The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative Mike Mullen

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The Global MaritimePartnership InitiativeImplications for theRoyal Australian Navy

No. 24

Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs

Chris Rahman

SEA POWER CENTRE - AUSTRALIA


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The GlobalMariTiMeParTnershiPiniTiaTiveiMPlicaTionsfor The royal

ausTralian navy


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Copyright Commonwealth o Australia 2008

This work is copyright. Apart rom any air dealing or the purpose o study, research,criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, and with standard sourcecredit included, no part may be reproduced without written permission. Inquiries should

be addressed to the Director, Sea Power Centre Australia, Department o Deence,CANBERRA ACT 2600.

National Library o Australian Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Rahman, Chris 1966

The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications or the Royal Australian Navy

ISSN 1327-5658

ISBN 978-0-642-29682-5


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c rm

The GlobalMariTiMeParTnershiPiniTiaTiveiMPlicaTionsfor The royal

ausTralian navy


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Dm

The views expressed are the authors and do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy

or position o the Government o Australia, the Department o Deence and the RoyalAustralian Navy. The Commonwealth o Australia will not be legally responsible in

contract, tort or otherwise or any statement made in this publication.

Sea Power Centre Australia

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Pp at Mtm a

ThePapers in Australian Maritime Aairs series is a vehicle or the distribution o

substantial work by members o the Royal Australian Navy as well as members o theAustralian and international community undertaking original research into regional

maritime issues. The series is designed to oster debate and discussion on maritime

issues o relevance to the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Deence Force, Australia

and the region more generally.

Other volumes in the series are:

No. 1 From Empire Deence to the Long Haul: Post-war Deence Policy and its

Impact on Naval Force Structure Planning 19451955 by Hector Donohue

No. 2 No Easy Answers:The Development o the Navies o India, Pakistan,

Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 19451996 by James Goldrick

No. 3 Coastal Shipping: The Vital Linkby Mary Ganter

No. 4 Australian Carrier Decisions: The Decisions to Procure HMA Ships

Albatross, Sydney and Melbourne by Anthony Wright

No. 5 Issues in Regional Maritime Strategy: Papers by Foreign Visiting Military

Fellows with the Royal Australian Navy Maritime Studies Program 1998

edited by David Wilson

No. 6 Australias Naval Inheritance: Imperial Maritime Strategy and the Australia

Station 18801909 by Nicholas A. Lambert

No. 7 Maritime Aviation: Prospects or the 21st Centuryedited by David Stevens

No. 8 Maritime War in the 21st Century: The Medium and Small Navy Perspective

edited by David Wilson

No. 9 HMASSydney II: The Cruiser and the Controversy in the Archives o the

United Kingdom edited by Captain Peter Hore, RN

No. 10 The Strategic Importance o Seaborne Trade and Shipping: A Common

Interest o Asia Pacic edited by Andrew Forbes

No. 11 Protecting Maritime Resources: Boundary Delimitation, Resource Conficts

and Constabulary Responsibilities edited by Barry Snushall and Rachael

Heath

No. 12 Australian Maritime Issues 2004: SPC-A Annualedited by Glenn Kerr

No. 13 Future Environmental Policy Trends to 2020, edited by Glenn Kerr and BarrySnushall


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No. 14 Peter Mitchell Essays 2003 edited by Glenn Kerr

No. 15 A Critical Vulnerability: The Impact o the Submarine Threat on Australias

Maritime Deence 19151954 by David Stevens

No. 16 Australian Maritime Issues 2005: SPC-A Annualedited by Gregory P. Gilbert

and Robert J. Davitt

No. 17 Australian Naval Personalities edited by Gregory P. Gilbert

No. 18 ADF Training in Australias Maritime Environmentedited by Chris Rahman

and Robert J. Davitt

No. 19 Australian Maritime Issues 2006: SPC-A Annualedited by Andrew Forbes

and Michelle Lovi

No. 20 The Russian Pacifc Fleet: From the Crimean War to Perestroika by Alexey

D. Muraviev

No. 21 Australian Maritime Issues 2007: SPC-A Annualedited by Andrew Forbes

No. 22 Freedom o Navigation in the Indo-Pacic Region by Stuart Kaye

No. 23 Asian Energy Securityedited by Andrew Forbes

No. 24 The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications or the Royal

Australian Navyby Chris Rahman


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ctt

Abbreviations ix

About the Author xiii

Acknowledgements xiv

Introduction 1

The 1000-ship Navy Concept 3

What the Initiative Is, and What It Is Not 7

Sea Lines o Communication Security or the Post-9/11 Era 8

Idealism and the 1000-ship Navy 9The Concept as System Deence 10

Policy and Strategy Foundations 13

Naval and Maritime Security Strategy Post-9/11 14

Sea Power 21 14

The National Strategy or Maritime Security 15

Navy Strategic Plan 18

Naval Operations Concept 20

The New Maritime Strategy 20

Evolution, Not Revolution 21

The 1000-ship Navy in Practice 23

Building Regional Networks 23

Global Fleet Stations 26

Maritime Domain Awareness 27

Inormation Collection 27

Sources o Inormation 30

Surveillance and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 33

Implications for Naval Cooperation 35

Framework or Naval Cooperation 35

Inormation Sharing 36

CENTRIXS 38


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The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP

Coalitions Versus Networks 40

The V-RMTC: A Model or Regional Inormation Exchange? 42

The Prospects or a Regional Inormation Exchange Network in Southeast Asia 44

Maritime Enorcement 46

Interoperability 48

Implications for Australia and the Royal Australian Navy 51

Australian Regional Engagement and Cooperation Programs 51

The Implications o Australian Participation 53

Implications or the Royal Australian Navy 54

Conclusion 57

Notes 59

Bibliography 69


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x

at

ABCA Australia, Britain, Canada and America [group]

AIS Automatic Identifcation System

APEC Asia Pacifc Economic Cooperation

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ATS Automated Targeting System

BPC Border Protection Command

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and

Intelligence

CARAT Cooperation Aoat Readiness and Training

CENTRIXS Combined Enterprise Regional Inormation Exchange System

CMFP Cooperative Maritime Forces Pacifc

CNO Chie o Naval Operations

COP Common Operational Picture

COTS commercial-o-the-shel

COWAN Coalition Wide Area Network

CSCAP Council or Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacifc

CTF Combined Task Force

DHS Department o Homeland Security

Equasis Electronic Quality Ship Inormation System

FPDA Five Power Deence Arrangements

GCTF Global Counterterrorism Task Force

GIG Global Inormation Gridgrt gross registered tons

IMO International Maritime Organization

ISPS Code International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

IUU Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated [fshing]

LRIT Long-range Identifcation and Tracking

MALSINDO Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia [coordinated patrols]


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x The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP

MDA Maritime Domain Awareness

MEH Marine Electronic Highway

MIC Multinational Interoperability Council

MIED Maritime Inormation Exchange Directory

MNIS Multinational Inormation Sharing [Program]

MSSIS Maritime Saety and Security Inormation System

NETWARCOM Naval Network Warare Command

NOC Naval Operations Concept

NSMS National Strategy or Maritime Security

NSP Navy Strategic Plan

OPV Oshore Patrol Vessel

PSI Prolieration Security Initiative

QDR Quadrennial Deense Review

RAN Royal Australian Navy

ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and

Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia

ReMIX Regional Maritime Inormation Exchange

RFID Radio Frequency Identifcation

RIMPAC Rim o the Pacifc [exercise]

RMSI Regional Maritime Security Initiative

SEACAT Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism

SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

SLOC Sea Lines o Communication

SMIS Strategic Maritime Inormation System

SOLAS Saety o Lie at Sea [Convention]

SOSUS Sound Surveillance System

SPAWAR Space and Naval Warare Systems Command

TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

TTCP The Technical Cooperation Program

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

USN United States Navy


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xabbreviaTions

USCENTCOM US Central Command

USSOUTHCOM US Southern Command

VMS Vessel Monitoring Systems

VoSIP Voice over Secure Internet Protocol

V-RMTC Virtual Regional Maritime Trafc Centre

VTIS Vessel Trafc Inormation System

WMD Weapons o Mass Destruction

WPNS Western Pacifc Naval Symposium


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at t at

Dr Chris Rahman is a Research Fellow at the Australian National Centre or OceanResources and Security (ANCORS), University o Wollongong, currently researching

China, Australian and Asia-Pacifc maritime security, strategic theory, United States

national security strategy and regional space power and policy. He is the coordinator o

the Centres Maritime Strategy and Security research program, the Centres academic

programs and research and courses developed or the Royal Australian Navy and

Department o Deence.

Chris holds a BA degree in politics and history rom Victoria University o Wellington,

a Master o Arts degree in deence studies rom the University o Waikato and a PhDrom the University o Wollongong on Chinese maritime power.


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akwdgmt

The author would like to acknowledge the time and insights o several people whohave made this project possible.

Within the Sea Power Centre Australia: its Director, Captain Peter Leavy, RAN, who

has been an enthusiastic and supportive sponsor o the project rom its inception, and

its Deputy Director (Research), Andrew Forbes, has been the projects prime mover

and has assisted greatly with the accessing o documentation and organisation o a

Roundtable held at SPC-A on 30 April 2007, as well as providing useul eedback

and assistance in getting the project to print. The author also thanks all those who

participated in the Roundtable, rom the Royal Australian Navy, Department o Deence,Border Protection Command and Ofce o Transport Security.

The helpul, detailed comments o Dr Lee Willett rom the Royal United Services

Institute or Deence and Security Studies, London were much appreciated.

As always, responsibility or any errors, oversights or omissions rest with the author

alone.


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1inTroDucTion

itdt

Im ater that proverbial 1000 ship Navy - a eet-in-being, i you will

comprised o all reedom-loving nations, standing watch over the seas,standing watch over each other.1

Admiral Mike Mullen, USN

In August 2005 the US Navys then Chie o Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen,

introduced a new concept or international naval and maritime cooperation to an

audience at the US Naval War College: the 1000-ship Navy.2 In November 2006,

the Chie o the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Vice Admiral Russ Shalders, publicly

confrmed that the RAN would adopt the concept.3

Because the concept remains relatively new and underdeveloped, it is important to

ascertain, in the Australian, regional and global contexts, what the implications o

the 1000-ship Navy might be or maritime security and naval cooperation. An initial

point o resistance rom some quarters was the name, which conjured up visions

o an American-controlled naval eet attempting to dominate the global maritime

domain. To allay such concerns, the US Navy (USN) renamed the concept the Global

Maritime Partnership initiative, whilst the term Global Maritime Network has also

been employed. Despite these modifcations, the 1000-ship Navy label has persisted,

including continued use in USN strategy and policy documents. This paper thus

uses the three terms interchangeably. It is divided into fve chapters to address the

ollowing questions:

I. What is the 1000-ship Navy?

II. How does it ft within the USNs policy and strategy ramework?

III. How might it work in practice?

IV. What are the implications or international naval cooperation?

V. What are the implications or Australia and the Royal Australian Navy?


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2 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP


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T 1000-p n cpt

In establishing the initial case or his proverbial 1000-ship Navy, Admiral Mullenexplicated a vision or sea power in the 21st century that would broaden the ocus o the

US Navy (USN) somewhat; rom perorming roles connected primarily to deterrence

and warfghting, to one that also emphasises the protection o shipping and saety o

sea lanes, the maintenance o a stable and lawul maritime domain and prosecution

o the fght against transnational terrorist groups, including in the littoral, and the

ability to inuence events ashore. This vision would require the USN to rebalance its

orce structure to be able to ace the challenges o our age, which he argued comprise

Piracy, drug smuggling, transport o weapons o mass destruction over the high seas,

exploitation o economic rights, organized crime, and terrorism. He summed uphis vision with the motherhood statement that the USN needs tools that are not only

instruments o war, but implements o peace - to become a strong partner or a stable

global community.4

Beyond adaptation by the USN itsel to the new security environment, Mullen

envisaged that the goal o peace and order throughout the worlds maritime domain

would require new levels o naval and maritime cooperation, in part building on

existing concepts such as the Prolieration Security Initiative (PSI) and US Pacifc

Commands Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), and bound together by

new technologies or maritime domain awareness (MDA), command, control and

communications: the 1000-ship Navy.5 These goals essentially aspire to a system

or ensuring the maintenance, or enorcement, o a condition o maritime peace and

stability that Georey Till has described at length as good order at sea.6

Admiral Mullen expanded on his concept or a global maritime network o like-minded

states to secure the global maritime environment at the 17th International Seapower

Symposium in September 2005, which became the initiatives ormal diplomatic launch

pad. In his address Mullen argued that the most serious threat aced by all states

was that o irregular and Unrestricted Warare - warare with no rules, with nothingorbidden. These threats were deemed to be o particular signifcance in certain

regions o the maritime world labelled the ungoverned and under-governed parts o

the maritime domain, denoting both coastal areas and the high seas.7

The threat environment being described is clearly one dominated by the global menace

o the new terrorism, as epitomised by Al Qaeda and its ideological ellow travellers,

and roguish state actors willing to conduct asymmetric and unconventional, and

unrestricted, albeit not necessarily unlimited, orms o warare against the United

States (US) and the US-led world order. The term unrestricted warare is an implicit

reerence to the title o a book written by two senior colonels rom Chinas Peoples


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Liberation Army, which sets out the asymmetric military and non-military tactics o

a grand strategy with which to combat American dominance, whether in war or in

periods o so-called peace.8

Mullens view o the threat environment thus makes signifcant assumptions aboutthe character o current and uture threats and challenges, and orms o warare,

deemed most likely to be encountered by the USN over the medium term. That threat

environment supposedly will be dominated by non-traditional security actors and

irregular warare, whether conducted by states or non-state oes, rather than the

reputedly more amiliar orms o conventional conict against similarly equipped

states.9

The 1000-ship Navy concept was urther elucidated by two o Admiral Mullens

senior sta in a short article published in November 2005.10 The article identifed

the current salience o transnational threats to international security in a globalisedworld characterised by increasing economic and security interdependence. The

authors argue that a purported growth in maritime lawlessness resulting rom the

cumulative eect o threats to good order at sea posed by criminal activity, terrorism

and weapons prolieration may seriously impact the security and economic well-being

o all states, which increasingly are interconnected by their reliance on a largely sea-

based international trading system. Given the extent o the maritime domain and the

range o challenges to order, as well as the political sensitivities and legal limitations

posed by the reality o national sovereignty and sovereign rights either extant or

claimed at sea, it recognises that the problem is too large and complex or the USNalone to combat. In this view the size and complexity o the problem thus necessitates

the need or enhanced international cooperation, although it may be viewed by some

as a declinist argument: that is, being symptomatic o Americas declining ability to

protect the international system it notionally leads.11

One o the truly innovative aspects o the proposed global maritime security network

outlined in the November 2005 article is its intention to incorporate into the network

not only the assets o navies and other government agencies but also those o the

private sector - the international maritime industry. The 1000-ship Navy network

would be built around inormation rom the sensors o all o those national and private

industry seaborne assets to enhance maritime domain awareness. The concept thus

would pursue two objectives: enhanced maritime domain awareness and improved

response capacity. Finally, the article explained that the network would be able to

export maritime security and security assistance to willing countries and regions

where there exist capacity shortalls to deal with threats to order at sea.

Admiral Mullen urther expounded the developing concept to a Royal United Services

Institute conerence in December 2005, when he made the somewhat startling claim

that not only was good order at sea under increasing threat but that a nexus o piracy,terrorism, and exploitation o the maritime domain or illegal purposes had passed


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5The 1000-shiP navy concePT

a new threshold, or tipping point, which potentially could change the world.12 The

supposed tipping point or Mullen was the unsuccessul November 2005 attack on the

cruise ship Seabourn Spiritby pirates o the southern coast o Somalia using two 25-

oot boats and armed with rocket-propelled grenades and assault ries. That the attack

took place some 100 miles oshore and employed such a signifcant arsenal certainlywas unusual,13 but Mullens assertion that this represented a signifcant discontinuity

in maritime security analogous to the momentous strategic shocks o Pearl Harbor in

1941 and 11 September 2001 (9/11) surely is a gross exaggeration. Indeed, to compare

the Seabourn Spiritincident to 9/11, which resulted in around 3000 civilian deaths,

signifcant economic disruption and the launching o a global war (o sorts) against

militant Islam would seem entirely inappropriate; yet even the attacks o 9/11 and

the consequent, ongoing conict pales into relative insignifcance compared to the

genuinely world-changing consequences o Japans sneak attack on the United States.

Rather, it would seem that the dangers in the waters adjacent to Somalia are more areection o the anarchy reigning within that country itsel than being portentous o

a new tipping point or security in the wider maritime domain.

Mullen explicitly acknowledged the PSI as a preerred model or cooperation, noting

that it was an inormal and voluntary arrangement amongst likeminded states, with

no ormal organisation, sta or support structure. This no doubt also reects the Bush

Administrations preerence or these types o inormal coalitions o the willing rather

than having to deal with the inherent constraints and unwieldy nature o ormal treaty

agreements and international organisations, which oten are incapable o acting in a

timely ashion, i at all. The Administration itsel has spruiked the PSI as a model or

uture security cooperation - or results-oriented partnerships in its currentNational

Security Strategy:

These partnerships emphasize international cooperation, not

international bureaucracy. They rely on voluntary adherence rather

than binding treaties. They are oriented towards action and results

rather than legislation or rule-making.14

Perhaps inuenced by the PSIs Statement o Interdiction Principles, Mullen oeredhis own set o ten First Principles or the Global Maritime Network in his December

2005 speech, set out below.


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To unction eectively, the 1000-ship Navy will not only require high levels o

international political support to oster the necessary levels o cooperation, but also

will be heavily technology dependent. Mullen stressed this aspect in his address

to the Western Pacifc Naval Symposium (WPNS) in October 2006, stating that

Technology and inormation technology, in particular, may very well be the single

largest contributor to our maritime security in the uture. According to Mullen, the

promise o signifcant technological progress, including web-enabled MDA, is itsel

a compelling reason to cooperate or maritime security.15

M ft Pp

a recognition o the continued primacy o national sovereignty1.

many o the problems that are challenging good order at sea can be solved2.

when States respond cooperatively where they share a common interest

the scope o the network is limited to the maritime domain, rom ports to3.

the high seas

the networks undamental building block will be the extant capabilities4.

o individual states

the network is not limited to navies and will include all relevant national5.

government agencies and maritime orces, and private industry playersstates with the ability to export maritime security or security assistance6.

should be willing to do so

states which require maritime security assistance should be prepared to7.

request it o those willing and able to provide it

states must develop regional networks or maritime security as the key to8.

constructing an eventual Global Maritime Network

to be eective, the network needs to be able to share inormation amongst its9. members, which preerably should be o an unclassifed nature to overcome

security concerns. Such inormation should include commercial ship

characteristics, accurate cargo maniests, merchant ship crew lists, sailing

times, destinations, and current ship locations

the security situation in the global maritime domain requires that eorts10.

are initiated as soon as possible to strengthen national maritime security

capacities, build regional cooperation and link regional arrangements to

build the global network.


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Wt t itt i, d Wt it i nt

Tentatively, then, the Global Maritime Partnership initiative represents both less, and

more, than meets the eye. In some respects, it represents little more than a continuation

o post-Cold War proposals by many policymakers, naval operators and commentatorsor increased naval and maritime security cooperation, albeit on a grander scale. In

this respect, the concept very much represents an evolutionary approach to maritime

security, whilst at the same time reecting the greater sense o urgency o the post-

2001 security environment.

Usually, those earlier proposals were regionally based. The Asia-Pacifc region,

characterised by its maritime geography and beset by maritime sources o international

dispute, has witnessed a high level o activity promoting maritime security cooperation

at the ofcial, inter-governmental level, such as in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

and the Asia Pacifc Economic Cooperation (APEC) orum;16 at the Track II unofcial

level o supporting cooperative activity, such as the Council or Security Cooperation in

the Asia Pacifc (CSCAP);17 and in naval orums, such as the multilateral Western Pacifc

Naval Symposium.18 The United States has also been active in the region, promoting

the RMSI and conducting other, more US-centric orms o naval cooperation.19

The USNs 1000-ship Navy concept can be thought o as a continuation o these regional

processes and initiatives, only extrapolated to encompass maritime security on a truly

global basis. Indeed, it is sometimes implied, rightly or wrongly, that the announcement

o the RMSI in 2003 and subsequent pronouncements by US Pacifc Commandspurred Malaysia and Indonesia to take security in the Malacca and Singapore straits

more seriously. In this manner o thinking, the launch o the MALSINDO coordinated

patrols o the straits in July 2004 and the subsequent launch o the Eyes-in-the-Sky

aerial patrols may have been a response to the threat o American intervention in

the area. I that is a view widely shared within the USN, it is possible that the intent

o the 1000-ship Navy is simply to spur other states to improve maritime security

globally. Nonetheless, the act that the concept is being ully integrated into USN

strategy and planning documents suggests a more ambitious scheme which needs to

be taken at ace value.On the other hand, however, beyond the promotion o naval cooperation, there are

aspects to the concept which are potentially groundbreaking. The intent to develop the

MDA picture available to participating states into a unctionally global, comprehensive

system o near-real time data collection, analysis and exchange on merchant ship

movements and related inormation on the maritime domain, is both highly ambitious

and signifcant. O course, MDA has been a eature o other, regional, proposals

or some time. The RMSI unsurprisingly has a heavy emphasis on this actor, and

other proposals or regional cooperation also have oten ocused on the importance

o maritime inormation and its exchange. For example, in the early to mid 1990sthe RAN sponsored the development o an unclassifed database which would have


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integrated a wide range o inormation on Southeast Asian seas, able to be accessed

by regional states: the Strategic Maritime Inormation System (SMIS).20 Although

SMIS itsel was never completed, the American conception o MDA can be thought

o as an SMIS on steroids, harnessing the great leaps in inormation technology and

communications systems made since the time o SMIS and the vast technological andfnancial resources which the US can bring to bear on the problem, and applied not

just to a single geographical sub-region but the entire global maritime domain.

It has been made sufciently clear what the 1000-ship Navy concept is not intended to

be: a global naval alliance consisting o a nominal eet o 1000 ships under American

leadership. The coining o the term 1000-ship Navy was probably a mistake in this

regard and, despite attempts at relabelling, the moniker has become strongly afxed.

The intent o the term itsel is largely metaphorical,21 and somewhat misleading: as

Admiral Mullens fth First Principle states, the concept is about more than just navies.

Yet by employing navy in its title the initiative gives the impression that it is solely a

military scheme, when in act it is not. That issue o perception will pose problems or

certain states in important maritime regions, such as Southeast Asia, and will likely

mean that such states do not publicly join the initiative, even i they cooperate with

it. That pattern o behaviour has already been evident in the PSI.

s l cmmt st t Pt-9/11 e

In many ways the 1000-ship Navy concept is a reection o the changing conditions or

the security o shipping in a time o a constant terrorist threat. The security o shipping

itsel indeed is the very essence o the idea o securing the sea lines o communication

(SLOCs): the actual sea lanes themselves are ater all just stretches o empty ocean.22 In

times o (conventional) war, and the period o the Cold War, SLOC security was solely

a military task to deend allied shipping against attack rom rival military orces. The

primary responsibility or this task rested with navies.

However, the character o SLOC security has in eect been redefned by the exigencies

o the current circumstances in which not only shipping but the entire maritimetransportation system is at risk rom the spectre o terrorism; and that system also

could be exploited by terrorists to conduct catastrophic attacks against high-value

targets on land. The threat to shipping is now more likely to be posed by, or example,

a small boat attack close to shore or a weapon smuggled in a ships cargo, than a

conventional attack on the open ocean.23 The implication o the changed character

o SLOC protection is that navies, or the time being, have lost their monopoly on

securing the worlds sea lanes. SLOC security must thereore now involve a plethora

o other protective agencies, such as coast guards, marine police orces and other law

enorcement agencies, customs organisations, immigration departments, intelligence


24/93


agencies, port authorities and other commercial players throughout the maritime sector

and international supply chains. The 1000-ship Navy should be viewed in this context

as an attempt to integrate the capabilities o all types o agencies that contribute to the

security o shipping on an international, cooperative basis, as reected in the ollowing

statement by the US Secretary o the Navy:

The responsibility or Global Maritime Security lies with many

departments, agencies, and organizations across the spectrum o

our government, international partners, and industry. Each o these

stakeholders bring a part o the solution, and taking the lead in

establishing a global capability rom those parts is one o the single

most important new steps o the Department o the Navy.24

From this perspective the 1000-ship Navy is just one o a number o dierent strategies

that the US has employed to strengthen the overall security o the international maritime

system in the post-9/11 world - along with a host o new regulatory measures which

have been pursued both on a unilateral basis, and multilaterally through international

groups such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Increasingly, these

dierent strategies in combination are beginning to orm a globally integrated protective

maritime security system.25

idm d t 1000-p nAdmiral Mullens pronouncements on the Global Maritime Partnership initiative reect

a highly idealistic view o states common interests at sea, and invokes the old notion

o collective action noted in the epigraph to this paper, o all reedom-loving nations,

standing watch over the seas, standing watch over each other.26 He has even employed

the term collective security in the context o the initiative.27 However, does the 1000-

ship Navy actually represent a orm o collective security? And is truly collective

security at sea (or even collective security in general) actually attainable?

Perhaps unortunately, undermining both the theory and practice o collectivesecurity are perormance criteria that are all but impossible to meet. That is why the

use o the term collective security has devolved, rom the frst extremely idealistic

pronouncements in the interwar years and the tragic dbcle o the League o Nations,

into something more akin to a populist political slogan, much like the currently

popular, highly misleading - and essentially empty - term international community.

The characteristics that make collective security distinct rom other, more traditional

security systems have been identifed by Richard Betts as universality and automaticity.

Thus, in order to work as advertised, a collective security system must be truly


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collective, with the universal and automatic participation o its members in response

to aggression - the all or one, and one or all principle.28

Participation in the 1000-ship Navy, however, is to be voluntary. As a type o inormal

coalition o the willing, whereby members would participate in instances comportingwith their own national interests, it notably ails the collective security test. Rather, the

initiative should be viewed more as a orm o cooperative security, itsel a somewhat

amorphous construct characterised by its inclusiveness o membership and both

military and non-military contributions to security, which does not exclude existing

strategic relationships such as alliances rom the system.29 Americas new joint

Maritime Strategy also suers rom this terminological inaccuracy, employing both

terms in aid o its message; stating that sea power must be used to promote collective

security,30 and that the Global Maritime Partnership initiative will serve as a catalyst or

increased international interoperability in support o cooperative maritime security.31

The temptation to appeal to the symbolism o collective security ought to be avoided

though: little kudos is likely to be won by such overselling and mislabelling.

Although the initiative is ramed in such a way as to be inclusive o a wide range o

threats and challenges to security in the maritime domain, it is also evident that it is

driven by an overriding American concern with the threat posed by Al Qaeda and other

extreme Muslim groups. The possibility that those terrorist networks might exploit the

maritime transportation system, to carry our potentially catastrophic attacks on United

States territory or against allies, or contribute to instability in those under-governed

parts o the world is real. However, that threat perception is not universally shared,placing a urther potential obstacle in the path o the initiative. Some Muslim states may

be especially sensitive to that motivating actor. Others will view the scheme simply

as urther evidence o American unilateralism, even though the USN has gone out o

its way to promote the scheme as inclusive, voluntary and non-threatening.

T cpt stm D

In summary, then, the 1000-ship Navy can be thought o as an initiative to enhance

the deence o the US-led international system, including globalisation and the sea-based trading system, by coopting international partners at a time in which the United

States is preoccupied and overcommitted in Iraq and elsewhere around the globe.32

There are historical antecedents or such a proposal, particularly Mahans call or the

establishment o an Anglo-American naval consortium and even wider naval cooperation

around the turn o the 20th century to deend the then British-led international system

o international commerce and Anglo liberalism against new threats to that order.33

However, one abiding question hanging over the entire concept remains its assumption

o global disorderat sea. Apart rom a number o regional hot spots, it is not clear that

that assumption is a reasonable appraisal o the wider maritime security situation at

all. The terrorist threat, though, is real enough: the potential or catastrophic attacks


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involving WMD alone mandates that responsible states give a high priority to improving

SLOC security, as reormulated above or post-2001 circumstances.

A cynic might perhaps suggest also that the 1000-ship Navy concept and the new

Maritime Strategy are ways to make the navy seem more relevant to the war onterrorism, thus saeguarding service unding at a time o great budget stress due to

the wars in Iraq and Aghanistan and maintaining political support or programs such

as the littoral combat ship.34 Yet navies do have important roles to play, and these

need to be understood by policymakers. Indeed, inasmuch as the US-led international

system is by nature a maritime system,35 navies and other maritime orces will always

have a central role to play in saeguarding it. As the player with the greatest degree o

responsibility or system deence - like Britain beore it in a previous era - the United

States has had to adapt to the current threat environment to ensure that the maritime

system itsel continues to unction. The Global Maritime Partnership initiative is a

potentially important element in system deence, both symbolically, as a rhetorical

instrument o international outreach and cooperation, and practically, through its

promotion o an improved understanding o the maritime domain and the dissemination

o such inormation to partner states.

The USNs proposal to deend the international system thus seeks to build, frstly,

new, or enhance existing, regional networks or maritime security cooperation; and,

secondly, to link those regional networks into a global network. Within that ramework,

there are two main components to the initiative, each with its own sub-components:

improving maritime domain awareness1.

increasing the number o sensors

incorporating military, non-military (agency) and private sector assets

networking the inormation

sharing the inormation

enhancing the ability o states to respond to threats to good order at sea and crises2.

in littoral areasbuilding national enorcement and response capacity

building regional enorcement and response capacities through improved

cooperation.


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P d sttg fdt

Existing schemes and new initiatives or naval cooperation do not provide the onlycontext or the development o the 1000-ship Navy idea. It has also taken place within

a ertile post-Cold War naval policy and strategy-making environment, one which has

been built upon in the post-9/11 world by an entire new policy preoccupation with

terrorism and the terrorist threats to maritime security. The ollowing discussion

places the 1000-ship Navy within that uid environment, inclusive o both USN and

national-level strategy development.

In June 2006 Admiral Mullen outlined the bare bones o a new US maritime strategy.36

The strategy itsel was released by his successor, Admiral Roughead, and his MarineCorps and Coast Guard counterparts in October 2007, becoming the frst new US

maritime strategy since the Reagan-era Maritime Strategyormulated under the

leadership o then Secretary o the Navy, John Lehman.37 The 1980s strategy became

almost instantly obsolete with the end o the Cold War and the abrupt and happily

peaceul demise o the Soviet Union. The USN (and US Marine Corps) instead reocused

their operating concepts to the new strategic environment,38 which was characterised

by regional conict, including limited conventional wars such as Operation DESERT

STORM; internal conict, as many parts o the ormer Soviet and Communist worlds

began to disintegrate; and general instability, as the caution-inducing constraints o the

bilateral Cold War strategic ramework were shrugged o to reveal underlying tensions

and longstanding political, ethnic and religious fssures in many parts o the world.

The new post-Cold War operational concepts redirected the ocus o the USN: rom

winning and maintaining sea control in order to then launch oensive operations

against the Soviet homeland, to an assumption o sea control in the absence o a peer

naval competitor, which in turn allowed that naval preponderance to be used to project

power into the worlds littorals and across the shore to directly inuence events on

land with relative impunity. In so doing US maritime orces proved rather more adept

at adapting to the new strategic circumstances than the other Services, especially theresistant US Army, and the maritime orces o many other states, including the NATO

Europeans, whose legacy orce structures proved to be less exible and adaptable

to the demands o littoral operations and power projection than those o the United

States.39


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n d Mtm st sttg Pt-9/11

The ollowing discussion describes the relationship between the Global Maritime

Partnership initiative and major strategy and doctrinal documents. It demonstrates

that the USN has taken an evolutionary approach to conceptual development andstrategy ormulation since 9/11: the 1000-ship Navy has grown logically rom those

developments and continues to inorm the urther evolution o policy and strategy. In

terms o the documents surveyed, theNational Strategy or Maritime Securityrepresents

higher level policy guidance or maritime security rom a national, whole-o-government

perspective, and is one o a number o national strategies directly linked to theNational

Security Strategy. The current Chie o Naval Operations describes his own overarching

guidance in terms o three documents:

The Maritime Strategy creates a unifed strategy that integrates sea power with

other elements o national power, and those o our riends and allies.

The Navy Strategic Plan translates [the] Strategy into guidance or uture Navy

program development.

The N aval Operations Concept describes how the Navy-Marine-Corps team will

fght.40

And the operational principles o the Sea Power 21 concept continue to inorm USN

thinking, including the Navy Strategic Plan and the Naval Operations Concept. To

establish the evolutionary nature o US thinking the documents are consideredchronologically.

sea Pwer 21

The frst restatement o US naval power or the post-9/11 era took place in October 2002

with the release o the Sea Power 21 concept document.41Sea Power 21 expanded the

USNs regional ocus with a new emphasis upon conducting global operations against

transnational threats. These dual concerns o regional conict and regionally ocusedrogue states, and the threat o globally active terrorist organisations, had become the

new strategic preoccupation or the United States, as set out in theNational Security

Strategywhich preceded Sea Power 21.42 The threat o the new terrorism, as epitomised

by Al Qaeda, the development o weapons o mass destruction (WMD) by regional

rogue states, and the potential or cooperation between such states and terrorists thus

became the driving motivation or US national security policymaking. In particular,

the possibility, however remote, that Al Qaeda or a similar group might successully

develop, procure or be gited by a rogue state some orm o useable WMD especially

a crude nuclear or atomic device - to attack the American homeland understandably


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15Policy anD sTraTeGy founDaTions

ocused minds throughout the US national security community. The consequences o

not preventing such an attack would be horrifc indeed.

Sea Power 21 introduced three new operational concepts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield

and Sea Basing. These concepts in turn are connected by FORCENET, which is thearchitectural ramework that intends to exploit advanced inormation technologies to

network command and control systems, sensors, platorms, weapons and people into

an integrated, network-centric orce.43 O particular relevance to the 1000-ship Navy

are aspects o Sea Shield and Sea Basing.

Sea Shield reormulates the concept o naval deence, rom the deence largely o

individual ships, eets or sea lines o communication, to a more expansive concern

with protecting wider national interests with layered global deensive power based

on control o the seas, orward presence, and networked intelligence. It seeks to

project deensive power into the littorals and deep inland and contribute to theprotection o the American homeland. Homeland deence is both a new role and one

especially relevant to the issue at hand, as the 1000-ship Navy concept also is driven

by a preoccupation with terrorism and other, potentially interlinked, threats o a

transnational nature. The intention is that naval homeland deence capabilities will be

integrated with those o other military and civilian agencies with homeland deence

and homeland security responsibilities. In keeping with the idea o layered deence,

the intent oSea Power 21 is that the orward-deployed navy would act to identiy,

track, and intercept threats ar seaward o US territory, long beore they could directly

endanger the homeland. This would include the use o advanced radiation detectionequipment by boarding parties on intercepted vessels, or example.44

The Sea Basing concept envisions that orward deployed naval assets will act as

essentially independent bases or operations in the littoral and on land, complete

with their own integrated logistics and command and control capabilities. These

capabilities also can support coalition or non-coalition multilateral operations in

a littoral environment, as occurred, or example, in the response to the December

2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. As will be examined urther, elements o the Sea Basing

concept are being developed specifcally to support the regional, in-theatre, aspects

o the 1000-ship Navy.

T nt sttg Mtm st

In September 2005 the Departments o Deense and Homeland Security released the

National Strategy or Maritime Security(NSMS). The NSMS and its eight supporting

implementation plans represent a whole-o-government planning approach to

maritime security, reecting the strategic priorities o the 2002 National Security

Strategy. Although the NSMS identifes state, terrorist, transnational criminal, piracy,


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environmental and illegal immigration threats to maritime security, clearly it is

terrorism and the possible interplay between terrorists, rogue states and WMD that

dominates the thinking behind the document.

The counter-terrorism priority is also reected in the National Strategy or MaritimeSecuritys strategic objectives, the frst three o which are concerned with preventing

terrorist attacks and other hostile acts throughout the maritime domain, protecting

coastal population centres and critical inrastructure rom attacks and minimising

damage incurred rom such an attack whilst ensuring successul recovery. The

fnal strategic objective, saeguarding the ocean itsel and its resources rom illegal

exploitation is treated only cursorily in comparison.45

It is in its fve declared strategic actions that the NSMS clearly lays an important

oundation or the 1000-ship Navy:

enhance international cooperation1.

maximise domain awareness2.

embed security into commercial practices3.

deploy layered security4.

assure continuity o the marine transportation system.5. 46

The frst o these actions is largely sel-explanatory, and involves military and inter-

agency cooperation between states, as well as engagement within international andregional organisations and security regimes. So too are the second and fth o these

actions. The integration o private industry, including the commercial maritime sector,

into supply chain security has an analogous component in the 1000-ship Navy, whereby

shipping companies have been invited to contribute as part o the global sensor grid,

eeding inormation rom their ships automatic identifcation systems into the overall

MDA picture.

Layered security, a term previously made amiliar by the USNs Sea Shield concept,

applies across dierent levels o analysis. For example, it can reer to layering security

practices along the entire length o the maritime transportation chain, to all possiblepoints o vulnerability. It also means integration o security practices between the

various levels o government within the US domestic jurisdiction, with the private

sector, between dierent agencies and internationally. The physical protection o ports,

ships and cargoes adds extra layers. Further layers still are provided by interdiction

o suspicious materials and people all along the supply chain, and enorcement action

where necessary. Layered security thereore attempts to establish preventative security

measures through (usually non-military) interdiction and pre-emptive action - such

as pre-screening containers in oreign ports beore being loaded onto ships bound or

the United States - and protection, through deterrence and deence.47


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Also in common with the Sea Shield concept, layered security seeks to extend the reach

o its maritime security aegis - in this case the physical protection o the American

homeland rom terrorist threats delivered via the maritime transportation system - as

ar rom US national territory as possible. The pursuit o such a strategy should not

be a surprising one or any maritime power o signifcance, or as Norman Friedmanreminds us in the conclusion to his examination o the strategy o sea power:

The issue is always the same. Is the sea a barrier or a highway?

I seapower makes the sea a barrier, then it is a tool to promote

isolationism. The argument against isolation is that some weapons, both

military and economic, can leap any barrier. It is better to use the sea

as a highway, and engage potential threats as close to source as possible.

That is the ultimate character o maritime strategy - or the United States,

and or any other country contemplating such a strategy.48

Although Friedman was reerring primarily to the use o naval means in a more

traditional strategic context, the utility, or maritime powers, o engaging threats as

close to source as possible remains valid in the current security environment, in which

a collaborative, joint and inter-agency approach is being pursued to negate a maritime

security threat o a non-traditional nature. The new US Maritime Strategy is explicit on

this point: Maritime orces will deend the homeland by identiying and neutralizing

threats as ar rom our shores as possible. This requirement is also linked to a standard

doctrinal component o the application o maritime power: orward presence, both to

prevent hostile acts and to build partnerships.49

Whilst identifcation and neutralisation o such threats might be an obvious response

to the new threat environment, it is nevertheless interesting to note how these two

necessities correspond to the substantive elements o the Global Maritime Partnership

initiative: identifcation representing the MDA component, and neutralisation the

preventative enorcement element. I one were to take an entirely US-centric view o

the 1000-ship Navy, by integrating the eorts o other members o the cooperative

scheme, the United States can thus be seen to be adding the capabilities o their

international and commercial sector partners to the layered maritime security o theUS homeland.


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navy strategi Pla

The Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) o May 2006 added to the strategy ramework

underpinning the Global Maritime Partnership initiative. It outlines three CNO ocus

areas:

global war on terror/irregular warare1.

homeland security/homeland deense2.

conventional campaigns.3. 50

These ocus areas are consistent with, and linked to, the Force Planning Construct

outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Deense Review(QDR). The new priorities o deending

the American homeland and prosecuting the so-called long war against violent

extremists who use terrorism as their weapon o choice were clearly elucidatedby the QDR, although it perhaps overstated the signiicance o changes to the

strategic environment when it outlined an apparent necessity to transorm deence

preparations rom 20th to 21st century realities. This supposed discontinuity includes

the downplaying o state-based threats in avour o accentuating non-state enemies

(such as Al Qaeda and other related terrorist groups).51

That same prioritisation o the irregular threat to the homeland is also apparent in the

Navy Strategic Plan. O particular relevance to the 1000-ship Navy, the NSP includes

among the desired eects that the navy can contribute to its CNO ocus areas, global

MDA, theatre security cooperation programs and cooperation with the US Coast Guardand other Department o Homeland Security (DHS) agencies to better prepare or joint

and inter-agency responses to maritime threats to the US homeland.52

In regard to cooperation with the US Coast Guard, the relationship has been enhanced,

at least in theory, with the reinvigoration o the National Fleet policy. Although frst

promulgated in 1998, the National Fleet concept had been largely moribund until the

exigencies o the global campaign against extreme Islamist revolutionaries demanded

closer cooperation. The renewed emphasis on the National Fleet also implicitly

recognises the limitations o a downsized and overstretched USN orce structure, therole and expertise o the US Coast Guard in saeguarding the United States against

threats emanating rom within the global maritime transportation system, and the

utility o employing a non-military orce to engage with countries which may be less

comortable or willing to cooperate with the US military. Thus, the National Fleet

aspires to be

A joint and interoperable maritime orce to establish the numerical

sufciency required or eective global operations and to eectively

oster and leverage regional international partnerships in order to


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achieve global maritime domain awareness and maritime transportation

security in the era o globalization.53

The Navy-Coast Guard relationship has been urther bolstered by the inclusion o the

latter agency as a ull partner in the new Maritime Strategy. Nevertheless, althoughthe 1000-ship Navy has been a USN initiative and despite an NSP assertion o the

Navys unique position in acilitating its construction, it is somewhat surprising that

the US Coast Guard has not been given a prominent role in developing and promoting

the concept.54 As a ormer Coast Guardsman notes, the US Coast Guard itsel has

many unique attributes that would be useul in operationalising the initiative.55 In

this respect the Coast Guard:

is a law enorcement agency with powers and expertise not held by the Navy

already has considerable responsibility or maritime homeland security andmaritime transportation security, including developing MDA capabilities and

implementation o international regulations such as the International Ship and

Port Facility Security(ISPS) Code

has close operational relationships with other DHS agencies involved with maritime

security, such as Customs and Border Protection

is deeply involved in international cooperation and engagement programs 56

as a primarily civilian rather than military organisation, it is both more closely

attuned to the capability requirements and operational concerns o potential partnernation coast guard (and other civilian) agencies and many o the worlds smaller

navies which unction primarily as coast guards and more politically acceptable

than the USN (or other navies) in some parts o the world.

One o the tangible outcomes o closer Navy-Coast Guard cooperation or the

homeland deence role is the development o a Maritime Domain Awareness Concept

o Operations.57 This is a logical step and, indeed, the USN will undoubtedly need to

leverage the US Coast Guards expertise and access to the entire range o commercial

maritime supply chain data derived rom the inormation collection capacities o various

DHS agencies, i it wishes to play a signifcant role itsel in securing the homeland

rom threats carried via the maritime transportation system.

The NSP summarises the now amiliar case or the need or a Global Maritime Network

o partner nations cooperating to ace down the growing challenges to security in the

global maritime domain. It also adds a fnancial justifcation, stating that the proactive

cost o ensuring day-to-day security in the maritime domain is dramatically more

aordable than the reactive costs o going to war or mounting a large-scale security

operation. This seems to ignore the act that the context o the war on terrorism was

the leading driver o the concept in the frst place.58

Nevertheless, the 1000-ship Navyhas clearly become a signifcant element o USN strategy making.


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naval operati cept

TheNaval Operations Concept(NOC) o September 2006 urther integrates the 1000-ship Navy into USN operational thinking, which takes pride o place, or example, in

the NOC discussion o maritime security operations or, the apparent need or the

Policing o the maritime commons. The NOC also places importance upon security

cooperation programs and civil-military operations, such as those employed or counter-

insurgency and counter-terrorism, and humanitarian and civic assistance. Lastly, the

NOC emphasised building cooperative partnerships the mantra o the 1000-ship

Navy again by building up the capacity o the maritime orces o partner nations.59

The NOC will be revised to take into account the new Maritime Strategy.60

T nw Mtm sttg

In October 2007 the USN, US Marine Corps and US Coast Guard released the frst ever

tri-Service Maritime Strategy to describe the role o joint sea power in protecting the US

homeland, national interests and the extant international system:A Cooperative Strategy

or 21st Century Seapower. It sets out the potential sources o disruption that might upset

an ever more tightly connected global system whose economic linkages via trade are

overwhelmingly maritime: rom major power war and regional conict to terrorism,lawlessness and large scale natural disasters. Unsurprisingly, it builds upon the same

set o perceptions and assumptions about the international strategic environment as

earlier pronouncements on the 1000-ship Navy concept: the globalised world does not

come ree o negative consequences, including the spread o the disruptive political

ambitions and extremist ideologies o rogue states and transnational actors, via modern

technologies and employing a hybrid blend o traditional and irregular tactics.61 It

also identifes the potential or the continued rapid growth o the global economy to

increase the competition or natural resources, including marine resources, although it

alls short o Admiral Mullens more dramatic 2006 characterisation that globalisationis driving a competitive race or energy.62

A Cooperative Strategy or 21st Century Seapowerpays due regard to the ability o

US maritime orces to prevent conventional wars through deterrence or fght them

using their sea control and power projection capabilities. However, it is also clear

that, consistent with the 1000-ship Navy concept, there is a growing emphasis upon

conducting maritime security operations to saeguard both the homeland and the

international system - including its major sea lanes and global maritime commons - rom

transnational terrorist and criminal threats, as well as operations in response to natural

disasters and demands or humanitarian assistance. US maritime orces thus contribute


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to the outer reaches o the layered security o the homeland by the persistence o their

orward presence, particularly in unstable regions o the world.63

As befts its title and consistent with the NSMS and 1000-ship Navy, the Maritime

Strategy places a strong emphasis on cooperation, not only between the three Americansea Services but also with riends, allies and other partners in achieving cooperative

maritime security throughout the global maritime domain, including with international

organisations, the private sector, and other non-state actors.64 The strategy thus places

the Global Maritime Partnership initiative at the heart o its international partnership-

building activities, which are in turn central to the current American conception o the

roles o sea power in the war against transnational Islamist insurgents.

et, nt rtIn summary, thereore, it is clear that the 1000-ship Navy concept has been the

product o an evolutionary process rather than a revolutionary departure in maritime

strategy and security policy making since 2001.65 Not only has the concept grown

out o pre-existing policy and strategy thinking, but it has been ully integrated into

new USN concepts o operations and strategy priorities, including a prominent role

in the Maritime Strategy. The underlying assumptions and strategic priorities o this

thinking seem to be well established and unlikely to change in the current international

circumstances, particularly Washingtons preoccupation with the Global War on Terror.Strategic circumstances can change rapidly, however, and it remains to be seen how

resilient the new thinking would be in the event o a more traditional maritime-strategic

challenge, such as a Chinese assault on Taiwan or an Iranian attempt to close or

dominate the Persian Gul region. Those types o scenarios - o state-based challenges

to regional or international order or a break down o the globalising, integrative

international economic order so integral to USN thinking would thus perhaps provide

the real test o the strength o the Global Maritime Partnership initiative.


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T 1000-p n Pt

This chapter takes a two-pronged approach by examining the regional ocus areas othe proposed global maritime security network, and outlining the challenges acing

the construction o a system o global maritime domain awareness.

bdg rg ntwk

The USN has conceptualised the global 1000-ship Navy as being built around existing

regional cooperative ventures to enhance maritime security, where such initiatives

exist, and the creation o new cooperative initiatives in regions where they do not. In

keeping with the network theme, and analogous to the Internet which is constituted

by networked but independently operated computers, these regional schemes, Admiral

Mullen states explicitly, need not be led by the USN or even involve the United States

at all.66

Nevertheless, the USN has pinpointed certain regions as particular areas o concern

to global maritime security due to their strategic locations and/or instability, involving

actors such as the potential disruption o good order at sea, international trade or

energy supplies, and the potential to oster the growth o those irregular Islamistenemies that are the ocus o current US national security eorts.

The NSP identifes three maritime ocus areas that correlate directly to the priority

regions in the global campaign against Islamist extremism: the western Pacifc,

especially Southeast Asia; the Middle East and Southwest Asia; and the Mediterranean.67

These regions also include most, i not all, o the worlds most important, and vulnerable,

maritime choke points.

In Southeast Asia, the NSP takes particular note o the Muslim terrorists and insurgents

who are using violence to orward their goals in an arc stretching rom southernThailand through the Malay peninsula, the Indonesian archipelago and Borneo to the

southern Philippines. The NSP notes the Al Qaeda links o regional organisations such

as Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayya Group.68 The importance o archipelagic and

peninsular Southeast Asia barely needs stating: with its straits orming the essential

link between the Indian Ocean and the semi-enclosed seas o the western Pacifc and

the large markets o Northeast Asia, the region straddles an international trade route

vital or regional and, indeed, global, economic - and consequently also political

stability.


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A ocus or American Theater Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia since its

inception in 1995 has been the annual bilateral Cooperation Aoat Readiness and

Training (CARAT) and, since 2002, the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism

(SEACAT), exercises. US maritime orces conduct these bilateral exercises each year

with the navies o Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand,exercising a range o scenarios depending on the requirements o the CARAT partner

nation and on sometimes limiting political actors. Vietnam now also observes CARAT

activities and is likely to become the seventh ull participating partner in coming

years. The exercises ocus on improving interoperability, multinational coordination

and inormation sharing, and include the exercising o humanitarian assistance and

disaster relie and, increasingly, maritime interdiction and maritime counter-terrorism

scenarios. The United States hopes that the CARAT program will eventually evolve into

a multinational exercise, although that will be difcult given the prevailing political

and strategic cultures in the region which continue to indicate a preerence to abjurerom security multilateralism amid prevailing sensitivities, disputes and mutual

suspicion. Despite this difculty, the Commander Logistics Group Western Pacifc/

Commander Task Force 73 (the executive agent or both CARAT and SEACAT), Rear

Admiral William Burke, USN, has gone so ar as to claim that CARAT is the model

exercise or the 1000-ship Navy.69

The Middle East and Southwest Asian areas o primary interest conorm largely to

the maritime parts o the existing US Central Command (USCENTCOM) area o

responsibility: the Persian (Arabian) Gul, Red Sea, Gul o Oman, the Arabian Sea and

parts o the north-western Indian Ocean, including the vital choke points o the Strait

o Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Bab al Mandeb.70 The Mediterranean area has a

strong ocus on the northern Arican littoral as well as the Suez Canal and the Strait

o Gibraltar. In addition, the NSP identifes other maritime areas o interest where

regional instability has the potential to negatively impact maritime security: the Gul

o Guinea and Aricas Swahili Coast, parts o South America and the Black Sea.

Nascent regional networks already exist and, in the American conception, should

orm part o the Global Maritime Network. For example, NATOs Operation ACTIVE

ENDEAVOUR in the Mediterranean has been carrying out maritime security operationsand protecting that region against possible terrorist activity since October 2001, and

has enlisted the support o Russia, Ukraine, Algeria, Israel, Morocco, Albania and

Georgia.71 In the USCENTCOM area o responsibility, Combined Task Force (CTF) 150,

established in the early stages o Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the war against

terrorism, conducts maritime security operations in the Arabian Sea, Gul o Oman,

Gul o Aden, the Red Sea and the adjacent parts o the Indian Ocean. Currently led

by the French navy, it has previously been commanded by Germany, the Netherlands

and Pakistan.72


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25The 1000-shiP navy in PracTice

The United States is leading an eort to establish a maritime security network in the

Gul o Guinea, including engagement with the Maritime Organization or West and

Central Arican States, which is pursuing the establishment o an integrated regional

coast guard network, and through the Arica Sea Power Symposia.73 And US Southern

Command (USSOUTHCOM) holds a series o maritime security exercises in CentralAmerica and the Caribbean, and provides maritime security assistance to the region

under the Enduring Friendship program.74

These peacetime roles to inuence regional security environments involve not only

capacity building activities to improve the protection o important sea lanes, but

also support rendered by maritime orces to wider eorts to provide stability to

erstwhile unstable or at least, vulnerable regions and states. Such operations

include humanitarian and civic assistance missions, such as the response to the

Indian Ocean tsunami and the deployment o the hospital ships USNS Mercyand

USNS Comortto regions such as archipelagic Southeast Asia and Central America,

respectively, where their humanitarian missions can help win the hearts and minds

contest against the disruptive ideologies noted above and destabilising transnational

criminal inuences.

Following the deployment oMercyto Southeast Asia in 2006, the amphibious assault

ship USS Peleliu deployed or our months beginning in June 2007 to Southeast

Asia and the Southwest Pacifc to provide medical and other humanitarian and civic

assistance in a mission entitled Pacifc Partnership 2007. The deployment involved

participation rom humanitarian non-governmental organisations and other regionalstates.75 It seems as though such regular deployments may become a sort o precursor

to a regional US Global Fleet Station (see below), although it is possible that that name

may not be used in Southeast Asia due to overriding local sensitivities.

There can be no doubt that these nation and security-building activities play an

increasingly important role in the American conception o the long war. For example,

Admiral Mullen explicitly linked such enterprises to that overriding strategic priority:

I view relie eorts and any number o other engagement activities as very much

a part o winning the war on terror. And we are at war.76


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G ft stt

One supporting concept under development is the establishment o Global Fleet

Stations, which will consist o orward-deployed shallow drat ships and support

vessels based in littoral regions: a orm o Sea Basing. Global Fleet Stations couldbecome both a means o exerting the positive inuence desired by Mullen and his

successor and a means by which to build cooperation and local capabilities or maritime

security. They could be staed by specialist Foreign Area Ofcers and orm a hub

where all manner o Joint, Inter-Agency, International Organizations, navies, coast

guards and non-governmental organizations could partner together as a orce or good

in particular regions o interest.77 The Maritime Strategy urther states the need to

develop sufcient cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise amongst the three sea

Services to nurture eective interaction with diverse international partners:78 a kind

o neo-imperial enabling orce or the global policing and security-building deemednecessary by the United States to saeguard the maritime domain?79 Like the 1000-ship

Navy itsel, the Global Fleet Station idea is clearly idealistic, and requires the support

o sometimes hesitant coastal nations to be eective.

Global Fleet Stations, urther described by Mullen as a persistent sea base o operations

ocused on shaping (that is, inuence) operations, Theater Security Cooperation and

contributing to maritime domain awareness, are being developed explicitly as regional

support elements or the 1000-ship Navy.80 In April 2007 the initial Global Fleet Station

deployed to Panama and six other Central American and Caribbean states in a six

month pilot mission, consisting o the high speed vessel HSV 2 Switand USN andUS Coast Guard training teams.81

The second Global Fleet Station, named the Arica Partnership Station, began a

seven month deployment to the Gul o Guinea in November 2007. Consisting oSwit

and the amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry, the deployment involves

the participation o personnel rom the three US Sea Services, military sta rom

seven NATO European states, sta rom the State Department and the US Agency

or International Development, Department o Homeland Security, Department o

Commerce and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and selectednon-governmental organisations. This is indeed the joint, combined, inter-agency and

still wider maritime collaboration o the type posited by Mullen at the Naval War College

less than 18 months earlier, representing an impressive case o backing words with

actions. According to US Naval Forces Europe-US Sixth Fleet, the Arica Partnership

Station will concentrate on providing tailored education and training to improve

maritime saety and security, including or enorcement, interdiction, search and

rescue and counter-terrorism operations, as well as support or over 20 humanitarian

assistance missions.82


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Mtm Dm aw

The United States takes a comprehensive and inclusive view o what constitutes

maritime domain awareness. Its defnition o the maritime domain itsel is also so

broad as to make the MDA task extremely difcult, as laid down in theNational Planto Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.83 The maritime domain:

is all areas and things o, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering

on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime

related activities, inrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other

conveyances.

Maritime domain awareness:

is the eective understanding o anything associated with the maritimedomain that could impact the security, saety, economy, or environment

o the United States.

In the international context o the 1000-ship Navy, one can substitute all participants in

the initiative or perhaps even all statesper se or the United States. This is a highly

ambitious undertaking which will demand not only the application o technology but

also the development o protocols and procedures, political and, at times, possibly legal

arrangements or the accessing and sharing o data. The MDA aspect o the initiative

can be divided into two elements: inormation collection and inormation sharing.

imt ct

The extent o United States ambitions or MDA data collection is probably not entirely

obvious even rom the above defnition. The ultimate intent is to be able to maintain

tracks on the entire global merchant eet o approximately 121,000 ships o 300 gross

registered tons (grt) or larger. In the words o the USNs Director o Naval Intelligence:

As we evolve down the road well get closer to tracking all [merchant ships] that are inthe world on a minute-by-minute basis.84 A common theme in USN pronouncements

is to draw a parallel with the way international civil aviation is tracked using a system

o global identifcation standards or airliners and civilian-based air trafc control

radar.85 It should be noted though, that the analogy is not entirely sound: there is an

underlying saety demand to ensure that large, relatively ast moving airborne people

carriers do not collide and all rom the sky. The system thus represents a practical

necessity to ensure the saety and viability o the civilian aerospace industry. There

is no comparable saety issue, on the other hand, that would require the constant,

global tracking o the worlds eet o merchant ships. Nevertheless, one o the USNsongoing technology development programs involves the construction o an unlimited


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track database which would merge and display maritime track data rom a number

o separate databases.86

As indicated earlier, Admiral Mullen has placed considerable importance upon the

development and application o technology, and inormation technology, in particular, asthe single largest contributor to uture maritime security. He suggests that, even today,

such technologies can play a leading role in negating the enemys intentions.87

Whilst MDA technologies can indeed play an important role, and they are indispensable

to gaining an understanding o the maritime domain, it is also essential that the

limitations o technology be recognised. This is less a question o the technical limits

o technology, but rather that an understanding is required that technology unctions

only as a tool - a particular means to achieving a specifc objective - and not an end in

and o itsel. In other words, there are signifcant dangers in assuming that the task o

enhancing maritime security can be equated with achieving a certain level o domainawareness: such as mistaking MDA or maritime security. Indeed, the promotion o

technology as a solution to strategic, as opposed to merely technical, problems has

been identifed as a characteristic typical to American military and strategic culture.88

It will thus be important that MDA technologies are treated as enabling tools or

maritime security rather than as a wand to magically solve the challenges o the

current maritime security environment. Americas allies and close coalition partners

may play an important role in this respect by helping the United States to keep a sense

o perspective regarding the role o MDA technologies.

One question worth asking is whether it is really necessary to be able to track the

worlds entire eet o merchant ships persistently. The need to fnd or track specifc

ships when required is understandable, and authorities would need the capability to

be able to do so. But the assertion that the war on terrorism demands that one o the

strategies that we have to ocus on is fnding the needle in the haystack by using

a database o ship tracks, assumes that we know what we are looking or in the frst

place.89 Otherwise we might end up knowing an awul lot about all the haystacks and

not much about the apparent needle, until we are pricked. It remains the case that

MDA inormation in isolation may not be sufcient to prevent major attacks. Rather,

it will be o most utility when matched with actionable intelligence, oten rom non-

maritime sources, on specifc threats. The lack o good intelligence, on the other hand,

has spurred greater eorts to develop better MDA capabilities, including, or example,

NATOs Maritime Saety and Security Inormation System (MSSIS), which supports

Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR in the Mediterranean.90

A number o technologies and strategies are being pursued to attain the necessary

inormation to achieve comprehensive MDA - a kind o peacetime (or quasi-war time,

given contemporary circumstances) equivalent to the US military concept o dominant

battlespace awareness. Piecing together a composite picture or comprehensive MDAis an extremely challenging task, which involves the incorporation o a wide range o


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data beyond just tracks o merchant ships. Attaining the data, rom all sources, such

as customs and port state reporting requirements, military and non-military sensors

and ship transmissions, is only the frst step in the process. Such vast quantities

o disparate data need to be used and analysed that specialised computer-based

algorithms are required to process all the inormation and potential risk actors in themaritime trading system identifed. One o the goals o the analysis process is to identiy

anomalous behaviour. For example, anomalies in a ships behaviour might be identifed

by comparing inormation on the ships actual location and bearing with its sailing

schedule and itinerary. This type o process is already being implemented not only by

the United States and in other national systems, but also in some regional systems.

However, as noted by Martin Murphy, systems relying upon inormation rom AIS and

other similar raw data sources can be vulnerable to non-compliance and deception by

merchant ships. Moreover, anomalous behaviour is not necessarily easy to detect. For

example, a supposedly anomalous voyage pattern was one o the actors that inuenced

British authorities to board and search theNisha in British waters in December 2001

on suspicion that it might be carrying WMD-related materials, yet on investigation

that pattern turned out to be normal or that particular ship.91 At the very least, the

computer programs developed

to crunch all the raw data may

need to be ed with historical

inormation on the normal mode

o movement and behaviour

o individual ships in order to

be able to detect anomalies:

a vast undertaking. And even

with such historical data sets,

the MDA picture will probably

still need to be matched with

specifc intelligence inormation

to be truly eective in preventing

terrorist attacks, although

there are obvious benefts rom

enhanced MDA or all manner o

maritime enorcement and border

protection operations.

The US National Plan to Achieve

Maritime Domain Awareness sets

out an essential task l

Documents

The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative Mike Mullen