The Impact of the COVID-19 Outbreak on Governance, Peace ......Kamil Kamaluddeen (South Sudan), Selva Ramachandran (Sudan) and Christine Musisi (Tanzania). The findings also benefited

R E G I O N A L B R I E F2 7 J U L Y 2 0 2 0

The Impact of the COVID-19 Outbreak on Governance, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa

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Jointly published by the African Union Commission and UNDP Regional Service Center Africa (2020)

African Union Commission

P.O. Box 3243

Roosevelt Street (Old Airport Area) W21K19

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Email: [email protected]

United Nations Development Programme

P.O. Box 60130

Main Bole Road, Olympia round about, DRC Street

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Email: [email protected]

This publication is the property of the African Union Commission through the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and the Peace and Security Department, with the generous support of UNDP. No part of this publication may be replicated in any form without the permission of the African Union Commission and UNDP.

mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]

Foreword

The novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has spread rapidly around the world since it was first identified in January 2020. This pandemic represents a major crisis for countries across the African continent, not only in the risk to lives. Africa has a young population, which should decrease the numbers of severe cases, but it has large numbers of people with underlying health conditions which make them vulnerable. Perhaps most significantly, health systems have very limited capacity to treat severe cases. Importantly, the economic impacts will be severe. Measures to contain the spread of COVID-19 will inhibit economic activity and could hit the poor hardest, especially those living in cities. The World Bank’s bi-annual Africa’s Pulse report suggests that sub-Saharan Africa could experience its first collective recession in 25 years.

The consequences of COVID-19 pandemic could be long-lasting. Supporting countries to address the immediate and long-term impact of COVID-19 requires a regional approach. The leadership of the African Union has been crucial and commendable. It will continue to support governments to make extremely difficult choices, rather than make false compromises, to address the impact of COVID-19 across the continent. The Africa Joint Continental Strategy for COVID-19 provides a clear vision for how the African Union will work with its member states to address the multi-faceted challenges posed by the pandemic.

Whilst the focus has been on mitigating the health and socio-economic impacts, COVID-19 has thepossibility of significantly impacting governance, peace and security and reversing gains made in Africa.COVID-19 could delay electoral processes and could affect accountability, service delivery and the questfor improved governance on the continent. In addition, the virus has delayed the implementation of criticalpeace agreements and hampered our mediation efforts at the local level. Terrorist and non-state armedgroups have not ceased their attacks against innocent populations. In West Africa, Boko Haram insurgentslaunched an offensive against an army base claiming the lives of hundreds of peacekeepers. In the Hornof Africa, Al-Shabaab has continued to pose significant risks to civilian populations in the region,especially in Somalia and Kenya. While the spread of terrorism and extremism on the continent isworrisome, it is even more alarming to see terror groups leverage the outbreak of coronavirus to spreadmisinformation as a recruitment tactic.

While COVID-19 creates clear challenges to government effectiveness and risks to peace and security, thepandemic may, in place, also present renewed opportunities for enhancing governance or achievingbreakthroughs to lasting peace in parts of Africa.

It is against this backdrop that the African Union Commission and Africa CDC, through their partnershipwith UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa, has launched reports to assess the impact of COVID-19 ongovernance, peace and security, with a focus on the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.

This edition on the Horn of Africa consolidates trends with a view to identifying multi-layered responses toCOVID-19 in the region. It provides an overview of the epidemiological trends across the region andprovides a reflection on how COVID-19 is impacting on governance indicators as well as peace andsecurity trends in the Horn of Africa. The report concludes with a set of recommendations forconsideration by the African Union, Regional Economic Communities and member states. It is hoped thatthe information contained in this brief will enhance our collective understanding of the unfoldingconsequences in the Horn of Africa and provide the foundation of relevant multi-dimensional interventionsto address this crisis for humanity.

H.E Ambassador Smail Chergui AU Commissioner for Peace and Security

Acknowledgements

This preliminary report on the governanceresponse to COVID-19 by African Union memberstates was prepared under the overall technicalleadership and guidance of Stan Nkwain andJide Okeke with the extraordinary support ofFatma Ahmed at UNDP Regional Service CenterAfrica. Special thanks to UNDP TechnicalReference Group for their inputs and valuablefeedback to this report notably: Philliat Matsheza,Kristoffer Tangri, Nika Saeedi, Nirina Kiplagat,Lucy Turner, Lea Zoric, Tim Heine, LeanneMcKay, Jon Dean, Usman Iftikhar, Armand-MichelBroux, Waly Ndiaye, Hawa Aw, Clement Hamon,Sofiene Bacha, David Omozuafoh, YoshihiroSaito, Raymond Gilpin, Angela Lusigi and EuniceKamwendo; and to UNDP Country Office teamsin the region: Gael Ollivier, Angela Anna deTommasi, George Wachira, JacquelineNzoyihera, Louis Kuukpen, Shimels Assefa,Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, MandisaMashologu, Dan Juma, Rana Taha, RogersDhliwayo, Martha Mathenge, Bokayo Sora, JoanVwamu, Jacqueline Olweya, Peter Nordstrom,Dragan Popovic, Doel Mukerjee, Reeya Patel,

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Chrysantus Ayangafac, Musa Ibrahim, AugustineBahemuka, Amon Manyama, Godfrey Mulisa,Takawira Musavengana, Joyce Deloge,Ruphina.Mbua-Monono, Usman Iftikhar, DavidOmozuafoh, and Dieudonne Tshiyoyo.

Appreciation to UNDP Resident Representativesfor their feedback, Fatima Elsheikh (Djibouti),James Wakiaga (Eritrea), Turhan Saleh (Ethiopia),Walid Badawi (Kenya), Jocelyn Mason (Somalia),Kamil Kamaluddeen (South Sudan), SelvaRamachandran (Sudan) and Christine Musisi(Tanzania).

The findings also benefited inputs, partnershipand strong collaboration with colleagues fromthe African Union Commission. In particular, DrAhmed E. Ogwell OUMA, Deputy Director of theAfrica CDC and Ambassador Frederic NgogaGateretse of the AU Peace and SecurityDepartment provided deep insights thatcontributed to and helped shape the report.

The report was drafted by Dalberg Advisors.

SUMMARY

STATUS OF COVID-19

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COVID-19

STATE OF THE ECONOMY, LIVELIHOODS, FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH

IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON GOVERNANCE

IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON PEACE AND SECURITY

IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON BILATERAL COUNTRY RELATIONSHIPS

IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON THE BORDERLANDS BETWEEN COUNTRIES

INITIATIVES TAKEN BY AFRICAN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR REGIONAL ACTION

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30

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Contents

Summary

The COVID-19 crisis has had a moderate impacton governance, peace and security in the Hornof Africa to date—countries include Djibouti,Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan andSudan, and this analysis includes Tanzania inaddition to countries in the Horn of Africa. As of24 July, there were 50,066 cases and 1,392deaths confirmed of COVID-19; the true caseloadis likely understated due to limited testingcapacity. No country has experienced significantpolitical instability. Political change and reformprocesses remain mostly on track. No majorconflicts have emerged since the start of theCOVID-19 pandemic. Al-Shabaab remains athreat in the region and could be strengthenedby the loss of livelihoods.

COVID-19 has delayed progress inimplementing reforms in some countries and isinhibiting government effectiveness across theregion. The integration of different armed forcesin South Sudan has been put on hold andelections in Ethiopia have been postponed.Elections in Somalia were postponed due tointernal security concerns and not COVID-19. Inmost countries, government operations havebeen constrained due to closures of non-essential services and government workersbeing asked to work from home. Budgets will beconstrained by reduced economic activity, and

7

the fall in the oil price affecting oil-exportingcountries, further affecting service delivery andpossibly corruption. The impact of COVID-19 hashampered mitigation efforts to improve stabilityin the region.

COVID-19-related containment measures—together with the global recession, lower oilprices and damage to agriculture from locustsand flooding—are increasing poverty levels andjeopardizing livelihoods. Political stability andprogress may be tested as the health, social andeconomic impacts of COVID-19 grow.Lockdowns, which are now being relaxed inmany countries, have strained livelihoods. Foodinsecurity is expected to deteriorate across theregion in the coming months. These stresses arelikely to continue to grow and, in some countries,may lead to civil unrest, political instability orviolence.

Bilateral country relationships have been stableand borderland areas in the region have beenmostly peaceful since the start of COVID-19.Except for a few isolated incidents, there havebeen no major confrontations along the borders.Borderlands in the region are particularlyvulnerable during COVID-19: borders have beena prime source of new infections, requiringdedicated health and economic interventions,

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and they should be a focus for continuedpeacebuilding and development efforts.Borderlands have less government oversight,and typically host more rebel activity.

Regional institutions have taken severalinitiatives to anticipate and mitigate the healthand socio-economic effects of COVID-19. Theseinclude the AU’s Africa Joint ContinentalStrategy, IGAD’s Emergency Fund AgainstCOVID-19, COMESA’s common guidelines forsafe trade during COVID-19 and EAC’s post-COVID-19 economic recovery plans. Thepandemic will require sustained efforts andresources to be deployed.

Regional and international organizations cansupport governments in the region by(i) supporting ongoing political reforms andelection processes, (ii) prioritizing regionalsolidarity when implementing health responsestrategies, (iii) strengthening the social contractby providing healthcare and welfare equitablyand transparently, (iv) ensuring the continuationof trade of essential goods, (v) monitoring andaddressing food insecurity, (vi) improving themacroeconomic environment, and (vii)supporting efforts in Somalia and regionally torespond to the threat of Al-Shabaab.

Source: 1, 2World Health Organization

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Status of COVID-19

As of 24 July, Horn of Africa countries haveconfirmed 50,066 cases and 1,392 deaths fromCOVID-19, with most concentrated in urbancenters.1 Kenya confirmed the most cases andSudan confirmed the most deaths. Djibouticonfirmed the highest cases per capita which islikely a reflection of more testing per capitacompared to other countries. Eritrea reports thelowest number of cases and no deaths.

After a rapid acceleration in April and May,rates of new cases and deaths have stabilizedbut not declined, suggesting that controlmeasures have helped but not stopped thespread of COVID-19. Reported case numbersare likely to be significantly understated due tolimited testing capacity across all countries.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

31-May19-Apr 26-Jul22-Mar 17-May8-Mar 5-Apr 3-May 14-Jun 28-Jun 12-Jul

Number of new cases Number of new deaths

50,066confirmed cases

1,392confirmed deaths

Figure 1: Daily confirmed cases and deaths of COVID-192

7-day rolling average, as of 24 July

Figure 2: Daily confirmed cases and deaths of COVID-193

7-day rolling average, independent scales for cases and deaths, as of 24 July

Source: 3World Health Organization

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Djibouti5,031 cases58 deaths

Ethiopia11,933 cases197 deaths

Eritrea261 cases0 deaths

Kenya15,601 cases263 deaths

Tanzania509 cases21 deaths

Somalia3,171 cases93 deaths

South Sudan2,258 cases45 deaths

Sudan11,302 cases715 deaths

Government responses to COVID-19

Most nations in the Horn of Africa enactedmeasures proactively to contain COVID-19—insome cases before their first case.

Emergency administrative structures wereactivated in all countries, and each strived totailor their response to the complexities of theircountry context.

Interventions have focused on movementrestrictions and social distancing, and some

Source: 4Dalberg Dashboard (Government Actions on COVID-19 in Developing Countries)

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countries have provided limited economicsupport. Adherence to enacted measures hasoften been a challenge due to cultural norms andthe need to preserve livelihoods.

Early lockdowns have been lifted, andmovement restrictions are being relaxed insome countries. This will ease the negativeeffects on livelihoods but could likely lead tomore rapid growth in case numbers and putpressure on already weak health systems.

Category Intervention Category DJI ERI ETH KEN SOM SSD SDN TZA

Government Coordination and Legal Authorization

Emergency administrative structures activated or established No

Yes20 Mar

Yes31 Jan

Yes 28 Feb

Yes 16 Mar

Yes20 Mar16 May

Yes16 Mar

No

State of emergency declarationNo Unknown

Yes10 Apr

No No NoYes

16 MarNo

Lockdowns Full lockdown of some areas Yes 19 Mar17 May

Yes2 Apr

Yes26 Mar23 Apr

Partial6 May

NoYes

16 Mar7 May

Yes 24 Mar1 June

No

Full lockdown of whole country Yes 19 Mar17 May

Yes2 Apr

No No NoYes

16 Mar7 May

No No

Yes

Intervention was taken and is ongoing

Yes

Intervention was taken in the past

Partial

Intervention was partially implemented

NoIntervention was not taken

Figure 3: Actions taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic4

Start to end date, if known

12

Category Intervention Category DJI ERI ETH KEN SOM SSD SDN TZA

Movement Restrictions

Ban of entry for non-citizens/residents

No UnknownNo Partial

17 MarNo

Yes24 Mar

Yes16 Mar

No

Ban on entry for all non-citizens (including residents)

No Unknown No NoYes

18 MarYes3/24

Yes16 Mar

No

Ban on entry for all persons No Unknown No

Yes25 Mar

NoYes3/24

Yes16 Mar

No

Advice to citizens/residents against travel to other countries

NoYes

17 MarNo No No Unknown Unknown No

Suspension of flights to/from affected countries

Yes 18 Mar

Yes26 Mar

Partial21 Mar

NoYes

18 Mar

Yes 13 Mar7 May

Yes12 Mar

Yes11 Apr18 May

Movement Restrictions -Within Country

Advice against non-essential travel between cities/provinces

No Unknown Partial No No YesYes

26 MarNo

Ban on travel to/from affected cities/provinces

No Unknown PartialYes

6 AprYes

29 MarYes

15 AprYes

26 MarNo

Social Distancing -Closures

Ban on mass gatherings Yes 19 Mar

Yes23 Mar

Yes16 Mar

Yes1 Mar

Yes 17 Mar

Yes16 Mar

Yes30 Apr

No

Closure of schools and universities

Yes 19 Mar

Yes27 Mar

Yes25 Mar

Yes20 Mar

Yes 17 Mar

Yes 20 Mar

Yes15 Mar

Yes17 Mar29 Jun

Closure of bars and other social venues

Yes20 Mar15 Jun

Yes31 Mar

Partial 20 Mar

Yes23 Mar

Yes 17 Mar

Yes 16 Mar

Unknown No

Closure of religious buildings and sites

Yes20 Mar17 May

Unknown NoYes

22 MarYes

17 MarYes

16 MarYes

18 AprNo

Closure of government offices Yes20 Mar17 May

Unknown Partial 24 Mar

NoPartial 17 Mar

Yes 16 Mar

Unknown No

Closure of non-essential retail and other businesses serving public

Yes 23 Mar17 May

Yes No NoYes

17 MarYes

16 MarUnknown No

Social Distancing -Physical Distancing Between People

Advice to stay at home and work from home

Yes23 Mar17 May

YesPartial24 Mar

Yes13 Mar

Yes 17 Mar

Unknown Unknown No

Requirement to stay at home except for purchasing essentials, medical care, daily exercise and work if necessary

Yes23 Mar17 May

Yes No No NoPartial 25 Mar

Unknown No

Curfew for parts of each dayNo Unknown No

Yes25 Mar

Yes 15 Apr

Yes25 Mar

Yes24 Mar

No

Requirement to use surgical masks in high-traffic locations

Yes10 May

UnknownYes

2 JunYes

4 AprYes Unknown Unknown No

Social distancing indicators and infrastructure No Unknown Yes

Yes27 Mar

Yes Unknown Unknown No

Special actions for prisons, military barracks or other high-density settings

No UnknownYes

27 MarPartial2 Apr

Partial 12 May

Yes20 Apr

Yes25 Mar

No

Figure 3 (continued): Actions taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemicStart to end date, if known

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Category Interventions DJI ERI ETH KEN SOM SSD SDN TZA

Strengthening the Healthcare System

Expansion of basic supplies - PPE, masks, hand sanitizers, etc.

Yes Unknown YesYes

30 MarYes Unknown Unknown Unknown

Additional pay for healthcare workers

Yes Unknown Yes Partial Yes Unknown Unknown Unknown

Accelerated graduation and deployment of healthcare students

Unknown Unknown YesYes


Call for volunteers from trained healthcare workers who are retired, working in other positions or working abroad

Unknown UnknownYes

11 AprPartial 1 Mar

Yes 17 Mar

Unknown Unknown Unknown

Psychological assistance and medical social work

Unknown Unknown YesYes


Economic and Social Measures

Postponement of cancellation of payments of fees for public services

Yes Unknown No No No Unknown Unknown Unknown

Postponement of tax payment deadlines

Unknown UnknownPartial 14 May

No No Unknown Unknown Unknown

Allowances for people required to go into quarantine or self-isolate

Yes UnknownNo

No No Unknown Unknown Unknown

Special payments or support for people made unemployed due to Covid-19

Unknown Unknown NoYes

23 MayNo Unknown Unknown Unknown

Partial coverage of wages by government if businesses don't lay off workers

Unknown Unknown No No No Unknown Unknown Unknown

Direct payments to people (either payments or tax rebates)

Unknown Unknown NoYes

25 MarNo Unknown Unknown Unknown

Emergency assistance to most affected business sectors

Unknown Unknown Yes 27 Mar

Yes 23 May

Yes Unknown Unknown Unknown

Figure 3 (continued): Actions taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemicStart to end date, if known

State of economy, livelihoods, food security and public health

Source: 5, 7IMF; 6World Bank

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ECONOMYThe global economic slowdown and the impactof movement restrictions have put highpressure on Horn of Africa economies and onpeople’s livelihoods. The IMF and World Bankrecently revised GDP growth forecasts for 2020downwards. Lockdowns and border closureshave affected farmers who cannot get theirproducts to markets. Exports have fallendrastically, e.g., the leading flower exportingcountries—Kenya and Ethiopia—have faced asignificant drop in sales of flowers due to the fallin global demand and border closures. Regionaltrade in goods, although small, has beensuppressed by movement restrictions.

The sharp fall in global oil prices, coupled withCOVID-19, has negatively affected South

Sudan, which would limit the government’sability to deliver highly-needed services to itscitizens. This will constrain the governmentsability to pay civil servants—including securityforces, which may lead to unrest and violence.

Debt distress is hampering some countries’ability to respond to COVID-19. Although Sudanis eligible for debt relief, it remains on the U.S.State Sponsors of Terrorism List, which blocksprogress toward HIPC debt relief. Somalia couldbecome eligible for debt relief, which wouldreduce its debt obligation from USD 5.2 billion toUSD 577 million, if key fiscal stability andgovernance reforms are implemented.7 The debtdistress further limits governments’ ability to offera social safety net or take other measures toprotect the most vulnerable populations.

Figure 4: Adjusted growth forecasts5, 6

Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya SomaliaSouth Sudan

Sudan Tanzania

Original 2020forecast

7.50% 3.90% 6.20% 5.70% 3.20% 7.40% 4.90% 7% (est.)

COVID-19 adjusted 2020 forecast

1.30% 0.10% 3.20% 1.00% 2.30% 4.90% -7.20% 2.50%

The World Bank and IMF’s debt-servicesuspension to the poorest countries has helpedsome countries in the region manage thesevere impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.Djibouti, Ethiopia and Tanzania are participantsin the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI)and could potentially benefit from DSSI savingsof USD 59.2 million, USD 511.3 million, and 148.9million, respectively.

POVERTY AND LIVELIHOODSHorn of Africa countries have high rates ofpoverty. According to the World Bank, about82% of the South Sudanese population andnearly 70% of the Somali population live belowthe poverty line of USD 1.90 PPP per day.8, 9

The COVID-19 induced economic crisis isaffecting the livelihoods of informal workersmost heavily, who account for a significantportion of workers in the Horn of Africacountries. Youth, in particular are, mostvulnerable, and some may find themselvespushed into crime, violence or extremism.

COVID-19 could have far-reaching economicconsequences for women and girls. CARE

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conducted a rapid gender analysis for COVID-19in East, Central and Southern Africa that foundwide-ranging impacts on women and girls,including:

• The closure of schools and limited access tohealthcare increases the burden of care onwomen.

• Women make up 70% of frontline health-careworkers, increasing their risk of contractingCOVID-19.

• Access to GBV support and sexual andreproductive health services will be less, andmaternal mortality could increase.

• Women are more likely to work in the informalsector which will be disproportionatelyaffected by the socioeconomic impact ofCOVID-19.

• Data suggests that there has been an increasein GBV during the pandemic.

• Limited engagement of women in COVID-19decision-making.

• The gender gap in the use of technology andliteracy in the region could affect prevention,awareness and access to resources.

Source: 8, 9World Bank; 10UNDP

0.000

0.200

0.400

0.600

0.800

1.000

EritreaSouth Sudan SomaliaEthiopia

SSAaverage

Djibouti Sudan Kenya

173rd186th 182

nd171st 168th

147th

N/A

Figure 5: Human Development Index10

Rank out of 189 countries, 2018

Figure 7: Maternal mortality ratio15

per 100,000 live births

HEALTH SYSTEMSHorn of Africa countries have some of theweakest health systems in the world. Kenya andEthiopia have relatively stronger health systemsthan the rest of the countries in the region.Kenya ranks 55th out of 195 countries in the 2019Global Health Security Index; Ethiopia is 84th,Sudan is 163rd, South Sudan is 180th, andSomalia ranks the lowest at 194th.11

Horn of Africa countries face similar challengesin healthcare systems to each other, but thescale varies across countries. The healthsystems suffer from a shortage of doctors andnurses and reliance on the import of medicalequipment and medicines. With the disruption ofglobal medical supply chains and the increase inglobal competition for PPE and other medicalequipment, some countries in the Horn of Africa

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are at high risk of being unable to treat peoplewho are infected with COVID-19 and in a criticalcondition. For example, as of 9 April, SouthSudan reportedly had 4 total ventilators and 24ICU beds for its 11 million people.13

One of the main health challenges women inthe Horn of Africa region face is access toquality maternal health, which could worsenwith movement restrictions related to COVID-19. South Sudan has the highest maternalmortality rate in the Horn of Africa region (789per 100,000 live births) while Djibouti has thelowest (229 per 100,000 live births).14 Movementrestrictions could affect women’s access tomaternal and new-born care services. In addition,the pressure that COVID-19 puts on healthcaresystems could particularly undermine sexual andreproductive health and rights.

More prepared for epidemics/pandemics

Least prepared for epidemics/pandemics

Ethiopia

Sudan

Kenya

South Sudan

Eritrea

Djibouti

229

311

353

501 510

732

789

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

650

700

750

800

SomaliaDjibouti Sudan KenyaEthiopia South Sudan

Eritrea

SSA average

Source: 11, 12Global Health Security Index; 13Devex; 14, 15UN Women

Figure 6: Global Health Security Index12

Figure 8: Projected food security outcome19

April to September 2020

FOOD SECURITYNearly 28 million people were already foodinsecure before COVID-19 in the IGAD region.16

According to the IGAD Drought DisasterResilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI),the highest shares of acute food insecuritybefore COVID-19 were in South Sudan (61%),followed by Ethiopia (27%), Kenya (22%), Somalia(17%) and Sudan (14%).17

The Horn of Africa region was already battlingthe effects of locust invasions and weathershocks when COVID-19 struck. Heavy rainsfollowed by devastating floods struck the regionduring the second half of 2019, which createdfavorable conditions for desert locusts, whosebreeding is now contributing to an infestation

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across the region, primarily in Ethiopia, Kenyaand Somalia.

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network(FEWS NET) estimates that COVID-19 will leadto a 25% increase of the number of highly foodinsecure people in the region.18 COVID-19-related border closures, along with locustinvasions and extreme weather, will decreasefood production and leading to surging prices.With the lockdowns and curfews exposingvulnerable communities to dwindling livelihoodsand greater risks of starvation, the level of foodinsecurity in the Horn of Africa is going to riseeven faster—unless urgent action is taken toprovide large-scale humanitarian support.

Source: 16, 17IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative, 18, 19Famine Early Warning Systems Network

Phase 1: Minimal Phase 2: Stressed Phase 3: Crisis

Phase 4: Emergency Phase 5: Famine Not analysed

April to May 2020 June to September 2020

Impact of COVID-19 on governance

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SUMMARY Since Jan 2020 Outlook

The health and socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 has hadlimited impact on the state of governance in the region to date,although governance could be affected if the impacts of thepandemic get worse over time. The global economic slowdownand social distancing measures are likely to affect governmenteffectiveness for most countries, with political transitions, publicservice delivery and judicial effectiveness being the most heavilydisrupted elements. Health systems and social safety nets areconstrained by limited resources but are under increased scrutinyin light of the pandemic. There have been some positive effects,as COVID-19 has provided opportunities for improved governancein Djibouti and Sudan and could create a common cause for thenew unity government in South Sudan to collaborate on.

PositiveLimitedchange

Negative

Improving or deteriorating - arrow direction Impact of COVID-19 and other factors - arrow fillPrimarily driven by non-COVID-19 factors

Primarily driven by COVID-19

Since Jan 2020 Outlook

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PROGRESS ON POLITICAL REFORM

COVID-19 could delay political transitions insome countries. Ethiopia’s elections werepostponed due to COVID-19. Somalia’s electionswere postponed due to internal security reasons,but COVID-19 could contribute to the delay inreforms and related processes. South Sudanformed a unity government as part of a peacedeal before COVID-19 reached the country, butsocial distancing measures led to delays in manyof the other 186 steps that need to be taken aspart of the peace deal, including the unificationof the army and the opposition military. COVID-19could disrupt Sudan’s transition to a democracy,and challenge the unity between civilian andmilitary leaders in the government.

The crisis created along multiple fronts couldhave varying effects on relations betweenmajor political parties. COVID-19 and its impactcould lead to tension between the governmentand opposition parties, especially in instances

where political reforms are hindered. However,the ability of governments in the region tobalance the need for addressing the prevailinghealth crisis without a prolonged delay in thevarious political processes could prove historic insolidifying unity in some of the countries of theregion. For instance, COVID-19 provides acommon cause for South Sudan’s new unitygovernment to collaborate on and build trustupon. The same opportunity remains true for allcountries, dependent on their success in theirresponse, and the extent of engagement withthe opposition.

VOICE AND PARTICIPATION

Lockdown and social distancing measures haverestricted government engagement with civilsociety. Formal processes for civic engagementon parliamentary and other political processeswere halted or severely restricted. Civic spacewas restricted during COVID-19—driven by bans

Figure 9: Parliamentary and presidential elections

Country Parliamentary election Presidential electionCOVID-19 related postponements

Djibouti February 2023 2021 None

EthiopiaInitially May 2020, then postponed to August 2020 and postponed again

to after COVID-192024 Yes – twice

Kenya August 2022 August 2022 None

SomaliaInitially November 2020, then postponed to December 2021 February 2021

Yes

South Sudan 2023 2023 None

Sudan 2022 2022 None

Tanzania 2020 2020 None


on mass gatherings rather than governmentintention to restrict freedoms, although the lattercould be a risk in the region.

Despite COVID-19 restrictions, protests didoccur. There were several demonstrationsprotesting isolated incidents where police usedexcessive force to enforce COVID-19 restrictions.Vendors protested their loss of livelihoods dueto movement restrictions and the mandatedclosure of businesses. There were protestsagainst some government actions, includingperceived unlawful arrests. Across all countries,these demonstrations did not lead to mass scalecivil unrest. The protests did indicate that in aregion where freedom of speech can berestricted, that there could be an opening of civicspace. However, governments used force inresponse to some of the protests.

TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY ANDTHE SOCIAL CONTRACT

The effectiveness of government responses tothe health and socioeconomic impacts ofCOVID-19 will depend on its transparency andcivic engagement. Transparency and effectivecommunication are critical to holding thegovernment accountable which should lead to amore effective response. Such actions havevaried across the region, with some countriescreating new communication and accountabilitychannels that could last beyond the pandemic,and others taking a less transparent approach.

The response to COVID-19 provides anopportunity to expand civic engagement.

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Differing levels of communication on COVID-19-related restrictions and engagement with civilsociety could be one reason behind the varyinglevels of adherence to public health measures indifferent places. For example, Somalia hasworked with religious leaders to spreadawareness of the disease and how to control it.The inability to effectively capture civic needswould lead to a response not grounded in reality.

GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS

COVID-19 measures have hindered governmenteffectiveness across the region. Duringlockdowns in most countries, non-essentialgovernment workers worked remotely or wereplaced on administrative leave, leading to mostpublic services being temporarily halted orseverely restricted. The focus of efforts onresponding to the pandemic has divertedresources away leading to ineffective servicedelivery, when public services are most needed.

The economic impact of COVID-19 will continueto constrain government effectiveness.Pandemic-related restrictions and the globaleconomic slowdown, and expenditure on thehealth and socioeconomic response to COVID-19 will exacerbate existing crises, reducinggovernment revenues and constraining theirbudgets. Public service delivery and the salariesof federal workers will continue to be adverselyaffected. These impacts could threaten stabilityin countries that are going through politicalreforms, where transition processes have lessfunds available, and new governments areunable to deliver on their agenda.



HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights violations have occurred duringthe enforcement of COVID-19 restrictions.Across countries that implemented lockdownand movement restrictions, there were multiple,yet isolated, incidents of extrajudicial killings bypolice in the enforcement of curfew and otherrestrictions. Journalists covering COVID-19-related stories were detained in multiplecountries. Protests in response to COVID-19-related killings and other related incidents weresometimes met by force by governments.

There were a few reported incidents of violencearising from a stigma against those suspectedof being COVID-19 positive.

Stay-at-home orders coupled with the loss oflivelihoods led to increases to domesticviolence.

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RULE OF LAW

Access to justice and the effectiveness of thejudiciary have been limited by COVID-19.Courts were suspended in some instances. Stay-at-home orders restricted the ability ofindividuals to seek justice. Limits on visits toprisons hindered access to legal counsel forprisoners. However, prisoners in some countrieswere pardoned to reduce overcrowding.

The effectiveness of judiciaries could beharmed by reduced government budgets dueto COVID-19. Crime has increased duringCOVID-19, and could worsen with the increasedloss of livelihoods, which raises the need for aneffective judiciary that can address the risingnumber of criminal cases.

The fairness of the judicial system has notchanged due to COVID-19. There have beeninstances across countries that highlight thebiases of judiciaries, including unlawful arrests.



Impact of COVID-19 on peace and security

22

SUMMARY Since Jan 2020 Outlook

COVID-19 has not led to disruptions to peace and security in theregion, but protracted impacts from the pandemic could lead toinstability in the future. Most countries are experiencing a periodof relative peace, especially across borders, which has not beenimpacted by COVID-19. Inter-communal and inter-ethnic violencecontinues in some of the countries in the region, which couldincrease as COVID-19’s impact leads to the loss of livelihoods andincreased food insecurity. Similarly, civil unrest could worsen withweakened socioeconomic conditions. Lockdown restrictions haveled to increased domestic violence. Extremist groups, especiallyAl-Shabaab, could use the pandemic to improve their standingand increase their recruitment in Somalia and across the region.The impact of COVID-19 could lead to increased politicalinstability if peace deals and reforms breakdown.


Negative



Source: 20, 21 Fragile States Index; 22Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

23

0

20

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120

DjiboutiEthiopiaSomalia EritreaSouthSudan

47th

Sudan Kenya

8th

Tanzania

SSAaverage

2nd 3rd

18th 21st29th

61st

Figure 10: Fragile States Index21

Index out of 120, rank out of 178 countries

CIVIL UNREST AND CRIME

There have been upticks in clashes and violentevents in recent months, but only 6% of thesewere attributed to COVID-19 and lockdowns,according to ACLED.22 Increases in poverty dueto COVID-19, in addition to threats to livelihoodsand growing food insecurity, could lead to anincrease in protests and possibly in violence, inthe months ahead.

PEACE AND SECURITY CONTEXT PRIORTO COVID-19The Horn of Africa is viewed as one of the mostunstable and vulnerable regions in the world.Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan arerespectively ranked as the 2nd, 3rd and 8th mostfragile countries.20

However, the region has seen a period ofrelative peace compared to recent years. Therehas been an absence of major cross-borderconflict, marked by peace deals being signedand sustained. Internal disruptions to peace docontinue, with regular bouts of intercommunalviolence, civil unrest, and extremist activity.


Figure 11: Conflicts, protests and violent events23

2019 and 2020

COVID-19 lockdowns

There have been recent protests, some ofwhich were related to COVID-19 restrictions.Protests have followed extrajudicial killings bypolice enforcing COVID-19 curfew. Following theincreased loss of livelihoods and rising foodinsecurity, systemic unrest is a threat ifgovernments are not able to effectively containthe impact of the pandemic.

The socioeconomic disorder that COVID-19 islikely to cause could contribute to possibleinstability. In Ethiopia, there has been anincrease in protests, clashes and crime, raisingconcerns over the federal government’s capacityto maintain order and unity in the country. Therehas been increases in crime across the region.

Source: 23ACLED

24

There were no major changes to the peace andsecurity situation in Djibouti, Eritrea andTanzania. Since COVID-19 has started, therehave been no incidents reported within Eritrea,and no incidents along the borders with Djibouti,Ethiopia and Sudan. Djibouti remains peacefulwith no major violent incidents threatening itspeace and security.

There has not been systemic political instabilityacross the region, although this could worsenwith COVID-19. Internal politics have not led tolarge scale violence in 2020. COVID-19 will testpolitical alliances, especially of countries that areundergoing political transitions and those thathave more fragile contexts.

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Apr JunMayJan2019

Feb Mar OctJul Aug Sep Nov Dec Jan2020

Feb Mar Apr May June

Explosions/Remote violenceClashes Protests Riots Violence against civilians

INTERCOMMUNAL TENSION

The region is characterized by recurring boutsof intercommunal violence which has continuedin 2020. Most of the incidents appear to not berelated to COVID-19. In May 2020, Sudanwitnessed an increase in widespread violence inSouth Kordofan and Blue Nile states. On 12 and13 May, the long-running dispute over cattlebetween members of the Beni Amer and Nubaethnic groups erupted in South Kordofan,Sudan.24 In February and March, intercommunalviolence between Somali and Oromocommunities erupted in several villages.25 A UNmission to the Somali region was forced toretreat as a result of the violent clashes.26

Intercommunal violence could increase due tothe impact of COVID-19. Clashes tend to bedriven by access to natural resources andeconomic grievances, all of which could worsengiven the impact of COVID-19.

WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY

Women and girls in the Horn of Africa regionhave been subject to conflict-related sexualviolence, unrelated to COVID-19. According toUNFPA, the ongoing conflict in West Darfur hasforced thousands of women and girls to flee theirhomes and camps, putting them at higher risk ofsexual violence, abuse, and exploitation.33

Increased inter-communal violence could beaccompanied by conflict-related sexual violence.

Source: 24Dabanga Sudan News; 25, 26OCHA Humanitarian Access Situation Report Jan-Mar 2020; 27Women, Peace and Security Index; 28UNICEF; 29UNFPA; 30Garda News

25

Women and girls faced increased risk ofgender-based violence, including femalegenital mutilation. Lockdowns and the loss oflivelihoods driven by COVID-19 have led toincreases in domestic violence across the region.According to UNICEF, Somalia has a 98%prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM)amongst women and girls—the highest in theworld.28 UNFPA which estimates that 290,000girls will be cut in 2020, reported a spike in thenumber of girls cut during COVID-19.29

VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Al-Shabaab continues to carry out attacks inSomalia and could leverage the current crisis torecruit marginalized youth. Despite the UN’s callfor a global ceasefire, Al-Shabaab has conductedmultiple attacks in Somalia.30 Youth make up themajority of the Somali, and neighboringcountries’ population, many of which will facefurther hardship due to the impact of COVID-19,which could risk to rising extremist recruitment.

0.479

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0.604

0.651

0.700

0.651

0.703World

South Sudan

Sudan

Somalia

Djibouti

Ethiopia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Kenya

Figure 12: Women, Peace and Security Index27

2019




Al-Shabaab is likely to disrupt humanitarian aidand could use the current crisis to underminethe legitimacy of the Somali federalgovernment. The group has a history of killing orabducting aid workers for ransom andambushing convoys to steal humanitarian aid. Al-Shabaab could seek to use COVID-19, as it hasdone in previous disasters, to strengthen itsstanding among the population by providinghealth services, food aid and other support.

Al-Shabaab’s recent uptick in activity couldhave adverse socio-economic effects on theHorn of Africa. Al-Shabaab poses a threat toKenyan security—some strategic projects havebeen suspended due to the threat of Al-Shabaab, such as the Lamu Port that will connectKenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. There arereports that the group is targeting recentlydiscovered oil fields in the region.

There has been rebel activity by other groupsacross the region, especially along the borders.The borderlands in the region have lessgovernment oversight and worse socioeconomicconditions and tend to be hotspots for extremistand rebel activity.

REFUGEES AND IDPS AND THEHUMANITARIAN SITUATION

The East and Horn of Africa region is currentlyhome to 6.3 million IDPs and 3.5 millionrefugees & asylum-seekers.31 Although this has

Source: 31IOM; 32UN Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; 33New Humanitarian; 34UN press release

26

reduced since 2019, mainly due to 1.3 millionEthiopians displaced by communal violencereturning home, the crisis remains dire.

COVID-19 is projected to increase the need forhumanitarian assistance in many countries. Forexample, the UN Under-Secretary-General forPolitical and Peacebuilding Affairs, RosemaryDiCarlo, has warned that “the number of peoplewho need humanitarian assistance across Sudanincreased from about 8 million to 9.3 million bythe end of 2019, and with the risk of a widerCOVID-19 spread, the economic challengescould worsen.”32

COVID-19 poses risks to people in refugee/IDPcamps, where containment measures can bedifficult to implement due to densepopulations. UNHCR reported nine confirmedCOVID-19 cases in the refugee camps in Kenya,with eight in Dadaab and one in Kakuma, as ofend of May 2020.33

Movement restriction measures threaten thelivelihoods and safety of refugees and IDPs.Refugees and IDPs in many Horn of Africacountries earn their income by working laborersand are now limited due to COVID-19. Increasingtensions and inter-communal violence coupledwith COVID-19 movement restrictions limit theability of IDPs and refugees to flee violence andaccess humanitarian aid and essential services.As humanitarian needs increase and movementrestrictions continue, aid workers are not able totravel to provide support to communities in need.In Sudan, the border closures have reduced themovement of UNAMID personnel.34 Migrants whohave lost their jobs in the Gulf and othercountries could be stranded by movementrestrictions and would require assistance.


CROSS-BORDER TENSIONS & CONFLICT

The region has experienced relative cross-border peace, with no major cross-borderconflicts in 2020. Peace deals in recent yearshave contributed to this stability, especially theEthiopia-Eritrea peace agreement, with countriesaiming to improve regional stability and benefitfrom economic gains.

COVID-19 has led to some tensions, which havenot escalated. Kenya was one of three countriesto shut its borders with Tanzania following 200

27

people testing positive while crossing theborder. Border crossings have been a source ofnew COVID-19 cases and deserves additionalattention as this could lead to further tensionsbetween countries.

There have been isolated incidents of tensions,unrelated to COVID-19, that have not led toconflict. Two Somali factions fought on Kenyanterritory, which raised tensions which did notescalate. There were clashes between theEthiopian and Sudanese armies along theborder, which deescalated following diplomaticdiscussions. The Grand Ethiopian RenaissanceDam which could restrict water flowing along theNile could exacerbate tensions between Ethiopiaand Sudan.


Impact of COVID-19 on bilateral country relationships

COVID-19 has had limited impact to date onbilateral country relationships between mostcountries in the Horn of Africa. Most countriesare expected to see a continuation of pre-existing trends in their relationships, with only afew exceptions to note, which are unrelated toCOVID-19.

Since January 2020, incidents have taken placeat the Kenya-Somalia and Ethiopia-Sudanborders. Two Somali factions fought with Kenyanterritory, which the Kenyan governmentcondemned but this did not lead to instability.36

On 28 May, clashes between Ethiopian andSudanese militaries occurred along the sharedborder—this incident might have an impact onthe relationship between the two countries in the

Source: 35Reuters

28

months ahead.35

Eritrea-Ethiopia and Eritrea-Sudan relationsappear stable. In both cases, relationships haveimproved in recent years, following the electionof Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia and theremoval of President Omar Al-Bashir in Sudan.COVID-19 may provide opportunities for thesecountries to further collaborate around thepandemic response and strengthen their ties.

As the COVID-19 outbreak continues, regionalinitiatives strive to bring countries together tobetter fight the pandemic. There is no indicationthat COVID-19 will adversely impact relationshipsbetween neighboring countries in a significantway in the short to medium term.

29


Ethiopia-Eritrea: Relations remain stable, as highlighted by arecent visit by President Issias Afwerki to Ethiopia.

Ethiopia-Sudan: On 28 May, clashes between the Ethiopian andSudanese armies erupted along the border. The Ethiopian Ministryof Foreign Affairs urged diplomatic discussions to address theincident and de-escalate hostilities between the two countries. Thedispute could complicate Sudan’s stand on the ongoingdiscussions about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Ethiopia-South Sudan: Relations have been relatively stable,although rebels are reported to continue to operate along theborder.

Sudan-Eritrea: Relations remain stable since Jan 2020 and nomajor changes are expected in the incoming months.

Sudan-South Sudan: Relations remain stable since Jan 2020 andno major changes are expected in the incoming months. It remainsunlikely that progress will be made in stabilizing the Abyei areas inthe short to medium term.

Somalia-Ethiopia: Relations have improved under Prime MinisterAbiy’s leadership, and Abiy is now mediating between the leadersof Somaliland and Somalia.

Somalia-Kenya: On 4 March 2020, two Somali military factionsbattled on Kenyan territory. Such clashes are likely to worsenmaritime disputes between Kenya and Somalia. However, theincident is unlikely to further deteriorate the relations between thetwo countries in the incoming months.

Tanzania-Kenya: Over 200 truck drivers and others crossing theborder from Tanzania to Kenya tested positive for COVID-19,leading to many being deported. The Kenyan government closedthe border with Tanzania to stem the inflow of cases. While this ledto tensions, there are no indications that the situation will worsen.


Negative



Impact of COVID-19 on the borderlands between countries

Borderlands in the region suffer from acombination of inherent risks and challenges,including weaker government institutions,underfunded health and education systems,greater insecurity and instability (e.g. violentextremism such as Al-Shabaab in the ManderaTriangle between Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia),and a higher prevalence of informal economicactivity. This set of constraints has created ahistory of marginalization, environmentalpressures, forced displacement, poverty andunderdevelopment.36

During the present crisis, border regions havetended to be significant sources of new COVID-19 cases due to the extent of cross-border tradeand movement of populations, notably truckdrivers. Dr. Workneh Gebeyehu, ExecutiveSecretary of IGAD, stated that “the COVID-19pandemic has further compounded the

Source: 36UNDP; 37, 39IGAD; 38ACLED, 40, 41UNISFA

30

vulnerability of neglected communities in theface of emergencies along the borderlands ofmost countries in the Horn of Africa.”37

The sensitive peace and security situation inborder areas such as Karamoja between Kenya,Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, or theAbyei region between Sudan and South Sudan,may worsen38 as a result of regional institutions’greater focus on COVID-19 priorities, and thedecreased interest by parties involved inengaging in peace negotiations.39, 40 Accordingto Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-Generalfor Peacekeeping Operations, the securitysituation in Abyei remains volatile. Tensionsbetween the pastoral Ngok Dinka and nomadicMisseriya communities continue to rise, andarmed groups have emerged, including somethat exchanged gunfire with UNISFA troops on24 April.41

Figure 13: Conflicts, protests and violent events42

Since January 2020

This set of risks and constraints should makeborderlands a priority area to mitigate theCOVID-19 outbreak in the region. For example,working with local communities can help bettercontact-trace people who interacted with truckdrivers who might have contracted the virus.

The current crisis presents opportunities to re-engage with borderland communities in ameaningful way, build economic growth andultimately have a positive impact on the

Source: 42ACLED; 43UNDP; 44World Bank

31

region’s peace and security.43, 44 For instance,the peace communities in South Sudan couldplay a role both in raising awareness of COVID-19 and in delivering peace messages betweenrival tribes. In addition, greater efforts to legalizeinformal cross-border trade can help mitigate theeconomic challenges brought about by thepandemic by securing livelihoods for localcommunities, which helps to steer them awayfrom crime and extremist groups.

Initiatives taken by African regional institutions

The focus of the initiatives taken by regionalinstitutions since the first cases of COVID-19 inthe Horn of Africa has shifted from pandemicpreparedness to health response and morerecently to economic recovery.45 The AU movedearly to proactively prepare countries for theinitial phases of the outbreak. “I would like toassure you of the firm resolve of the AfricanUnion Commission to establish the necessarysynergy to maximize the impact of our actions toprotect our continent from the ongoingcoronavirus disease outbreak,” said H.E.Mahamat during the opening ceremony of theemergency meeting of the African UnionMinisters of Health on COVID-19. Subsequently,all regional bodies defined joint strategies anddeployed numerous measures to contain thespread of the virus. The Africa Centres forDisease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) hasplayed a central role in leading the coordinationof health interventions at the pan-African level,notably with regards to capacity building and thedistribution of health supplies.

Regional institutions’ initiatives have beenincreasingly focused on protecting andimproving livelihoods. As the effects of

Source: 45AU, IGAD, EAC, and COMESA official websites

32

COVID-19 on the economy and livelihoodsincrease, more support will be needed.

The AU appointed four envoys—Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Donald Kaberuka, Tidjane Thiam andTrevor Manuel—to mobilize internationaleconomic support for the fight against COVID-19, notably by negotiating a moratorium on debtpayments for all member states. These regionalefforts need to be sustained to assist countrieseffectively recover from the socio-economic andhealth consequences of COVID-19.

IGAD, EAC and COMESA took health andeconomic measures that accounted for thespecificities of the region and its sensitiveeconomic and humanitarian context. Mostinitiatives were deployed in a way that prioritizedat-risk and vulnerable groups. Emergency foodaid and access to emergency healthcare forother conditions than COVID-19 has beenprovided to IDPs, refugees and migrants.Measures were taken to sustain a decent level ofcross-border trade and economic activity withfragile and commodity export-dependentcountries such as Sudan and Somalia in order toavoid a food security crisis and potential unrest.

Figure 14: AU, IGAD, EAC and COMESA initiatives during COVID-1946

Source: 46AU, IGAD, EAC, and COMESA official websites

33

Regional organization

Strengthening the healthcare system

Containing the spread Protecting livelihoods

• Distribution of a donation of PPE, test kits and medical equipment from the Jack Ma Foundation to member states (except Eritrea)

• Africa CDC’s partnership with SACIDS on COVID-19 preparedness and response

• Africa Joint Continental Strategy for COVID-19 outbreak

• Africa CDC’s partnership with UNDP to strengthen Africa’s Response to COVID-19

• AU and Africa CDC’s partnership to accelerate COVID-19 testing: Trace, Test and Track

• COVID-19 Response Fund

• Special envoys to mobilize international economic support for continental fight against COVID-19

• Taskforce on COVID-19 impact on food security and nutrition

• Joint Strategy for COVID-19 Response and Recovery for the energy sector

IGAD

• Donation of PPE kits to refugees and cross-border populations in Djibouti

• Regional Response Strategy

• Emergency Fund against COVID-19

EAC

• Deployment of mobile laboratories and testing kits to all partner states

• Capacity building for diagnosis of COVID-19

• Strengthening capacity of staff at international airports for the prevention & detection of COVID-19

• Joint COVID-19 Response Plan

• Preparation of post-COVID-19 economic recovery plans

• Common guidelines for safe trade during COVID-19

COVID-19 has affected ongoing regionalinitiatives such as the African Continental FreeTrade Area (AfCFTA), the launch of which waspostponed from 1 July 2020 to 1 Jan 2021, andthe IGAD Regional Capacity EnhancementInitiative in South Sudan. Regional institutions areworking on continuing these initiatives, as theycan contribute to countries’ ability to recoverfaster from the crisis and for fragile states tomove towards greater peace and stability.

The current crisis could present an opportunityto advance some initiatives. Progress could bemade towards realizing the AfCFTA and

34

maximizing its impact as the current periodprovides an opportunity to increase localproduction and manufacturing, and to deploydigital solutions. Coordinated responses to thepandemic could strengthen regional andsub-regional solidarity, effecting newcoordination mechanisms.

The need to focus on addressing thedownstream effects of the pandemic is steadilygrowing, especially as it comes to politicaltransitions, election preparations, populations’livelihoods, as well as IDPs and refugees’welfare.

In supporting governments in the Horn of Africa to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and recoverfrom its effects, international organizations should continue their support to governance and peace andsecurity programs in the region. The response should ensure that communities and stakeholders areengaged and feel a sense of ownership of the solutions developed. The interventions to prevent violenceshould address the root causes such as food insecurity, competition over scarce resources and absence ofthe state in the periphery. Regional efforts should be strengthened to prevent violent extremism.

Recommended areas for regional action

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Supporting sensitive political transitions in countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan andSouth Sudan, with a particular focus on electoral processes. COVID-19 has delayed politicalreforms and elections and will continue to do so. UNDP, AU, IGAD and other regional playersshould support negotiations between rival parties, and provide technical assistance to supportkey processes, in order to build and sustain trust between governments and opposition parties.

Strengthening the social contract between governments and populations. In responding toCOVID-19, governments can build trust with citizens by acting to provide healthcare and socialprotections through equitable, transparent and accountable mechanisms. Effectivecommunication is essential to strengthening the social contract. Regional and globalorganizations can support efforts by deploying assistance, where possible, through governments.

Prioritizing regional solidarity when implementing health response strategies. The AU and theRECs should (1) keep focusing on coordinating and mutualizing member country efforts; (2)further strengthen surveillance, testing and tracking capabilities, notably by leveraging dataanalytics; and (3) develop capacity, including through training and provision of health suppliesand protective gear.

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Improving the macroeconomic environment to counterbalance the effects of the globalrecession. The AU and RECs should pursue initiatives that help to create greater fiscal space formember countries, through debt relief and through special funds such as the AU COVID-19Response Fund.

Building the capacity of Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting a regional response tothe threat of Al-Shabaab. The international community should provide technical and financialsupport to restructure the security sector in Somalia, integrating regional and clan militias into theSNA. UNDP should continue efforts to prevent violent extremism through an approach groundedin sustainable development.

Monitoring the food security situation within the most vulnerable groups of all Horn of Africacountries and looking for early signs of deterioration. The goal would be for globalhumanitarian agencies and regional institutions to move quickly, if required, to supply suchgroups with the relief they need.

Supporting Horn of Africa countries with protecting the livelihoods of the most vulnerablesocio-economic classes, notably by facilitating safe cross-border trade of goods and services inorder to enable vital goods to get to neighboring countries and to protect the businesses andjobs that depend on exports.

Slide Number 1Slide Number 2Slide Number 3Slide Number 4Acknowledgements ContentsSummarySlide Number 8Slide Number 9Slide Number 10Government responses to COVID-19Slide Number 12Slide Number 13State of economy, livelihoods, food security and public healthSlide Number 15Slide Number 16Slide Number 17Impact of COVID-19 on governanceSlide Number 19Slide Number 20Slide Number 21Impact of COVID-19 on peace and securitySlide Number 23Slide Number 24Slide Number 25Slide Number 26Slide Number 27Impact of COVID-19 on bilateral country relationshipsSlide Number 29Impact of COVID-19 on the borderlands between countriesSlide Number 31Initiatives taken by African regional institutionsSlide Number 33Slide Number 34Recommended areas for regional actionSlide Number 36Slide Number 37

Documents

The Impact of the COVID-19 Outbreak on Governance, Peace ......Kamil Kamaluddeen (South Sudan), Selva Ramachandran (Sudan) and Christine Musisi (Tanzania). The findings also benefited