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The impact of media coverage on crime rates andcrime style
Viridiana Rıos∗
November 13, 2017
Abstract
Contributing to a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the effects thatmedia contents may have on crime, this paper presents compelling empirical ev-idence that media portrayals of crime influences the probability of using similarcrime styles, not of engaging in more criminal actions. We tracked 31,676 homi-cides carried out by drug cartels operating at the US-Mexico border, its stylisticcharacteristics, and the detail with which the media covered each of them. Withthis uniquely detailed and large data, we estimated reaction functions to determinethe Granger causality between the quality of media coverage, crime rates and crimestyle. Our estimates show that when the media covers crimes in larger detail, crim-inals react by increasing the certain criminal styles such as leaving credit-takingbanners or exposing the tortured bodies of their victims. Up to 53% of the variancein criminal styles can be traced back to changes in the quality of media coverage.These results indicate that media coverage does not encourage criminal acts, butmay strongly influence the modality under which crimes are conducted.
∗Assistant Professor, Purdue University; [email protected]
1
There is a widespread notion that detailed media coverage of criminal acts creates models
of crime that function as direct causes of criminality, or as crime “triggers”, for at-risk
populations (Surette, 2013). For example, evidence suggests that at least 30 separate
occurrences of gun violence were inspired by the Russian Roulette scene from the movie
The Deer Hunter (Gunter, 2008). Additionally, the shooter in The University of Virginia
Tech massacre was initially thought to be copying events from an action movie (Nizza,
2013). Lastly, the rape of a nine-year-old with a bottle was connected to a scene from the
movie “Born Innocent”. (Gunter, 2008).
As a result, it is not surprising to see the implementation of public policies that aim
to reduce crime by controlling media contents, particularly in developing countries. As
a result, it is not surprising to see the implementation of public policies that aim to
reduce crime by controlling media contents, particularly in developing countries. In 2010,
for example, Zimbabwe’s government attempted to regulate international news outlets
and prevent negative media portrayals that might encourage violent uprisings against it
(Surette, 2013). Likewise, during the nineties, Colombia convinced 35 top communication
outlets to sign the “Discretion Agreement” and reduce the coverage of violent paramilitary
groups by appealing to national security and violence reduction. Mexico followed a similar
path in 2011, when the Federal government proposed an agreement (“Agreement on Media
Coverage of Violence”) with 700 media outlets to reduce coverage of drug-related crime
(Philip and Berruecos, 2012).
Despite all this, much research is still needed to prove whether the relationship between
media coverage and crime rates is empirically robust and unidirectional (Surette, 2013).
The unsettled debate about whether media coverage promotes criminal behavior or crimi-
2
nal ideation is one of the most lively areas of criminality research (Surette, 2013; Ferguson
et al., 2008), and it is also becoming important to the study of political violence.
While some argue that exposure to media coverage of crime is itself criminogenic, mean-
ing likely to cause crime, others see the media as an instructional guide for individuals
that were going to commit crimes anyway. The first group has developed the General
Aggression Model, which argues that exposure increases crime by “triggering” aggres-
sive behavior and by assisting in the development of callous dispositions (Bushman and
Anderson, 2002; Anderson et al., 2007). The second group has a more favorable view,
arguing that exposure merely provides criminals with inspiration, it influences the style
of the crime but does not cause it. In other words, media coverage of crime here acts as
a “rudder”; although it can change the direction the boat is going, it is not the source of
propulsion (Ferguson et al., 2008; Surette, 2013).
This paper examines whether media coverage of crime functions as a crime “trigger”, or
as a crime “rudder”, by testing both models. To accomplish this, we rely on a unique
database that records the violent criminal activities of drug cartels operating at the US-
Mexico border, and the stylistic characteristics of their crimes. Specifically, we identify
the rates of drug-related homicides per week in more than 2,500 counties/municipalities.
We also identify whether these murders were accompanied by public banners, known as
“narco-messages”, a stylistic feature that is sometimes used by drug cartels (Campbell
and Hansen, 2014; Martin, 2012; Atuesta, 2017). Criminal activities, especially homicides,
are typically understood as clandestine in nature, however, we find counterintuitive evi-
dence that the use of narco-messages occurs the most when the press has covered similar
modalities in the weeks before.
3
Our results show that “criminogenic styles”, such as using credit-taking banners and
exposing bodies/dismemberment in crime scenes, react to media coverage. These “crim-
inogenic styles” are such in that they do cause crimes to take on certain features, but
do not cause the crime itself. Specifically, we provide evidence of Granger causality from
media coverage to crime style, but not to crime rates. Furthermore, we provide evidence
that crime style reacts to media coverage unidirectionally, rather than as a cycle. Our
results show that as much as 53% of the error in the forecast of credit-taking crime styles
is explained by changes in the quality of media coverage. Moreover, we find that when the
media covers crimes in larger detail, criminals increase the use of credit-taking and body
exposure styles in their crimes. These findings provide valuable insight into one of the
most controversial areas of criminality research: the relationship between crime coverage
in the media and criminal behavior.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the existing literature
about media coverage and crime. The second section presents original data and describes
empirical tests. The third and fourth sections present results and robustness tests. Both
sections show that media coverage of crime functions as a crime “rudder”, but not as
crime “trigger”, particularly when media is detailed in covering the style of crimes. We
conclude by discussing how the paper contributes to the literature, and by suggesting
possible avenues for future research.
Media coverage and crime
A large body of criminology literature has tried to determine whether exposure to crim-
inogenic media content “triggers” delinquency and aggression, or just acts as a “rudder”,
4
by providing instructional models of style for individuals that already had criminal inten-
tions. The debate in the literature as to which understanding best describes the role of
the media has, overall, lacked conclusive results.
In support of the “trigger” theory, many studies have shown some significant effects
between media consumption and crime (Bushman and Anderson, 2002; Anderson and
Carnagey, 2004; Anderson and Bushman, 2001; Doley et al., 2013; Chadee et al., 2017).
Moreover, the relation between media and criminal conduct has also been attributed to
the constant portray of violence that might result in ideas for potential criminal minds
(Surette, 2013; Surette and Gardiner-Bess, 2013).
Other scholars have shown that violent media content can drive individuals that already
have violent thoughts and behavior (Surette and Gardiner-Bess, 2013; Ivory and Kaestle,
2013; Ferguson, 2015).1 (Gunter, 2008) provides evidence that shows how criminals have
modeled their crimes from media content. Moreover, this relation is stronger for people
that have similarities with criminal character(Huesmann, 1986; Surette, 2013). Other
scholars have found evidence of increased hostility and engagement in physical fights
among individuals exposed to violent video games (Anderson et al., 2007, 2010), and
violent song lyrics (Anderson et al., 2003).
However, there is also supporting evidence for the “rudder” theory, as many studies have
shown a lack of correlation, or lack of causality, between media content and crime (Fergu-
son et al., 2012, 2009, 2008; Ferguson and Kilburn, 2009; Freedman, 1984; Savage, 2004;
Freedman, 2008; Ferguson, 2002; Huesmann and Taylor, 2006; Gunter, 2008; Murray,
2008). Even if a significant and causal effect could be found, some academics claim that
1For example, violent media tends to be watched the most by those with a relatively higher tastefor violence (Brown and Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005; Huesmann and Taylor, 2006; Coyne, 2007; Savage,2008; Savage and Yancey, 2008; Bushman and Huesmann, 2014; Helfgott, 2015).
5
it could not be large enough to change aggregated criminal rates in notable ways (Surette
and Gardiner-Bess, 2013; Elson and Ferguson, 2014; DeCamp and Ferguson, 2017). This
literature refuses to assume viewers are “passive receptacles of learning”, and instead
conceives individuals as “active shapers and processors of media culture” (Elson and Fer-
guson, 2014). As a result, they argue that the interaction between media and behavior is
shaped by media users, not media content (Elson and Ferguson, 2014).
Furthermore, several studies have shown a stronger and more solid association between
media coverage of crime and the stylistic decisions of criminals. To these scholars, the
media is more a source of crime techniques than a source of crime motivation. In general,
this literature argues that the media’s criminogenic influence concentrates in populations
with pre-existing susceptibility to criminality. More specifically, it shows that environ-
mental factors and psychological predispositions are behind disruptive behavior disorders,
rather than just exposure to media or video games. Based on this research, courts have
systematically ruled against attributing any significant impact to the media (Ferguson
and Dyck, 2012; Ferguson et al., 2012; Grimes et al., 2008; Ferguson and Savage, 2012).
The work of Surette (2014), for example, analyzed anonymous surveys of 574 male and
female correctional inmates. Surette concluded that the media influenced the style of
crimes by providing instructional models to predisposed individuals, yet it did not prompt
crime per se (Surette, 2014). He coined the term “ruddering” to illustrate how media
portrayals of criminality shape the stylistic form the crime takes on, instead of acting as
a direct catalyst for the crime itself (Surette, 2013).
This debate stands unresolved, mostly because of the difficulties involved in finding ap-
propriate ways to measure and correlate the role of the media as a “trigger” or “rud-
6
der” for crime. The first difficulty is gathering data on “copycat” criminals (Surette,
2013). Most studies rely on evidence gathered from post-crime interviews with offenders
(Surette, 2013). This means that all these studies are subject to perception biases and
self-justification. Offenders may rationalize their criminal behavior by attributing it to
the impact of the media, or to other third parties, because they find it comforting to
avoid the cost of decision making. To mitigate this problem, studies have tried to identify
copycat criminals based on the facts of the case (Surette, 2013). Despite this, the lack
of a centralized and comparable source of information that describes crimes occurring at
different times and in different police jurisdictions is a serious challenge. Furthermore,
even if two crimes appear to be similar, scholars cannot be certain that they were inspired
by the same source (Stack, 2000; Coleman, 2004; Surette, 2015).
A second difficulty is that media coverage and criminal behavior may enforce one another.
Front-pages prioritize content with higher audience ratings and editors approval (Reiner
and Newburn, 2007; Fink and Schudson, 2014; Coddington, 2014). Criminal groups may
perpetuate noticeable violent actions to gain more visibility to intimidate their enemies.
Indeed, there is much evidence that media coverage is proactively sought by some criminals
who wish to advance their criminal objectives by receiving attention and inducing fear.
Terrorists are the most common type of such criminal (Schmid and De Graaf, 1982;
Hoffman et al., 2010; Kearns et al., 2014; Abrahms and Conrad, 2017; Brown, 2017; Min,
2013), followed by other criminal organizations (Gambetta, 2009; Duran-Martınez, 2015;
Mendoza Rockwell, 2016; Atuesta, 2017; Martin, 2012; Campbell and Hansen, 2014).
Furthermore, some research has found that criminals tend to value media coverage the
most when there is intergroup competition (Hoffman, 2010; Hoffman et al., 2010; Martin,
2012), when criminal groups identify with ethnic separatist groups instead of groups with
7
broad goals (Min, 2013), when criminal groups operate in democratic governments (Min,
2013), when criminal groups are non-religious (Wright, 2009), when attacks are less lethal
for civilians (Abrahms and Conrad, 2017), when criminals are trying to perform particu-
larly dramatic attacks (Wright, 2009), when criminal groups are “leaderless resistance” or
not hierarchical (Brown and Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005), and when terrorist groups want
to claim credit (Wright, 2009).
In sum, testing for the criminogenic effects of media exposure is problematic because of
the dynamic process between the media, which may be driven by sensationalism, and
criminals, who may be benefited by the direct/indirect reputational gains of media cover-
age. Identifying which of these two reactions happens first is a methodological challenge,
particularly when –as has been the case– academics lack data on the strategic choices of
criminals that has been observed over long-enough time periods to provide material for
statistical inference.
By directly tackling this issue, this paper contributes to studying how media immersion
and narrative influences social behavior (Slater, 2007; Zhang et al., 2010; Valenzuela et al.,
2012), to identifying the effects of violent media contents on criminal behavior (Surette,
2013), and to discerning how media, a crucial element of democracy, can tackle governance
(McCarthy-Latimer and Kendrick Jr, 2016).
Data
Our study uses drug cartels operating at the US-Mexico border as our subjects because
of their notably different stylistic patterns (Martin, 2012), and because their crime rates
8
vary over time and geographically (Coscia and Rios, 2012). Homicides perpetrated by
drug cartels vary in style, stylistic differences can be found in the use of specific types of
weapons, victims’ characteristics, types of torture, the display of dismembered or decapi-
tated bodies at the crime scene, and in the use of other intentionally public displays, such
as banners, that explain their motivations or intents (Shirk and Wallman, 2015; Duran-
Martınez, 2015). Drug cartel-related crimes can be observed across 1,068 municipalities,
from border cities like Rıo Bravo and Tamaulipas that had only 18 homicides from 2008
to 2010, to places like Juarez that endured 6,300 homicides during the same period. A
burgeoning literature seeks to understand the levels of violence in Mexico (Dell, 2015;
Rıos, 2015; Shirk and Wallman, 2015; Osorio, 2015; Calderon et al., 2015; Trejo and Ley,
2017), but research analyzing the dynamics within the conflict, such as communication
strategies, has not kept pace.
Mexican drug cartels are highly relevant as case studies for the interaction of crime and
media. It has been strongly questioned if media outlets should exhibit the violent activi-
ties of drug cartels. While some argue that media’s priority is to show to the public the
truth, other arguments rely on the fact that violent media coverage inspire new forms
of violence and serves as a channel for criminal organizations to gain visibility and dis-
seminate their messages (Reyes, 2011). Despite this controversy, the Mexican National
Institute of Information Access has decided to reserve the right to publish the records
of drug cartel-related crime for up to 12 years, arguing that allowing publication sooner
would also “allow criminal groups to generate instability and insecurity among the Mex-
ican population” (Martin, 2012).
Our research was made possible due to the existence of two unique datasets that we
collected to describe crime rates and crime styles among drug cartels operating at the
9
US-Mexico border. First, to measure “Crime Rates”, we obtained official registries of
homicides attributed to drug cartels by Mexican intelligence and security institutions
(SNSP, 2011). During a short sui generis period (2007-2011), Mexican authorities allowed
public access to a database that recorded whether a homicide was drug cartel-related. This
gave us the unique opportunity to identify drug cartel-related violence in a georeferenced
panel. To be considered drug cartel-related, a homicide needed to meet six criteria. These
are (i) use of high-caliber firearms, (ii) signs of torture or severe lesions in victims, (iii)
bodies found at the crime scene or in a vehicle, (iv) victims were taped, wrapped, or
gagged, (v) murders happened in a prison and involved criminal organizations, and (vi)
if one of several “special circumstance” occurred. Among these “special circumstances”
are whether the victim was abducted prior to assassination (known as a “levanton” in
Spanish), ambushed or chased, whether the victim was an alleged member of a criminal
organization, and whether a criminal organization publicly claimed responsibility for the
murder (Molzahn et al., 2012). In the period from 2008 to 2010, we identified 31,676 drug
cartel-related homicides across 1,112counties/municipalities. Overall, these homicides
represent 95% of all homicides perpetrated during those years and in those areas.
Second, to measure “Criminogenic Style”, we constructed a database that identifies two
discretionary stylistic features that sometimes accompany drug cartel-related homicides:
credit-taking banners and bodies/dismemberment put on display. We matched official
registries of homicides with our original data set of about 1,800 credit-taking banners
displayed publicly by drug cartel organizations during 2007-2010. These banners, also
known as “narco-messages” (Campbell and Hansen, 2014; Martin, 2012; Atuesta, 2017;
Mendoza Rockwell, 2016; Duran-Martınez, 2015), are used by drug cartels to take-credit
for their criminal actions, or to clarify their degree of responsibility for them. Narco-
10
messages may also be displayed to intimidate potential victims, to communicate with
local citizens, or to give instructions to investigators, policemen, or journalists (Martin,
2012). The content of the banners may be a threatening maxim like “you cannot be on
good terms with both God and the Devil”, or an appeal to the public, like the claim that
“this [battle for turf] is for the good of all”, or like the banner dedicated to “the brave,
noble, and loyal people” wishing them “Merry Christmas, ho, ho, ho”. Narco-messages
are a creepy stylistic innovation that stretches the boundaries of traditional graffiti with
its bizarre mimicry of the formality of Mexican political campaign propaganda (Salopek,
2011).
Our database allowed us to identify the share of drug cartel murders that were accom-
panied by a credit-taking banner, we classified this as a dummy called “Credit-taking
Style”.
The use of credit-taking messages in Mexico is fascinating in its own right, but this is not
the only example of such phenomena. We have evidence of similar criminal messaging
occurring around the world, in places such as Colombia, Southern Italy, and in numerous
U.S. cities (Cowell, 1992; Carbray, 2002; Martin, 2012; Ortiz, 2013). Criminal messaging is
also a major part of terrorism, which has been described as violent propaganda or violent
communication (e.g., (Schmid and De Graaf, 1982)). A line of research has examined why
terrorist groups sometimes claim their attacks (Wright, 2009), among reasons for doing
so are intergroup competition (Hoffman et al., 2010), communication within the group
(Brown and Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005), and operation in democratic countries (Min,
2013). However, this literature also established that there are reasons militant groups
do not seek credit. Such reasons could be that the attack was especially heinous, or the
desire to avoid a bad reputation (Hoffman, 2010; Abrahms and Conrad, 2017).
11
Interestingly, and specific to the case of US-Mexico border drug cartels, we were also
able to identify the share of credit-taking banners that were combined with another crim-
inogenic style: the display of bodies or dismemberment (typically beheadings) (Duran-
Martınez, 2015). The stylistic display of human heads or bodies is worth analysis be-
cause it helps us understand why the appearance of the crime scene is important to
these kinds of criminals and how they use violence as a narrative. Narco-messages and
bodies/dismemberment are typically displayed openly in high-traffic public areas where
authorities, citizens, and journalists can easily find them. They are often found on roads,
hanging from bridges, or dispersed around various parts of a city (Lantz, 2016). Out of
the total of 1,800 narco-messages, 51% were accompanied by a body, or part of one. We
created a dummy for homicides with this characteristic and called it “Body Exposure
Style”.
We also developed two ways to measure the extent and the quality of the media cover-
age of criminogenic contents. To create the variable “Media Coverage”, we identified the
amount of drug cartel-related homicides that were covered by the press. Beginning in
2007, news-media organizations closely followed organized crime-related homicides, keep-
ing count independent of government sources. The most comprehensive coverage was done
by Reforma, a major national newspaper with a large pool of correspondents, but other
national newspapers like Milenio and El Universal also had their own independent counts
(Molzahn et al., 2012). The “Justice in Mexico Program” www.justiceinmexico.org has
also gathered statistics regarding media coverage of drug-related homicides from 2006 to
2017 (Reforma, 2017; Milenio, 2017). Out of the 32,199 homicides officially classified as
perpetrated by drug cartels, 23,737 were covered by the press. Coverage is very different
across time, and geography. For example, although the press covered 76% of the homi-
12
cides in 2010, in 2007 it only covered 63%. Also, in Oaxaca, 26% of drug cartel-related
homicides were not covered, meanwhile, in Queretaro were all were covered by the press.
It is important to note that Mexican news outlets and the Mexican government used a
similar methodology to classify a homicide as drug cartel-related (Milenio, 2017).
Finally, to identify the quality of media coverage, we measured the degree of detail with
which each of the 1,800 narco-messages was reported. We classified coverage as “detailed”
when the specific content of the narco-message was reported. This means that messages
like “Esto les va a pasar a los que no respeten a los grandes jefes de La Familia” (this
will happen to those that don’t respect La Familia’s great chiefs) could be read in their
entirety in the newspaper (El Sol de Toluca 2009). Coverage classified as “non-detailed”
was when the reporter only hinted at the existence of a narco-message without explicitly
quoting its content. Out of our total sample, 74% of the messages were detailed. The share
of detailed messages over total messages is represented by the variable “Media Coverage
Quality”.
Our final dataset is thus a weekly-frequency panel with 5,408 observations over a period
of 508 weeks between 2007 and 2010. 2. We exploit state-level variations in measures of
the extent and quality of media coverage, and in measures of the relative frequency of the
two criminogenic styles: narco-messages and body/dismemberment displays. Descriptive
statistics of our measures of media coverage, quality of media coverage, and criminogenic
styles are shown in Table 1.
(Table 1 about here)
2We use weeks as our frequency measure because media coverage measures were only available perweek (Reforma, 2017; Milenio, 2017)
13
On average the media fails to cover 1.28 homicides per week, per state. The lowest
recorded coverage was during the 13th week of 2010 when, in the state of Chihuahua,
the media failed to report on 77 drug related homicides. There are instances in which
media covers more homicides than the official count like during the 43th week of 2010
for the state of Guerrero (61 more homicides). This happens when mass murder graves
are found. Official records generally avoid these records as they consider them just part
of previous “missing persons” statistics. Of the total events covered by the media, on
average only 10.8% are reported in detail. Drug cartels take credit on average for 2.7%
of their homicides. There are cases in which credit taking is up to 250% larger than
homicides because many drug cartels take credit for a single action. Finally, on average
7.9% of credit-taking style homicides were accompanied with the display of bodies or
dismemberment.
Empirical test
To address possible bidirectionalities between media coverage and crime, we rely on re-
action functions and Granger causality tests as our main empirical specifications. These
methods are an efficient way to show co-movements of multiple time series. A large em-
pirical literature supports the use of Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969) for testing
cycles (Jaeger and Paserman, 2008; Huang et al., 2008; Gambacorta et al., 2014) and as a
relevant tool for crime studies with time series analysis (Saridakis, 2004; Ramirez, 2013;
Hsu and McDowall, 2017).
Our panel vector autoregression consists of p lags of each variable in the equation, in this
14
case empirical reaction functions for Criminogenic style (Credit-taking or Body exposure
style) and Media coverage (Media coverage or Media coverage quality):
xit = β0 +5∑
j=1
β1jxit−j +5∑
j=1
β2jzit−j + exit(1)
zit = β0 +5∑
j=1
β1jzit−j +5∑
j=1
β2jxit−j + ezit (2)
where the β1’s and β2’s are matrices of coefficients for each state i, on time t. The terms
z (for 1) and x (for 2) are vectors of exogenous variables that may shift the reaction
function up or down, and ex and ez are the vector error terms. These equations can also
be expressed in matrix form, letting Yit = xitzit and eit:
A(L)Yt = eit (3)
where eit are structural shocks which are, by definition, uncorrelated with each other, and
A(L) is a matrix lag polynomial of order A(L) = I −A1L1−A2L
2 + · · ·+ApLp where A1
is:
A1 =
βx1,1 βx
1,2
βz1,1 βz
1,2
(4)
Note that efficiency and consistency is achieved because all variables in the equations
15
are lagged (t − 1 or earlier), while the error term corresponds to time t, and because all
variables on the right side of the equations are the same.
This specification is advised to test whether two variables can be characterized as a
cycle, or as a unidirectional effect. It fits our purposes because we want to determine if
media coverage is reacting to past crime rates or crime styles, not to solve for a dynamic
equilibrium.
Every panel vector autoregression model is accompanied by a Granger test, a joint signif-
icance test to check the significance of the coefficient of our lagged impulse and response
variables. The null hypothesis that x does not Granger-cause y is accepted if and only if
no lagged values of x are individually significant according to their t-statistics, provided
that collectively they add explanatory power to the regression according to an F-test. The
null hypothesis of the F-test is that there is not explanatory power jointly added by the
x′s. If our coefficients for the impulse variable are significant we can reject the hypothesis
that the impulse variable is not causing the response variable to change. It is considered
that the impulse variable will react to the response variable if the lagged values of the
impulse variable have an effect on the current value of the response variable, controlling
for the lagged values of the response variable.
When estimating a panel vector autoregression, we are generally not interested in our co-
efficients. Instead, we are interested in the dynamic responses of the variables to shocks.
Therefore, we provide additional post-estimation analysis like nonparametric impulse reac-
tion functions and forecast error in variance decomposition. An impulse-reaction function
is a signal processing technique that allowed us to take our defined dynamic system with
16
an input signal, called an impulse, and to describe the reaction of the system to it as a
function of time.
We followed Love and Zicchino (2006) to transform the system of equations into a recursive
autoregressor vector with Choleski decomposition of variance-covariance matrix residuals.
Note that residuals need to be orthogonal to control for other shocks. The forecast error in
variance decomposition is useful to measure how relevant each shock is to the explanation
of each variable in the equation system. This is the same as obtaining the size of the
forecast error in variance for each variable, due to each shock at each period.
Results
Table 2, shows the results for the models that use combinations of variables for quality of
media coverage and crime rates for both reaction functions, estimated from a panel vector
autoregressor with five lags. Columns (1) and (2) show the relationship between quality
of media coverage and crime rates. The results show that exposure to crime media does
not trigger an increase in violent crime or aggression. Specifically, we can see that crime
rates show no reaction in any of the five weeks following media coverage. Additionally,
results show that quality of quality of media coverage also does not react to crime rates.
Our Granger test supports this result, showing that we fail to reject the hypothesis that
quality of media coverage does not “Granger cause” crime rates and vice versa.
Columns (3) and (4) show the relationship between the quality of media coverage and
crime rates. The results show that crime rates do not react to criminogenic media content.
Moreover, quality of media coverage has no reaction to crime rates. As expected, the
17
granger test shows that quality of media coverage and crime rates both fail to predict
each other.
(Table 2 about here)
In Tables 3 and 4, we present the same models as above, but for the two stylistic patterns:
credit-taking (columns 1 and 2) and body exposure (columns 3 and 4).
Columns (1) and (2) of table 3 show the relationship between quality of media cover-
age and observations of crimes that have a credit-taking style. The results indicate that
credit-taking styles of crime increase in a statistically significant way when similar crimes
have been covered in the prior one, two and four weeks. The Granger test supports this
result, showing that quality of media coverage helps to predict credit-taking behavior (5%
significance level), but credit-taking behavior fails to predict quality of media coverage
(35% level). Additionally, the forecast error in variance decomposition supports our find-
ings. We can see that as much as 53% of the error in the prediction of credit-taking crimes
is due to media coverage. In other words, about half of the variance of credit-taking style
is explained, not by previous cases of credit-taking, but by increased detailed media cov-
erage of cases of credit-taking. Drug cartels tend to take credit more for their crimes when
the media has previously covered their crimes with detail.
Columns (3) and (4) show the relationship between quality of media coverage and ob-
servations of crimes that have a body-exposure style. The results are consistent with
previous models, showing that body-exposure styles increase with quality of media cov-
erage of similar crimes during the prior first and fifth weeks. The Granger test supports
these findings that the quality of media coverage helps to predict body-exposure crime
18
styles but with lower significance than previous models. Accepting larger variance, the
model shows that as much as 26% of the error in the forecast of the body-exposure crime
style is due to quality of media coverage. A quarter of the variance of body-exposure style
is explained, not by previous trends in cases of body-exposure, but by increased detailed
media coverage of body-exposure crimes. In other words, rug cartels tend to expose bod-
ies more when the media has previously covered their crimes with detail, yet this effect is
less string than with credit-taking styles.
(Table 3 about here)
Overall, the models above provide evidence that media coverage functions as a crime
“rudder”, and not as crime “trigger”. Our empirical specifications show that there is not
any solid association between media exposure and crime rates. Also, that media coverage
influences the style of the crimes perpetrated by drug cartel organizations operating at the
US-Mexico border, but does not motivate more crime. In other words, we find compelling
evidence that detailed media coverage influences crime style, but not crime rates. It is
also noteworthy that the effects of detailed media coverage on credit-taking styles lasts
up to 4 weeks.
The impulse reaction functions for credit-style taking and media coverage are presented
in figure 1. They use 95 percent confidence intervals and 1000 repetitions of Monte-Carlo
simulations to create a 5 percent band error interval. The graph in the bottom-left corner
describes how the number of credit-taking style crimes reacts to quality of media coverage,
while holding all other shocks at zero. The graph in the top-right shows how quality media
coverage reacts to credit-taking style crimes, while holding all other shocks at zero. The
shocks and the impacts are presented as standard deviations.
19
(Figure 1 about here)
The bottom-left corner of Figure 1 shows that increased quality media coverage of credit-
taking crime styles increases similar crimes in the second and fourth week. This effect is
statistically significant. During the third week, the positive effect decreases and loses sta-
tistical significance; however, it increases during the fourth week and becomes statistically
significant again. After the fourth week, the graph shows a slightly decreasing tendency.
Figure 1 also shows (top-right corner) that when there is a shock in crime-taking style;
quality of coverage increases during the first and second week, decreases during the third
and fourth week, and slightly increases during the fifth week, and has practically no effect
after the fifth week. In this case, the effect of the credit-taking style on quality of media
coverage is only statistically significant for the second week. This pattern is intuitive and
it reflects the news cycle. It is unlikely that one incident would be in the news for more
than two weeks, but specialized opinion or monthly reviews can pick the story up again
once ‘it has been in the cooler’ for a while. This could explain the peaks of the coverage
function.
In Table 4, we present the same models as in Table 3, but instead examine media coverage,
independently it its quality. We have estimates for crime styles in the form of credit-taking
(columns 1 and 3) and body-exposure (columns 3 and 4).
(Table 4 about here)
The results show that we do find a statistically significant reaction to media coverage. As
in Table 4 above, both crime styles increase in a statistically significant way with media
coverage. The impact of both crime styles seems to be present during the first, third, and
20
fourth weeks. Additionally, the Granger test supports a rejection of the hypothesis that
media coverage does not cause the credit-taking criminal style (5% significance level), and
a rejection of the body-exposure hypothesis (5% significance level). As much as 1.9% of
the error in the forecast for credit-taking style, and 0.6% of the error in forecast for body
exposure style is explained by changes in media coverage.
Our results show that criminogenic media content provides criminals with inspiration
regarding the features of the crime, but does not cause crime. Interestingly, and quite
consistent with theories showing that criminogenic media contents influence the style of a
crime, we find that such influence is dramatically stronger when media covers crime with
full detail. In the case of the most detailed media coverage, we observe impacts that are
28 times larger.
Figure 2 presents the impulse-reaction functions with 95 percent confidence bands for
credit-taking and for media coverage (columns 1 and 2 in Table 4). The graph in the
bottom-left corner describes how credit-taking reacts to the media coverage, while holding
all other shocks at zero. The graph in the top-right shows how media coverage reacts to
crimes exhibiting the credit-taking style. The shocks and the impacts are presented as
standard deviations.
The bottom-left corner of Figure 2 shows that when there is an increase in media coverage,
credit-taking crimes increase in the following week. This effect is statistically significant.
During the second week, the positive effect decreases but keeps its statistical significance.
In the third week after coverage, the positive effect decreases again and loses significance.
During the fourth week, however, the positive effect increases and becomes statistically
21
significant again. After the fourth week period, the graph indicates the beginning of a
slightly decreasing tendency without statistical significance.
(Figure 2 about here)
Turning to the top-right corner of Figure 2, we see that credit-taking crimes cause coverage
to increase during the first week, decrease during the second and third week, peak during
the fourth week, but it has practically no effect after.. In this case, the effect of credit-
taking crime on media coverage is only statistically significant for the third week. Again,
this pattern reflects the news cycle.
Robustness tests
To interrogate our data further, we tested for heterogeneous effects driven by (a) the
strength of drug cartel territorial entrenchment, and (b) the degree in which drug cartels
follow media coverage. The logic of behind these tests is straightforward. First, if crim-
inogenic media coverage serves as inspiration for crime style, as we proved in our previous
models, then we should expect that media coverage will have a larger effect in are where
drug cartels are more entrenched and thus, more physically present to be influenced. Sec-
ond, if the media provides instructional cues to people intending to perform criminal acts,
we may see different effects depending on how much drug cartels follow the dissemination
of information by the media. We expect that media coverage will have a larger effect in
areas where traffickers more closely follow media coverage.
We began by testing heterogeneous effects by the strength of drug cartel territorial en-
22
trenchment. We determine whether a state is drug cartel territory by identifying the
presence of drug cartels in different territories over time. To measure drug cartel pres-
ence, we relied on a published big-data framework that uses a text-analysis algorithm
to extract web content about recorded criminal activities by subnational economy. The
algorithm “reads” digitalized records, news content, blogs and Google-News indexed con-
tent searching for instances in which drug cartel operations are mentioned. The Python
crawler was created to extract JSON objects using unambiguous query terms to perform
text analysis. The final data, cleaned using a hyper-geometric cumulative distribution
function, includes 2,449 sub-national economies, and 178 “actor terms” associated with
traffickers and drug cartel organizations. Each actor was classified according as part of
13 drug cartels and a residual category. We have information of 13 drug cartels operating
in Mexico for 19 years (1991 - 2010). Drug cartel organizations operate in 713 munici-
palities in Mexico, and in most of the US-Mexico border. A more detailed description of
the methodology that we followed can be found at the published paper (Coscia and Rios,
2012).
This framework allowed us to obtain information of a phenomenon that would otherwise
require large scale, expensive intelligence exercises. Most importantly, this procedure
helped us to disentangle drug cartels performing violent crimes from drug traffickers that
are present in peace. Many of the recorded drug cartel operations are non-violent, consis-
tent in peacefully trading, transporting, producing or cultivating illegal drugs. This data
set has been a source to study criminal activity in many published papers (Osorio, 2015;
Castillo et al., 2014; Dube et al., 2016; Holland and Rios, 2017).
Table 5 shows our estimates for the quality of media coverage and credit-taking style for
two subsets: areas that are geographical bastions for drug cartels, and areas that are not.
23
The results indicate that crimes with credit-taking style react in a statistically significant
way on the first, second and fourth, as detailed coverage increases. Meanwhile, locations
where drug cartels are not entrenched only exhibit association between criminogenic media
content and the stylistic decisions made by criminals during the second week. The Granger
test bolsters these findings, showing that media coverage helps to predict credit-taking
crimes (10% significance level) in places where drug cartels are entrenched, but fails to
do so otherwise (30% significance level). Furthermore, the forecast error in variance
decomposition supports our findings. We can see that as much as 52% of the error in the
forecast for credit-taking crimes is due to quality of media coverage.
(Table 5 about here)
A second robustness tests was conducted to evaluate heterogeneous effects the degree in
which drug cartels follow media coverage. Following the research of Holland and Rios
(2017), we used statistics of violence against the press as a proxy to measure how much
drug cartels care about the dissemination of information. The degree in which individuals
care about the dissemination of information is crucial in determining the violence that they
are willing to employ against potential informants (Reuter, 1983; Kalyvas, 2006). Only
drug cartels that are powerful and that care and pay attention to the media will incur in
the potentially quite large cost of inflicting violence against journalists to silence the press.
Violence against the press is costly because it may lead to increased federal attention and
enforcement on local illicit activity. Thus, incurring on the high cost of inflicting violence
to journalists is a proxy for how much drug cartels care and pay attention to media
contents.
To identify the existence of violence against the press, we used journalist homicide data
24
collected by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). This same data has been used
before in published academic articles like Holland and Rios (2017). The US-Mexico border
is one of the most dangerous areas in the Western Hemisphere to practice journalism, with
various sources reporting between 85 and 100 journalists having been killed or disappeared
since 2000 (Edmonds-Poli, 2013). In many recent years, journalists in Mexico have faced
levels of danger comparable to countries in war like Iraq and Pakistan (CPJ, 2014). In
fact, in 2010 and 2011, more journalists were assassinated in Mexico than in any other
country in the world, except Pakistan (CPJ, 2014).
Table 6 shows that credit-taking reacts to criminogenic media content in states where
cartels care the most about the dissemination of information. Specifically, there is a pos-
itive and statistically significant association during first, second, and fourth week after
the detailed coverage occurred. Meanwhile, states in which criminals do not follow media
coverage do not show any significant statistical reaction between credit-taking and the
quality of media coverage. The Granger test supports these findings, showing that me-
dia coverage helps to predict credit-taking crimes (1% significance level) in states where
criminals more closely follow press contents, but fails to do so in states where they do
not (65% significance level). Moreover, the forecast error in variance decomposition also
reinforces our findings. We can see that as much as 52% of the error in the forecast for
credit-taking crimes is due to media coverage.
(Table 6 about here)
In sum, our results have clearly defined the relationship between media coverage and
crime style. There is strong evidence that news coverage of stylized crimes is significantly
and predictably responsible for the replication of those styles. In other words, we find
25
that detailed media coverage of crime creates templates for crime. However, there is no
evidence that coverage impacts crime rates. Furthermore, there is a stronger and more
solid association between criminogenic media content and stylistic decisions than there
is between media and crime rates. We interpret these results as evidence of a world in
which the media influences the style of crimes for those already so inclined, but provides
no other kind of encouragement.
It is also notable that we find no evidence to suggest that the relationship between media
coverage and crime style is bidirectional. There exists a Granger causality that runs from
media coverage to criminal style, but not from criminal style to media coverage. We have
also found that the share of drug-related homicides that were publicly claimed increases
when the press covers similar credit-taking crimes. This means that publicity-seeking
criminals use more stylized crimes when they know that their messages will be better
spread by the press, but this does not mean that they commit more crimes. On this view,
media coverage and criminal behavior is not a vicious cycle, but instead a unidirectional
relationship that mostly flows from media coverage to criminal style.
The results above are further cemented by our finding of heterogeneous effects in states
where drug cartels operate. Specifically, we found a clear association between the media
and crime style in states with cartel operations, but not in states without them. Addition-
ally, we found that states in which the press was endangered by cartel operations exhibit
a strong association between media coverage and crime style, but this did not hold for
states without cartel operations. For both cases, we found evidence that the relationship
between media coverage and crime style is not bidirectional.
26
Conclusion
Our research was inspired by one of the most enduring controversies in criminology litera-
ture: whether exposure to criminogenic media content causes crime by “triggering” delin-
quency and aggression (Bushman and Anderson, 2002; Anderson and Carnagey, 2004;
Anderson and Bushman, 2001; Doley et al., 2013; Chadee et al., 2017), or just provides
“rudders” that guide the style of individuals already intending to commit crime (Ferguson
and Dyck, 2012; Ferguson et al., 2012; Grimes et al., 2008; Ferguson and Savage, 2012).
This debate has been difficult to resolve because measuring copycat crime presents major
empirical challenges (Surette, 2014), but also because criminogenic media content and
crime rates may be modeled as a self-reinforcing cycle. This would mean that media
coverage may induce criminal events, and criminal events may also induce increases in
criminogenic media content, if such events are interesting for audiences.
To provide insight into the controversy, and to overcome these empirical challenges, we
examined drug cartel operations at the US-Mexico border by leveraging two exceptionally
fruitful and unique datasets. To do so, we developed an empirical specification that
address the possibility that the relationship between media coverage and criminal behavior
may be bidirectional. Specifically, we defined reaction functions and Granger causality
tests to identify the relationships between media coverage, or media quality, and crime
rates, or crime styles.
Our major finding is that media coverage of crime provides criminals with stylistic inspi-
ration, but does not cause crime rates to increase. Specifically, we found evidence that
two “Criminogenic Styles” tend to react to media coverage: credit-taking banners and
displays of bodies/dismemberment. These results indicate that publicity-seeking crimi-
27
nals will intensify the most gruesome aspects of their crimes if they believe that doing so
means that their messages will get more attention. Additionally, contrary to suppositions,
a strong Granger causality from media coverage to crime style shows that this relationship
is unidirectional.
When media covers crimes in larger detail, criminals increase the use of credit-taking and
body exposure styles. As much as 53% of the variance in credit-taking styles of crime is
explained by changes in the quality of media coverage. The use of body-exposure styles
is also influenced by the quality of press coverage, but much less, only 26%, and with
higher variance. This may be related to the higher costs related to copycat different
styles. While credit-taking requires displaying a public banner next to a homicide, body-
exposure requires dismembering and displaying the body of the victim. Interestingly, we
also present evidence that detailed criminogenic contents (media coverage in which all
the details of the crime are covered) have up to 28 larger effects on crime style. Our
robustness tests also show that, as expected we find stronger in territories where drug
cartels are more entrenched, and where they follow media coverage with more attention.
Although this paper has contributed to a better understanding of the relationship between
the press and criminal behavior, future research would need to test for causal relationships
beyond Granger causality. Furthering this area of research is critical to the social sciences
and to democratic governance because it exposes the tension between two important
values: freedom of the press and the de-escalation of horrific publicity-seeking crime styles
(Doley et al., 2013)). In addition to guiding us as we consider this issue, this research will
assist with the development of better strategies to stifle terrorism, criminal organizations,
copycat criminals, and individuals who aspire to notoriety.
28
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statisticsVariable Mean Std. Dev. Min MaxMedia coverage 1.29 6.11 -77.62 61.45Quality of media coverage 0.11 0.30 0 1Credit-taking style crimes 0.03 0.14 0 2.5Body-exposure style crimes 0.08 0.26 0 1
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Table 2: Crime and media coverageVariable Coverage Homicides Coverage Quality HomicidesMedia coverage (t-1) -0.0046 0.0278Media coverage (t-2) 0.0022 -0.0211Media coverage (t-3) 0.0308 -0.0223Media coverage (t-4) -0.0040 -0.0038Media coverage (t-5) 0.0696 -0.0323Coverage quality (t-1) 0.1078*** 0.2056Coverage quality (t-2) 0.0770*** -0.0549Coverage quality (t-3) 0.0107 -0.0088Coverage quality (t-4) 0.0396* 0.2573Coverage quality (t-5) 0.0117 0.0465Homicides (t-1) -0.0992 1.2025*** 0.0053 1.1804***Homicides (t-2) -0.0347 -0.2813*** -0.0040 -0.2712***Homicides (t-3) 0.1742 0.1222*** 0.0066* 0.1259***Homicides (t-4) -0.2113 -0.2606*** -0.0008* -0.2637***Homicides (t-5) 0.1915 0.2153*** -0.0043 0.2208**Granger test (Prob>chi2) 0.249 0.301 0.015 0.442
Note: * p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01.
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Table 3: Quality of media coverage and crime stylesVariable Coverage quality Credit-taking Coverage Quality Body exposureCoverage quality (t-1) 0.0683** 0.0683** 0.1020*** 0.0198**Coverage quality (t-2) 0.0213 0.0442* 0.0738*** 0.0096Coverage quality (t-3) -0.0092 0.0172 -0.0016 0.0033Coverage quality (t-4) 0.0282 0.0568** 0.0295 0.0026Coverage quality (t-5) -0.0053 0.0099 0.0177 0.0222**Credit-taking (t-1) 0.0424 0.0612*Credit-taking (t-2) 0.0692** 0.0838**Credit-taking (t-3) 0.0129 0.0373Credit-taking (t-4) -0.0017 0.0925*Credit-taking (t-5) 0.0076 -0.0182Body exposure (t-1) 0.0088 0.0612*Body exposure (t-2) -0.0024 0.0838**Body exposure (t-3) 0.0352 0.0373Body exposure (t-4) 0.0250 0.0925*Body exposure (t-5) -0.0418 -0.0182Granger test (Prob>chi2) 0.312 0.048** 0.786 0.155
Note: * p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01.
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Table 4: Media coverage and crime stylesVariable Media coverage Credit-taking Media coverage Body exposureMedia coverage (t-1) 0.0153 -0.0033*** 0.0168 -0.0005*Media coverage (t-2) 0.0191 -0.0012 0.0193 -0.0003Media coverage (t-3) 0.0406 -0.0022** 0.0414 -0.0009***Media coverage (t-4) 0.0072 -0.0018* 0.0107 -0.0006*Media coverage (t-5) 0.0709 -0.0012 0.0710 -0.0002Credit-taking (t-1) 0.1689 0.1599***Credit-taking (t-2) -0.3733 0.1310***Credit-taking (t-3) -0.7232* 0.0609***Credit-taking (t-4) 0.5442 0.0498**Credit-taking (t-5) -0.2387 0.0462**Body exposure (t-1) 0.6198* 0.0815***Body exposure (t-2) 0.2679 0.0947***Body exposure (t-3) -0.3150 0.0425Body exposure (t-4) 0.6989** 0.0967**Body exposure (t-5) 0.2183 0.0043Granger test (Prob>chi2) 0.204 0.037** 0.101 0.012**
Note: * p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01.
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Table 5: Strength of drug cartel territorial entrenchmentOperations No operations
Variable Coverage quality Credit-taking Coverage Quality Credit-takingCoverage quality (t-1) 0.0653 0.0754** 0.0722 0.0632*Coverage quality (t-2) 0.0194 0.0658* 0.0244 0.0029Coverage quality (t-3) -0.0193 0.0288 0.0108 -0.0102Coverage quality (t-4) 0.0241 0.0755** 0.0372 0.0172Coverage quality (t-5) -0.0511 -0.0103 0.0908** 0.0510*Credit-taking (t-1) 0.0472 0.1319*** 0.0334 0.0229Credit-taking (t-2) 0.0685* 0.0946** 0.0685 0.0933**Credit-taking (t-3) 0.0175 0.0356 0.0047 0.0819Credit-taking (t-4) 0.0015 0.0112 -0.0112 0.0071Credit-taking (t-5) 0.0287 0.0559 -0.0402 0.0147Granger test (Prob>chi2) 0.484 0.056** 0.775 0.293
Note: * p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01.
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Table 6: Degree in which drug cartels follow media coverageViolence against the press No violence against the press
Variable Coverage quality Credit-taking Coverage Quality Credit-takingCoverage quality (t-1) 0.1303** 0.1028** 0.0411 0.0533Coverage quality (t-2) 0.0211 0.0724* 0.0221 0.0341Coverage quality (t-3) 0.0026 0.0295 -0.0127 0.0129Coverage quality (t-4) 0.0806 0.1342*** 0.0048 0.0243Coverage quality (t-5) 0.0165 -0.0141 -0.0130 0.0219Credit-taking (t-1) -0.0499 0.0443 0.0821** 0.1313Credit-taking (t-2) 0.0764 0.0751 0.0661 0.1085Credit-taking (t-3) 0.0344 0.0728 0.0030 0.0400Credit-taking (t-4) -0.0540 -0.0695 0.0226 0.0446Credit-taking (t-5) -0.0199 0.0258 0.0174 0.0476Granger test (Prob>chi2) 0.539 0.006*** 0.262 0.639
Note: * p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01.
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Figures
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Figure 1: Impulse reaction functions, Quality of media coverage and Credit-taking stylecrimes
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Figure 2: Impulse reaction functions, Media coverage and Credit-taking style crimes
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