EThe 15Initiative

Strengthening the Global Trade System

Co-convened with

E15 Expert Group onClean Energy Technologies and the Trade System

Overview Paper

Winds of Change and Rays of Hope: How Can the Multilateral Trading System Facilitate Trade in

Clean Energy Technologies and Services?Mahesh Sugathan

December 2013

Published by

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)7 Chemin de Balexert, 1219 Geneva, SwitzerlandTel: +41 22 917 8492 – E-mail: ictsd@ictsd.ch – Website: www.ictsd.orgPublisher and Chief Executive: Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz

World Economic Forum91-93 route de la Capite, 1223 Cologny/Geneva, SwitzerlandTel: +41 22 869 1212 – E-mail: contact@weforum.org – Website: www.weforum.orgCo-Publisher and Managing Director: Richard Samans

Acknowledgments

This paper has been produced under the E15Initiative (E15). Implemented jointly by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the World Economic Forum, the E15 convenes world-class experts and institutions to generate strategic analysis and recommendations for government, business and civil society geared towards strengthening the global trade system.

For more information on the E15, please visit www.e15initiative.org

The Expert Group on Clean Energy Technologies and the Trade System is co-convened with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – www.fes.de/ – and Chatham House – www.chathamhouse.org/

With the support of:

Citation: Sugathan, Mahesh. Winds of Change and Rays of Hope: How Can the Multilateral Trading System Facilitate Trade in Clean Energy Technologies and Services? E15Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 2013. www.e15initiative.org/

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ICTSD, World Economic Forum, or the funding institutions.

Copyright ©ICTSD and World Economic Forum, 2013. Readers are encouraged to quote this material for educational and non-profit purposes, provided the source is acknowledged. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial-No-Derivative Works 3.0 License. To view a copy of this license, visit: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.ISSN 2313-3805

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

And ICTSD’s Core and Thematic Donors:

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CONTENTS

List of abbreviations

List of tables, boxes, and figures

Executive summary

Context

Trends in the Clean Energy Landscape and Tensions between Domestic Clean Energy and Trade Policy

What Is Clean Energy? Definitional Complexity and the Trade Context

Recent Trends in Clean Energy Investment

Role of an ‘Enabling’ Policy Environment

Trends in Trade Flows

Relevance of Trade Policy and Interface between Domestic Clean Energy Policies and Trade

Key Issues and Important Considerations in Trade Policy

Tariffs

Clean Energy Incentives, Subsidies and Local Content Measures

WTO Process-related Issues and Systemic Questions

Annex I

Annex II

Annex III

References

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iii

1

3

6

6

7

10

10

11

16

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18

25

27

31

34

35

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AC alternating current

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

BNEF Bloomberg New Energy Finance

C Celsius

CFL compact fluorescent lamp

CO2 carbon dioxide

CPC Central Product Classification

CTE-SS Committee on Trade and Environment

DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding

EPC engineering, procurement, and construction

ESCOs energy services companies

EU European Union

FITs feed-in tariffs

FTAs free-trade agreements

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services

GtCO2e giga-tonnes of CO2 equivalent

GPA Government Procurement Agreement

GREMO Global Renewable Energy Market Outlook

IEA International Energy Agency

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

IOS International Organization for Standardization

ITA Informational Technology Agreement

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ISA International Services Agreement

LCRs local content requirements

LED light-emitting diode

MFN most-favoured nation

NAMA Non-Agricultural Market Access

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

ppm parts per million

PPMs process and production methods

PV photovoltaic

R&D research and development

RTAs regional trade agreements

SCM Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

TBT Technical Barriers to Trade

TRIPs Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

TRIMS Trade-related Investment Measures

UL Underwriter Laboratories

UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Law

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

US United States

WEF World Economic Forum

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

iii

Table 1: CO2 Emissions in 2011(million tonnes CO2) and CO2 Per Capita Emissions, 1990–2011 (tonne CO2 per person)

Table 2: Typology of Clean Energy Policies

Table 3: Exports of PV Cells and Modules (HS 854140), USD millions, 2004–2011, and Top Ten Exporters in 2010

Table 4: Imports of PV Cells and Modules (HS 854140), USD millions, 2004–2011, and Top Ten Importers in 2010

Table 5: Exports of Wind-powered Generating Sets (HS 850231), USD millions, 2004–2011, and Top 10 Exporters in 2010

Table 6: Imports of Wind-powered Generating Sets (HS 850231), USD millions, 2004–2011 and Top 10 Importers in 2010

Table 7: Trade Impact of Domestic Sustainable Energy and Trade Policies

Table 8: Local Content Requirements in Clean Energy in Selected Countries

Table 9: Sectoral Commitments on Other Professional, Technical and Business Services

Table 10: Sectoral Commitments on Construction Services

Box 1: Policy Tensions Surrounding Clean Energy Subsidies

Figure 1: Sectoral Potential in Bridging the ‘Emissions Gap’

Figure 2: Renewable Power Generation and Capacity as a Proportion of Global Power, 2004–2011

Figure 3: Global New Investment in Renewable Energy – Developed versus Developing World, 2004–2011

Figure 4: Global New Investment in Renewable Energy by Sector, 2011, and Growth compared to 2010 (in USD billion)

Figure 5: Additions to Power Generation Capacity Under ‘New Normal’ Scenario, 2013 to 2030

Figure 6: Forecasted Evolution of the Power Generation Output Mix under Different Scenarios, 2013 to 2030

Figure 7: Solar Modules Components and Assembly

Figure 8: US-China Solar Energy Trade Flows, 2011

LIST OF TABLES, BOXES,

AND FIGURES

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257 billion in 2011, with 35 percent of investment flows going to developing economies. It is encouraging that some of the biggest greenhouse gas emitters, such as the United States (US), the European Union (EU), China, and India witnessed the largest volumes of clean energy investments or represent some of the fastest growing clean energy markets. Another noticeable trend has been a significant jump in investment inflows in solar helped by rapid cost declines in solar photovoltaic (PV) modules. Long-term forecasts by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) predict a bright future for renewables, and in one scenario renewables account for between 69 percent and 74 percent of all new power capacity added between now and 2030, owing to increasing cost competitiveness. Large hydro is expected to remain the dominant form of renewable energy generation under all scenarios. According to the projections of the International Energy Agency (IEA’s) 2012 World Energy Outlook, by 2035, renewables would comprise 31 percent of electricity generation in 2035, up from 10 percent in 2010. Falling costs and natural demand is also expected to take over from policy support as the main driver for renewables according to BNEF, which also foresees a need for public support at least until 2020.

Trade in clean energy goods has been growing rapidly and the growth in exports and imports of solar PV modules has been particularly impressive. Chinese solar PV exports, for instance, grew spectacularly from USD 644 million in 2004 to USD 27.94 billion in 2011. An interesting aspect is that the key traders in clean energy products, like solar panels and wind turbines, are often also the major greenhouse gas-emitting countries. Thus, the “critical mass,” if it were to be defined as such, for both climate mitigation as well as trade in clean energy products comprises a handful of countries and often the same ones—China, the US, and the EU being fundamentally important in both spheres. The emerging economies among developing countries have been steadily increasing their share of exports of clean energy products, and their rates of growth have been much larger than OECD countries. Another interesting aspect is the concentration of the major players in solar PV and wind turbines (and clean energy technologies more broadly) in the Asia-Pacific region. This has implications, particularly in the context of voluntary initiatives on liberalizing trade in clean energy goods and services (and environmental goods and services more broadly) under the aegis of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

From a World Trade Organization (WTO) perspective, there are ways in which the multilateral trading system could play a more supportive role to facilitate greater deployment of clean energy goods and services. These would include the following.

(i) Addressing measures that restrict trade in clean energy goods and services while being mindful of legitimate concerns with respect to the policy space that WTO Members, particularly developing countries. may have.

(ii) Enabling greater transparency on clean energy measures and policies that could restrict trade.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The world today confronts an urgent need to address climate change and the serious consequences that a global temperature rise of more than 2 degrees Celsius threatens to bring with it. At the same time, it is imperative for increasing global energy supplies to meet the needs of economic activity and continued growth in both developed and developing countries, as well as to provide energy access to the 1.3 billion people that lack it. The reality is that fossil-fuel use—the primary cause of human-induced global warming—is dominant in the global energy mix, and is expected to remain so for several decades to come. Efforts to keep global temperature rise within the 2 degrees Celsius mark will require both a rapid scale up of clean energy sources (solar, wind, hydro, and biomass) and greater efficiency in the use of energy. This is critical not only for countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that already contribute a significant level of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, but also countries in the developing world, where most of the future growth of emissions is expected.

The transition to a low-carbon future will require an effective “enabling environment,” shaped by a “toolkit” of domestic and international regulatory policies and frameworks that will influence price signals, and public and private resource allocation and consumption decisions, encouraging the deployment and diffusion of new clean energy and energy-efficiency technologies and discouraging the use of fossil fuels. Trade policies and regulatory frameworks will be an important set of tools in that context. While energy itself is “tradable” like other goods and services, it is also different and more fundamental in that it is also an “enabler” of economic activity, including manufacturing and trade.

For the purposes of this paper, clean energy has been taken to include only clean electricity generation technologies related to wind, solar, hydro, and biomass and in certain cases cleaner fuels, such as ethanol, in addition to clean energy services. While nuclear fuel and generation technologies produce no carbon emissions during generation, the associated environmental and safety risks lead to its being excluded from the scope of the paper, although there is no doubt that it will play an important role in climate change mitigation efforts. Also excluded from the paper is consideration of a broad set of measures, such as carbon taxes and fossil fuel subsidy reform, and measures such as carbon and border tax adjustments, all of which may indirectly promote clean energy by discouraging or removing incentives related to the use of fossil fuels.

Despite the gloomy investment climate resulting from the global economic recession, investment in renewable power and fuels increased by 17 percent to a new record of USD

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(iii) Improving clarity on existing trade rules that may affect deployment of clean energy and exploring the need for reformulating rules and new provisions through fresh negotiations among WTO Members with a view to ensuring greater predictability for policymakers and the private sector, and reducing the likelihood of future trade disputes.

From this perspective, the paper examines five key issues at the interface of trade and clean energy policy—(i) tariffs; (ii) clean energy incentives, subsidies and local content measures; (iii) services; (iv) government procurement policies; and (v) standards and certification. A review of these issues, including examination of the findings of the ICTSD, reveal that tariffs may be relatively easier to address compared with non-tariff measures. At the same time, tariff liberalization has faced its own set of challenges, as reflected by the contentious debates over defining and identifying “environmental” goods in the WTO Doha Round of negotiations. Such issues of classification and identification may also play an important role in addressing market access-related barriers on services. From the perspective of clarifying rules and examining the need for new rules, the significant issue areas appear to be clean energy subsidies and local content measures, standards, and certification and government procurement policies. Services also appear to be an important area for further developing and clarifying rules, particularly on subsidies and domestic regulatory aspects. From a rules perspective of all the issues, clean energy incentives and local content measures could arguably deserve priority attention from the WTO, especially keeping in mind the nature of disputes arising at it. Addressing trade remedies may also be important from a market access perspective, and it has taken centre stage in disputes between the US, the EU and China. Countervailing duties, to the extent they are applied in the future, will no doubt also be shaped by any clarification or development of subsidy rules that may take place within the WTO.

In addition to these five sectoral issues, the paper also examines WTO process-related issues and systemic questions. It contends that the WTO is at a crossroads. Given the lack of progress in the Doha Round of negotiations, activity is increasingly shifting to regional forums. At the same time, the WTO remains the only multilateral institution with binding rules and a robust dispute settlement system. It is also the only trade institution that brings all major greenhouse gas emitters—developed as well as developing—under a single set of trade-related rules and obligations. Hence trade-related decisions taken under the WTO would be politically and economically significant. Given that the WTO operates within the “single undertaking” framework, decision-making agreements may not be easy to reach. Progress may need to come incrementally, and the focus may have to be first on easily attainable reforms and issues. In other words, “fine-tuning the WTO’s engine” will be easier than aiming for a rapid overhaul or transformation. The paper highlights three process-related problems in the WTO—(i) fragmentation of relevant rules across a number of WTO agreements; (ii) challenges on negotiating market access for clean energy goods and services,

including fragmentation of negotiating forums; and (iii) lack of clarity and coherence in rules. The paper raises a number of questions for these process-related issues once again from the perspective of improving transparency, increasing market access, and clarifying existing rules and developing new ones if necessary.

In addition, the paper raises the issue of whether any interim measures may be necessary to reduce the likelihood of trade disputes related to clean energy policies until meaningful progress may be made on the other pillars—market access, transparency, and rules.

The paper will not attempt to address the WTO’s coherence with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) system and climate-relevant measures, such as treatment of fossil fuels, carbon taxes, labeling, and border carbon adjustments on carbon-intensive goods. Important as they are in determining market opportunities for the scale up of clean energy, any meaningful discussion of their range and complexity and relevant gaps in the multilateral trading system that will need to be addressed will require a separate paper. The current paper, therefore, focuses only on trade barriers, transparency measures, and rules that directly affect clean energy technologies and services.

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The danger posed by climate change is one of the greatest threats mankind has faced. The dangers of global warming triggered by rising atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases are well understood and documented—rising sea-levels, changes in weather and rainfall patterns, and increased frequency of extreme weather—and they impact human habitats and livelihoods, biodiversity, and species loss, among other things. In May 2013, carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration levels in the atmosphere exceeded 400 parts per million (ppm) for the first time in three to five million years (BBC News 2013). This puts further pressure on global efforts to rein in the rise in climate temperature to a maximum of 2 degrees Celsius (C) (36 degrees Fahrenheit), which is needed to avoid some of the worst effects of global warming.

The challenge of climate change mitigation is daunting, owing to the already high levels of per capita fossil-fuel energy use in much of the developed world; the rapidly growing global demand for energy fuelled by economic growth, particularly in newly emerging developing countries such as China and India; and the imperative to provide energy access to 1.3 billion people in the developing world, particularly in Africa and South Asia, to meet basic survival needs, such as cooking and lighting. Addressing these needs in a manner that does not harm the climate will require a shift away from fossil fuels toward clean energy sources. Because fossil fuels are expected to be dominant in the energy mix for the next several decades, climate change mitigation efforts and the transition to a sustainable energy future will require not only renewables, but also much greater efficiency in the use of fossil fuels themselves. Currently fossil-fuel combustion accounts for 90 percent of total CO2 emissions (excluding forest fires and the use of wood fuel) (Olivier et al. 2012). In 2011, global energy demand grew by about 2.5%, in line with the average for the past decade. Consumption of important fossil fuels, such as oil, coal, and natural gas, have continued to increase with oil consumption growing at 2.9 percent, coal at 5.4 percent, and natural gas at 2.2 percent. Coal consumption alone accounted for 30.3 percent of global energy consumption, which represents the highest share since 1969 (Olivier et al. 2012). While investments in renewables have been growing rapidly (see Section 2), they still account for a small portion of the overall power generation mix and will likely account for less than half of the mix even by 2030 (See Figures 2 and 6).

To stay within a “likely” chance (66 percent) of meeting the target of limiting the rise in global temperatures to 2 degrees C, emissions have to peak before 2020 and emission levels have to be around 44 GtCO2e (giga-tonnes of CO2 equivalent) in the same year. In addition, there would need to be an average decline of emissions of 2.6 percent a year

after 2020. At present, there is a significant “gap” of 5 GtCO2e between this ideal target and the most ambitious reduction pledges (which would keep emissions at around 49 GtCO2e). The Emissions Gap Report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP 2010) estimates a “gap” of about 5-9 GtCO2e, and its Bridging the Emissions Gap estimates the gap to be about 12 GtCO2e. Figure 1 illustrates the potential for bridging this gap through emissions reductions in various sectors. The power, building, and transport sectors (where most of the renewable energy and energy-efficiency technologies can be deployed) account for a huge share of potential reduction sectors. Energy efficiency (and by implication technologies and services that deliver it) will have an important role to play. Based on the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2012, implementing economically viable energy-efficiency measures could reduce the growth in global energy demand by half, and the amount of oil saved would be equivalent to the current combined production of Norway and the Russian Federation, with similarly impressive savings for coal and gas. Energy efficiency gains would also cut emissions of local pollutants and carbon dioxide by significant amounts, resulting in a five-year postponement (until 2022) of the date when the world would become locked in by the existing energy infrastructure to an average temperature increase of at least 2 degrees C (WEF 2013).

While industrialized countries formerly accounted for the majority of CO2 emissions, future growth will come from the developing world. As Table 1 shows, emission levels in a number of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have been declining while they have been growing in the developing world. China already accounts for the largest share of absolute emissions, although, for India and other developing countries, emission levels are still low in per capita terms.

A transition to a low-carbon future will require an effective “enabling” environment shaped by a “toolkit”’ of domestic and international regulatory policies and frameworks that will influence price signals as well as public and private resource allocation and consumption decisions, thereby encouraging the deployment and diffusion of new clean energy and energy-efficiency technologies and discouraging the use of fossil fuels to the extent possible. A meaningful toolkit will involve, for instance, the reform of fossil-fuel subsidies—huge budgetary outlays that artificially lower the price of fossil fuels, like coal, and create an uneven playing field for cleaner energy sources, such as solar and wind.

Trade policies and regulatory frameworks will be an important set of tools in such a climate mitigation toolkit. Energy has a special significance. While it is tradable, like other goods and services, it more broadly is fundamental to the provision of agricultural and industrial goods and services. Energy prices can alter choices of manufacturing locations and patterns of trade. Recent trends in new investments and the relocation of certain energy-intensive industries to the United States (US) is one example (WEF

CONTEXT

4

2013). Another example is the recent rise in coal-fired generation in Europe driven by coal imports from the US, as coal becomes increasingly displaced in the US power generation sector by shale gas (WSJ 2013). Trade policies shape the nature of barriers and impediments that clean energy technologies and services face as they cross national boundaries. Clean energy goods and services, like other goods and services, are increasingly being driven by global value chains and networks involving trade in raw materials, intermediate components and services, and finished goods and services. Addressing barriers to trade ranging from tariffs to non-tariff measures and restrictions on services can enable firms to more cost-effectively optimize their global value chains and facilitate the scaling up of clean energy.

Well-crafted and transparent trade rules, particularly multilateral ones embodied in World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements, will also give a greater degree of predictability to private actors in the clean energy space, encouraging greater levels of investment. This is critical, as it is widely acknowledged that the majority of the resources and investments needed to facilitate a transition to a clean energy future will have to come from the private sector. Clearer trade rules will also enable governments to ascertain

their “policy-space” boundaries, that is, the extent to which they can deploy domestic policies in their toolkit to foster scaling up clean energy. Such policies may be introduced with the intention of not only responding to climate change, but also a host of other domestic economic objectives, such as ensuring economic growth, competitiveness, employment, and energy security. Such objectives could often compete with the requirement to provide non-discriminatory market access for clean energy goods and services to a country’s trade partners. A lack of clarity on trade rules could conversely result in tensions between a country’s domestic clean energy policies and trade-related obligations. It could also lead to trade disputes among countries regarding these policies, as is increasingly being seen, for instance, in cases brought to WTO’s dispute settlement body, such as the Ontario Feed-in Tariffs case (Canada vs. Japan and the EU); China’s complaint against solar photovoltaic (PV) local-content measures, and related incentives in the European Union (EU); and the US complaint against India’s local-content measures in the solar PV sector. Trade friction has also led to domestic anti-dumping and countervailing measures being initiated or considered, for instance, by the US and EU against Chinese solar panels, and China on polysilicon imports from the EU. Annex 1, Table 1 provides

Figure 1:

Sectoral Potential in Bridging the ‘Emissions Gap’

Source: UNEP 2011.

Improving energy efficiencyImproving energy efficiency so that primary energy production is up to 11% lower than

business-as-usual levels in 2020 (with one study 18% lower). The amount of energy used per unitGDP de-creases around 1.1 - 2.3 % per year from 205 to 2020.

Non fossil fuel energy sourcesProducing up to 28% of total primary energy from non-fossil fuel energy sources in 2020.

(As compared to 18.5 in 2005).

Energy from biomassProducing up to 17% of total primary en-ergy in 2020 from biomass. (As compared to

10.5% in 2005).

Renewable energy (solar, wind, hydro)Producing up to 9% of total primary energy in 2020 with non-biomass renewable ener-

gy (solar, wind, hydroelectricity, other). (As compared to 2.5% in 2005).

Reduce non-CO2 emissionsReducing non-CO2 emissions up to 19% relative to business-as-usual in 2020 (with

one estimate of 2%).

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an overview of the main trade disputes involving the clean energy sector.

This paper will attempt to examine how WTO can play an important role in climate mitigation efforts by facilitating both market access for clean energy goods and services as well as increasing transparency and clarity on domestic clean energy policies and trade rules It will begin with an overview of the landscape and trends in clean energy markets and trade, and identify a number of priority issues at the heart

of the trade and clean energy interface. It will conclude by discussing important process-related considerations, and raising questions to enable a better understanding of how WTO could play a more meaningful role in addressing clean energy governance. This will be centred on three overarching themes—transparency; addressing market access issues and barriers for clean energy goods and services; and clarifying trade rules. It will also briefly raise the issue of whether there is a need for WTO to consider “interim” or “stop-gap” measures that will temporarily reduce or eliminate the risk

Country Emissions 2011

Per capita emissions Change 1990-2011

Change 1990-2011

in %

Change in CO2 1990-2011 in %

Change in population 1990-2011,

in %

1990 2000 2010 2011

Annex I*

United States 5420 19.7 20.8 17.8 17.3 -2.4 -12% 9% 19%

EU27 3790 9.2 8.4 7.8 7.5 -1.7 -18% -12% 6%

Germany 810 12.9 10.5 10.2 9.9 -3 -23% -21% 4%

United Kingdom 470 10.3 9.3 8.1 7.5 -2.8 -27% -20% 8%

Italy 410 7.5 8.1 6.9 6.7 -0.8 -11% -4% 7%

France 360 6.9 6.9 6.1 5.7 -1.2 -17% -9% 10%

Poland 350 8.2 7.5 8.8 9.1 0.9 11% 11% 1%

Spain 300 5.9 7.6 6.3 6.4 0.5 8% 29% 16%

Netherlands 160 10.8 10.9 10.5 9.8 -1 -9% 2% 11%

Russian Federation 1830 16.5 11.3 12.4 12.8 -3.7 -22% -25% -4%

Japan 1240 9.5 10.1 10 9.8 0.3 3% 7% 3%

Canada 560 16.2 17.9 16 16.2 0 0% 24% 19%

Australia 430 16.0 18.6 17.9 19.0 3 19% 57% 24%

Ukraine 320 14.9 7.2 6.7 7.1 -7.8 -52% -58% -14%

Non Annex I

China 9700 2.2 2.8 6.6 7.2 5 227% 287% 15%

India 1970 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.6 0.8 100% 198% 30%

South Korea 610 5.9 9.7 12.2 12.4 6.5 110% 141% 11%

Indonesia 490 0.9 1.4 2 2.0 1.1 122% 210% 24%

Saudi Arabia 460 10.2 13.0 15.8 16.5 6.3 62% 181% 43%

Brazil 450 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.3 0.8 53% 106% 24%

Mexico 450 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 0.2 5% 45% 27%

Iran 410 3.7 5.2 5.4 5.5 1.8 49% 100% 27%

South Africa 360 7.3 6.9 7.1 7.2 -0.1 -1% 35% 27%

Taiwan 270 6.2 10.5 11.7 11.8 5.6 90% 119% 13%

Thailand 230 1.6 2.7 3.3 3.3 1.7 106% 155% 18%

TABLE 1:

CO2 Emissions in 2011(million tonnes CO2) and CO2 Per Capita Emissions, 1990–2011 (tonne CO2 per person)

Source: Source: Olivier et al. 2012.*Annex I countries: industrialised with annual reporting obligations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The United States signed but not ratified the protocol, and thus the US emission target in the protocol has no legal status.

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of further trade disputes pending future clarification of rules, thereby reducing the lack of predictability or certainty for both governments and private sector actors.

From a climate perspective, it is also important that WTO rules are cognizant and supportive of the multilateral framework on climate change as embodied in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). There may be trade implications, for instance, of response measures that members of the UNFCCC undertake in pursuit of climate mitigation. In addition to coherence with the UNFCCC framework, there are a number of other important issues relevant to how the WTO system can be supportive of clean energy scale-up—for instance, in the manner in which measures on fossil fuels such as carbon taxes and fossil-fuel subsides are addressed, as well as measures such as carbon labelling and border tax adjustments. WTO can play an important role in all these issues by ensuring (i) good governance through sharpening and reforming trade rules; (ii) greater transparency; and (iii) avoiding protectionism.

This paper, however, will not attempt to address WTO’s coherence with the UNFCCC system and climate-relevant measures such as treatment of fossil fuels, carbon taxes, labelling, and border carbon adjustments on carbon-intensive goods. Important as they are in determining market opportunities for clean energy scale-up, any meaningful discussion of their range and complexity, and relevant gaps in the multilateral trading system that will need to be addressed, will require a separate paper in itself. This paper will therefore focus only on trade barriers, transparency measures, and rules that directly affect clean-energy technologies and services.

WHAT IS CLEAN ENERGY? DEFINITIONAL

COMPLEXITY AND THE TRADE CONTEXT

Before examining the growth of clean energy markets and its implications for the multilateral trading system, it may

be worthwhile to define what we mean by “clean energy.” This is no simple matter, as energy is “clean” in most cases, though only in a relative sense. Even supposedly carbon-free sources of energy, such as solar and wind, may involve carbon emissions during the production of solar panels and wind turbines or require additional fossil-fuel sources to ensure continuous operation. Hydro-projects may have upstream environmental impacts, and production of ethanol could result in carbon emissions associated with land-use change.

From a trade perspective, “clean energy” goods and services could comprise the following categories, each of which may have different trade implications.

(i) Fuels: These may be used for power generation, industrial processes, transport, or all three. Good examples are fossil fuels, such as coal, natural gas, and petroleum; synthesised fuels, such as ethanol, biodiesel, and hydrogen; and nuclear fuels, such as uranium or thorium. Each of these fuels may have its own carbon footprint during consumption as well as production (depending on the processes and methods used). “Clean” or “cleaner” fuels may include those that have zero or lower carbon emissions in electricity generation or transport compared with fossil fuels. For instance, natural gas, though not clean, is cleaner than coal. The emissions associated with hydrogen, ethanol, and biodiesel may vary, depending on how they are produced. Nuclear fuels produce carbon-free electricity (although emissions may be involved in the construction of power plants), but are radioactive, and thus have other associated environmental and health risks. Fuels are classified under specific customs codes for international trade and are usually classified as industrial products. However, ethanol is also an agricultural product.

(ii) Electricity-generation technologies: These may be used to produce electricity from all the sources mentioned—fossil fuels, synthesised fuels, and nuclear fuels. In addition, electricity-generation technologies can harness naturally available sources of energy, such as the sun (through solar panels); wind (using wind turbines); and running water (hydro-electric dams and turbines). Certain technologies, such as steam turbines or alternating current (AC) generators, can be used to generate electricity from steam produced by burning fossil fuels or from heat generated from the sun (concentrated solar thermal). For the purposes of international trade, electricity-generation technologies are manufactured or “industrial” goods.

(iii) Electricity: This can be produced from diverse sources using diverse technologies. The implications for CO2 emissions may be very different, but for international trade purposes, any electricity traded across borders is indistinguishable and it has one single harmonized system (HS) customs code—271600.

(iv) Energy-efficiency technologies: These could include a wide variety of consumer goods that may be energy efficient in a relative sense, but physically

TRENDS IN THE CLEAN

ENERGY LANDSCAPE AND

TENSIONS BETWEEN

DOMESTIC CLEAN ENERGY

AND TRADE POLICY

7

indistinguishable from their counterparts—for instance, a more fuel-efficient car or air conditioner—or distinguishable—a light-emitting diode (LED) or compact fluorescent lamp (CFL) compared with an incandescent one. Or they could increase energy efficiency when applied within an energy system (“smart-grid” technologies).

(v) Clean energy “services”: These include a wide variety of services that may be involved in the provision of clean energy, such as consulting, engineering, and construction and installation services. They may also include services designed to increase the energy efficiencies of buildings and homes, such as energy audits and energy management services provided by energy services companies (ESCOs).

Another category that could arguably be included would be policy measures that discourage “dirty” or “fossil fuel” energy, thereby indirectly promoting the scaling up of clean energy. These may range from carbon taxes to elimination of fossil-fuel subsidies and border tax adjustments, all of which have implications for trade policy and the multilateral trading system, but will require an extensive and detailed analysis exclusively devoted to these issues. They are therefore outside the scope of this paper.

For the purposes of this paper, a reference to clean energy in the context of WTO will include only “clean electricity” generation technologies related to wind, solar, hydro, and biomass, as well as in certain cases, cleaner fuels, such as ethanol and clean energy services. While nuclear fuel and its generation technologies produce no carbon emissions, the associated environmental and safety risks lead them to being excluded from the scope of this paper, although it is clear they will play an important role in climate change mitigation efforts.

RECENT TRENDS IN CLEAN ENERGY

INVESTMENT

The share of renewables in the global energy mix (excluding large-hydro) rose from 5.1 percent in 2010 to 6 percent in 2011. Despite the gloomy investment climate after the global economic recession, investment in renewable power and fuels increased by 17 percent to a new record of USD 257 billion in 2011 with 35 percent of investment flows going to developing economies. Renewables accounted for 44 percent of newly installed power capacity worldwide in 2011, an increase from 34 percent in 2010 and 10.3 percent in 2004. The US overtook China to be the lead investor with USD 51 billion, a 57 percent rise over 2010, while India showed the fastest growth of any large market with investments in renewables rising 62 percent to USD 12 billion. The market has also witnessed unprecedented declines in technology costs, particularly solar PV where costs dropped by close to 50 percent and onshore wind turbine prices fell by between 5 and 10 percent. Wind, usually the biggest sector in terms of attracting investment, was overtaken by solar in 2011. Solar attracted an investment of USD 147 billion in 2011 (an increase of 53 percent over the previous year), almost twice as much as wind (USD 84 billion) for which investments declined by 12 percent from 2010. The jump in solar investment may be attributed to increased rooftop installations in Germany and Italy helped by a dramatic fall in panel prices and a rapid rise in investments in the solar thermal sector in Spain and the US. The fall in wind energy investments was a result of the lower turbine prices; policy uncertainty in Europe; and a slowdown in China’s previously hectic growth in wind installations (UNEP and Bloomberg 2012).

Despite the increase in investment, the financial climate for renewables has become more difficult in recent years with banks increasingly unwilling to lend to the renewable energy

Figure 2:

Renewable Power Generation and Capacity as a Proportion of Global Power, 2004–2011

Source: UNEP and Bloomberg 2012.

Renewable power capacity change as a % of global power capacity change (net)

Renewable power generation change as a % of global power generation change (net)Renewable power as a % of global power capacity)Renewable power as a % of global power generation

Note: Renewable power excludes large hydro. Renewable capacity figures based on Bloomberg New Energy. Finance global totals.

Legend:

8

sector, given the recession and uncertain policy support for renewables in a number of countries. This has resulted in a focus on alternative sources of investment, such as pension funds and long-term institutional investors.

The future for renewables looks bright. Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s (BNEF) latest forecast, known as GREMO (Global Renewable Energy Market Outlook), projects that renewables (including large-hydro) could account for between 69 percent and 74 percent of all new power capacity added between now and 2030, owing to increasing cost competitiveness (See Figure 5). This compares with an estimate of 57 percent by the IEA (including large-hydro). Of this, wind and solar is expected to take up 30 percent and 24 percent of new power capacity added in terms of gigawatts (GW) between 2012 and 2030. This capacity addition involves a jump in investment by 230 percent from 2012 to USD 630 billion a year by 2030. These projections are based on the “new normal” scenario, considered most likely among three scenarios making up BNEF’s predictions for world energy markets until 2030. The more optimistic “barrier-busting” scenario would require investments reaching USD 880 billion a year by 2030 (USD 9.3 trillion cumulative

from 2013 onwards), and an additional USD 2 trillion (22 percent increase) in supporting infrastructure, such as long-distance transmission systems, smart grids and demand response. Under the more pessimistic “traditional territory” scenario, investment requirements would be USD 470 billion by 2030 (USD 6.1 trillion cumulative from 2013 onwards) (BNEF 2013).1 Large-hydro will remain the dominant form of renewable energy generation until 2030 under all three scenarios (Figure 6).The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2012 projects that by 2035 renewables will comprise 31 percent of electricity generation in 2035, up from 10 percent in 2010,2 which is similar to the “traditional territory” projections in BNEF’s 2013 Global Renewable Energy Outlook (Figure 6).

Figure 3:

Global New Investment in Renewable Energy – Developed versus Developing World, 2004–2011

Source: UNEP and Bloomberg 2012.

Figure 4:

Global New Investment in Renewable Energy by Sector, 2011, and Growth compared to 2010 (USD billion)

Source: UNEP and Bloomberg 2012.

Note: New investment volume adjusts for re-invested equity. Total values estimates for undisclosed deals.

Note: New investment volume adjusts for re-invested equity. Total values include estimates for undisclosed deals. Developed volumes are based on OECD countries excluding Mexico, Chile and Turkey.

Developed

Developing

Legend:

The three scenarios come from BNEF’s Global Energy and Emissions Model, which integrates all the main determinants of the energy future, including economic prosperity; global and regional demand growth; the evolution of technology costs; likely developments in policies to combat climate change; and trends in fossil-fuel markets.

See IEA 2012, Factsheet, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowe bsite/2012/factsheets.pdf.

1

2

9

Figure 5:

Additions to Power Generation Capacity Under ‘New Normal’ Scenario, 2013 to 2030

Legend:

Marine

Solar thermal

Small scale PV

Solar PV

Offshore wind

Wind

Energy from waste

Biomass

Geothermal

Hydro

Nuclear

Oil

Gas

Coal

Source: BNEF 2013.

Figure 6:

Forecasted Evolution of the Power Generation Output Mix under Different Scenarios, 2013 to 2030

Legend:

Source: BNEF 2013.

Marine

Solar thermal

Small scale PV

Solar PV

Offshore wind

Wind

Energy from waste

Biomass

Geothermal

Hydro

Nuclear

Oil

Gas

Coal

10

According to BNEF, the main driver for future growth of the renewable sector over this time-frame (2013–30) is a shift from policy support to falling costs and natural demand. The falling costs of renewable energy and of all the technologies required to integrate it into our energy system suggest that “we are beyond the tipping point towards a cleaner energy future (BNEF 2013b).” However, some level of support for renewables will continue to be required at least until 2020, according to BNEF, under all three scenarios. The IEA’s 2012 World Energy Outlook, however, adopts a more cautious outlook, stating that support for renewables will reach USD 240 billion a year in 2035, up from USD 11 billion in 2011.3

This naturally leads us to a discussion on the role of an enabling policy environment for renewables.

ROLE OF AN ‘ENABLING’ POLICY ENVIRONMENT

The investment climate for clean energy in general depends on a mix of factors, notably policy and financial support for renewables; the price of competing fossil fuels (which, in turn, are determined by a mix of market forces and subsidies for fossil fuels); and technology prices. Policy support through various types of incentives, such as feed-in tariffs (FITs), investment tax-credits, and renewable portfolio obligations have played a critical role in the development of the clean energy sector. The cutting back of these incentives in 2011 has fuelled fears that the sector is coming under threat despite a fall in technology costs and the scenario of several renewable energy sources being competitive with fossil fuels in a couple of years. The discovery of shale gas in the US, and new technology, such as hydraulic fracturing, has also depressed gas prices, further adding to a challenging future environment for investment in clean energy.

Policy and financial support for clean energy is therefore important, given the challenges facing clean energy, although as with other subsidies it will cost taxpayers money and will need to be phased out over the longer term. Policy and financial support for clean energy has been an important driver for trade in clean energy goods. For instance, the production and export of solar PV panels in China has largely been driven by FITs for solar energy in Europe. It is also being deployed domestically in greater numbers following China’s introduction of its own FITs for solar PV in 2011.4 Similarly, higher electricity and energy prices would in general stimulate manufacturing and trade in energy-efficient products. However, as will be explained later, certain domestic clean energy policies, depending on their design and manner of application could distort trade and create frictions among countries that produce and trade clean energy goods and services.

Table 2 lists some of the commonly used clean energy policies and incentives in power generation. These can be oriented either toward producers or consumers.

According to a background document prepared by the Energy Advisory Board of the World Economic Forum (WEF), support schemes for renewables must be carefully designed to ensure their success. They should be based on predictable and transparent frameworks, focusing on a portfolio of technologies best suited to meet short- and long-term objectives. These should be backed up by ambitious yet credible targets, and support should be differentiated according to the maturity of each technology. Further, as cost reductions for renewable technologies are achieved, the level of support provided for new installations needs to decline to avoid excessive and unnecessary increases in the cost of energy services (WEF 2013).

TRENDS IN TRADE FLOWS

Trade flows in clean energy goods, such as wind-powered generating sets and solar panels, have grown rapidly over the period 2004–11. In terms of trade intensity, solar panels seem to be particularly important, as seen in Table 3. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that solar panels and local content measures affecting solar have assumed prominence in recent clean energy trade disputes and application of trade remedies (anti-dumping and countervailing duties). The tables below show the top ten exporters and importers of solar PV cells and modules, as well as wind turbines, as of 2010 (in shaded column) and their export and import volumes over the period 2004–11.

Based on these trade figures, it is possible to make a number of observations that have implications for the nature of discussion on WTO’s role in clean energy governance. Some important aspects are:

• Thetopfivegreenhousegasproducers(China,theUS,theEU, India, and Japan) are also among the top traders of solar PV panels and wind turbines. With a few variations, previous research by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) has revealed a similar trend in a number of other climate-friendly goods relevant to clean energy.5

• Emerging economies have been steadily increasing theirshare of exports of clean energy products, and their rates of growth have been much larger than OECD countries, such as the US, the EU (excluding intra-EU trade), and Japan. One country, China, is already the top exporter of solar panels, and Malaysia and Korea have steadily

See IEA 2012, Factsheet, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2012/factsheets.pdf.

3

ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable En-ergy, Research and Analysis, http://www.ictsd.org/research/

5

See http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2098838/china-heats-solar-market-feed-tariff.

4

11

are centred in the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, trade liberalisation initiatives as well as other clean energy and trade-related rules, guidelines, and principles developed as part of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) processes will have implications for any initiatives or discussions within WTO.

RELEVANCE OF TRADE POLICY AND INTERFACE

BETWEEN DOMESTIC CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES

AND TRADE

International trade today is largely driven by global supply chains. Companies benefit from the cost-optimisation advantages of dispersing production locations for goods and services that enter at different points along the value chain in the manufacture of a final product. This is also true for clean energy products, and from a climate change mitigation perspective is significant, as it enables deployment of these goods at the lowest cost possible. Every advantage that these products enjoy in terms of cost reduction helps to tilt an already uneven playing field, even if slightly, in favour of

increased their exports, overtaking the US in 2010. In 2011, the emerging economies alone accounted for nearly 80 percent of solar PV exports and 33 percent of imports. However, for wind-powered generating sets, the US and the EU remain dominant exporters, with countries like India and Vietnam registering a presence among the top five exporters. The share of developing countries (including emerging economies) in exports of wind-powered generating sets has been much lower, accounting for about 16 percent of total global exports and 26 percent of total global imports in 2011.

• China’s rise in terms of solar PV exports has beendramatic; its 2011 export value was 43 times that of the value in 2004. Gains of all the other major exporters have been much more modest over the same period, rising by about double to about ten-fold. China started becoming a major importer of solar panels only from 2010 onwards, after the government initiated bids for solar power projects and launched a series of subsidies under the “Golden Sun” programme in 2009 (Wigmore et al. 2012).

• Most of the top traders, in solar PV andwind turbines,but also more broadly for other clean energy goods

Producer-Oriented Policies and Incentives. (Incentivising supply of clean energy)

Consumer -Oriented Regulatory Policies and Incentives (Creating demand for clean

energy)Investment-related Production-related Other regulatory policies and Incentives

Investment Subsidies/Grants

Preferential Tariffs and Premiums (including Feed-in Tariffs)

Renewable Energy Targets Carbon and Energy Taxes

Investment-tax credits. Eg: Accelerated depreciation

Production Tax-credits/ Generation-based Incentives

Binding Commitments to Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Removal/Reform of Fossil-fuel based Subsidies

Preferential Finance or soft loans

Power Purchase Agreements (providing stable guaranteed returns for ‘X’ number of years)

Carbon and Energy Taxes Renewable Purchase Obligations

VAT and Sales Tax Reductions and Exemptions on Equipment

Removal/Reform of Fossil-fuel based Subsidies

Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs)

Income Tax holidays Government Assistance for Business Development

Government Procurement (including through competitive bidding)

Customs-duty exemptions and reduction

Renewable Portfolio Standards

VAT and Sales Tax Reductions and Exemptions on Equipment (for instance: solar water heaters or rooftop solar panels)

Subsidies/Grants for R&D Financial incentives and soft loans to purchase RE equipmentNet Metering

TABLE 2:

Typology of Clean Energy Policies

Source: ICTSD analysis based on REN 21 2012.

12

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011All countries* 10,331.4 11,751.0 14,696.1 19,410.8 30,485.7 27,898.4 54,005.3 57,622.9

China 644.2 1,257.5 2,459.7 5,252.3 11,745.4 10,721.2 25,178.6 27,946.2Taiwan 1,175.3 1,403.2 1,689.1 2,580.0 4,002.3 3,871.8 7,424.9 6,951.2Japan 4,628.9 4,796.2 5,198.8 5,472.2 6,189.8 4,673.4 6,397.3 6,604.1Rep of Korea 317.3 315.2 422.1 563.2 805.1 1,307.3 3,807.2 3,884.3United States 1,193.2 1,297.6 1,298.1 1,582.2 1,976.1 2,017.6 2,706.1 2,427.0Malaysia 792.7 843.8 1,004.3 942.4 744.6 835.5 2,598.7 2,725.6EU27* 688.6 764.0 1,072.8 1,260.3 2,024.9 1,748.4 1,835.4 2,100.1Singapore 328.7 317.1 444.6 500.3 737.2 673.7 1,253.4 2,080.7Mexico 81.6 140.8 218.5 200.6 397.6 560.1 711.0 931.9India 87.2 93.7 133.9 212.8 528.8 437.3 585.7 327.5

Developing countries, including emerging economies

3,613.4 4,628.9 6,790.3 10,681.9 19,455.3 18,864.2 42,418.0 46,131.1

Intra-EU27 1,512.1 2,592.9 4,052 5,986.4 10,556.2 8,621.9 15,623.3 12,660.2

EU272 2,200.7 3,356.9 5,124.8 7,246.7 12,581.2 10,370.4 17,458.6 12,769.7World ** 11,843.5 14,343.9 18,748.1 25,397.2 41,042.0 36,520.4 69,628.6 70,283.1

TABLE 3:

Exports of PV Cells and Modules (HS 854140), USD millions, 2004–2011, and Top Ten Exporters in 2010 (In descending order of 2010 values)

Note: * excluding intra-EU trade; ** including intra-EU trade.Source: COMTRADE, using WITS (Oct 2012).

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

All countries 11,358.6 13,566.4 16,644 21,217.1 33,182.3 30,876.5 56,747.7 59,076.8

EU27* 2,948.7 4,093.8 5,513.7 8,411.0 17,102.2 15,160.0 30,646.4 26,536.6

China 1,930.5 2,362.4 2,680.8 3,288.6 3,743.9 3,606.5 6,144.7 6,719.7

USA 1,251.3 1,390.8 1,848.1 2,155.7 2,760.2 2,591.7 4,411.5 7,193.1

Hong Kong 1,204.8 1,334.8 1,715.4 1,817.5 1,983.8 2,109.1 3,204.7 3,637.0

Rep of Korea 858.4 865.1 978.9 1,276.8 2,143.8 1,996.0 2,793.8 2,822.8

Japan 1,001.7 1,135.9 1,207.1 1,131.3 1,412.3 1,212.1 2,189.2 2,305.9

Taiwan 472.6 462.1 524.6 544.4 660.2 696.8 1,285.9 1,153.1

Australia 55.4 55.4 52.5 59.2 171.1 400.0 1,047.4 1,509.8

Mexico 282.6 356.9 414.3 442.5 487.9 541.2 876.3 1107.1

Singapore 339.1 328.2 432.1 503.6 559.1 478.2 814.4 904.8

Canada 165.1 215.7 215 202.4 266.9 269 700.7 987.1

Malaysia 251.3 256.3 225.1 305.6 353.8 299.0 498.0 685.5

India 49.8 53.8 104.8 168.9 420 405.4 298.9 1,332.8

Developing countries 6,734.7 6,484.6 7,611.1 8,988.8 11,080.2 10,783.6 17,151.6 19,765.4

Intra-EU 1,121.4 1,991.0 2,790.3 4,216.7 7,762.0 6,472.7 12,721.5 11,062.9

EU27** 4,070.1 6,084.8 8,304 12,627.7 24,864.2 21,632.6 43,367.9 37,599.5

World** 12,480.0 15,557.4 19,434.3 25,433.8 40,944.3 37,349.2 69,469.2 70,139.7

TABLE 4:

Imports of PV Cells and Modules (HS 854140), USD millions, 2004–2011, and Top Ten Importers in 2010 (In descending order of 2010 values)Note: * excluding intra-EU trade; ** including intra-EU trade. Source: COMTRADE using WITS (Oct 2012).

13

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011All countries* 561.1 1,104.3 2,467.1 2,802.9 3,337.6 2,503.4 2,487.8 2,509.4EU27* 534.0 993.1 1,886.8 1,870.7 1,812.9 1,260.6 2,035.5 1,934.0USA 4.4 3.6 83.3 14.2 22.1 117.0 142.1 126.0India 1.2 23.8 199.0 335.8 651.1 335.6 122.9 41.1China 0.2 0.4 3.2 78.0 210.9 151.1 56.6 351.1Viet Nam n/a 13.5 37.6 108.6 126.4 116.9 67.4 n/aDeveloping countries 20.1 66.4 285.4 524.8 1,010.4 624.9 294.7 413.0

Intra-EU 517.1 811.8 629.2 1,062.4 2,062.3 1,646.8 1,973.3 1,898.4EU27** 1,051.1 1,804.9 2,516 2,933.1 3,875.2 2,907.4 4,008.8 3,832.4

World** 1,078.2 1,916.1 3,096.3 3,865.3 5,399.9 4,150.1 4,461.1 4,407.8Malaysia 251.3 256.3 225.1 305.6 353.8 299.0 498.0 685.5India 49.8 53.8 104.8 168.9 420 405.4 298.9 1332.8

Developing countries 6734.7 6484.6 7611.1 8988.8 11080.2 10783.6 17151.6 19765.4Intra-EU 1121.4 1991.0 2790.3 4216.7 7762.0 6472.7 12721.5 11062.9EU27 ** 4070.1 6084.8 8304 12627.7 24864.2 21632.6 43367.9 37599.5World ** 12480.0 15557.4 19434.3 25433.8 40944.3 37349.2 69469.2 70139.7

TABLE 5:

Exports of Wind-powered Generating Sets (HS 850231), USD millions, 2004–2011 and Top 10 Exporters in 2010 (In descending order of 2010 values)

Note: * excluding intra-EU trade; ** including intra-EU trade.Source: COMTRADE, using WITS (Oct 2012).

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011World* 588.2 1,064.0 2,426.8 3,578.5 4,751.3 4,641.0 3,431.0 3,853.1United States 64.1 503.8 1,280.0 2,365.1 2,679.1 2,300.6 1,197.5 1,289.9Canada 93.7 41.3 183.3 108.6 545.2 435.7 895.0 546.2Turkey 5.9 0.1 54.3 92.4 285.0 506.2 405.2 353.6Mexico 0.1 0.2 85.3 17.1 85.4 195.3 295.3 341.4Brazil 3.9 5.6 61.7 42.3 121.7 221.1 273.9 456.3Japan 112.6 43.8 232.9 62.5 173.7 55.5 40.0 30.9EU27*/ 3.3 12.5 6.8 98.2 153.3 165.6 74.7 64.5Taiwan 2.3 67.9 49.3 123.9 90.9 124.6 36.5 45.7Selected other reporters Australia 66.9 130.4 47.8 158.2 220.7 204.6 21.7 154.6China 93.3 211.5 257.1 372.0 189.3 26.4 11.5 11.7India 2.1 6.0 4.9 0.6 2.3 1.4 3.9 9.5Rep of Korea 31.5 22.9 59.2 33.6 102.2 37.5 2.1 2.8Developing countries 168.3 324.4 627.4 761.1 947.5 1,418.0 1,108.0 1,390.5Intra-EU 632.1 1,128.3 1,592.3 1,766.2 2,157.9 2,160.5 2,507.1 3,314.1

EU** 635.4 1,140.9 1,599.0 1,864.4 2,263.9 2,313.8 2,581.8 3,378.6World** 1,220.3 2,192.3 4,019.1 5,344.7 6,909.4 6,801.5 5,938.2 7,167.2

TABLE 6:

Imports of Wind-powered Generating Sets (HS 850231), USD millions, 2004–2011 and Top 10 Importers in 2010 (in descending order of 2010 values)

Note: * excluding intra-EU trade; ** including intra-EU trade.Source: COMTRADE, using WITS (Oct 2012).

14

renewables relative to fossil fuels. To the extent that trade policy can contribute to lowering the deployment costs of renewables, trade policy is also contributing to climate mitigation efforts. Figure 7 shows the value chain for the production of solar PV modules.

The example of the production value chain of a solar PV module (which is at the heart of a number of trade disputes) is a good illustration of the way global value chains operate in clean energy. According to a 2013 report by Pew Charitable Trusts, China and the US traded more than USD 6.5 billion in solar products. Of these, 95 percent of China’s exports to the US comprised finished solar modules, and China exported USD 151 million of solar cells to the US. Both these categories represent China’s strength in mass assembly and high-volume manufacturing. The US, on the other hand, enjoyed a competitive advantage in producing high-value

inputs (polysilicon and wafers for making PV cells) as well as the machinery and equipment required for solar factories. Consequently, contrary to popular perception, the US actually enjoyed a trade surplus of USD 913 million in 2011 in the solar sector. Figure 8 provides of good illustration of the breakdown of this trade.

Despite the prominent role of global value chains in clean energy goods, tensions between domestic clean energy policies and trade have often arisen. The main reason for this is that governments design clean energy policies in a manner that is aimed at achieving a number of other domestic policy objectives, not simply the deployment of clean energy alone. Such objectives include the creation of domestic jobs and the development of a “green” manufacturing sector for economic strength in a strategic and fast-growing sector. These objectives often imply policies that restrict imports

Figure 7:

Solar Modules Components and Assembly

Source: Pew Charitable Trusts (2013).

Figure 8:

US-China Solar Energy Trade Flows, 2011 (millions of dollars

Source: Pew Charitable Trusts (2013).

15

and often require a trade-off with acquiring and deploying clean energy goods and services at the lowest cost possible. Domestic clean energy policies may have either de jure or de facto trade effects, the former obviously intended to restrict trade and the latter restricting trade due to the manner in which a policy may be designed or applied. For instance, raising tariffs on imported clean energy goods or requiring a certain proportion of domestic goods and services to be used for clean energy projects to benefit from renewable energy incentives—local content requirements (LCRs)—are obviously trade restrictive. The trade impact of others are not immediately obvious, but their restrictive effects can occur due to their design or the way they are applied—for instance designing standards for clean energy products in a manner that benefits local producers and keeps out imports. Countries may also require products to be certified by national test laboratories creating an additional burden for importers. Certain policies, such as “hidden” subsidies provided by a country to manufacturers of clean energy goods, can also distort trade in third-country markets by providing an undue advantage for the country’s exporters.

The presence of global value chains, however, amply demonstrates why restricting trade in clean energy products could backfire in unexpected ways. The production of a certain good in Country A might create jobs in components or capital equipment in country B. Further, the import of that good from country A could also create downstream jobs in the services sector in country B. In September 2012, the EU launched its biggest ever anti-dumping investigation on the import of Chinese solar panels, and in May 2013, EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht urged the imposition of provisional duties of up to 47 percent on Chinese imports for ‘dumping’ or selling products below production cost in Europe. However, the proposed measure has drawn protests from numerous solar panel installers who argue that by making solar panels more expensive in a price-sensitive market the duty would actually destroy jobs in installation. In addition, it could also provoke Chinese countermeasures on polysilicon imports from Europe, which are needed to manufacture these panels (an investigation by China is already under way). According to one estimate, European companies capture 70 percent of the value of Chinese panels sold in Europe when one accounts for European polysilicon suppliers to China and downstream installers in Europe. According to a study carried out by the German consultancy Prognos and flagged by the Alliance for Affordable Solar Energy, a coalition of mainly European companies, a 60 percent duty on Chinese solar panels could cost 240,000 European jobs over three years. However, the findings of this study have been contested. A PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) study on the Prognos report contends that in the US solar jobs and installations increased even after it had imposed countervailing and anti-dumping duties on Chinese solar panels in 2012 (Financial Times 2013). Those duties had been triggered by investigations after complaints by US solar panel producers regarding unfair subsidies enjoyed by Chinese manufacturers. In response, China announced its own investigation into US subsidies in the solar, wind, and

hydro-electric sectors, and Chinese manufacturers also called for anti-dumping duties on polysilicon imports from the US worth more than USD 800 million annually. Within the US, firms dependent on imports of Chinese PV modules have formed a Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy to oppose US duties on China (Ghosh and Gangania 2012).

Table 7 shows a range of domestic sustainable energy and trade policies that could have direct or indirect trade impacts.

As can be seen, for most policies it may not be possible to immediately discern a trade impact if there is one. It is noteworthy that local content measures and subsidies have been at the heart of recent trade disputes involving clean energy measures. The table in Annex 1 provides an overview of some of the major disputes to date.

In addition to the various measures listed in Table 7, a number of other measures that could have impacts on clean energy trade include the operation of cartels, monopolies over electricity transmission; distribution grids that favour incumbent operators; other anti-competitive practices that may affect clean energy goods and services exporters; investment-related restrictions and discriminatory practices favouring domestic clean energy goods and services; and domestic intellectual property regimes that could encourage or discourage clean energy technology dissemination.

From a WTO perspective, there are ways in which the multilateral trading system could play a more supportive role to facilitate greater deployment of clean energy goods and services. These are:

(i) Addressing measures that restrict trade in clean energy goods and services while being mindful of legitimate concerns about the policy space that WTO Members, particularly developing countries, may have.

(ii) Enabling greater transparency with regard to clean energy measures and policies that could restrict trade.

(iii) Improving clarity on existing trade rules that may affect deployment of clean energy and exploring the need for reformulating rules and new provisions through fresh negotiations among WTO Members with a view to ensuring greater predictability for policymakers as well as the private sector, and reducing the likelihood of future trade disputes.

(iv) Interim measures that the WTO could consider to reduce the immediate likelihood of trade disputes related to clean energy policies.

16

While the issues at the interface of trade and clean energy policy are diverse, this section will focus on only four issue areas in clean energy. It will highlight areas where there may be a greater priority or urgency to address trade barriers, improve transparency on measures that have a potential impact on trade, and facilitate better governance through

KEY ISSUES

AND IMPORTANT

CONSIDERATIONS IN

TRADE POLICY

Policies with a Direct Trade ImpactTariffs: Customs-duty Concebbions and ExemptionsExport Restrictions and Export-TaxesMarket Access for Suslainabic Energy Service ProvidersMeasures Affecting National Treatment for Sustainable Energy Sarvice ProvidersTrade-Facilitation and Transit MeasuresLocal-content Requirements (LCRa)Possible Trade Impact based on “Design”/Implementation/Price SignalsRenewable Energy TargetsBining Commitments to Reduce Greenhouse GasesCarbon and Energy TaxesRemoval/Reform of Fossil-Fuel based SubsidesRenewable Portfolio StandardsInvestment Subsides/Grants Investment-tax Credits. Eg: Accelerated DepreciationPreferential Tariffs and Premiums (including Food-in Tariffs)Production Tax-credits/Generation-based IncentivesRenewable Purchase ObligationsRenewable Energy Certificats (RECs)Goverment Procurement (including through competitive bidding for SEGS)VAT and Sales Tax Reductions and Exemptions on Equipment (for instance: solar water heaters or rooftop solar panelsFinancial Incentives and Soft Loans to Purchase RE EquipmentTechnical Standards/Regulations for Sustainable Energy GoodsDomestic Regulatory Measures affecting SEGS proviersNo Forseeable Trade ImpactGovernment Assistance for Business DevelopmentSubsidics/Grants for R&DPower Purchse Agreements (providing stable guaranteed returns for ‘X’ numbers of years)Net Metering

TABLE 7:

Trade Impact of Domestic Sustainable Energy and Trade Policies

Source: ICTSD Analysis based on literature survey

greater clarity in WTO rules. It will also highlight some previous research findings on these issues by ICTSD.6 In the end it will pose questions for further discussion on how WTO may address these issues.

TARIFFS

Tariffs on clean energy goods are one of the most visible barriers that can be addressed. The Doha Round of WTO negotiations included a specific mandate to “reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs and non-tariff measures on environmental goods and services.” However, such reduction has not been easy. This often has to do with the way that many clean energy goods are classified under the HS, which may group these goods at the six-digit level (the level at

Research carried out under ICTSD’s Sustainable Energy Trade Initiative (SETI).

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which all WTO Members use common HS nomenclatures) with other goods that may not have renewable energy or even environmental applications. It may be possible to locate these products in some cases by digging deeper into national tariff lines, but WTO Members will then need to come to a common agreement on product nomenclatures and descriptions, as otherwise there may be uncertainty as to what good is actually being liberalised. In other cases, the same good could have both clean energy as well as other environmental applications. For instance, ball bearings and pipes could be used in wind energy projects and solar-thermal power projects as well as in other industrial applications. While some countries (Argentina and India ) have proposed applying lower customs duties on ball bearings or pipes (and in fact on all goods) as long as it can be certified that they are being used in specific environmental projects, other WTO Members consider such an approach as imposing administrative costs and not providing the certainty that ‘bound’ tariff liberalization could provide.7 The easiest solution may be for WTO members to reduce tariffs at the six-digit level whether or not such a reduction would also apply to “non-environmental” goods. But, many developing countries have been reluctant to apply such a “broad-based” liberalisation and argue that such liberalisation should be pursued within the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) group within WTO rather than being initiated as part of environmental goods liberalisation being discussed within special sessions of the WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE-SS). One solution could also be to start with a smaller list of clearly identifiable clean energy goods that are solely or predominantly used for environmental applications. Such a list has been identified by ICTSD based on a mapping exercise of clean energy goods in the energy supply, buildings and transport sectors (see Vossenaar 2010).

A study of tariff profiles for a number of clean energy products reveals that most countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), including the EU and the US, apply very low tariffs (5 percent or below) to a large number of clean energy goods. Emerging developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and India, apply tariffs ranging from 5 to 20 percent for a large number of clean energy goods and even zero (in the case of solar PV modules). Not surprisingly the highest tariffs are usually applied by lower-income countries, mainly in Africa, and this could also be due to customs revenue concerns and protection of domestic industries. It may be arguable whether these tariffs make sense for such countries and how long they should be retained, particularly given the need in many of these countries to provide energy access to the poor and reduce reliance on fossil-fuel imports.

Previous studies indicate that tariffs do not represent the greatest obstacle to the diffusion of clean energy goods (Hufbauer and Kim 2011) and may be less important as a driver of international trade in these goods than other variables, such as domestic environmental regulation. However, among various environmental goods categories

A reference is frequently made to “bound” and “applied” tariffs. Bound tariffs are the maximum “ceiling” levels that are legally permissible un-der WTO. WTO Members may actually “apply” tariffs to any extent as long as it does not exceed the permitted bound levels. Such tariffs, ac-tually in place at a given time, are known as applied tariffs.

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that cover lists of goods submitted by WTO Members during the course of environmental goods negotiations, two categories of products relevant to climate change mitigation—renewable energy and heat and energy management imports—showed a higher sensitivity to tariff reduction than other categories of products (Jha 2008). Tariffs may also be the easiest barrier to address first in any trade negotiations, and for products where countries already apply very low tariffs this may not be too difficult to achieve even within WTO. Success is, however, conditional on progress in other trade issues being negotiated as part of the Doha negotiating mandate, as under the WTO’s single undertaking approach “nothing is agreed, unless everything is agreed.” This has been a big obstacle to progress on reducing tariffs in clean energy goods in the WTO context. However, in forums outside WTO, such as bilateral free trade agreements, clean energy goods have been liberalised as part of broad-based liberalisation for all manufactured products. Recently, as part of APEC’s Vladivostok Declaration, there has been agreement to lower tariffs, albeit voluntarily and on a limited set of 54 tariff lines that does include a number of clean energy goods (Sugathan and Brewer 2012). Although it is a “drop in the ocean” in terms of measures to address climate change, tariff reduction could be a “low-hanging fruit” and an “easy deliverable” that WTO could make as a contribution. In trade terms too, there will certainly be gains. The World Bank estimates that a removal of tariffs alone in four categories of products—wind-power generation, solar power technology, clean coal technology, and efficient lighting—would increase trade volumes by 7.2 percent, while removing tariffs and a select set of non-tariff barriers (based on ad valorem equivalents of selected measures, such as quotas and technical regulations) would increase trade volumes by 13.5 percent (World Bank 2008).

A number of questions could be raised on WTO’s role in promoting transparency and clarity to facilitate tariff reform and in addressing tariff barriers on clean energy goods in a more efficient manner given the negotiating challenges in WTO. These include:

Transparency

How can WTO address difficulties on tariff liberalisation for clean energy products with environmental and non-environmental uses? Should it promote greater discussion among members in further refining products that can be isolated at national tariff-lines (that is, beyond the six-digit level) and agree to common product descriptions to facilitate liberalisation?

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Market access

Could an “early” tariff harvest on certain clean energy products be envisaged as a “deliverable” in the fight against climate change? What products should be emphasised? Should already low tariffs on certain products be reduced to zero or at least bound permanently?

CLEAN ENERGY INCENTIVES, SUBSIDIES AND

LOCAL CONTENT MEASURES

Financial incentives for clean energy are among the most important tools used by governments worldwide to support the deployment of clean energy. Such incentives can take the form of grants, capital subsidies, soft loans, and tax-credits. Subsidies for clean energy production, particularly FITs, have played a major role in the rapid scale up of grid-connected solar PV in recent years in countries such as Germany and Spain, even when equipment costs remained high. While equipment costs have been declining, clean energy is, with the recent exception of solar energy in certain locations, still not competitive with fossil fuel-based energy sources for reasons discussed earlier in Section 1. As a result, some form of support for clean energy may be required until it attains “grid-parity” or price competitiveness with fossil fuel-based electricity generation. The conflict with trade may arise if subsidies provided by one country constrain trade opportunities for another. This may happen automatically

Country Technology LCR % (start year) LCR % (2012) Notes and Remarks

Brazil Wind 60% (2002) 60% (2012)

China Wind 20% (1997) 70% (2009) The LCR requirement was formally abolished in 2009

France Solar (2012) 60% (2012) 10% bonus on EDF repurchasing price

India Solar 30% (2011) 30% (2011) Feed-in tariff conditionality

Italy Solar Variable (2011) 5 to 10% bonus if local content used

Ontario (Canada) Wind 25% (2009) 50% (2012) Feed-in tariff conditionality

Ontario (Canada) Solar 50% (2009) 60% (2012) Feed-in tariff conditionality

Québec (Canada) Wind 40% (2003) 60% (2012)1

South Africa Wind 35% (2011) >35% (2012)

Spain Wind 70% (2012)2

Turkey Wind Variable (2011) Additional feed-in tariff if local content used

Turkey Solar Variable (2011) Additional feed-in tariff if local content used

TABLE 8:

Local Content Requirements in Clean Energy in Selected Countries

Source: ICTSD research.

under WTO rules on subsidies if they are conditional on exports, or need to be proven based on “adverse trade impacts” and “injury” suffered by a trading partner. Subsidies provided only to manufacturers of clean energy goods could very likely be trade restrictive. However, a source of trade disputes in clean energy have more commonly been subsidies and incentives linked to “local-content” measures that mandate the use of locally made components or technologies in clean energy projects so as to induce a certain degree of investment in local manufacturing. A list of LCRs in selected countries is shown in Table 8.

Subsidies that are contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, on the use of domestic over imported goods are clearly prohibited by Article 3.1 (b) of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). LCRs are themselves also prohibited by WTO’s Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMS). The recent decision by the WTO Panel and Appellate Body in the Ontario FITs case (Canada vs. Japan and EU) clearly ruled against the use of LCRs. The WTO dispute settlement body, however, did not rule on the legality of FITs per se. While it could be presumed that FITs by themselves do not distort trade, this is not a foregone conclusion, and much may depend on the design of the FIT scheme. In a future context where renewable electricity will be increasingly traded across international borders, FITs themselves could have trade effects if they favour domestic clean electricity providers.

An ICTSD General Equilibrium modelling study undertaken by Jha shows that LCRs by themselves may have little effect on trade in clean energy goods unless there is a viable clean

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electricity sector, which means they usually have to be linked to an incentive scheme for clean electricity generation. Hence, it makes sense to examine LCRs in the clean energy sector in the context of clean energy subsidy schemes (Jha 2013). It is clear, however, that LCRS raise costs of clean energy goods for domestic power producers and hinders immediate and cost-effective generation of clean electricity.

Given the increasing use of LCRs in the renewable energy sector by a number of countries, it may be asked whether there is a need to provide some sort of temporary exemption, particularly for developing countries. Often the promise of local manufacturing jobs is a way of securing local “buy-in” for other renewable energy promotion measures that could involve higher taxes (such as carbon taxes) or higher electricity prices. At the same time, opening up TRIMs or SCM could be a potential “slippery slope,” altering a carefully put together balance of rights and obligations under WTO. Further research on LCRs indicates that there is no real empirical evidence to back up claims that LCRs would have positive spillover effects, such as the establishment of a viable domestic manufacturing industry or increasing medium to long-term competitiveness and innovation, all of which could depend on a complex set of country and technology-specific factors (Kuntze and Moerenhout 2013).

What could be discussed or debated may be some form of time-limited, non-renewable waiver for certain countries for LCRs and perhaps regional or plurilateral variants of LCRs set at a low local content percentage, as suggested by Stephenson, to dilute its protective impacts. In addition, a moratorium or standstill on future LCRS could be an option. However, as Stephenson has argued, in the interests both of the global economy and efficient renewable energy production by developing as well as developed countries, less distorting options and alternatives for dealing with LCRs should be considered. It must also be borne in mind that once LCRs become a mainstay and expectation of local businesses, the withdrawal of government support will often be met with fierce resistance, and the LCRs themselves may do little to increase competitiveness of domestic firms or create jobs in services segments of the value chain, such as installation and maintenance (Stephenson 2013).

Identifying potentially trade-distorting subsidies can be a challenge. Another challenge would be ensuring they are captured by the definition of a “subsidy” under the Agreement on SCM. For instance, a grant of “free” land to clean energy equipment manufacturers could confer a “benefit,” as required by the Agreement, but it does not likely fall within the parameters of a “financial contribution” laid out by it. While the Agreement on SCM also lays down a notification process under Part VII, information on subsidies is often incomplete or non-existent. This represents a serious lacuna in WTO practice in an important policy area (WTO 2006).

In a recent ICTSD paper on clean energy subsidies, Ghosh and Gangania (2012) highlight a number of sources of policy

tensions surrounding clean energy subsidies (See Box 1). They point out that individual country policies, emerging disputes, and lack of clarity on exceptions to WTO rules underscore the tension between maintaining non-discriminatory trade practices while also promoting greater and faster adoption of clean energy. There is thus a need for greater legal and policy clarity and perhaps the need for a re-examination of the Agreement on SCM. For instance, Article 8 included a list of non-actionable subsidies, such as for research and development (R&D) and for environmental protection, but this provision lapsed in 2000 (WTO 2006). It is not clear whether the exceptions under Article IXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for environmental or health protection, for instance, could apply to the Agreement on SCM. In any case, it may be worthwhile for WTO Members to consider the design and nuances of various clean energy support schemes.

Following the issues that have arisen in recent clean energy disputes and based on the findings of Ghosh and Gangania (2012), it may be worthwhile to raise the following questions that WTO could consider.

Transparency

• Is there a need to consider improved or enhancednotification processes for clean energy subsidies?

• Should, and if so how could, relevantWTO committeesdebate the nature, purpose, scale, and impact of different types of clean energy subsidies so as to help clarify individual country measures (for instance at WTO Trade Policy Reviews)?

Clarity in existing subsidy rules/development of new rules

• Shouldtherebeareviewofthedefinitionofa“subsidy”under the Agreement on SCM so as to better capture certain types of clean energy subsidies that could have a potential impact on trade? Could this be linked to the debate on clean energy subsidies by WTO committees as highlighted above?

• Shouldtherebeaclearwindowofexemptionforcertaintypes of subsidies, for instance, under a revived “non-actionable” category of subsidies?

• Should a time-limited exemption be granted to certaintypes of local-content measures in clean energy, for instance, for developing countries, given the increasing frequency of use with the phase-out being strictly monitored by WTO?

• Should discussions on rules take into account thedifferent natures and cost structures of various clean energy technologies? That is, should there be differentiation in rules to respond to differentiation in technologies, or should the same rules apply (keeping in

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mind the objective is cost-effective attainment of climate change goals and related environmental, social, and economic benefits)?

Services

Trade in services plays a critical role in the deployment of clean energy and comprises a major input into clean energy projects. A number of projects are actually built by engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contractors to whom these projects are outsourced by power producers. After the project is commissioned, there is still a need for maintenance, and often monitoring. Producers may also rely on external sources for data, such as on wind speeds and solar radiation levels. Trade in services also spills over into the realm of foreign direct investment if it involves the commercial presence of a foreign services provider (also known as Mode 3). Other modes of trading services are through cross-border delivery, for instance, of consulting or monitoring services over the Internet (Mode 1); the movement of consumers abroad to consume a service, such as in tourism, or technicians travelling abroad to obtain training at a foreign institute (Mode 2); or the temporary movement of service personnel abroad to deliver a service, such as, for example, Spanish technicians moving temporarily to India to carry out repair work at a solar thermal power plant (Mode 4).

BOX 1:

Policy Tensions Surrounding Clean Energy SubsidiesSource: Ghosh and Gangania (2012).

1. The environmental imperative: The support needed to cover the incremental costs to enable clean energy sources to reach “grid-parity” or cost comparability with fossil-fuel energy sources. The tensions arise from the question of how the incremental costs will be covered, and whether the financial support will be sustained over a period sufficient to scale up deployment of new and emerging clean energy technologies. Many countries will also desire flexibility in terms of pathways to pursue a “green” and “low-carbon” economy and this will determine how clean energy subsidies are governed. However, different types of subsidies may also have differential impact on consumers, project developers, and equipment manufacturers at home and abroad.

2. The technology imperative: Technological initiatives including research, development and deployment through for example joint-venture partnerships will require some form of support. The question is how partner countries can or should support these joint ventures, such as through direct financial transfers or by contributions in kind — and how the fruits of such labour are to be shared.

3. The economic imperative: Countries may resort to subsidies to ensure economic viability and attractiveness of the renewable energy sector for investors, particularly during times of recession. However, periods of recession could also see subsidies that assume mercantilist purposes, especially if domestic industrial development, manufacturing capacity, and employment generation come at the expense of other countries. Governments, and firms, are interested not only in the collective good of cleaner, low-carbon energy, but also in industrial and economic competitiveness.

4. The trade imperative: Mercantilist policies discriminate between foreign and domestic firms in a country. They can also discriminate between imported clean energy products and local manufactures. Subsidies could be granted to promote clean energy exports, making domestic firms more competitive in the international market. The impacts of such policies are already being felt today, leading to high-profile trade disputes between countries such as Canada versus. the EU and Japan, and China versus the US and EU.

A mandate for the liberalisation of environmental services is also contained in Paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha mandate. The pace of liberalisation has progressed very slowly at WTO. As of August 2008, only 48 WTO Members had made commitments in environmental services, compared to 100 members on financial services. Commitments in environmental services have been selective and do not cover all sub-sectors. For instance, most commitments have been on environmental sanitation and sewage treatment. Further liberalisation may be boosted through ongoing discussions on a plurilateral international services agreement within WTO (see below).

An important consideration for liberalising clean energy services in WTO would be to re-examine approaches for classification of such services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The classification issue is closely linked with the type of barriers that have to be addressed for clean energy services trade. Given that classification of environmental services is based on Central Product Classification (CPC) categories, most of the environmental services listed (except possibly “Other Environmental Services”) may not adequately capture a number of clean energy services, particularly in critical areas such as design and installation, and construction and maintenance, for renewable energy projects. It is likely that a number of horizontal policies, such as procurement and visa restrictions, and

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Major Explorters/ importers

Archi-tectural services

Engineer-ing ser-

vices

Integrated engineering

services

Other business services

c. Manage-ment con-sulting ser-

vices

e. Technical testing and

analysis services

j. Services inci-dental to energy

distribution

m. Related sci-entific and tech-nical consulting

services

Australia (E/I)* √ √ √ √ √ √ √

Brazil (E/I) o o x √ x x x

Canada (E/I) o o o o √ x o

EU ** (E/I) o o o o o x [o] x

India (E/I) x o x x o x x

Korea, Rep. (E/I) o √ √ √ o x √

Norway (E/I) √ √ √ √ √ x √

Singapore (E/I) √ o x √ x x x

United States (E/I) o o o √ x √ √

* E/I=Major exporters as well as major importers. ** Among the EC member states, Cyprus and Malta have not made any commitment on “other professional, technical and business services” group.

TABLE 9:

Sectoral Commitments on Other Professional, Technical and Business Services Source: Derived from the WTO Services Data base on Members’ Commitments Schedule and Initial Offers as well as Revised Offers (TN/S/O and TN/S/O rev.1).Notes: The classification of sub-sectors is based on W/120. √ = Unrestricted commitment, x = No commitment, O =Limited commitment, [ ] = A new commitment included in the EU’s ‘revised offer’ during the Doha Round.

Major exportersimporters

General construction work for buildings

General construction work for civil engoneering

Installation and assembly work

Other: site investiga-tion work

China (E/I) o o o o

EU ** (E/I) o o o o

Egypt, Arab Rep. (E) x o o o

India (E/I) x o x x

Japan (E/I) o o o o

Malaysia (E/I) o o o o

Singapore (E) o o o o

Turkey (E) o o o x

United States (E/I) o o o o

TABLE 10:

Sectoral Commitments on Construction Services Notes: The classification of sub-sectors is based on W/120.X = No commitment, O = Limited commitmentE/I = Major exporter as well as importer* Among the new EU member states, Cyprus, Hungary, and Malta have not submitted their commitments schedules on the construction services sector. Finland has made a partial commitment on this sector.Source: Derived from the WTO Services Data base on Members’ Commitments Schedule and Initial Offers as well as Revised Offers (TN/S/O and TN/S/O rev.1).

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For instance, Kim (2011); Monkelbaan (2013).8

even restrictions on the use of electronic payment methods such as credit cards for foreign transactions could have a restrictive effect on not only environmental services, but also sustainable energy services.

A number of papers, including those commissioned by ICTSD, have highlighted various perspectives on the need for a clearer classification.8 One is that the absence of an appropriate classification must not and should not prevent WTO Members from negotiating on climate change-related services. What is more important is to ensure that each schedule is internally coherent by avoiding overlap among sectors and defining the scope of the commitments clearly and precisely.9 The WTO Secretariat in a recent note to WTO Members suggested several ways in which clean energy services can be classified. It started by confirming the lack of explicit reference to services related to renewable energy or energy efficiency in both the Sectoral Classification List (W/120) and the CPC and the neutrality of classification of energy-related services, that is, it is neutral with respect to the energy source (clean energy services cannot be distinguished from services related to fossil fuels). The only explicit reference made to renewable energy is found in “engineering services for power projects” (CPC2 83324). Whatever the approach used, it will be important to give consideration to new and emerging technologies, such as carbon capture and storage and smart-grid related services. Smart grid, for instance, would cut across several W/120 sectors, including telecommunication and computer services and others that are perhaps incidental to energy distribution. According to the paper, engineering services, together with construction services, are key in the category of “other professional, technical and business services” in delivering effective public services and electricity generation and transmission. Engineering services, which predominantly entail advisory, design, consulting, and project management functions, complement construction services. Therefore, many firms provide integrated packages of engineering and construction services. While developed countries have historically dominated the markets in many sustainable energy services, existing data reveal that countries such as Brazil, India, Russia, and Singapore are exporters of “other professional, business and technical services.”

This raises another issue. While clean energy services and goods are often provided in an integrated manner, negotiations on liberalising these two are being carried out separately within WTO—the former in the CTE-SS and the latter in the Council for Trade in Services (special session). It may be appropriate to ensure some level of coordination between the two negotiations so as to ensure a coherent outcome on clean energy services.Presently in terms of negotiating modalities for services liberalization, a significant development within WTO has been the agreement on 5 May 2012 by a group of Members—“the Really Good Friends of Services”—to start negotiations towards a plurilateral International Services Agreement (ISA). These members include key countries that make up a strong majority of services traders—the

US, Canada, the EU, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iceland. Negotiations commenced in March 2013 and the options are to negotiate it within WTO as a plurilateral agreement similar to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) or an agreement outside WTO as permitted by GATS Article 5. The agreement would supposedly provide a new platform where the parties could work to build stronger international consensus on new and improved rules to address emerging issues. It will remain to be seen whether this will provide a boost to liberalization of clean energy services and whether major countries such as Brazil, China, and India that have been critical of a plurilateral agreement could accede at a later stage (Library of the European Parliament 2013). Given the limited liberalization commitments in major clean energy service sectors, such as construction and engineering (see Tables 9 and 10; they may have autonomously liberalized to a much greater extent), any progress made in this regard by an ISA would be commendable.

The Doha mandate also provides for the development of new disciplines in safeguards procurement and subsidies in services pursuant to Articles V, X and XIII of the GATS, although little to no progress has been made. However, any future disciplines could have positive implications for the trading climate in renewable energy services by offering greater predictability and clarity.

A few (non-process related) questions on clean energy services trade that WTO could consider could be:

Transparency

• ShouldWTOtrytoenableabetterclassificationofcleanenergy services and promote a uniform approach on this to facilitate negotiations? (Members can now use whatever classification approaches they wish as long as the sectors are mutually exclusive.)

Market access

• Will the ongoing plurilateral services negotiations for anISA facilitate addressing market barriers? Should there be a “critical mass” of countries that should participate, including from a climate change perspective?

Clarification of existing-rules/development of new rules

• What rules need to be clarified as far as trade in cleanenergy services is concerned? What new rules need to

One issue that is important in relation to the classification of environmental services is how to classify “new” activities, particularly in a sector undergoing significant technological development. The field of carbon capture and storage may be a case in point (Cossy 2011).

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be developed? Is this a realistic possibility in the short to medium term?

Government procurement policies

Government procurement for sustainable energy and related equipment and services can play an important role as a driver of demand for clean energy goods. Energy-efficient government procurement was also identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as a possible policy tool to address climate change (Cottier et al. 2010), and many governments prefer to use procurement policies as a tool for promoting domestic clean energy capacities and industry. At the same time, procurement policies can also discriminate against foreign suppliers by favouring domestic suppliers in a de jure or de facto manner. This could result in restricted opportunities for trading partners. Greater transparency in clean energy procurement policies would enable foreign goods and services providers to clearly understand the criteria and requirements.

Because of their effect on trade, these discriminatory practices have been addressed in WTO law and more particularly in the GPA. The United Nations Commission on International Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services, the APEC non-binding guidelines on government procurement, and other regional non-binding instruments are an attempt to regulate public procurement as well. Also many free-trade agreements (FTAs) include “WTO-plus” obligations to regulate public procurement.

While transparency in government procurement was one of the issues included under the Doha Ministerial declaration, it was eventually dropped from the Doha agenda in the aftermath of a failure to reach an explicit consensus in Cancun. The GPA, which came into effect on 1 January 1996, also provides a framework for procurement issues. The GPA was initially intended to apply to all WTO Members, but this proved impossible. Consequently, the GPA is one of the few plurilateral agreements within the WTO legal framework, creating obligations and rights only for WTO Members that have signed it. In December 2011, parties meeting at the ministerial level in Geneva formally approved a revised version of the GPA, which also significantly improved market access in procurement as WTO Members committed to extend coverage to new sectors as well as government entities. The cardinal rule in the GPA is that standards and/or technical regulations “shall not be prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.” Similarly, any technical specifications inserted in the tender “shall be in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics” (Cottier et al. 2010).

From the perspective of promoting trade in sustainable energy goods and services, it may be useful to examine specific issues of concern as highlighted in an ICTSD paper by Herve and Luff (2012). A major lack of clarity in the GPA as it exists, according to the authors, is the extent to which

provisions of non-discrimination as contained in the GPA would permit the use of procurement policies that explicitly favour clean energy goods and services against non-sustainable ones if they have the effect of favouring particular regional suppliers. One example could be a requirement to use energy-efficient methods in the delivery of a service. Unlike the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Article IV of the revised GPA does not contain any reference to “likeness,” as public procurement provisions are mostly addressed to suppliers and procuring entities of countries. However, while a possible justification could exist under the general exceptions provisions of the GPA that mirrors Article XX, any preference based on process and production methods (PPMs) cannot be presumed. Cottier et al. (2010) have raised the issue that GPA Article XXIII does not contain the equivalent of the words “relating to conservation of natural resources,” as found in GATT Article XX (g).

The revised version of the GPA contains two new provisions suggesting that requirements can be included in standards or labels. This would be particularly useful, for instance, when a standard or a label specifies that a good or a service must be produced through energy-saving methods.

Luff and Herve (2012) contend that it would be helpful if such ambiguity could be clarified and provisions expressly allow promoting clean energy goods and services by public purchases. The recently revised GPA specifies that sustainable procurement should be one of the subjects for future GPA negotiations. It will be interesting to examine the implications of these negotiations on future trade in clean energy goods and services from both a market access and a rule-creation perspective.

A number of issues WTO could address with respect to procurement of clean energy goods and services would be:

Transparency

• How can transparency be improved with respect toprocurement measures in clean energy goods and services?

Market access

• Can future negotiations on sustainable procurement asmandated in the revised GPA contribute to addressing procurement-related market access for clean energy goods and services?

Clarification of existing rules/development of new rules?

• How can rules be clarified or developed further undera future GPA that provides greater certainty and predictability, or perhaps an explicit exception allowing governments to use green-procurement measures without running afoul of WTO rules prohibiting discrimination against “like” products?

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Clean energy equipment standards and certification

Standards, depending on how they are designed and applied, may be among the most important non-tariff measures to affect trade in clean energy goods. Under WTO law, standards that are mandatory are known as technical regulations. Technical standards and regulations have an important role in ensuring safe and reliable performance of clean energy equipment. They are also relevant for clean energy services. For instance, installation of solar equipment can be done effectively only by properly trained and certified installers. Technical standards are important in conveying confidence and trust between manufacturers, operators, owners, financial institutions, and government authorities. Standards can either be based on “design” or “performance.” Greater harmonization of standards enables easier and quicker deployment of equipment across projects and countries, supporting the development of economies of scale. Minimum performance standards for equipment are also necessary for clean energy producers to obtain project-specific financing from commercial banks; in other words, to enable projects to be “bankable.” Standards are also important in enabling trade in energy-efficient goods. Given that many energy-efficient products are physically indistinguishable from their less energy-efficient counterparts, labelling based on energy-efficiency standards will be an important way of differentiating between them.

Ensuring compliance with different foreign technical regulations and standards, as well as getting them tested and certified, involves costs for foreign producers. There are also general costs, such as translation of foreign regulations, hiring of technical experts to explain foreign regulations, and adjustments to production facilities to comply with regulations. It is possible that countries might design and apply standards in a manner that protects their domestic producers of clean energy goods.

The TBT contains provisions intended to prevent this from happening. Article 2.2 of the TBT requires that “technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.” The TBT also encourages members to base national regulations or parts of them on international standards. Such standards are presumed “not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.”

In reality, however, national technical regulations even if based on internationally accepted standards still throw up a number of issues. An interesting case in point is that of solar PV modules that are intensively traded. International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards with local variations make up the majority of the global market and form the basis of technical regulations effectively “required” for import of solar PV modules. The only market-significant global region that does not follow a variation of IEC standards is North America, where Underwriter Laboratories (UL) standards are currently the standards recognised by government agencies. A forthcoming ICTSD study on solar PV equipment standards by Rai and Payasova (2013) identified

the following issues that have a trade impact.

(i) Diversity of testing procedures and requirements specific to countries. For instance, in China mandatory testing requirements are to be conducted in national laboratories, which impose additional costs for exporters.

(ii) Diversity of product requirements due to varying local conditions such as climate and electrical grid codes. While some of these may be legitimate, it may be worthwhile to harmonize others, such as national electrical grid codes, when feasible.

(iii) Enabling standard-setting to keep pace with and not discourage new and innovative clean energy products.

Some of these issues may be outside WTO’s regulatory reach, but in certain areas it could contribute. These areas are raised below as questions for further consideration.

Transparency

• CouldtheTBTnotificationprocessofdiversestandardsforvarious types of clean energy equipment and services be further streamlined and made coherent? If so, how?

• Should a special information system for clean energystandards be created based on the proposed WTO/International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Standards Information System and the ISO/IEC Information Centre?

Clarification of existing rules/development of new rules

• Certificationrequirementsappeartobemoreburdensomethan the actual standards per se. What can WTO do to further discipline unnecessary and costly certification requirements?

• The GATS does not contain detailed rules for technicalrequirements for services, such as installation of clean energy equipment. These may include qualifications, licensing requirements, and so on, and are classified under domestic regulation addressed under Article VI of the GATS. The Working Party on Domestic Regulation has been established to develop coherent horizontal disciplines on domestic regulation for services, but so far it has developed only special rules for the accountancy services sector. Should new rules be similarly developed for the clean energy services sector?

• The effect of technical regulations that are not adoptedby central governments still may have a crucial negative impact on trade in PV products. Should Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT also explicitly discipline such regulations?

• Similarly,currentTBTdisciplinesdonotsufficientlyaddressstandardization activities of local governments and non-governmental bodies. What can be done in this regard?

25

While the previous section dealt with specific issues of substance and some key areas of intersection of clean energy and trade policies, this section will briefly raise a number of process-related issues and questions under the three thematic headings in the previous sections—(i) improving transparency; (ii) enhancing market access; and (iii) clarifying existing rules and developing new ones. While dispute settlement is another obvious area that has been under the spotlight, this section will not address it. Rather, it will argue that proactive steps taken by WTO to improve transparency, enhance market access, and clarify and develop rules could lessen the need for WTO dispute settlement. Indeed, the increasing number of renewable energy dispute cases in WTO underscores this.

WTO is at a crossroads. The Doha Round has not reached a successful conclusion even after a decade of negotiations, and trade negotiations are increasingly shifting to regional forums. Despite this, WTO remains the only multilateral trade institution with binding rules and an effective dispute settlement system. It is also the only trade institution that brings all major greenhouse gas emitters—developed as well as developing—under a single set of trade-related rules and obligations. Thus, any contribution it makes toward advancing climate goals will be significant, politically as well as economically. However, because WTO operates under a “single undertaking” framework and by consensus, it will not find it easy to speedily advance in negotiations or quickly take the innovative decisions required to facilitate a global scale up of clean energy. Progress may need to come incrementally, and the focus may have to be first on easily attainable reforms and issues. In other words, “fine-tuning the WTO’s engine” will be easier than aiming at a rapid overhaul or transformation. Yet, in the process of doing so, WTO could take lessons from developments in other forums that deal with clean energy and trade issues, notably APEC, as well as innovative bilateral and regional trade agreements that address clean energy issues and agreements, such as the Energy Charter Treaty, which has developed comprehensive rules on energy transit.

Some major process-related problems under the WTO are:

Fragmentation: Issues of clean energy fall under the scope of a number of WTO Agreements—GATT, GATS, the SCM, the TRIMS, the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and the GPA. Rules on

anti-dumping and countervailing measures and steps taken pursuant to those rules could also affect market access opportunities for clean energy goods. While the diversity of rules and applicable agreements is understandable, it also leads to a fragmented approach in viewing trade issues for clean energy goods and services. For instance, there are notification requirements under various agreements, but a lack of systematic collection or compilation of measures affecting the clean energy sector. Similarly, negotiations on environmental goods and services are fragmented, each taking place in their respective committees despite the fact that these goods (including clean energy goods and services) are traded together. Ways need to be explored by WTO to reduce fragmentation in terms of notification processes as well as negotiations. Some experts are of the opinion that fragmentation in terms of rules on energy can be addressed only through a Framework Agreement on Energy (for instance, see Cottier et al. 2010).

Negotiating market-access challenges in clean energy goods and services: The challenges that have faced WTO negotiators in negotiating market access for clean energy goods and services are well-known and well-documented. (For instance, see Claro et al. 2007). At the same time, talks on opening up markets have made faster progress in forums, such as APEC, where members agreed to liberalize tariffs on a set of 54 product categories to 5 percent or less by 2015. While it could be argued that APEC members were able to achieve such progress because they were unconstrained by a “single undertaking,” the initiatives were voluntary, and the outcome was non-binding, perhaps WTO could examine the ways and processes followed in APEC to see whether something could be borrowed that could help catalyze progress within the WTO context—such as, for instance, involvement of private sector associations in working groups, and peer reviews of voluntary liberalization initiatives in services. Similarly, WTO could explore ways in which the results of the APEC agreement on environmental goods could be built on. Plurilateral initiatives concluded within or outside WTO could also hold lessons for addressing market challenges in clean energy goods and services. For instance, WTO’s Informational Technology Agreement (ITA) is a successful example of an agreement triggered by the participation of a “critical mass” of interested countries with a certain percentage of world trade extending benefits to all members (even non-participating ones) on a most-favoured nation (MFN) basis. On the other hand, the GPA and the proposed ISA are based on a “closed” model with benefits being enjoyed only by signatories. Such agreements could be one way of making progress by “like-minded” countries in addressing market access barriers on clean energy goods and services. However, the procedural steps, legality, and pros and cons of such agreements within or even outside WTO will need to be carefully evaluated, particularly if they go beyond market access and enter the “rules” arena. An ICTSD paper by Kennedy (2012) provides a detailed assessment of various legal aspects that may need to be considered in pursuing various plurilateral options for a sustainable energy trade agreement.

WTO PROCESS-RELATED

ISSUES AND SYSTEMIC

QUESTIONS

26

Lack of clarity and coherence in rules: This is also a major area of concern for clean energy goods and services. Effectively fulfilling the Doha mandate could address some aspects of this, such as through the development of subsidies and procurement rules in services. The lack of a formal negotiating mandate may make it difficult to draft new rules or re-open existing ones. Nevertheless, discussion among WTO Members on where such rules should most usefully be developed or clarified would be worth having. Some examples of issues where rules may need to be clarified or new rules need to be developed have been provided in the previous section. It is also likely that new innovative or technological developments in the clean energy sector will raise the need for new rules even though there is no formal negotiating mandate. Perhaps such discussions on a regular basis could also be given an outlet in some form without the fear of upsetting the balance of rights and obligations of WTO Members.

Following an identification of these main problems, a number of questions that could be raised for further discussion follow.

Increasing transparency

• What can WTO do to increase transparency on cleanenergy measures that could have a trade impact? Is this something that could be “worked into” existing mechanisms (such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and various notification procedures) or is there a need to create completely new mechanisms?

• Should there be strict penalties for non-notification ofmeasures that have a potential trade impact?

• How can various notification processes be “clustered”in a coherent manner so as to obtain an easy overview of measures prevailing in the clean energy sector? For instance, should subsidies and standards affecting the solar PV sector be “gathered” together? Which WTO body should be responsible?

Enhancing market access

• How can fragmentation in negotiations on clean energygoods and services be avoided? Should some kind of formal mechanism within WTO ensure this?

• How can WTO discuss and draw lessons from positivedevelopments in market access negotiations on clean energy goods in other forums, such as the APEC and regional trade agreements (RTAs)? Where should such discussions take place?

• Should discussions on plurilateral initiativeswithinWTObe considered for clean energy goods? Are there systemic risks involved?

Clarifying existing rules and developing new rules

• ShouldalreadyagreeduponWTOrulesbe re-opened fordiscussion and new rules be created? Or, is constructive ambiguity better despite the burden it places on the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)? If it is decided that new rules are necessary, should such rules be part of a separate framework agreement or developed within the various individual agreements?

• Given that there is no negotiating mandate in mostinstances, how can discussions on rule clarification or development proceed within the WTO setting? Should the focus be on what can be done within the existing mandates and negotiating or working groups? Should new forums or working groups be created?

• Annex 2, Table 2 provides an overview of some of themain questions that could be raised on clean energy and trade in terms of both substance as well as process.

In addition to these points, it may be worth considering other interim, stop-gap measures WTO could take to reduce the likelihood of trade disputes related to clean energy policies until meaningful progress may be made on the other pillars—market access, transparency, and rules.

27

ANNEX I

Dispute name

Year of dispute initiation/WTO Case No (1. For WTO cases: date of request for consultations; 2. In trade remedy cases: date of filing of complaint by private sector or launch of investigation)

Defending/targeted

country (ies)

Compla-inant(s)

Measure WTO relevant articles raised in complaint

Dispute status and year of

resolution (if applicable)

1. China –Measures concerning wind equipment

Dec 2010 (DS 419) China United States

Grants, funds, or awards to enterprises on condition of manufacturing wind power equipment (including the overall unit, and parts thereof) in China

(i) GATT 1994: Art. XVI:1(ii) Subsidies and Coun-tervailing Measures: Art. 3, 25.1, 25.2, 25.3, 25.4(iii) Protocol of Acces-sion: Part I, para. 1.2

Measure unilaterally revoked by China in Feb 2011

2. Canada – FIT programme

Sep 2011 (DS 412 and 426)

Canada EU and Japan

Local content requirements (LCRs) in Ontario’s Feed in Tariff programme for wind and solar PV

(i) GATT 1994: Art. III:4(ii) Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Art. 1.1, 3.1(b), 3.2(iii) Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs): Art. 2.1

Resolved in 2013(Appellate Body Report DS 426).Appellate Body rules Canada’s measure inconsistent with GATT Article III and TRIMS Article 2

3. US trade remedies application on solar panel imports from China

Oct 2011 China US (on ba-sis of com-plaints by domestic solar panel manufac-turers to US Com-merce Depart-ment)

Alleged Chinese subsidisation of its solar panel manufacturers

(i) Countervailing duties imposed by US on March 2012 after finding of “injury;” (ii) Higher anti-dumping duties imposed by US on May 2012 after determination of “dumping” by Chinese panel manufacturers

Table 1:

An Overview of Some Prominent Clean Energy Trade Disputes Sources: World Trade Organization, Chronological List of Dispute Cases, and ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digests.

28

4. US trade remedies application on wind tower imports from China and Vietnam

Dec 2011 China and Vietnam

US Alleged Chinese subsidisation of wind tower manufacturers and dumping by Chinese and Vietnamese exporters

Preliminary CV duties (on Chinese imports) and AD duties (on Chinese and Vietnamese imports) announced by US Department of Commerce in May and July 2012. Final duties announced in Dec 2012

5. Chinese AD and CVD inves-tigation on polysilicon imports from EU, US and Korea

Nov 2012 US, EU and Korea

China Alleged subsidisation and dumping of solar grade polysilicon by US, EU and Korea

Investigation ongoing

6. US –countervail-ing duty measures on certain products from China

May 2012 (DS 437) US China Various aspects of certain identified countervailing duty in-vestigations by the US, including their open-ing, conduct and the preliminary and final determinations leading to the imposition of CVDs. China also chal-lenges the “rebuttable presumption” allegedly established and applied by the US Department of Commerce that majority government ownership is sufficient to treat an enterprise as a “public body”

(i) Article VI of the GATT 1994;(ii) Articles 1.1, 2, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 12.7 and 14(d) of the SCM Agreement; and(iii) Article 15 of the Protocol of Accession of China.

Panel composed on 26 Nov 2012

29

7. EU trade remedies on solar panel imports from China

Sep 2012 (anti-dumping investigation launched)Nov 2012 (investigation of subsidisation launched)

China EU (on basis of complaint by the EU Pro Sun coalition, a group of 25 European solar panel manu-facturers headed by the German-based So-larWorld)

Alleged dumping and subsidisation by China of solar panels and cells and wafers used in production of solar panels

EU’s planned anti-dumping duties expected to be approved by June 2013; reports of potentially negotiated settlement of cases involving the US, EU and China.Investigation into subsidies ongoing. Results expected by Aug 2013.

8. EU –Certain measures affecting the renew-able energy generation sector

5 Nov 2012 (DS 452) EU China Domestic content re-strictions affecting the renewable energy gen-eration sector relating to the FIT programmes of EU member states, including but not lim-ited to Italy and Greece

(i) GATT 1994: Art. I, III:1, III:4, III:5(ii) Subsidies and Coun-tervailing Measures: Art. 1.1, 3.1(b), 3.2(iii)Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs): Art. 2.1, 2.2

In consultations

9.EU trade remedies on solar glass from China

15 January 2013 China EU (on basis of complaint filed by ProSun Glass an ad hoc group rep-resenting European solar glass manufac-turers.

Alleged dumping by China of solar glass used primarily though not exclusively in the production of solar panels and accounting for 4 percent of panel costs

Investigation ongoing; provisional findings expected by Dec 2013.

10. India –Certain measures relating to solar cells and solar modules

6 February 2013 (DS 456)

India US Domestic content requirements under India’s Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission for solar cells and solar modules.

(i) GATT 1994: Art. III:4(ii) Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs): Art. 2.1(iii) Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Art. 3.1(b), 3.2, 5(c), 6.3(a), 6.3(c), 25

In consultations

30

11. EU –Certain measures on the import and marketing of biodiesel and meas-ures sup-porting the biodiesel industry

15 May (DS 549) EU Argentina Two types of measures adopted by the EU and certain member states: (a) measures to promote the use of energy from renewable sources and to introduce a mechanism to control and reduce greenhouse emissions; and (b) measures to establish support schemes for the biodiesel sector

(i) GATT-1994: Articles I:1, III:1, III:2, III:4 and III:5

(ii) SCM Agreement: Articles 1.1, 2.3, 3.1(b), 3.2,5(b), 5(c) and 6.3(a)

(iii) TRIMS Agreement: Articles 2.1 and 2.2

(iv) TBT Agreement: Articles 2.1, 2.2, 5.1, 5.2

(v) WTO Agreement: Article XVI:4

In Consultations

31

Key issue areas

Questions and considerations for WTO

Enabling greater transparency Market access -addressing trade restrictive measures

Clarifying existing rules and developing new ones

Tariffs • Howcancustomsclassifications be better refined to more clearly identify clean energy products?

• Couldan“earlyharvest”forclean energy products be identified? What products make good candidates?

Clean energy subsidies and incentive measures

• Isthereaneedtoconsiderimproved or enhanced notification processes for clean energy subsidies?

• Shouldandifsohowcouldrelevant WTO committees debate the nature, purpose, scale and impact of different clean energy subsidies so as to help clarify individual country measures? (for instance, at WTO Trade Policy Reviews).

• Shouldtherebeareviewofthedefinition of a subsidy under the SCM so as to better discipline clean energy subsidies with an adverse trade impact on clean energy goods and services? Can this be linked to the debate on subsidies in relevant committees?

• Shouldtherebeaclearwindowof exemption for certain types of subsidies, for instance, under a revived “non-actionable” category of subsidies?

• Shouldtherebeatime-limitedexemption granted to certain types of local-content measures in clean energy (for example, developing countries) given the increasing frequency of use?e?

Government Procurement Policies

• Howcantransparencybeimproved with regard to procurement measures in clean energy goods and services?

• Canfuturenegotiationsonsustainable procurement as mandated in the revised GPA contribute to addressing procurement-related market access for clean energy goods and services?

• Howcanrulesbeclarifiedordeveloped further under a future GPA that provides greater certainty and predictability for governments to use green procurement measures without running afoul of WTO rules prohibiting discrimination against “like” products?

ANNEX II

Table 2:

Key Issues and Considerations for WTO in Supporting Clean Energy Scale-up by Facilitating Trade in Clean Energy Goods and Services

32

Clean Energy Equipment Standards and Certification

• CouldtheTBTnotificationprocess of diverse standards for various types of clean energy equipment and services be further streamlined and made coherent? If so, how?

• Shouldaspecialinformationsystem for clean energy standards be created based on the proposed WTO/ISO Standards Information System and the ISO/IEC information centre?

• WhatcanWTOtodofurtherdiscipline unnecessary and costly certification requirements that are often more burdensome than the actual standards per se?

• Shouldnewrulesbedevelopedto address domestic regulation disciplines in the clean energy services sector? Such regulation may be required, for instance, to address qualification and licensing requirements for installers of clean energy equipment.

• Theeffectoftechnicalregulations which are not adopted by central governments may still have a crucial negative impact on trade in PV products. Should Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement explicitly discipline such regulations?

• CurrentWTOTBTdisciplinesdo not sufficiently address standardization activities of local governments and non-governmental bodies. What can be done in this regard?

Services • ShouldtheWTOtryandenablea better classification of clean energy services and promote a uniform approach in this regard to facilitate negotiations?

• Willtheongoingplurilateralnegotiations for an ISA facilitate addressing of market barriers? Should there be a critical mass of countries that should participate, including from a climate perspective?

• Whatrulesneedtobeclarifiedas far as trade in clean energy services is concerned? What new rules need to be developed? Is this a realistic possibility in the short to medium term?

33

WTO process-related issues and systemic questions

• WhatcanWTOdotogenerallyincrease transparency on clean-energy measures that could have a trade impact? Can it be worked into existing mechanisms (such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and various notification procedures) or is there a need to create completely new mechanisms?

• Shouldtherebestrictpenaltiesfor non-notification of measures that have a potential trade impact?

• Howcanvariousnotificationprocesses be “clustered” in a coherent manner so as to obtain an easy overview of clean energy measures? For instance, should subsidies and standards affecting the solar PV sector be ‘gathered” together? Which WTO body should be responsible?

• Howcanfragmentationin negotiations on clean energy goods and services be avoided? Should some kind of formal mechanism within WTO ensure this?

• HowcanWTOdiscussanddraw lessons from positive developments in market access negotiations in other forums such as the APEC and RTAs? Where should such discussions happen?

• Shoulddiscussionsonplurilateral initiatives within WTO be considered for clean energy goods? Are there systemic risks involved?

• ShouldalreadyagreeduponWTOrules be re-opened for discussion and new rules be created? Or is constructive ambiguity better despite the burden it places on the DSU? If it is decided that new rules are necessary, should such rules part of a separate Framework Agreement or developed within the various individual agreements?

• Giventhatthereexistsnonegotiating mandate in most instances, how can discussions on rule clarification or development proceed within a WTO setting? Should the focus be on what can be done within the existing mandates and negotiating/working groups? Should new forums/working groups be created?

34

ANNEX III

FIGURE 1:

Relevance of Downstream Jobs in the Solar PV Sector (More than half the jobs and value generated lie downstream of modules)Source: Natural Resources Defense Council; Council on Energy, Environment and Water, Laying the Foundation for a Bright Future: Assessing Progress under Phase 1 of India’s National Solar Mission, Interim Report, April 2012.

Silicon PV value distribution* 7.00

6.00

5.00

4.00

3.00

2.00

1.00

-

$ / W

Polysilicon Wafer Cell Module Inverter Other Installation

-70%

-30%of value

of value

6.36

Silicon ingots Cells Modules Balance of system Installations

15% TO 40% JOBS IN MANUF ACTURING 60% TO85% JOBS IN DESIGN, INSTALLATION, SALES, OTHER

*Based on value chain analysis of U.S. silicon PV market. similar value distribution for thin film technologies .unsubsidi zed R oughly

Wafer

* Based on unsubsidized value chain analysis of U.S. silicon PV market. Roughly similar value distribution for thin film technologies.

15% TO 40% JOBS IN MANUFACTURING 60% TO 85% JOBS IN DESIGN, INSTALLATION, SALES, OTHER

35

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Implemented jointly by ICTSD and the World Economic Forum, the E15Initiative convenes world-class experts and institutions to generate strategic analysis and recommendations for government, business and civil society geared towards strengthening the global trade system.