

for understanding the nature of language itself"

?4 (he certainty of the e)istence of silence lets us distinguish the orld 7or that

hich forms part of the set of all the statements8 from the language 7or that hich constitutes

the set of all the possi'le statements8"

?4 Confusing one ith the other has 'een the cause of most of the so4called

pro'lems of philosophy and theology"


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 ?:

?G4 $ost 9estern philosophies and theologies have systematically tried to identify the

orld and the language, or derive the former from the latter 0>In the beginning was the

word?3, or the latter from the former, considering language as a physical event"

?4 (he certainty that silence is the a'solute limit of language does not imply that

spea!ers must 'e foreign to the orld, outside the orld, or previous and superior to that

orld, in !eeping ith Platonic tradition"

?4 0n the contrary, that same sensitive certainty, if considered to 'e fully

prelinguistic, is the ma)imum guarantee of 'elonging to the physical and human orld, as

long as no attempt is made to formulate it ver'ally"

4 (he attempt to ver'ally formulate the certainty that the feeling of 'elonging to the

orld cannot 'e ver'ally formulated 'rought a'out the e)istence of +sticis"

54 &ll mystical formulations are contradictory in terms" By attempting to ver'ally

e)press the feeling of 'elonging of the to types, they end up creating systems of

propositions"

:4 But since all propositions must have e)pression, coloring, sense and reference,

the propositions of mysticism are no more than systems of lies 'ased on the idea that there

can 'e reference in silence, something hich contradicts the definition of silence itself"

?4 (he certainty of silence and the feelings of 'elonging that are derived from it, can

serve as feelings of security 'y revealing the integration of the spea!er into the physical and

social orld" (hose are the feelings of security that mysticism has attempted to formulate

ver'ally"

4 $ysticism cannot formulate ver'ally that hich cannot 'e ver'ally e)pressed" (he

'asic feelings of 'elonging, hoever, 'eing sensitive certainties, can 'e sensorially

perceived and e)pressed 'y those arts hich do not depend on language* music and the

plastic arts"

4 (he assertion that music and the plastic arts 7hich don%t re#uire the presence of

ver'al statements8 can 'ring a'out the sharing of those sensitive certainties hich can 'e

sensorially perceived in silence, does not mean that those arts are the supreme forms of!noledge, and that all !noledge hich can 'e ver'ally formulated is derived from them"

(hat as one of the !ey concepts of /omanticism and of those philosophies hich anted

intuition to ta!e precedence over non4ver'al !noledge"

4 (his is an error 'ecause it presupposes the association of realities hich are

completely heterogeneous, such as language and silence, and 'ecause in the end those

same philosophies 7such as Schopenhauer%s8 attempted to formulate ver'ally that hich

cannot 'e ver'ally formulated, as in the case of mysticism"


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1os2 Carlos Berme3o Barrera $he "iits o! "anguage 4 ??

G4 (he non4ver'al arts form part of the orld of the sensitive certainty, and that

e)plains ho the properties of or!s of art 7rhythms, proportions, harmony and 'eauty8 can

also 'e sensorially perceived ith certainty in nature organic and inorganic"

4 From the e)istence of the arts came the theological and philosophical idea of the

e)istence of an intelligent 'eing ho created nature as an artisan or demiurge" (his idea

presupposes the idea that the orld can 'e thought up 'y a 'eing ho masters the language

and plans the creation of the orld li!e an artisan or demiurge"

4 (his artisan or demiurge ould also 'e the ma)imum spea!er, the "ogos, ho

tends to 'e conceived as 'eing similar to humans, and hose a'solute sensitive certainty

coincides ith a orld, not the orld it 'elongs to, 'ut the orld that 'elongs to it, or that

coincides ith it"

4 (he error ith this concept derives as ith all mystic concepts from not

admitting the difference 'eteen language and silence and 'eteen the language and the

orld, as ell as from the feeling of insecurity hich ma!es those ho formulate these

concepts thin! that the only ay of feeling secure in the orld of 'elonging to it is 'y

dominating it ith a'solute poer"

54 (his is the reason hy theology, religions and philosophy have alays 'een

associated ith the e)ercise of poer"

:4 (he only ay to avoid falling into this infantile feeling of omnipotence hich

derives from the feelings of certainty and 'elonging is 'y ac!noledging contingency"

?4 &ll sensitive certainty and all physical and social 'elonging are contingent, since

they depend on the integration of each individual or each group into a specific space and

time"

4 (he contingency of certainty and 'elonging ma!es the feeling of a'solute security

attri'uted to >od an impossi'ility"

4 9e can, nevertheless, do ithout a'solute security, since e only need enough

security for our on condition, hich is naturally contingent"

4 In the same ay that the orld is o'livious to language and that the meaning ofthe orld 'elongs to the spea!ers and is not a characteristic of the orld itself, the security of

the spea!ers 7or of hoever feels the sensitive certainty8 'elongs only to them" &nd as

contingent 'eings that they are in space and in time they do not need a'solute security"

G4 (he a'solute security in space of a contingent 'eing is unthin!a'le, since it is a

contradiction in terms, 'ecause one part cannot 'e identified ith the hole"

4 -evertheless, the aspiration toards a'solute security in time does e)ist" 9e call

this a'solute security eternit+ one of >od%s essential characteristics"

4 By ;eternity< e refer to the a'solute certainty of hoever feels part of a temporalflo, of remaining in that flo forever, hich contradicts the idea of a temporal flo"


37/63


4 9e call ;eternity of the instant< the feeling of certainty of 'elonging to a temporal

flo, due to the suspension or free=ing of time itself" (he eternity of the instant is one of the

essential characteristics of or!s of art, ver'al or not, hich aim to overcome time"

54 (he eternity of the instant can also 'e formulated, as ith -iet=sche, in the form

of the eternal recurrence" (his theory, hoever, 'eing a metaphysical theory of religious and

mystical origin, must necessarily 'e a lie, since it presupposes the attempt to ver'ali=e a

non4ver'ali=a'le e)perience"

:4 (he eternity of the instant can 'e perceived ith certainty in music and the plastic

arts hich seem fro=en in time"

?4 (he eternity of the instant, hich re#uires us to transcend time, shares the

property ith silence of transcending that reality here humans live and e)press themselves

in time* language"

4 (he survival in the physical orld of a or! of art produced in another time 'y a

person or persons no a'sent, and preserved ithin the silence of a physical o'3ect hich

can 'e perceived or physically reproduced in the case of a musical interpretation 'ut not

ver'ali=ed, forms an essential part of the feeling of the eternity of the instant"

4 (he eternity of the instant, hoever, forms part of the sensitive certainty that ta!es

place in time" (hus, it could 'e said that the eternity of the instant is simply one more degree

in the feelings of sensitive certainty and 'elonging"

4 (hose feelings that form part of the eternity of the instant are the ones that can

help human 'eings find a form of e)pression in silence, a ver'al silence that can allo them

to open themselves up to other forms of sensorial perception such as music 7see >aviln,

:8, plastic perception or the perception of nature"

G4 In this manner human 'eings have tried to feel surer of themselves, closer to

each other and more integrated in a orld that is ine)hausti'le through language and

!noledge"

4 & orld a'out hich e may have come to thin! since it is itself silent that

perceiving its silence and accepting the definite limits of our language may 'e the finalguarantee that e shall alays 'e integrated in it"


38/63


E*)ress&o#. Pa a#$ Fear

54 9ith the term ;pain< e refer to the sensitive perception of a state hich hinders or

impedes us from 'elonging to the physical and social orlds"

:4 9ith the term ;pleasure< e refer to the sensitive perception of a state hich

facilitates and favors 'elonging to the physical and social orlds"

?4 Pleasure and pain are opposites, 'ut not contradictory" In fact, they are

complementary"

4 Pleasure cannot 'e conceived of ithout pain"

4 Pleasure and pain are perceived in time as are all the sensitive perceptions"

4 In pleasure and pain there is alays a triple structure* past, present and future"

G4 (here is no a'solute pleasure or pain" Pleasure and pain are alays gradual"

4 (he transition 'eteen the degrees of pleasure and pain coincide ith the structure

of sensitive time"

4 Pleasure and pain 'elong to the orld of reference"

54 Pleasure and pain are not a property of the propositions" (he propositions can

refer to the states of pleasure and pain" (he propositions hich refer to the states of pleasure

and pain are the propositions of e)pression"

554 In the same ay that the o'3ect hich refers to a proposition is different from the

proposition itself, and in the same ay that a proposition neither e)hausts nor alters the

o'3ect or o'3ects hich it refers to, the propositions hich refer to pleasure and pain are

su'stantially different from pleasure and pain"

5:4 Pleasure and pain 'elong to the orld outside of language, to the orld that

language refers to" (his is the reason hy language can never capture them in their totality"

5?4 Propositions e)ist hich refer to pleasure and pain"

54 (he propositions hich refer to pleasure and pain have reference, sense, coloring

and e)pression"

54 (he propositions hich refer to pleasure and pain have sense and coloring'ecause the degrees of pleasure and pain follo one another in time and cannot 'e

e)pressed univocally"

54 Pleasure and pain are not only temporal systems, 'ut also spatial" (his is the

reason hy it is necessary to connect their references ith their sense and coloring, 'ecause

they are the only instruments hich can account for the nuances"

5G4 Even so, in the propositions of e)pression it is impossi'le to e)haust the

references as is the case in all types of propositions"


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54 (his is the reason hy pleasure and pain 'elong fundamentally to the e)tra4

linguistic orld, the orld of silence even though pleasure and pain can 'e e)pressed in

language"

54 (hrough pleasure and pain the spea!er is integrated into the physical and social

orlds, 'ut it is also through pleasure and pain ho the spea!er may 'ecome incapa'le of

integration into those orlds"

:4 Pleasure and pain are 'asically pre4predicative 'ecause they are 'eyond the

limits of language"

:54 It is from the pre4predicative level of pleasure and pain that language 'ecomes

possi'le"

::4 .anguage may not 'e possi'le hen the spea!er cannot find any ay to 'e

integrated into the physical and social orld"

:?4 In the case here a spea!er is not integrated into the physical orld, the

spea!er%s incapacity for e)pression is a physical impossi'ility"

:4 In the case here a spea!er is not integrated into the social orld, the spea!er%s

incapacity for e)pression is a social incapacity"

:4 -evertheless, it cannot 'e said that there is a sharp division 'eteen the physical

and social orlds 'ecause a spea!er is a physical 'eing ith a social nature, and language

is the #uintessential social event"

:4 & spea!er%s incapacity for e)pression depends on the temporal structure of the

spea!er%s sensorial perception 'ecause language is a'ove all a physical event, and

language is 'uilt from the propositions stated in time time 'eing an essential aspect of the

structure of language itself"

:G4 & spea!er%s possi'ility of e)pression is related to the spea!er%s temporal structure

of pleasure and pain"

:4 Since a spea!er 'ecomes integrated into the physical and social orld 'y means

of e)pression, the spea!er%s capacity for e)pression is correlative to the perception of the

gradual and temporal states of pleasure and pain":4 (he ;spea!er%s e)pression< refers to the act 'y hich a spea!er, upon formulating

a statement, can frame it ithin a structure articulated on the 'asis of pleasure in such a ay

that the degrees of pleasure predominate over those of pain either at the time of ma!ing

the statement or in a near future"

?4 (hus it can 'e said that a spea!

Documents

The Limits of Language Propositions And