The historical argument for the Christian faith: A response to Alvin Plantinga

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53: 147–161, 2003.© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

147

The historical argument for the Christian faith: A response toAlvin Plantinga

JASON COLWELLDepartment of Mathematics, Caltech 253-37, 1200 E, California Boulevard, Pasadena, CA91125

Introduction

In Chapter 8 of his book, Warranted Christian Belief, Alvin Plantinga criti-cally discusses the historical argument for the Christian faith. Generally, hecharacterizes the historical argument as an evidentialist argument for the truthof Christianity. Specifically, he says that the argument claims to show that theconditional probability of the central claims of the Christian faith, given thetruth of a certain body of background knowledge, is high. Historical argu-ments, in Plantinga’s view, rest on a sequence of propositions, beginningwith the background knowledge assumed and ending with (the conjunctionof) the central claims of the Christian faith. Each proposition in the sequenceprovides evidence for the next. In this way, he explains, the backgroundknowledge provides evidence for the final proposition. More precisely, sucha sequence of propositions provides a lower bound on the conditional proba-bility of the final proposition (the truth of the central claims of Christianity)given the inital proposition (the background knowledge). Plantinga’s mainpoint is that such a sequence of propositions provides a small lower bound,and thus he concludes that the historical argument provides weak evidencefor the Christian faith.

In this article, I wish to show that Plantinga’s considerations do notrequire us to dispose of the historical argument. I intend to argue that thelower bound may be significantly increased by simultaneous considerationof several different sequences of propositions. Supposing these requisitesequences can be found, the significant increase in the lower bound showsPlantinga’s conclusion to be false. (And as a matter of fact, many have arguedfor the truth of propositions comprising such sequences.)

I am not claiming to show here that the historical argument is a good one.Rather, I am trying to demonstrate that the weakness Plantinga finds in theargument need not be fatal, as he thinks, but that it might be compensated

148 JASON COLWELL

for, in fact by a mathematical principle similar to the one he uses. It is inter-esting to note that Plantinga’s arguments in Warranted Christian Belief havea similar scope: he does not argue that Christian belief is warranted. Rather,he proposes a model whereby Christian belief could have warrant.

The historical argument

The historical argument, says Plantinga, is an attempt to derive the conclu-sion that the central truths of Christianity are probable given the evidencefrom history available to us. I shall first look in detail at his explanationand negative evaluation of the historical argument. Then I shall make twoobervations. My first and primary observation is that multiple sequences ofpropositions may strengthen the historical argument in a way that Plantingahas not considered. My second observation is that non-historical evidencemight be used along with historical evidence to further strengthen thehistorical argument.

The historical argument, explains Plantinga, rests on a sequence ofpropositions such as the following:

K The things which we all take as background knowledge are indeedtrue.

T God exists.A God would make some kind of revelation to humankind. This revela-

tion could be of God or of certain aspects of him of which it isimportant for humankind to know.

B Jesus’ teachings were such that they could be sensibly interpretedand extrapolated to G.

C Jesus rose from the dead.D In raising Jesus from the dead, God endorsed his teachings.E The extension and extrapolation of Jesus’ teachings to G is true.G The central claims of the gospel are true.

Here C must be taken to refer to a literal bodily resurrection.The argument then proceeds by claiming that the existence of God,

T , is probable on K, our background knowledge. This (assumedly high)probability is denoted by P(T |K). Next, the argument asserts that A

is probable on the conjunction T &K, i.e. that P(A|T &K) is high.Similarly, P(B|K&T &A), P(C|K&T &A&B), P(D|K&T &A&B&C),P(E|K& T &A&B&C&D), P(G|K&T &A&B&C&D&E) are taken to behigh. Then the argument claims that P(G|K) is high, that is, that G isprobable on K.

THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE CHRISTIAN FAITH 149

The law of dwindling probabilities

Plantinga exposes a flaw in this historical argument by noting that theseprobabilities have to be multiplied to obtain the probability P(G|K) whicha proponent of the argument wishes to be high. By the usual arithmetic ofconditional probabilities, we have the relations

P(G|K) ≥ P(G|K&T &A&B&C&D&E) · P(T &A&B&C&D&E|K),

P (T &A&B&C&D&E|K) = P(E|K&T &A&B&C&D) · P(T &A&B&C&D|K),

P (T &A&B&C&D|K) = P(D|K&T &A&B&C) · P(T &A&B&C|K),

P (T &A&B&C|K) = P(C|K&T &A&B) · P(T &A&B|K),

P (T &A&B|K) = P(B|K&T &A) · P(T &A|K),

and P(T &A|K) = P(A|K&T ) · P(T |K).

Substituting each relation into the previous one, we obtain

P(G|K) ≥ P(G|K&T &A&B&C&D&E) · P(E|K&T &A&B&C&D)

· P(D|K&T &A&B&C)

· P(C|K&T &A&B)

· P(B|K&T &A)

· P(A|K&T )

· P(T |K).

For the purpose of illustration, Plantinga then proceeds to assign approximatevalues to each of the probabilities on the right-hand side of the above equa-tion. He notes that E entails G, so that the first probability is 1. (Equivalently,one could omit the first factor.) He assigns to the others values

P(E|K&T &A&B&C&D) ∈ [0.7, 0.9]P(D|K&T &A&B&C) = 0.9

P(C|K&T &A&B) ∈ [0.6, 0.8]P(B|K&T &A) ∈ [0.7, 0.9]

P(A|K&T ) ∈ [0.9, 1]P(T |K) ∈ [0.9, 1].

Then, although these probabilities each is reasonably high, their product,the value on the right-hand side of the above inequality is low: ≥0.21 if wechoose the left endpoint of each interval, ≥0.35 if we choose the midpointof each interval. Plantinga calls this phenomenon the “law of dwindlingprobabilities”.

150 JASON COLWELL

An observation about dwindling probabilities

My main observation is that the law of dwindling probabilities also givessupport for the historical argument in question. Specifically, one can apply,in a way Plantinga has not considered, the mathematical fact, the sameone considered by Plantinga, that for events X1, . . . , Xn, the probabilityP(X1&X2& . . . &Xn) can be small even if the individual probabilities P(Xi)

are large. (The discussion here will be comfortably short on mathematicalrigour, but more detailed calculations of probability can be found in AppendixA.)

Suppose there is a set of n sequences of propositions,

Y1,1, Y1,2, . . . Y1,m1,

Y2,1, Y2,2, . . . Y1,m2,...

Yn,1, Yn,2, . . . Yn,mn

(of respective lengths m1,m2, . . . , mn), each of which forms an argument forthe truth of the gospel. That is, the ith argument can be represented as a chainof (claimed) implications:

K

��K&Yi,1

��K&Yi,1&Yi,2

��...

��K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi−1

��K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi

��G


We have n sequences and thus n different arguments for G. In the ith argu-ment, one would argue from K to Yi,1, from K&Yi,1 to Yi,2, from K&Yi,1&Yi,2

to Yi,3, and so on, until finally one would argue that G follows fromK&Yi,1&Yi,2& . . . &Yi,mi

. The situation can be depicted by the followingdiagram:

K

��

��

��

Y1,1

��

Y2,1

��

· · · Yn,1

��Y1,2

��

Y2,2

��

· · · Yn,2

��...

��

...

��

...

��Y1,m1

��

��

Y2,m2

��

Yn,mn

��

G

(The n sequences may not all be of the same length, as it might appear fromthe diagram.) Within each sequence, we consider the conditional statements

Yi,1 | K,

Yi,2 | K&Yi,1,

...

Yi,mi| K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi−1,

G | K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi,

which form an argument from our background knowledge K to our desiredconclusion G.

The essential idea is that although each of the n arguments may be weakon its own, they may be strong together. The chains may together providegood evidence for their common conclusion G.

We shall assume that each of the n arguments is independent of eachother argument. (The type of analysis which follows may also be done inthe case where the sequences of propositions are dependent or even over-lapping, though the calculations then are more complex. An example of suchcalculations is given in Appendix B.)

152 JASON COLWELL

For any fixed i, Plantinga’s analysis is correct. Precisely, suppose that

P(G | K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi)

·P(Yi,mi| K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi−1)

...

·P(Yi,2 | K&Yi,1)

·P(Yi,1 | K),

which we denote by Pi , is small (even while, as Plantinga allows, eachmultiplicand may be large). We have

P(G|K) ≥ P(G|K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi)

·P(Yi,mi|K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi−1)

...

·P(Yi,2|K&Yi,1)

·P(Yi,1|K)

= Pi,

which gives a weak lower bound on P(G|K). That is, for each i, it is probablethat the ith argument fails.

But we can apply the law of dwindling probabilities to

{1 − Pi}1≤i≤n ,

the set of probabilities of the respective chains of (claimed) implicationsfailing. It says that although each 1 − Pi (the probability that the ith chainfails) is large, the product (1 − P1)(1 − P2) · · · (1 − Pn) (the probability thatall the chains fail) may be small. Equivalently, although Pi (the probabilitythat the ith chain succeeds) is small, 1 − (1 − P1)(1 − P2) · · · (1 − Pn) (theprobability that at least one of the chains succeeds) may be large. If suitablepropositions {Yi,j }i,j can be found, then there will be a large lower bound forthe probability of G:

P(G|K) ≥ 1 − (1 − P1)(1 − P2) · · · (1 − Pn)


An example supporting the historical argument

The following example illustrates that this method can be deployed in supportof the historical argument. For ease of notation, let us rename the propositionsT , A, B, C, D, E already used, writing Y1,1 = T , Y1,2 = A, Y1,3 = B,Y1,4 = C, Y1,5 = D, and Y1,6 = E. This sequence of propositions will beused along with two other sequences now to be defined. The first of these twoother sequences is the following:

Y2,1 The Old Testament prophecies were in fact written well in advanceof Jesus’ life.

Y2,2 The Old Testament prophecies predicted the coming of aMessiah.

Y2,3 The Old Testament prophecies were fulfilled in the person of Jesusof Nazareth.

Y2,4 This fulfillment of prophecy demonstrated that Jesus was divine, andthat the things he taught were true.

The first proposition, Y2,1, is reasonably certain. The next, Y2,2, is alsofairly certain, though many Jews today do not wait for a personal Messiah,and take the passages to be figurative. There is much evidence for Y2,3,assuming Y2,1 and Y2,2. Moishe Rosen argues, using the Jewish calendarand calculations of the periods of time given in the Book of Daniel,that the prophecies of Daniel were fulfilled in Jesus.1 Finally, Y2,4 mightalso be well argued for, assuming that the previous three statements aretrue.

We now turn to a third sequence of propositions. This one concerns thechurch which sprang up, both in Palestine and as far away as India, by thework of Jesus’ apostles. Nine or ten of the twelve (all but Judas and John, andpossibly Matthew) were martyred for their faith. They died refusing to denytheir beliefs in Jesus and his teachings. They also claimed to have personallyseen him after his resurrection. Following, then, are the propositions we shallconsider:

Y3,1 Jesus had apostles who spread the message of Christianity after hisdeath.

Y3,2 Nine of them died for that message.Y3,3 They died claiming what the book of Acts records: that Jesus

appeared to numerous people in bodily form after his death.Y3,4 They were not mistaken or insane, and would not all have died for

what they knew was a lie.The plan of the argument (which is composed of three separate arguments)

can be depicted as follows:

154 JASON COLWELL

K

��

��

��

��

Y1,1

��

Y2,1

��

Y3,1

��Y1,2

��

Y2,2

��

Y3,2

��Y1,3

��

Y2,3

��

Y3,3

��Y1,4

��

Y2,4

��

Y3,4

��

Y1,5

��Y1,6

��

��

G

I will not attempt to assign values to the conditional probabilities involvedin these sequences of assertions. Instead, I will assume that P2 and P3

are comparable to Plantinga’s moderate estimate, 0.35, for P1. Under thisassumption, we discover that the probability of G on K is at least

1 − (1 − P1)(1 − P2)(1 − P3)

= 1 − (1 − 0.35)(1 − 0.35)(1 − 0.35)

� 0.725.

This is certainly an improvement, and demonstrates how the law of dwindlingprobabilities, though working against the argument in one way, can work forit in another way. I claim that the mathematical principle which appears toweaken the historical argument bears upon the argument not only by weak-ening each sequence of propositions, but also by combining the strengths ofmultiple sequences of propositions. The essential principle involved is thatwhereas the law of dwindling probabilities decreases the probability of aconjunction, it increases the probability of a disjunction.

But perhaps we can do better still with a another observation. I am notreferring to the finding of more independent sequences of historical claims,


though that may be possible. Instead, let us consider other evidence, suchas personal sensory experience (here “sense” is intended not to include thesensus divinitatis) and accounts of miracles in modern times. We may applythe same reasoning to this whole set of evidence (including the historicalevidence just discussed). Of course these experiences and reports would haveto be specific enough to lead us to conclude the truth of Christianity or offundamental claims thereof. But such may exist, and the law of dwindlingprobabilities would give us, even for six independent sequences of proposi-tions, each chain of conditionals yielding alone a probability of 0.35, aresulting estimated chance of 1 − (1 − 0.35)6 � 0.925 that the claims ofthe gospel are true.

With this argument, I do not mean to suggest that faith is unnecessaryfor the acceptance of the central truths of Christianity, that the need for faithis removed by the use of reason. Plantinga says that there is within everyhuman being a capability to perceive God directly, which he calls the sensusdivinitatis. “The sensus divinitatis is a disposition or set of dispositions toform theistic beliefs in various circumstances, in response to the sorts ofconditions or stimuli that trigger the working of this sense of divinity.”2 Thesensus divinitatis, says Plantinga, is damaged or impeded by sin and mustbe restored to proper function by faith and the working of the Holy Spirit.Further to Plantinga’s exposition, perhaps our fallen state makes us unable tofollow (unaided) the deliverances of our reason when they would lead us intohumble submission to God. Indeed, the Apostle Paul speaks in Romans 7 ofsin “living” in him, making him unable to do even the good he wants to do.Romans 7:23 says: “. . . but I see another law at work in the members of mybody, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner ofthe law of sin at work within my members.”

The matter of the need for faith is raised with a question at the beginningof Plantinga’s discussion of the historical argument. “But given that recalibra-tion [of your affections, aims, and intentions], couldn’t you then see andappreciate the historical case for the truth of the main lines of Christianitywithout any special work of the Holy Spirit?”3 Not necessarily; becausealthough historical evidence may well function as part of a strong argumentfor the truth of the Christian faith, the internal instigation of the Holy Spiritmay still be necessary to bring someone to believe that truth.

Conclusion

The historical argument attempts to show that the central claims ofChristianity are probable given the evidence available to us from history. Inthe historical argument, a sequence of propositions is used, each of which is

156 JASON COLWELL

probable given the truth of the previous propositions. Accordingly, from thesequence of propositions a chain of conditionals is constructed which leadsfrom background knowledge consisting of propositions commonly assumedto be true, to the desired conclusion that the gospel is true. Plantinga illustratesthe fact that even if each conditional in the chain is very likely true, the wholechain of conditionals may provide weak evidence for the Christian faith.

I respond by pointing out that if several sequences of propositions areused, the historical argument may be much strengthened. I consider the setof chains of conditionals constructed, each chain being constructed froma sequence. Standard calculations of probability are used to show that themultiple chains of conditionals combine disjunctively. That is, the (perhapshigh) probabilities of each chain having at least one of its conditionals false– this is the conclusion of Plantinga’s argument – are multiplied to give alow probability that all of the chains so fail. In Plantinga’s considerations, theprobabilities of the statements in a conjuction (the probabilities that each ofthe conditionals in a chain is true) are multiplied. In my considerations, theprobabilities of the negations of the statements in a disjunction (that is, theprobabilities that the chains fail) are multiplied. Then it is seen to be likelythat at least one of the chains has all its conditionals true. Thus, we obtain areasonably high lower bound for the probability that the claims of the gospelare true.

Based upon the argument from dwindling probabilities associated withone chain of historical evidence, one might be tempted to think it unprofit-able to try to find support for the gospel in the historical argument. Such athought, however, would be mistaken because, as I have shown in this article,multiple chains of historical evidence may be deployed to provide strongsupport for the central claims of the Christian faith. There is no reason tobecome discouraged about the strength of the historical argument.4

Appendix A: Detailed calculations of probability

While this section is not necessary for a basic understanding of my argument, itjustifies rigourously my reasoning concerning the n sequences of propositions.

Suppose there is a doubly indexed collection {Yi,j }1≤i≤n,1≤j≤mi∀i of proposi-tions. For each i, we consider the conditional statements

Yi,1 | K,

Yi,2 | K&Yi,1,

...

Yi,mi | K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi−1,

G | K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi ,


which form an argument from our background knowledge K to our desiredconclusion G. Again, the diagram which depicts the situation is:

K

��

��

Y1,1

��

Y2,1

��

· · · Yn,1

��Y1,2

��

Y2,2

��

· · · Yn,2

��...

��

...

��

...

��Y1,m1

��

��

Y2,m2

��

Yn,mn

��

G

The essential idea is that although each of the n arguments may be weak on itsown, they may be strong together. The chains may together provide good evidencefor their common conclusion G. Precisely, denoting by Yi the conjunction

Yi,1&Yi,2& . . . &Yi,mi ,

it is the case that the statements

{G&Yi |K}1≤i≤n

may each be improbable while their disjunction may be probable. (The truth of thisdisjunction would in particular imply the truth of G given K .)

Assume that for any i0 �= i1, j0, j1, the statements

Yi0,j0+1|K&Yi0,1& . . . &Yi0,j

andYi0,j1+1|K&Yi1,1& . . . &Yi1,j

are independent. Put another way, we shall assume that each of the n arguments isindependent of each other argument. (The type of analysis which follows may alsobe done in the case where the sequences of conditional statements

Yi,j+1|K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,j

are dependent, and will be shown by example in Appendix B.)For any fixed i, Plantinga’s analysis is correct. Precisely, suppose that the

expression

158 JASON COLWELL

P(G|K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi−1&Yi,mi )

·mi−1∏

j=1

P(Yi,j+1|K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,j )

· P(Yi,1|K),

which we denote by Pi , is small (even while, as Plantinga allows, each multiplicandmay be large). We have

P(G|K) ≥ P(G&Yi |K)

= P(G|K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,mi−1&Yi,mi )

·mi−1∏

j=1

P(Yi,j+1|K&Yi,1& . . . &Yi,j )

·P(Yi,1|K)

= Pi,

which gives a weak lower bound on P(G|K).But we can apply the law of dwindling probabilities to the set of probabilities

{P(¬(G&Yi)|K)}1≤i≤n .

It says that although each

P(¬(G&Yi)|K) = 1 − Pi

is large,

P(¬(G&Y1)&¬(G&Y2)& . . . &¬(G&Yn)|K)

=n∏

i=1

P(¬(G&Yi)|K)

=n∏

i=1

(1 − Pi)

may be small. Equivalently,

P((G&Y1) ∨ (G&Y2) ∨ . . . ∨ (G&Yn)|K)

= 1 − P(¬((G&Y1) ∨ (G&Y2) ∨ . . . ∨ (G&Yn))|K)

= 1 − P(¬(G&Y1)&¬(G&Y2)& . . . &¬(G&Yn)|K)

= 1 −n∏

i=1

(1 − Pi)

may be large even if eachP(G&Yi |K) = Pi


is small. If suitable propositions {Yi,j }i,j can be found, then there will be a largelower bound for the probability of G:

P(G|K) ≥ P(G&(Y1 ∨ Y2 ∨ . . . ∨ Yn)|K)

= P((G&Y1) ∨ (G&Y2) ∨ . . . ∨ (G&Yn)|K)

= 1 −n∏

i=1

(1 − Pi)

Again, the idea is that though each ith chain may have a high probability 1 − Pi

of failing, the probability that they all fail is∏n

i=1(1 − Pi), which may be low.

Appendix B: Overlapping sequences of propositions

Overlapping sequences of propositions could also be used to strengthen the historicalargument. (There is likely to be overlap among the sequences of propositions wewould actually use.) For example, we might use the propositions

Y ′1,3 God would make himself widely known to the world.

Y ′1,4 Christianity is the religion today which has the best claim to historical

accuracy.The plan of the argument would be depicted

K

��

��

��

��

Y1,1

��

Y2,1

��

Y3,1

��Y1,2

��

��

�Y2,2

��

Y3,2

��Y1,3

��

Y ′1,3

��

Y2,3

��

Y3,3

��Y1,4

��

Y ′1,4

��

Y2,4

��

Y3,4

��

Y1,5

��Y1,6

��

��

G

160 JASON COLWELL

and the probability P(G|K) would have a calculated lower bound of

1−(1−P(Y1,1|K)

·P(Y1,2|K&Y1,1)

·(1− (1− P(Y1,3|K&Y1,1&Y1,2)

·P(Y1,4|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3)

·P(Y1,5|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4)

·P(Y1,6|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4&Y1,5)

·P(G|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4&Y1,5&Y1,6))

·(1−P(Y ′1,3|K&Y1,1&Y1,2)

·P(Y ′1,4|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y ′

1,3)

·P(G|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y ′1,3&Y ′

1,4))))

·(1−P(Y2,1|K)

·P(Y2,2|K&Y2,1)

·P(Y2,3|K&Y2,1&Y2,2)

·P(Y2,4|K&Y2,1&Y2,2&Y2,3)

·P(G|K&Y2,1&Y2,2&Y2,3&Y2,4))

·(1−P(Y3,1|K)

·P(Y3,2|K&Y3,1)

·P(Y3,3|K&Y3,1&Y3,2)

·P(Y3,4|K&Y3,1&Y3,2&Y3,3)

·P(G|K&Y3,1&Y3,2&Y3,3&Y3,4)),

which would be an improvement over the previously calculated lower bound,

1−(1−P(Y1,1|K)

·P(Y1,2|K&Y1,1)

·P(Y1,3|K&Y1,1&Y1,2)

·P(Y1,4|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3)

·P(Y1,5|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4)

·P(Y1,6|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4&Y1,5)

·P(G|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4&Y1,5&Y1,6))

·(1−P(Y2,1|K)

·P(Y2,2|K&Y2,1)

·P(Y2,3|K&Y2,1&Y2,2)

·P(Y2,4|K&Y2,1&Y2,2&Y2,3)

·P(G|K&Y2,1&Y2,2&Y2,3&Y2,4))

·(1−P(Y3,1|K)

·P(Y3,2|K&Y3,1)

·P(Y3,3|K&Y3,1&Y3,2)

·P(Y3,4|K&Y3,1&Y3,2&Y3,3)

·P(G|K&Y3,1&Y3,2&Y3,3&Y3,4)).

To see this, observe that

1− (1− P(Y1,3|K&Y1,1&Y1,2)


·P(Y1,4|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3)

·P(Y1,5|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4)

·P(Y1,6|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4&Y1,5)

·P(G|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4&Y1,5&Y1,6))

·(1−P(Y ′1,3|K&Y1,1&Y1,2)

·P(Y ′1,4|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y ′

1,3)

·P(G|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y ′1,3&Y ′

1,4))

is greater than or equal to

1− (1− P(Y1,3|K&Y1,1&Y1,2)

·P(Y1,4|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3)

·P(Y1,5|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4)

·P(Y1,6|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4&Y1,5)

·P(G|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4&Y1,5&Y1,6)),

which equals

P(Y1,3|K&Y1,1&Y1,2)

·P(Y1,4|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3)

·P(Y1,5|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4)

·P(Y1,6|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4&Y1,5)

·P(G|K&Y1,1&Y1,2&Y1,3&Y1,4&Y1,5&Y1,6).

Notes

1. Moishe Rosen, Y’shua (Chicago: Moody Press, 1982).2. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000),

p. 173.3. Ibid., p. 271.4. I wish to thank Gary Colwell for his helpful comments, and an anonymous referee for a

useful suggestion.

Documents

The historical argument for the Christian faith: A response to Alvin Plantinga