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Cover illustration: Frans Hals, Regentessen Oude lvIannenhuis, 1664, Frans Halsmuseum Haarlem

Cover design: Jaak Crasborn bno, Valkenburg aid Geul Lay-out: Adriaan de longe,Amsterdam

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Table of Contents

Preface 9

1 The State of the Art in Argumentation Theory II Frans H. van Eemeren

1.1 The Study of Argumentation 11 1.2 Some Crucial Concepts 17 1.3 Overview of the Book 23

Bibliography 25

2 Points ofYiew 27 Peter Houtlosser

2.1 Introduction 27 2.2 Different Approaches to Points of View 28

2.2.1 Classical and Formal Dialectic 28 2.2.2 Pragma-Dialectics 30 22.3 Socio-Psychological Research of Persuasion 33 22.4 Cognitive Research on Reasoning 34 2.25 Argumentative Discourse Analysis 35 2.2.6 Structuralist Informal Logic 36 2.27 Procedural Informal Logic 38 2.2.8 Advocacy and Debate 39 22.9 Communicative Action Theory 40

23 Starting Points for Further Research 42 Bibliography 48

3 Unexpressed Premises 51 Susanne Gerritsen

3.1 Introduction 51 3.2 Two Traditional Approaches 52 3.3 The Deductive-Inductive Distinction 55

3.3.1 Pluralism 55 3.3.2 Modern Deductivism 57 3.3.3 Neither Pluralist, nor Deductivist 59

3-4 The Nature of the Unexpressed Premise 61 3+1 Confusion over Definitions 61 3-4.2 The Unexpressed Premise as a Gap-Filler 65 3-4.3 Used or Needed Premise 67

3.5 The Role of Context 68 3.5.1 The Meaning of'Context' 69 3.5.2 The Position of the Analyst 71

3.6 Argument Schemes 72 37 Conclusion 74

Bibliography 76

4 Argument Schemes 81 Bart Garssen

4.1 Introduction 81 4.2 Argument Schemes and Finding Arguments 82

4.2.1 The Classical Topical Tradition 82 4.2.2 Whately's Rhetoric 83 4.2.3 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric 84

4.3 Argument Schemes and the Evaluation of Argumentation 86 4.3.1 American Textbooks on Academic Debate 86 4.3.2 Hastings' Classification of Types of Warrants 87 4.3.3 Schellens' Reasonable Argument Forms 89 4.3-4 The Pragma-Dialectical Typology of Argument Schemes 91

4-4 Argument Schemes and the Description of Argumentative Discourse 93 45 Conclusion 94

Bibliography 98

5 Argumentation Structures 101 A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans

51 Introduction 101 52 Historical Overview 102

5.2.1 Classical Rhetoric 103 52.2 Enlightenment Rhetoric 105 523 The EarlyTextbooks 107

53 Current Approaches 111 531 The Textbook Distinctions III 532 TheoreticalApproaches 119

54 Methods of Analysis in Doubtful Cases 124 55 Conclusion 126

Bibliography 132

6 Fallacies 135 Frans H. van Eemeren

6.1 Introduction 135 6.2 Brief History of the Study of Fallacies 136

6.2.1 The Aristotelian Approach to Fallacies 136 6.2.2 Idols and Sophisms 141 6.23 The Ad Fallacies 142 6.2-4 Syllogistic and Inductive Fallacies 144 6.25 The Treatment of Fallacies in Logic Textbooks 145

63 Modern Theoretical Approaches to the Fallacies 149 6.3.1 Hamblin's Criticisms of the Standard Treatment 149 6.3.2 Post-Hamblin Treatments of the Fallacies 153 633 The Woods-Walton Approach 154 63-4 The Formal-Dialectical Approach 156 635 The Pragma-DialecticalApproach 157 636 Walton's Pragmatic Approach 159

Bibliography 161

7 Argument Interpretation and Reconstruction 165 M. Agnes van Rees

7.1 Introduction 165 7.2 Argument Interpretation 166 . .

7. 2 .1 General Characteristics of Discourse OrgamzatIOn 7.2.2 Features of Argumentative Discourse 170 7.2.3 Cognitive Processes 175

7.3 Argument Reconstruction 177 7.3.1 Logic 178 7.3.2 Informal Logic 179 7.3.3 Rhetoric 183 7.3-4 Pragma-Dialectics 185

7.4 Conclusion 190 Bibliography 193

8 Argumentation in the Field of Law 201 Eveline T. Feteris

8.1 Introduction 201 8.2

8.2.1 8.2.2 8.23

83 8.3.1 8.3.2 8.).3 834 835

Different Approaches to Legal Argumentation The Logical Approach 203 The Rhetorical Approach 204 The Dialogical Approach 208 Topics in the Research of Legal Argumentation The Philosophical Component 209 The Theoretical Component 210 The Analytical Component 211 The Empirical Component 212 The Practical Component 213

8.4 Conclusion 214 Bibliography 216

Index of Names 227

Index of Terms 230

The Contributors 237

8 TABLE OF CONTENTS

203

209

Preface

All argumentation theorists' contributions to the study of argumentation, from whatever perspective they originate and whatever approach they advo-cate, are aimed at furthering the development of argumentation theory. Some of these contributions involve purportedly original and creative ampli-fications of the discipline. They are all of vital importance to the advancement of the study of argumentation. Other contributions such as translations of scholarly insight and research findings from argumentation theory into lay language, course books for students and surveys that offer would-be re-searchers a systematic overview of central parts or aspects of the field, are also indispensable to the vitality of the discipline but serve the discipline in a dif-ferent way: Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theoryaspires to belong to this last category.

The research group of the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdam intends to contribute to the theoretical advancement of the study of argumentation by developing a pragma-dialectical approach to argumentative discourse. Among the results of their efforts published in English are Speech Acts in Ar-gumentative Discussions and Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984 and 1992, respectively), Analysing Complex Argumentation (Snoeck Henkemans 1992), Studies in Pragma-Di-alectics (edited by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst in 1994) and Recon-structing Argumentative Discourse (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, together with Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, 1994). An introductory course book based on pragma-dialectical insight is Argumentation by van Eemeren, Groo-tendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2001). And a general overview of the vari-ous theoretical approaches to the study of argumentation from the past to the present is provided in Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory, an interna-tional co-production by Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henke-mans with contributions by J. Anthony Blair, Ralph Johnson, Christian Plan-tin, Douglas N. Walton, Charles A. Willard, John Woods, and David Zarefsky (1996). The book was later followed by its legal equivalent, Fundamentals of LegalArgumentation (Feteris 1999).

Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory relates most closely to publica-

9

tions intended to be helpful to students of argumentation such as Argumenta-tion and Fundamentals. The book consists of a series of overviews of the state of the art in prominent research areas in the study of argumentation. The au-thors, Frans H. van Eemeren, Peter Houtlosser, Susanne Gerritsen, Bart Garssen, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, M. Agnes van Rees and Eveline T. Feteris, aim to provide readers with accurate surveys of the main views and approaches favored in argumentation studies. Most of the contributions have already been published in an earlier version of the journal Argumentation. They have all been revised considerably for this book. The authors would like to thank all of their colleagues in the community of argumentation scholars constituted by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation OSSA) for their help in the shaping of their ideas and texts. With regard to the current project, they are particularly grateful to J. Anthony Blair, Trudy Govi-er, Hans Hansen, Scott Jacobs, Erik C.W. Krabbe, Michael Leff, Leah Polcar, Douglas N. Walton and John Woods, and to Paul Nagtegaal for his invaluable technical help in preparing the manuscript for publication. May Crucial Con-cepts in Argumentation Theory be a helpful aid and resource for students of ar-gumentation.

Frans H. van Eemeren Amsterdam, January 19, 2001

10 PREFACE

1 The State of the Art in Argumentation Theory

Frans H. van Eemeren

1.1 The Studyof Argumentation

A survey of crucial concepts in argumentation theory cannot proceed with-out a short introduction regarding the state of argumentation scholarship. What is the subject matter of the study of argumentation? Argumentation can be defined as a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by advancing a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint (Van Eemeren et aI.1996). This definition does justice to the "process-product ambiguity" of the word "argumentation" because it not only refers to the ac-tivity of advancing reasons but also to the shorter or longer text that results from it.

One of the essential characteristics of argumentation is that it always per-tains to a specific point of view with regard to a certain issue. The speaker or writer who advances argumentation defends this "standpoint" to a listener or reader who doubts the acceptability of the standpoint or has a different stand-point. The subsequent argumentation is aimed at convincing the listener or reader of the acceptability of the standpoint. When someone advances argu-mentation, that person makes an appeal to reasonableness and silently as-sumes that the listener or reader will act as a reasonable critic when evaluating the argumentation. Otherwise it would not make sense to advance a certain line of argumentation.

It is the task of argumentation theorists to determine which soundness cri-teria should be satisfied for the argumentation to be called r~asonable. Many argumentation theorists inspired by logic, study argumentation for norma-tive purposes. There are also argumentation theorists however who pursue merely a descriptive goal. Linguistically oriented scholars in textual and dis-course analysis are often only interested in describing how, with varying de-grees of success, language users make use of argumentation to convince oth-ers. Although in current research practice both extremes are represented, most argumentation theorists take a middle position. Their starting point is that the study of argumentation has a normative as well as a descriptive di-menSIOn.

11

The study of argumentation has thus far not resulted in a universally accepted theory. The current state of the art is characterized by the co-existence of a va-riety of approaches, differing considerably in conceptualization, scope and degree of theoretical refinement, albeit that all the modern approaches are strongly influenced by classical and post-classical rhetoric and dialectic. To-gether with approaches of a more limited scope or a less developed research program, the most important approaches are discussed in considerable detail in Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory (Van Eemeren et aI.1996).As an in-troduction to the great variety in the field, I shall present a brief overview of these theoretical contributions.

Toulmin's Model of Analysis

Toulmin's The Uses of Argument, which appeared in 1958, is known mainly for the model of argumentation presented in this book. This model represents the "procedural form" of argumentation or the various steps that can be dis-tinguished in the defense of a standpoint or claim. According to Toulmin, the soundness of argumentation is primarily determined by the degree to which the warrant, which connects the data adduced in the argumentation with the claim that is defended, is made acceptable by a backing.

The procedural form of argumentation is in Toulmin's view"field indepen-dent." This means that the steps that are taken - and which are represented in the model- are always the same, irrespective of the subject the argumentation refers to. The type of backing required, however, is dependent on the field to which the question at issue belongs. An ethical justification, for instance, re-quires a different kind of backing than a legal justification. Toulmin thus con-cludes that the evaluation criteria for determining the soundness of argu-mentation are "field dependent."

Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca's New Rhetoric

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in La nouvelle rhetorique (1958, English trans-lation 1969) provide an inventory of frequently-used "argumentation tech-niques." They regard argumentation as sound if it adduces (greater) assent with the standpoint that is defended among the audience the argumentation is aimed at. Thus, in the new rhetoric, the soundness of argumentation is measured against its effect on the target group. This target group may consist of a "particular audience;' but it can also be the "universal audience": the peo-ple who, for the speaker or writer, are the embodiment of reasonableness.

12 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's contribution to argumentation theory con-sists, first of all, of an extensive list of elements that can serve as a point of de-parture or as an argument scheme when constructing the argumentation that should convince or persuade the audience. With the help of a "quasi-logical" argument scheme, which resembles a logically valid argument form in some way, one can, for instance, sometimes achieve the effect that the public con-siders the standpoint defended in a reasonable way. Another way of justifying a standpoint is the use of an argument scheme, such as analogy, "that struc-tures reality;' so that the audience will conclude that the defended standpoint is in a similar way acceptable as a different kind of standpoint that they al-ready accept.

Informal Logic

Because some researchers were dissatisfied with the way argumentation was being treated in introductory logic textbooks, an approach to argumentation known as. informal logic was propagated in Canada and the United States in the early seventies. Since 1978, the journal Informal Logic, edited by Blair and Johnson, has been the voice of the informal logic movement. Informal logic is not a new kind oflogic, but an approach to the normative study of argumen-tation in ordinary language which remains closer to the practice of argumen-tation than formallogic (Blair and Johnson 1987).

Informal logicians would like to develop norms and procedures for inter-preting, assessing and construing argumentation. Their starting point is the notion that argumentation should be sound in a logical sense. Apart from the fact that it is clear that something else is meant by this than that the arguments used must be valid in a formal-logical sense, it is not yet clear,however, exactly what. It is clear, however, that informal logicians are primarily interested in the relations between premises and conclusions in arguments and it is also clear that their interest is not restricted to reasoning aimed at convincing.

Johnson and Blair (197711993) have indicated what they have in mind when they refer to an informal logical alternative for the formal criterion of deduc-tive validity. In their view, the premises of an argument have to meet three cri-teria: (1) relevance (2) sufficiency and (3) acceptability. These criteria are in-troduced in Logical Self-Defense; they are adopted, sometimes under different names, by other informal logicians (e.g., Govier 1987). When considering "relevance," the question is whether there is an adequate substantial relation between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. While in the case of "sufficiency", the question is whether the premises provide enough evidence for the conclusion; in the case of "acceptability'; whether the premises them-selves are true, probable, or in some other way trustworthy.

THE STATE OF THE ART IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY 13

RadicalArgumentativism

Ducrot and Anscombre, in the early seventies, developed in a number of - al-most exclusively French - publications a linguistic approach to language use and argumentation. Because Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) believe that all verbal utterances that lead the listener or reader to a certain conclusion - of-ten implicitly _ always involve argumentative relations, they refer to their the-oretical position as radical argumentativism.

Ducrot and Anscombre's descriptive approach is characterized by a great 1 h)) (b ))" "(( t'll" b e" interest in words such as only, no ess t an, ut, even, s I , ecaus

and "so", which can serve as argumentative "operators" or "connectors" and give the utterances a certain argumentative force and argumentative direction. In a certain context, the sentence "The ring costs only one hundred euros" can point to a conclusion such as "Buy that ring", Meanwhile, the sentence "The ring costs no less than one hundred euros" points instead to a conclusion such as"Do not buy that ring". .

Another observation made by Ducrot andAnscombre is that a word such as "but" only determines the direction of the conclusion that is suggested by the sentence, not the content of this conclusion. This content is also dependent on the context and the situation in which the sentence is uttered. Whatever conclusion may be drawn in a specific context, the presence of the word "but" in all cases causes this conclusion to be the opposite of, and also stronger than, the conclusion that has to be drawn from the part of the sentence preceding "but". According to Ducrot and Anscombre, the opposite standpoints sug-gested by"but" in a sentence such as "Paul is rich, but he is married", select two different "argumentative principles" which are on a par with the topoi of clas-sical rhetoric (Van Eemeren et al. 1996). N0lke (1992), in this example, as-sumes that these are "The more someone has the property of being rich, the more attractive it is for a woman to get to know him better" and "The more someone is tied to another woman, the less attractive it is for a woman to get to know him better': In this case, the latter topos is a stronger argument than the first, which is as it were put aside - overruled - by the latter. Thus, the last topos determines the eventual argumentative direction of the sentence, which leads to an implicit conclusion such as "It is no use trying to get to know Paul

better".

Modern Dialectical Approaches

To modern dialecticians, argumentation is part of a procedure to resolve a difference of opinion by means of a regulated discussion. Dialecticians at-

14 FRANS Ii. VAN EEMEREN

te~pt to formula~e :'problem-sound" rules that are instrumental in resolving a dIfference of opmlOn. These rules must also be "conventionally valid" in the sense that they are inter-subjectively acceptable (Barth and Krabbe 1982: 21-22). When designing a procedure for language users who would like to resolve a dispute by means of a critical dialogue, the "new dialecticians" make use of the ideas put forth by Crawshay-Williams and Naess as well as the ideas of Lorenzen, Lorenz and other members of the Erlangen School.

The first initiatives towards a new dialectic have already been presented by Barth and Krabbe. In From Axiom to Dialogue they described a "formal-di-alectical" procedure to determine whether a standpoint can be maintained in the light of certain starting points or "concessions." The term formal dialectics was introduced earlier by Hamblin (1970). The indication "formal" refers to the strictl~ regimented character of the dialogue games. In dialogue logic an

argum~~t IS prese~ted as a dialogue game between a "proponent" and an "op-ponent of a theSIS. Together these two parties try to establish whether the thesis can be defended successfully against critical attacks. In the defense, the

propo~ent can make use of the propositions the opponent is prepared to commIt to. The proponent attempts to bring the opponent into a contradic-tory position by skillfully exploiting these concessions. If the proponent suc-ceeds, the thesis has been successfully defended given the concessions (ex con-cessis).

Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) developed a theory of argumentation called pragma-dialectics, which immediately connects with formal dialectics, but is also different. The agree-ment is expressed in the term dialectics; the replacement of formal by pragma (for "~rag~atic") refers to the differences. The pragmatic elements in prag-ma-dialectlcs concerning speech acts and discourse analysis are primarily in-spired by insights of "ordinary language philosophers"; the dialectical ele-ments are inspired by the insights from the work of "critical rationalists" such as Karl Popper.

. I~ the ~ragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical'discussion, four stages are dIstmgUlshed. In the confrontation stage, a participant in the discussion puts forward a standpoint while a second participant either expresses doubt con-cerning the acceptability of the standpoint or he or she contradicts it. In the opening stage, which is in practice often largely implicit, the participants who ac~ept the roles of "protagonist" and "antagonist" of the standpoint deter-mme what the discussion's point of departure is. Here the question becomes what are the common starting points and which rules are being observed? The prot~gonist begins to advance an argument in the argumentation stage to defend hIS or her standpoint and adds, if necessary, new arguments to answer


further critical reactions. If the advanced arguments lead to the acceptance of the standpoint by the antagonist in the concluding stage, the difference of opinion has been resolved; this is also the case if the protagonist withdraws the standpoint because of the antagonist's critical reactions.

Besides an ideal model of the speech acts performed in the various stages of a critical discussion by a protagonist and an antagonist who make an attempt to resolve their difference of opinion in a reasonable way, the pragma-dialec-tical discussion procedure also includes a series of basic rules which together constitute a code of conduct for reasonable discussants (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992). Each violation of a rule amounts to an incorrect discus-sion move that is an impediment to the resolution of a difference of opinion. This can happen in each stage of the discussion. The incorrectness involved generally resembles one or more of the well-known fallacies or a similar of-fence against reasonableness.

Modern Rhetorical Approaches

In recent years, a powerful re-evaluation of rhetoric has taken place. The irra-tional and even anti-rational image of rhetoric that has evolved during the past centuries has now been revised. Meanwhile, the sharp division between rhetoric and dialectic made in the past appears in need of blurring. Several ar-gumentation theorists have become aware that rhetoric as the study of per-suasive techniques is not per se incompatible with maintaining a critical ideal of reasonableness.

It is remarkable that the rehabilitation of rhetoric in the study of argumen-tation began at about the same time in various countries. A considerable time after the pioneering work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, several argu-mentation scholars in the United States began to defend the rational qualities of rhetoric. Wenzel (1980), for one, prefers to fully credit rhetoric, but then emphatically in relation to logic, particularly dialectics. In France, Reboul (1990) prefers to view rhetoric as second only to dialectics in importance. He regards rhetoric and dialectic as different disciplines that display some over-lap. Rhetoric applies dialectic to public discussions while dialectic is also a part of rhetoric because dialectic provides rhetoric with intellectual tools. In Germany, Kopperschmidt (1989) takes it a step further. He argues, viewing things from a historical perspective, that rhetoric is the central concern of ar-gumentation theorists. In the Netherlands, Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999) have pursued the integration of rhetoric's insight into their "pragma-dialectical" method for analyzing argumentative discourse. In their view, there is a rhetorical goal corresponding with each of the dialectical stages of


the process of resolving a difference of opinion. They think that an argumen-tative text or discussion can be reconstructed with more subtlety, and can be more fully accounted for, if the strategic maneuvering that takes place in each dialectical stage of the selection from among the "topical potential" (the pos-sible discussion moves) available in the discussion stage concerned, the adap-tation to the wishes of the audience and the use of presentational devices is in-vestigated.

1.2 Some Crucial Concepts

The problems involved in the production, analysis and evaluation of argu-mentation are approached much differently by the various theoretical contri-butions to the study of argumentation. The problems argumentation theo-rists are jointly concerned with can be elucidated by explaining some con-cepts crucial to the theory of argumentation: "point of view", "unexpressed premise'; "argument scheme': "argumentation structure': and "fallacy". This book will make it clear that each of these concepts represents an indispens-able element in the study of argumentation. In addition, two other promi-nent problem areas crucial to the study of argumentation will be discussed: "methods of argument interpretation and reconstruction" and "argumenta-tion in the field of law':

Points of View

It is important to recognize that verbal expressions are not "by nature" stand-points, arguments, or other units of language use which are interesting to argumentation theorists, but only when they occur in a context where they serve a specific function in the communication process. This means that these utterances must be specifically instrumental in achieving a certain goal. An oral or written expression is, for instance, a pointof view, if it expresses a cer-tain positive or negative position with respect to a proposition, thus making it clear exactly what the speaker or writer stands for.

In ordinary discourse, explicitness is the exception rather than the rule. Sometimes the communicative function of an utterance becomes clear after the event, when this function is identified by a participant ("So, that is your standpoint then, eh?'; "You have heard my major arguments"), but more of-ten than not, no explicit identification is offered, while, moreover, the propo-sitional content of the utterance remains ambiguous.

Fortunately, there are some verbal indicators which specifically refer to


standpoints and argumentation, such as "therefore'; "hence", "so", "thus", "ergo'; and "since'; "for" and "because': Some of them, like "for:' are used ret-rogressively to refer to a preceding standpoint; while others like "so", are used progressively, and precede the standpoint, and some such as "because:' can be used either way ("I cannot do it because I am ill" and "Because I am ill I cannot do it"). The fewer the number of verbal pointers, the more necessary it is to make use of verbal and non-verbal contextual clues. Usually, some back-ground knowledge of the context and the type of speech event involved, and even some knowledge about the world, is necessary to detect these clues and put them to good use.

Confusingly, formulations of standpoints and reasons may be presented in speech acts that are, at first sight, non-assertive, as in "Let's take an umbrella, or do you want to get wet?" Taken literally, what the speaker does here is con-front the listener with a proposal, followed by a question. The (rhetorical) question, however, must be interpreted as a reason to accept the implicit standpoint that the two should take an umbrella. To correctly determine the speaker's commitments, one must analyze this discourse as containing an im-plicit (and indirect) standpoint defended by an implicit (and indirect) rea-son: "We should take an umbrella,for we do not want to get wet". In the analy-sis of such implicitness (and indirectness), and in the justification of this analysis, an important role is usually played by general standards for reasoned discourse and by the context (in its broadest sense) of the specific discourse under analysis.

Unexpressed Premises

Unexpressed elements that are only implicitly present in the discourse are in practice often the pivotal points of an argument. This is particularly true for unexpressed premises and unexpressed standpoints. In ordinary arguments, usually one of the premises is left unexpressed. In some cases, the identifica-tion of the elements implicit in enthymematic argumentation is quite simple. It is obvious, for example, that in "Amos is pig-headed because he is a teacher" the premise that is left unexpressed is "Teachers are pig-headed': In "I am sure that Amos is pig-headed, since all teachers are pig-headed", it is just as clear that the unexpressed premise is: "Amos is a teacher".

There are also cases in which the identification of unexpressed premises may cause more problems - usually, because there are several possibilities. In order to determine what the commitments of an arguer are, the analyst must not only carry out a logical analysis, based on a formal validity criterion, but also a pragmatic analysis, based on standards for reasoned discourse. In the


logical analysis, an attempt is made to reconstruct the argument as one that has a valid argument form; in the pragmatic analysis, the unexpressed premise is then more precisely defined on the basis of contextual information and background knowledge. The logical analysis is thus instrumental to the achievement of a satisfactory pragmatic analysis.

In the absence of any contextual information or background knowledge, the pragmatic identification of unexpressed premises will be hard to accom-plish. A logical analysis must then suffice. Otherwise, there is a danger that the added premise oversteps the mark, attributing more to the speaker than he or she is actually committed to. With unexpressed standpoints we are on safer ground. Starting from the explicit premises, a logical analysis of the underly-ing argument usually leads to an unequivocal determination of the conclu-sion representing the unexpressed standpoint that is being advocated.

Argument Schemes

I It sh2!lld!12tpe !,*~!!J2!JQ~nt~d th~t an..YQ!le who puts forward an argument is automatically attempting to logically derive the conclusion from ili--;;-p~;~et, in some way or another, a transfer of acceptance from the ;x-plid!: premise to the standpoint must be aimed for. On this point, thus far, for-mal logic does not have much to offer. Modern logicians, even when they are

cgE:,~~rn~~~~pin&~!ternative systems such as non-monotonic logic and defaultlogic, seem almost unanimous in their concern with formal valid-i!y~ertIiansuDStailtive"reraUonSb-etWeenpremises and conclusions. ~-:. ceEc!rating on thSJ!.J:.Ilbklm of imRlication and truth, they tend to ignore tb; p~o~~I!1~_ of pl~usible inference and the transmission of acceptanc~

The speaker or writer who puts forward an argument aims to effect a trans-fer of acceptance from the premises to the standpoint that makes the listener or reader accept the standpoint. Hence, the speaker attempts to design the ar-gument in such a fashion that it will convince the listener. Take the following argument: "Daniel will certainly be concerned about the costs, because he is an American:' When looking for an argument to defend the standpoint that Daniel will be concerned about the costs, the arguer may, for example, have entertained an unfriendly thought like "It is typical of Americans that they are materialistic." From this thought, the arguer's standpoint may have been backed up by the argument, the unexpressed premise being "Americans are inclined to care a lot about money." By arguing in this manner, the speaker or writer is relying on a more or less ready-made argument scheme.

Argument schemes are conventionalized ways of displaying a relation be-tween that which is stated in the explicit premise and that which is stated in


the standpoint. The internal organisation of each single argument can be characterized by the argument scheme being employed. Because an argu-ment scheme characterizes the type of justification or refutation provided for the standpoint in a single argument by the explicit premise for the stand-point, an analysis of the argument schemes used in a discourse produces in-formation regarding the principles, standards, criteria, or assumptions in-volved in a particular attempt at justification or refutation. In most cases, some interpretative effort is required to identify the argument scheme that is being em ployed, i.e., to discover the topos on which the argumentation rests. In this endeavor, again, pragmatic knowledge must be brought to bear. !\!~ment schemes are ~l!&1hes;ml~s:.P!?.s!udiIl-iheon~;te- a com lementar alternative to the formal . 0 t~ndtheir v~~y !2~~Jhe point of de~arture in these studies is generally that in argumentative discourse, dependmg on the argument scheme used, various types of argumentation can be distinguished and that each type of argumentation requires that specific critical questions are answered.

Argumentation Structures

A central problem in the analysis of argumentative discourse is determining the structure of the argumentation. The argumentation structure of a text, speech or discussion is determined by the way the reasons advanced hang :0-gether and jointly support the defended standpoint. An adequate evaluatIOn of the argumentative discourse cannot take place as long as it is unclear what the structure of the argumentation is. What kind of structural relations can be distinguished?

Argumentation for or against a standpoint can be simply "single argumen-tation", which consists of one reason for or against the standpoint. But the argumentation can also have a more complex argumentation structure, de-pending on the way the defense of the standpoint has been organized in view of (anticipated) doubts or criticism. In a more complexly structured argumentation several reasons are put forward for or against the same stand-point. These reasons can be alternative defenses of the standpoint which are unrelated ("It is impossible that you saw my mother last week in Sheringham in Marks and Spencer's, because my mother died two years ago and She ring-ham does not have a Marks and Spencer's"), but they can also be interdepen-dent, so that there is a "parallel chain" of reasons which mutually strengthen or complement each other ("We have to dine out because there is nothing left athome and all the shops are closed"), or a "serial chain" of reasons ("I cannot help you with painting next week, because next week I have no time because I have to study for an exam").


The structure of argumentation is sometimes clearly indicated by the use of connecting expressions such as "apart from X, Y", "Y, moreover X", and "for, because Y, X" respectively. Or the structure may be clear from the content of the arguments. Often, however, a problem in the analysis of complex argu-mentation arises because the literal presentation makes insufficiently clear how the argumentation is structured. To solve this problem, again, all kinds of contextual and other pragmatic factors need to be taken into account.

Fallacies

Another concept argumentation theorists are especially interested in is that of the fallacies. \Ti!!ually ~,,-erJ:'.l!9rfQi!tive ths:ory of argumentation incll!desAccording'to the standard definition, a fallacy is an argument that seems valid but is not (Hamblin 1970: 12). Well-known objections to this definition point out that a great number of the generally recognized fallacies are not ar-guments (e.g., "many questions") and others (in modern interpretations) are not invalid arguments (e.g., petitio principii) or the fallaciousness is not due to the invalidity of the argument (e.g., argumentum ad verecundiam, argu-mentum ad populum, argumentum ad hominem). Therefore, these types of fallacies are not covered by the definition.

One explanation why fallacy theorists stuck with this definition, even though many fallacies remain outside its scope, is that until recently most ap-proaches to fallacies have been restrictively logico-centric. However, if the old definition is dropped, as most modern argumentation theorists have done, and fallacies are ~.!1ceive.Q.2..f~~discu~si~ moves which in some way damage t~ual~~_~_~~~~~!~~.~sc

procedural tools, involving the use of various kinds of contextual informa-tion, need to be designed. As a preliminary to this last enterprise, it must be es-tablished whether the situation in which a would -be fallacy occurs is indeed within the scope of the norms. All contributions to the fulfillment of these tasks are pertinent to the development of argumentation theory.

Argument Interpretation and Reconstruction

Although not so much a concept as a research area, the problems involved in argument interpretation and reconstruction require our attention when we are dealing with the state ofthe art of studying the production, analysis, and eval-uation of argumentation. These problems are approached quite differently in each of the various theoretical contributions to the study of argumentation. The interests of argument interpretation center around the general charac-teristics of the organisation of discourse and the features of argumentative discourse that ordinary language users employ to orient themselves with when interpreting arguments, and around the reasoning processes that are applied in argument interpretation. When it comes to argument reconstruc-tion, different methods are employed using various approaches such as for-mal logic, informal logic, rhetoric and pragma-dialectics.

Argument interpretation is the basis of argument reconstruction. Argu-mentative discourse can only be systematically reconstructed from a norma-tive perspective, developed for the purposes of argument evaluation, after it has been interpreted properly. This is why argumentation theorists need to not only be engaged in developing methods for reconstructing argumenta-tive discourse in a highly-motivated manner, but also in disclosing the way in which ordinary language users proceed in making sense of argumentative discourse. They have to detect the various verbal and nonverbal tools the ar-guers put to good use in this endeavor in order to be in a better position to de-velop reconstruction methods that consciously transcend ordinary interpre-tative practice.

Argumentation in the Field of Law

Legal practice is the argumentative practice par excellence. In modern society, the institution of the court offers a place where various kinds of disputes that cannot be resolved without recourse to specific procedures and the judgment of disinterested outsiders can be resolved. Argumentation theorists are there-fore well-advised to pay special attention to the argumentative proceedings


applied in legal contexts and the relevant findings in the study of argumenta-tion in the field of law. As is evident in their writings, the founding fathers of modern argumentation theory, Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman, were fully aware of this.

The study of legal argumentation presents a great variety of approaches and topics of interest. The different approaches usually lead to different re-search topics and different conceptions of the relation between the soundness criteria as applied in legal procedures and the soundness criteria as developed in argumentation theory. In what manner do the two kinds of soundness cri-teria relate to each other? What kinds of explanations can demonstrate the differences? What are the reasonableness conceptions underlying the various approaches to legal argumentation? Such questions are studied in this specif-ic area of the study of argumentation and their answers can be illuminating to the field as a whole.

1.3 Overview of the Book

Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory aims to provide interested readers with an overview of the current study of some fundamental problems in ar-gumentation theory. For this purpose, the next five chapters discuss in greater detail the five concepts and the two prominent problem areas we have just briefly described. Various theoretical perspectives are presented by authors who have paid special attention to these concepts in their earlier work.

In chapter 2, Peter Houtlosser discusses the concept of point of view. He dif-ferentiates between the approaches to points of view favored in the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, the socio-psychological research of persua-sion, cognitive research, argumentative discourse analysis, structuralist infor-mal logic, procedural informal logic, advocacy and debate, and communica-tive action theory. He also indicates what the starting points could be for fur-ther research. The chapter closes, just as all the other chapters, with an exten-sive bibliography on the specific subject.

In chapter 3, Susanne Gerritsen devotes her attention to unexpressed prem-ises. She first explains two traditional approaches, and then turns to the de-ductive-inductive distinction and also discusses pluralism, modern deduc-tivism, and the "neither pluralist nor deductivist stance". She then turns to the nature of the unexpressed premise, focusin on the confusion of definitions, the unexpressed premise s a a -filler and utilized and necessa -remises. When discussing the role of the context, she pays particular attention to the meaning of "context" and the position of the analyst. The relation between unexpressed premises and argument schemes is also discussed.


Chapter 4, written by Bart Garssen, is devoted to argument schemes. After in-troducing the concept, Garssen first concentrates on the use of argument schemes in finding arguments. He discusses the classical topical tradition, Whately's rhetoric, and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's new rhetoric. He then turns to the relation between argument schemes and the evaluation of argumentation. He pays particular attention to American textbooks on aca-demic debate, Hastings' classification of types of warrants, Schellens' reason-able argument forms, and the pragma-dialectical typology of argument schemes. Before his concluding remarks, Garssen deals with the use of argu-ment schemes for describing the characteristics of argumentative discourse.

Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, author of chapter 5, describes the different conceptions of the various kinds of argumentation structures and the way in which they are studied. In her historical overview, she deals with classical rhetoric, enlightenment rhetoric, as well as the early textbooks. In her discus-sion of modern approaches, Snoeck Henkem~ns explains the textbook dis-tinctions between linked and convergent premises and between coordinative and multiple argumentation. The theoretical approaches she considers worth discussing in more detail are Freeman's Toulminian approach, her own prag-rna-dialectical approach, and Walton's pragmatic approach. She also pays specific attention to the methods of analysis in doubtful cases.

In chapter 6, I begin by recounting the history of the study of fallacies. I move from the Aristotelian approach to fallacies, to idols and sophisms, to the ad fallacies, syllogistic and inductive fallacies, and the treatment of fallacies in logic textbooks. Then I turn to modern theoretical approaches to fallacies such as Hamblin's criticism of the "standard treatment", post -Hamblin treat-ments of the fallacies, the Woods-Walton approach, the formal dialectical ap-proach, the pragma-dialectical approach, and Walton's pragmatic approach.

Agnes van Rees, in chapter 7, concentrates on argument interpretation and argument reconstruction. In her discussion of argument interpretation, she highlights some general characteristics of discourse organisation features prevalent in argumentative discourse, patterning and linguistic devices. The interpretation section closes with some observations concerning the study of cognitive processes. In the argument reconstruction section, Van Rees dis-cusses logic, informal logic - paying special attention to unexpressed premis-es and argumentation structure - rhetoric and pragma-dialectics.

Chapter 8, by Eveline Feteris, is devoted to argumentation in the field of law. Feteris distinguishes different approaches to legal argumentation such as the logical approach, the rhetorical approach and the dialogical approach. When discussing the topics in legal argumentation research, she starts from the pragmadialectical division of the research program into the philosophical component, the theoretical component, the analytical component, the em-


pirical component, and the practical component. Feteris' contribution to ends with a broad but selective bibliography.

Bibliography

Anscombre, J.-c., and o. Ducrot (1983). L'argumentation dans la langue. Brussels: Mardaga.

Barth, E.M. and E.C.W. Krabbe (1982). From Axiom to Dialogue. Berlin: Wal-ter de Gruyter.

Blair,J.A, and R.H. Johnson (1987). "Argumentation as Dialectical:' Argumen-tation, 1, 1, 41-56.

Eemeren, EH. van, and R. Grootendorst (1984). Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions. Berlin/Dordrecht: Walter de Gruyter/Foris.

Eemeren, EH. van, and R. Grootendorst (1992). Argumentation, Communica-tion, and Fallacies. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Eemeren, EH. van, and P. Houtlosser (1999). "Strategic Manoeuvring in Ar-gumentative Discourse:' Discourse Studies, 1, 4, 479-497

Eemeren, EH. van, R. Grootendorst, A.E Snoeck Henkemans, J.A. Blair, R.H. Johnson, E.C.W. Krabbe, C. Plantin, D.N. Walton, C.A. Willard, J. Woods, and D. Zarefsky (1996). Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Govier, T. (1987). Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris.

Hamblin, c.L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen. Photographic reprint Newport News, VA: Vale Press.

Johnson, R.H., and J.A. Blair (1977/1993). Logical Self-Defense. Toronto: Mc-Graw-Hill Ryerson, 3rd ed., 1993.

Kopperschmidt, J. (1989). Methodik der Argumentationsanalyse. Stuttgart: Fromann -Holzboog.

N0lke, H. (1992). "Semantic constraints on argumentation: From polyphonic microstructure to argumentative macro-structure:' In: Eemeren, EH. van, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, and C.A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation Illumi-nated. Amsterdam: SICSAT lISSA, 189-200.

Perelman, c., and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958/1969). La nouvelle rhetorique: traite de l' argumentation. Bruxelles: l'Universite de Bruxelles. English trans-lation The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation. Notre Dame etc.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.

Reboul,o. (1990). "Rhetorique et dialectique chez Aristote." Argumentation, 4,1,35-52.


Toulmin, S.E. (1958). The Uses of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press. d J d S N II

Wenzel,J.W.(1980)."PerspectivesonArgument."In:Rho es, .,an . ewe, (Eds., 1980). Proceedings of the 1979 Summer Conference on Argument. Falls Church: SCA, 112-133.


2 Points of View Peter Houtlosser

2.1 Introduction

In the study of argumentation, argumentation is generally considered to con-sist of a set of statements put forward to support or rebut, or justify or refute, some other statement. This other statement can provisionally be referred to as the point of view. In evaluating its quality, the strength of an argumentation can only be established if it is clear what point of view the argumentation is supposed to support or rebut. When it is impossible to establish which point of view is at issue, it also becomes impossible to determine whether the argu-mentation is relevant, let alone whether it provides adequate support for that particular point of view. As everyone knows, it is not always easy to find out what point of view is at issue in a particular case. One of the central issues in the study of argumentation is how an analyst can adequately identify the points of view in an argumentative text or conversation. For this problem to be resolved, it must first be clear which conception of a point of view should be adopted.

How exactly is the object of argumentation to be understood? The answer to this question depends largely on the theoretical perspective from which ar-gumentation is approached. Different perspectives are motivated by different concerns and interests. These concerns and interests have consequences for the way in which the object of argumentation is conceived. Social psycholo-gists, for instance, are interested in the degree to which persuasive messages affect people's attitudes; informal logicians in the conditions under which conclusions can be inferred from premises in natural arguments; discourse analysts are interested in the way in which people propound their opinions in talk exchanges; while dialecticians are interested in the degree to which theses or standpoints are up to critical scrutiny in argumentative discussion.

This chapter provides an overview of the ways in which the object of argu-mentation is characterized by various approaches to argumentation and the methods used to identify that object. The overview will commence with the characterization of the notion of "stand point" as it is used in the pragma-di-alectical approach to argumentation (the "Amsterdam School"). Preceding this characterization, 2.2.1 briefly discusses the dialectical notion of "thesis" as it is used in classical and formal dialectic. This notion can be regarded as the

27

2.2

2.2.1

forerunner of the pragma-dialectical notion of a "standpoint". In o~der t.o es-tablish in what respects the pragma-dialectical notion of a standpomt dIffers from "equivalent" notions used in contemporary argu~entation :esear~h, "standpoints" will subsequently be compared to the notlOns used m soc~opsychological research on persuasion (2.2.3); cognitive rese.arch on reasomng (2.2.4); argumentative discourse analysis (2.2.5); structurahst (2.2.6) and pro-cedural (2.2.7); informal logic; advocacy and debate (2.2.8); and the commu-nicative action approach to argumentation (2.2.9) In conclusion, some i~terrelations between the various notions are indicated; the procedures for Iden-tifying them are discussed, as well as some perspectives on further research

(2.3)

DifferentApproaches to Points of View

Classical and Formal Dialectic

In the Topica (ed. 1966), Aristotle devotes particular attention to the dialecti-cal notion of thesis. A thesis, as he sees it, is "the conception contrary to gene-ral opinion but propounded by someone famous as a philosopher:' (104b 119-120). The fact that a thesis should be contrary to what people thmk about a certain subject is emphasized when Aristotle adds: "Or a thes~s may c~~cer~ matters on which we hold a reasoned view contrary to receIved opmlOns (104b 124-126). This definition seems to assume that non-philosoph~rs ~an also present a thesis, but the notion that a thesis is only worth consldenng when presented by a reputed philosopher is emphasized in Aristotle's addi-tional comment that "to pay any attention when an ordinary person sets forth views which are contrary to received opinions is foolish" (104b 122-124) The examples of theses that Aristotle supplies-"Contradiction is impossible", "All things are in a state of motion" (104b 121-123) - make it clear that t~e conte~t of a thesis should be a philosophical issue. Aristotle calls such an ISsue a dI-alectical problem. A dialectical problem is "something a~o~t which either men have no opinion either way, or most people hold an opmlOn contra.ry to that of the wise, or the wise contrary to that of most people, or somethm~, about which members of each of these classes disagree among themselves (104b 103-105). Phrased in modern terms, dialectical problems are disputable philo-sophical issues.

As these definitions suggest, there is a close relation between theses and dialectical problems. For all practical purposes, they may even be co~side~ed to coincide: "a thesis is always a problem" (104b 129) and "almost all dlalectlCal problems are now called theses" (104b 135-137). Nevertheless, there is a rele-

PETER HOUTLOSSER

vant distinction: "not every problem is a thesis, since some problems are such that.,:e hold no opinion about them either way." This implies that a thesis, in addltlOn to pertaining to something controversial, also involves a choice or opinion, which may be absent in the problem as such.

D~alectical p:oblems are constitutive of "an investigation leading either to chOlce and aVOldance or to truth and knowledge, either by itself or as an aid to the solution of some other such problem" (104b lOl-103). In other words, for moral or epistemological reasons, they are examined critically. But, as Aristo-

~le notes, only some problems and theses deserve dialectical examination: "It IS not ne~essary to e~amine every problem and every thesis but only one about whlCh doubt mIght be felt by the kind of person who requires to be ar-gued with" (105a 103-105). In order to be a candidate for critical examination then,. a thesis or problem must, at least potentially, be disputable to someon~ who IS worth arguing with.

Once a thesis or problem enters the examination process, it is argued for, and argued against, with the help of "dialectical propositions". Aristotle de-fines a dialectical proposition as a "question which accords with the opinion held by everyone or by the majority or by the wise-either all of the wise or the majority or the most famous of them - and which is not paradoxical" (104a 8-11). Rephrased in our current terminology, dialectical propositions are undis-puted by those who matter intellectually; as such, they are the premises with which a thesis can be defended.

To summarize, it can be said iliat by Aristotle's definition, a thesis is a repu-ted philosopher's opinion concerning a disputable philosophical issue which

contr~~cts the o~inion of others who are worth arguing with, is put forward for c~ltlcal exammation, and must be defended by means of undisputed premIses.

~n formal dialectic, a present-day descendant of classical dialectic, propound-mg a thesis is not restricted to philosophers and a thesis is not restricted to philosophical issues, as they were in Aristotelean dialectic.' Nicholas Rescher is a p.hilosopher who remains close to Aristotle; his focus is on systems of di-alectlc that provide a rational method for scientific inquiry. In Dialectics

(~97~)' Re.scher developed a model of formal disputation. A formal disputa-tlOn IS a dIscussion involving three parties: a "proponent': an "opponent" and a "determi~er': ~he proponent formulates a thesis and builds a prima facie case ~or ilil~ thesIs by adducing "grounds"; the opponent attacks the propo-

ne~t s thesIs and grounds by objecting and making counter-arguments to whiCh the proponent has to respond; the determiner presides as referee and judge ove~ ilie ~onduct of ilie dispute (1977: 3-4). Apart from iliis type of asymmetncal dispute, Rescher also distinguishes a "symmetrical contradic-

POINTS OF VIEW 29

tory debate", in which the opponent has to defend a thesis of his own, which is contradictory to the thesis of the proponent. According to Rescher's analysis, propounding a thesis consists of making a categorical assertion. Making such an assertion involves taking on a commitment to defend both the assertion and all logical consequences that follow from it. In addition, the proponent takes on a similar kind of commitment for every subsequent move he makes since all of them have to be categorical assertions.

Inspired by the semantic approach to argumentation developed by Arne Naess (1966) and the studies on dialogue logic done by the "Erlangen School" (Kamiah and Lorenzen 1967, Lorenzen and Lorenz 1978), Barth and Krabbe, in From axiom to dialogue (1982), proposed sets of systems of rules for critical dialogues aimed at resolving conflicts or disputes between a proponent and an opponent concerning one or more externalized or "avowed" opinions. An avowed opinion, in their conception, is a statement Tput forward by the pro-ponent and attacked by the opponent. Tis the initial thesis of the discussion. The next statements in the discussion are all "concessions" - they constitute the basis from which Tmay be defended and attacked. In a simple or "pure" conflict, only the proponent has to defend a thesis; he has nothing to attack (except the attacks made by the opponent); the opponent has no thesis to de-fend and just has to attack the proponent's thesis. In a mixed conflict, the op-ponent has something to defend as well - a thesis that opposes the propo-nent's thesis or a concession which is challenged by the proponent. In both cases, the proponent has also engaged in attacking statements of the oppo-nent (see Van Eemeren eta1.1996: 265).

For Barth and Krabbe, discussing a particular thesis makes sense only if the proponent is prepared to commit himself positively, i.e., to assume an obliga-tion to defend the thesis against the opponent's criticisms, and if the oppo-nent is prepared to take on a negative commitment, i.e., to make use of his un-conditional right to criticize the proponent's thesis systematically. The same types of commitments are to be taken on with regard to the concessions, the other statements made in the discussion - the opponent will be positively committed, the proponent negatively (1982: 57-58).

2.2.2 Pragma-Dialectics

In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, argumentative discourse is studied with a view of critical evaluation. Starting from the assumption that argumentation is part of a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion, a model has been developed of the stages of the resolution process and the various types of speech acts that are instrumental in each of these

30 PETER HOUTLOSSER

stages. The model of a critical discussion serY!LlUULheuristic tool in tb.i:.,~ -I?rocess of aIlalytic recoustruction and as an evaluative tool in the process of sri tical assessment.

In the pragma-dialectical theory the object of argumentation is referred to as the standpoint. The pragma-dialectical conception of a standpoint agrees with the meta theoretical principles of externalization, functionalization, so-cialization, and dialectification. In agreeement with the principle of external-ization, a standpoint is not viewed as a psychological attitude or mental state, but as a verbally expressed position carrying specific commitments and re-sponsibilities. In agreement with the principle of functionalization, not only the proposition that expresses a standpoint is subject to analysis, but also the communicative speech act of advancing a standpoint. In agreement with the principle of socialization, a standpoint is not just regarded as the individual expression of someone's subjective opinion, but as a public statement put for-ward for acceptance by a listener or reader who is assumed not to share the speaker or writer's point of view. In agreement with the principle of dialectifi-cation, acceptance of a standpoint is only considered to be justified when the standpoint turns out to be resistant to the criticisms of an antagonist put for-ward in a regimented procedure of pro and con discussion.

In Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst characterize a standpoint as an externalized position of a speaker or writer in respect to a formulated opinion (1984: 5). This position can be explicitly expressed with the help of a standard paraphrase:

My point of view in respectto [the opinion lOis that 0 is/is not the case (1984: 114).

Conversely, a speaker or writer who - in this manner, or in a similar one _ states a position indicates that he regards the subject of that position as an opinion (1984: 96).

A standpoint can be positive or negative. If it is positive, the speaker or writer externalizes a positive position in respect to a formulated opinion ("I think that women are better drivers than men"); if it is negative, he external-izes a negative position ("I do not think that women are better drivers than men"). The opinion to which the positive or negative position pertains can be either positive or negative as well ("[I (do not) think that] women are better drivers then men"; "[I (do not) think that] women are not better drivers than men"). In advancing a position in respect to an opinion, the speaker or writer assumes a duty to defend that position when requested to do so. Depending on whether the position is positive or negative, he has committed himself to justifying or refuting that opinion for the listener or reader.2 The speech activity of advancing a standpoint can be characterized by defin-

POINTS OF VIEW 31

ing it as a speech act and by formulating its felicity conditions. In this endeav-or, two questions are relevant: (1) What type of speech act (assertive, commis-sive, directive, expressive, or declarative) is performed in advancing a stand-point? (2) Under which conditions is this speech act performed happily? I ~~ording tQ. VaDJ~5:!!!~~eI1aIl~ I not every standpoint is directly advanced as an assertive. Moreover, advanc-ing a standpoint is more than performing just any assertive. Unlike most oth-er assertives (e.g., announcements), standpoints are typically advanced in a context in which the listener or reader is supposed to have doubts regarding the acceptability of the assertive.

As with other speech acts, the felicity conditions of advancing a standpoint can be divided into two groups: (1) identity conditions indicating what makes an utterance a performance of a particular speech act; (2) correctness condi-tions indicating what an entirely correct performance of that speech act amounts to (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 42). Jointly, the identity conditions and the correctness conditions constitute a definition of the speech act, in this case, the speech act of advancing a standpoint. For advan-cing a positive standpoint, these felicity conditions read as follows (Houtlosser 1995: 75-83):3

Identity Conditions Propositional Content Condition 1 The propositional content of the standpoint consists of an expressed opinion O. 2 0 consists of one or more utterances. Essential Condition

Advancing a standpoint counts as taking responsibility for a positive position in respect to 0, i.e., as assuming an obligation to defend a positive position in re-spect to 0, if requested to do so.

Correctness Conditions Preparatory Condition 1 Speaker S believes that listener L does not (already, at face value, completely)

acceptO. 2 S believes that he can justify 0 for L with the help of arguments. Sincerity Condition 1 S believes that 0 is the case.4 2 S has the intention to justify 0 for L with the help of arguments if requested to

do so.

32 PETER HOUTLOSSER

In the pragma-dialectical perspective on argumentative discourse, an utter-ance can also function as a standpoint without having been presented as such. An informative assertive, for instance, may start to function as a standpoint if the listener questions the information provided in the assertive. In such a case, the speaker has retrospectively committed an offense against the inter-actional principle that prescribes that speakers must not perform speech acts that are not acceptable to the listener (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1991). If the speaker has indeed performed a speech act that appears not acceptable to the listener, then he should attempt to make it acceptable in the second in-stance - or he must retract it. This means that any assertive that is not explicit-1y or implicitly accepted by the listener - and that is not retracted by the speaker - incurs an obligation for the speaker to justity his assertive for the lis-tener. If he complies with this obligation, he in effect supports the opinion that his assertive is acceptable and appears to take a positive standpoint in re-spect of this opinion.

Non-assertive speech acts may also occasion a speaker to defend a stand-point. If the speaker, for example, requests a listener to do something ("Hold the door for me, will you?") and the listener makes it clear that he is not in-clined to comply with that request ("Why?"), the speaker must either justity his request ("I've got these boxes to carry") or retract it ("OK, leave it") - oth-erwise he obstructs the normal process of interaction. If the speaker justifies his request, he actually supports the opinion that his request is acceptable. Just as in the case of an assertive, he then implies that he takes a positive stand-point in respect of the opinion at issue.5

2.2.3 Socio-Psychological Research of Persuasion

At the center of the socio-psychological research of persuasion is the notion of "attitude': According to Daniel O'Keefe in his critical survey, Persuasion (1990), with the term attitude, social psychologists refer to a person's inner, positive or negative evaluation of an object- another person, an institution, an event, a product, a policy, and so on - based on specific beliefs about the supposed properties of that object. Attitudes are not innate; they are a "residue of experience" (1990: 18). They are also enduring and involve a dispo-sition to act in a certain way. Someone may, for instance, have adopted a nega-tive attitude towards the European Union as a result of years of negative re-porting; his attitude will not change just because he has received a few positive reports, and the tendency is for him to continue to express himself negatively rather than positively about the Union (see also Krech and Crutchfield 1969: 679)

When this conception of an attitude is compared with the pragma-dialectical

POINTS OF VIEW 33

definition of a standpoint, some clear differences emerge. First, an attitude is an inner state of mind and a standpoint is an externalized position. The exter-nalized position may - and, in empirical reality, more often than not will- of course be based on some inner state. If someone advances a standpoint in a discussion, say the standpoint that the European Union is an undesirable in-stitution, it is more likely that he already has a more negative attitude towards the Union than a positive one. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that this is indeed the case. A second difference is that only standpoints carry an obliga-tion to argue. Attitudes do not, despite the fact that standpoints are often in-spired by attitudes and sometimes even based on attitudes. Advancing a standpoint creates certain commitments, having an attitude does not. A third

, / ~i~erence b~tween attitudes and standpointsi~JhilJ;l!t:!itlldi;;S inYRly~ ;t2:i~ ; L sltIon to act ill a certain way while standpoints per se do not.A speaker's stand-I ipoint does not necessarily have to agree with his actions; viewed dialectically,

it only needs to be consistent with other externalized positions propounded by the same speaker in the same discussion. In all other cases, a tu E,uoEudi!lla.-cy is committed when a discrepan

tive. and evaluative position is presented in respect to a possible, existing, or desirable state of affairs.9 A distinctive feature of opinions appears to be that they are not "externally verifiable': According to Schiffrin, the term opinion refers to a mental state which is only accessible to the speaker himself (1987: 236; 1990: 244). Someone who expresses an opinion is primarily committed to the sincerity of his words, not to the truth of what he says. Even when the speaker refuses to justify his opinion, he cannot be denied the right to main-tain that opinion. According to Schiffrin, expressed opinions carry no burden of proof. This feature, to a certain extent, makes opinions immune from criti-cism (1985: 40; 1990: 248).

At first glance, opinions and standpoints seem to have a great deal in com-mon. Both opinions and standpoints are a type of statement, both of these statements express some sort of position which, as a rule, will not go undis-puted, and both opinions and standpoints can be individual and subjective. But there are also some crucial differences.

According to Schiffrin, opinions do not carry a burden of proof; stand-points do; a standpoint must be defended against criticisms. If a standpoint turns out to be untenable in a discussion, it would be unreasonable to main-~ain it - although it may, of course, be put forward in a new discussion, so that It may be defended again. According to Schiffrin, an opinion can also be maintained if the critic, at the conclusion of a discussion, is still not convinced of.its ~cceptability. In her view, opinions are subjected to different rationality

cn~e~la than standpoints. Yet, in everyday life, not everyone will agree that opmlOns do not need to be defended. Although Schriffrin's characterization of an opinion is avowedly founded on analyses of everyday discourse, it is in this respect slightly esoteric.

Another important difference between opinions and standpoints is that someone who expresses an opinion primarily commits himself to being sin-cere, not to being right, as is the case with someone who advances a stand-point. When a standpoint is advanced, the sincerity of the speaker is implied

~though not necessarily achieved). Again, Schiffrin's conception of an opin-1O~ s~ems to depart from the ordinary language user's understanding of an opmlOn.As a general rule, someone who utters an opinion in everyday life not only wants to assert that he is being sincere, but also that he is right.lO

2.2.6 Structuralist Informal Logic

The notion of "conclusion" in the structuralist approach to argumentation is commonly used by prominent informal logicians such as Stephen Thomas in Practical Reasoning in Natural Language (1986), Trudy Govier in A Practical

PETER HOUTLOSSER

Study of Argument (1992) and Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair in Logical Self-Defense (1994). Both Govier and Johnson and Blair regard a conclusion as a proposition that is derived from one or more other propositions or premis-es: "The conclusion emerges from the premises" (Govier 1992: 27). They also regard a conclusion as a statement that is in dispute, and in support of which, reasons have been put forward: "Any sentence expressing an opinion [that someone has asserted and is defending] expresses what is called a conclusion of the argument" (Johnson and Blair 1994: 10, 29-30); "The conclusion is the claim or statement that is in dispute and that we are trying to support with reasons" (Govier 1992: 5)." As a consequence, their characterization of a con-clusion does not apply to the final points of logical patterns that are struc-turally parallel to, but functionally different from, arguments. For example, instances of explanatory reasoning such as "Someone else was appointed to the case, because the person to whom it originally had been assigned was on holiday" parallel the logical structure of arguments such as "He will surely come back, because he left the pictures of his mother here"; the proposition "Someone else was appointed to the case" in the explanation, however, can-not count as a conclusion in the informal logic sense, since it is not in dispute and no attempt is made to support it. In this respect, Govier's and Johnson and Blair's use of the term conclusion differs slightly from the way in which the word "conclusion" is used in everyday discourse. Colloquially, a conclusion may very well be the result of a piece of explanatory reasoning.

Because he does not make a distinction between argumentative and explanatory reasoning, for Thomas a conclusion can also be the result of ex-planatory reasoning,u He defines a conclusion as "any statement that an au-thor presents as justified or explained by some reason in a discourse" (1986: 34). In comparing conclusions to standpoints, it is preferable to start from Thomas' definition of a conclusion, because, by using that definition, the dif-ferences between standpoints and conclusions become clearer than when one employs Govier's and Johnson and Blair's definitions. .

The first difference, then, is that a conclusion mi!YQt'!_~:;!ate~nt!!1i!i-1S made (m;~~);c~~Pt~bl~-bi-~th~~~t~t~~~l}i~,Ql!t .~lso a .. st~temen1_~U

,A ~~-;(mQief~en;ib)e1by other statements. With a ~tandpoint, the I"only Issue is acceptability. Formulas suc~~s~~lj>E~!! ~?~~uCldate Il1ystand- .

point"may be colloquial, ~I,!!~()~~~~~*~"r"

concluded from arguments previously propounded and a conclusion may precede the reasons that support it, but logically, conclusions emerge from premises already stated, whereas dialectically, standpoints precede their de-fense. These differences have, by the way, nothing to do with the nature or the formal properties of the statements by means of which they are advanced; de-pending on the perspective one takes, the same statement may be analyzed as a conclusion or as a standpoint.

2.27 Procedural Informal Logic

In the procedural informal logic approach of argumentation expounded by Stephen Toulrnin (195811988) in The Uses of Argument, the notion of a "claim" is central. Toulmin starts from the assumption that a speaker who makes an assertion, by definition, puts forward a claim: "A man who puts forward an as-sertion makes a claim - a claim on our attention and to our belief. [ ... ] The claim [ ... ] in an assertion is like a claim to a right or a title" (1988: 11). The "merits" of such a claim depend, according to Toulmin, on the arguments that can be produced in its support.13 If a speaker advances a claim in an assertion, the listener has the unconditional right to challenge the speaker to justify this

',' claim. In Toulmin's model of argumentation, this challenge is met by advanc-ing data. The data may invoke the question of why they are relevant to the claim. Then, a warrant must be advanced, which may in turn need to be sup-ported by a backing. Also, conditions of rebuttal may be added to the claim, which may occasion the speaker to insert a qualifier (1988: 97-105).

According to Toulmin, an adequate argumentative procedure does not start by advancing a claim, but by posing a question in which a problem is pre-~ sented. Only then is the claim advanced. The claim is presented as the opti-

mally appropriate answer to the problem question - as the solution of the ';problem. Procedurally, claims are thus connected to problem questions and their solution (1988: 17-22). \ How do claims relate to standpoints? Just like in the advancement of a standpoint, by advancing a claim, the speaker purports that what he is assert-ing is acceptable. In this respect, there is no difference between claims and standpoints. Nor is there a difference between claims and standpoints as re-gards the obligation to provide support when either is challenged. According to Toulmin's model, claims should be supported to meet the question as to the grounds on which the claim is based. Standpoints should be supported or re-tracted to meet the doubts of a listener. A significant difference between claims and standpoints is that, according to Toulrnin, a claim is implied by every assertion, whereas not every assertion automatically implies a stand-

PETER HOUTLOSSER

point.'4 In order for an assertion to be a standpoint, additional conditions must be fulfilled (see 2.2.1).

2.2.8 Advocacy and Debate

A debate in the North American style centers around "propositions." As Austin Freeley describes it in his prominent book, Argumentation ~nd De~ate (1993), in a debate two parties attempt, with the help of argument~tI~n, to ~ustify or refute to a judge a statement about whi.ch a di~erence of opl~lOn .eXists. The affirmative side defends the statement ill confhct; the negative SIde at-tacks it. The statement that is defended and attacked is called the debate proposition, or proposition (1993: 38). The affirmative side has the burd~~ of proof of the proposition. This means that they need to justify the propOSIt10~ convincingly to the judge. The negative side has no burden of proof; theH only task is to attack the proposition (1993: 43). . .

American debate distinguishes between three types of propOSItion: pro-positions of fact, propositions of value and proposit~~ns o~ policy (199.3: 47-48 ).'5 The burden of prooffor these types of propositlOns IS, to. a certaI~ e~tent, fixed. To each proposition a certain defense scheme apphes that .I~dIcates which stock issues should be addressed in defending the propos~t~on. Stock issues are questions that are related to a particular type of proposIt~on. The answers to these questions constitute direct justifications or refut~tlO.ns of the proposition (1993: 60 ).'6 In a debate, the affirmative side should JUStify all positive answers in order to make the debate proposition ac~eptable to the judge. In doing so, this party must provide su~porting co~tentlOns for all t.he positive answers to the questions formulated m the StOCkISSU~S. Th: negatIve side needs to refute only one positive answer. If they succeed m domg so, the proposition becomes unacceptable to the judge in accordance with the rules of debate (1993: 61). . .

There are a number of similarities between debate propositlOns and stand-points. Both are externalized statements and both ~res~ppose a difference of opinion. Both debate propositions and standp~ll1ts ll1volve a burden of proof, and the proponent can acquit himself of hIS burden of proof by for-warding arguments.

There are also differences. The first difference is contextual. Debate ~ropositions are, by definition, part of a form~, regime.nted debate. ~ta~dpomts, on the other hand, appear both in formahzed, regImented and m mformal, non-regimented discussions. The second difference is that in a debate that proceeds in accordance with the rules, ~ach party.has o~~ and only one tas~ with respect to the proposition; dependmg on theIr positlOn, one party mus

POINTS OF VIEW 39

defend the proposition, the other must attack it. In an ordinary discussion, the participants have more options. Someone who attacks a standpoint may also advance and defend the opposite standpoint, and the defender of the ini-tial standpoint may start attacking this opposite standpoint. These differ-ences have consequences for the burden of proof. In a debate, the negative side has no burden of proof for the opposite proposition. In a discussion, the party attacking a standpoint has no burden of proof for the opposite stand-point, but if this party advances an opposite standpoint, it assumes a burden of proof.

2.29 Communicative Action Theory

Various argumentation theorists have taken their inspiration from Jiirgen Habermas' theory of communicative action. One of the most prominent

among.the~ is Josef K~ppersch~~c:~ to Kopperschmidt, argu-mentation IS presented ill order ~o justify a thes;y. In Kopperschmidt's ap-proach, the notion of "thesis" is us'Callnrarften:;nt sense than the one devel-oped in classical and formal dialectics.'! To clarify what "thesis" in Kopper-schmidt's sense means, it is imperative to explain his Habermasian theoretical framework. This framework is presented in its fullest form in Methodik der Argumentationsanalyse (1989; see, for an English introduction, Kopper-schmidt1987).

Just like Habermas, Kopperschmidt is of the opinion that the validity basis (Geltungsgrund) of normal communication is constituted by three validity claims underlying every communicative act: comprehensibility, sincerity, and truth or rightness. In the normal course of action, speakers and listeners mutually assume that their utterances are intersubjectively valid in these three respects; the validity claims underlying their utterances remain implic-it. The validity claims may, however, always be made problematic and thus be-come explicit. This happens if one of the interlocutors makes it clear that an utterance is not - or might not be - intersubjectively valid in every respect (1989: 16, 40-43).

According to Kopperschmidt, only truth claims and rightness claims need argumentative support if they are made problematic. Truth claims are im-p lied by assertive speech acts. These claims refer to (supposed) states of affair; the speaker guarantees that the information provided in his assertive is reli-able. Rightness claims are implied by directive speech acts. These claims refer to actions whereby the speaker guarantees that performing the action men-tioned in his directive is legitimized by a mutual willingness to act (1989: 16, 333-334).

40 PETER HOUTLOSSER

If a truth claim or a rightness claim has been made into an issue in the dis-course, it has been, as Kopperschmidt calls it, virtualized (1989: 97). Virtualiz-ing a truth claim or a rightness claim implies that its legitimacy is made de-pendent upon argumentative support; the claim is made the subject of a dis-cussion in which it now functions as a thesis. As soon as the legitimacy of the validity claim is established with the help of arguments, it no longer has the function of a thesis (1989: 98).

A speaker can make an issue of a validity claim by explicitly stating that what he asserts is true or by advancing argumen ts. A listener can virtualize the validity claim underlying a speaker's utterance by explicitly disputing that va-lidity claim, by asking whether it is justified, or by requesting that the speaker advance arguments in its support (1989: 19, 23).

In Kopperschmidt's view, performing an assertive or directive speech act implies a guarantee that the underlying validity claim can be made legitimate. If a speaker performs such a speech act, he undertakes an obligation to defend the thesis that may result from that speech act, if asked to do so, with the help of arguments. If a thesis originates from an assertive speech act, the argu-ments should show what has been asserted to be true; if the thesis originates from a directive speech act, the arguments should show that it is all right to perform the action mentioned in the directive (1989: 18,36).

How do theses relate to standpoints? The terms thesis and standpoint ap-pear to refer to the same thing, albeit from different theoretical perspectives. Both theses and standpoints are part of a discussion situation and both create an obligation to defend, which can be redeemed by advancing arguments. One difference, in Kopperschmidt's view, is that a thesis is not a statement but a virtualized validity claim. ~~e~~~_i!l"_e Ilotput forward as sucl:Ufa speaker appears to be explicitly advancing a thesis ("I hereby advanq; the thesis that

w~men are better drivers than men are" )~i!! I

2.3 Starting Points for Further Research

A clear distinction appears to exist between, on the one hand, the notions "conclusion", "claim", "debate proposition" and "thesis", which, from different perspectives, refer to the same or a similar concept as the pragma-dialectical notion of a standpoint. On the other hand, the notions "attitude", "belief" and "opinion", refer to a different concept. "Attitude': "belief" and "opinion" refer to internal states or expressions of such internal states, which places them in a different category than standpoints. This does not mean,however, that the in-ternal states to which they refer do not playa role in advancing a standpoint. Their "positive" role is roughly that when a standpoint is advanced, the speak-er makes it known to others that he takes a position towards a proposition that he considers to be under dispute, i.e., an opinion. This opinion is ex-pressed in the standpoint. Expressing the opinion implies that the speaker has a certain belief (positive in the case of a positive standpoint, negative in the case of a negative standpoint). Advancing a standpoint commits the speaker to having that belief. The opinion and belief aspects are included in the speech act definition of advancing a standpoint; the opinion aspect in the propositional content condition, the belief aspect in the sincerity condition. A standpoint advanced in the discourse will sometimes also be based on an attitude that corresponds with the position the speaker claims to uphold. But since this is, pragmatically speaking, not required, attitudes are not a consti-tutive part of thepragma-dialectical definition of a standpoint.

In the concluding part of this chapter, two questions remain to be an-swered: what clues do the approaches discussed earlier offer in the identifica-tion of the entity they are interested in, and to what extent are these clues rele-vant for identifying standpoints in the pragma-dialectical sense?

Apart from cognitive research on reasoning, all the approaches discussed above are concerned with problems of identification. In persuasion research, several techniques are used to identify a person's attitudes. Most prominent among them is the "direct measurement technique;' in which respondents are asked to what extent they evaluate a certain object positively or negatively, or are requested to evaluate a number of properties of the object to which a sup-posed attitude pertains (O'Keefe 1990: 19-21). Among the less direct tech-niques are the "quasi-direct measurement technique" and the "indirect mea-surement technique", in which verbal and nonverbal reactions to evaluative statements are measured that indicate a certain attitude (O'Keefe 1990: 20-26, Krech and Crutchfield 1964: 681-683). None of these techniques can be ap-plied for identifying standpoints in argumentative discourse.

In Schiffrin's view, a structural clue for identifying opinions is that opinions are often expressed at the beginning or at the end of conflict discourse. This

42 PETER HOUTLOSSER

clue might also apply to standpoints advanced in discussions that come close to the ideal of critical discussion; standpoints are advanced in the confronta-tion stage of such a discussion and maintained or retracted in the concluding stage. Other clues for identifying opinions can, according to Schiffrin, be found in external markers such as "it is my opinion that" and internal markers such as attitude indicating verbs ("think", "believe") and modal expressions ("should", "could"). The indicative function of these verbs and expressions derives from the fact that they can signal the uncertainty involved in express-ing an opinion (1990: 244). Although a standpoint does not presuppose un-certainty but a difference of opinion, the markers of opinions may also be useful for identifying standpoints. A difference of opinion may, after all, im-ply some kind of uncertainty. . '

According to the structuralist informal logicians, conclUSIOns can be Iden-tified both with the help of clues in the presentation and clues in the context. To the first category belong expressions by which a speaker explicitly indi-cates that he h

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The Handbook Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory (Bibliography 2)