The 'Görgey Question' Revisited: Reflections on Academician Domokos Kosáry's Work

The 'Görgey Question' Revisited: Reflections on Academician Domokos Kosáry's WorkAuthor(s): Laszlo PéterSource: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 85-100Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4212559 .

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SEER, Vol. 76, JNo. i, Januagy I998

MARGINALIA The 'Gorgey Question' Revisited: Reflections on

Academician Domokos Kos'ary's Work LASZLO PETER

ARTHUR GORGEY, admired and feared general and incisive commander of the Hungarian War of Independence, led a brilliant campaign against Windisch-Gratz's Austrian Imperial Army in I849. When the military fortune turned, Gorgey, using the authority vested in him by Governor Kossuth, unconditionally surrendered his troops, in August I849, at Vilagos, to the Russian army that had come to Austria's aid. Although the military might of the combined Austrian and Russian forces was overwhelming, and a large number of lives was spared on both sides by the surrender, the Austrian military courts executed the Hungarian generals. G6rgey's life was saved by the intervention of the Russian Tsar. The 'Gorgey question', stated in simple terms, was whether the Hungarian general was a patriot and hero or a traitor to his country's cause. It does not at first sight possess the makings of a major historical subject. Surely a competent biographer, exploiting the vast amount of primary sources that survived, should have come up with some plausible answer to the question sometime during the last one-and-a-half centuries. Plausibility, however, is not prominent in much that has been written on the subject over the years, and it is not difficult to see why.

There is more to the Gorgey question than the political loyalty and personal probity of a distinguished soldier. The Hungarian revolution of I 848 and the War of Independence fought against Austria, in which Gorgey rose to a prominence comparable only to Kossuth's, were the formative events at the birth of modern Hungary. After I849, the revolution and the war became emblematic of the nation's survival and aspirations. The question that has, ever since, occupied many Hung- arian politicians and scholars, as well as the public, was whether the collapse through military defeat was unavoidable. This is the proper context of the ferocious debate (for at times ferocious it undoubtedly was) over the assessment of G6rgey's act. Did the conflicts that developed during the war between Kossuth, the political leader, and Gorgey, an over-ambitious general, foreshadow that fateful act at Vilagos, as Kossuth's supporters argued after i849? Or was Gorgey a victim of the understandable search for a scapegoat to explain the

Laszlo Pter is Emeritus Professor at the University of London.



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failure after so much effort and sacrifice? Had the general merely bowed to the inevitable, as some argued, then all the suffering of the war and the sacrifices made for independence might have been in vain, and Kossuth's political leadership and the oratory that hypnotized the nation into ignoring reality should carry the blame for the failure. But that conclusion was, and has been, unacceptable to many true nationalists: the cause of the failure had to be human error or worse. Attitudes to the war's leading general have touched on a very tender nerve of national sensibilities, hence the survival of the Gorgey question even into the recent Communist period.

The publication of 'The History of the Gorgey Question',' by the Nestor of Hungarian historical scholarship, Academician Domokos Kosary, is an important event in the growth of Hungarian historical literature. The mastery in the handling of the sources and the vast literature, the economy of presentation (notwithstanding the book's length), the perceptive comments and its translucent prose make the book a compulsive read. The author's review of the recent literature on a subject which has been habitually burdened with heavy political messages shows the critical-analytical methods of Hungarian historical scholarship at its best. Kosary's interest in the subject is far from being new. Half a century ago, the author published his doctoral dissertation on the Gorgey question.2 As we shall see, however, the new work may not be regarded as merely a revised second edition. Yet, as Kosary summarizes in his preface, his conclusions have changed little over the years. He still believes, as he did in I 936, that Gorgey, far from being a traitor, was as good a patriot as anybody, combining talent with a robust personality, and that, although he was not an adept politician, Gorgey was an outstanding military leader. Moreover, Kosary argues in both works that posterity has failed to grasp the realities of the international conditions within which the War of Independence took place: the national memory has turned the war into a crude mythologi- cal struggle between good and evil, as if any recognition of Gorgey's achievements would necessarily demean Kossuth's. Finally, assess- ments of both the War of Independence and of the Gorgey question were diagrams that illustrated and indeed became parts of the political discourse under successive regimes from I 849 onwards. The 'rehabilitation' of Gorgey, the restoration of his good, name and memory is not Kosary's real concern. Indeed, as Kosary already observed in the preface of his first book, the general's 'treachery' had been discarded many times over by scholars. The author's primary interest is not even

' Domokos Kosary, A Gdrgey-ke'rdes torte'nete, 2 vols, Budapest, I994 (hereafter Kosary, ' 994).

2 Domokos Kosdry, A Gdrgy-kerdis is ffirteinete, Budapest, 1 936 (hereafter KosAry, I1936).



THE GORGEY QUESTION 87

the spelling out of some basic truths about the Hungarian War of Independence -important though these concerns are. What makes the work fascinating is its historiographical focus. The book is driven by its author's passionate belief that the ability to confront, and if necessary discard, established views about the national past is as much a requirement of history as a discipline as its role in encouraging the growth of mature political attitudes concerning the present.3

Whereas the I 936 book was largely a history of the Gorgey question between the I85os and the I930s, the new work has brought its historiography up to the present and has much expanded the account of Gorgey's role and his relationship to Kossuth during I848-49. Theirs was an impassioned, febrile relationship. The two men, notwithstanding the sixteen years that separated their birth, had much in common. Both came from the Lutheran nobility of the Highland (today's Slovakia) and had German mothers, yet felt passionately Hungarian. Above all, both were born of modest means and were self- made men who rose in society through intellect and personal effort, both felt resentful of the aristocracy, and both were inclined to radical politics. Gorgey went to a cadet school at Tulln in Austria and became a first lieutenant, but, as he disliked the Austrian army, resigned his commission in I845 and took up the study of chemistry in Prague. In the spring of I848, however, he left a promising academic career to join the National Guards at Pest. He rapidly rose to the rank of major, repeatedly (and usually justifiably) denounced his superiors for incompetence, hanged a count, Eugen Zichy, for treason, encircled and captured the invading Croat army of General Roth, and distinguished himself during the military debacle at Schwechat in October before being appointed by Kossuth to command the main Hungarian army, thus becoming a major-general at the age of thirty. At the start of their intense relationship, the affinity and bonds between the parliamentary dictator and the rising soldier were strong. Soon, however, conflicts emerged over strategy. The politician urged quick successes, however small, with the untrained honved units and guerillas. The soldier expected a long haul before victory, with a professional army that had yet to be created out of a motley of undisciplined insurrectionists. He would not give early battle against the invading Imperial Army of Field Marshall Windisch-Gratz. A hard taskmaster, calm yet resolute, Gorgey combined personal courage with superior intellect and soon emerged as a charismatic war-leader. Men would follow him anywhere, and most other generals deferred to his authority. He did, however, generate envy in a few, and even hatred among those to whom he gave

3 Kosary, I994, I, pp. 9-IO.



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short shrift for insubordination (not that he himself invariably obeyed his masters).

Kosary follows the story of Kossuth and Gorgey with great care. Disagreements over strategy between them were kept under wraps. Their political conflicts, however, became public with Gorgey's Vac Proclamation on 5 January i 849, which he made to keep the army together, for the rupture of relations between the court and the Hungarian government threw most of Gorgey's senior staff into an existential crisis. The officers had taken the oath to serve the Emperor before I 848; then, after the promulgation of the April Laws, they took an oath to the Hungarian Constitution and were placed under the royal Hungarian ministry which promoted them and paid their salary. They had to choose between 'Emperor' and 'King' when the war started. In October, Windisch-Gratz ordered all Imperial Army officers stationed in Hungary to report to his headquarters or face court- martial for treason. Later he set the final deadline at 26 November. Some, including many Hungarians, moved to the Imperial side, but a large number, including many non-Hungarians, stayed because the Vac Proclamation made clear that they were fighting for King and Constitution and the honour of the army. Kosary points out that the Proclamation's moderate constitutional position did not differ from that of the government at the tirne and that Kossuth well understood Gorgey's fear lest his army should break asunder.4 The Proclamation, however, also protested against undue interference by the Committee of National Defence, led by Kossuth, and it warned against 'republican agitation'. This was what generated the suspicion in Debrecen, where parliament and the ministry had moved after evacuating Buda-Pest, that Gorgey aimed to replace civil government, or at least to carry on secret negotiations with Windisch-Gratz for a compromise, and that he had understandings with the so called 'Peace Party' (Kossuth's opponents) in Debrecen. As Kosary argues, however, no evidence has come to light in support of any of these suspicions. Kosary also argues that, later in his memoirs, Gorgey5 treated the Vac Proclamation as a statement of his political philosophy rather than, as it had been, a tactical necessity to save his army from disintegration. In fact, G6rgey's politics in I848-49 (so far as he was concerned with politics at all) appeared not all that different from Kossuth's.6

4 Ibid., pp. 30-32. kAlIein Leben und W11irken in Ungarn in den Jaren 1848 und 1849, 2 vols, Leipzig, 1852; see also

Istvan Gorgey's voluminous writings in defence of his brother. 6 Kosary, 1994, I, pp. 3 If., 48f., 57, etc. The unjustified contrast between the 'constitution-

alist' Gorgey and the 'revolutionary' Kossuth persists in the literature (particularly in English) even today. See, for example, Istvan DeAk, The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, I848--I849, New York, I979 (hereafter The Lawful Revolution), p. i86; Hungarian translation, Budapest, I 983.




After the Proclamation, Gorgey moved his army (less than half the strength of Windisch-Gratz's fifty thousand) to the Highland rather than blocking the Austrian's route to Debrecen. Although this move enticed Windisch-Gratz to split his batallions, Gorgey's army was for weeks out of communication with Debrecen, which became a source of further aggravation with Kossuth. When Gorgey's strategy paid off, however, reconciliation followed. Gorgey led the brilliant Spring Campaign in I849, which cleared the Imperial Army from most of Hungary, as Commander-in-Chief of the whole army, for a while even doubling up as Minister of Defence. Now Kossuth repeatedly acknowl- edged in fulsome language the soldier's aclhievements, while Gorgey once more recognized in Kossuth the outstanding national leader. After the Declaration of Independence in April, of which, on tactical grounds, Gorgey took a poor view, Kossuth became governor. The rift and recriminations between them reopened when the exhausted Hungarian army had to face simultaneous attack by the newly replenished Imperial Army, led by General Haynau from the west, and an even larger Russian army commanded by Prince Paskevich from the north. The Hungarian strategic plan was defensive: it aimed to bring all army units to the centre of the country. G6rgey, no longer Commander-in-Chief , would have preferred to attack the Austrian army immediately after the retaking of Buda and before the arrival of Paskevich. Neither plan was accomplished. In the rapidly deteriorating position Kossuth, recognizing that there was no way out, formally resigned as governor, handed over political authority to G6rgey and escaped to Turkey.8 The general, hoping (wrongly as it turned out) that the Tsar would not let the Austrian military court-martial his officers, surrendered his troops to the Russian army without battle. He did not act on his own. He produced the draft letter of surrender to his staff and left the meeting which then concurred with his decision. Further- more both Kossuth, as governor, and the whole ministry were aware of Gorgey's intention to surrender, as the general frankly discussed his plan at one of the last ministerial councils to which he had been invited.9 After the catastrophic defeats inflicted on Bem's and Dem- binski's armies on 3 I July and 5 and 9 August, Kosary argues, Gorgey's immediate surrender to the Russian side appeared the only responsible course.

7 Kossuth sacked Gorgey on I July, a real muddle, cleared up recently by Tamans Katona: see Kosary, I 994, 1, pp. 78f., I 27n., 273.

8 In a letter to Gorgey and in a Proclamation to the nation Kossuth as Governor and the ministry resigned and transferred all civil and military power to General Gorgey on i i August I849.

9 Kosary, 1994, ", pp. I o4f. It is also a fact that both the ministry and Gorgey had already embarked on extensive communications with the Russian leaders.



90 LASZLO PETER

Kos'ary examines afresh the perennial questions about the War of Independence (without which his story would be somewhat incomplete). He implies rather than states that, because of Austria's superior strength, there was no chance of Hungarian military victory. Still, the best course might have been the hot pursuit of the Austrian army, which Gorgey planned, rather than the retaking of Buda which Kossuth and others insisted on and with which Gorgey complied, perhaps partly because the unresolved conflict of loyalty for his staff would recur at the Austrian border.'0 Nor could independent Hungary become a catalyst of all the revolutionary forces in Central Europe: by I849 they had been badly beaten everywhere. The Russian intervention was a response to the Hungarian Spring Campaign and not to the Declara- tion of Independence, although the latter did help the Tsar's involve- ment to be accepted by the Western Powers, who considered the survival of the Austrian Empire vital for European peace. Thus Kossuth's expectation that the Declaration would bring international recognition for Hungary was dangerously off the mark. Recognition might have been attained, argues Kosary, after the achievement of (unattainable) military victory, not before. Evidence abounds that the army, including Gorgey (on tactical grounds), were dismayed by the way the Declaration was sprung upon them suddenly, yet they connived at it and Gorgey did his best to quell resistance among his staff and keep up his men's fighting spirit. Was there a chance for the Western Powers to mediate? That might have been a response to feelers put out for a compromise during the Spring Campaign by the advancing Hungarian side a psychological improbability. " I Did Gorgey aim at replacing Kossuth as dictator at any time before the last days? 'Bonapartism' was a habitual charge levelled at Gorgey by Marxist historians, insinuating collusion between Gorgey and the Peace Party of the Assembly. Kosary convincingly argues that contact between them was established late, remained sporadic and was above board.'2 The evidence Kosary has assembled entirely bears out his view that Gorgey concerned himself with politics, rather reluctantly, only in unsuccessful attempts to remedy the consequences of government decisions that, in his view, adversely affected military strategv. And Gyula Szekffu had been right, too, that his forays into politics largely concerned the preservation of his army's unity. 13

The Gorgey question was born in Turkey, to where Kossuth, former ministers, officials and army officers, around 5,000 in all, had fled. The former governor soon recovered from the shock and acute personal

10 This was Gorgey's explanation which Kosary does not quite accept: see ibid., pp. 59f. ' Ibid., pPP 54f 12 Ibid., pp. 65f 13 Ibid., p. 7; Kosary, I994, II, p. I84.



THE GORGEY QUESTION 9I

crisis which he had suffered after the loss of power and the collapse of his world. The dishonour of failure had to have an explanation. The hatred felt towards Gorgey overpowered him and suppressed the memory of his great achievements. Kossuth's new ideas appeared in the letter from Viddin, where he was interned by the Turkish authorities, addressed to Hungarian agents in Britain and France on I2 September I849. Kossuth now firmly believed that Gorgey's treachery, rather than the superior strength of the enemy, had been the cause of the collapse. The message to the nation, as well as to the outside world, was that Hungarian independence was not an unrealistic dream. Yet the allegation of treachery was far from being the product of a cynical calculating mind. A romantic idealist who lived in a state of grace, a reordered world in which he combined fantasy with reality to reach his version of the truth, Kossuth had visions of the future which were always inspired by a reconstructed past. Hungary could be liberated, he believed, because only treachery had caused its fall. The delivery, of his country from the Habsburg yoke became the mission of the emigre. He himself was to lead the struggle from abroad and not as a private individual but as his nation's elected 'governor', which, by right, he still was, since Gorgey's take-over in order to surrender was invalid. Kossuth's new vision was shared by a large number of Hungarians, many of whom came to similar conclusions independently. For revolutions, as Kosiary argues, habitually produce 'traitors'; the conflicts between Kossuth and Gorgey disturbed many participants, and after the failure of Kossuth's radical course people expected miracles from the invincible charismatic general, and were devastated by his failure to prevent the executions while his own life was spared. None the less, the critical influence in the spreading of the charge was Kossuth's. 14

Gorgey, interned in Klagenfurt by the Austrian authorities, also went through a personal crisis. He was tormented by self-doubt and guilt for not sharing the fate of the other generals who had, on his advice, surrendered at Vilagos. But he carried the shame of wild allegations with dignity. He did not defend himself until I852, when his memoirs appeared:'5 they were replete with bitterness towards Kos- suth, harsh comments on the incompetence of other Hungarian generals on the battlefield and contempt for public opinion. Later, a more serene Gorgey became resigned to the role of being the nation's sacrificial lamb so that it could regain its self-confidence, and he even insisted on remaining an admirer of Kossuth. But back in I852, the publication of his memoirs was oil on the fire. Kosary's detailed analysis

14 Ibid., pp. 245f 15 See note 5 above.



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of the large literature on the Hungarian revolution in English, French and German and of the participants' memoirs and correspondence shows that, in one form or another, the allegations were widely shared. 16 Eventually they found their way into the works of professional historians. The allegations undoubtedly marred the scholarship of the first comprehensive history of the War of Independence published in i865.'" Mihaly Horvath, the bishop, historian and close associate of Kossuth, did not describe Gorgey as a traitor in the ordinary sense, but nevertheless he characterized the general as a dark sinister force all along, from October I848 onwards.'8 Because of Horvath's authority, his work opened the way to the distortions that historians transmitted from generation to generation concerning Gorgey's role.

Not that Gorgey was bereft of supporters and defenders. Most of his former officers, those who knew him well, many of Kossuth's opponents and a few impartial foreign writers, including Engels, were on his side. And politics turned in his direction too, at least in Hungary (if not among the emigres), where the public idolized Kossuth but the political class worked towards rapprochement: a constitutional settlement within the Habsburg empire by the restoration of the i848 April Laws. Gorgey's Vac Proclamation and his disapproval of the Declaration of Independence seemed to fit well into Deak's course. Especially so, Kosary argues, because Gorgey, in his memoirs and later, consistently claimed to have been an opponent of Kossuth's reckless radicalism all along. In his memory, the Vac Proclamation, a tactical necessity at the time to save his army, became a statement of his political philosophy. 19 Yet even after the I 867 Settlement, which rejected Kossuth's independence course, few people possessed enough courage to speak up for Gorgey, and those who did were mostly fired by anti-Kossuth sentiments. Gorgey now moved back to Hungary (settling at Visegrad) to a long retirement, where he had a small, growing circle of friends and where all the leading Sixty-Sevener politicians respected him, but where he and his family were ostracized by the public and the nationalist opposition to the I 867 Settlement and where he was occasionally even chased by hostile mobs. The Gorgey question survived as an integral part of the conflict between the two camps of the Sixty-Seveners and the Independentists, which dominated politics between I 867 and I 9 I 8. Rather typical was the young Oszkar Jaszi's book on the Gorgey question, published in I896: a clear exposition of

16 Kosary, 1994, I, chapters 3-9. 17 Mihaly Horvath, Magyarorszagfuiggetlensegi harczdnak tdrtenete 1848 es 1849-ben, 3 vols,

Geneva, I 865. He was Minister of Education in Kossuth's last government and remained a staunch supporter of Kossuth in emigration.

'8 Ibid., I, pp. 588-9 I; see also Kosary, I994, ", pp. 364-69. 19 Ibid., pp. 3 I 3- I 5, 322.




its history coupled with warnings against the dangers of the independence course. ForJ'aszi, the surrender to the Russian rather than the Austrian army demonstrated the 'parity' in the relationship between Austria and Hungary the constitutional principle on which the Dualist system rested.20 The 'martyrdom' of Gorgey depended on putting all the blame for the failure of the war on Kossuth's reckless radicalism, while the cult around the still influential Great Exile in Turin depended on the condemnation of Gorgey. The view of the past could not be separated from the politics of both the detractors and the defenders of the general, and no proper scholarly work was written on the formative period of modern Hungary, the eventful years I 848-49.21

An interesting paradox was that, in the i 88os, when Kossuth's influence in Hungarian politics was actually growing, a campaign for Gorgey's 'rehabilitation' was organized by retired honved officers, in I 884. Also, a new critical literature emerged in Gorgey's defence that did not merely reflect political divisions.22 But political the subject fundamentally remained. After the collapse of the independence course in Hungarian politics in I 9 I 0, the Sixty-Sevener establishment overtly embraced Gorgey's cause.23 And, simultaneously, the Forty-Eighters' frustration at losing the conflict with the crown spilled over from politics into history. Both the scandal that broke out over Szekfu's book on Riakoczi, in 19 I 3, and the renewed, and this time vicious, attacks on Gorgey by romantic nationalists, like Geza Kacziany, were produced by the same group of literati buzzing around at Count Michael K'arolyi's Independence party.24 But this camp was now on the defensive. Gdrgey died in I 91 6, at the age of ninety-eight. His funeral became an establishment event, attended by the government, headed by Count Istvan Tisza, and a large crowd.

20 Kosairy, 1936, pp. 289-go; Kosary, I994, II, pp. I 26-27. 21 Sandor Marki's account, in volume Io of Sandor Szilagyi's Magyar nemzet tdrtenete,

Budapest, I o vols, I 895-98, dodged the sensitive question of the Kossuth--G6rgey conflict. 22 The new critical attitude towards romantic nationalism characterized the high-powered

Budapesti Szemle and PM Gyulai's editorship of it from the I870s on. An excellent essay on the Gorgey question was published in that periodical in I 885 byJeno Peterffy. The better- educated part of the literati, leading writers, historians and politicians did not accept the accusations against Gorgey. The publication of Russian memoirs also helped him. Kosary, in chapter I 7 of his 1994 volumes, examines the Russian works on the intervention and reviews the recent literature, including Ian W. Roberts's Nicholas I and the Russian Intervention in Hungagy, London, I 99 I.

23 The 'bourgeois radicals', the Social Democrats and Marxist intellectuals such as Ervin Szab6 were sympathetic to Gorgey and very critical of Kossuth, who was seen as the nobility's politician, Kosary, I994, II, pp. I42-43.

24 Ibid., pp. I47, I52-67.



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After the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy, scholarly studies began to appear on Gorgey, including Lajos Steier's works25 and the first proper biography, by Sandor Petho.26 In the new literature on G6rgey, history and politics were much less close than they had been when Hungary had been a part of the Habsburg Monarchy.27 The Horthy era has acquired the reputation of right-wing authoritarianism; it was, however, also the age in which independent scholarship particularly in history made great strides. Domokos Kosary, then a young historian and a student of Gyula Szekffi, published his doctoral dissertation on the Gorgey question in 1936.28 This impartial analysis of the Gorgey question's history was well received by the historians as well as the public. The only attack came from Geza Kacziany, apparently without any impact. It has already been pointed out that Kosary's 1994 work, from its chapter twenty-one (dealing with the inter-war years) to chapter twenty-four (to the present), displays strong elements of intellectual memoirs.29 For, ever since I936, Kosary has not only been a participant historian more closely associated with the subject than anyone else, his academic career has been affected by the Gorgey question. In 1936, romantic nationalism, at least in historiography, was on the defensive. It did not disappear, however, and came back with a vengeance after I 945.

Kosary's assessment, expressed with eloquence in the closing paragraph of his first book, that Hungarian historians were no longer looking for messages in the past to serve the politics of the present, turned out to be wildly (and tragically) over-optimistic.30 The Gorgey question was once more dragged into politics. The Hungarian Stalin- ists'- above allJozsefRevai's affinities to Kossuth, who represented national independence and 'revolutionary progress', led to a revival of the Kossuth cult in the service of anti-German propaganda during World War II. Later, the Communists in power claimed to be the true inheritors of Kossuth's I 848 revolution in order to legitimate their own revolution manque. For the destruction of the old social order and the

25 See, for example, Lajos Steier, Kossuth and Gorgei, Budapest, I925, and other works by him. Istvatn Hajnal's volume of documenis on the Kossuth emigration in Turkey sheds much light on the origins of Kossuth's Viddin letter: see Hajnal, A Kossuth-emigracio Tfroikorszdgban, Budapest, I927, pp. 34-63, 472-74. 26 Sandor Peth6, GorgeiArtur, Budapest, I 930. 27 The new conflict between 'Legitimists' and 'Free Electors' affected historical debates,

including the Gorgey question: see Kosary, I994, II,pp. I93f. (debate over Petho's work). A Gorgey statue was erected in Buda Castle in I935, but removed and melted down after the war.

28 KosAry, I936. Gyula Szekfui drew Kosary's attention to the subject. As KosAry, born in I 9 I 3, was not yet of age, his father had to sign the contract with the publisher: see Kosary I994, II, pp. 209-I 0. 29 AadAr Urban's review in Szazadok, I995, p. 920; Robert Hermann, 'A Gorgey kerdes

mai AllAsar6l', Hadtortenelmi Kozlemenyek, I 995, 4, pp. I I 6, I 25. 30 Kosary, I936, p. 32I.




imposition of socialism amounted to a social revolution; they were not the products of a political coup. The publications and political speeches on the centenary of Kossuth's revolution in 1948 already prefigured the new outlook. Those writings which did not share the new canon were now denounced as 'counter-revolutionary propaganda in scholarly disguise'.31 Kosary, professor at the University and Director of the Institute of History, Budapest, from I 945, soon became a major target of the Communist historians. In I 949, he was denounced for his views on Gorgey and Kossuth and was deprived of his academic posts.32 In the new political canon, Gorgey, the self-confessed opponent of popular uprising, once more became a sinister figure. The Marxist historians took out the old skeleton of Gorgey's treachery from the cupboard, dusted it down and used it to support the Stalinist shibboleth of the necessarily sharpening class struggle during the socialist transforma- tion. Kossuth, who, in the writings of Erzsebet Andics, Aladar Mod and others, prefigured the Communist dictator Rakosi, had relentlessly fought against the 'internal enemies' of the revolution, above all against Gorgey. The revolution had fallen, not because of the strength of the enemy armies but, and this was the political message, because the 'forces of progress', in the end, lacked the resolution to extirpate all internal enemies. This paranoid view lasted only a few years.

After the death of Stalin and the change of government in I953, historians themselves began to abandon the worst excesses of their views. And now Kosary, an outsider, reappeared. A rather isolated voice in 1953,33 by the summer of I956, in the historians' debate in the Petofi Circle, he had become a rallying point of the intellectual opposition to the regime.34 He paid dearly for his courage after the suppression of the revolution. In November I957, he was given a four- year prison sentence for sending 'counter-revolutionary documents' to the West via the French Embassy. Having served two-and-a-half years, he was released in May i 960.

The intellectual atmosphere was changing in the Ig6os. The revolution had discredited the 'dogmatic revolutionary' view of the past. Under the Kadar regime, history before I 917 became less

3' Kosary, I994, II, p. 233- 32 Ibid., pp. 240f. Kosary was given a library post in an Agricultural College in Godollo. A

scholar with much wider historical interests than any of his colleagues, Kosary, from I 95 1, produced volumes of magnificent surveys of Hungarian history from the earliest times to the nineteenth century. See Laszl6 Pter, 'The One-Man Bibliographer: Reflections on Dr Kosary's Works on the Historical Sources of Hungary', Slavonic and East European Review, 52, I974, pp. 605-o8. 33 For example, in the Szazadok debate in December: Szazadok, I 953, pp. 65 I -55. 34 The gist of his very effective contribution was that the writings of historians had lost all

their credibility and that older historians, including himself, should help younger colleagues to acquire professional methods to discover historical truth: see Andras B. Hegedus et al. (eds), A Petf Kor Vitdi. Vol. 3. Tdrte'n6szvita, Budapest, I 990, pp. 52-56.



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important than it had been under Rakosi to legitimate power. Yet the romantic nationalist outlook among Marxist historians remained strong enough to prevent any restatement of the Gorgey question for many a year. That outlook was, however, eroded by the re-emergence of critical scholarship, a slow process, in which the re-establishment of regular contacts with West European and American scholars in the I 960s was crucial. This process was nevertheless initiated by the Kadar regime itself. For the I956 revolution scared the Communist leaders. The fight against 'populist ideology' and 'bourgeois nationalism' became the order of the day.35 Historians began to examine the roots of modern nationalism by turning to the primary sources. Terms like 'peasants', 'lords', 'people', 'nation', 'patriots', 'independence' and others were now analysed in their proper context.

The re-emergence of historical methods received a powerful impetus from Erik Moln'ar, Marxist theoretician and Director of the Institute of History from I 949, when he had replaced Kosary. From I 96 I, Moln'ar attacked the 'revolutionary progress' school as anti-Marxist, 'hungaro- centric', indeed provincial: it looked for 'progressive inheritance' in the past, mixing up the independence movements of the Habsburg period with class conflicts. Was it not absurd, asked Molnar, the orthodox Marxist, to assume, as historians largely did, that the peasants, the have-nots of the patria, had stubbornly defended the country against the Turks and the German 'colonizers', whereas the landed nobility, the possessors in the patria, had invariably betrayed it? But Moln'ar's orthodoxy (at least in his insistence on the laws of social development) was coupled with heterodoxy concerning historical method. For he declared in I962 that 'analysis of causal relationships of the historical process' must be kept separate from the 'evaluation of events by reference to social progress'. He was interested in the former, not the latter.36 He even opined that Marxists had not yet developed a proper theory of historical evaluation.37 Molnar's articles triggered off a mighty row in the periodicals, and even in the daily press, that permanently split the historians. This was later referred to as the historians' debate on nationalism, which eventually produced work of lasting value, such as that of Jeno Szufcs on the 'historicism of the nation'.38

35 See the 'Theses' issued by the Central Committee of the Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart: 'A burzsoa nacionalizmusr6l es a szocialista hazafiasagr6l (tezisek)', Tdrsadalmi Szemle, I 959, 8-9, pp. I 1-39.

36 Uj Iras, I 962 (November), p. I 243. 37 Ibid., I 963 (August), p. 984. 38 Jen6 Szfics, A nemzet historikuma e's a tdrtenetszemlelet nemzeti lat6szoge, Budapest, I 970. This

brilliant essay was written two years earlier and forms the first piece of many other works by Szuics on the subject.




Professor Alad'ar Mod, another Marxist old hand,39 led the attack against Molnar and indeed the Institute. The debates soon shifted from the early Modern Age to the modern periods when the conflicts, centred on the 'evaluations' of the failed revolutions in I848-49 and I 9 I 8- I 9, were sharp between the adherents of 'progressive inheritance' and the 'objective social factors' schools.40 These labels of self- descriptions were complemented by the labels used for opponents: 'dogmatic nationalists' and 'denationalizers' respectively. Far more important than the substance of the conflict was that the debates went on and on without the party, or anybody else, 'closing' them: authoritative history suffered a slow death. The stalemate in the historians' conflicts and soon there were many more than just two sides became the source of limited intellectual freedom. History to a considerable extent ceased to be an ancilla of day-to-day politics. The Institute became a workshop of innovation. Scholars in academic positions could, up to a point, search for truth and follow their own, Marxist or iion-Marxist, lights. Some applied the comparative method and placed their subject in a wider East or Central European context. In many subjects, source analysis and construction of argument became as good as anywhere outside Hungary. In other subjects, historians clung on to heavy Marxist or nationalist preconceptions. Again, some historians showed tolerance towards dissenting views, yet the liberal attitude to agree to differ remained incomplete.

The history of the years of I 848-49, including Gorgey's role therein, was approached with robust preconceptions by historians, and tolerant, liberal attitudes towards dissenting views did not get very far in this subject for well over two decades under the Kad'ar regime. The Gorgey question even after I956 was 'to a large extent dependent on politics', vrote Kosary.4' Now the interesting question is whether direct

interference by the Communist leaders was the main obstacle to research into the subject. The party undoubtedly retained control over the history of the working-class movement and political history after I9I7. But what else? Why did historians fail to develop alternative views to the shibboleths of the Stalinist years (after they had lost their political function) concerning a nineteenth-century subject in the changed intellectual environment of the I 96os? After all, the Institute, which Kos'ary was invited to rejoin in I 968, was largely self-governed.

39Neither Molnar nor M6d were historians in the ordinary sense. 40 See review articles on two debates held in the I96os: Laszl6 Peer, 'New Approaches to

Modern Hungarian History', UngarnJahrbuch, Mainz, I972, pp. I6I-7I; and LAszl6 Peter, 'A Debate on the History of Hungary between I 790 and I945', Slavonic and East European Review, 50, I 972, pp. 442-47.

4' Kosary, I994, II, p. 269.

4



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From that part of Kosary's book dealing with these years,42 the reader forms the strong impression that the fact that Gorgey's representation as a sinister force survived had little to do with the party's political expectations and much more to do with the professional prejudices of well-established scholars. Far too many historians were beavering away on the subject of Hungary's great revolution who were, through their own published works, committed to established views and did not allow major reshaping of the mould into which Kossuth and G(orgey had been cast in the 195os. Most historians condemned Gorgey for something or other, and no two historians reached similar conclusions. Occasionally, dissenting opinion slipped through.43 But, as Kosary points out, studies that aimed to shed new light on the subject did not find a publisher. He quotes from a substantial letter ofJozsef Antall, the late Prime Minister, who, as a young historian, had carried out research into the Gorgey family archives but failed to get his study published.44 Interestingly, in the 1970S the shackles on playwrights, novelists and even the media (perhaps because they did not work under the control of historians?) were not as strong as within the profession. In the theatre, in Gyula Illyes's Fdklyaldng, written in I953 and very popular in the I96os and 1970S, Gorgey was painted as black as the devil. But another leading writer, Laszlo Ntemeth, in another successful play, defended Gorgey.45 Reassessment of Gorgey began only at the end of the 197os. The publication (and re-publication) of documents- especially those by Tamas Katona, as well as his studies46 the effect of Istvan Deak's work, published in America,47 which offered a balanced view on the Kossuth-Gorgey relationship, and above all the ever freer intellectual discourse and publishing houses made it possible for the whole subject once more to become a concern of scholarship well before the collapse of the Kadar regime in I 989.48

42 Ibid., chapter 23. 43 Aladar Urban, in a popular history on the European revolutions of 1848, described the

Hungarian attempt to recreate St Stephen's empire as a 'great illusion' (nagy dbrdnd) and Kossuth as the 'country's dictator'. Although he thoroughly condemned Gorgey's politics, he did not treat him as a traitor, praised the general's military record and thought that Gorgey's surrender was unavoidable: see Urban, Europa aforradalomforg6szeliben I848-I849, Budapest, I970, pp. 207, 2I8, 227-31; see also Robert Hermann, 'A Gorgey kerdes mai a1lhsar6l' (see note 29 above), p. I 32. 44 Kosdry, I9947 II, pp. 285-88. 45 Ibid., pp. 253f., 276f. and 290f. 46 Ibid., pp. 3I6-I7. 4Deik, The Lawful Revolution (see note 6 above); Kosiry, I994, pp. 318-19.

48 The examination of Gorgey's war record by military historians, the essays of Geza Herczeg, and a book on Gorgey by the young historian Laszl6 Pusztaszeri, among other studies, represent a new approach: see ibid., pp. 3I9f. Meanwhile, Kosary, in articles published from I 985, examined aspects of Gorgey's record and had made it known in an interview in 1982 that he was working on a larger study of the whole Gorgey question.




Thus the ground was well prepared for a most favourable reception of Kosary's work by the profession and the public in I 994. As Kosary was, by then, President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, his book received wide coverage in the media. Aladar Urb'an wrote a comprehensive review in Szazadok, saluting the historian who lived to see the day when, after half a century, new research had endorsed his views.49 Robert Hermann examined the work in great detail, adding complementary material and perceptive reflections.50 Any long book has mistakes. Kos'ary's has very few; the present writer found only a couple.5' It is, however, a pity that the publisher tucked away the 2500 footnotes of a historiographical work at the end of each of the twenty- four chapters rather than giving them at the bottom of the page. The index of persons is a great help to the reader but a subject index would have made the book which runs to over seven hundred pages (in which the same themes appear again and again!) more serviceable.

No book, however enlightening and comprehensive, can be the last word on a subject. Kosary, in the light of evidence, has separated sense from nonsense in the Gorgey question. Also, he has connected views held on Gorgey and Kossuth on a rather general level to the politics of later periods. It might be interesting to explore this subject more closely. Can historians' views on I848-49 be more closely connected to their individual political psychology? This looks easy, of course, with authors like Erzsebet Andics and Aladar Mod, who drew explicit analogies between the past and the present (aktualizal in Hungarian). But how exactly did Geza Kaczi'any show the frustration felt by the Independentists after the I905 constitutional crisis (from which the Habsburg monarch emerged intact) in his writings? Again, how far can the conflict of, say, PWter Han'ak andJanos Varga with Aladar Mod on Kossuth and Gorgey be explained by reference to Hanak's 'pessimism' and Varga's rejection of 'illusions', knowing that both historians were deeply affected by the suppression of the 1956 revolution in which they had played a prominent role? Questions concerning the revolution and the war in I848-49 will, of course, never shed politics altogether. But after Kosary's work it will be difficult to revive any of the notorious allegations about the general.52 Historians and their readers may have become more sensitive to the need to avoid the pitfall of mixing up the

49 Urb'an, commenting on the Stalinist period, distinguished the 'proclaimers' from the 'adopters' (hirdeto'k and e(fogad6k) of Gorgey's treachery: see Szazadok, I995, pp. 919-28

(5.925). Hermann, 'A Gorgey kerdes mai allasar6l', pp. I I 6-34.

51 The politics professor Gy6z6 Concha could not be described as a 'constitutional historian', and the Opposition broke up the furniture in the House of Representatives in I904, rather than in I9I2: see Kosary, I994, II, pp. I52, 154. 52 No 'attack' has appeared on Gorgey since a piece written by the journalist Mihaly

Andras R6nai in the Jepszabadsg on27June 1987.



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past with the present, although there is so much nonsense still in print today about i848 that the emergence of balanced views on Kossuth and Gorgey and on the War of Independence will be a long haul. And it is not very likely that historians, as a reaction to their earlier views, will start writing hagiographies on the tragic fate of the general who undoubtedly was modern Hungary's greatest soldier.

Kosary's works, the I936 and the I994 editions together, form the first critical examination of Hungarian historiography on a major modern subject. They should be followed up by others, a hope also expressed by Robert Hermann.53 For, in the end, history is what historians have constructed about the past. Many Hungarian historians may not accept the full implications of the view that history is essentially historiography. However, because they are wedded to the idea of knowledge informed by the search for truth (a commodity frequently put in brackets by their colleagues in the West), most of them probably go along with the central belief of Kosary's ars historica: that it is frequently our own age which poses the questions they address; the trouble begins when the answers themselves are prescribed by the present.54

53 Robert Hermann, 'A Gorgey kerdes mai allasar6l', p. I 34. He suggested the subjects of Mohacs (the defeat in 1526) and World War IL.

54 Kosary, I 936, p. 8; and Kosary, I 994, II, pp. 2 I 0-I I.



Documents

The 'Görgey Question' Revisited: Reflections on Academician Domokos Kosáry's Work