Psychobabblethe Journal

MARCH 2011, ISSUE 2

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Welcome back to PsychobabbleAfter a very successful launch with our first edition of Psychobabble, I am very excited to present our second

edition. Again I would like to start by thanking all those who have contributed and helped in the proofreading and formatting. It is through the contributions of people expressing their own opinion and showcasing their work that Psychobabble can hope to achieve its aim; to provide a platform from which to encourage discussion and hopefully enthusiasm for studying psychology.

In this edition we have an interview with Professor Karmiloff Smith, one of the leading developmental psychologists of our time. I first heard of her work after looking for criticisms to the modular approach of language proposed by Pinker. I agreed with and became interested in her approach. This led me to see if there was an opportunity of a volunteer research assistant in her department, for the summer of 2010. To my surprise I was accepted, and I am very grateful to her for have given me this opportunity, as I learnt a large amount from the placement. In particular, seeing her hard work and enthusiasm for studying development was inspirational. I would also like to thank Dean D'Souza, one of Professor Karmiloff-Smith's PhD students, who helped me during my placement.

The rest of the edition is full of articles of a very high standard and I am glad to see that contributions have come from across different year groups. With this my 4th and final year of psychology at Edinburgh I am glad that Rebecca White and Lewis White have agreed to be co-editors of Psychobabble next year with several other showing an interest in helping. If you are one of those who would like to get involved or get an article in for next edition please write to pychobabble.ed@googlemail.com. I wish Psychobabble every success in the future.

Let the babbling commence... John Howard Co founder

ContentsINTERVIEW:

2 Professor Karmiloff-Smith

REVIEW:

5 “Beyond the Looking Glass” by Iona Walker

6 “The Case for Massively Modular Mind”by Maria Stropyra

7 “Motor Resonance in Speech Comprehension”by Oana Stanciu

TALKING POINTS

8 “Hypnosis, Dreams and the Ganzfeld”by Rebecca Sanderson

10 “Looking Out to Look In”

by Vanessa Wilson11 “Psychology's Other Roots”

by Andrew Joseph Amari12 “What is it Good for?”

by John Howard13 “Ideas of Self”

by Agata Dzieciolowska14 “Things I wish I had known earlier...”

by John Howard

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Interviewee: Professor Karmiloff-Smith, CBE, FBA, FmedSci, MAE, Cpsychol

Interviewer: John Howard, 4th year Psychology, 50 meter backstroke

For the feature article of this edition we are lucky to have Professor Karmiloff-Smith answering question for us. She is a developmental psychologist who began her psychology career working for Jean Piaget. She then went onto work at Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen, MRC Cognitive Development Unit in London. Thereafter, UCL where she set up the Neurocognitive Development Unit, to study atypical development, in particular Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, FragileX syndrome and Velocardiofacial syndrome, and has specialised in that field since. She currently occupies a Professorial Research Fellowship at Birkbeck’s Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development.

It seems there are few if any awards or titles Professor Karmiloff-Smith does not have, these include a CBE, FBA & BPS Lifetime Achievement Award, she is also author of Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science which won the BPS book award and is co-author of Rethinking Innateness: A Connectionist Perspective on Development.

Q. As you started your academic career working for the Jean Piaget, could you give us an insight into what it was like working for him, as well as the research methods used and how they differ from a modern lab?

A. Working with Piaget was both exhilarating and frustrating! Exhilarating, because Piaget made psychology feel so broad, encompassing philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, physics, mathematics, biology, anthropology and psychology. It was very different from a modern lab. We met every Monday morning, with the “experimentalists” on one side of the room and the “theoreticians” on the other (a bit like co-ed education used to be with boys on one side of the class and girls on the other!) Piaget invited some of the greatest minds in the world to these sessions, several of whom were Nobel Prize laureates. I think I annoyed him because I sometimes sat on the “wrong” side of the

room! We discussed both theory and the latest findings on the theme of the year. But the experiments were very different from those one read in journals. We used the critical evaluation method of on-the-spot hypothesis-driven questioning (adapting our questions to our hypothesis of what was underlying what the child had just said), so no standardised procedure across subjects, and the analyses were very descriptive, on occasion risking anecdote, so no statistics. But the data were always very rich. Frustrating, because Piaget was quite obstinate and never changed his write-up of reports of our results. At best, if I objected to some conclusion, he would leave the text intact but put in a footnote “one of us thinks X, the other Y; for the reader to decide”!

Unless I am mistaken, Piaget proposed a domain general account of cognitive development. For those unfamiliar with the developmental literature could you explain what this means and whether you think this is a valid stance.

A domain-general account of development implies that one general process (in Piaget’s theory, assimilation, accommodation and equilibration) can explain development across all cognitive domains, e.g., how language, number, social cognition, spatial cognition and so forth all develop via the same process. You also find domain-general theories underlying some computer modelling approaches to development, such as David Klahr’s Production System modelling of children’s problem solving in different domains or the use of connectionist modelling of cognitive development. A strong reaction to the domain-general theories was to opt for a domain-specific approach, often accompanied by a Nativist view of built-in modules. But there is a third alternative that I propose – a domain-relevant approach. The idea here is that the brain is not just a general mechanism for learning nor composed of built-in modules, but that certain brain circuits are more relevant to some types of input over others and become domain-specific over development – a gradual process of modularisation over time. But initially many parts of the brain in both hemispheres compete to process inputs, and only with time does specialisation and localisation of function occur as the more domain-relevant part of the brain for a particular class of input gradually wins out.

An Interview with Professor Karmiloff-Smith: Developing psychology through development.

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Although seen as one of the most influential psychologists for his work on developmental psychology, Piaget is often criticised for neglecting the role of social factors influencing cognitive development. Do you think this is a fair criticism?

Well, you have to recall that Piaget had a biological background and was interested in the “epistemic subject”, not in the “psychological subject” functioning in real time. He didn’t negate that social influences played a role, but he focused more on biological influences. It was Inhelder, his lifelong collaborator, who focused on children’s problem solving in real time and saw the importance of social influences. Others in Geneva, like Willem Doise, ran a whole section of the Faculté de Psychologie on social development. I think Piaget underplayed, rather than neglected, the role of social factors, as he did the role of language.

Have there been any fundamental changes in your theory or approach to psychology during your career?

Goodness, yes! I’d be a very boring scientist if I remained static…. I was initially very influenced by Piaget’s biologically-based epistemology (and still am) but didn’t like the stage theory and felt that language played a greater role in terms of an important representational system and communicative system than Piaget. In the early 80s, I was influenced by Fodor’s modularity theory but because of my developmental background, soon began to think of modules as the end product of a gradual process of modularisation. I have in recent times been increasingly influenced by work on the brain, although I draw a strong distinction between the developING brain and the developED brain. But when I look at my old books and articles I feel I have been saying the same thing again and again!!

As an expert on the study of William syndrome, could you give a brief description of what this condition is and how the study of atypical development can inform our understanding of typical cognition.

Williams syndrom (WS) is a fascinating neurodevelopmental condition and initially seemed to offer Nativists the proof of built-in modules which were either intact or impaired. Indeed, first observations of individuals with WS seemed to yield intact language, face processing and social interaction, and impaired spatial cognition and number. But subsequent more in-depth studies showed those conclusions to be very premature. First a quick word about the syndrome: WS

is caused by the deletion of some 28 genes on one copy of chromosome 7. It occurs because the regions flanking the deleted area are identical, so during meiosis the two chromosomes from mother and father misalign and a piece gets deleted. It’s purely random and can occur in any population. Of course, if a parent has WS there is a 50% chance that it will be passed to offspring. It was first recognised by the facial dysmorphology, a deficit in the aorta and very friendly social behaviour. But nowadays there is a critical genetic test which confirms the clinical description. WS presents with mild to moderate impairments in IQ, and behaviourally surprisingly proficient language and face processing. However, since the original work, many studies have now revealed late language onset, later deficits in several aspects of language including morphology and pragmatics, and an unusually featural strategy for face processing. Moreover, the overly friendly social behaviour is accompanied by a lack of social judgment and poor understanding of the subtleties of other minds. In sum, people with WS don’t present with a normal brain with a neat juxtaposition of intact and impaired parts. Rather, from embryogenesis and throughout ontogenesis the WS brain develops differently which has cascading effects on the resulting phenotype. To what extent does WS inform our understanding of typical cognition? Well, had it turned out that language and face processing were really intact (or even “relatively intact” as some claim – that always reminds me of claiming “I’m relatively pregnant”!) – then it might have directly informed about normal development. But since this is a dynamic developING system, comparisons turn out to be less obvious. I think in-depth phenotyping of atypical infants and children will show how domains interact early in development and the atypical case will reveal how, if the system fails to modularise, the cognitive and neural underpinnings to even proficient overt behavioural scores will be different.

What do you think are the most interesting areas of research that may have implications for developmental theory in the future?

Clearly, the field of developmental neuroscience, but with the proviso that it is done with a developING brain in mind, and not confused with the adult developED brain. Development is about change, not about static snapshots. Working with infants and children doesn’t necessarily mean that the researcher is studying development! That may sound paradoxical but it is not. Studying development involves a special frame of mind. One can study adults developmentally, especially the ageing population, as long as it focuses on change.

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Cross-syndrome comparisons will also be very informative instead of the focus on single syndromes, particularly looking not just for dissociations but also associations across syndromes. Another current methodological innovation is the use of eye tracking devices, even with young infants, because they help us to know very precisely where an individual is focusing her or his attention. Combining eye tracking with a number of different brain imaging methods will be very informative. I think the convergence of several methods on the same subjects will be particularly important. Finally, more emphasis on individual differences in both the typical and atypical populations will be centre stage in the near future in my view.

Have you always worked in the area of psychology, and what first got you interested?

No, I was a simultaneous interpreter in the United Nations organisations in Geneva. But although it was exciting to travel all over the world for conferences of the UN, WHO, ILO, FAO etc., I was getting bored repeating other people’s thoughts and not being allowed to have any of my own. It came to the crunch in Ethiopia at a WHO meeting on birth control, when I was interpreting a Belgian Catholic parliamentarian and strongly disagreed with his views. But I had to say “I think that birth control should be banned” because one has to interpret what is said, not what one thinks personally! So I started thinking about a career change and initially was attracted to medicine and psychiatry. But by then I had a baby daughter (I now have 2 grown-up daughters and 7 grandchildren) and medicine would have involved many years, along with internships, so I started reading about psychotherapy. Books beginning with PSY sit with psychology books so occasionally I picked up one by Piaget, and one day in the bookshop Piaget walked in (I recognised him from the photos on his books) so I followed him across to the university and audited his class. I was mindblown! I thought psychology was questionnaires and reaction time. But Piaget made it feel like the most exciting domain to study, so I signed up that Autumn fulltime. After my licence, I spent two years in Beirut and worked in the Palestinian refugee camps – an extraordinary experience. Then we returned to Geneva where I did my doctorate. The rest is history!

For all budding psychologists at Edinburgh, what do you think are the attributes that make a successful academic.

The willingness to work bloody hard for not much money – since I officially retired, I say that I now only

work seven days and evenings a week whereas I used to work eight days and evenings a week! As an interpreter I earned far more than I ever have as an academic, but I would never go back. How to be successful? Well, tiny variations on a well-worked theme makes for a boring academic, so the willingness to take risks into unknown territory and to come up with new ideas. The willingness to take criticism and accept that one is wrong (and that is difficult!) Taking great care of one’s students, thinking ahead about their careers, making sure they have first-author publications so that they are competitive on the subsequent job market. Above all, enthusiasm! Being utterly fascinated by a human issue and finding multiple ways to address the problem. And, of course I would say this, approaching any human problem WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE!

A few relevant publications

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992) Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

Karmiloff-Smith,A. (2007) Williams Syndrome., Current Biology, 17, 24, R1035-1036.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2009) Nativism versus Neuroconstructivism: Rethinking the Study of Developmental Disorders. Special Issue on the Interplay of Biology and Environment, Developmental Psychology, 45(1), 56-63

Karmiloff, K. & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2010) Getting to know you. The first three years. London: Carroll & Brown.

Karmiloff-Smith, A., Aschersleben, G., de Schonen, T., Elsabbagh, M., Hohenberger, A. & Serres, J. (2010) Constraints on the timing of infant cognitive change: Domain-specific or domain-general? European Journal of Developmental Science, 4(1), 31-45.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2010) Neuroimaging of the developing brain: Taking “developing” seriously. Human Brain Mapping, 31(6), 934-941.

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Beyond the Looking Glass: The Relationship between Mirror Neurons and Theory of Mind.

By Iona Walker, 3rd year Psychology

Di Pellegrino et al.’s (1992) discovery of a new set of specialised neurons that fired both when a monkey performed a particular motor act and when a monkey observed another individual performing the same motor act caused a sensation in neuroscience and psychology. These neurons appear to internally mirror the neural activity of the action being observed, as if the monkey itself is performing the action. In humans, however, these mirror neurons have yet to be directly observed, as the single cell recording used in monkeys is too invasive for use on humans (Alegre et al., 2010). The putative human mirror neuron system (MNS) is thought to be located in the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (inside Broca’s area), and within the rostral posterior parietal cortex (Dapretto et al., 2006).

Theory of Mind (TOM) refers to the ability to understand other people’s emotions – that is, to be empathetic (Baron-Cohen, 1991). A lack of TOM, therefore, means that a person is insensitive to social context and lacks an understanding that other people have ideas, knowledge and feelings different from their own (Baron-Cohen, 1985). An extensive network comprising the MNS, the insula and some limbic structures - especially the amygdala - could plausibly facilitate TOM processing in humans (Augustine, 1996). Thus, researchers have hypothesised that the MNS is damaged in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), which is characterised by restricted interests and an underlying impairment in TOM (see Pickett & London, 2005 for a review). It is generally accepted in the field that a MNS exists in humans (Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007), but the hypothesis that a damaged MNS underlies TOM deficits in Autism is much more controversial.

Mu waves, a frequency of neural activity measured using EEG, have been utilised as a theoretical index of MNS activity arguably since Gastaut & Bert (1954) showed that they were suppressed when neurotypical individuals watched others move. A recent study involved participants watching a person perform hand actions and facial expressions before being asked to imitate these while EEG measures were taken (Bernier et al., 2007). Autistic participants demonstrated poor imitation compared to neurotypical controls, and Mu wave

suppression was reduced during observation of actions and facial expressions. This suggested that participants with autism present weaker Mu suppression during socially relevant tasks. This evidence may be interpreted as showing that autistic impairments of TOM may be linked to lack of Mu suppression, and this finding has been widely replicated (Matrineua et al., 2010; Oberman, Ramachandran & Pineda, 2008).

Interestingly, a recent experiment found that Mu suppression is normal in autistic individuals when the stimuli are more socially relevant to them (Oberman, Ramachandran & Pineda, 2008). Other experiments go further in this opposite direction, finding EEG evidence that Mu suppression is normal in autistic individuals (Fan et al., 2010; Raymaekers, Wiersema & Roeyers, 2009).There is, however, a much more substantial body of research supporting the mirror neuron hypothesis of autism. It is a valid theory, but the current research has gone as far as possible using current methods.

The problem with mirror neuron research, which could account for the contradictory results in humans, is a methodological one. The methods used in these experiments are unable to exclusively locate mirror neuron activity because during passive movement observation and imitation conditions, other areas of the brain not believed to be part of the MNS present increased activity. Most studies attempt to overcome this issue by including only the activity of the ventral premotor cortex and the intraparietal sulcus, because these areas correspond anatomically with the MNS found in monkeys. This is a problematic because the corresponding areas in monkeys (area F5 and PF/IPL) only consist of a very small percentage of mirror neurons.

A recent article provides a possible solution. The authors suggest experiments should isolate these neurons by utilising the principle of movement selectivity, which refers to subsections of the MNS responding selectively to specific movements or goals in a homunculus-like arrangement (Dinstein et al., 2008). When an area shows increased activation when processing a specific movement, however, neurons within the area that are not part of the MNS will also show increased activation. Further use of another principle, that sensory neurons habituate, would eliminate these extra areas from analysis.

Research using this method would further the understanding of the relationship between the MNS and TOM, regarding not only autism but other disorders of

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TOM including schizophrenia (Quintana et al., 2001; Soubasi et al, 2010) and Parkinson’s (Alegre et al., 2010; Peron et al., 2010), for which the MNS research has only just begun.

Summary: “The case for massively modular models of mind” – Peter Carruthers

By Maria Stropyra, 3rd year Philosophy

Peter Carruthers is a philosopher at the University of Maryland with research interests in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. He has written extensively on cognitive architecture and favours a massively modular model of the mind. The paper this summary focuses on is written in defence of such models. In his article Carruthers examines what it means to say the mind is massively modular. He looks at what kind of features modules should have for such a theory to be plausible, focusing particularly on the encapsulation constraint which is the main reason for rejecting any kind of central systems modularity in the mind which massive modularity endorses.

Carruthers briefly explains ‘Fodor-modules’, some of whose features are incompatible with central systems modularity. Features mentioned include a “domain-specific innately-specified processing system” (so limited in what kind of information they can take as inputs and under “significant genetic control”), delivers non-conceptual outputs, has its own proprietary transducers (e.g. eardrum for the auditory system), its operations are mandatory, it processes swiftly, is localised to specific areas of the brain and its operations are isolated from and inaccessible to the remainder of cognition.

Then Carruthers considers which features must be dropped to maintain central systems modularity quickly dismissing ‘non-conceptual outputs’ and ‘proprietary transducers’ which clearly don’t fit central systems. They also cannot always be informationally domain-specific (though they could be functionally domain-specific) or swift in their processing as there is nothing to compare them to. Carruthers does suggest that conscious thought is realised in cycles of modular activity and so could be used for comparison; presumably the swiftness condition could be kept on this basis though it probably would not add much of interest to the concept. Innateness is also dropped to allow the possibility that modules are constructed during learning. He retains the remaining

properties of Fodor-modules at this point.

Next Carruthers gives three arguments in favour of massive modularity and examines what properties of modules they warrant. In the ‘argument from biology’ Carruthers considers complex biological systems generally which seem to be constructed hierarchically out of ‘dissociable sub-systems’, and since such organisation is less prone to damage or interruption it is exactly the kind of structure that would come about by natural selection. Since the mind is a complex biological system, and plausible product of natural selection, it is probably constructed similarly. This is somewhat unclear, since it could be that the mind is more analogous to the immune system, which is adaptive but begins with a very general way of dealing with a huge range of antigens that it might encounter in the environment, why could the mind not approach learning and inferencing problems in a similar way?

Carruthers also believes that the great complexity of the mind suggests a great many modules, roughly one for every “reliably recurring function”, supporting massive modularity. Further supporting this claim is the ‘argument from task specificity’. This proposes distinct learning mechanisms for distinct learning tasks, which often run unique ‘processing algorithms’ but don’t have to, in fact algorithms are probably often repeated as well. He rejects a general-inferencing mechanism working on distinct organised bodies of innate information because it would cause a computational tractability problem; such a system couldn’t process all the different sets of information it needs to all at the same time. He also rejects lots of domain-general inference mechanisms since this requires large amounts of innate information to be replicated for each of these modules so they could perform all the tasks they might, which has serious computational costs, and modules probably become task specific through evolution. A possible weakness here is that unless task specific modules are constructed during learning, in which case some account of how this happens is necessary, this suggests a large amount of information must be provided by the genes controlling mental functions, which presents a worry if the genes don’t seem to carry sufficiently large amounts and also begins to look like either space it taken up in the brain unnecessarily or space is taken up in the genes (arguably) unnecessarily.

The ‘argument from computational tractability’ is that processes of the mind are computational in character, and such computations are ones which can be carried out in a system like the human brain within time-frames

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matching actual human performance. This means processes must be frugal in that they only deal with limited amounts of information and the algorithms used aren’t overly complex or they would take too long. This motivates the claim that modules are encapsulated; they can only consult “a limited data-base of information relevant to those computations”.

Carruthers then considers the encapsulation constraint, and suggests there is narrow-scope and wide-scope encapsulation. ‘Narrow-scope’ means that processes can only access one particular set of information and cannot be affected by any other information in the mind, whereas ‘wide-scope’ means that processes cannot be affected by most of the information in the mind. Central systems could be wide-scope encapsulated since they could be affected by any, or almost any, of the information in the mind, but only a limited subset of this information at any one time. Carruthers gives an example of a system like this where a module taking the initial input of strongest desire P queries other belief-generating modules for a belief of the form Q→P, and then R→Q→P, if such a belief is not found in a certain time frame, and which moves on to the next strongest desire if no belief ending →P is found within a certain time.

The article ends with a concept of module which allows central systems to be modular and so supports massively modular models of mind; dissociable sub-systems which are mandatory in their operations, have unique functions, often unique algorithms and are ‘wide-scope’ encapsulated.

References

Peter Carruthers. “The case for massively modular models of mind” http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/index.html (accessed 23/01/2011)

David Buller & Valerie Gray Hardcastle. “Evolutionary psychology, Meet Developmental Neuobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity” Brain and Mind 1: 307-25t

Motor Resonance Literature and its Implications for Embodied Language Comprehension.

By Oana Stanciu, 3rd year Psychology

The claims gathered under the umbrella of embodiment have been attracting considerable attention and

generating ardent debates within the cognitive sciences. During the past decades, there have been attempts at developing embodiment accounts of language comprehension, which is a somewhat surprising candidate considering the long tradition of understanding language in terms of an abstract symbol system; an idea impossible to reconcile with the stronger embodiment claims.

The empirical motivation for an embodied approach lies within a series of studies pointing to a possible extension of the phenomenon of motor resonance (which is more widely discussed within the literature on perception) to action language comprehension (sentences describing actions). Motor resonance occurs when either the observation of an action or the comprehension of a sentence describing an action activates the same neural substrates as the performance of the action would have (with mirror neurons being proposed as a possible neural mechanism for the phenomenon, although this is a very controversial claim).

Initial studies using a behavioural paradigm have reported an Action-Sentence Compatibility Effect (Glenberg and Kashack, 2002), which occurs during the comprehension of a sentence with an implied direction of movement and predicts a relative speed advantage for a motor task that is congruent with this direction relative to an incongruent one. For instance, if the instruction is to rotate a knob clockwise for an affirmative answer in a lexical decision task, a sentence like “Emma opened the bottle” would result in the speed advantage since it implies a clockwise rotation as well.

However, this would not warrant any conclusions regarding the necessity of motor simulation for language comprehension, as the definitive claim could be made only if an impairment of motor simulation would result in an ability of comprehension. Temporal mappings from studies using TMS to record MEPs in the hand muscle during spontaneous sentence comprehension (Glenberg et al., 2008, exp2) provide a stronger case for a link between motor resonance and comprehension since they show that the effect occurs immediately following the verb (as reflected in higher MEPs), eliminating the possibility that motor resonance is in fact a post-comprehension (or potentially superfluous one). The MEPs observed at the end of the sentences were smaller than at the verb level in action sentences, but still higher than in the non-action context.

Neuroimaging studies provide further corroborating evidence, amongst which a seminal paper by Hauk and

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Pulvermüller (2004) which illustrates that the comprehension of action words is followed by a rapid activation in areas of the cortex involved in the control and execution of movement. The activation pattern matched the somatotopic organisation of actions related to the meanings of the words (e.g. the presentation of the word “kick” would result in activation of areas overlapping and adjacent to those involved in foot movements).

It is hardly surprising that such positive findings have stirred the interests of many. They are a promising platform for embodiment; however it is important not to lose sight of the narrow scope of these studies, the issues inherent in the specific methodologies employed and the vast number of questions that remain unanswered. For instance, how can the fact that the TMS study described above found the effect observed at the verb (and in other studies motor resonance has been successfully solicited using simple action verbs as cues), be reconciled with the presence of motor resonance at the end of the sentence as illustrated in behavioural studies? Why did Glenberg et al. (2008) find higher MEPs in the hand muscle for general action sentences in general (rather than only for those describing hand-specific movements)?Furthermore, can an embodiment explanation be generalised to account for abstract language as well?

The issue that poses most concerns here is whether mechanisms postulated by embodiment approaches (in particular motor resonance) have enough explanatory power or whether they will need to rely on other mechanisms postulated by previous theoretical accounts; abstract symbolic representations in particular. This is of course an issue that cannot be laid to rest in the near future, although there is some evidence from studies with higher temporal resolution that suggests that motor resonance is a more complex phenomenon than originally thought, one that is sensitive to subtle changes in syntactic and semantic elements.

Due to this sensitivity, Zwaan and Taylor (2008) argued that motor resonance is best understood as a function of linguistic focus of action. In other words, motor resonance can be observed whenever the action is in the linguistic “spotlight”. In order to verify their claim, Zwaan and Taylor (2008) manipulated the action focus, maintaining or dispersing it through the presentation of action-modifying (e.g. quickly) or subject-modifying adverbs (e.g. happily) presented after the verb. As hypothesised, motor resonance was extended to the adverb only in the first situation, suggesting sensitivity to context changes relevant in comprehension. This is a

further indication of its involvement in meaning allocation; since the adverb alone does not imply any direction of movement; the only viable interpretation is that motor resonance is sensitive to contextual changes relevant in comprehension.

Perhaps even more intriguing prospect is that adverbs may play a crucial role in action simulation, possibly coordinating the temporal order of simulations. De Vega, Robertson, Glenberg, Kaschak, Rinck (2004) reach this conclusion after observing the differences in comprehension measures associated with the different order adverbs presented, namely “after” and “during”.

To sum up, even if a coherent self-sufficient account of embodied language comprehension cannot be derived from the empirical evidence available at the moment, it is clear that this kind of exploration has great promise in providing insights into language comprehension.

Hypnosis, Dreams and the Ganzfeld: Commentary on the noise reduction model of communication anomaly.

By Rebecca Sanderson, 4th year Psychology & Philosophy

It is probably the only experimental procedure that has put halved ping-pong balls to good use. But add to that a red light bulb and a soundtrack of white noise, and you have all the specialist equipment you need to begin the ganzfeld technique. Developed in the 1930s by Wolfgang Metzger, the ganzfeld is a method for testing telepathic communication which relies on the noise-reduction model of extra-sensory perception (ESP). If, as the theory goes, someone is put into a state of relaxation with very low level sensory stimulation to the ears and eyes, then they may more able to detect a psi signal that would otherwise be hidden in noise. In a ganzfeld experiment a ‘Receiver’ will be put into such a state, reclining in comfort under a red light and listening to static through headphones. A ‘Sender’, isolated in another sound-proofed room, will then attempt to send information to the Receiver. Under the noise-reduction hypothesis, such conditions will make it more likely for a Receiver to pick up any signals that are being communicated. Suspending for a moment any judgement on whether telepathy can exist in the first place, the noise-reduction model has historically been treated as a strong candidate to explain subjective reports of communication anomaly. Since the explosion of interest into psychic phenomena during the

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18h and 19th centuries, it has been a fairly common theme that some altered states of consciousness appear to be more conducive to non-normal communication.

Mesmerism, which was developed by Franz Anton Mesmer as a healing cure in the 1700s, may have been based on a dubious theory of a physical ‘vital fluid’, but it grew popular as a therapeutic technique and gave rise to the use of hypnosis in healing. While the two therapies differed in their interpretation of whether supernatural forces lay behind the treatment, they apparently shared the ability to have long-lasting physical and mental effect on people by means of inducing trance-like states. This is not to suggest that any form of paranormal ESP communication was at work. Indeed the effects of mesmerism and hypnosis were “reconcilable with well-known physiological and psychological principles” (James Braid, Hypnotic Therapeutics, 1853: 36). Even if these therapies only serve to demonstrate the power of suggestion, what is interesting is that both were reliant on a level of communication achieved with altered states of consciousness. This may also be one driving force behind new-age forms of healing, such as Reiki, which will typically encourage recipients to enter a meditative state for ‘maximum effect’ of the therapy. If, as many of these therapies will claim, any transfer of energy or information is involved, the noise-reduction model may explain the benefit of entering a relaxed meditation.

In the parapsychology literature, one early investigation by Louisa Rhine (1954) amassed a large amount of anecdotal evidence from individuals who believed they had had a paranormal experience. Her goal was simply to classify the responses, rather than analyse the validity of any individual claims. She found that the phenomenological form of the accounts could be classified as ‘intuitive impressions’, hallucinations, realistic and unrealistic dreams. In over 7000 reports, 65% of experiences were dreams. Even if none of these were real cases of ESP, the prevalence of reports from people who had experiences while in semiconscious or unconscious dream-states again suggests that such states may give rise to vivid and powerful subjective experience of receiving information.

So, has parapsychology managed to address these anecdotal or circumspective reports of communication anomaly in a well-regulated and replicable research paradigm? The ganzfeld technique is, arguably, a way to do exactly that. A tightly controlled ganzfeld experiment should in theory be a way to test whether people in altered states of consciousness are able to receive information signals in an environment that precludes any

normal sources of information transfer. The experimental design is fairly simple, but sufficient controls are difficult to attain. Proper randomisation of the targets and decoys is one problem. Another difficulty is making sure that there is absolutely no ‘normal’ sensory leakage, and no interaction between the Receiver and Sender.

Hyman and Honorton (1986) wrote a seminal paper on the issue of quality control in the ganzfeld, laying down some criteria for researchers in the field to follow. Over the decades since, there have been a number of ganzfeld studies showing results that point to a small but significant indication of a communication anomaly. This makes the ganzfeld an area of interest in which to apply meta-analytic techniques.

In a recent study, Storm et al. (2010) compared meta-analytic data on three types of ESP studies: (1) ganzfeld, (2) non-ganzfeld noise-reduction (e.g. studies involving hypnosis/meditation/relaxation), and (3) standard free-response (i.e. no altered states of consciousness). The number of studies per condition was 29, 16 and 14 respectively, all from the period 1997-2008. Mean effect size (ES), derived from direct-hits measures (whether or not the Receiver correctly selects the target), was higher in (1) than (2), which in turn was higher than (3). Specifically, they found that the ganzfeld ES was significant, and significantly higher than the (non-significant) mean ES for standard free-response.

Putting their study in the context of ganzfeld history, Storm et al. comment “34 years of ganzfeld research has more often than not produced a communications anomaly…as evidenced by the cumulative record” (Storm et al., 2010: 480). While this is not a conclusive result for ESP evidence, partly as a properly controlled ganzfeld experiment is notoriously difficult to carry out and replicate, it is interesting in the context of investigating the receptive abilities people in altered states of consciousness. Whether or not something paranormal is at work, the literature on hypnotic therapy, dreams and the ganzfeld technique seem to combine to show that there is something of interest, at least phenomenologically, in the noise-reduction model.

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Looking Out to Look In.

By Vanessa Wilson, MSc Individual Differences

A growing trend in cognitive research has been to take the ‘internal’ approach towards understanding cognition. Such evidence lies in the increase of neuroimaging studies, aiming to pinpoint a neural correlate of a given theory. Take, for example, the hunt for the phonological loop: a theoretical component of working memory proposed by Baddeley and Hitch in 1974, it received its first ‘neural location’ in 1993. This landmark study by Paulesu, Frith and Frackowiak, was followed by an explosion of attempts to replicate these results. Since these efforts, there has been an increasing trend in imaging studies trying to locate numerous other functional positions of mental components.

Parallel to this are the heuristic models trying to locate their theory in genetics. The Five Factor Model of personality is one such example of this. Why, in trying to understand the psychology of our species, have we turned increasingly inwards for our answers? This is not to say that these studies have no value to research: on the contrary, imaging studies have helped both to support cognitive theory and to provide valuable detail on the functional workings of the brain. Genetic studies meanwhile have shown support for theoretical models, allowed comparisons between the effects of genetic and environmental factors, and been applied in the treatment of personality disorders. Yet however practical their application, such approaches are still looking inwards for their answers.

There is a lot to be found in examining the physiology of the human; but this approach cannot answer every question of cognition. Coltheart (2006), questions how much neuroimaging is able to tell us about the workings of the mind; this opens a whole new door into the division of mind-brain definition. That is, neuroimaging can only tell us about the anatomical structure of a brain - it tells us little about the first person perspective of an individual. This is not to say that the anatomical approach to cognition is incorrect; rather, that it is lacking something. As cognitive psychology is taking an ever-increasing view inwards, the broader picture is steadily disappearing.

This picture puts us in perspective of everything else. We cannot understand ourselves without putting ‘Us’ into context. We will surely learn more about ourselves through the approach of comparative evolution with other species. Thus, we explore ourselves in a more

holistic sense, an approach that draws on the ideals of phenomenology. This holistic stance rejects reductionist approaches of psychology; that in being objective, science reduces life to mere objects. Phenomenology applies itself to the integration of Self and Other – the idea that we cannot experience ourselves without experiencing others. Such is the traditional view taken by the likes of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, and carried into present-day discussions. Husserl firmly depicted phenomenology as the basis of science, in that no detailed analysis can tell us anything of the personal perspective. It is this perspective which is lacking in anatomical approaches to cognition.

The problem is, science typically frowns upon research that does not appear thoroughly objective (if it is even possible to be completely objective). Yet there are examples of ground-breaking research which did just this. A young Jane Goodall, naïve of scientific protocol, was thrown into an observational role studying the chimpanzees of Gombe. To understand them, she found she had to become part of their society. Through years of gaining their trust, she observed things she may never have done had she not bonded with the group, including the first example of tool use in a non-human primate. The observations she made re-wrote the historic definition of ‘being human’. And this she did as a subjective individual in chimpanzee society. Yet, still today arguments persist for caution against anthropomorphic interpretations.

Gosling (2001) encourages comparative studies of human and non-human animals to an evolutionary benefit; he also dismisses arguments for anthropomorphism as unjustified: if we all evolved from a common ancestor, then we should expect to have more than just physiological traits in common with our non-human cousins. The phenomenological view is shared by Smuts (2001), a primatologist for over twenty years. In her encounter with baboons, she remarks that in habituation, she realised it was not them who habituated to her, but she who had to habituate to them. In spending time with the Baboons, she learnt as much about herself as she did about them.

There is perhaps a leaf or two we can take from the books of Goodall and Smuts. In immersing themselves in their non-human subjects, they were able to make discoveries of a very human nature. This approach thus draws on the ideals of phenomenology whilst allowing a context of evolutionary understanding. Certainly, studies of brain anatomy and genetics both have their place. But perhaps this place is better put into a broader context,

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where we can explore our human Self in relation to our ancestral Other.

References

Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. J. (1974). Working memory. In G. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 7, pp. 47–90). New York: Academic Press.

Coltheart, M. (2006). Perhaps functional neuroimaging has not told us anything about the mind (so far). Cortex, 42, 422-427.

Distel, M. A., Trull, T. J., Willemsen, G., Vink, J. M., Derom, C. A., Lynskey, M.., Boomsma, D. I. (2009). The five-factor model of personality and borderline personality disorder: a genetic analysis of comorbidity. Biol Psychiatry, 66, 1131-1138.

Goodall, J. (1971). In the Shadow of Man. USA: Mariner Books.

Gosling, S. D. (2001). From mice to men: what can we learn about personality from animal research? Psychological Bulletin, 127(1), 45-86.

Husserl, E. (1927). Phenomenology. Encyclopedia Briticannica. Retrieved from http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~achou/EncyBrit.pdf

Husserl, E. (1931). The thesis of the natural standpoint and its suspension. (Gibson, W. R. B., Trans.). In Muirhead, J. H. (Ed.), Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology (pp. 101-111). London, UK: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. (Reprinted from Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, 1913, Halle, Germany)

Merleau-ponty, M. (1964). Eye and Mind (C. Dallery, Trans.). In J. M. Edie (Ed.), The primacy of perception (pp. 96-155). USA: Northwestern University Press. Reprinted from Art de France, 1(1), 1961).

Psychology’s Other Roots: Undiscovered in Your Academic Peripheries

By Andrew Joseph Amari, Visiting Psychology

‘All the works of man have their origin in creative fantasy. What right have we then to depreciate imagination?’

-Carl Gustav Jung

It is easy to miss the foresight in the above quotation in first pass, but note that the Neo-Freudian, Carl Jung, proposes an idea that bears an incalculable prophecy preceding many thinkers who have come after him, and yet carry more intellect and understanding of psychology. ‘Why?’ you might ask, is this so insightful; how does a quote, a relatively simple idea, present such a crucial underpinning in academic psychology?

Try this: psychology’s recognized conception during the times of Wilhelm Wundt and company is, perhaps, more indebted to the likes of poetry and painting than that of the natural sciences. Yes, that’s right: I am saying that many core psychological theories have been, whether apparent or not, paved by that of the writer, the musician, and the painter; the arts and artists of yesteryear.

In today’s academia certainly some regress spawns progress and it’s important to understand psychological foundations, but it would be ludicrous to ask a progressive and comparatively young field such as psychology or its even newer relative, neuroscience, to look across subjects and back centuries in an attempt to make progressions in their respective studies; so that is exactly what I plan to do.

In Jonah Lehrer’s Proust was a Neuroscientist (2007), he underscores this same point. From the likes of Victorian novelist George Eliot to the delicacies of French Chef Auguste Escoffier, Lehrer capitalizes on the premise of this article: that the arts have serious invocations in the world of psychology and neuroscience, backed by legitimate modern testing; corollary support, if you may. I leave you to judge my introduction of and Lehrer’s support for his claim independently. Lehrer focuses incisively on neuroscience, an interdisciplinary science with strong ties in biology, psychology, and others. I would like to move within the realms of psychology.

In my own studies, I have concerned myself with the works of William Wordsworth, noting his fascination in memory and perception (see ‘Lines written a few miles above Tintern Abbey’), Thomas Hardy’s exploration of the Anima/Animus (see ‘Jude the Obscure’ and ‘Far from the Madding Crowd’), as well as Bram Stoker and Mary Shelley’s astounding intuitions of human fear and emotion (see ‘Dracula’ and ‘Frankenstein’).

More recently, but somewhat less novel, are ideas from modern and contemporary poets such as A.R. Ammons’ exhibition of visual sensation (see ‘Tape for the Turn of the Year’) and E.E. Cummings’ unparalleled understanding of visual aesthetics.

The reason that I am doing this, as you may be wondering, is not to make an untouchable argument backed with scientific evidence and proof, but to suggest something different; as neuroimaging and lab technology advance, and the experimental boundaries of psychology are being peeled away like the skin of a proverbial onion, it is important for the psychology student to hold their ground and engage in a more interdisciplinary pursuit.

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We, as the future of the field, must do our best not just in specialization, but in recognizing the foundations of psychology, whether or not the contributors are ‘so and so et al’ or an eighteenth century poet. As psychologists, we learn to use meticulously planned experimentation if we desire to negate or bolster a theory or hypothesis, and, although they haven’t explicitly published their ideas, who is to say that the ‘old masters’ aren’t as strong in their contributions as the leading researchers of today are?

The point is that it would be a shame if we ignored the profound creative license and innovation that these artists present to us; and yes, that would imply studying and reading the novels, poems, documents, and primary sources that these people wrote. Too often do students dabble in the inexhaustible ‘isolation of the subject,’ ostracizing themselves academically, and keeping their work within one field.

I stress that as psychologists, as social scientists, we are posed with the particularly difficult job of measuring human behavior; we are to remain as objective and unbiased as humanly possible, and are rewarded for this with the unveiling of psychological principles and truths. So why, I ask, would you not want to test the ideas of the minds that have aptly been deemed ‘brilliant’ or ‘genius’?

Artists have been examining psychology (both before and after psychology’s formal conception), maybe not with the same precision as those that Lehrer proposes, but certainly with a keen interest and a moderate understanding of their doings. What I propose is that psychologists return the favor; turn to the arts for ideas. It’s no wonder that such psychological figures as Freud and Jung looked to a creative aesthetic to make the innovations that they did; don’t be confined to journals and papers, but transcend subject borders; focus on what has already been seen but has not already been properly investigated.

What is it good for...?

By John Howard, 4th year Psychology

With ‘Government cuts’ replacing the ‘credit crunch’ in the mainstream news the spotlight is once again on Psychology to justify itself or more directly its funding. The argument most often put forward against psychology is that it is a pseudoscience that does little more than reiterate what is common sense. An argument such as this

which has festered and lingered to the point of irritation is often resolved with ‘I guess history will have to be the judge of that...’ I will therefore have a brief look at examples of how psychological conditions are perceived, and how psychology has contributed to this. Common sense has led people to classify and treat people with psychological conditions differently, however, it has been through the aid of empirically driven research in psychology that much progress has been made.

AutismSince its modern day definition given by Hans Asperger in 1938, Autism has been defined as a triad of impairments in social interaction, verbal and non-verbal communication and restricted repertoire of activities (e.g. stereotyped or repetitive behaviour). Explanations of causal factors have moved away from that of a ‘refrigerator mother’; a mother who has rigid and isolated attachment to their child. Instead it has been identified to have a strong genetic cause and the cognitive profile is better understood. With advances in objective measures including scanning, genetics and neuro-development we are able to paint a much clearer picture of the cognitive profile of autism. This in turn has lifted much of the social stigma and enabled more effective help to be given to those with autism as well as informing family members and carers.

DyslexiaKara Tointon, best known for her role as Dawn Swann in EastEnders, recently presented a BBC documentary on dyslexia. The programme showed a move towards a greater public understanding of the condition despite highlighting some misunderstandings and social stigma still attached to the condition. It is now largely held that dyslexia is seen as a cognitive profile that shows a lower level of language ability compared to non-verbal IQ. This definition has facilitated help for many people who are dyslexic, including myself. Before such a definition existed it would be easy to see how the same person could have been given any number of inappropriate labels; slow, stupid, lazy, for example. This could have prevented them from reaching their potential. Within the last generation our understanding of dyslexia has come a long way. For example, my Aunt, who has dyslexia, recounted how during her school history class she dreaded the humiliation that awaited her when the members of the class would take turns to read aloud. As a result she would spend that lesson in the toilets to avoid embarrassment. Unlike children of today’s generation, dyslexia was not widely recognised or understood. Later in life through her own determination and hard work my Aunt became a very successful midwife and later

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business woman. The boundaries for those with dyslexia are being removed, with adjustments now made for those with dyslexia; ‘extra’ time in exams, support in English lessons given in many schools and a growing understanding of the condition amongst teachers.

DementiaAlthough records of dementia date back to ancient Greek and Roman times it is only in recent times that a more detailed description of what this is and the different subtypes has been understood, in particular that of Alzheimer’s disease.

The study of psychological processes through psychology has shifted a roster of previous causes; supernatural agents, witchcraft, imbalance in four humours of the body. Psychology has always tried to be a science through empirical investigation however lacking many of the objective measures of other sciences. However, with advances in brain scanning, genetics and neuro-development, psychologists are using these as objective references to validate and guide theory. This has lead to greater clarity of our understanding of psychological conditions and reduced much of the unnecessary stigma attached.

Although the clarity in which we now view psychological conditions is a great accolade for psychology to be associated with, this could lead to a change in our perception of what the self is. Psychological conditions are often used to explain behaviours and take individual responsibility away from the associated behaviour. As the clarity of psychological conditions increases it leads to questions such as what remains of the ‘self’ and therefore what is the self accountable for? Should psychological conditions be incorporated into our concept of self?

What is psychology good for...? Well, I guess we will just have to let history be the judge of that, but it seems to have done quite a good job so far.

Ideas of Self: How, according to social psychologists, do we come to hold discrepant views about ourselves? What effect might such discrepancies have?

By Agata Dzieciolowska, 4th year Psychology

Generally, the Self may be defined as a sum of one’s

beliefs about and attitudes toward oneself. Every time, someone asks us, who we are, we intend to think about our selves related to the appropriate moment. We forget about how vitally important our relation to time can be. The Self reflects our view of who we are at a given moment, and is influenced by all those factors which shape perception in general, including past experiences, the present situation and our expectations for the future (Glassman, 1999). It gives us a clearer picture of how our self develops and interacts with a world around us. The Self encompasses such things as our conscious thoughts of our uniqueness from others, and of course our similarities to them (Davey, 2004). Higgins (Higgins, 1999) suggested that the Self is divided into two parts: the Ideal Self (what individuals would like to be) and the Ought Self (an understanding of what others want us to be). However, later on Higgins widened the theory including the third part which is called Actual Self (beliefs about who we are in reality). Higgins’ theory of the Self is the essential explanation of the discrepant core and it has been the most powerful and meaningful explanation for the views held by Social Psychologists today.

According to Charles Cooley (1864-1929)’s annotations, self-feelings are profoundly shaped by the imagined appraisals of one's Self by significant others; the looking-glass Self (Cooley, 1997). This social aspect of psychological approach is hugely influenced by the philosophical ideas of George Herbert Mead (Mead, 1913), who argued that society, which encompasses culture, institutions, role systems, language and acts, precedes symbolic thought which, in turn, precedes the development of Selves. Mead suggested that we should examine the Self as a dynamic process within an individual. Individuals create a picture of their morality, ability and variability through discrepant views of their own self-believes and the imagined expectations of significant others. The conflict between these two aspects of the self-concept might have very deep and crucial consequences for an individual’s well-being. That is why we can speak about Self-conflicts or Self-inconsistencies.

The Discrepancy Theory (Higgins et al, 1985), presents two cognitive dimensions. Higgins called them ‘Self-state representations’ from which we make judgments about things (our own standpoint and the standpoint of our significant others like closest relatives, friends etc). Higgins explained that there are three fundamental domains. The first domain is the Actual Self; it is our representation of the attributes that someone (our self or another) believes we truly possess. The second one is the Ideal Self; which is our interior illustration of the

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dispositions that someone (our self or another) would like us to possess as a perfect scheme, for example, a person’s hopes, aspirations or wishes for us. And the third domain, characterized by Higgins as the Ought Self; the representation of the attributes that someone (our self or another) believes we should or ought to have, for instance the understanding of what our duties, obligations or responsibilities are.

Discrepancy has a very strong influence on the way we think about ourselves and might be affected by any social groups within which we identify. Considering the claim that social identity involves the ways in which we see our Self through our subjective judgments about the way in which others see us (Davey, 2004; Woodward, 2004) leads to some proposals about how this takes place. First, we have to be able to imagine ourselves, to reflect on who we are and how we appear to others. We do this through symbolizing; through producing images and visualizing ourselves (Woodward, 2004). The ability to

visualize ourselves and to represent ourselves gives us some degree of control over our behaviour and situation, although the ‘repertoire of symbols upon which we can draw is always limited by the particular culture which we inhabit’ (Woodward, 2004). This approach to the notion of identity puts more emphasis on the control which individuals have, rather than the limitations which they experience when Self-discrepancy occurs.

We come to hold discrepant views about ourselves whilst

passing through different conflicts and crises within our Self-concept. The understanding of ourselves is strongly connected with the way in which the social environment views and judges our values, attitudes and behaviour. We cannot separate any particular element of our Self from the permanent interaction with other human-beings. Once we are exposed to discrepant views of others the only one thing which we are able to do about it is to keep going forward and try to solve our problems as effectively and positively as we can.

ReferencesCooley, C., (1997). ‘Social Conciousness’. American Journal of Sociology, 12, pp.675-687.

Davey, G., (2004). ‘Complete Psychology’. Hodder & Stoughton. Glassman, W.E., (1999). ‘Approaches to Psychology’. Third Ed. Open University Press.

Higgins E.T., (1999). ‘Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect’ , New York University.Higgins, E.T., Klein, R., & Strauman, T. (1985). ‘Self-concept discrepancy theory: A psychological model for distinguishing among different aspects of depression and anxiety’. Social Cognition, 3, 51-76.

Mead, G.H., (1913). ‘The Social Self’. In Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 10, 374-380.

Woodward, K. (2004). ‘Questioning identity: gender, class, ethnicity’, New York, Routledge.

Things I wish had known earlier...By John Howard, 4th year Psychology

• Discovering Statistics Using SPSS – if in trouble with stats this book is really good at explaining stats and how to run them on SPSS.

• Web of knowledge – is good search engine for finding journals• Becoming a student member of BPS (The British Psychological Society) is worthwhile see their website for

benefits; http://www.bps.org.uk/smg/. There is also the BPS student annual conference in May with international speakers; http://www.bps.org.uk/conferences-and-events/event-listing/events$/2011/may/smg-2011/smg-2011_home.cfm

• http://www.postgraduatesearch.com is a good site if wanting to look up postgraduate courses.• A good way of backing up work is having it on line, Google doc is one way of doing this and can easily be

transferred from google doc back to word if need be.• Psychology society, is good way to get to know other people in the course and staff .• Edinburgh Research Archives; http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1253, a good reference as it has 4th

year dissertations, masters and PhD, that are published from Edinburgh.

Thanks to the contributors• Prof. Karmiloff-Smith• Iona Walker• Maria Stropyra• Oana Stanciu• Rebecca Sanderson• Vanessa Wilson• John Howard• Agata Dzieciolowska• Andrew Amari

ContributeWe are always on the lookout for new material in the form of reviews, experiments you have contributed to or discussions of contested issues in Psychology. Please email contributions of 800 words or less to psychobabble.ed@gmail.com. The deadline is end of week 5 of semester 1. Interested in editing? Email above address if you've any interest in contributing to future issues of Psychobabble!

Congratulations to Kerry Morrison for winning the Logo

competition, she wins a £20 book voucher!

EditorsJohn Howard, Lewis

White, Rebecca White, Rowan Kirsty Bell,

Alexandra Lowe and Stuart Ritchie

Thanks to Kasper Sylves Munk co-founder and artistic mastermind of Psychobabble