The governance of the South African higher education system: balancing state control and state supervision in co-operative governance?

International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 475–489www.elsevier.com/locate/ijedudev

The governance of the South African higher educationsystem: balancing state control and state supervision in

co-operative governance?

Yusuf Sayed*

University of Sussex Institute of Education, Centre for International Education, Sussex, UK

Abstract

The publication of the National Commission for Higher Education (NCHE) in 1996 was hailed as the first systematicattempt to map out a policy terrain for higher education in South Africa since the elections of April 1994. Its recommen-dations, particularly on the governance of higher education, elicited much discussion and debate. The debate continued(and continues) with the publication of the Green and White Papers, the Bill on Higher Education, and the HigherEducation Act (HEA) in late 1997.

This paper explores and seeks to clarify the emerging model of educational governance that has been accepted bythe Ministry of Education in South Africa as the basis for managing and transforming the inherited system of highereducation. Specifically, the paper considers the philosophy of “co-operative governance” and the governance recommen-dations of the NCHE Report and the HEA. These documents are examined in relation to state control and state super-vision models of higher education governance. The paper concludes by considering the politics of policy developmentin the transformation of the South African higher education governance system. 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. Allrights reserved.

Keywords:Cooperative governance; Higher education; South Africa; Education policy

1. Contextualising higher education policydevelopment in South Africa

South Africa has a fairly large and diversehigher education sector. It comprises 21 univer-

* Tel.: +44-1273-877051; fax:+44-1273-678568.E-mail address:[email protected] (Y. Sayed).

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sities, 17 technikons1 and more than 100 teachertraining colleges. The National Education PolicyInvestigation (1993) outlined in detail some of thekey problems of the inherited system of highereducation in South Africa. In respect of govern-ance, the key legacy of the apartheid higher edu-cation has been (see NEPI, 1993; Badat and

1 Technikons were previously technical universities thatoffered diploma programmes mainly in the sciences and applieddisciplines. In current policy, they are part of the higher edu-cation system, can, and do offer degree programmes includingpostgraduate studies.

476 Y. Sayed / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 475–489

Wolpe, 1993; UDUSA, 1994 for a more detailedaccount):

O The lack of co-ordination and articulationbetween and within the various segments of thehigher education system

O State interference in the governance of thehigher education institutions in pursuance of itsapartheid ideology

O Lack of system-wide planning and coherenceO Lack of representation and participation in the

governance of the system at both the nationaland institutional levels

O Where participation has occurred in structuressuch as the Committee of University Principals,this has been marked by gross racial and genderimbalances. Moreover, such structures havebeen marked by what Badat and Wolpe (1993):11–12) refer to as “lack of vision, policy andparalysis”

O The higher education system lacked trans-parency, legitimacy and was to a large extentnot accountable to the needs of society and tothe various stakeholders within, and outside,the system.

The post-1990 period witnessed a number ofattempts at developing policy options for therestructuring of the higher education system. Theseinclude the then ruling Nationalist Party’s Edu-cation Renewal Strategy (1992), the AfricanNational Congress’ Education and Training Frame-work (1994), and the Union of Democratic Univer-sity Staff Association’s (UDUSA) (1994) positionon higher education transformation.

Subsequent to the democratic elections of 1994,the Ministry of Education appointed the NCHE andtasked it with a comprehensive review of the sys-tem and the formulation of policy alternatives. Thework of the NCHE was framed in the context ofthe Constitution and the White Paper on Educationand Training (1995) in which the new governmentcommitted itself to democratic governance,increased participation, linkages with civil societystructures, and redress and equity.

The Ministry of Education’s response to theNCHE (1996) Report was contained in the Whiteand Green Papers on Higher Education that

resulted in the HEA of 1997. This paper focuseson the latter reports.

The HEA was one of many policy texts thatwere issued by the new Ministry of Education totransform the system. There were numerous otherpolicy texts which included:

O A new framework for education (National Edu-cation Act)

O The introduction of a new learner-led, outcome-based curriculum (Curriculum 2005 and theNational Qualification Act)

O The restructuring of the further education sector(the National Commission for FurtherEducation)

O The reorganisation of the funding and govern-ance of schools (South African Schools Act)

O The recognition of the need for new forms ofeducational management (National Task Teamfor Education Management Development reportand the establishment of a new National Edu-cation Management Development Institute).

Samoff (1996) has critiqued policy change inSouth Africa arguing that much of what had beenproduced are essentially frameworks or symbolicpolicy with a singular lack of attention todeveloping strategic priorities and singling outfinite areas of intervention. This is a telling criti-cism as it is beyond the capacity of the new Minis-try to deal with all areas of education, and that afocus on one or two would have created greaterimpact (see Sayed, 1999b). Collectively, the vari-ous policy texts reflect a desire on the part of thenew Ministry of Education to undo the inheritedlegacy of apartheid education.2

2 Various commentators such as Jansen 1998 and Carrim1998 have critiqued South African education for, inter alia, thelack of attention to strategies of implementation. It is beyondthe scope of this paper to review educational policy in SouthAfrica in general. See Sayed (1999a,b) for a more comprehen-sive review of educational policy development in South Africaduring the first period of democratic rule (1994–1999).

477Y. Sayed / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 475–489

2. Balancing control and supervision in co-operative governance?

The governance of higher education institutionshas been a subject of much debate and controversy(see Scott, 1995; World Bank, 1994; Girdwood,1995; Turner, 1997; Van Vught, 1989; Clark,1983a,b; Kooimans, 1993; Neave and Van Vught,1991; Goedegebuure and Van Vught, 1994; Shat-tock 1983, 1998). Underpinning these debates anddiscussions have been questions concerning thepurpose(s) of higher education, the tensionbetween university autonomy and public account-ability, the balance between self-regulation andgovernmental intervention and control, and the nat-ure of academic freedom. While these debates havestrong historical antecedents, they take on newinflections in times of financial austerity, govern-mental and societal doubts about the value ofhigher education in relation to economic growthand developmental priorities, and the emergence ofmarket ideology as an approach to the funding,governance and organisation of higher education.

Underpinning the governance models of highereducation in South Africa are conflicting and con-trasting understandings of the relationship betweenthe government/state and higher education. Neaveand Van Vught (1994) refer to two models of thestate/higher education relationship while Scott(1995) discusses five forms of the relationship.Recognising the complexity of modes of highergovernance, this paper argues that it is useful todiscuss the transformation of the South Africansystem in relation to the state control and statesupervision models of governance outlined byNeave and Van Vught (1994).

The state control model is based upon therational planning model and presumes total andcomplete knowledge of the object of regulation.The model further assumes that it is possible anddesirable to control the behaviours of differentactors involved in the higher education system (seeNeave and Van Vught, 1994; Van Vught, 1989;Goedegebuure and Van Vught, 1994 for a moreextensive discussion of this model). This model istraditionally found in countries in continental Eur-ope and can also be found in countries in Africa.

In the state control model governments seek to

control both the process and product of higher edu-cation, and are concerned with actively directingthe creation of higher education systems. Themodel is characterised by strong state bureaucracywhich is a powerful medium of regulation. At theinstitutional level, the state model comprisespowerful guild structures of senior academics(professors).

Based upon a cybernetic model of decision-mak-ing, Neave and Van Vught (1994) posit a con-trasting supervisory model in which the state setsframeworks and play mainly a monitoring roleleaving decision-making to decentralised units atlower levels. The state’s role in such a model is toevaluate the system and ensure uniformity acrossthe different institutions. Van Vught (1989: 43)argues that in the supervisory model the state “seesitself as supervisor … steering from a distance andusing broad terms of regulation”. The state in sucha perspective fulfils primarily, as Neave (1988)argues, an evaluative role. The traditional Britishand US higher education systems are perceived tobe key representatives of such a model of highereducation governance (see Neave and Van Vught,1994; Van Vught, 1989; Goedegebuure and VanVught, 1994 for a more extensive discussion of thismodel). Whilst the two-fold typology is persuasiveand has useful explanatory value, the key difficultyis the treatment of the state and the understandingof regulation in both models.

The state control model fails to distinguishbetween a legitimate state and a state struggling tomaintain its legitimacy in the face of opposition, adistinction of crucial importance in the SouthAfrican context. In the former, the interests of thestate are seen to reflect the will of the broad elec-torate and consequently its intervention perceiveda legitimate. In the latter scenario, the state controlsin order to ensure its ideology, and acts in the faceof popular will.

The distinction between a legitimate and illegit-imate state can also be correlated with the differingroles of the bureaucracy in the governance of thehigher education system. In many higher educationsystems in which the state control model can bediscerned, the distinction between the state and itsbureaucratic apparatus is absent as was the case inapartheid education. In other contexts, as is the


case of France, control is exercised by a pro-fessional bureaucracy that fulfils a co-ordinatingand regulative function in a context of a legitimatepolitical order. In such a context, the state plays arecessive role relying on the “independent” pro-fessional bureaucracy for control. By contrast, inthe case of political systems where the state isstruggling to maintain its legitimacy, the forms ofregulation are often direct and the distinctionbetween the political centre and the bureaucracy isblurred. While control may be central to both, thedistinction proposed here, however, indicates dif-ferent forms of control and points to more complexrelationships between state, bureaucracy, andhigher education institutions.

If the state control model foregrounds the powerof the state, the state supervisory model converselyunderrates the influence of the state, or more accu-rately fails to specify the boundary conditions andparameters of state intervention and regulation.Even as a recessive agent, the state is, in most edu-cation systems, the primary funder of education.In other words, a supervisory relationship may notnecessarily alter the allocative authority of thestate. The mechanisms of steering and regulationin a supervisory model of higher education govern-ance may, therefore, be as equally constrictive asin the state control model. Or in Foucauldian terms,the power relationship in a state supervisory modelof higher education governance may be moreinsidious as the capillaries of power extend beyondthe formal state apparatuses and are thus every-where (see Sayed, 1995 for a more extensive dis-cussion of this idea).

The state in the supervisory model of highereducation governance recasts its relationship tohigher education institutions in different ways. Oneexample is through the process of “quangofication”through which the state makes semi-governmentalagencies such as the Teacher Training Agency inthe UK responsible for intervening and monitoringthe system of higher education provision. In sodoing, it contracts out services that deal with pro-visioning while retaining strategic control. In theSouth African context, this can be seen in theSouth African Qualifications Authority (SAQA)which is responsible for overseeing the registrationof all programmes offered by higher education

institutions in accordance with an agreed nationalqualifications framework. SAQA thus acts as amediating body between the state and higher edu-cation institutions in respect of programmes andthe associated qualifications. A key governancequestion would be how SAQA interfaces with theCHE as some of their powers and functions overlapat the level of programmes and qualifications.

In both models, strategic control by the stateover the direction of higher education is main-tained through its armoury of positive and negativesanctions which include funding and legislation.The exercise of funding sanctions is possiblethough the rise of various assessments of quality ofboth the teaching and research functions of highereducation institutions. In turn, assessment recaststhe relationship between the state and higher edu-cation institutions in that the state now plays amainly monitoring and evaluative role rather thana director’s role.

Strategic control in the supervisory model relies,as Neave and Van Vught (1994) point out (also seeVan Vught, 1989; Goedegebuure and Van Vught,1994), on institutional self-regulation. This form ofregulation, however, relies on the state acting asthe overarching body that sets broad frameworksthrough legislation and policy text, relying on itsagencies and institutions to specify the mechanicsof actions. Neave (1988) refers to this as de-jurid-ification. The state is thus not absent; it simplyoperates differently as Jessop (1990): 94) pointsout:

… If civil society and the economy can be soreorganised that new management systems,modes of operation and objectives are tied tonew forms of control, support and incentivesexercised by the state, they would form newensembles and social networks which would behard to unravel. In place of direct action thoughgeneral legislation, bureaucracy, purposiveaction or central planning, the state would beoperating indirectly and at a distance.

In analysing the two-fold typologies developed,it should be noted that they function at both norma-tive and empirical levels. Neave and Van Vught(1994) not only note the empirical tendency, prob-


lematic as it may be, towards the state supervisionmodel but also contend that this is a desirable andworthwhile goal. This is not suprising as thecharacterisation of the state supervision model con-curs not only with the need for institutional auto-nomy and responsiveness in times of rapid changebut also provides an acceptable consensual plan-ning framework for educational planners anddepartments. It is seductive to the extent that itrelieves already pressed bureaucracies from theburden of direct management of the system whileretaining their roles as referees and rule-makers.

A further critique of the two-fold typologycomes from Moja et al. (1995) who argues that thetypology of Neave and Van Vught (1994) ignores“crisis interventions” in higher education which are“an attempt to control through a fairly narrow andcrude set of measures aimed at asserting mainlypolitical control”. Neave and Van Vught (1994: 21)use the notion of interference to signify govern-ment control of institutions even when autonomyis a formal policy position. Interference is charac-terised by a “government whose hegemony is notwell established, a weak civil society, a weakbureaucracy, few mediating mechanisms betweengovernments and institutions and no conflictmediating procedures” (Neave and Van Vught,1994: 22).

It is difficult to sustain the thesis that inter-ference can be considered as a model of highereducation governance as interference signifiesmodalities of governmental action which can befound in both the control and supervision models.This is evident in the fact that interference occurs,as Moja et al. themselves acknowledge, in systemsof governance that are at the formal policy levelcommitted to supervision. Intervention thusdescribes the character of state action in a specificcontext rather than signifying a prior or a program-matically planned commitment to a particularapproach to higher education governance. Thispaper thus concentrates on higher educationgovernance in relation to the models proposed byNeave and Van Vught (1994) as the interferencemodel has limited analytical purchase.

The distinction between state control and statesupervision is reflected in debates concerninghigher education governance in South Africa. The

NCHE which reviewed higher education in SouthAfrica argued for the philosophy of co-operativegovernance as follows:

Co-operative governance offers a strong steer-ing model with a planning role and strong co-ordinating role, which provides for increasedand stronger government and stakeholder par-ticipation, as well as expert input from the[higher education] sector (NCHE, 1996: 180).

The NCHE (1996) indicates that politicalresponsibility and the determination of higher edu-cation objectives would be the domain of the state,though the exact powers of the state are vaguelydeveloped. The document indicates that partici-pation and co-operation in policy formulation andin the allocation of funding to institutions, basedupon the notion of interdependence, would be theresponsibility of a proposed Higher EducationCouncil (HEC). The HEC would work with aHigher Education Forum (HEF) which act as a dis-cussion and advisory body primarily, and compriseof representatives of all stakeholder groups insociety.

The NCHE clearly locates itself within the dis-course of a supervisory model of higher educationgovernance. It commits itself to the values of co-operation and participation seeking to entrenchstrong institutional participation in the determi-nation of the system, a position which at times con-flates with the process of strengthening civilsociety.

The government’s response to the NCHE Reportendorsed the philosophy of co-operative govern-ance. The Green Paper (DoE, 1996) reflects a cat-egorical commitment to co-operation and partici-pation. Yet, at the level of structures ofgovernance, it differs from the NCHE. First, it pro-poses that the HEC and HEF of the NCHE Reportbe combined into a single Council for Higher Edu-cation (HEC) comprising representatives from thehigher education sector, civil society structures,and experts. Further, it proposes that the HEC bemainly an advisory body shorn of the fundingallocative function. The Green Paper (DoE, 1996)does, however, transfer to the CHE the executiveauthority for quality assurance and promotion.


Second, the Green Paper (DoE, 1996) makes anumber of recommendations which make clear therole of the state in higher education. These include,for example, the fact that the Ministry would beresponsible for approving institutional higher edu-cation plans, and that the Ministry reserves theright to make independent assessments of the man-agement of higher education institutions. Thus, theproposals of the Green Paper (1996) suggest struc-tures of governance that conflict with and differfrom those of the NCHE (1996), particularly withrespect to according allocative authority to theHEC.

The important questions that emerge in the shiftfrom the NCHE document to the Green Paper areWhy this shift? and How does the Green Paperrelate to the two-fold typology of Neave andVan Vught?

The proposal of the Government’s Green Paperhas elicited much debate from some who wereinvolved in the NCHE process and from some sec-tions of the higher education sectors, in particular,the historically white English-speaking univer-sities. The governance recommendations have beenhailed as a statist approach to education, a rever-sion of the pragmatic autonomy under apartheideducation, a move away from the supervisorymodel of higher education governance, and/or theabandonment of the philosophy of co-operativegovernance (see Bunting, 1997 for example). Thekey concerns centre on the fear (real or imagined)that the Green Paper signals an attempt by theGovernment to impose tight controls on the highereducation system and consequently the desire torestrict and diminish institutional autonomy. Thecriticism, in effect, reflects a growing suspicion ofthe Government’s intentions for higher educationand the fear that it is seeking to unilaterally restruc-ture the system.

The Government’s position has been that theGreen Paper reflects a concern with establishingmultiple structures which may add to the costs ofhigher education governance. Further, the Govern-ment believes that creating both the HEC and HEFmay create confusion and ambiguity about the roleand responsibilities of different actors, particularlythe role of the Minister of National Education. Thisreflects a desire on the part of the Ministry of Edu-

cation to take a more active role in leading edu-cational transformation.

Which of these positions reflects the truth is amoot debate.3 The key issue is that the proposalsabout governance in the Green Paper whichbecame part of the Higher Education Act (DoE,1997) reflect the conceptual difficulties and ten-sions of a simple state control system versus a statesupervision approach to higher education govern-ance.

In the context of higher education governance inSouth Africa and the need for the transformationand restructuring of the system, the model adoptedcombines features of both state control and statesupervision. On the one hand, state control isguaranteed by retaining strategic control of theobjectives and aims of the higher education sys-tem. This control is effected through retaining pol-icy advantage over funding allocation in respect ofboth institutional grants and the determination ofthe number of publicly funded student places to beaccorded to higher education institutions. It is alsomanifested by the fact that the state retains theright to audit and approve institutional plans. Thestate’s ultimate power is the right to commissionindependent reviews of institutions.

Gentle regulation and supervision would befacilitated by creating a CHE which would act as

3 The shift in position from the NCHE to the Green Paperpartly reflects, as indicated in the paper, the tension betweenthe government and the higher education institutions. The Min-istry of Education felt that the NCHE Report minimised therole of the Ministry of Education in leading educational trans-formation. This was a position taken by stakeholders groupssuch as student organisations who maintained that the govern-ment should play a more active role in institutional life. A con-cern is why the Ministry would endorse a commission and thenchose to ignore its key recommendation, an event that affectsother policy texts such as the report of the National Task Teamfor Educational Management Development. It is cynicallyargued that the Ministry was merely seeking to legitimise itsposition by appointing various task teams. However, as thepaper indicates, the reality is that such shifts in policy areoccasioned by a number of factors and issues such as; differentunderstandings of the role of the state in the process of edu-cational transformation, the tension between different forms ofparticipation, and the influence of different stakeholder groupson the new Ministry of Education. It is beyond the scope of thepaper to provide a more comprehensive account of the politicsof educational policy change in South Africa.


an advisory body to the Minister and the Branchof Higher Education (BHE), a point that isdeveloped later in the paper. The state would alsoremove itself from direct supervision and controlover the work of higher education institutions bydelegating the quality assurance and promotionprocesses to the CHE.

In many respects, the tension and debatebetween state control versus state supervision is ared herring in higher education governance, gener-ating more heat than light. The reality is that theSouth African higher education governance systemcombines elements of both models. The preciserelationship between control and regulation islikely be an outcome of, and conditioned by, theways in which the tripartite relationship betweenthe BHE, the CHE and institutions, develop on aday-to-day basis. This suggests that the two-foldtypology is useful but does not provide an accuratecharacterisation of the mixed economy of edu-cational governance that has developed in theSouth African context.

3. The developmental conception of highereducation co-operative governance: seekingthe “best governance fit”?

Clark (1983a,b) suggests that the key questionregarding higher education governance is a matterof asking: What structures of governance help thisor that function to operate well? What governancefits? (Clark, 1983b). In this respect, the fundamen-tal issue is not state control or supervision, but theway in which the relationship between the state,intermediary bodies and higher education insti-tutions can be developed to ensure effectivegovernance of the system.

Implied in the two-fold typology of higher edu-cation governance, is the notion of a natural his-toric progression and linear upward development.The thesis that seems to be advanced, notwith-standing the qualifications offered, is that the statecontrol model should be (normative definitionalorientation of Neave and Van Vught, 1994), andis (empirical definitional orientation of Neave andVan Vught, 1994) being replaced by the statesupervision model. The reason offered for this pro-

gression is the growing complexity of higher edu-cation institutions brought about by changes classi-fied as post-fordist (or post-modern), that result inincreased access and marketisation of education. Insuch a complex and turbulent environment, inno-vation and responsiveness is best secured throughgentle steering rather than strong direct control.

Neave and Van Vught (1994), however, do con-cede that it might be possible, under certain cir-cumstances, particularly in the developing world,to adopt a state control model. The reasonsadvanced are the need for national developmentand, as implied in the Green Paper (DoE, 1996),the need for a strong state which is able to effectand guarantee equity. This notion of “governanceexceptionalism” has been critiqued by Moja et al.(1995). Nonetheless, they do accept that the co-operative governance approach is not likely to beeasily achieved in South Africa by the stroke of alegislative pen and that “it has to be constructedand forged through a range of connective arrange-ments” (Moja et al., 1995: 23). Thus, it could becharitably argued that it might be necessary tomove from a strong interventionist state approach(in the transitional period) to a supervisory statewith a strong CHE and perhaps to a CHE withgreater executive authority. This suggests a devel-opmental path to higher education governance inSouth Africa.

The developmental thesis might be persuasivebut it is fraught with many difficulties. At whatpoint and under what conditions should the statebe less interventionist? Why should the state beless interventionist at all? Who is to determine thetransition point? These are some of the many dif-ficulties of the developmental thesis and theimplied historic progression of the two-foldtypology. Moreover, it presumes a “will-o’-the-wisp” character to the state; Now you see it, nowyou don’t! The reality, as argued above, is that thestate is never absent nor does it always act singlyor unilaterally. This key issue is Clark’s (1983b)question of the best fit. The “governance question”really is who does what, at what level and how?What are the procedures that determine themodalities of actions, and what are the checksand balances?

In this respect, as indicated in the preceding sec-


tion, the Government has granted to the institutionthe right (or perhaps power) to determine overallinstitutional priorities and foci. The governmentplays the role of cohering these separate insti-tutional plans into a comprehensive framework forthe system and providing the resources. It adoptsa number of policy mechanisms to effect thiscoherence, the principal being funding. This is dis-cussed later in the paper.

The higher education system in South Africa ischarged with a key responsibility for effectingtransformation in a system that is deeply polarisedand marked by gross disparities. The balancebetween control and supervision is not likely to fol-low a historical linear developmental pattern inas-much as it is to be a dialectal interplay betweentight regulation and institutional volition and inno-vation. It is also unlikely that the Government willdrift into pragmatic autonomy, as Bunting (1997)suggests, where it relinquishes the management ofthe system of individual institutions while main-taining sporadic interventions and retrospectivecontrol through formulae-based funding.

4. The ties that bind: developing theconditions for co-operative governance

The question of the best fit necessitates anunderstanding of the ways and manner in whichthe tripartite relationship between the CHE, theBHE and institutions, develop and bind together.In understanding the bonds that tie together thestructures of higher education of governance, atten-tion needs to be paid to a few inter-related pro-cessual relationships. First, associative bonds in thetripartite governance structure adopted in SouthAfrica require and necessitate a set of behavioursand normative commitments in order to ensureorganisational efficacy. Kooimans (1993) contendsthat effective new governance relationships requiremutual trust and respect, common responsibilityand political involvement, and social support, inorder to bind different sectors involved in govern-ing the higher education system. In South Africa,however, engendering binding ties between differ-ent groups within and outside the higher educationsector along the lines suggested by Kooimans

(1993) is difficult for two reasons. First, the differ-ent stakeholder groups have a long history ofantagonism and conflict. A particular expression ofthis conflict is the ceaseless confrontation betweenstudents and higher education institutions overissues such as fee payments and accommodation.Second, there is an inevitable tension between theneeds of specific stakeholder groups and the needsof the system as a whole. The conditions for therecognition of contending and complementaryinterdependent interest cannot be automaticallyassumed in South Africa. The difficulty of securinginterdependency is exacerbated by the nature of thetransitional state which whilst expressive of popu-lar political will, does not have the necessaryhuman resource capacity to direct and steer the sys-tem. The voluntarism of Kooimans’ bindingbehaviour, although appealing, is fraught withpractical difficulties.

Further, underpinning the philosophy of co-operative governance are competing claims andunderstandings of civil society as both a theoreticalconcept and as a political necessity in the reorgan-isation of an apartheid ravaged society into ademocratic, plural polity. The issue of civil societyis crucially connected to questions of the state, andthe state/civil society problematic (see Moja et al.,1995; Carrim and Sayed, 1992; Sayed and Carrim,1998 for a review of some of the debates). Thispaper will not rehearse these issues here but focuson the parameters of representation manifest instructures such as the CHE.

Various policy texts in South Africa (forexample, the Constitution and the National Edu-cation Policy Act) all indicate a strong commit-ment to participation at all levels of the system andrecognises the imperative for active civil societyparticipation and representation. These commit-ments are evident in the NCHE document, theGreen Paper, and the Higher Education Act. Thekey question, though is, what is understood by civilsociety and stakeholder participation, as much ofthe tension between the NCHE report and theGreen Paper turn on this issue.

The Higher Education Act (1997) provides theCHE with mainly advisory powers and limitedsupervision over the higher education system. Areason for this, as discussed above, is the need for


the state to take an active interventionist role ina deeply divided and inequitable higher educationsystem inherited from the past. Another expla-nation advanced is the fissiparous nature of stake-holder interests and politics. Civil society associ-ations are understood to be self-interested andnormally single issue-specific. In its organisedform, civil society thus voices the concerns ofparticular groups. System-wide needs and coher-ence takes secondary position to immediate stake-holder interests.

In such a context, the state becomes theexpression of all and in higher education terms,expresses the needs of a national system. From asystem-regulation perspective, this idea is appeal-ing as the state has the overall vantage position andresources to act in the interest of all institutions.The presumption of a benevolent and benign state,however, is fraught with difficulties as the stateacts in one or more and/or its own interests (seeSection 2, also, see Offe 1984, 1996 for a morecomprehensive discussion).

The notion of stakeholder participation and poli-tics has been a subject of much debate and argu-ment (see Morrow, 1998). Morrow (1998), writingabout stakeholder participation in university sen-ates, argues that “populist” notions of participationmay undermine the educational enterprise and thatstakeholder politics may corrode the notion of auniversity. While Morrow (1998) may be correctin noting the sectional nature of stakeholder par-ticipation, his argument may undermine attemptsto allow students and others to have voice in edu-cational decision-making.4 The key issue is thusdetermining the appropriate balance betweenstakeholder participation and state regulation at thenational level, and the balance between stakeholderparticipation and the autonomy of institutionallevel governance structures.

The answer found in the HEA with regard tosystem-wide governance is that stakeholders may

4 The elitist implication of Morrow’s argument founders onwho has more voice in higher education institutions and on whatbasis. The key issue in stakeholder politics is to allow sustainedand informed dialogue of differing interest group which laysthe basis for common and shared agreements, albeit tentativeand temporal.

participate by providing advice about higher edu-cational matters while the Minister, as indicatedearlier, retains strategic control. Thus, the balancecan only be understood in relation to the steeringmechanisms in the system of higher educationgovernance in South Africa and in respect of therole of the CHE, issues which this paper now con-siders.

5. Intervention and interference: the steeringmechanisms for co-operative governance

The governance of the higher education systemin South Africa as proposed in the HEA requiressystem-wide steering and regulation. Theimportant policy levers at the national levelemployed in the HEA are formula-based fundingand three-year institutional rolling plans.5

The funding formula in the HEA (1997), whichis no different from that in the NCHE Report(1996), contains two inter-related aspects. First, theMinistry of Education intends to control thegrowth, shape, and size of the evolving system bydetermining the number of subsided student places.Thus, it proposes to introduce a funding formulawhich will determine the gross number of studentsplaces to be funded out of the public purse for eachlevel and field of study. This presupposes thedemarcation of courses and qualifications offeredby higher education institutions into levels andfields. For each level and field of study demarcated,the Ministry is to determine the normative unit costper student. Institutions are able to enrol more stu-dents than those specified for each level and fieldof study but these will not be publicly subsidedplaces. Thus, institutions which enrol above thenumber of allocated places, will have to recoverthe full cost of increased enrolments from thoseadmitted, or from other sources. The formula indi-cates that the Ministry is reserving the right tomake authoritative decisions about allocations and

5 This paper will not focus on the recommendations concern-ing institutional level of governance, as the intention is to exam-ine critically system level governance.


using funding as a policy lever to direct the shapeand size of the system.

Institutions will be allocated funds as blockgrants based on a specified number of publicly sub-sidised places. The block funding formula includesan earmarked component under three categories:institutional grants, student financial aid, andredress and equity funds. It is the latter categoryof earmarked funds which will be utilised to reduceinequities in the higher education system.

The funding formula proposed also uncouplesresearch funds from gross student enrolments.Research funds will be tied directly to the numberof postgraduate student places allocated for eachlevel and field of study. The Green Paper (1996)makes it clear that not all institutions will havepostgraduate student places. Postgraduate studentplaces will only be allocated to those institutionsthat have demonstrated capacity and/or potential inthe area of postgraduate work and research.

Second, the funding formulae is premised oninstitutions developing three-year rolling planswhich would include, “inter alia”, plans for pro-moting and achieving equity, capital development,and human resource development. A centralcomponent of these plans is the specification byinstitutions of planned enrolment for specific levelsand fields of study. The planned enrolments of stu-dents by individual institutions will be aggregatedand used as one measure to determine the precisenumber of publicly funded places that will be madeavailable to each institution. The operation of thefunding formula requires detailed planning pro-cesses at the institutional level and is an essentialpolicy mechanism used by the Ministry of Edu-cation to steer the higher education system.

The proposed operation of formula-based fund-ing is coupled with the commitment of the Ministryto ensure cost-recovery through the effective andefficient collection of student fees. While studentshave always been expected to pay fees, this hasnot been effected in practice. In more recent times,institutions have cracked down on non-fee payingstudents, a move supported by the Ministry. TheMinistry has committed itself to a student financialaid package combining a loan and bursary schemewhich would make funding available for eligibleneedy students. Institutions are expected, however,

to recover partial costs from student fees. Thus,the steering of the system is based on the centralallocation of funds and revenue generation at theinstitutional level through fees and other sourcessuch as donations and endowments.

The proposed mechanisms of steering have elic-ited mixed reactions from those involved in highereducation. On the one hand, commentators (seeBunting, 1997 for example) have argued that theGreen Paper and by implication the HEA, diminishinstitutional autonomy and are contradictory to thegovernance approach of the NCHE. The objectionis based on the claim that whereas the NCHEReport (1996) accorded to its proposed HEC theright to make allocations for publicly-funded stud-ent places, the Green Paper (1996) and the HEA(1997) place this function firmly in the hands ofthe Ministry of Education, specifically the Branchof Higher Education (BHE).

On the other hand various commentators (seeMohamed, 1997 and the Historically Disadvan-taged Institutions (HDI) Forum, 1997) argue thatthe proposed formula-based funding does not gofar enough in promoting equity and redress. Thisclaim is based on three issues. First, it is arguedthat the formula marginalises equity and redressconcerns by making it part of one category of ear-marked funds, rather than part of the general fund-ing categories, and then only allocates 15% of thehigher education budget for this function(Mohamed, 1997: 6; DoE, 1996: 51). Second, thereis concern over the proposal that postgraduateplaces will be based on demonstrated performance.The HDI Forum claims that the HDIs were notencouraged to develop this area of work and thatto make postgraduate funding conditional uponcapacity, ignores the historical legacy of the apart-heid system. Further, the proposal denies thoseinstitutions which have made great strides in recenttimes in the area of postgraduate work andresearch, the opportunity to consolidate such work(HDI Forum, 1997: 4). Third, it is claimed thatsince the new system of governance and fundingis to be organised on the basis of institutional rol-ling plans, more attention and resources should bedevoted to developing the capacities of HDIs inthis area (HDI Forum, 1997: 5).

The approach to the governance of the higher


education system taken by the Ministry of Edu-cation is to determine the broad framework of thesystem and to control the outputs of institutionalefforts. The Ministry of Education therefore seeksto control the process of higher education and avo-ids micro-managing the system. It devolvesimportant responsibilities for planning to the insti-tutional level but retains control over the final plan.The essential input variable that it does control,however, is the number of publicly funded placesthat individual institutions are eligible to enrol.

The mechanisms of steering adopted in the HEAare an attempt by the South African state to inter-vene in the process of higher education planning.The South African state invokes protective meas-ures of public sector governance to steer the systemprincipally through the mechanisms of funding andinstitutional planning. This reflects a desire on thepart of the state to be an interventionist agent inrestructuring the system.

6. The ambiguities of the CHE: a buffer,allocative, oligarchic, and/or transactionalstructure of co-operative governance?

The CHE proposed in the HEA is an intermedi-ary structure that comprises stakeholder representa-tives (from both inside and outside the sector), rep-resentatives of the higher education sectors andexperts. The Minister appoints all members of theCHE after a due process of consultation and nomi-nation. The CHE is assisted by a professional sec-retariat which is responsible for the execution ofits mandate. This mandate includes quality assur-ance and promotion, and an annual report aboutthe state of the higher education system in SouthAfrica. The CHE is, as indicated earlier, mainly anadvisory body.

An important connectivity mechanism, workingalongside the CHE, is the South African Qualifi-cations Authority (SAQA) which accredits all edu-cation programmes and qualifications includingthose of higher education. Higher education pro-grammes and qualifications with respect to learningoutcomes are to be registered with the SAQA.

Neave and Van Vught (1994: 285–289) arguethat an important characteristic of the move

towards a supervisory model of higher educationgovernance is the creation of intermediary struc-tures between states and institutions. These may,they (Neave and Van Vught, 1994) point out, takea variety of forms such as vertical sector differen-tiation, horizontal layering and single structureswith one or more objectives.

The CHE may be considered as an intermediarystructure in that it operates in the space betweenthe state and its institutions. Not only does theCHE have limited delegated executive authority,but the state also has to negotiate with it to shapehigher education policy. The power of the CHE isits ability to influence the state and reflect popularsentiment about higher education. The state’sability to restructure higher education is thus con-ditioned by the support it can muster from theCHE. In this sense, it reflects a zone of negotiationbetween the state, the higher education sector andstakeholder representatives. Any measures regard-ing higher education that do not win the supportof the CHE will struggle to retain legitimacy in ademocratic polity. As such, whilst the state mayspecify the parameters of the authority of the CHE,it cannot determine the content and character of themargins of manoeuvre that it is able to effect.

As indicated earlier, a key point of controversywith the Ministry of Education is that the HEAstripped the CHE of any allocative authorityregarding the funding formula. Such authoritywould have conferred immense negotiatingstrength to the CHE. Its control over the process ofhigher education through the mechanism of qualityassurance and promotion, however, does provide itwith a leverage mechanism vis-a`-vis the state. Thusit has process authority rather than product auth-ority.

It is appropriate to consider the kind of partici-pation privileged in the HEA (see Sayed and Car-rim, 1998 for a more extensive review). The notionof participation can be graded along a continuumfrom passive information sharing at the one endto strong co-determination at the other (sometimescalled partnership though this, itself, is a problem-atic concept). In the governance arrangements pro-posed by the HEA, the approach to participationthat is privileged is advisory and consultative, butthe strength of the advice is not legislative so much


as political. In other words, the efficacy of theadvice of the CHE, and the ability of the Ministryto restructure higher education is enmeshed in thepolitics of contestation that emerge from the zoneof negotiation.

A crucial aspect in the governance of highereducation systems is what Clark (1983a,b) refersto as the power of the academic oligarchy. The aca-demic oligarchy, he argues, retains strong controland discretion over institutional, and in somerespect, the management of the overall higher edu-cation system. The presumption of academic oli-garchy rests upon the expertise and knowledgedomain specialisms of the learned. The NCHEReport (1996) proposed institutionalising thepower of the academic oligarchy by creating anHEF comprising of persons who come primarilyfrom the higher education sector but do not rep-resent their institutional affiliations, a distinct formof self-rule or oligarchic control. The objection tothis proposal came not only from the state but alsofrom other actors and organised formations in civilsociety who felt that their role in higher educationgovernance had been restricted to participation inthe advisory HEF. Moreover, the important ques-tion was whether such representatives could actoutside their specific individual, organisational andinstitutional biographies, and claim to represent thesystem as a whole.

In place of the organised academic oligarchy,the CHE allows for sector representation in twoways. First, different institutional types (e.g.teacher training colleges, technikons, anduniversities) are represented on the CHE by nomi-nated and appointed persons. Second, the Minsterappoints a number of persons who are regarded asexperts in matters of higher education to sit on theCHE. The academic oligarchy is thus bifurcatedinto institutional type representatives and Ministerappointed experts.

The model of higher education governance towhich South Africa is committed in the HEA maybe considered by Neave and Van Vught (1994) tobe a “high risk” approach as it tends to limit insti-tutional options in respect of publicly-funded stud-ent enrolments, and participation in system-wideplanning of priorities. A high risk approach thatattempts to macro-plan a system but avoids micro-

management necessitates high transactional costs.The costs are high in many respects. First, the statehas to enter the zone of negotiation with the CHEto persuade it of the developmental strategy that itseeks to pursue and vice versa. Second, the stateand institutions directly enter a transactional pro-cess over institutional rolling plans and system-wide allocations and determination of priorities.

In the model of governance adopted, the CHEwill become one of the bodies that the state willneed to engage with and which itself will need togenerate consensus amongst its diverse constitu-encies. The CHE will thus need to develop agree-ments around higher education change and is likelyto become paralysed in the absence of an emergingconsensus. This is likely in the absence of bindingtrust amongst constituencies and shared agree-ments about the imperatives of higher educationtransformation in South Africa.

In all these instances, the high transactionalcosts entailed in the governance of the system mayresult in the inability of the system to responddecisively to the imperatives of change and trans-formation. A consequent of the model of high riskand transactional imperatives is that the variousactors, including the state, may develop a riskaversive strategy with minimal consensus consti-tuting the foundation of brokered agreements.Thus, no actor will attempt to act decisively and aconsequence may be that the state is then, as aresult of the network of relationships and negoti-ations it has created, forced to intervene. In otherwords, the system of governance may be pulled atall times between control and regulation on the onehand, and supervision and gentle steering on theother.

7. By way of conclusion: the politics of thepolicy of co-operative governance

By way of conclusion, this paper considers thepolitics of policy which partly explain the evol-ution of the system of higher education governancein South Africa.

Underlying the debate about higher educationgovernance in South Africa are different and con-trasting conceptions of the state. On the one hand,there is a strong feeling that a legitimate govern-


ment is best placed and morally impelled to redressthe inequities of the past. The developmental con-ception of the state, is expressed by Nkoane (1997:8–9) who indicates that the “state is best placed tolead transformation and thus create an environmentfor fuller participation in the system by other stake-holders”. Control and intervention take priorityover supervision in the short-term.

On the other hand, the state is understood toemerge organically from grassroots organisationsand owes it power and legitimacy to the vigour ofcivil society. Such a state is supposed to facilitatecivil society participation and determination in thegovernance of society, a crucial precondition for itslegitimacy. A supervisory model of the state wouldencourage the entrenchment of democracy bydecentralising control of the education system (seeCarrim and Sayed, 1992; Sayed and Carrim, 1998for a more extensive review). The complex andpotentially contradictory character of the state’srole in higher education governance is rooted inthese two competing notions of democracy, and therole of the state in a post-apartheid society.

The conflicting notions of the state discussedabove are rooted in debates surrounding the needfor, and the appropriate strategies to, reduce anderode inequities in the higher education system.Redress and equity are perceived to be goals whicha strong interventionist state is best able to achieve.Stakeholders may not be able to do so as they notonly reflect competing interests but also reflecttheir own rootedness in the apartheid system. Bycontrast, it is believed that equity and redressrequire innovation and cannot be macro-plannedand/or managed. The best way to effect equity andredress is therefore to create a framework whichallows institutions to chart their own specificredress and equity strategies. The state’s decisionto remove the allocative authority of the CHE ispremised on the assumption that the state is theagent that is able to best guarantee equity andredress in a society that is trying to overcome itsapartheid legacy.

The conflict about higher education governanceraises the issue of the role of the bureaucracy inthe process of change and transformation. Theargument of the NCHE (see Bunting, 1997; Mojaet al., 1995) is that the post-apartheid state does

not have the necessary bureaucratic capacity toadminister, direct and steer the transformation ofthe higher education system without external sup-port and assistance. Furthermore, the post-apart-heid state inherited a highly politicised bureaucracythat was not professional in orientation and charac-ter. Such an inherited bureaucratic structure isunlikely to work in the best interest of the newhigher education system.

The Green Paper (1996: 40) recognises thecapacity constraints of the existing bureaucracy.The strategy adopted, however, implies a commit-ment to a concentration of capacity rather than to“disperse the available expertise”. Further, from apublic sector regulation perspective, the strategy ofthe Ministry of Education is to build its ownbureaucratic capacity in the long-term, althoughthis may be difficult in the short-term. It is alsoevident that the state is able to mobilise capacity,as and when it needs, from within higher educationinstitutions, or by bringing in external consultants.

The role of the emerging higher educationbureaucracy (BHE) is intimately connected to itsrelationship to the CHE. There are three possiblerelationships that may develop between the CHEand the BHE. First, they may become mired into arelationship of continuing and mutual conflict andantagonism. The zone of negotiation that both entermay therefore be marked by ceaseless confron-tations, and consequently result in mutual paral-ysis, inertia or, as indicated earlier, risk aversion.Whatever the outcome, antagonisms between thetwo national structures of higher education govern-ance may incapacitate the system from workingtowards transformation.

Second, the CHE may be drawn in as an exten-sion of the higher education bureaucracy in a semi-governmental form. The possibilities for this existto the extent that the CHE has delegated responsi-bility for quality assurance and promotion. Thisscenario reflects the administrative dispersion ofgovernance or, to put it more cynically, adminis-trative downloading.

Third, an evolving organic relationship maydevelop between the BHE and the CHE which ful-fils the co-operative governance strictures of dif-fering but mutually interdependent interactions.The CHE and the BHE may possibly develop a


connectivity relationship based on binding ties oftrust and mutual respect.

The potential flowering of the relationship is dif-ficult to predict as they will develop over time.Further, the maturing of the relationship will beconditioned and constrained by the persons whoserve on the CHE, the persons who staff the pro-fessional secretariat of the CHE and the personsappointed into the BHE.

Finally, it is perhaps worth noting the difficultyof translating a commitment to co-operativegovernance into specific recommendations aboutstructures and relationships. The translation prob-lem is one of rendering principles or philosophiesinto concrete strategies. At the level of translation,the problem of conflict between different valuesand practical exigencies raises its head. This is fun-damentally the key policy conundrum; translationalways generates new tensions and contradictions.

It is also worth noting that the debate abouthigher education governance is reflective of pos-itional and organisational locations. Those outsidedirect state apparatuses may perceive certain formsof regulation as control, while the state may per-ceive such regulation to be supervision. The poli-tics of policy is thus about the positionality of indi-viduals and groups.

This article has critically examined the approachto co-operative governance taken in South Africa.The paper argues that while the concept of co-oper-ative governance has a seductive appeal it masks anumber of tensions and contradictions regarding thebalance between control and regulation, the natureof decision-making, the balance between consul-tation and co-decision-making, the relationshipbetween the state and civil society, and the policymechanisms employed to steer the system. The ten-sions are reflected in the continuities and disson-ances between the NCHE Report and the GreenPaper and HEA. The approach to higher educationgovernance is, in the final analysis, an outcome ofthe politics of policy contestation in South Africa.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Ali Wyllie and DominicFurlong who struggled through the paper and mademany useful comments.

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The governance of the South African higher education system: balancing state control and state supervision in co-operative governance?