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Comparative PoliticsProf. Marco Giuliani AY 2009-2010. The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies. 4 th November 2009. Camilla Mariotto. Content. Introduction – research questions Background Supporting theory Data: Country Selection Sample of Government Bills - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies
4th November 2009
Camilla Mariotto
Comparative Politics Prof. Marco GiulianiAY 2009-2010
Comparative Politics 2
Content
1. Introduction – research questions2. Background3. Supporting theory4. Data:
1. Country Selection2. Sample of Government Bills3. Measurement of Independent and Dependent
Variables
5. Analysis and Findings6. Conclusions
Comparative Politics 3
Introduction
Core research question:How do governments organize the policy agenda?
Specific question:How do coalition governments determine the sequence and timing of bills submitted to the legislature?
Focus on the “life” of a coalition vs. focus on its “birth” or “death” (who gets into government, which ministries each party controls and how long the government will last).
Comparative Politics 4
Background (1)Parliamentary Democracy
The government determines the TIMING and SUBSTANCE of the main policy initiatives.
To understand the policy agenda any attempt must focus on goals and capabilities of parties involved in the government coalition.
≠ parties tend to prioritize their own issues … Conflicting issues
Government parties have the incentives to seek a policy agenda able to accomodate the preferences of all partners in the coalition
Comparative Politics 5
Background (2)
The construction of the policy agenda is taken by individual cabinet ministers and their departments.
Minister (with portfolio)
Gov.Department
Policy area
controls controls
Each minister has a crucial role in the definition of the government policy agenda.
Comparative Politics 6
Background (3)
CABINET MINISTERS
Positive agenda control:
means of ensuring that their proposal
does not face defeat, extensive
modification or delay
Negativeagenda control:
capability of keepingunacceptable proposaloff the government’s
agenda
Comparative Politics 7
Background (4)
Portfolio allocation approach (Laver and Shepsle): Cabinet ministers are able to act as virtual dictators in
the policy areas they control “Member of the cabinet will have only limited ability to
shape the substance of policy emanating from the department of a ministerial colleague.”
However, coalition parties would prefer a compromise policy package instead of package of each party’s ideal policy in the issue area it controls.
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Supporting theory (1)
Gains from cooperation
But, cooperation can disappear if a minister (agent) has incentive to act contrary to the interest of the whole cabinet (principal). Principal-agent framework.
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Supporting theory (2)
The prevention of subversion of the agreement is to control and monitor the actions of cabinet.
Role of junior minister as watchdog (Thies) Mechanisms of information-gathering and
conflict-management (Mueller and Strøm) Parliamentary oversight devices (Martin
and Vanberg) committees.
Not costless!
Comparative Politics 10
Supporting theory (3)When should coalition members be more likely to use control devices to counter the actions of minister from other parties?
1. Divisiveness of the issue
2. Saliency of the issue
more salient issue quick• Not significantly divisive issue
less salient issue less quick
more salient issue more reneging
• Significantly divisive issueless salient issue less reneging
Comparative Politics 11
Supporting theory (4)
“If coalition partners use the monitoring and control devices, then we should expect the government policy agenda to be organized in an accommodative fashion”
Attractiveness as ordering criterion of the issues
At the cabinet level there should be a delay in the introduction of the proposal Inducement to initiate bargaining with other parties and before a particularly controversial bill is even brought to the cabinet, because of intense scrutiny.
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Data_country selection
PROS: Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands 1979-1992 Governments were coalitions controlling a majority of
legislative seats.
CONS: Difficult assessment of the impact of alternative
institutional arrangements and certain coalition attributes on the organization of the government agenda.
Difficult conclusions if minority or single party government.
Comparative Politics 13
Data_sample of government bills
833 bills classified in 8 categories: Tax policy, foreign policy, industrial policy, social policy,
clerical policy, agricultural policy, regional policy, environmental policy.
Exclusion of budget bills and bills proposing constitutional changes.
3 sources of variation in issue saliency and divisiveness across bills:
1. Across issue area (to whom is the issue important?)
2. Across governments (are there any gov. changes?)
3. Across elections (how big are the parties?)
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Data_measurement of dependent and independent variables Dependent variable timing of bill introduction
Comparative Politics 15
Independent variables issue saliency and divisiveness Government issue saliency Government issue divisiveness
Opposition issue saliency clashes can affect Opposition issue divisiveness bill timing
Data_measurement of dependent and independent variables
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Data_measurement of dependent and independent variables (A)
Government issue saliency:An issue of average saliency for any given party received a score of “1.” A scaled saliency score >1 = relatively more salient dimension for a party.A scaled score < 1 = relatively less salient dimension. On gov-by-gov basis saliency scores were weighted by the proportion of lgs seats. On dim-by-dim basis an average weighted saliency score was derived by summing all the seat-weighted saliency score for the dimension on which the bill is classified.
Comparative Politics 17
Data_measurement of dependent and independent variables (B)
Government issue divisiveness:The absolute distance of each coalition party from the party position of the minister drafting the billThe distance measures were weighted by the proportion of lgs seats.The seat-weighted distance were summed, on a dim-by-dim basis, across coalition parties in order to create the average weighted distance score.This distance score was multiplied by the government issue saliency.
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Analysis and Findings (1)
Mod.1 estimated effect of:- The ideology variables- Countries- Issue dimension indicators
Mod.1 for issue of mean saliency, of 1 SD in the level of gov.divisiv. the probability that this bill
will be introduced by ~ 12%
Mod.1 for issue of mean divisiv.,of 1 SD in issue saliency the probability of introduction by ~18%.
Contrary to expectations!
Comparative Politics 19
Analysis and Findings (2)
Mod.2 estimated effect of also time dependency.The effect shown for each government variable is the percentage change in the hazard rate resulting from a 1 SD increase in the variable 780 days before the end of the parliamentary term.
The effect for government issue saliency is now positive and
statistically significant.Expectations that governments
will give priority to bills dealing with issues important to coalition.
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Analysis and Findings (3)Effect of government issue saliency on timing of bills
over parliamentary term (CIEP)
Beginning: A bill on a very salient policy D is over 60% more
likely to be introduced than a bill on 1-D
of average saliency.
First 2 years: issue saliency the odds of bill introduction by
slightly more than 40%.
Final year: issue saliency the odds
of bill introduction by about 40%.
Comparative Politics 21
Analysis and Findings (4)Effect of government issue divisiveness on timing of bills
over parliamentary termThe effect of
government issue divisiveness does not
change very much
First 2 years: of one SD in issue
divisiveness the odds of
bill introduction by more than 25%
Last 2 years: the effect falls to an
average of about 20%
Comparative Politics 22
Conclusions (1) Lawmaking is very demanding it requires cooperation
and compromises by parties Doubts on portfolio allocation approach (Laver &
Shepsle) if ministers were free to implement their own ideal policy, we cannot see any systematic relationship between the timing of gov. bill and the ideological preferences.
Accommodative fashion first, the more attractive issues, then the less ones
Emphasis on the policy divergence for other important episodes in coalition politics (such as pregov. negotiations, gov. formation and termination)
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Conclusions (2)
Future researches:
1. Other types of institutional setting and governmental context, particularly majoritarian
2. Organization of the policy agenda in minority government
3. Consideration on how coalition make substantive policy making decision s at other important stages of lawmaking.