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THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL BUDGETING ON TREATMENT OUTCOMES. Kanhom Kan Shu -Fen Li Wei- Der Tsai. Objective of this study Investigate the impact of global budgeting on treatment outcome. Motivation: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL BUDGETING ON TREATMENT OUTCOMES
Kanhom KanShu-Fen Li Wei-Der Tsai
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Objective of this studyInvestigate the impact of global budgeting on
treatment outcome.
Motivation:1. The rapid increase in health care expenditure
since the 1960s has become a great concern to policy makers in most developed countries.
2. Global Budgeting is effective in controlling medical expenditures and it was adopted in OECD countries (see Docteur and Oxley, 2004, and Wolfe and Moran, 1993).
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Figure 1 Comparison of per capita NHE between OECD Countries and Taiwan
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
5,500
6,000
6,500
7,000
7,500
8,000
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000
NHE( )平均每人 美元
GDP( )平均每人 美元
Taiwan
Norway
Japan2006
IcelandDenmark
Sweden Ireland
FinlandUnited Kingdom
AustriaCanada
Belgium
Australia2006
ItalyGreece
France
New Zealand
Spain
KoreaCzech Republic
HungarySlovak Republic
Portugal2006
Turkey2005
Poland
Germany
Mexico
Netherlands
Data Source: OECD Health Data 2009
4資料來源:中央健保局
Figure 2 The Growth of NHI Revenues and Expenditures
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Literature Review Most relative research focus on the provider’s
behavior responses (quantity and quality) to global budgeting:
A. Theoretical Prediction:1. Phelps (1997) and Fan, et al. (1998) show that
medical service providers will increase the quantity of services supplied.
2. Benstetter and Wambach’s (2006) suggest that there is likely to be a coordination failure such that medical service providers will supply a high quantity of services in order to achieve a target income and prevent bankruptcy (the so-called “treadmill effect”).
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Literature Review (Cont)A. Theoretical Predictions:3. Based on the assumption of monopolist and Cournot
competitive market, Mougeot and Naegelen (2005) suggest that compared with FFS, an expenditure cap results in a lower level of service quantity and quality.
4. Feldman and Lobo’s (1997) assume that medical service providers’ utility is a function of services quantity and quality. Their model indicates that the excess demand which is prevalence under global budget systems is due to the high level of resource intensity chosen by service providers.
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Literature Review (Cont)B. Empirical Evidence: 1. Rochaix (1993) show in response to an expenditure
cap, physicians in Québec increase their activity levels, and provide more complex and high-priced procedures.
2. Similar results found by Hurley et al. (1997) [cases
of Alberta and Scotia Nova in Canada] and Lee and Jones (2004) [case of Taiwan’s dentists].
3. Chen et al. (2007) and Cheng, et al. (2009) show that hospitals in Taiwan are more likely to hospitalize patients under global budgeting.
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The literature is silent on the issue that whether the implement of global budgeting has an impact on quality or treatment outcome.
Using the data of Taiwan’s National Health Insurance claim records in 1998-2007, we examine the effect of global budgeting on treatment outcomes of AMI (acute myocardial infraction), ischemic stroke and hemorrhagic stroke patients.
The treatment outcome is measured by inpatient readmission within 30 days, and the rate of 7, 14, 30, 60 and 90 days post-discharge mortality.
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Background of Taiwan’s NHINational Health Insurance (NHI) was
implemented in March of 1995.NHI provides patients with comprehensive care,
but only requests low out of pocket expenditures. Payment system started from FFS in 1995, but
changed to global budget system sector by sector. 1998/7 Dental services2000/7 Chinese Medicine2001/7 Community clinics in 20012002/7 Hospital services 2010/1 DRG for hospital inpatient services.
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Background of Taiwan’s NHI (cont)Under FFS, a providers is credited a certain
point for each treatment procedure offered and each point is worth NT$ 1.
Under global budgeting system, there is a regional level expenditure cap. Taiwan was divided into six medical regions. The point value for a given region is determined as follows
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Figure 3 Medical Region in Taiwan
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Figure 4 Health Care Expenditures Funded by NHI
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Figure 5 Point Value
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Figure 6 Treatment Intensity by Average Number of Points per in-patients
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Figure 7 Treatment of AMI Patients
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Data DescriptionClaim record form the 1998-2007 Claim File
of Taiwan’s NHI.
The claim record contain information both on hospitalized patients’ and hospitals’ characteristics.
We use the claim data to construct three samples, including AMI (acute myocardial infraction, ICD 410), ischemic stroke ( ICD 434) and hemorrhagic stroke (ICD 430 & 431)patients.
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Data DescriptionSome criteria are imposed to exclude observations.
(a) admitted to hospitals due to same ICD code in
previous year;(b) hospitalized for more than 30 days;(c) admitted to a hospital, which treated less than
300 cases in the past 10 year;(d) younger than 30 or older than 80. (e) hospitalized during June, July and August of 2002. There are total 63,142, 238,810 and 99,907 patients,
respectively, for AMI, Ischemic stroke and hemorrhagic stroke in 1998-2007.
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Year Readmission
Within 30 days
discharge
Sample size
Mortality within 7
days after discharge
Mortality within 14 days after discharge
Mortality within 30 days after discharge
Mortality within 60 days after discharge
Mortality within 90 days after discharge
Sample Size
1998 .093 4,779 .186 .197 .210 .222 .230 6,054
1999 .091 5,500 .188 .199 .209 .221 .233 6,950
2000 .092 6,045 .169 .177 .189 .202 .212 7,455
2001 .092 6,582 .177 .184 .194 .207 .217 8,171
2002 .073 7,167 .160 .167 .178 .192 .202 8,723
2003 .065 7,496 .158 .166 .177 .190 .200 9,105
2004 .071 8,319 .158 .163 .173 .187 .197 10,057
2005 .063 8,749 .150 .155 .166 .176 .186 10,487
2006 .054 9,120 .143 .149 .158 .171 .179 10,827
2007 .048 9,904 .122 .127 .134 .144 .151 11,431
Mean value of treatment outcome for AMI patients
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Year ReadmissionWithin 30
days discharge
Sample size
Mortality within 7
days after discharge
Mortality within 14 days after discharge
Mortality within 30 days after discharge
Mortality within 60 days after discharge
Mortality within 90 days after discharge
Sample Size
1998 .069 20,325 .054 .061 .070 .084 .094 21,907
1999 .069 22,008 .054 .059 .069 .081 .091 23,684
2000 .068 23,916 .048 .054 .062 .075 .085 25,581
2001 .069 26,019 .047 .051 .060 .072 .081 27,779
2002 .067 27,352 .043 .048 .056 .067 .077 29,069
2003 .056 26,550 .043 .048 .056 .068 .077 28,247
2004 .065 27,947 .041 .045 .052 .064 .073 29,700
2005 .058 28,513 .042 .046 .054 .064 .073 30,349
2006 .059 30,235 .040 .043 .051 .061 .068 32,054
2007 .057 28,814 .036 .039 .044 .050 .057 30,352
Mean value of treatment outcome for Ischemic Stroke patients
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Year ReadmissionWithin 30
days discharge
Sample size
Mortality within 7
days after discharge
Mortality within 14 days after discharge
Mortality within 30 days after discharge
Mortality within 60 days after discharge
Mortality within 90 days after discharge
Sample Size
1998 .116 4,729 .276 .290 .306 .317 .324 6,857
1999 .129 5,040 .286 .298 .310 .321 .326 7,340
2000 .131 5,593 .280 .290 .300 .311 .317 8,044
2001 .133 5,749 .279 .289 .299 .309 .316 8,258
2002 .135 5,769 .276 .285 .293 .304 .310 8,225
2003 .109 5,813 .276 .284 .293 .302 .308 8,280
2004 .127 6,141 .277 .283 .291 .300 .305 8,781
2005 .116 6,294 .278 .282 .289 .296 .302 8,979
2006 .113 6,104 .270 .275 .281 .288 .293 8,627
2007 .108 5,884 .248 .253 .259 .265 .267 8,044
Mean value of treatment outcome for hemorrhagic stroke patients
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Empirical Strategy Linear probability model:
Where subscribe d index calendar dates, h and i index, respectively, the hospital and the patient; yhid an outcome of interest; GBd global budgeting indicator; trendd year trend, Xhid a vector of patient characteristics (i.e., CCI score, age, gender); ηh hospital fixed effect; εhid residuals.
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Empirical Strategy (cont) To have a preliminary examination of the effect of GB on patient
outcome, we first estimate a fixed effects model without GBd :
We employ a nonparametric smoothing method, call local polynomial
(Fan and Gijbels, 1996), to display the predicted residual
Where g = 0, 1 indicating the pre- and post-global budgeting periods.
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Empirical Strategy (cont)The graphs indicate that the pattern of the
time trend is the residuals before and after the implementation of GB are different.
To incorporate the effect of time on the readmission and mortality of AMI and stroke patients, we estimate the following specification model
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Empirical Results
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Empirical Results (cont)
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Empirical Results (cont)
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Conclusion Our estimation results suggest that global
budgeting has some effects on post-discharge readmission and mortality for for-profit hospitals.
Our empirical results suggest that global budgeting leads to an improvement in treatment outcomes for for-profit hospitals. For AMI patients, GB reduces post-discharge readmission by 1.67%, and 7 and 14 days post-discharge mortality by approximately 2%. For hemorrhagic stroke patients, GB reduces the 14, 30 and 60 days post-discharge mortality by 0.0195-0.0233.