The Impact of Political Dynasties on City Health and

The Impact of Political Dynasties on City Health

and Education Inputs, Outputs and Outcomes:

A Comparative Case Study

Baladad, Paolo Antonio A.

2009-00737

BA Political Science

College of Arts and Sciences

University of the Philippines Manila

Manila, 2014

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to thank my mother and father for their unending support, belief

in my abilities, and for being the primary source of funding for this paper.

I would also like to thank my thesis adviser, Mam Fatima Castillo, who was my

first and last political science professor during my stay in UPM, for bearing with my late

night consultations on the phone and editing the errors in my migraine-causing paper.

Special thanks to Sir Carl Ramota, who was my adviser in PS 199.1, for guiding

my research at its earliest stages, and to Mam Mimi Palatino, whose help in statistical

analysis proved invaluable.

I also thank my current girlfriend, Phoenicia Dela Merced, for helping ease the

strain and giving comfort in times of despair.

Lastly, I would like to thank my bestfriend and research assistant, Julian Andrew

Da Costa, for his assistance during the endless nights of encoding and calculating data

from hundreds of pages.

“The Emperor protects.”

APPROVAL SHEET

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in

Political Science, this research report entitled: “The Impact of Political Dynasties on City

Health and Education Inputs, Outputs and Outcomes: A Comparative Case Study”,

prepared and submitted by Paolo Antonio A. Baladad, is hereby recommended for

approval.

__________________________

Professor Fatima Castillo

Adviser

Department of Social Sciences

This research report is accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science.

__________________________

Professor Sharon Caringal

Chairperson

Department of Social Sciences

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 Research Questions 3 Review of Related Literature Perceptions of Political Dynasties 5 Philippine Political dynasties and the Party System 6 Differences between Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Politicians 7 Philippine Political Dynasties: A Second Look 9 Summary of the Literature 12 Analytic Framework Theories and Related Concepts 13 Defining inputs, outputs, and outcomes 15 Defining political dynasties 17 Methodology Sampling Technique: Level of government 20 Sampling Technique: Choosing city and scope 21 Measuring Service Delivery 23 Data collection 29 Ethical Considerations 29 Scope and Limitation of the Study 30 Results and Discussion Education Inputs 32 Outputs 36 Outcomes 43 Health Inputs 48 Outputs 51 Outcomes 61 Technical Efficiency and Cost-effectiveness 71 Discussion of Results 80

Conclusions and Recommendations 84

References 85

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Character creates consistency, and if your people know what they can expect from you, they will

continue to look to you for leadership.” - John Maxwell

“Leadership is a potent combination of strategy and character. But if you must be without one, be

without the strategy.” - Norman Schwarzkopf

In politics, the background and character of a politician is balanced with his

concrete strategies and principles. These characteristics are a matter of much public

interest especially during elections. A particular issue that has occurred throughout the

history of democratic elections is that successive leaders are related to one another

either by marriage or by blood, which raises the persistent debate whether politicians

who are related to one another share the same characteristics in strategy and character

and if this phenomenon should even be legal and allowed. This phenomenon has been

described by many as the formation of “political dynasties”, a term which gives the

regressive impression of backwardness and obsoleteness similar to the defunct

monarchic system of governance.

In various countries across the world, dynastic politicians exert a great influence

in political and economic decision-making in their respective governments. More than

one-third of the population in the world is in societies where political dynasties play a

pivotal role in political decision making, from polities governed by monarchies to

authoritarian forms of government, and from consolidated democracies to volatile states,

dynastic leaders have exerted their influence in almost all types of polities (Rahman,

2013).

In Asia, economic policies and reforms introduced by members of the Lee

dynasty of Singapore contributed to the economic rise of the nation (Ghesquire, 2006).

Others highlight the Bhutto dynasty of Pakistan as an example of both the positive and

negative effects of dynasties in power, as it has produced three executive heads of

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state and a period of stability in the country despite numerous allegations of corruption

and abuse of power (Rahman, 2013).

In the Philippines, the influence of political dynasties are arguably just as

prevalent, if not more so. Currently, 178 political families hold various elected

government positions. Nearly 64% of the 250-member chamber House of

Representatives and 80% of the 24-member Senate are members of political dynasties

(Tuazon, 2012). In the 15th Congress, 70% of the members of the House belong to

political dynasties if the links to the local government units are included in the count,

while 85 percent of the 23 senators also come from them (Beja et al, 2012). Of the

estimated 178 political families in the Philippines, Teehankee (2007) said that 56

percent come from what he calls “the old elite,” with the remaining 44 percent as newer

political families, and that each province in the Philippines has a total of 2.31 political

families.

Under the policy of deconcentration and devolution of power from the national

government to local governments, local governments have a greater capacity to

influence and affect changes in their constituencies. In this case, the effect of

entrenched political dynasties will also be magnified given that the position/s they hold

are vested with greater power and authority (Solon, Fabella, and Capuno, 2001).

In reviewing the literature, there are few comprehensive empirical studies

conducted in the Philippines that conclusively find causation between the prevalence of

political dynasties in the Philippines and adverse performance of local government units

under their control, particularly in the city government level. The relationship between

political dynasties and good governance in general remain vague and ambiguous,

clouded by contending definitions and theories, and varying scope. Despite this, there

are already repeated proposals in the national legislature calling for the prohibition

political dynasties from running for public. I assert that the grounds for depriving a set of

people of the right to run for public office should be well-founded, holistically tested, and

have little room for ambiguity.

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Using the systems theory framework, the study tests the theories in the literature

regarding the effect of political dynasties on governance. The study attempts to do a

historical review of the education and health outcomes of a city under a dynastic mayor

and compare these outcomes with those of another city and the time period prior to the

establishment of a dynastic mayor.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

GENERAL RESEARCH QUESTION: Does a succession of chief city executives

coming from a political dynasty affect city health and education in terms of inputs and

outcomes? If so, in what ways does this affect these services?

SPECIFIC RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

1. How significant is the role of the local chief executive (the city mayor) in the

prioritization of city health and education?

2. What are the city‟s priorities for basic social services? What explains these

priorities?

3. In terms of systems theory, what are the inputs and outputs of the city for

health and education services? What are the outcomes?

a. Education

a.i. City input

a.i.1. Funding for city educational institutions

a.i.2. Prioritization of city education funding

a.ii. Education outputs

a.ii.1. Total number of public school teachers employed

by thecity government

a.ii.2. Ratio of teacher to students

a.ii.3. Percentage of school-age population enrolled

a.iii. Education outcomes

a.iii.1. Educational attainment of the population

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b. Health

b.i. City inputs

b.i.1. Funding for hospitals and the city health office

b.i.2. Prioritization of city health funding

b.ii. Health outputs

b.ii.1. Total number of doctor and nurses employed in

city health facilities

b.ii.2. Number of doctors and nurses per 1000

population

b.ii.3. Percentage of Livebirths Medically Attended

b.iii. Health outcomes

b.iii.1. Lifespan of city residents

b.iii.2. Average Years of Potential Life Lost per person

b.iii.3. Infant and Fetal deaths per 1000 livebirths

4. Is there a significant difference between a city with a dynastic mayor and a

city with a non-dynastic mayor in terms of:

a. City Inputs for Health and Education

b. City Outputs for Health and Education

c. City Outcomes for Health and Education

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REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Perceptions of Political Dynasties

There is data in the literature that suggests a strong belief regarding the

correlation between political dynasties and corruption, poor governance, and low

economic growth. There is widespread perception of political dynasties as inimical to

the development and welfare at both the local and national levels due to alleged

excessive rent-seeking tendencies, pursuance of self-serving interests through public

policies, and the concentration of political power of these political clans, thereby

thwarting political competition (Mauricio and Villanueva, 2012).

Many of the proposed anti-dynasty laws highlight this negative sentiment. Lim

(2004) presents a general overview of the dangers of political dynasties, notably the

ease by which political dynasties could wrest power in their localities, the difficulty for

their adversaries to obtain a fair chance in getting elected to a position that is controlled

by the dynasty, and the risk that these dynasties could easily angle for and perpetrate

illegal activities to the great detriment of their constituents.

Commissioner Sarmiento stats (1986, as cited in Lacson, 2007, page 1) during

the debates in the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the rationale for including a

provision for the prohibition of political dynasties:

“By including this provision [The Constitution, Article 2, Section 26], we

widen the opportunities of competent, young, and promising poor

candidates to occupy important positions in the government. While it is

true we have government officials who have ascended to power despite

accident of birth, they are exemptions to the general rule. The economic

standing of these officials would show that they come from powerful clans

with vast economic fortunes. ”

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As far as Commissioner Sarmiento and Senator Lacson are concerned, “political

dynasties limit the opportunities of competent, young, and promising non-dynastic

candidates” (p. 1). This same implication is affirmed by the Philippine 1987 constitution

with the inclusion of Article II Section 26 which states that: "The State shall guarantee

equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may

be defined by law”.

Querubin (2011), in his study on the effects of elite persistence in the Philippines,

states that the concentration of political power in a small set of families increased the

risk of political capture and the subsequent adoption of policies and institutions that

benefit only a narrow set of interests. He suggests that the advantages and strategies

employed by incumbent dynastic politicians discourage high-quality non-dynastic

challengers from risking their political career and resources by running against them.

Furthermore, he claims that this process undermines the country‟s democratic

framework.

Another author blames the interaction between dominant family centered-elites

and weak state institutions as having contributed greatly to the decline of the Philippine

economy in the 1970s and 1980s (McCoy, 1994). Furthermore, others suggest that the

resulting inequality in the distribution of political power caused by political dynasties can

sow harmful seeds for long-term development paths of economies. (Acemoglu, Bautista,

Querubin, and Robinson, 2008 and Ferraz and Finan, 2010).

Philippine Political Dynasties and its relationship with the Party System

Some sources identify political dynasties as one of the leading causes of the

weak party system in the Philippines because political dynasties place a greater value

on marketing the “family brand” and personality cults instead of party-based ideological

principles (Lim, 2004; Barretto, 2013; and McCoy, 1994). They cite specific actions of

political dynasties, such as conspiring in putting relatives in positions in government,

violating binding commitments even within their own party (thus weakening their own

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political parties in favor of the family), rent-seeking behavior and preferential rent-

transfer to fellow family members in government, as having severely undermined the

niche of the political party and have become so rampant so as to cut across nearly all

levels of government from the presidency to local government chiefs.

However, there are some who contend that the formation of political dynasties is

not the cause of weak political parties but is rather, a response to the pre-existing

condition of weak political machineries of political parties (Capuno, Quimbo, Kraft, Tan

& Fabella, 2012). They argue that politicians who are members of weak political parties

but are members of political clans use the political machinery and reputation of the latter

to attain an advantage because they are already more established and reliable than the

infrastructure of political parties.

Empirical Differences between Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Politicians and

their Constituencies

Research by Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) drew a correlation between areas with

political dynasties in local government positions and the mean growth expenditure on of

local governments and the results of these expenditures in reducing poverty incidence.

Their findings show that while the presence of political dynasties increased the mean

growth in expenditure in their respective local governments, this did not result in the

reduction of poverty. Additionally, they found that areas with political dynasties were

negatively correlated with subsequent income growth.

In a study by Beja et al (2012), a correlation was drawn between districts that

had dynastic legislators and several socio-economic measures, particularly poverty

incidence, poverty gap, and poverty severity. Their findings show that measures for

poverty incidence, poverty gap, and poverty severity are consistently higher in districts

with dynastic legislators with jurisdictions under dynastic legislators tend to have poverty

incidence that is five percentage points higher than non-dynastic legislators, poverty

gap that is one percentage point and poverty severity that is half a percentage point

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higher than other areas. They also observe that the average income of districts with

dynastic representatives is lower than that those with non-dynastic representatives.

They reason that the prevalence of political dynasties prevented the majority of the

citizenry from effectively communicating their needs to the government and prevented

the government from effectively responding to social and economic problems, which will

ultimately compromise the capacity of the government to provide the most necessary

public goods and services.

One study considered how accountability measures, namely yardstick

competition and term limits, influence the fiscal behavior of local chief executives in

providing health insurance and other public services to their constituents. Using a time

series and cross-sectional dataset of Philippine municipalities and cities from 2001,

2004, and 2007, they found that Philippine political clans have had a negative effect on

extending health insurance coverage for the poor. The study explains that dynastic

incumbents have fewer incentives to provide health insurance to secure votes as their

pre-existing political machineries already suffice for the next election period. (Capuno et

al, 2012)

Asako, Iida, Matsubayashi, and Ueda (2012) developed a model that shows how

dynastic candidates with inherited electoral and bargaining advantages slowly crowd out

non-dynastic candidates and how their dynastic status affects policy decisions on the

distribution of benefits from the national government on the assumption that dynastic

politicians enjoy higher bargaining power and a lower cost in running for office. Their

analysis states that dynastic politicians are able to boost the funding received from

national budget allocations to their respective districts but do not boost the economic

performance in the area and in some cases, their districts show worse economic

performance than those represented by non-dynastic legislators.

The findings of the studies by Asako et al (2012) and Beja et al (2012) both

strengthen the notion that the personal characteristics of politicians play a major role in

determining the policy-making processes they adopt and the subsequent effect of these

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policy choices and that these factors are constrained by the political and cultural

background of the society they work in.

A quantitative study by Mauricio and Villanueva (2012) found that dynastic

municipalities (municipalities with at least two consecutive generations in the local chief

executive) in Rizal have higher proclivity to depend on fiscal transfers from the central

government and tend to be lax in local tax collection effort compared with non-dynastic

municipalities. Also, clan-dominated municipalities are more likely to spend higher on

public health on public health and social services compared with municipalities where

political clans are not in power. Their findings suggest that dynastic municipalities are

less fiscally self-sufficient than non-dynastic ones but are able to deliver channel more

resources to public health and social services.

Philippine Political Dynasties: A Second Look

Despite the significant amount of literature that suggests a negative relationship

between development and political dynasties, there exist some studies that suggest a

positive or a null relationship. A study by Solon, Fabella, and Capuno (as cited in

Mauricio and Villanueva, 2012) contend that the decisive factor at the back of poor

services provision and low-level welfare in many local areas may actually be the lack of

competition among political families – not their presence per se.

A later study by Beja et al (2013) contradicted the results of his previous study,

having found that political dynasties neither reduce nor increase poverty or lead to

better governance performance relative to non-dynasties. Building on previous studies

linking term limits and performance, they postulated that dynastic rule provides for

longer time horizons on which to plan and implement reforms with long-term

development objectives, in contrast with non-dynastic rule where one likely possible

outcome would be a politician with short tenure and who is seeking re-election may opt

for projects and policies with immediate results, providing less emphasis on promising

projects and policies whose returns become visible only under a longer horizon and

may therefore become realized under subsequent regimes. Beja et al (2012) contends

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that dynastic politicians may perceive successive terms in the same position by

members of the same dynasty as part of their long-term strategic planning, a

consideration he considers to be unique to them. Solon et al (2001) finds evidence that

support this, having found that Philippine dynastic politicians tend to adopt a long-term

strategy of sustaining a larger public spending on education and health, among other

development spending items, that may be beneficial to each local jurisdiction and could

translate to votes.

Furthermore, Beja et al (2013) argue that an increased poverty incidence does

not induce political dynasties to emerge but it contributes to the expansion of the largest

and strongest political dynasties. They argue that dynasties, especially those with the

most extensive networks of patronage and the most accumulated political and financial

capital, are in the best position to take advantage of vulnerable economically

disadvantaged voters. In their assessment, political dynasties have mastered both the

art of appealing to voters and the art of assuming a façade of identification with the poor

while also passing on these skills to the next generation of their relatives running for

public office. They explain:

“Non-dynasties, on average, may be failing to offer better governance that lead to

significant reduction in poverty. Indeed, this interpretation coheres with the

observation that political parties in the country are not really offering nor

supporting polices that benefit the poor but instead are introducing policies that

entrench political dynasties. Even some non-traditional and non-dynastic

politicians that are elected into office appear to be pulled to engage in the

traditional politics and form new dynastic clans of their own.” (p.7)

Beja et al (2013) also analyzed the effect of legislative dynasties on education

and found a strong positive impact in both local government spending and education

quality (based on the Education Index 2008 from National Statistics and Coordination

Board). Their explanation for this pattern is that the education sector offers numerous

opportunities to cultivate patronage relationships through scholarship grants and

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infrastructure expenditure support. As noted by Solon et al (as cited in Beja et al, 2013),

the dominant political dynasty channels resources into education projects and programs

as a means for securing and maintaining political support and votes.

An explanation for this pattern involves the influence of political dynasties in the

local public education system, which offers numerous opportunities to cultivate

patronage relationships through scholarship grants and infrastructure expenditure

support. Indeed, as noted by Solon et al (2009), the social spending in the Philippines

has become a means for securing political support and votes. The dominant political

dynasty can thus channel resources into education projects and programs that identify

their members as politicians with only the interest of the locals foremost in their minds.

A number of researchers also claim that dynastic politicians are not identical to

each other in terms of behavior and practices. Mojares (1994) and Roces (1994) point

out that the Osmeña family of Cebu as case of political dynasties performing well while

in office and they supposedly did not have resorted into bribing their supporters for

political favor, an activity which Mojares (1994) alleges to be widely associated with

political dynasties in the Philippines. He claims that the success of their political family‟s

careers was due to the accumulated political capital, family reputation and brand of

leadership in technocratic policies.

Another study by Solon et al (2001) finds that Philippine local government

politicians, including political dynasties, are re-elected through stronger public spending

in education and health. Political dynasties that are successful in retaining and

perpetuating their power tend to channel a significant amount of resources towards

human capital investments, particularly in programs begun by their preceding relative.

Solon et al (2001) argues that underdevelopment is not necessarily due to political

dynasties, but it is the absence of effective competition among political rivals and clans,

Hence, he recommends that political reforms must focus on heightening competition,

rather than forcibly disqualifying clan members who are otherwise able and competent

local leaders from the race. Additionally, Beja et al (2012) also argued that consecutive

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terms by different people but within the same political dynasty can be considered as a

term continuation and when considered relative to Solon et al‟s (2001) studies, could

translate to a trend toward stronger public spending in education and health.

Using the concepts put forward by Olson (2003), who put postulated the idea of

“Roving Bandits” and “Stationary Bandits” (p. 2), political dynasties can be likened to

stationary bandits who have the incentive to develop their jurisdictions, as they foresee

the future benefits it will reap for them and their relatives. Olson‟s (2003) concepts on

incentives for long-term planning and development when applied to Philippine political

dynasties, contradict Capuno et al‟s (2001) position that long-term stability of position

creates complacency and a disincentive for development.

Summary

In summary, the literature suggests that there are two arguments on how political

dynasties affect governance. The first view is the predatory perspective, that dominance

of political dynasties in the country is a concentration of power that is equivalent to a

non-competitive political system. The complacency and lack of incentives for

performance has an adverse effect on the societies dynasties govern, hindering

economic growth and social development (Teehankee, 2007; Asako et al, 2012;

Capuno et al, 2001; McCoy, 1994; Barretto, 2013; Querubin, 2011; Balisacan and

Fuwa ,2004).

The second view however, contends that dynasties have little or no impact on

economic and social development and in some cases, dynasties have the potential to

do better than non-dynasties because they enjoy a form of political stability and security

which allows for extended time horizons in planning and execution of socio-economic

reforms and enable adequate planning and implementation of socio-economic policies

with long-term goals. (Beja et al, 2013; Olson, 2003; Solon et al, 2001)

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ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

Theories and Related Concepts

The literature on political dynasties is enough to establish that they have a mixed

reputation as far as Philippine experience is concerned. However, the rest of the world

has greatly varying experiences with political dynasties in different levels in government.

The literature notes the actions, behavior, and possible motivations of political dynasties

as a whole but does not take into account the actions, behaviors, and motivations for

individual members. Do all individual members of a political dynasty behave and believe

the same principles compared with other members of the same political dynasty? How

about compared with members of other political dynasties? Or when compared with

other officials in similar elected posts but who are not members of a political dynasty?

The general framework that will be used in the study is Systems Theory, as it

was presented by David Easton for use in analyzing the inputs, outputs, and outcomes

of governments. In Systems Theory, “output” is composed of specific inducements,

such as discussions and policies, for citizens to support the ruling system. Systems

theory posits that it is the government‟s responsibility to match or balance outputs of

decisions against input of demand and that to obtain and maintain the support of the

members of a system, governments need to meet at least some of these demands

(Easton, 1957).

Easton (1957) further states that: “No political system can continue to exist

unless its members are willing to support the existence of a group that seeks to settle

differences or promote decisions through peaceful action in common” (p. 10). He labels

these decisions and policies as “outputs”, being the concrete tasks undertaken by

government to address issues and demands.

I also incorporate von Bertalanffy‟s (1968) ideas on the systems theory

framework, particularly the idea that the health of the overall system is contingent on

sub-system functioning. City governments can be considered as sub-systems of the

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national governments and the individual stability and productivity of each of the former

affect the general stability and productivity of the latter. If we were to further apply the

concept of sub-systems, we would find that there is another set of sub-systems under

the city. These are composed of the facilities and offices that are geared toward a

specialized sector in local governance, which in this case, are hospitals for healthcare

and schools for education. These interdependent sub-systems receive inputs, such as

budget appropriations, from the city government in order to produce specialized outputs

and outcomes that makeup the overall outputs of the city system.

I also include two supporting theories that complement Easton‟s assumption that

government seeks to maintain political support through policies and projects that

produce positive outcomes that are desirable to the voting citizenry.

First is rational choice theory, which states that individual choices are tied to

preferences, underscoring choice as teleological or purposeful behavior, and claims that

individuals ought to behave purposefully in accordance with their values (Oppenheimer,

2008). This theory accounts for the way dynastic and non-dynastic local chief

executives behave with the assumption that both seek to maximize their returns in office,

minimize the costs for maintaining their power, and place the same value on attaining

votes.

Another supporting theory is Chiao‟s (1995) theory on strategic behavior, which

is very similar to Game Theory. Ciao states that elites, particularly in the town and city

level, behave as if from an “arena”, which he defines where individuals engage in the

activities of politics, in the fights and struggles over roles and relationships within

society‟s socially accepted values, rules, and roles. He makes a distinction with regard

to the “political arena” – where ambitious people gather to compete for power, fame,

status, and wealth. Chiao (1995) likens the political arena to that of a sports field, where

the participants are forced to act and react according to long-established rules and with

stratagems that they have designed with the knowledge obtained from the rich repertory

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of the arena, and they cannot stop these activities unless they withdraw (or withdrawn)

from the arena.

The concept of “arena” helps explain the many cases observed (Beja et al, 2013;

Teehankee, 2007; Mauricio and Villanueva, 2007) of non-dynastic politicians being

“captured system” and eventually adopting behavior and practices associated with

dynasties, as they are forced to adopt these measures because it is expected, possibly

even desired, of them by society or out of necessity to stay competitive within the

“arena”. An example of this would be political patronage in order to secure votes and

support. The implication is that dynasties and non-dynasties generally behave and

perform identically given that they both compete within the same social arena and

because such behavior is expected of or pressured unto them due to the elected

positions they occupy. I expect to find little or no significant difference in performance

between dynastic and non-dynastic cities.

Defining inputs, outputs, and outcomes

Rather than strictly using Easton‟s definitions, as his definitions of “inputs” are

out-dated and confusing, I have modified his macro-analytic model to conform to the

scope and context of my study by using the different outcomes and outputs frameworks

in use by governments today.

The outcomes and outputs framework used by the Australian Department of

Finance & Administration (2000) define inputs as the finances, human resources, and

capital equipment that government agencies apply to the activities and processes that

generate the products and services that constitute their outputs. These inputs include

the funds appropriated to them from the budget or received through purchaser/provider

arrangements, as well as revenue raised through other means, such as sales, levies

and industry contributions. In the outcomes approach framework used by the South

African government (2010), inputs were defined as the resources that contribute to the

production and delivery of outputs (What government uses to do the work); outputs as

the final products or goods and services produced for delivery (What government

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produces or delivers); and outcomes as the medium-term results for specific

beneficiaries (What government aims to achieve). I find that these definitions of inputs,

outputs, and outcomes are more suitable for suitable than Easton‟s. In the study, inputs

are the funds appropriated by the city government to health and education, outputs are

the quality and quantity of health and education services generated from the inputs, and

outcomes are the real empirical effects these services have on city health and

education.

The SCRGSP (2011) notes the necessity of using outcome indicators to provide

information on the impact of a service on the status of an individual or a group, the

effectiveness of inputs, and on the success of the service area in achieving its

objectives. They make a distinction between outputs and outcomes:

“Outputs are the services delivered whereas outcomes may be short term

(intermediate) or longer term (final). A short term police random breath testing

„blitz‟, for example, may achieve the intermediate outcome of fewer drunk drivers

and lead to a short term reduction in road deaths. A longer term outcome of a

permanent reduction in road deaths is likely to reflect external factors such as the

design quality of cars and capital investment in improved roads. Outcomes are

the impact of these services on the status of an individual or group.” (p.19)

In assessing the impact of government inputs on city health and education, I will

base the assessment on two of the three ratios used by the Steering Committee for the

Review of Government Service Provision (2011): 1.)Technical efficiency (the ratio of

inputs to outcomes); and 2.) Cost-effectiveness (the ratio of inputs to outcomes).

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(The Service Process of Outputs and Outcomes – SCRGSP, 2011)

In summary, I assume that all incumbent local chief executives desire to improve

social services outcomes as part of their political game plan to maintain the support of

the citizens, as assumed by Easton‟s Systems Theory and Ciao‟s theory on strategic

behavior. The study anticipates finding no significant difference in the health and

education outcomes between cities under dynastic leadership and those that are not.

Defining Political Dynasties

A key point that needs to be addressed is defining what qualifies as or

constitutes a political dynasty. A study on political dynasties in Japan by Asako, Iida,

Matsubayashi, and Ueka (2012) defined dynastic politicians as those whose family

members have also served for the same position in the past. Their definition however

does not make a distinct time dimension, only that both family members have occupied

the same post.

Studies by Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009b) Dal Bo and Rossi (2009a) defined

a political dynasty in the context of the national legislature, as it was the focus of their

research. They defined a dynastic legislator as a politician with a family member who

was elected to a previous congress. Querubin (2013) classified candidates who have

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had at least one previous relative serving in congress or governors prior to the election

as `dynastic'. Though these definitions are limited to referring to the national legislature,

a key distinction is made that political dynasties seek office in the same political area.

In the Philippine legislature, Senator Alfredo Lim‟s proposed Prohibit Political

Dynasty Act (S. No. 1317, 2004) defined a political dynasty as “the exercise and control

of political power and authority by two or more members of the same family in a political

unit that deprives deserving and qualified citizens of that political unit of the opportunity

to be elected to public office” and occurs when two or more persons related within the

third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, whether legitimate or otherwise, to an

incumbent local elective official of the same political unit, assumes elective office in the

same locality.

A subsequent proposal, Senator Panfilo Lacson‟s Prohibiting the Establishment

of Political Identities Act (S. No. 1468, 2007), defined the terms “political dynasty” and

“political dynasty relationship”, where the former refers to “the concentration,

consolidation, or perpetuation of political powers of persons related to one another” and

the latter refers to “a situation where a person who is the spouse or relative within the

second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of an incumbent elective official holds or

runs for an elective office simultaneously with the incumbent elective official within the

same municipality/city, legislative district and/or province or occupies the same office

immediately after the term of office of the incumbent elective official” or “a situation

where two or more persons who are spouses or related to one another within the

second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity run simultaneously for elective public

office within the same municipality/city, legislative district, and/or province, even if

neither is related to the incumbent elective official”.

Using the same definition as Senator Lacson, Senator Defensor-Santiago (S. No.

2649, 2011), Representative Colmenares et al, and Senator Estrada‟s more recent Anti-

Political Dynasty Act of 2013 (S. No. 1906, 2013) additionally state that:

19 | P a g e

“It shall also be deemed to exist where two (2) or more persons

who are spouses or are related within the second civil degree of

consanguinity or affinity run simultaneously for elective public office within

the same province, even if neither is so related to an incumbent elective

official.” (p.1)

It is important to consider the multiple definitions presented by these different

authors and highlight their good points. The definitions by Asako et al (2012) and Dal Bo

et al (2009b) have a distinct weakness in that they hold only two qualifications by which

political dynasties are defined – that they have had a previous relative in the same post

or government unit and the relative/s served previously. These definitions do not take

into account the time period in between terms of two related candidates, considering

that a long period of time between them would obscure the effect of dynasties.

In Associate Justice Antonio Carpio‟s (2011) dissenting opinion in the Navarro v

Ermita case, he defined dynastic politics as a phenomenon that concentrates political

power and public resources within the control of few families whose members

alternately hold elective offices, deftly skirting term limits.

For the purpose of this study, the comprehensive definition provided for by

Senators Defensor-Santiago and Lacson will be sufficient for this study in defining a

political dynasty, as it addresses the weaknesses mentioned in previous definitions and

is the most appropriate based on the researcher‟s opinion. This same definition will also

be used in formulating a definition for dynasty-ruled city.

For the purpose of this study:

“A dynasty governed city shall be defined as a city where the mayor and/or vice

mayor is immediately succeeded by his spouse or relative within the second degree of

affinity; accordingly, dynastic politicians are defined as those who possess the

aforementioned relationship with another.”

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CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

Sampling Technique

Deciding what level of government

Unlike other studies which focused on the influence of the dynasties in the

legislature, this study revolves around dynastic politicians at the city level and how they

affect the delivery of city health and education. Mauricio and Villanueva‟s (2012) study

is closely similar to the study as they drew a correlation between dynasties and health

services. However, their quantitative study did not take into account on whether or not

the increased funding translated into improved quality of the city healthcare.

The rationale for studying political dynasties at the city level is the government

policy of devolution of power, Tapales (2001) identifies the three main components in

The Philippine Local Government Code of 1991 pertinent to this: 1.) Devolution of

powers to governors and city/municipality mayors (local executive chiefs) in

implementing basic services; 2.) Increasing sources of funds for local jurisdiction via

increases in shares in nationally and locally collected taxes; and 3.) the mandate of

citizens' participation in different respects of local activities

Under the LGU code of 1991, local city governments have increased

responsibilities. Among these are provision of basic services and facilities, particularly

support for education, and ensuring the efficient, effective, and economical governance

for the overall general welfare for the city‟s inhabitants (Local Government Code, 1991).

Furthermore, the LGU Code (1991) states that city mayors exercise general supervision

and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the city government,

determine the guidelines of city policies, ensure the delivery of basic services and the

provision of adequate facilities, co-chair the city school board, and chair the city health

board, highlighting the extent of the city government‟s responsibility.

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Marasigan (2009) further comments that the changes on how Local Government

Units operate has allowed them to have garnered greater financial resources, such as

increased tax rates on business and property taxes, and higher share from the central

government's internal revenue collection. A lower tier government unit "is vested with

the power to create its own revenue sources and levy taxes, fees and charges, subject

to certain conditions," it also generates "income from external sources". He has

identified the primary source of an LGU's external revenues emanates from its share in

the national government's internal revenue tax collection, otherwise known as the IRA.

Manasan (2007) describes the IRA as a "formula-based block grant" which is one of the

three types of intergovernmental transfers that we have in the Philippine governmental

setting with the two others being "origin-based share in central government revenues"

and "ad hoc categorical grants" (p. 6).

Mauricio and Villanueva (2012) concur, stating that the installation of the Local

Government Code of 1991 has granted LGUs greater taxing and spending powers and

by extension, the Local Chief Executives of municipal and city mayors possess greater

discretion over tax-collection within their jurisdictions and expenditure priorities for their

constituencies. Hence, given that LCEs are the foremost drivers of local fiscal

performance, their profile - which includes the membership/non-membership in political

clans, among others - matters significantly to the course of local development.

Additionally, they justify:

“Considering, that we are under the ambit of decentralized form of government

which devolved so much political power to LCEs, it justifies that municipal/city-

level analysis deserves a niche in the expanding study of political dynasties. A

smaller geographical jurisdiction is much more conducive to the proliferation of

personalized style of politics.” (p.7)

Sampling Technique in Choosing the city and scope

The Two Cases: Pasig and Parañaque

The study made use of the Most similar systems design strategy (Anckar, 2008),

otherwise known as Mill‟s Method of Difference, which instructs that the two political

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systems to be compared must be as similar in as many variables as possible with the

exception of the phenomenon to be examined (mayors having a political dynasty

relationship) in the hopes of keeping otherwise confusing and irrelevant variables in the

research constant. In comparing cities, I have considered the variables of population

demographics, geography, date founded, date of incorporation into cityhood, legal class,

and income class as those that need to be as closely similar as possible at a given base

year. For the dynastic city case, I have chosen Pasig City for a number of reasons

namely: 1.) Ease of access to data; 2.) The political dynasty has been founded fairly

recently (1992); and 3.) The dynasty is still in power following the victory of the 4th

Eusebio to run for mayor in the 2013 local elections.

PASIG CITY PARANAQUE CITY

Population (NSO, 1980) 268,570 208,552

Geography (Villar, 2003)

Region National Capital Region National Capital Region

Date founded 1573 1572

Date of ratification of city

charter

1995 1998

Legal Class (NCSB, 2012) Highly Urbanized Highly Urbanized

Income Class (NCSB,

2012)

1st class 1st class

Political Dynasty

Relationship in the LCE

1992 - Present None

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Table 1Application of Most Similar Systems Design

Initially, I considered choosing Taguig City for the non-dynastic case but after

taking into consideration the numerous definitions used by preceding legal and scholarly

work, the validity of Taguig as a non-dynasty ruled government was put into question,

due to conflicting definitions on the status of the Cayetano family as a dynastic entity.

Although some definitions, such as those used by Asako et al (2012) and Sen. Santiago

(2011), would not classify the Cayetanos as a political dynasty, others such as Dal Bo et

al (2009a) and Querubin (2013) would classify the Cayetano family as a political

dynasty. Furthermore, Pasig and Taguig are adjacent cities, which could possibly result

in “spillovers”, especially in healthcare (example: hospitals close to the shared borders),

that could potentially skew findings, as the performance of one city could have an

impact on the other. After reviewing other cities in the NCR, I decided that Parañaque

city was more suitable for the following reasons: 1.) The city of Parañaque has not had

consecutive mayors that share a political dynasty relationship as far back as 1965; 2.) It

has a smaller population difference with Pasig than Taguig; 3.) It has similar population

age demographics as Pasig; 4.) It has similar geography with Pasig without being

adjacent to it; 4.) Paranaque and Pasig were founded within 1 year of each other, 1572

and 1573 respectively; and 5..) Paranaque and Pasig are both classified highly

urbanized cities with 1st class income classification and both were incorporated as a city

in the mid-1990s whereas Taguig was incorporated only in 2004.

Measuring service delivery

A number of strategies regarding the measurement of government services were

found in the literature. Probst (2009) in Wisconsin made use of a formal performance

measurement program in evaluating how well programs are operating, finding out how

to improve those programs, and ensuring funding is spent in a cost-effective manner,

and providing a method for understandable accountability to the citizens.

In defining performance measurement, Probst (2009) highlighted the importance

of benchmarking, particularly internal and external benchmarking. He defined internal

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benchmarking as the comparison between the present outcome data of the local

government and the outcome data of previous time periods to show progression and

improvement from one year to the next; while external benchmarking is a comparison

between the outcome data of similar local governments within the same time frame for

the purpose of seeing how well a particular local government is performing compared

with other similar governments. Additionally, he states that those other governments

don‟t necessarily have to be from the same state or region provided the demographic

and geographic discriminators are recognized.

In the study, both internal benchmarking and external benchmarking will

be applied. Internal benchmarking will help in observing changes in the annual

health and education outcomes of Pasig City, particularly if there were

substantial differences between the outcomes prior to and after the

establishment of a political dynasty in the local chief executive. On the other

hand, external benchmarking will involve comparing the health and education

outcomes of Pasig City with the outcomes of Paranaque and the collective

outcomes of the National Capital Region as a whole.

Using the internal benchmarking strategy, the study will cover the time period

from 1980 up to 2013 data. The rationale for this being that the Eusebio dynasty began

in 1992 with dynasty patriarch Vicente Eusebio‟s first term as mayor of Pasig. The data

range will include the years 1980 to 1991 as these represent the time period prior to the

establishment of a political dynasty in the city chief executive and give perspective on

the outcomes of Pasig City as a non-dynastic city.

For external benchmarking statistical data from 1992 to 2012 from both cities will

be used in comparison, as the time period will cover both the dynastic period of the

mayoral position of Pasig and the non-dynastic period of the mayoral post in Parañaque.

A case study on performance and productivity was done by Alicar-Cadorna (2009)

in Vigan City. Alicar-Cadorna focused on barangays as the most basic political unit and

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included the analysis of government inputs and outcomes of delivery in social services

using the following framework:

(Alicar-Cadorna, 2009)

Alicar-Cadorna‟s objectives had a great influence in the formulation of the study‟s

own objectives, even though her research is focused at the barangay level rather than

at the city. She defined performance in the local government as the responses to the

community‟s needs, particularly the provision of basic and essential public services. She

stated that high performance was the result of rational decision-making, optimal use of

resources such as funds, personnel, equipment, etc.; and the delivery of basic public

services in a timely and sustained manner.

She stated that LGU performance can be measured through discernible

improvement in the quality of life of individuals, the society as a whole, and more

importantly the poor. If we were to relate this to Probst‟s Four Point Methodology, the

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enumerated factors can be seen as the indicators of performance outcomes: namely on

the quality of services, quantity of service providers, and equitable access.

She heavily made use of data from the Department of Interior and Local

Government, specifically from the Local Governance Performance Management System

(LGPMS). She cited that the LGPMS is one of the most commonly used performance

indicator systems at the local level, as it assesses LGU performance by measuring

multi-sectoral impact and the presence, quantity, and variety of services, facilities,

projects, plans, programs, and policies.

Based on these guidelines in measuring education and health performance, the

study will make use of the following indicators in measuring inputs, outputs and

outcomes for education:

CITY INPUTS - CITY EDUCATION

INDICATORS SOURCE INTERPRETATION

City budget allocated

to education

City budget reports

Percentage of city

budget allocated to

city education

City budget reports A higher percentage indicates

prioritization of this sector; a

consistently high percentage every

year would indicate consistency in

prioritization

CITY OUTPUTS - CITY EDUCATION


Number of teaching

personnel employed

by city hall

HRMO Reports

Student/teacher ratio School

accomplishment

reports

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Percentage of school-

aged population

attending city schools

NSO Reports and

School

Accomplishment

Reports – (Total

number of students

enrolled in city

schools/Total number

of school-aged

population in the city)

Indicates how much of the school age

population is availing of city

education services; also shows how

much of the education duties are

being shouldered by the city relative

to DepEd; a higher percentage would

indicate that the city takes a higher

load

OUTCOMES - CITY EDUCATION


Highest educational

attainment

demographics

National Statistics

Office

LGPMS Scorecard LGPMS Website

(Indicators are based on Global City Indicators Facility – UNICEF, Alicar-Cadorna

(2009); Amin, Das, and Goldstein (2008) “New Tools for Measuring Service Delivery” )

The study will make use of the following indicators in measuring inputs, outputs,

and outcomes for health:

INPUTS - CITY HEALTH

INDICATORS SOURCE INTERPRATATION

City budget allocated

to health

City budget report

Percentage of local

government budget

allocated to city health

City budget report A higher percentage indicates

prioritization of this sector; a

consistently high percentage every

year would indicate consistency in

prioritization

OUTPUTS - CITY HEALTH

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Number of physicians

and nurses employed

by the city (Physician

to city population ratio)

Hospital data/City

Health Office

The higher the ratio, the better.

Percentage of

Livebirths Attended by

Health Professionals

Department of Health

OUTCOMES - CITY HEALTH


Average Life Span of

Population

Derived from NSO

Vital Statistics

Indicates quality of hospital services

Average Years of

Potential Life Lost

(YPLL)

The lower the value, the better

“The concept behind YPLL involves

using the number of years of life (life-

years) lost due to premature death,

defined by a standard cut-off age in a

population, to obtain a total sum of

the life-years lost before ages 65, 75,

or 85 (for example) for a population.”

Infant and Fetal

deaths per 1000

livebirths

LGPMS Score LGPMS Website

(Indicators are based on Global City Indicators Facility – UNICEF; Alicar-Cadorna

(2009) ; and Amin, Das, and Goldstein (2008) “New Tools for Measuring Service

Delivery”; Vila, Booske, and Remington (2006) “Measuring mortality”)

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Data collection

The majority of the data were collected via formal requests sent to the relevant

local government offices and from the facilities themselves. Letters were sent to the

each city‟s Administrator‟s Office, Health Office, Budget Office, and Human Resource

Management Office. Letters were also sent to public city hospitals, namely the record

offices of Pasig General Hospital and Paranaque Community Hospital. For the schools,

letters were sent to the City Education Unit and to the schools themselves. With the

exemption of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Pasig, which chose to withhold the

release of confidential data, all of the offices and institutions cooperated with the study.

In Pasig City, the budget office was able to provide city budget records from the

year 2000 to 2012 with no surviving readily-available records from the preceding years.

This would mean that a comparison in terms of city inputs to health and education

between the time before and after a dynastic mayor will be difficult.

Data on vital statistics, population demographics, and national life expectancy

were taken from Department of Health publications online and from the National

Statistics Office Library at Sta. Mesa.

Like Alicar-Cardona (2009), the study also used LGPMS data as part of the

outcome indicators. For this data set, a formal request was made and addressed to the

Bureau of Local Government Supervision Director. The data attained from the LGPMS

was used in supporting the data gathered by the study and in establishing consistency

of findings.

Ethical Considerations

The highly sensitive topic of the study necessitates the careful use of neutral

language when interacting with city officials, as the term „political dynasty‟ is already

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politically-loaded and is even deemed as politically incorrect by some. I decided to

retain the use of the term in the study given that it is already used by other scholarly

work, the lack of a similar alternative term to use, and to avoid confusion.

Initially, I was hesitant about fully informing city officials about my highly critical

topic due to potential attempts to skew the data in their favor. However, these officials

may be risking their careers by releasing data that could potentially depict their

government in a negative light. As a means of addressing this concern, I have made

known to every office the purpose and topic of my study so that they are fully aware of

possible risks to themselves and by getting the endorsement of the city administrator

and the mayor. This step arguably sacrifices integrity of the data gathered from these

offices but its effects are mitigated by gathering identical data from other sources in

order to double-check for accuracy. Additionally, I have also agreed to provide copies of

the study to my sources who requested it.

Scope and Limitation of the Study

The overall scope of the study is the cities of Pasig, Paranaque and the NCR as

a whole, covering the years from 1980 to the present and will focus on the inputs,

outputs, and outcomes in the provision of health and education services. The study

includes the health and education facilities directly funded by the city government as

well as manpower and financial support to facilities that are administered by the national

government.

The performance health and educational services are only two of the many duties

of city governments that can be measured and compared. A high or low assessment of

in areas of health and education would not mean that the same assessment for other

areas. A high assessment of health and education does not mean that other aspects of

governance, such as traffic infrastructure or the environment, are not being neglected

and vice versa. The decision to narrow the focus of the study to only two areas was

made due to time and manpower constraints. As a case study, any findings regarding

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the trends and outcomes of a dynastic city will not necessarily reflect those of others,

especially for rural areas as the study covers highly urbanized cities.

The study also took into consideration that there are other variables aside from

the dynastic characteristic of the mayor that determines how city inputs are allocated,

such as the strength of the local economy in generating internal revenue through taxes,

the ability of the city representative to secure funding in budget deliberations (Asako et

al, 2012), and unique geographical problems. For example, cities with higher risks of

flooding may allocate less in education and health in order to allocate more resources

for flood control infrastructure. Another variable that may skew the data in city outputs is

how the city representative chooses to spend his Priority Assistance Development Fund,

as he may choose to use his assets to subsidize health and education services and

infrastructure, whether in coordination with the city mayor or not. For the purposes of

the study and in consideration of time constraints, I assume that these variables are

identical or close enough to be so for both cities. A key limitation of this study is the

lack of formal qualitative methods to supplement the statistical data. Originally, I

intended to conduct interviews and formal group discussions with output providers

(teachers, doctors, etc) regarding the responsiveness of city hall to the needs of their

facilities and to identify other issues. However, due to time and manpower constraints,

this was omitted, leaving the study somewhat lacking. Another limitation is the

accounting for the effect of spillovers. As cities are open systems and a sub-system of

the state, the actions of neighboring cities and the national government can possibly

influence outcomes in one city. This is particularly true for health spillovers, as this

works both ways. The health outputs of one city could possibly affect outcomes in a

nearby city especially when placed near the border. Since there is no practical means of

determining whether the people availing of the health and education services are from

within the city (short of reviewing the individual records of each student enrolled and

each patient and even then a common practice is to submit fake addresses to or those

of relatives who are residents), the study can only speculate on the possible effects

these spillovers may have. It is because of these spillovers that the outputs and

outcomes of each city is not conclusively attributable to dynasties alone.

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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Data Analysis and Results

1. EDUCATION

a. Education Inputs

In analyzing city inputs to education, the study used linear regression analysis to

derive trends in the nominal amount allocated to education and in the percentage of city

budget. In Pasig City from the year 2000-2013, the average percentage of the city

budget allocated to education was 2.24%, with the lowest value being 0.47% in year

2000 and the highest value being 4.28% in year 2013.

s

Figure 1(Total City Budget Appropriations for Education Pasig City 2000-2013)

Applying a linear regression analysis, we come up with the following data:

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Figure 2(Linear Regression Analysis of Percentage of City Budget Allocated to Education -

Pasig City)

Figure 3(Scatter Plot of Percentage of City Budget Allocated to Education - Pasig City, 2000-

2013)

As shown in Figure 2, that for between every year of measurement from 2000-

2012, there was an average annual increase of 0.24% in the percentage of the local

budget of Pasig allocated to education. This shows a growing trend for the prioritization

of education, as shown by the 78.43% R2 value in Figure 1 and extremely low p-value.

This is visually evident in Figure 2, which shows an upward central tendency in Pasig

city government prioritization of education from 2000 to 2013.

Regression - Education PASIG CITY

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0.885626391

R Square 0.784334104

Adjusted R Square 0.764728114

Standard Error 0.005164188

Observations 13

ANOVA

df SS MS F Significance F

Regression 1 0.001066882 0.001067 40.0048191 5.63804E-05

Residual 11 0.000293357 2.67E-05

Total 12 0.001360239

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%

Intercept 0.005429049 0.003038342 1.786846 0.101517663 -0.001258296 0.012116394 -0.001258296 0.012116394

X Variable 1 0.002421154 0.000382795 6.324936 5.63804E-05 0.001578628 0.003263681 0.001578628 0.003263681

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For Paranaque, the most data on city appropriations education that could be

obtained was from 2008 up to 2013. In this time period, the average percentage of the

city budget allocated to education was 5.84%, with the lowest value being 4.17% in year


Figure 4(Total City Budget Appropriations for Education Paranaque City 2008-2013)

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Using linear regression analysis on the Percentage of City Budget Allocated to

Education:

Figure 5 (Linear Regression Analysis of Percentage of City Budget Allocated to Education -

Paranaque City)

Figure 6 (Scatter Plot of Percentage of City Budget Allocated to Education - Paranaque City,

2000-2013)

As shown in Figure 5, the percentage of city budget allocated to education in

Paranaque City decreased by an average of 0.03% per year. This illustrates a very

likely slight downward trend for the prioritization of education, as evident by the

Regression - Education PARANAQUE CITY



R Square 0.866378094



Observations 8

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.00061513 0.000615 38.90281721 0.000786224

Residual 6 9.48718E-05 1.58E-05

Total 7 0.000710001


Intercept 0.075577361 0.003098406 24.39234 3.12135E-07 0.067995836 0.083158887 0.067995836 0.083158887

X Variable 1 -0.003827002 0.000613576 -6.23721 0.000786224 -0.005328368 -0.00232564 -0.005328368 -0.002325636

36 | P a g e

relatively high 86.63% R2 value in Figure 5 and the extremely low p-value. This is

visually evident in Figure 6, which shows a small shift in Paranaque city government

priorities from 2008 to 2013.

b. Education Outputs

For city outputs, the study measured the total number of teachers employed by

city hall, the ratio of public school teachers employed by city hall to school-age

population, and the percentage of school age population attending school.

I used linear regression analysis to observe annual trends in city government

manpower support for public education. The results are as follows:

PASIG CITY Year Elementary High School Tertiary TOTAL

2003 1 152 100 21 273

2004 2 132 89 21 242

2005 3 173 118 21 312

2006 4 188 101 21 310

2007 5 182 124 21 327

2008 6 222 156 21 399

2009 7 231 194 21 446

2010 8 262 200 21 483

2011 9 239 212 21 472

2012 10 222 225 21 468

Table 2(Annual Number of Teachers Employed by the City of Pasig by Education Level and Year,

2003-2012)

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Figure 7(Scatter Plot of Public School Teachers Employed by Pasig City, 2003-2012)

Figure 8 (Regression Analysis of Total Annual Number of Teachers Employed by Pasig City,

2003-2012)

The analysis shows that there was an average increase of 29 teachers employed

by the city government of Pasig for every year from 2003-2012. Based on the high R2

value of 88.29% and an almost non-existent p-value, there is a very strong possibility of

an upward trend in the number of public school teachers employed by the Pasig City

government.

SUMMARY OUTPUT Pasig City



R Square 0.882935402



Observations 10

ANOVA


Regression 1 71515.64848 71515.64848 60.3383372 5.39491E-05

Residual 8 9481.951515 1185.243939

Total 9 80997.6


Intercept 228.2666667 23.51837236 9.705887091 1.06026E-05 174.0332028 282.5001306 174.0332028 282.5001306

X Variable 1 29.44242424 3.790328905 7.767775563 5.39491E-05 20.70191011 38.18293837 20.70191011 38.18293837

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PARANAQUE Year Elementary High School Tertiary TOTAL

2003 1 213 140 13 366

2004 2 187 133 0 320

2005 3 172 132 9 313

2006 4 115 83 29 227

2007 5 193 132 31 356

2008 6 41 116 9 166

2009 7 42 123 19 184

2010 8 40 141 47 228

2011 9 40 141 47 228

Table 3(Annual Number of Teachers Employed by the City of Paranaque by Education Level and

Year, 2003-2011)

Figure 9(Scatter Plot of Public School Teachers Employed by Paranaque City Government,

2003-2011)

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Figure 10(Regression Analysis of Total Annual Number of Teachers Employed by Paranaque,

2003-2011)

The analysis shows that there was an average decrease of 19 teachers

employed by the city government of Paranaque for every year from 2003-2011. Based

on the R2 value of 49.44% and the p-value of 0.03, there is strong indication that the

downward trend will continue as the years go by.

In computing the percentage of school age population attending school, I

combined two data sets from the National Statistics Office: the enrollment

demographics and age demographics of each city. The former states the number of

people enrolled and at which level of education while the latter gives us the total school-

age population (Ages 5 to 24). By dividing the number of people enrolled at different

levels of education over the total school-age population of each city, we come up with

the percentage of school age population attending school within each city (See Table 5).

2007 5 to 9 10 to 14 15 to 19 20 to 24 Total School Age Population

Pasig 65,634 58,733 59,796 64,692 248,855

Paranaque 55,993 50,941 54,294 58,483 219,711

Table 4 (School Age Population for Pasig and Paranaque, 2007)

SUMMARY OUTPUT TOTAL TEACHERS - Paranaque



R Square 49.44%

Adjusted R Square 42.21%


Observations 9

ANOVA


Regression 1 21926.81667 21926.81667 6.843824942 0.034606389

Residual 7 22427.18333 3203.883333

Total 8 44354


Intercept 360.9166667 41.1210217 8.776938211 5.0206E-05 263.6809015 458.1524318 263.6809015 458.1524318

X Variable 1 -19.11666667 7.307397317 -2.616070515 0.034606389 -36.39591558 -1.837417754 -36.39591558 -1.837417754

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2007 Level NUMBER % of Total 2007 Level NUMBER % of Total

Pasig 5-24 Years Paranaque 5-24 Years

Preschool 12,877 8.06% Preschool 11,678 8.50%

Elementary 77,630 48.59% Elementary 66,802 48.60%

High School 42,177 26.40% High School 35,874 26.10%

Post-Secondary 412 0.26%

Post-Secondary 583 0.42%

College 26,536 16.61% College 22,375 16.28%

Post-bacc. 34 0.02% Post-bacc. 39 0.03%

Not stated 89 0.06% Not stated 109 0.08%

TOTAL 159,755 100.00% TOTAL 137,460 100.00%

Table 5 (School-Age Population Currently Attending School, 2007)

2007 School-age Population Enrolled

School-age Population

% of School Age Population Enrolled

Pasig 159,755 248,855 64.20%

Paranaque 137,460 219,711 62.56%

Table 6(Percentage of School Age Population Enrolled, 2007)

Ideally, I aimed to do a regression analysis on the percentage of school age

population enrolled over time. However, NSO‟s measurement of school-age population

enrolled per city occurred only in 2007. The alternative means to gathering the same

data would be to get them from each school within the city, a very time-consuming

process that was not undertaken for purposes of expediency. In place of this, I assumed

that the 2007 value of Percentage of School-Age Population Enrolled remained

constant for years 2003-2011 in order to calculate the ratio of city-employed public

school teachers and school age population enrolled. The results:

41 | P a g e

Pasig City Total Teachers Estimated School-Age

Population Enrolled

Ratio

2003 273 129,717 475

2004 242 129,717 536

2005 312 129,717 416

2006 310 129,717 418

2007 327 159,764 489

2008 399 159,764 400

2009 446 159,764 358

2010 483 159,764 331

2011 472 159,764 338

2012 468 159,764 341

Table 7(Ratio of Students to Teachers, Pasig City 2003-2012)

Figure 11(Linear regression Analysis of Student to Teacher Ratio, Pasig City 2003-2012)

The analysis shows that for every year in Pasig City between years 2003-2012,

the ratio of school-age students enrolled to teachers decreased by 19.88 students per

year. The likeliness of a decreasing trend in the student to teacher ratio is very high, as

the regression model has a high R2 value and an extremely small p-value.




R Square 72.03%



Observations 10

ANOVA


Regression 1 32610.97853 32610.97853 20.59698304 0.001903223

Residual 8 12666.31272 1583.28909

Total 9 45277.29125


Intercept 519.6721238 27.18213093 19.11815248 5.80488E-08 456.9900174 582.3542301 456.9900174 582.3542301

X Variable 1 -19.88176522 4.380797063 -4.538389917 0.001903223 -29.98390136 -9.779629077 -29.98390136 -9.779629077

42 | P a g e

Paranaque City Total Teachers Estimated School-Age

Population Enrolled

Ratio (Number of Students Per Teacher)

2003 366 70,608 193

2004 320 70,608 221

2005 313 70,608 226

2006 227 70,608 311

2007 356 137,451 386

2008 166 137,451 828

2009 184 137,451 747

2010 228 137,451 603

2011 228 137,451 603

2012 366 137,451 193

Table 8 (Ratio of Students to Teachers, Paranaque City 2003-2011)

Figure 12(Linear regression Analysis of Student to Teacher Ratio, Paranaque City 2003-2011)

The analysis of the ratio in Paranaque City shows that for every year between

years 2003-2012, the number of school-age students enrolled increased by 72.44

students per year. The likeliness of an increasing trend in the student to teacher ratio is

very high, as the regression model has an average R2 value and an extremely small p-

value.

SUMMARY OUTPUT Paranaque City



R Square 67.01%



Observations 9

ANOVA


Regression 1 314825.9524 314825.9524 14.22079104 0.006973385

Residual 7 154968.993 22138.42757

Total 8 469794.9454


Intercept 95.26535101 108.0933398 0.881324892 0.407383079 -160.3347817 350.8654837 -160.3347817 350.8654837

X Variable 1 72.43686359 19.20869056 3.771046411 0.006973385 27.01552806 117.8581991 27.01552806 117.8581991

43 | P a g e

c. Education Outcomes

For outcomes, our primary indicator is the educational attainment of the city

population due to the lack of data at the city level for simple literacy and functional

literacy. Only the years 1990 and 1994 have Functional literacy rates available for the

city level and the years 1990, 1994, and 2000 have Simple literacy rates.

The collective outcomes of the NCR in educational attainment will be used to

establish an external benchmark by which to compare the outcomes of both cities. The

findings are as follows:

Figure 13(NCR Educational Attainment 1980-2007)

In the NCR, the percentage of the population with academic degrees ranged from

as low as 8.05% in year 2000 and as high as 27.81% in 2007, with the arithmetic mean

valued at 15.22% for years 1980-2007. On average, the percentage of the total

population with academic degrees changed by 7.22% between measurements. For high

school diplomas, the percentage of the population ranged from as low as 45.13% in

1980 to as high as 69.08% in 2007, with the arithmetic mean valued at 54.00%. On

average, the percentage of the total population with high school diplomas changed by

7.11% between measurements. For elementary school diplomas, the percentage of the

population ranged from as low as 61.89% in year 1980 to as high as 77.50% in year

44 | P a g e

2007. On average, the percentage of the total population with elementary diplomas

changed by 4.54% between measurements.

Figure 14 (Pasig City Educational Attainment 1980-2007)

In the case of Pasig City, regression analysis does not show a linear relationship

for the percentage of the population with academic degrees, likely due to the lack of

data. The percentage of the population with academic degrees in the city ranged from

as low as 8.80% in year 2000 to as high as 29.03% in 2007, with an average change of

4.55% between measurements. However, regression models on high school and

elementary education were statistically significant, yielding the following data:

45 | P a g e

Figure 15(Linear Regression Analysis of Percentage of Population with High school diplomas,

Pasig City 1980-2007)

Figure 16(Scatter Plot of Percentage of Total Population with High School diplomas, Pasig City,

1980-2010)

SUMMARY OUTPUT (High school)



R Square 76.64%



Observations 5

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.031510818 0.031510818 9.840061775 0.051788237

Residual 3 0.009606896 0.003202299

Total 4 0.041117714


Intercept 36.82% 0.059350894 6.203398262 0.00844064 0.1792962 0.557058269 0.1792962 0.557058269

X Variable 1 5.61% 0.017894968 3.136887275 0.051788237 -0.000815277 0.113084272 -0.000815277 0.113084272

46 | P a g e

Figure 173(Linear Regression Analysis of Percentage of Population with elementary diplomas,

Pasig City 1980-2007)

Figure 14(Scatter Plot of Percentage of Total Population with Elementary diplomas, Pasig City,

1980-2010)

For secondary level education, there was an average increase per year of

measurement of 5.61% in the percentage of the total population of the Pasig City with

high school diplomas, with the R2 and acceptable 0.5 (when rounded off) p-value

indicating a strong upward trend in secondary education achievement for the area (see

Figures 11 and 12). At the elementary level education, there was an average increase

per year of measurement of 3.77% in the percentage of the total population of Pasig

SUMMARY OUTPUT (Elementary)



R Square 80.13%



Observations 5

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.014192853 0.014192853 12.09975588 0.040099615

Residual 3 0.00351896 0.001172987

Total 4 0.017711813


Intercept 55.95% 0.035920543 15.57599234 0.000575038 0.445182905 0.673813304 0.445182905 0.673813304

X Variable 1 3.77% 0.010830451 3.478470337 0.040099615 0.003206074 0.072140733 0.003206074 0.072140733

47 | P a g e

with elementary diplomas and the R2 and p-value of 0.04 indicates a likely upward trend

in elementary education (see Figures 13 and 14).

Figure 18(Paranaque City, Educational Attainment 1980-2007)

None of the applications of regression analyses educational attainment for

Paranaque yielded acceptable p-values for the results to be significant. The

percentages of the population of Paranaque with academic degrees ranged from as low

as 9.98% in year 2000 to as high as 29.13% in 2007, with an average change of 3.28%

between years of measurement. The percentages with high school diplomas ranged

from as low as 45.64% in 1980 to as high as 69.34% in 2007, with an average change

of 5.92% between years of measurement. For elementary diplomas, the percentage

ranged from as low as 61.83% in year 1980 to as high as 77.74% in year 2007, with an

average change of 3.98% between measurements.

48 | P a g e

2. HEALTH

a. Health Inputs

In analyzing city inputs to health, the study also made use of linear regression analysis

to derive trends in the nominal amount allocated to health and in the percentage of city budget.

In Pasig City from the year 2000-2013, the average percentage of the city budget allocated to

health was 10.53%, with the lowest value being 8.63% in year 2012 and the highest value being

12.37% in year 2008.

Figure 19 (Total City Budget Appropriations for Health, Pasig City 2000-2013)

Applying a linear regression analysis on the percentage of city budget

appropriated for health, we come up with the following data:

Figure 20(Linear Regression Analysis of Percentage of City Budget Allocated to Health - Pasig

City, 2000-2013)

SUMMARY OUTPUT (Health)



R Square 4.80%

Adjusted R Square -3.86%


Observations 13

ANOVA


Regression 1 8.81114E-05 8.81114E-05 0.554327086 0.472161761

Residual 11 0.001748473 0.000158952

Total 12 0.001836584


Intercept 11.02% 0.007417673 14.84973235 1.26702E-08 0.093824273 0.12647665 0.093824273 0.12647665

X Variable 1 -0.07% 0.000934539 -0.744531454 0.472161761 -0.0027527 0.001361113 -0.0027527 0.001361113

49 | P a g e

Figure 21(Scatter Plot of Percentage of City Budget Allocated to Education - Pasig City, 2000-

2013)

As stated in Figure 29, there was an average annual decrease of 0.07% in the

percentage of the local budget of Pasig allocated to education from 2000-2012.

However, considering the p-value of 0.47, the relationship is likely non-linear and the

predictability of the data is quite low, as shown by the 4.80% R2, though it would appear

upon visual inspection that the trend would be very slightly downward.

For Paranaque, the farthest data on city appropriations education that could be

obtained was from 2009 up to 2013. In this time period, the average percentage of the

city budget allocated to health was 8.78%, with the lowest value being 7.28% in year


50 | P a g e

Figure 22(Total City Budget Appropriations for Health Paranaque City 2008-2013)

Using linear regression analysis on the Percentage of City Budget Allocated to Health:

Figure 23(Linear Regression Analysis of Percentage of City Budget Allocated to Health -

Paranaque City)

SUMMARY OUTPUT (Paranaque Health)



R Square 65.60%



Observations 6

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.000802839 0.000802839 7.628206495 0.050749526

Residual 4 0.000420984 0.000105246

Total 5 0.001223823


Intercept 6.41% 0.009550565 6.71417301 0.002561754 0.037607525 0.090640762 0.037607525 0.090640762

X Variable 1 0.68% 0.002452359 2.761920798 0.050749526 -3.56188E-05 0.013582059 -3.56188E-05 0.013582059

51 | P a g e

Figure 24(Scatter Plot of Percentage of City Budget Allocated to Health - Paranaque City,

2008-2013)

As shown in Figure 32, the percentage of city budget allocated to education in

Paranaque City increased by an average of 0.68% per year. The acceptable p-value

and R2 illustrate a possible linear upward trend for the prioritization of health in

Paranaque.

b. Health Outputs

For health outputs, the study covered the number of doctors and nurses

employed by both city hospitals and city health offices and the number of doctors and

nurses per 1000 people per city. Only the last two datasets will be subject to statistical

analysis as hospital bed capacity has largely been constant based on the data provided.

The results of data collection for the two cities were uneven, due to differences in

record keeping by each city‟s HRMO offices, hospital record offices, and the Bureau of

Local Health Facilities Development of the Department of Health. Pasig City HRMO

offices were able to provide data from years 1995 to 2012 were available on Pasig while only

52 | P a g e

years 2003 to 2011 were available at the Paranaque City HRMO. Linear regression analysis

was used to analyze annual trends in the number of doctors and nurses employed by each city

per year. Results are as follows:

Figure 25(Linear Regression Analysis of the Total Number of Doctors and Nurses Employed by

the Pasig City Government, 1995-2012)

Figure 26(Scatter Plot of Total Number of Doctors and Nurses Employed by the Pasig City

Government, 1995-2012)

SUMMARY OUTPUT (Doctors and Nurses- Pasig)



R Square 0.721432907



Observations 18

ANOVA


Regression 1 35060.3968 35060.3968 41.43679131 8.21351E-06

Residual 16 13537.88098 846.1175611

Total 17 48598.27778


Intercept 198.5751634 14.30442816 13.88207631 2.42669E-10 168.2511303 228.8991965 168.2511303 228.8991965

X Variable 1 8.506707946 1.321503944 6.437141548 8.21351E-06 5.705244732 11.30817116 5.705244732 11.30817116

53 | P a g e

With a 72.14% R2 value and negligible p-value, the analysis shows a distinct

linear increase in the total number of doctors and nurses employed by the Pasig City

government, with an average annual increase per year of 8.50 doctors and nurses.

Figure 27(Linear Regression Analysis of the Total Number of Doctors and Nurses Employed by

the Pasig City Government, 2003-2011)

Figure 28(Scatter Plot of Total Number of Doctors and Nurses Employed by the Paranaque City

Government, 2003-2011)

SUMMARY OUTPUT (Doctors and Nurses - Paranaque)



R Square 49.82%



Observations 9

ANOVA


Regression 1 25133.06667 25133.06667 6.950381981 0.033600782

Residual 7 25312.48889 3616.069841

Total 8 50445.55556


Intercept 338.8888889 43.68616835 7.75734979 0.0001109 235.5875157 442.190262 235.5875157 442.190262

X Variable 1 20.46666667 7.763235839 2.636357711 0.033600782 2.109530932 38.8238024 2.109530932 38.8238024

54 | P a g e

With a 49.82% R2 value, the analysis shows a relatively average degree of

predictability. However, the low p-value of 0.03 indicates a strong possibility of a distinct

linear increase in the total number of doctors and nurses employed by the Pasig City

government, with an average annual increase per year of 20 doctors and nurses.

Linear regression analysis was used to analyze the number of doctors and

nurses employed by each city per 1000 population. Results are as follows:

PASIG Doctors-Nurses Employed by City Government

City Population (In thousands)

Ratio: (Doctor-Nurse per 1000 population)

1995 219 471 0.46

1996 231 479 0.48

1997 235 494 0.48

1998 236 507 0.47

1999 245 520 0.47

2000 250 532 0.47

2001 254 543 0.47

2002 260 554 0.47

2003 266 565 0.47

2004 273 541 0.50

2005 280 549 0.51

2006 285 557 0.51

2007 290 627 0.46

2008 356 573 0.62

2009 446 581 0.77

Table 9(Doctor-Nurse per 1000 population, Pasig City 1995-2009)

55 | P a g e

Figure 29(Linear Regression Analysis of the Doctors and Nurses per 1000 population, Pasig

City Government, 1995-2009)

Figure 30(Scatter Plot of Doctors and Nurses per 1000 population, Pasig City 1995-2009)

SUMMARY OUTPUT Ratio - Pasig



R Square 39.97%



Observations 15

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.037973 0.037973 8.654041 0.011451

Residual 13 0.057043 0.004388

Total 14 0.095016

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%

Intercept 0.414511544 0.035993 11.51652 3.42E-08 0.336754 0.492269 0.336754 0.492269

X Variable 1 0.011645538 0.003959 2.941775 0.011451 0.003093 0.020198 0.003093 0.020198

56 | P a g e

Analysis of the data from Pasig City strongly suggests a linear increase in the

number of doctors per 1000 people, given the 0.01 p-value, and a moderately low

predictability due to the R2 value of 39.97%. The average increase per year from 1995-

2009 was 0.01 doctors and nurses per 1000 people.

Paranaque Doctors-Nurses Employed by City Government

City Population (In thousands)

Ratio: (Doctor-Nurse per 1000 population)

2003 282 486 0.58

2004 371 482 0.77

2005 455 489 0.93

2006 439 496 0.89

2007 501 552 0.91

2008 515 510 1.01

2009 460 517 0.89

Table 10(Doctor-Nurse per 1000 population, Paranaque City 2003-2009)

Figure 31(Linear Regression Analysis of the Doctors and Nurses per 1000 population,

Paranaque City Government, 2003-2011)

SUMMARY OUTPUT Ratio Paranaque



R Square 58.48%



Observations 7

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.06859037 0.06859037 7.043342073 0.045212396

Residual 5 0.048691636 0.009738327

Total 6 0.117282006


Intercept 0.655262372 0.083402326 7.856643822 0.000536467 0.440869867 0.869654877 0.440869867 0.869654877

X Variable 1 0.049494 0.018649327 2.653929553 0.045212396 0.001554379 0.097433622 0.001554379 0.097433622

57 | P a g e

Figure 32(Scatter Plot of Doctors and Nurses per 1000 population, Paranaque City 2002-2009)

Analysis of the data from Paranaque City also suggests a linear increase in the

number of doctors per 1000 people, given the 0.04 p-value, and a moderate

predictability due to the R2 value of 58.48%. The average increase per year from 2003-

2009 was 0.04 doctors and nurses per 1000 people.

The same statistical methods were used for the percentage of births being

medically attended:

58 | P a g e

Figure 33(Linear Regression Analysis of the Percentage of Livebirths Medically Attended, NCR,

1990-2009)

Figure 34(Scatter Plot of Percentage of Livebirths Medically Attended, NCR, 1990-2009)

The data indicates a linear increase in the percentage of births attended by

trained medical personnel (doctors, nurses, and licensed midwives) in the NCR, given

negligible p-value, and a high conformity to the linear model with an R2 value of 77.62%.

The average increase per year from 1990-2009 was 0.10%.

SUMMARY OUTPUT NCR



R Square 0.777628596



Observations 20

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.00062734 0.00062734 62.94565978 2.75789E-07

Residual 18 0.000179395 9.96637E-06

Total 19 0.000806734


Intercept 0.884422127 0.001466505 603.0815013 3.30199E-40 0.881341114 0.887503 0.881341114 0.88750314

X Variable 1 0.000971271 0.000122421 7.933830082 2.75789E-07 0.000714073 0.001228 0.000714073 0.001228469

59 | P a g e

Figure 35(Linear Regression Analysis of the Percentage of Livebirths Medically Attended, Pasig

City 1994-2009)

Figure 36(Scatter Plot of Percentage of Livebirths Medically Attended, Pasig City 1994-2009)

In Pasig City, the data indicates a linear decrease in the percentage of births

attended by trained medical personnel, given negligible p-value, and a high conformity

to the linear model with an R2 value of 76.11%. The average decrease per year from

1990-2009 was 0.44%.

SUMMARY OUTPUT PASIG CITY



R Square 76.11%



Observations 16

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.006651708 0.006651708 44.60327347 1.04632E-05

Residual 14 0.002087827 0.00014913

Total 15 0.008739535


Intercept 0.917073087 0.006403974 143.2037419 1.44118E-23 0.903337928 0.930808 0.903337928 0.930808246

X Variable 1 -0.44% 0.000662283 -6.67856822 1.04632E-05 -0.00584356 -0.003 -0.00584356 -0.003002648

60 | P a g e

Figure 37(Linear Regression Analysis of the Percentage of Livebirths Medically Attended,

Paranaque City 1999-2009)

Figure 38(Scatter Plot of Percentage of Livebirths Medically Attended, Paranaque City 1999-

2009)

Lastly, for Paranaque City, the data indicates a linear increase in the percentage

of births attended by trained medical personnel, given low p-value 0.0049, and an

average conformity to the linear model with an R2 value of 60.30%. The average

increase per year from 1999-2009 was 0.38%.

SUMMARY OUTPUT PARANAQUE CITY



R Square 60.30%



Observations 11

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.001616378 0.001616378 13.667378 0.004943924

Residual 9 0.001064389 0.000118265

Total 10 0.002680767


Intercept 0.829907483 0.007032528 118.0098313 1.14409E-15 0.813998798 0.845816 0.813998798 0.845816167

X Variable 1 0.38% 0.00103689 3.69694171 0.004943924 0.001487713 0.006179 0.001487713 0.006178928

61 | P a g e

c. Health Outcomes

Admittedly, much of my time and effort in this study was spent more in

researching and computing the health outcomes than in other aspect. Age at time of

death was measured by the National Statistics Office only at the national level. The

records of the National Statistics Office and city hall only record deaths by age group

and not by specific age. Furthermore, Pasig and Paranaque deaths by age group were

only measured by the NSO after their city charter was ratified, 1994 and 1998

respectively. However, I was able to construct a formula in order to derive average life

span of the population at the city level using the following formulas:

LSHigh = NLE - (x5-9 * 9) + (x10-14 * 14) + … + (x85-89 * 89)

TRD

LSHigh = High estimate of life span

TRD = Total Registered Deaths at the city

NLE = National life expectancy

X5-9 = number of deaths at age group 5-9


X85-89 = number of deaths at age group 85 and over

LSLow = NLE - (x5-9 * 5) + (x10-14 * 10) + … + (x85-89 * 85)

TRD

LSLow = Low estimate of city life span

TRD = Total Registered Deaths at the city

NLE = National life expectancy

62 | P a g e



X85-89 = number of deaths at age group 85 and over

LSAverage = NLE - CLEHigh + CLELow

2

LSAverage = Average estimate of city life span

The first part of the formula involves calculating the high estimate of deaths,

which would be the “best case assumption” and assume that the deaths are clumped at

the maximum value for the age group. The second is the reverse, which involves

calculating the low estimate of deaths, conversely known as the “worst case assumption”

that the deaths occurred at the minimum value for the age group. The last part of the

formula is a simple averaging in order to come up with the median estimate. Using the

LSAverage, we are also able to derive the Average Years of Potential Life Lost per city by

subtracting the LSAverage of Pasig and Paranaque from the national life expectancy. The

results:

NCR

LSAverage of

Population Age 5 and

above

National Life

Expectancy

Average YPPL

per person

1988 53.36 64.77 11.41

1989 54.69 65.01 10.32

1990 54.99 65.22 10.23

1991 52.79 65.4 12.61

1992 54.23 65.56 11.33

1993 48.46 65.71 0.00

1994 49.34 65.87 0.00

1995 55.02 66.02 11.00

1996 55.53 66.18 10.65

1997 55.61 66.34 10.73

1998 55.93 66.5 10.57

1999 50.88 66.65 15.77

63 | P a g e

2000 49.78 66.8 17.02

2001 56.61 66.94 10.33

2002 57.45 67.08 9.63

2003 50.33 67.22 16.89

2004 50.29 67.35 17.06

2005 57.73 67.49 9.76

Table 11(Average Life Span and Average Years of Potential Life Lost per person, NCR 1988-

2005)

Pasig City

LSAverage of Population

Age 5 and above

National Life

Expectancy

Average YPPL

per person

1994 48.56 65.87 17.31

1995 55.48 66.02 10.54

1996 55.62 66.18 10.56

1997 54.00 66.34 15.02

1998 55.97 66.5 10.53

1999 54.51 66.65 12.14

2000 56.10 66.8 10.70

2001 55.59 66.94 11.35

2002 60.77 67.08 6.31

2003 52.26 67.22 19.96

2004 56.80 67.35 22.55

2005 57.83 67.49 9.66

Table 12(Average Life Span and Average Years of Potential Life Lost per person, Pasig City

1994-2005)

Paranaque City

LSAverage of Population

Age 5 and above

National Life

Expectancy

Average YPPL

per person

1999 64.83 66.65 -0.43

2000 57.59 66.8 7.21

2001 57.41 66.94 7.52

2002 57.41 67.08 7.67

2003 80.22 67.22 -15.79

2004 80.64 67.35 -16.06

2005 55.53 67.49 10.04

Table 13(Average Life Span and Average Years of Potential Life Lost per person, Paranaque

1998-2005)

64 | P a g e

I subjected the resulting annual LSAverage values of each city to linear regression

to derive the strength and direction of change, yielding the following results:

Figure 39(Regression Analysis of Average Life Span per year, NCR 1988-2005)

Figure 40(Scatter Plot of Average age at death for NCR, 1980-2005)

SUMMARY OUTPUT



R Square 0.56%



Observations 18

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.831541462 0.831541462 0.090086797 0.767931352

Residual 16 147.6871627 9.230447671

Total 17 148.5187042


Intercept 53.10754117 1.494054806 35.54591234 1.18068E-16 49.94028647 56.27479587 49.94028647 56.27479587

X Variable 1 0.041428105 0.138027141 0.300144626 0.767931352 -0.251176363 0.334032572 -0.251176363 0.334032572

65 | P a g e

Figure 41(Polynomial Scatter Plot of Average age at death for NCR, 1980-2005)

It appears that the general direction of life span for the NCR as a whole is

fluctuating and non-linear, considering the high p-values and almost 0 R2 value. This is

particularly evident in Figure 35.

Figure 42(Regression Analysis of Average Life Span per year, Pasig City 1994-2005)




R Square 28.07%



Observations 12

ANOVA


Regression 1 27.16548859 27.16548859 3.902211644 0.076454996

Residual 10 69.61562077 6.961562077

Total 11 96.78110936


Intercept 52.45727934 1.623870479 32.30385676 1.90358E-11 48.83907044 56.07548825 48.83907044 56.07548825

X Variable 1 0.435853704 0.22064055 1.975401641 0.076454996 -0.055764077 0.927471486 -0.055764077 0.927471486

66 | P a g e

Figure 43(Scatter Plot of Average age at death for Pasig City, 1994-2005)

In the case of Pasig City, regression analysis shows an average increase of 0.44

years in lifespan per year. As with NCR, it is not a linear relationship.

Figure 44(Linear Regression Analysis of Average Life Span per year, Pasig City 1999-2005)

SUMMARY OUTPUT Paranaque City



R Square 8.16%



Observations 7

ANOVA


Regression 1 60.02791652 60.02791652 0.444225714 0.534605714

Residual 5 675.6465762 135.1293152

Total 6 735.6744928


Intercept 58.949739 9.824507085 6.000274466 0.00184576 33.69503955 84.20443846 33.69503955 84.20443846

X Variable 1 1.464190616 2.196826569 0.666502598 0.534605714 -4.182931857 7.11131309 -4.182931857 7.11131309

67 | P a g e

Figure 45 (Scatter Plot of Average age at death for Paranaque City, 1999-2005)

In the case of Pasig City, regression analysis shows an average increase of 1.46

years in lifespan per year.

Figure 46(Line Graph for NCR, Pasig City, and Paranaque Average Life Span)

68 | P a g e

Lastly, I analyzed the infant and fetal mortality rates per 1000 livebirths, yielding:

Figure 47(Linear Regression Analysis of Infant and Fetal mortality rates per year, NCR 1995-

2009)

Figure 48(Scatter Plot of Infant and Fetal mortality rates, NCR 1995-2009)

The data from NCR indicates a linear decrease in the infant and fetal mortality

rates from 1994-2005, given an extremely low p-value, and a high conformity to the

linear model with an R2 value of 77.32%. The average decrease per year in the region

from 1994-2009 was 0.0006%.

SUMMARY OUTPUT NCR



R Square 77.32%



Observations 15

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.000108585 0.000108585 44.32057765 1.57011E-05

Residual 13 3.18499E-05 2.44999E-06

Total 14 0.000140435


Intercept 0.025547168 0.000850488 30.03823994 2.13696E-13 0.0237098 0.027384536 0.0237098 0.027384536

X Variable 1 -0.000622739 9.35412E-05 -6.657370175 1.57011E-05 -0.000824822 -0.000420655 -0.000824822 -0.000420655

69 | P a g e

Figure 49(Linear Regression Analysis of Infant and Fetal mortality rates per year, Pasig City

1995-2009)

Figure 50(Scatter Plot of Infant and Fetal mortality rates, Pasig City 1995-2009)

In Pasig City, analysis of the data also indicates a linear decrease in the infant

and fetal mortality rates from 1995-2009, given a low p-value of 0.0002, and an

acceptable fit to the linear model with an R2 value of 69.39%. The average decrease per

year in the region from 1994-2009 was 0.001%.

SUMMARY OUTPUT PASIG CITY



R Square 69.38%



Observations 15

ANOVA


Regression 1 0.000301968 0.000301968 29.45004113 0.000115716

Residual 13 0.000133296 1.02536E-05

Total 14 0.000435264


Intercept 2.095393466 0.383109893 5.469431889 0.000107598 1.267734861 2.923052071 1.267734861 2.923052071

X Variable 1 -0.001038487 0.000191363 -5.42678921 0.000115716 -0.001451902 -0.000625072 -0.001451902 -0.000625072

70 | P a g e

Figure 51(Linear Regression Analysis of Infant and Fetal mortality rates per year, Paranaque

City 1999-2009)

Figure 52(Polynomial Scatter Plot of Infant and Fetal mortality rates, Paranaque City 1999-

2009)

Lastly, for Paranaque City, analysis shows a non-linear trend in the infant and

fetal mortality rates from 1999-2009, given a high p-value of 0.8 a very poor fit to the

linear model with an R2 value of 0.31%. The average decrease per year in the region

from 1999-2009 was 0.0001%.

SUMMARY OUTPUT PARANAQUE CITY



R Square 0.31%



Observations 11

ANOVA


Regression 1 2.1713E-06 2.1713E-06 0.028091589 0.870599343

Residual 9 0.000695644 7.72938E-05

Total 10 0.000697815


Intercept 0.023626688 0.005685319 4.155736743 0.002463276 0.010765603 0.036487772 0.010765603 0.036487772

X Variable 1 0.000140496 0.000838255 0.167605458 0.870599343 -0.001755767 0.002036759 -0.001755767 0.002036759

71 | P a g e

3. TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS

Education

In measuring technical efficiency, I analyzed the inputs and outputs via

correlation, particularly annual budget allocations to health and school-age population to

teacher ratio. This analysis strengthens the likelihood and degree by which city

government inputs were able to affect education and health outputs.

Figure 53(Correlation of Ratio of School Age Population per City Government Teacher and Education

Funding, Pasig City 2002-2012)

Figure 54(Scatter Plot of Correlation, Pasig City Education Technical Efficiency)

For Pasig City, the R-coefficient of -0.7753 and R2 0.6 indicate a strong negative

linear relationship. This means that the higher the funding allocated to allocation, the

smaller the ratio between school age population and city government employed

teachers. The high R-coefficient also strengthens the ties between inputs and outputs of

Pasig.

PASIG CITY

SAP/EDUC FUNDING

Column 1 Column 2

Column 1 1

Column 2 -0.775357474 1

72 | P a g e

Figure 55(Correlation of Ratio of School Age Population per City Government Teacher and

Education Funding, Pasig City 2007-2012)

Figure 56(Scatter Plot of Correlation, Paranaque City Education Technical Efficiency)

For Paranaque City, the R-coefficient of 0.31 and R2 0.09 indicate a weak uphill

non-linear relationship. This means that the changes in city inputs did not necessarily

result in a corresponding change in outputs.

Due to the lack of annual data in educational attainment, it was not possible to do

a correlation between the educational attainments of a population with city government

inputs and only a comparison of outcomes will be possible.

PARANAQUE

SAP/EDUC FUNDING

Column 1 Column 2

Column 1 1

Column 2 0.313427585 1

73 | P a g e

Health

In measuring technical efficiency, I analyzed the inputs and outputs via

correlation. These include annual budget allocations to health, percentage of livebirths

attended by health professionals, and the number of doctors and nurses per 1000

population.

Figure 57(Correlation of Health Funding and Percentage of Livebirths Attended by Health

Professionals, Pasig City 2007-2012)

Figure 58(Scatter Plot of Correlation, Pasig City Health Technical Efficiency A)

PASIG CITY

Health Funding / % Livebirths Medically Attended

Column 1 Column 2

Column 1 1

Column 2 0.880518158 1

74 | P a g e

Figure 59(Correlation of Health Funding and Number of Doctors and Nurses per 1000

population, Pasig City 2007-2012)

Figure 60(Scatter Plot of Correlation, Pasig City Health Technical Efficiency B)

For Pasig City, the two correlations both yielded high R-coefficients, 0.88 and

0.73 respectively, with acceptable values of R2, indicating a strong positive linear

relationship between city health inputs and health outputs.

PASIG CITY

Health Funding / DaN per 1000 population

Column 1 Column 2

Column 1 1

Column 2 0.732834413 1

75 | P a g e

Figure 61(Correlations of Health Funding and Percentage of Livebirths Attended by Health

Professionals and Health Funding and Number of Doctors and Nurses per 1000 population,

Paranaque City 2007-2012)

Figure 62(Scatter Plot of Correlation, Paranaque City Health Technical Efficiency A)

PARANAQUE CITY

Health Funding / % Livebirths Medically Attended

Column 1 Column 2

Column 1 1

Column 2 0.726569854 1

Health Funding / DaN per 1000 population

Column 1 Column 2

Column 1 1

Column 2 0.360558319 1

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Figure 63(Scatter Plot of Correlation, Paranaque City Health Technical Efficiency B)

For Pasig City, the two correlations yielded differing R-coefficients, with 0.73 and

0.36 respectively, with low values of R2, indicating a moderately positive semi-linear

relationship between city health inputs and health outputs.

In computing the cost-effectiveness of health, I correlated health funding with the

two outcomes: infant and fetal deaths per 1000 livebirths and the computed city lifespan.

Figure 64(Correlations of Health Funding and Average City Resident Lifespan; Health Funding

and Infant and Fetal deaths per 1000 livebirths, Pasig City 2007-2012)

PASIG CITY

Funding/Lifespan

Column 1 Column 2

Column 1 1

Column 2 0.393790873 1

PASIG CITY

Funding/IaF Mort

Column 1 Column 2

Column 1 1

Column 2 -0.481636767 1

77 | P a g e

Figure 65(Scatter Plot of Correlation, Pasig City Health Cost-Effectiveness A)

Figure 66(Scatter Plot of Correlation, Pasig City Health Cost-Effectiveness B)

The data from Pasig City indicates a moderate correlation between increased

funding and health outcomes, based on the R-coefficient values of 0.39 and -0.48,

though the model is decidedly non-linear.

78 | P a g e

Figure 67(Correlations of Health Funding and Average City Resident Lifespan; Health Funding

and Infant and Fetal deaths per 1000 livebirths, Paranaque City 2007-2012)

Figure 68(Scatter Plot of Correlation, Paranaque City Health Cost-Effectiveness A)

PARANAQUE CITY

Funding/Lifespan

Column 1 Column 2

Column 1 1

Column 2 0.69769763 1

Funding/IaF Mort

Column 1 Column 2

Column 1 1

Column 2 0.332577158 1

79 | P a g e

Figure 69(Scatter Plot of Correlation, Paranaque City Health Cost-Effectiveness B)

The data from Paranaque City indicates a moderately high correlation between

increased funding and health outcomes, based on the R-coefficient values of 0.69 and -

0.33, though the model is decidedly non-linear.

80 | P a g e

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Education

In Pasig City, the city government is directly funding four educational institutions

(personal services, maintenance and other operating expenses, and capital outlay):

Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Pasig, Pasig City Institute of Science and Technology,

Pasig City Science High School, and Nagpayong High School. The city government

also provides manpower support to the teaching personnel of DepEd administered

elementary and high schools. These city schools cover the secondary and tertiary levels

of education and were founded in 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2007 respectively.

The establishment of two high school in years 2005 and 2007 (Pasig City

Science High School and Nagpayong High School), the continued operation of a local

university (Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Pasig), and the establishment of a post-

secondary school (Pasig City Institute of Science and Technology) reflect the trend of

an increasing prioritization of education for the Pasig city government. The data

suggests that Pasig City is focusing more on education than health, given that

appropriations for education are increasing while appropriations for health are either

constant or decreasing slightly. Education outputs are likewise linear and increasing, in

all levels.

In Paranaque, the city government has allocated funds from the city budget for

teaching personnel manpower support (personal services) spread out among 21

elementary schools and 10 high schools. The city government fully funds the personal

services, MOOE, and capital outlay of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Paranaque Campus, formerly known as the Paranaque City College of Science and

Technology.

From 1980 to 2000, the differences in education outcomes between the two cities

were high. In years 1980, 1990, and 1995, less than 12% of the city population of Pasig

had academic degrees while 17% of the city population of Paranaque did. From 1980 to

2000, Paranaque had a slightly greater percentage of high school graduates though

both cities performed on par with NCR performance with regard to percentage of

81 | P a g e

population with elementary diplomas. On average, from 1980 to 2000, the high school

and academic degree achievement of Pasig City was less than the achievement of NCR

as a whole. Most of the years between 1980 and 1995 represented the years preceding

the establishment of a political dynasty at the mayoral level of Pasig City. However,

these same years also represented the worst educational attainment levels in the city,

relative to the performance of Paranaque and the whole NCR. It could be concluded

that the education outcomes of non-dynastic Pasig city were much lower than the

performance of a similar non-dynastic city and was also performing below average

relative to other cities in the same region.

However, by 2007, both cities would be performing slightly better than most of

the cities of the NCR and the difference between them in terms of educational

attainment percentages would be less than 0.20% across all levels. Incidentally, by

2007, many of the projects associated with the Eusebio dynasty in Pasig were already

underway. By 2007, the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Pasig would have already

graduated at least three batches of college graduates while Pasig City Institute of

Science and Technology would have graduated at least five. The results of the two city

schools would not be evident yet, considering that has only been operating for three

years while the other has just started. It can be concluded from these findings that

based on education outcomes, the dynastic city of Pasig is performing equally to a non-

dynastic city and even slightly better than the rest of cities in the NCR.

82 | P a g e

In summary:

EDUCATION Inputs (Prioritization) Outputs 1

(Teachers

employed)

Outputs 2 (Student

to Teacher Ratio)

Outcomes 1

(Elementary

Educational

Attainment)

Outcomes 2

(High School

Educational

Attainment)

Outcomes 3

(Academic

Degree

Educational

Attainment)

Pasig City Increasing linear trend by

0.24% on average

annually

Increasing linear

trend in total

number of

teachers

employed by

29.44 on average

annually

Decreasing linear

trend in student to

teacher ratio by

19.88 on average

annually

Below NCR

average from

1980-1990; on par

with NCR average

from 1995-2007

Below NCR

average from

1980-1990; on par

with NCR average

from 1995-2007

Well below

NCR average

from 1980-

1995; Well

above NCR

average from

2000-2007

Paranaque

City

Decreasing linear trend by

0.38% on average

annually

Decreasing linear

trend of teachers

employed by -

19.11 on average

annually

Increasing linear

trend in student to

teacher ratio by

72.46 on average

annually

Above NCR

average in all

years

Above NCR

average in all

years

Above NCR

average in all

years

Table 14(Summarized Education Inputs-Outputs-Outcomes Comparisons)

Health

The major health facility of Pasig City is the Pasig General Hospital, a Level 4

hospital which was established in 1995. From 2000 to 2012, the percentage of the city

budget allocated to health has remained roughly constant, seldom falling below 10% of

the total budget. There is no data to suggest that prioritization of the health budget will

increase or decrease. In terms of outputs, the hospital has 150-200 beds available and

majority (estimated to be around 70%) of doctors and nurses employed by Pasig City

was at Pasig City General Hospital, which handles almost 30,000 in-patients annually.

The major health facility of Paranaque is the Paranaque Community Hospital,

which was established in 1978. From 2008-2013, the percentage of the city budget

allocated to city health in Paranaque averaged 8.78% and regression analysis suggests

that the percentage is increasing annually. The increasing percentage of the city budget

allocated to PCH would support the plans of the current city administration to expand

the hospital to a Level 3 classification. In terms of outputs, the hospital has 41 beds and

the majority of the doctors and nurses employed by the Paranaque City government are

employed at the City Health Office. The PCH handles almost 3,000 in-patients annually.

83 | P a g e

In terms of health outcomes, the findings are nearly the same as those in

education, with Pasig City performing below average in the early 1990s though steadily

rising to be on par with the NCR average. In 1994, the average lifespan in Pasig City

was an abysmal 48.56 years, though the number would increase slowly and steadily,

eventually rising above the NCR average. However, Paranaque still has a substantial

lead in average lifespan, most likely due to the longer operation of its city hospital.

HEALTH Inputs (Prioritization) Outputs 1

(Doctors and

Nurses

Employed)

Outputs 2 (Doctors

and Nurses per

1000 population)

Outputs 3

(Livebirths

Attended by

Medical

Professionals)

Outcomes 1

(City resident

lifespan)

Outcomes 2

(Infant and

Fetal deaths

per 1000

population)

Pasig City Relatively unchanging;

though data suggests a

extremely slight decrease

annually

Average linear

increase by 8.5

annually

Average linear

increase of 0.01

doctors and nurses

per 1000 population

annually

Average linear

decrease of 0.44%

annually

56.25 (1995-

2005); increasing

by 0.43 years

annually since

1995

Average linear

decrease of

0.001; less

than NCR

average

Paranaque

City

Average annual increase

of 0.19%

Average linear

increase by 20.46

annually

Average linear

increase of 0.04

doctors and nurses

per 1000 population

annually

Average linear

increase of 0.38%

annually

62.81 (1995-

2005); increasing

by 1.46 years

annually since

1995

Relatively

unchanged;

fluctuating ;

greater than

NCR average

NCR - - - - 56.01 (1995-2005) -

Table 15(Summarized Health Inputs-Outputs-Outcomes Comparisons)

84 | P a g e

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The study has two significant conclusions. Firstly, not all non-dynastic cities

necessarily perform at similar levels. By comparing the outcomes of pre-dynastic Pasig

and Paranaque city and the outcomes of pre-dynastic Pasig over a similar period, it

would appear that the performance of non-dynastic Pasig in health and education is

significantly lower than the performance of non-dynastic Paranaque over the same time

period. Secondly, Pasig City is one case where the health and education outcomes of

the city government were significantly better under a dynastic mayor compared with the

outcomes before. It has performed near-identically in terms of education outcomes with

a similar non-dynastic city within the same region and it has also performed above the

regional average for health and education outcomes. I would strongly recommend that

the study be repeated but with a wider and more thorough analysis, a longer timeline by

which to complete the study, and more researchers to provide manpower support.

Education and health are not the sole responsibilities of local government units and are

not the only measurements of performance. Additionally, I would strongly recommend

for public health professionals to further refine the technique by which to derive city

lifespans, to better identify health outcomes at the local level. Lastly, I strongly

recommend that a comparative case study between a dynastic and non-dynastic

city/municipality also be conducted at a rural region or province to ascertain if my

findings also hold true outside heavily urbanized Metro Manila.

85 | P a g e

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Documents

The Impact of Political Dynasties on City Health and