The Greek Koinon

The Greek Koinon

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All RightsReserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in OxfordHandbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).Subscriber: University of Oxford; date: 27 May 2015

PrintPublicationDate: Feb2013 Subject: ClassicalStudies,AncientGreekHistory,SocialandEconomicHistory,GreekandRomanLaw

OnlinePublicationDate: Jan2013

DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195188318.013.0012

TheGreekKoinon EmilyMackilTheOxfordHandbookoftheStateintheAncientNearEastandMediterraneanEditedbyPeterFibigerBangandWalterScheidel

OxfordHandbooksOnline

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapterexaminesthehistoryofthekoinon,aformofregionalstateinancientGreececomprisedofmultiplepoleisandinsomeinstancesotherformsofcommunity,andcharacterizedbythedivisionofsovereigntyamongtheregionalgovernmentanditsconstituentcommunities.ItexplainsthatthekoinonwasaremarkablywidespreadphenomenonandthatalmostofmainlandGreeceandthePeloponnesebecamepartofakoinon.ThechaptersuggeststhatthekoinonaroseamidstaworldofpoleisagainstabackgroundofstronggroupidentitiesandthatitsnaturewasprofoundlyalteredintheprocessoftheRomanconquestofGreeceinthesecondcentury.Keywords:koinon,ancientGreece,multiplepoleis,regionalgovernment,divisionofsovereignty,Greece,Peloponnese,groupidentities

ClicktoviewlargerMap11.1 KoinainMainlandGreeceintheFourthCenturyBCE

Betweentheindividual,autonomouspolisofancientGreeceandthebroaderworldofpoleisinteractingwithnoformalstructuresofinterstategovernancelayaremarkablecompromisebetweenpoliticalcentralizationanddecentralization:thekoinon(pl.koina,literally,acommonthing). TheGreekkoinonwasaformofregionalstatecomprisedofmultiplepoleisandinsomeinstancesotherformsofcommunity(villages,populationgroups,etc.),

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characterizedbythedivisionofsovereigntyamongtheregionalgovernmentanditsconstituentcommunities,whoinfluenceddecisionmakingbymeansofbothrepresentativesanddirectparticipationandwhometmilitaryandfiscalobligationsinexchangeforasetofprivilegesandadvantagesfromtheregionalstate.Thekoinonisdistinctfrommilitaryalliances(liketheso-calledPeloponnesianLeague),religiousorganizations(liketheDelphic-Anthelicamphiktyony),andunitarypoleiswithlocalcouncils(likeAthenswithitsdemes),butitsharesimportantfeatureswitheachofthese.Thekoinon,theGreeksmostcommontermforthiskindofstate,isusuallyreferredtoinAnglophonescholarshipasafederalstateorleague,butneitherphraseaccuratelycapturestheentiresetofpracticesthatareexhibitedbyakoinon(cf.Walbank19761977;Salmon1994,217).ThereareneverthelesssignificantpointsofcomparisonbetweentheGreekkoinonandmodernfederalstates(forwhichthekoinonservedexplicitlyasamodelinmanycases),andissuesandquestionsinthestudyofmodernfederalismthatoverlapwiththestudyofthekoinonwillbeaddressedbelow.EventheGreekterminologyforthisformofstateistricky:itwassometimescalledanethnos,anevenlessspecifictermthankoinon,andoccasionallyintheHellenisticperioditwasknownbythetermsympoliteia(Beck1997,1013;Siewert2005,1920).ButtheGreekphrasethatmostaccuratelycapturesthenatureofthisformofstateispolyeidespoliteuma,aconstitutionofmanykinds,appliedonlyoncebyPolybiosofMegalopolis(23.12.8)totheAchaiankoinon,ofwhichhewasahigh-rankingcitizen(Map11.1).(p.305)

Thekoinonwasaremarkablywidespreadphenomenon,andthedatapublishedintheCopenhagenPolisCentresInventoryofArchaicandClassicalPoleis(HansenandNielsen2004)allowustoquantifyitsextentforthefirsttime.InmainlandGreeceandthePeloponnese,elevenofthetwentyregionsrecognizedasdistinctbytheGreeksthemselvesandbymodernhistorianswerepoliticized,thatis,theyhadaregionalgovernmentintheformofakoinon.InmainlandGreeceandthePeloponneseto323BCE,onaconservativereckoning,183ofthe456poleis(40%)weremembersofonekoinonoranother.Ifweweretoexpandthepurview(p.306) toincludeAsiaMinorandtheHellenisticperiod,thenumberswouldincreasefurtherstill.YetevenintheHellenisticperiod,thekoinonremainsprimarilyaphenomenonofmainlandGreeceandthePeloponnese,probablybecausetherewereinthisregionalargerpercentageofsmallpoleis(withaterritoryof100km orless)andfewerlargeones(withaterritorygreaterthan200km )69.6and10.4percent,respectivelycomparedtothepoleisintherestoftheGreekworld(wherethefiguresare51%small,31%large).Smallterritorysizetranslatedinpracticeintomilitaryandeconomicvulnerability,bothofwhich,asweshallsee,thekoinonwaswelldesignedtoaddress.Butterritorysizewasnottheonlyfactor;therelativeabsenceofthekoinonfromotherpartsoftheGreekworldisalsotobeexplainedinpartbythepresenceofotherkindsofsocioculturalties(e.g.,betweenmetropolisandsettlement)andpoliticalobligations(e.g.,tothePersianempire)thatprecludeditfrombeingaviableoption.

ThatnearlyhalfofmainlandGreeceandthePeloponnesetothefourthcenturybecamepartofakoinonindicatesthatthecompromisesolutionitrepresented,betweencentralizedanddecentralizedpoliticalorganization,waswidelydesirable.Yettheevidencesuggeststhatthecompromisewasdifficulttoaccomplish.Whatfollowsisasurvey,farfromcomprehensive,oftheconditionsthatenabledthedevelopmentofthekoinonandofthepressuresthatthreateneditsviability,aconsiderationofwhatthekoinonaccomplished(whichisawayofaskingwhyitwasworthtryingandwhyitsucceeded),andtheinstitutionalmeansbywhichitdidso.Ishallarguethatthekoinondevelopedgradually,throughacombinationofopportunityandnecessity,asaprofoundlypracticalsolutiontothelimitationsimposedbythenarrowframeworkofthesmallpolisinaworldofnearlyendemicwarfareandhighlylocalized,oftenscarce,resources.

OriginsandDevelopmentTherehasbeenlittleinterestinchartingthedevelopmentofthekoinon.JakobLarsen,themostinfluentialAnglophonehistorianofGreekfederalstates,simplyassertedthattheyweretheproductofdirectevolutionfromtribalstates(e.g.,Larsen1968,xvi,28).Yettheveryconceptisvaguetothepointofmeaninglessness,anditislogicallyunnecessaryforunderstandingtheprocessofstateformation(Service1962,99132;Southall1969;1996;Fried1975;Yoffee2005,821,29contraSahlins1961;1968).Ifancienthistoriansstillusethetermtribalstatetorefertotheclusterofstate-likeactivitiesundertakenbypopulationgroupsincomparativelyunurbanizedareasofGreece,withnointendednegativeconnotationsofprimitiveness(Parker1998,16),CatherineMorgansadoptionofthetermethnos(pl.,ethne)fortheseearlyregionalstatesisawelcomedevelopment(Morgan2003,416).TheGreekwordmeanssimplygroupandisappliedtoabroadrangeofreferentsfromwhichittookitsspecificmeanings;itisnotanintrinsicallypoliticalconcept,(p.307) butmanypopulationgroupswerepoliticized

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andcontinuedonlytobearthelabelethnos,oftencombinedwiththecollectivegroupname,suchastheethnosoftheThessalians.TheotherproblemimplicitinLarsensmodelisthatitobfuscatestheveryprocessofdevelopment.Evidenceforinterpoliscooperation,whennotaccompaniedbyevidenceforanyinstitutionsofakoinon(e.g.,magistrates,representatives,lawsbindingontheentireregion,regulationsgoverningmilitarymusteringorthepaymentoftaxes),doesnotentailtheexistenceofakoinon;itentailsonlycooperation,whichisalogicalearlyphaseinthedevelopmentaltrajectoryofaregionalstate.Itisimportanttoattendtotheinstitutionaldevelopmentofthekoinonandtheprocessbywhichitdevelopedfromloosegroupsofpoleisthattendedtocooperate,foraseriesofreasons,intoastatestructuresupportedbyinstitutionsthatcontinuedtoevolveinresponsetoneedsandopportunities.

Commontomanyemergentkoinaintheseperiodswasasenseamongaseriesofgeographicallycontiguouspoleisandothercommunitiesofgroupidentity,whichwastypicallyarticulatedintheformofdescentfromacommonancestor,theoccupationofasharedterritory,andthesharingofoneormoresanctuaries.SotheIonians,descendantsoftheeponymousheroIon(Hesiod,fragment10a.23),inhabitedtwelvecoastalpoleisinaregionofAsiaMinorcalledIonia,whichtheyclaimedtohaveoccupiedafterbeingdrivenoutofthenorthernPeloponnesebytheAchaians(Herodotus1.145;Strabo8.7.2).TheyalsohadacommonshrinetoPoseidonHelikoniosontheMykalepeninsula,whichtheycalledthePanionion(Herodotus1.148.1).TheBoiotiansclaimedtohaveoccupiedtheirterritoryincentralGreeceafterbeingdrivenoutofArnebytheThessalianssixtyyearsafterthefallofTroy(Thucydides1.12.3),andtheyhadseveralsharedsanctuariesintheArchaicperiod,includingthatofPoseidonatOnchestos,whichwasnotassociatedwithanypolis,andthatofApolloPtoiosatAkraiphia.TheAchaians,inthededicationofamonumentalstatuegrouptoZeusatOlympiainthesecondquarterofthefifthcentury,claimedtobethedescendantsofPelopshimselfand,implicitly,oftheHomericAchaianssincethegroupdepictedtheheroesoftheTrojanWardrawinglotsfortheduelwithHektor(Pausanias5.25.810;forthedateWalter-Karydi1987,2732).Inhabitingtwelvecommunities(Herodotus1.145),theyhadatleastonecommonsanctuary,thatofPoseidonatHelike(Mylonopoulos2003,3540;Mylonopoulos2006,123129).Eachoftheseexamplespointstoearlyinteractionatacommonsanctuaryamongthecitizensofdifferentpoleis,whononethelessregardedthemselvesasbelongingtooneethnos.Thissenseofunitydistinguishessuchgroupsfromotheramphiktyonies(s.,amphiktyony),organizationsofmultiplepoleisandethnethatservednopurposebuttheadministrationofasharedsanctuary.TheDelphicamphiktyony,forexample,wascomprisedoftwelvedistinctethne(Lefvre1998;Snchez2001),andthemembersoftheKalaureianamphiktyony,otherwisesituatedaroundtheSaronicGulf,includedBoiotianOrchomenos(Strabo8.6.14;InscriptionesGraecaeIV.842;Kelly1966;Mylonopoulos2003,7081;Mylonopoulos2006,129136).Asthewealthandprestigeofsuchsharedsanctuariesburgeoned,theresponsibilityofmanagingthemfelluponthosewhousedthemandbecameasharedobligation.Thisneedtomanagesharedsanctuaries(p.308) certainlyaccountsforsomeoftheimpetustowardthecreationofgoverninginstitutionsbeyondtheindividualpolis,butitisonlyonepartofthestory,thepartthatshowshowcloselycommunitybuildingvergedtowardstatebuilding.ThatotherfactorshadtobepresentisshownbythenegativecaseoftheDorianPentapolis,theclusteroffiveDorianpoleisonandneartheKnidianpeninsulainAnatoliathathadacommonsanctuaryofTriopianApollo(Herodotus1.144.13;Parker1998,20;BergesandTuna2001)butwhoseassociationnevertookapoliticalform.

Beyondthesharingofreligiousrites,poleisthatlaterbecamepartofakoinoncooperatedinmilitaryendeavors;indeedthethreatofinvasionorforeigndominationwasfrequentlytheprincipalcatalystintheformationofpoliticalinstitutionsthatgovernedtheentireregion,whereotherunderlyingnecessaryconditionsexisted.ThisprocessisparticularlyclearinthecaseofBoiotia,aregioncomprisedinthesixthcenturybytwenty-sixpoleisofradicallydifferentsizes,Thebesbeingbyfarthelargest.Thisdisparityresultedintheabsorptionorsubordinationofsomesmallerpoleisbylargerones,perhapsasearlyastheseventhcentury(e.g.,HesiodsAskraandThespiai;Tandy1997,205;Edwards2004);whetherthistookaninstitutionalformorwasadefactorelationshipisnotclear.Aseriesofweapons,inscribedanddedicatedatOlympiabyseveralBoiotianpoleis,indicatethatothersfoughttoretaintheirindependenceortojockeyforapositionofhegemonyoverothers(SupplementumEpigraphicumGraecum11.1202,1208;15.245;24.300).AfascinatingpassageofHerodotus(5.79.12)recordingtheeventsof506revealsthat,despitetheapparentlycompletelackofpoliticalinstitutionsbindingtheBoiotianpoleistogether,theywereinthehabitofassistingoneanotherinwarsoregularlythattheyappeartohavebeenabletoexpectmutualmilitarysupport.Shortlybefore,in519,theThebanshadputpressureonPlataiatocontributetotheBoiotians(Herodotus6.108.25;Thucydides3.68.45),anditispossiblethattheperceivedurgencyofunitingBoiotiainthelatesixthcenturymayhavebeenaresponsetotherisingpowerofThessaly(Lehmann1983),but

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certaintyisimpossiblewithoutamorefixeddateforthebattleofKeressos,whichsourcesplacevariouslyintheearlysixthandearlyfifthcenturies(Plutarch,Camillus19.4;Moralia866d7b).ThessalianhostilityaftertheFirstSacredWarwasamajorfactorinthedevelopmentofthePhokiankoinon(McInerney1999,156,173178).AndoneofthefewthingswecansayabouttheAitoliansinthethirdquarterofthefifthcenturyisthattheycooperatedspectacularlywelltodefendtheirterritoryagainstinvasion(Thucydides3.9498,100).Iftheyhadanypoliticalinstitutionsthatgovernedthatprocessofcooperation,theyappearnottohavepreventedindividualAitoliancommunitiesfrommakingtreatieswithoutsiders(SupplementumEpigraphicumGraecum26.461,28.408;Pikoulas20002003).ThenatureofthesetiesiswellillustratedbyThucydidesbriefaccountoftheresponseoftheOzolianLokrianstoaSpartandemandforpermissiontomarchthroughtheirterritoryin426inordertomakearetaliatoryattackonNaupaktos,whichhadincitedanAthenianattackonAitolia:theAmphissaians,oneofthelargestoftheLokrianpoleis,agreedtogivehostagestotheSpartansandallowthemtopassthroughtheirterritory,andthentheyinducedtherest[oftheLokrianpoleis]todothesameforfearofthe(p.309) invadingarmy(Thucydides3.101.2).Ineachcase,activethreatclarifiedtheextentofvulnerability,andthesesmallpoleisrealizedthatcooperationwastheirmostlikelyroutetosurvivalandcontinuedindependence.Butittooktimeforthesecooperativepracticestobestrengthened,regularized,andprotectedbypoliticalinstitutions.

Inadditiontoethnicandreligioustiesandexogenousmotivationsformilitarycooperation,manyofthesesmallpoleiswereboundtoeachotherbyeconomicinteractionsandinterdependence,whichisbestdemonstratedforthisperiodbytheexistenceofcooperativecoinage,coinagemintedbymultiplepoleisonacommonweightstandardwithatleastonecommontypeandsometimesalegendidentifyingboththemintingpolisandthelargergroupofpoleisinwhichitparticipates(MackilandvanAlfen2006).Suchcoinageswereproduced,forexample,inBoiotiaandPhokisfromthelatesixthcentury,andinThessalyshortlyafter479(PsomaandTsangari2003surveytheevidence).Eachofthesehasfrequentlybeendescribedasafederalcoinage,despitetheabsenceofotherevidencefortheinstitutionsofafederalstateinanyoftheseregionsatthetimeoftheirappearance.Rather,thesecoinagespointtothedevelopmentofmonetaryinstrumentstofacilitateeconomicinteractionsbetweenpoleis,andtheybynomeansrequiretheexistenceofafullydevelopedfederalstate.Similarcooperativemonetaryarrangementsareknownforpoleisthatneverjoinedakoinonandalsoforthosethatdidbutonlywellaftertheemergenceofcooperativecoinage.ExamplesoftheformerincludethecoinagemintedjointlybyMytileneandPhokaia(MackilandvanAlfen2006,210219),andofthelattertheArkadikoncoinageoffifth-centuryArkadia(Psoma1997;1999;2001;cf.Morgan2003,84).DespiteourlackofdetailedevidenceaboutpatternsoftradebetweenthepoleisoftheseregionsinthelateArchaicandearlyClassicalperiods,theappearanceofthesecoinsinhoardssuggeststhattheycirculatedprimarilywithintheregioninwhichtheywereminted,andrathermorerarelybeyondit.Inadditiontofacilitatingregionaltrade,suchcoinageswouldalsohavefacilitatedcooperativeactionsundertakenbygroupsofpoleis,includingmilitaryexpeditionsandjointbuildingprojects.ThereisalmostcertainlyafinancialconnotationbehindtheThebandemandin519thatthePlataianscontributetotheBoiotians(Herodotus6.108.5).

TheGreekkoinonhaditsorigininpatternsofreligious,military,andeconomicinteractionamongpoleisthattendedtoregardthemselvesasbelongingtothesameethnos.Itrepresentsoneformtakenbythepoliticizationofethnicgroups,butitneversupplantedethnicidentity;thetwobecamerecursivelyinfluential,andthefuzzyboundarybetweenthemisperhapsbestillustratedbyanearlysecond-centurydecreeinwhichthepolisOrloandawasadmittedtotheLykiankoinonbybeinggrantedsympoliteiaoftheethnos(SupplementumEpigraphicumGraecum18.570:lines5657).Thepoleisthatjoinedakoinonwereoverwhelminglysmall,aswehaveseen,andthefactthatinmostregionswefirstdetecttheemergenceofstateinstitutionstoprotect,regularize,andpromotethosepatternsofinteractionintheaftermathofexogenousshocksuggeststhattheirvulnerabilityasindividualpoleiscontributedsignificantlytotheformationoftheregionalstate.TheBoiotian(p.310) experienceofadecadeofsubjugationtotheAthenianempire(457446)almostcertainlyencouragedthemtodevelopforthefirsttimeregionalpoliticalinstitutionstoformalizeoldhabitsofinteractionandtoprotectagainstarepetitionoftheirsubordinationbymandating,amongotherthings,theparticipationofeverypolisinallmilitaryendeavorsundertakenbytheBoiotians(Salmon1994;Hansen1995,3132).ThesuccessfulrevoltoftheChalkidicpoleisfromAthensin432waslikewiseprobablyfollowedbythecreationofaregionalstateundertheleadershipofOlynthos,newlyenlargedbysynoikism(Psoma2001,189209).Butifawilltocombatexogenousthreatsbymilitarycooperationmotivatedthedevelopmentofkoinoninstitutions,endogenouschallengesmustequallyhavebeenafactor.Thosechallengesweretwofold:thefirstwastonegotiatetheroletobeplayedbythelarger,strongerpoleisintheregionalstate;andthesecondwastosurmountthedifficultyofeconomicsurvivalinsmallpoleiswithsmall

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territoriesinthefragmentedMediterraneanecology,whereresourceswerehighlylocalized.Ishalladdresseachofthesechallengesinturninthenexttwosections.

Coercion,Cooperation,andNegotiationTheoverallstrategywastosurviveandflourishbycreatingaregionalstatethatwouldencompasspoleiswitha(putative)kinshipbondbutthatwouldnoteffacetheinstitutionsofthosepoleisthatweresosuccessfulasinstrumentsoflocalgovernanceandsocialorder.Noteverysmallpolisthatparticipatedintheseregionalnetworksofeconomic,military,andreligiousinteraction,however,agreedwiththisoverallstrategy.Itissometimesarguedthatthekoinonwasanaggressiveinstrumentforthesubordinationofsmallpoleis,nolessthanimperialAthensinthefifthcenturyorSpartaintheearlyfourth(e.g.,Rizakis1990,109).Theproblemofhowacentralgovernment,almostbydefinitionmorepowerfulthanthoseofmemberstates,canbepreventedfromusurpingthepowerandconfiscatingtheresourcesofthosememberstatesisafundamentaldilemmainthemodernpoliticaltheoryandpracticeoffederalism(Riker1964;Weingast1995;2005).Inantiquity,theuseofoverwhelmingforcebyaleadingpolisinthenameorinterestsofthekoinoniswellillustratedbytheThebanattackonPlataiain431(Thucydides2.2.16.4).AlthoughaBoiotianpolis,PlataiahadbeenanallyofAthenssince519;onlyafewofitscitizenspreferredmembershipintheBoiotiankoinontoAthenianallianceandthesefewinvitedtheThebanstomaketheirsurpriseattackin431.ThePlataians,withonlyminorsupportfromAthens,succumbedtosiegefouryearslaterandthepoliswasdestroyed(Thucydides3.2024,52.168.5).NorinthefourthcenturydidtheThebanstoleratetherefusalofBoiotianpoleistoparticipateinthekoinon:afterhavingbeenrestoredtotheircitybythetermsofthePeaceofAntalkidasin386(Pausanias9.1.4)thePlataianswereexpelledbytheThebansagainin373(Xenophon,Hellenica6.3.15;Plutarch,Pelopidas25.8;(p.311) DiodorusSiculus15.46.46;Pausanias9.1.8;Isocrates14),andaroundthesametimetheThespiansmusthaveresistedincorporationbecausetheirterritorywaspillagedandpossiblydepopulated(DiodorusSiculus15.46.6,51.3;cf.Isocrates14.9).Similarlyin382,ambassadorsfromthepoleisofAkanthosandApolloniawenttoSpartatoappealforhelpinresistingtheexpansionofthekoinonoftheChalkideisundertheleadershipofOlynthos.TheAkanthianambassador,afterdescribingtheadvancestheOlynthianshadmadeinsubjugatingaseriesofMacedonianpoleis,madehisowncityssituationquiteclear:TheOlynthianshavenowsenttousandtotheApolloniansandwarnedusthatifwedonotjointheircampaign,theywillmarchagainstus(Xenophon,Hellenica5.2.13).HefurthermentionedpoleisthathadjoinedthekoinonoftheChalkideisunwillingly,anddeclaredthattheywouldrevoltatthefirstopportunity(Xenophon,Hellenica5.2.18).IntheviolentearlyyearsoftheArkadiankoinon,thosecitiesthathadjoinedattemptedtocompelrecalcitrantArkadianpoleistojoinbyforce(Xenophon,Hellenica6.5.22,early369).In280theAitolianscompelledHerakleiaTrachiniatocontribute(syntelein)tothekoinon(Pausanias10.20.9;Scholten2000,24).

Theseexamplessufficetoshowthatcoercionwassometimesusedtoeffecttheparticipationofpoleisinakoinon,butitwouldbewrongtoextrapolatemorebroadlyfromthem.InBoiotiainthesecondhalfofthefifthcenturymemberstateswerejustthat,poleiswithpoliticalrightsandobligations,notsubjectsofThebesastheyappeartohavebeenfrom379,whenaSpartangarrisonwasexpelledfromThebes,to335whenthecitywasdestroyedbyAlexander.Afterthat,theBoiotiankoinonbecameawhollymoreequitablestate;membersremained(andsomebecame)membersvoluntarily,andnotbyforce,evenaftertherefoundationofThebesbyKassanderin316.InthecaseofthekoinonoftheChalkideis,coercionwasemployedonlywhereincentivesfailed.EverycitizenofamemberpolisofthekoinonoftheChalkideishadtherightsofenktesis(propertyownership)andepigamia(intermarriage)ineveryothermemberpolis(Xenophon,Hellenica5.2.19).Thismeantinpracticeafarhigherdegreeofeconomicmobilitythancouldbeenjoyedbythecitizenofasingle,completelyautonomouspolis.TheserightswerealsoamongtheincentivestojoinorremainpartoftheBoiotian(Roesch1973),Achaian(Larsen1971),Aitolian(InscriptionesGraecaeIX1 .1.3a,8,10b;Scholten2000,79;Scholten2003),andLykian(Larsen1957)koinaintheHellenisticandRomanperiods.Anotherprincipalincentivetomembershipwasthegreatermilitarysecurityitafforded:alawoftheAchaiankoinonrequiredthatthearmygototheassistanceofanymemberpolisbeingattacked,andensuredthatifitfailedtodosoandamemberpoliswasforcedtohiremercenariesoutofitsowntreasury,thekoinonwouldreimbursethosefundsfromthecentraltreasury(Polybius4.59.160.10).Whethersimilarlegalpressureswereinplaceornot,theAitolianssuccessfullycooperatedtodefendtheirentireterritoryagainstaMacedonianinvasionin322(DiodorusSiculus18.24.12;cf.18.38.45,19.74.6).

Ifthekoinonwassometimesusedasamechanismforthesubordinationofsmallpoleis,itmorefrequently(iflessnotoriously)servedtopromoteandprotectthecooperationofpoleisandothercommunitieswithinaregion.

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Indeed,(p.312) thekoinonis,likemodernfederalstates,characterizedbyakindoflateralpoliticsandtheinterdependenceofpartandwhole.ThisismostdramaticallyillustratedbyeventsinwesternAchaiain219.AnAitolianforceinvadedandravagedtheterritoriesofDyme,Pharai,andTritaia,thewesternmostoftheAchaianpoleis.Whenalocallymusteredforcewasdefeatedinitsattempttorepeltheinvasion,thethreepoleismadeaformalrequestforassistancefromtheAchaiankoinon.Helpwasrefusedonthegroundsthatthekoinonstillowedmoneytoitsmercenariesandthereforecouldnothireanotherforce;implicitisthefactthatthefullcitizenlevywasalreadydeployedelsewhere.Inresponse,Dyme,Pharai,andTritaiasecededfromthekoinonandrefusedtopaytheirtaxes(eisphora,Polybius4.5960),suggestingthattheypaidthemnotasaformofrenttoanexploitativecentralizedgovernmentbutinexchangeformilitaryassistancewhenevertheneedshouldarise.Secessionweakenedthekoinonandcreatedopportunitiesforitsenemies,asDemosthenespurportedlysawinthecaseofBoiotia(Aeschines,AgainstCtesiphon142).ThisimportantincidentinwesternAchaiarevealsaprocessofnegotiationbetweenpolisandkoinonunderpressure;thatitwasanegotiation,andnotafinalrupture,isshownbythefactthatthecitiesrejoinedthekoinonshortlyaftertheirrevolt.Theincidentillustratesoneofthemainprinciplesthatsomepoliticalscientistshavearguedcontributestoconstitutionalstabilityinfederalsystems,namely,theabilityofmemberstatestoactinconcertagainstpotentialabusesbythefederalgovernment(Weingast2005,161).Italsorevealsaninterdependencethatwouldbeentirelyobscuredifweweretoregardthekoinonprimarilyasaninstrumentofsubordination.

RightsandObligations:ThePoliticsofInterdependenceAsapoliticalsystememergesinwhichpowerisdistributedacrossmultiplescales,thechallengearisesofaccomplishingandmaintaininganequitableandefficientdistribution.Theappropriaterelationshipbetweenfederalandstategovernments,invariousrealms,isperhapsthecentralproblemofthepoliticalscienceandpubliceconomyliteratureonfederalism.Thebasicprincipleofsubsidiaritysuggeststhatpowersshouldbeheldbythosemostcloselyaffectedbythesuccessorfailurewithwhichtheyareexercised,aprinciplethatguidesdistributedauthoritysystemslikethekoinonandmodernfederalstatesinthepoliticalaswellastheeconomicrealm.

Theinterdependenceofpolisandkoinonismostevidentintheconstellationofrightsandobligationstheyhadtooneanother;theobligationofthekoinontoprotectitsmembercommunitiesisbutonepieceofthispuzzle.Inexchangeforthesurrenderofpartialsovereigntyatthelocallevel,poleisthatbecamemembersofa(p.313)koinoncouldinfluenceitsdecisionsbysendingrepresentativestocouncils;bytheattendanceoftheircitizensatdirect,regionalassemblies;andbytheelectionoftheircitizenstokoinonmagistracies.

ThesystemofrepresentationisbestknownforBoiotiacirca395,thankstoajustlyfamouspassagefromtheOxyrhynchusHistorian(HellenicaOxyrhynchia16.34Bartoletti).BecausetheBoiotianpoleishadradicallydifferentterritoryandpopulationsizes,theywereclusteredtogetherintoatotalofelevendistrictsforpurposesofrepresentation.Thedistrictsrangedinsizefromasinglelargecity(Tanagra)tothreemedium-sizedcities(e.g.,Akraiphia,Kopai,andChaironeia);themammothclusterofThebesanditsdependentpoleiscomprisedfourdistricts.EachdistrictsentoneBoiotarchandsixtycouncillorstoThebes,wherethekoinasynedria(commonassemblies)met;thedistrictwasalsoresponsibleforpayingadailywagetoitsBoiotarchandcouncillors.Thebes,bythesubordinationofsmallercommunities(includingPlataia),achievedadisproportionatedegreeofinfluence,buttheotherpoleiswerenonethelessrepresentedinsomerelationshiptotheirsize.Thissystemwentbackatleastto424(Thucydides4.91)andprobablytocirca446.Butfrom379/8,whentheThebansexpelledtheSpartangarrisonfromtheircity,until335whenthecitywasrazedtothegroundbyAlexander,theBoiotianpoleiswereprobablyexcludedfromthecollegeofBoiotarchs(Knoepfler2000,contraBuckler1979),theregionshighestpoliticalandmilitarymagistrates,andperhapsevenfromattendingtheassembly(damosorekklesia)thatactedasthedeliberativebodyinthesameperiod.Unfortunatelytheevidenceonbothpointsisinconclusive.InanycasethesystemdescribedbytheOxyrhynchusHistorianwasclearlyinplace,withsomechanges,shortlyafter335(Corsten1999,2760;Knoepfler2000).TheBoiotianuseofdistrictstomediaterelationsbetweenpoleisandkoinonnecessitatedsignificantcooperationamongpoleisthatbelongedtoasingledistrict,fortheyhadtoagreeamongthemselvesaboutwhomtosendasrepresentativesaswellasabouthowtopaythem.

Infourth-centuryAchaiaaregionalcounciloperatedalongsidethegovernmentsofthememberpoleis;ouronlyevidenceforthisisasinglefragmentaryinscription(SupplementumEpigraphicumGraecum14.375),butitincludesalistofnamesandseveralpolisnames,whichmayindicaterepresentativesofthesepoleisatthecouncil.

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Achaiancitizenshipwasnotjustasalientconceptbutalsoalegalrealityby389andcouldbebestowedenblocontheinhabitantsofnewlyincorporatedcommunities(Xenophon,Hellenica4.6.1).TheexactnatureofthegoverningbodiesintheHellenisticAchaiankoinonisunclear,butinbarestoutlinesweknowthattherewasbothapopularassembly(ekklesia)attheregionalscale,attendedbyallcitizenmalesofmilitaryage,andaregionalcouncil(boule)populated,almostcertainly,byrepresentativesofallmemberpoleis(Polybius2.37.1011,29.235;Walbank19571979,3:406414forabalanceddiscussionandreferencestoearlierliterature).Asimilarstructure,ofalarge,primarymilitaryassemblyoperatingalongsideasmaller,representativecouncil,governedHellenisticAitolia(Scholten2000,2627).ItissignificantthatinAitoliaandAchaia,wheremilitaryassembliesgovernedalongwithrepresentativecouncils,thehighestelectedmagistratesofthekoinonweregenerals(strategoi),pointingtowarasoneoftheprincipalfunctions(p.314) ofthekoinon.Indeeddefense,describedbypoliticalscientistsasanonrivalrouspublicgood,isintheorybestassignedtothecentralgovernmentratherthantoindividualmemberstates;theneedforitisregardedasamajorcentralizingforceintheformationoffederalstates(McKinnonandNechyba1997,6).

Inexchangefortherightofpoliticalparticipation(whetherdirectorbyrepresentation,oracombinationofthetwo),everykoinondemandedmilitaryservicefromitscitizens.Inearlyfourth-centuryBoiotiathelevyofhoplitesandcavalrywasconductedonaterritorialbasis,utilizingtheelevendistrictswehavealreadyseenatworkasinstrumentsforrepresentation.Eachdistrictprovidedathousandhoplitesandonehundredcavalrymen;significantnumbersoflight-armedtroopsareattestedintheBoiotianarmyinthelatefifthcentury(Thucydides4.93.3)butbywhatmechanismtheywereleviedisunclear.IntheHellenisticperiod,thenumberofdistrictswasreducedtosevenoreight(Knoepfler2000);poleisthatweremembersofthesamedistrictreachedagreementsamongthemselvesabouthowpreciselytoprovidethetroopsforwhichtheywerejointlyresponsibletothearmy(tienneandRoesch1978).Trainingtheirtroopswaslikewisetheresponsibilityofeachpolis,buttheywererequiredbyalawofthekoinontodoso(Roesch1971;Roesch1982,307354).InHellenisticAchaiaandAitoliathelevieswerenotaccomplishedthroughdistrictsbutweremoregeneral,andbecausetheassembliestherewerecomprisedofmenofmilitaryage,theybecamelociforstrategicdecisionmaking(e.g.,Polybius4.7.1011).

Inadditiontothefundamentalexchangeofmilitaryserviceforrightsofpoliticalparticipation,thecitizensofakoinonwereboundtoobeythelawsoftheirownpolisaswellasofthekoinon.Soin367/6anAthenianembassywenttotheAitoliankoinontocomplainoftheviolationbytwoofitsmembersofasacredtruce(RhodesandOsborne2003,no.35);theclearimplicationisthatthekoinonhad(orwasassumedtohave)fulllegaljurisdictionoverthecitizensofitsmembercommunitiesinexternalaffairs.Inlatethird-centuryAchaia,aboardoftwenty-fourlawgivers(nomographoi)setdownregulationsforsacrificeatanimportantregionalsanctuaryandweremoregenerally,wecanassume,responsibleforlegislatingmattersofimportancetotheentirekoinon;thememberswererepresentativesoftheirpoleis(orinsomecasesperhapsofgroupsofpoleis)butonwhatprincipleisunclear(InscriptionesGraecaeIV .1.73;Corsten1999,170172).Evidenceforkoinonlegislationistoopatchytodeterminethefulllegalspherewithinwhichthekoinonexerciseditsauthority,butitissignificanttonotethatitdidnotoverlapwiththelegaljurisdictionofmemberpoleistogoverntheirowninternalaffairs;wehave,forexample,adecreeofAchaianDymeintheearlysecondcenturyimposingthedeathsentenceonseveralmenwhohadproducedcounterfeitcoins(SyllogeInscriptionumGraecarum 530;ThrandStumpf1989).

Oneofthemostremarkableandinnovativerolesofthekoinoninthelegalspherewastofacilitatethearbitrationofdisputesbetweenitsownmembercommunities;thatfederationisapowerfulinstrumentforpeacehasbeenacentraltenetofmodernpoliticaltheorysinceKant(PerpetualPeace356;Hayek1948,255256).Inaworldwhereboundaryandtradedisputes,evenbetweensmallpoleis,(p.315) couldleadtowar,theprovisionofarbitrationbyaneutralthirdpartywasasignalservice,renderingtheappealtoforeignjudges,socommonelsewhereintheHellenisticperiod,unnecessary.Itwasonlypossible,however,wherecoerciontoparticipatewaseffectivelyabsentandcooperationtookprecedenceovercompetition,asshownbythefailureoftheBoiotianstoarbitrateinthedisputebetweenPlataiaandThebesin519andagainin432.Virtuallyalloftheseinterpolisdisputeswereoverboundaries(Ager1996,nos.1617[Boiotia],36[Achaia],56[Aitolia]),butquarrelsoverotherissues,likecontrolofapriestlycollegeforasharedcult(Ager1996,no.4[Ionia]),arealsoattested.Occasionallyakoinonappointedamemberpolisuninvolvedinadisputebetweenothermemberstoarbitrate(Ager1996,38[Achaia];41,5556[Aitolia]).Thekoinonbecameasignificantinstrumentinarbitrationbecausememberpoleisrecognizeditasapoliticalauthorityinwhichtheythemselveshadastake.Theseterritorialdisputespoint,however,toanothermajorfunctionofthekoinon:theprotectionandmanagementoftheregionaleconomy.

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Ecology,Economy,andtheKoinonTheextremeecologicalfragmentationoftheMediterraneanresultsinahighlyirregularandlocalizeddistributionofresourcesthatisaprincipalcharacteristicoftheregion(HordenandPurcell2000).Strategiesofagriculture,storage,andexchangeintendedtomitigatethedeleteriouseffectsoflocalizedscarcityandgluthavebeenwellstudiedbyancienteconomichistorians(e.g.,Garnsey1988;HalsteadandOShea1989;IsagerandSkydsgaard1992).ButthequestionofhowthisecologicallydrivenneedforhumanmobilityintheregioninteractedwiththepoliticalrealitiesoftheancientGreekworldremainsunderexplored(Bresson2000;Purcell2005).Expandingthesizeofasinglepolissterritorywasonestrategyforgainingcontrolofagreaterarrayandextentofresourcesinternally;atcirca2,500squarekilometers,AtticawasbyfarthelargestpolisterritoryintheGreekworld(Ober2008,chap.2),directlycomparableinsizetotheentireterritoryofBoiotia,divided(theoretically)amongsometwenty-fivepoleis.Butwhereexpansionandcentralizationwereimpossibleorundesirable,otherstrategiesweredevelopedtousepoliticalinstitutionstocapturesimilarbenefits,andthekoinonwasespeciallysuccessfulatdoingso.IndeedFriedrichHayek(1948,255)reckonedtheabolitionofimpedimentsastothemovementsofmen,goodsandcapitalbetweenthestatesalongwiththecreationofacommonmonetarysystemasamongtheprincipaladvantagesoffederalism.

TherightofallcitizensofmemberstatestoownpropertyandintermarrythroughouttheentireterritoryofthekoinonwasextendedforthefirsttimeintheearlyfourthcenturybytheexpandingkoinonoftheChalkideis,asdescribedabove,andbecameahallmarkofkoinoneconomiesbytheHellenisticperiod.TheeconomicincentivestomembershipofferedbythekoinonoftheChalkideisparalleledtheirownexpansionistpolitics:theAkanthianambassador,(p.316) seekingSpartanhelpagainstthemin382,attributedtheirpowertothepossessionofplentifulfoodandtimber,andwarnedthattheywereactivelyseekingtoincorporatetheThraciansinordertogaincontroloftherichminesunderMt.Pangaion(Xenophon,Hellenica5.2.167).Plentifultimberandlodesofpreciousmetalwerenot,however,typicalofthedistributionofresourcesinmainlandGreeceandthePeloponnese.Thethird-centurytravelwriterHerakleidesKretikossDescriptionofthepoleisinGreecegivesanimpressionofamorecommonsituation:plentifulfishbutwhollyunproductivelandinAnthedon,asmallcoastalpolisofBoiotia,contrastswithnearbyTanagra,blessedwithexcellentvinesandolivegrovesbutstillnograinlands(Pfister1951,8,2324).InmountaineconomieslikethoseofAitoliaandAchaia,accesstouplandsandlowlandswasvitalforpastoralism,andinitselfdemandedcooperationamongcommunitiesiftheirterritoriesweresmall(Schmitt1969,no.456;Chaniotis1999),buttherewaslittlepossibilityofeconomicorpoliticalgrowthwithoutaccesstothecoastfortrade.ThisprobablylaybehindtheAitoliansstruggletoregaincontrolofNaupaktosin389(XenophonHellenica4.6.14)andtheirseizureofAkarnanianOiniadaicirca335(Plutarch,Alexander49.15;DiodorusSiculus18.8.6).Thekoinonthususeditscentralizedpowertoalleviatethepressuresofhighlylocalizedresourcesbygrantingthecitizensofallmemberstatestherighttoownlandandpropertyanywherewithinthekoinon,enablingindividualstodiversifytheirownproductionanddistribution.

BytheHellenisticperiod,thekoinontookontheroleofprotectingthissystemoffragmentedresourcedistribution.IntheearlysecondcenturyaseveregrainshortageaffectedmuchofcentralGreeceandthenorthernPeloponnese,andboththeAchaianandBoiotiankoinarespondedbyimposingembargoesontheexportofgrainfromtheentireregion(SupplementumEpigraphicumGraecum25.445lines1516;22.410lines56withMigeotte1984,4144).ThekoinonsroleasmanageroftheregionaleconomyintheHellenisticperiodwasnotlimitedtointerventioninperiodsofcrisis.Wehaveevidenceforthekoinonhandlingtaxationofimportsandexportsfromalltheportsunderitssovereignty,andforcontrollingtherevenuesgeneratedthereby.ThekoinonoftheChalkideiscontrolledtheincomeofrevenuesfrommanyharbors,manyports(Xenophon,Hellenika5.2.16)accordingtotheAkanthianambassadortoSpartain382,andhepresumablymeantthatalltaxesonimportandexportthrougheveryportthatfellunderthejurisdictionofthekoinonwentintoitscentraltreasury.ThatimpressionisconfirmedbyaroughlycontemporaryalliancebetweenthekoinonoftheChalkideisandAmyntasIIIofMacedon,whichestablishestermsfortheimportandexportofgoodsbetweenthetworegionsandrequirespaymentoftaxesbybothparties(RhodesandOsborne2003,no.12).In352,whenPhilipIIofMacedonsavedtheThessaliansinabattleagainstthePhokiansduringtheThirdSacredWar,theThessaliankoinonsurrenderedtohimalltheirtaxesandrevenues(Justin,Epitome11.3.2).InBoiotiafromthemid-fifthcenturythekoinonextractedtaxesfromitsmemberpoleis,theassessmentsofwhichweremadeaccordingtosomeproportionoftheirpopulation(HellenicaOxyrhynchia16.4Bartoletti);thepracticecontinuedthroughouttheHellenisticperiod,alongsidethepoleisownpowertotaxforlocalpurposes(p.317) (Feyel1936,faceBlines2627;cf.faceAlines56).WhetherthetaxpaidtotheBoiotiankoinonbyitsmemberpoleiswasexceptionalorregularisunclear;thetermused,eisphora

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(enphoraintheBoiotiandialect),frequentlysignalsanexceptionallevyraisedtofundmilitaryactivity.ThesameuncertaintyprevailsaroundthetaxesleviedbytheAchaiankoinon;whenthewesternAchaianpoleisofDyme,Pharai,andTritaiasecededin219,theydidsobyrefusingtopaytheireisphora(Polybius4.60.4),butbecausetheirsecessionwaspromptedbythefailureofthekoinontodefendtheirterritoryfromattack,itwouldbereasonableforthemtorefusetopayatax(whetherregularorexceptional),therevenuesfromwhichfundedtheAchaianarmy.Thekoinonwas,itisimplied,normallyusingitstaxrevenuesforthepublicgoodofitsmembers;thesecessionofthesecitieslimitedthekoinonsabilitytobecomearent-seekersimplytoconfiscatethewealthofitsmembersundertheguiseoftaxation(cf.BrennanandBuchanan1980).Somepoliticalscientistsarguethatthiskindofinternalcompetition,intrinsictowell-engineeredfederalinstitutions,iswhatmakesfederalismattractiveinamarketeconomy(Weingast1995;McKinnonandNechyba1997;Weingast2005).

Theassignmenttothekoinonofthemanagementoftheregionaleconomyandthecollectionoftaxesonimportandexportaswellasthosecollectedforthefundingofmilitaryactivitywouldprobablyhavebeenimpossiblewithouttheadditionalresponsibilityformonetaryproduction.Wesawabovethattheproductionofacooperativecoinagewascharacteristicofearlypatternsofinteractionbetweenpoleisthatlaterbecamemembersofasinglekoinon.Astheinstitutionsofthatstatedeveloped,thekoinontypicallyplayedamajorroleinitsmonetarypolicyandproduction,buttheextentofcentralizationandpreciseconfigurationsofresponsibilityvariedsomewhat(PsomaandTsangari2003;MackilandvanAlfen2006,226235).Overall,theeconomicpowersandresponsibilitiesoftheGreekkoinonoutlinedherematchquitecloselytheprofileofpowersthatpoliticalscientistsandpubliceconomistsagreearebestassignedtothecentralgovernmentinmodernfederalstates,becausetheyaffecttheentirepopulation(Oates1972;McKinnonandNechyba1997).Weshouldperhapsnotbesurprisedthatthekoinon,asacompromisebetweencompletepolisautonomy(likeCorinthintheArchaicandClassicalperiods)andafullycentralizedstateincorporatingmultiplecommunitiesstrippedofmostlocaljurisdiction(likeAthensandAttica),wasadoptedasapoliticalsolutionbynearlyhalfofmainlandGreeceandthePeloponnesebythefourthcentury,andbyevenmoreintheHellenisticperiod.

Legitimation,Identity,andReligiousPracticeThecompromiseeffectedbythedevelopmentofthekoinonwas,however,delicate,andbothleadersandcitizenssoughttolegitimateandreinforceitthrough(p.318) religiouspractice.Whilememberpoleisretainedjurisdictionovertheirowncults,thekoinonsoughttolegitimateitspowerthroughritualactivityatoneorseveralprominentregionalsanctuaries.Inseveralregions,cultsofimportancetotheentirekoinoneithercommemoratedamajorvictoryoveranenemy,whichcrystallizedthepoliticalsalienceoftheworshipinggroupandcontributedtothedevelopmentofkoinoninstitutions,orwereassociatedwiththerulinggroupsoccupationoftheterritory.InPhokisahard-wonvictoryovertheThessaliansinthelatesixthcenturybecamethecatalystforthecreationofregionalpoliticalinstitutions,buttherewasaparallelreligiousresponsetothevictory:thePhokiansmadededicationstoApolloatAbai(Herodotus8.27.45,8.33),andthesanctuaryofArtemisElapheboliaatHyampolisbecamethesiteofafestivalfoundedincelebrationofit(Plutarch,Moralia244bd,660d;Ellinger1987;1993;McInerney1999,60,173181).ThecultofAthenaItoniaatBoiotianKoroneiaandthecultofPoseidonatHelikeinAchaiawerebothassociatedwithjustifyingterritorialoccupation.AthenaItoniawasaThessalianwarriorgoddess,andtheBoiotiansclaimedatleastfromthefourthcenturytohavefoundedhercultatKoroneiawhentheyseizedtheareafromOrchomenosattheendoftheirmigrationfromThessaly(Thucydides1.12.3;Strabo9.2.29;Hekataios,FragmentederGriechischenHistoriker1F2;Armenidas,FragmentederGriechischenHistoriker378F1).Thecultwaswellestablishedby446,whenthebattleofKoroneia,whichresultedinaBoiotianvictoryandtheendofaten-yearperiodofAtheniancontrol,wasfoughtonItoniasdoorstep(Plutarch,Agesilaos19.12).Herroleinsecuringthatvictorymaybebehindanapparentriseinregionalinterestinthecultinthemid-fifthcentury,andperhapsthemythitselfthatassociatedherwiththeconquestoftheregion.Severalfragmentsofculticpoetryattesttotheregionalinterestofthefestivalinthisperiod(Bacchylidesfragment15Maehler;Pindarfragment94b.3649),anditwasprobablyshortlyafter446thatthegoddessreceivedanewcultstatue(Pausanias9.34.1).TheregionalimportanceoftheshrinebecameexplicitintheHellenisticperiodwhenitwasthesiteofthesignificantlynamedPamboiotia,afestivalfeaturingequestriancompetitionsattestedbythededicationsofpolisteamstotheirownpolisdeitiesinthanksforvictoriesatKoroneia(InscriptionesGraecaeVII.3087;SupplementumEpigraphicumGraecum3.3545).Asafinalexample,theAchaiansexplainedthattheyworshippedPoseidonatHelikebecausetheIonians,whomtheyexpelledfromtheregion,haddonesobefore;intheearlyfourthcenturytheIoniansappealedtothe

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Achaiansforsomerelicsfromthealtartotransfertotheir(comparatively)newcultofPoseidonHelikoniosatMykaleinAsiaMinor,andthenarrativeoftherequestandresponsemakeitclearthattheAchaiankoinonhadatleastnominaljurisdictionoverthesanctuary,evenifthecitizensofHelikethoughtitsmanagementwastheirspecialconcern(Strabo8.7.2;DiodorusSiculus15.48).Thatthecityanditssanctuaryweredestroyedafewyearslaterbyanearthquakeandtsunamiwasanironynotlostonancientwriters.LiketheBoiotiancultatKoroneia,theAchaiancultatHelikelegitimatedtheAchaiansrighttoinhabitandruletheterritorytheyhad(atleastinmyth)seizedfromanotherpopulationgroup.Forakoinonseekingtolegitimateitsruleoveranextendedterritoryofmultiplepoleis,therecouldbenomoresignificant(p.319) oreffectivechoice.WhenitwasdestroyedthekoinonshifteditsreligiousattentiontothesanctuaryofZeusHoma(gy)rios,thegatherer,atAigion.

TheretheAchaiansheldcouncilmeetingsandelections,anddepositedcopiesofkoinondecreesfromthefourthcenturyonward(e.g.,Liv.38.30.1);thereisnocompellingevidenceforitspoliticalusebeforethedestructionofHelike(Plb.2.39.6islateandbiased).Thismoreexplicitlypoliticalroleforsanctuaries,aspoliticalmeetingplacesandarchives,isfrequentintheHellenisticperiod.InAitoliatheremarkablesanctuaryofApolloatThermonwasbothapoliticalmeetingplace(EphorosFragmentederGriechischenHistoriker70F122;thereisabouleuteriononthesite)andarepositoryfordecreesofthekoinon,butthelatterrolewasassumedalsobythesanctuaryofArtemisatKalydon(e.g.,InscriptionesGraecaeIX1 .1.170,lines34),pointingtotheparallelneedstodistributeinformationandtosecurethesupportandprotectionofallthepowerfuldeitieswithinakoinonsterritory.ThismultipolarapproachtolegitimationandthecaptureofdivinesupportismostnotableinHellenisticBoiotia,wherethevenerablesanctuaryofPoseidonatOnchestosbecametheprincipalmeetingplaceandarchiveofthekoinon,butcopiesofkoinondecreeswerealsoerectedatKoroneia,atthesanctuaryofAthenaatAlalkomenai,andattheAmphiaraionofOropos(againInscriptionesGraecaeIX1 .1.170,lines46;Roesch1982,268276).InitszealtointegratetherichreligiousresourcesofBoiotia,thekoinonevenappointedspecialmagistratescalledaphedriateswhoappeartohaveactedasrepresentativesofdistrictsforthepurposesofmakingdedicationsonbehalfofthekoinon.Wehaveevidenceoftheirdedicationsinthethirdcenturyatfourdifferentsanctuariesinasmanydifferentpoleis,noneofwhichwerethemostpoliticallysalientsanctuariesoutlinedabove(InscriptionesGracecaeVII.16723,1795,2723,2724cd,3207;Roesch1965,135141;Knoepfler2000).Sanctuariesfunctionedasvaluableresourcesforpoleisseekingtolegitimatetheircontrolofaterritory(soPolignac1995),andthesamewastrueforkoina.Butthekoinonsdistinctivedistributionofpoweracrossmultiplescalesthepolis,thedistrict,andtheregionmandatedamultipolarapproachtoritualactivitythroughouttheregionthatwouldbothsustainandreflectitspoliticalarrangements.

Conclusion:AConstitutionofManyKindsThenatureofthekoinonwasprofoundlyalteredintheprocessoftheRomanconquestofGreeceinthesecondcentury.Between189,whentheAitolianssurrenderedtoRometheirfreedomtodeterminetheirownforeignpolicyandacceptedalossofsomemembersandlimitationsontheirabilitytoadmitnewones,and146whenCorinthwassackedandtheAchaiankoinonforciblydismantled,thekoinonspowersweresignificantlycircumscribed,limitednowtolocalgovernancewhiletheRomansdeterminedforeignpolicy(Larsen1968,406504;Schwertfeger1974).

(p.320) Ihavesuggestedthatthekoinonaroseamidaworldofpoleisagainstabackgroundofstronggroupidentitiesthatsurpassedpolisboundariesandwerefrequentlyreinforcedandarticulatedinculticterms;thatthemembersofthesegroupsinteractedintenselywithoneanotheralsoforeconomicandmilitaryreasons;andthatwhentheadvantagesofcreatingastatethatwouldencompassthosepoleisandothercommunitiesthatwerepartofthissystembegantocrystallize,politicalinstitutionsweredevelopedbyacomplexprocessofcoercion,cooperation,andnegotiation.Itwas,asPolybiosastutelyrealized,aconstitutionofmanykinds.ThedevelopmentaltrajectoryfromethnostokoinonthatIhavesketchedabovepointstooneofthewaysinwhichtheprocessofdefininganethnicidentityinfluencednotjustreligiousbutalsopoliticalandeconomicbehavior.Politicalscientistsandeconomistshavearguedthatfederalismpromoteseconomicwelfarebyfacilitatingaccesstoagreaterarrayofresources,bycreatingacentralizedmonetarypolicy,andbypromotingpeaceamonglargergroupsofcommunities;theyalsoarguethatfederalismhasthepotentialtoaccomplishgreaterpoliticalequitythanmanyotherformsofstatebybeingfoundedonaprincipleofintrinsiccompetitionandconstantnegotiation.Most,ifnotall,ofthesefeaturesaremanifestinmostinstancesofthekoinon;iftheseinstitutionscontributedsosignificantlytothewelfareandequityofthesocietiestheygoverned,thatshouldgosomewaytowardexplainingwhytheyencompassednearlyhalfofthemainlandGreekworldintheClassicalandHellenisticperiods.

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Notes:

The Greek Koinon

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(1.)IammostgratefultoKathleenFrydl,ErichGruen,RonaldStroud,andPetervanAlfenforreadingdraftsofthischapterandsuggestingimprovements.Thispaperwascompletedin2007anddoesnottakeaccountofworkpublishedsincethen.

EmilyMackilEmilyMackilisAssistantProfessorofHistoryattheUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley.AhistorianoftheancientGreekworld,shehasaspecialinterestinissuesofstateformationandpoliticaleconomy.

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The Greek Koinon