THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IMPLICATIONS … · Part 1: The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030 The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030 and its Implications for Safety, Security and Nonproliferation

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TREVOR FINDLAY

THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TO 2030 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFETY, SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION Part 1 – The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030

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The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030 and its Implications for Safety, Security and Nonproliferation

Part 1 – The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030

Trevor Findlay

CIGI’s Nuclear Energy Futures Project is conducted in partnership with the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance (CCTC) at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa. The project is chaired by CIGI Distinguished Fellow Louise Fréchette and directed by CIGI Senior Fellow Trevor Findlay, director of CCTC. CIGI gratefully acknowledges the Government of Ontario’s contribution to this project.

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance Innovation, its Board of Directors and/or Board of Governors, or the Government of Ontario.

Copyright © 2010 The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (www.cigionline.org). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution — Noncommercial — No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice.

The Centre for International Governance Innovation

4 Part 1: The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030

Table of ContentsList of Tables and Figures 5Technical Glossary 6Foreword 7Preface to the Final Report of the Nuclear Energy Futures Project: Parts 1 to 4 8Part 1: The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030 9The Drivers 10

Growing Energy Demand 10The Problem with Global Demand Projections 12

Energy Security 15Uranium 16Thorium 17Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel 17Nuclear Technology Dependence 19

Climate Change 20The Promise of Nuclear Technology – Current and Future 24

Improvements in Current Power Reactors (Generation II) 24Generation III and Generation III+ Reactors 25Small, Medium, Miniaturized and Other Novel Reactors 27Generation IV Reactors 29Fast Neutron and Breeder Reactors 30Fusion Power 32

Political and Promotional Drivers 32Political Drivers 32Nuclear Promotion Internationally 33Nuclear Promotion Domestically 37

The Constraints 39Nuclear Economics 39

The Effects of Deregulation of Electricity Markets 40The (Rising) Cost of Nuclear Power Plants 41Cost Comparisons with Other Baseload Power Sources 42Cost Comparisons with Non-Baseload Alternatives: Conservation, Efficiency and Renewable 48Construction Delays and Cost Overruns 50The Impact of the 2008-2009 Current Financial Crisis 53The Impact of Government Subsidies 54The Impact of Carbon Pricing 56Costs of Nuclear Waste Management and Decommissioning 57

Industrial Bottlenecks 57Personnel Constraints 61Nuclear Waste 62

Interim Storage 63Long-Term Disposition 63

Safety, Security and Proliferation 66The “Revival” so Far 66

Current “New Build” 67“New Build” by Existing Nuclear Energy States 68

Aspiring Nuclear Energy States 72Institutional Capacity 75Physical Infrastructure 77Financial Indicators 79The Most Likely New Entrants 81

Conclusions 85

Part 1: The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030


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Endnotes 86Works Cited 89About the Author 102Nuclear Energy Futures Project Publications 103Acronyms and Abbreviations 104About CIGI 106

List of Tables and FiguresGlobal Nuclear Energy Projections at 2030 11IAEA Projections of World Nuclear Power Capacity (High Estimates) 13Global Nuclear Generating Capacity 14Box: Predictions for Developing Countries 14Predicted versus Actual Additions to Nuclear Generation Capacity, 1980-1989 15World’s Major Uranium Producers (tonnes U) 16Coal-Fired CO2 Emissions Displaced Per Dollar Spent on Electrical Services 23Progression of Nuclear Reactor Technologies 26The International Nuclear Industry 27Box: The South African Pebble Bed Reactor 28Box: Generation IV Reactors Being Studied By GIF 30Fast Breeder Reactors by Status and Country, 2009 31GNEP Members, January 2010 34Results of Recent Studies on the Cost of Nuclear Power 44Costs of Electricity Generation Alternatives 47Levelized Cost of Low Carbon Options to Meet Electricity Needs 49Overnight Cost of Completed Nuclear Reactors Compared to Projected Costs of Future Reactors 51Box: The Olkiluoto-3 Project in Finland 52Box: The French Example―Exemplar or Sui Generis? 58Box: Yucca Mountain 65Nuclear Reactor Numbers and Share of Global Electricity Production Since 2000 67Global Annual Grid Connections on Five-year Moving Average 67Nuclear Power Plants Currently under Construction by Country 68Current and Aspiring Nuclear Energy States 73Nuclear Infrastructure Development Programme (IAEA) 74Governance Indicators for SENES States, 2008 76Installed Electricity Generation Capacity for SENES States, 2005 78GDP and Credit Ratings for SENES States, 2007 and 2009 80


6 Part 1: The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030 cigionline.org

Technical Glossary

Units

BTU British thermal unit

g gram

kWh kilowatt hour – a unit of electrical energy equal to the work done by one kilowatt acting for one hour

SWU separative work unit – a measure of work done by a machine or plant in separating uranium into higher or lower fractions of U-235

t tonne

We watt (electric)

Wth watt (thermal)

Elements and Compounds

C carbon

CO2 carbon dioxide

Pu plutonium

U uranium

UF6 uranium hexafluoride

Metric Prefixes

k kilo 103

M mega 106

G giga 109

T tera 1012

All dollar values in this report, unless otherwise noted, are in US dollars.

Part 1: The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030 cigionline.org 7


Foreword By Louise Fréchette

2010 will be a pivotal year for nuclear issues. In April,

President Obama will host a special summit on nuclear

security. In May, parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation

Treaty will gather in New York for a review conference

and in June, at the G8 Summit hosted by Canada, nuclear

proliferation issues will occupy a prominent place on the

agenda. New challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation

regime by countries such as North Korea and Iran and

growing concerns about the possible appropriation of

nuclear material by terrorist groups arise at a time when

there is much talk about a major increase in the use of

nuclear energy for civilian purposes.

This so-called “nuclear renaissance” was the starting point

of the Nuclear Energy Futures project which was initiated

in May 2006. The purpose of this project was three-fold:

• to investigate the likely size, shape and nature of the

purported nuclear energy revival to 2030 – not to

make a judgement on the merits of nuclear energy,

but rather to predict its future;

• to consider the implications for global governance

in the areas of nuclear safety, security and

nonproliferation; and

• to make recommendations to policy makers in

Canada and abroad on ways to strengthen global

governance in these areas.

The project commissioned more than a dozen research

papers, most of which have been published in CIGI’s

Nuclear Energy Futures Papers series; held several

workshops, consultations and interviews with key

Canadian and foreign stakeholders, including industry,

government, academia and non-governmental

organizations; convened two international conferences,

one in Sydney, Australia, and one in Waterloo, Ontario;

and participated in conferences and workshops held

by others. The project has assembled what is probably

the most comprehensive and up-to-date information

on possible additions to the list of countries that have

nuclear power plants for civilian purposes. Along with

this Survey of Emerging Nuclear Energy States (SENES),

the project has produced a compendium of all the nuclear

global governance instruments in existence today which

will, I believe, prove to be a valuable reference tool for

researchers and practioners alike.

The project was generously funded and supported by

The Centre for International Governance Innovation and

was carried out in partnership with the Canadian Centre

for Treaty Compliance (CCTC) at Carleton University,

Ottawa. I was very fortunate to have found in Dr. Trevor

Findlay, director of the CCTC, the perfect person to

oversee this ambitious project. I am very grateful to him

and his small team of masters students at the Norman

Paterson School of International Affairs, especially Justin

Alger, Derek de Jong, Ray Froklage and Scott Lofquist-

Morgan, for their hard work and dedication.

Nuclear issues are quintessential global issues. Their

effective management requires the collaboration of a

broad range of actors. Canada, with its special expertise

in nuclear technology and its long history of engagement

in the construction of effective global governance in this

area, is particularly well placed to help deal with the new

challenges on the horizon. My colleagues and I hope

that the findings and recommendations of the Nuclear

Energy Futures Project will be of use to policy makers as

they prepare for the important meetings which will be

held later this year.

Louise Fréchette

Chair of the Nuclear Energy Futures Project

Distinguished Fellow,




Preface to the Final Report of the Nuclear Energy Futures Project: Parts 1 to 4

This report culminates three-and-a-half years’ work

on the Nuclear Energy Futures (NEF) project. The

project was funded and supported by The Centre for

International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and carried

out in partnership with the Canadian Centre for Treaty

Compliance (CCTC) at Carleton University, Ottawa.

The purported “nuclear renaissance” was the starting point

of the Nuclear Energy Futures project, which was initiated

in May 2006. The purpose of this project was three-fold:

• to investigate the likely size, shape and nature of the

purported nuclear energy revival to 2030 – not to

make a judgment on the merits of nuclear energy, but

rather to predict its future;

• to consider the implications for global governance

in the areas of nuclear safety, security and

nonproliferation; and

• to make recommendations to policy makers in

Canada and abroad on ways to strengthen global

governance in these areas.

Numerous outputs have been generated over the course

of the study, including the Survey of Emerging Nuclear

Energy States (SENES) online document, the GNEP

Watch newsletter and the Nuclear Energy Futures papers

series. The final installment from the project comprises

six outputs: the Overview, an Action Plan, and a four-

part main report. A description of how the project was

conducted is included in the Acknowledgements section

at the front of the Overview.

Part 1, The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030, provides

a detailed look at the renewed interest in global nuclear

energy for civilian purposes. Growing concerns about

energy security and climate change, coupled with

increasing demand for electricity worldwide, have

prompted many countries to explore the viability of

nuclear energy. Existing nuclear states are already

building nuclear reactors while some non-nuclear states

are actively studying the possibility of joining the nuclear

grid. While key drivers are spurring existing and aspiring

nuclear states to develop nuclear energy, economic and

other constraints are likely to limit a “revival.” Part 1

discusses the drivers and challenges in detail.

Parts 2 through 4 of the main report consider, respectively,

issues of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation

arising from civilian nuclear energy growth and the

global governance implications.



PART 1: The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030

The first decade of this millennium has seen a revival of

global interest in the use of nuclear energy for generating

electricity.1 From around 2000 onwards several trends

began to convince many observers that the coming

years would witness a so-called nuclear energy

“renaissance.”2 These have included the urgent need for

“decarbonizing” the world’s energy supply to mitigate

global warming; the ravenous energy demands of China,

India and other emerging economic powerhouses; the

call for energy security or diversity; the new profitability

but rapid ageing of the existing reactor fleet; the promise

of new reactor technologies; and the challenges facing

traditional energy sources, particularly recurrent spikes

in the price of oil and natural gas and fears about their

availability over the long term.

The nuclear industry, in the doldrums since the 1979

Three Mile Island accident and the 1986 Chernobyl

disaster, has sensed a “second coming” and ramped up

its research and development (R&D) and promotional

and marketing activities accordingly. Governments,

desperate for relatively “green” alternatives to

extravagant carbon emitters like oil, coal and gas,

and unconvinced that renewables like wind and solar

energy can do the trick, have seized on the idea of

nuclear power generation as a means of fulfilling their

commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The hope would be not only to meet future baseload

power requirements, but to sustain existing rates of

economic growth (at least those that pertained prior to

the current economic recession) and living standards.

Several countries, notably in East Asia, have already

begun building new reactors as part of ambitious nuclear

energy programs, while many others have announced

plans, are studying the possibilities or are simply

floating ideas. The countries with the most far-reaching

targets for domestic expansion are China, India, Russia,

the United Kingdom and the United States. The nuclear

industries of these and other established players like

France, Japan and South Korea have anticipated reactor

sales opportunities and talked up the prospects of a

revival (Thomas et al., 2007). Some states and companies

are considering other ways to profit, such as increasing

uranium exploration and mining or expanding uranium

enrichment capacity.

Internationally, the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)

of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD), responding to their members’

growing enthusiasm, have issued relatively optimistic

forecasts. The World Nuclear Association (formerly

the Uranium Institute), whose membership largely

comprises uranium producers and reactor vendors, has

done likewise. The launch of the Global Nuclear Energy

Partnership (GNEP) and the Generation IV International

Forum (GIF) has added to the enthusiasm. The nuclear

trade press and the general media have touted the

revival, mostly unquestioningly. There is certainly, then,

a revival of interest in nuclear energy. The question is

whether this interest is likely to be translated into action.

The purpose of this first part of the report is not to assess

the merits of a nuclear revival but its likelihood. This

involves the tricky business of attempting to predict the

collective and cumulative impact of scores of decision

makers in various guises. The future growth of nuclear

energy is ultimately dependent on the confluence

of decisions by governments, electricity utilities, the

nuclear industry, private and institutional investors and



international organizations. Perhaps most important of all

will be the decisions of non-nuclear stakeholders, notably

the general public as expressed through elections, opinion

polls or other means, and the activities of civil society

in supporting or opposing nuclear energy. One way of

considering how policy makers will reach their decisions

is to consider the balance of drivers and constraints. This

first part of the study is thus devoted to analyzing the

drivers and constraints most likely to influence decision

making about nuclear energy in the coming decades and

seeking to discover where the balance will lie.

The Drivers

The three most important drivers of the current

revival of interest in nuclear energy are: the perceived

increasing global demand for energy, specifically

electricity; the quest for energy security or diversity;

and the need to tackle climate change. Technology, in

the form of improved efficiency of existing reactors

and the promise of advanced reactor design, is also

a driver. In addition there are political and strategic

motivations that merit consideration.

Growing Energy Demand

The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects

world primary energy demand will increase by 45

percent between 2006 and 2030, an average annual

rate of growth of 1.6 percent (International Energy

Agency, 2008a: 78), slower than the average growth

of 1.9 percent per year from 1980 to 2006. World

electricity demand, which is more relevant for nuclear

power ― since electricity generation is by far its most

important civilian application ― is projected to grow

at a higher rate annually than world primary energy

demand. According to the IEA, demand will increase

by 3.2 percent between 2006 and 2015, slowing to 2

percent annually on average from 2015 to 2030. The

projected drop reflects a shift in the economies of non-

OECD countries away from energy-intensive heavy

manufacturing towards lighter industries and services,

as well as “saturation effects in the OECD and some

emerging economies” (IEA, 2008a: 139).

Where nuclear energy fits into this picture is often

taken for granted, the assumption being that nuclear

will automatically increase its share of the global

energy mix, or at least maintain its current share in line

with growth in energy and electricity demand overall.

The IAEA, the most authoritative international source

of information on nuclear energy, predicted in August

2009, as its high scenario, a doubling of global nuclear

power capacity by 2030, from the current 372 gigawatts

electric (GWe)3 to 807 GWe; it assumes an end to the

present financial crisis, continued economic growth and

electricity demand, and the implementation of policies

targeted at mitigating climate change (International

Atomic Energy Agency, 2009a: 6-7).4 Its low scenario

projected an increase to just 511 GWe, reflecting a

“conservative but plausible” revival.

The Nuclear Energy Agency, in its first ever Nuclear

Energy Outlook, released in 2008, projected a total

of just under 600 GWe by 2030 as its high scenario,

while its low scenario indicated only a negligible

increase over the current level, with new plants

built only to replace old ones (Nuclear Energy

Agency, 2008a: 19, 27). This puts both its high and

low scenarios above the IAEA’s. The NEA’s study

of various “business as usual” energy scenarios

devised by other international organizations

concludes that by 2030 and even by 2050 “fossil fuels

(coal, oil and natural gas) will provide a growing

share of energy supply, while nuclear power will



not make a significant contribution to meeting

demand growth” (NEA, 2008a: 94-95). “Business as

usual” includes no significant effort to tackle carbon

emissions through a carbon tax or “cap and trade”

system and no effort to promote (and presumably

subsidize) nuclear energy.

The IEA, traditionally more skeptical about nuclear

energy and with a much broader energy mandate than

its fellow OECD Agency the NEA, predicted in its 2008

nuclear reference scenario that world nuclear capacity

would rise to just 433 GWe by 2030. This puts its

estimate considerably below the IAEA’s low estimate

and on a par with that of the NEA (NEA, 2008a: 148).

Although nuclear electricity output is expected to

increase in absolute terms in all major regions except

OECD Europe, the largest increases occurring in Asia,

the IEA assumes that by 2030 nuclear’s share of global

electricity production will have fallen from 15 percent

in 2006 to 10 percent, “reflecting the assumption of

unchanging policies towards nuclear power” (NEA,

2008a: 142-143). In comparison, coal’s share of the

total world electricity production is projected to grow

from 41 percent currently to 44 percent by 2030, 85

percent of the increase coming from China and India.

Oil is expected to drop to just 2 percent. Gas demand

was expected to drop due to higher prices, leaving its

percentage share slightly lower by 2030 at 20 percent,

but new plants, using high-efficiency gas turbine

technology, will mostly meet the bulk of incremental

gas demand. Since 2008 falling gas prices and the

discovery of new methods of extracting gas from shale

will have affected this projection. While plants with

carbon capture and storage are likely to make only a

minor contribution to electricity generation by 2030, the

share of renewables is likely to rise considerably, from

18 percent in 2006 to 23 percent by 2030.

Global Nuclear Energy Projections at 2030

TotalCapacity(GWe)

0200400600800

100012001400

Low (if applicable)

High

Sources: IAEA (2008b: 17; 2009a); EIA (2008: 233), IEO (2009: 251); OECD/NEA (2008a: 19); WNA (2008b)

The WNA, an organization devoted to promoting

nuclear energy expansion, postulated in its 2008

Nuclear Century Outlook a low scenario of 552 GWe

and a high of 1203 GWe for 2030, both considerably

higher than the IAEA’s projection. It describes these

not as “growth” scenarios as such, but “rather the

boundaries of a domain of likely nuclear growth”

(World Nuclear Association, 2009d). The US

Energy Information Agency (EIA), part of the US

Department of Energy, predicted in September 2008

that, “despite considerable uncertainty about the

future of nuclear power,” world nuclear generating

capacity would rise to 498 GWe in 2030, slightly

higher than the IAEA’s low scenario (Energy

Information Administration, 2008). This would be

the equivalent, it said, of adding approximately 124

new 1,000 MW reactors5 to the current world reactor

fleet of approximately 436 reactors of varying

capacities (IAEA, 2009d).

A 2003 multidisciplinary study by the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology (MIT) projected 1,000

GWe of operating nuclear power globally by 2050

(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003: ix).

Six years later its 2009 update estimated that this is

“less likely than when it was considered in the 2003

study” (MIT, 2009: 5).



The Problem with Global Demand Projections

As even a cursory examination indicates, projections

of a global nuclear revival are highly variable and not

necessarily predictive.

First, they are often based on extrapolations of national

and global demand for electricity, which are based in

turn on predictions of national and global economic

growth. Others take into account population growth

and/or greenhouse gas reduction targets. None of these

indicators necessarily translates into increased demand

for nuclear energy. The WNA Outlook, for instance,

is “built on country-by-country assessments of the

ultimate growth potential of national nuclear programs,

based on estimates of need and capability with

projected population a key factor” (WNN, 2008b). Four

of the scenario sets used by the NEA for its 2008 Nuclear

Energy Outlook, the exception being those of the IAEA,

used computer-based energy modeling incorporating

such assumptions (NEA, 2008a: 92-93). As the recent

economic downturn indicates, such “guesstimates”

may be ill-founded. As the IAEA concedes of its own

figures, these “should be viewed as very general growth

trends whose validity must constantly be subjected to

critical review” (IAEA, 2008a: 5). As the NEA points

out, a larger role for nuclear depends crucially on

government policies (NEA, 2008a: 100).

Second, there is often an assumption in such projections

that nuclear energy will at least maintain its existing

share of expanding electricity production. While it seems

undeniable that global electricity demand will continue

to rise due to population growth, economic growth,

pressure from developing states for developed-world

living standards and demand for electric cars to replace

current vehicles (The Economist, 2009d: 15),6 it cannot

be assumed that nuclear will retain its share. That share

has gradually fallen from its historic peak of almost

18 percent in 1996 to just below 14 percent in 2008 (BP,

2009). In terms of generating capacity, nuclear has also

experienced a fall: after reaching a peak of 12.6 percent

of world electricity generating capacity in 1990, nuclear

declined to 8.4 percent in 2007 (IAEA, 2008a: 17; 2007a:

47). This occurred not only because other forms of energy

generation expanded faster, but because old nuclear

power plants were being shut down and not replaced.

Between 1990 and 2007, 73 new reactors were connected

to the grid worldwide and 62 were closed, resulting in a

net global increase of only 11 reactors over this 17-year

period (NEA, 2008a: 47-49).

Some of these closures have been for historic reasons

that are unlikely to be repeated, notably the admission

of former Soviet bloc states, Bulgaria, Slovenia and

Lithuania, to the European Union (EU), which required

the shutdown of their old Soviet reactors. Even so,

the world’s nuclear fleet is old. By January 2008 there

were 342 reactors aged 20 years or older (78 percent

of the total) (NEA, 2008a: 49). A major industrial effort

will thus be required just to replace the current fleet

― notwithstanding the possibility of life extensions to

some existing plants of up to 30 years and maybe more.

A third reason for skepticism about nuclear energy

projections is the fact that aggregate figures are usually

derived from totaling governments’ announced policies

and plans, in what the IAEA calls a “bottom up approach”

(IAEA, 2007a: 3). An exception is the IEA, which says

its figures reflect “the consistency of our rule not to

anticipate changes in national policies ― notwithstanding

a recent revival of interest in nuclear power” (IEA,

2008a: 39). Nuclear explansion plans by governments

are often overly optimistic, designed for internal political

consumption and/or to impress neighbouring states, their

immediate region or even international bodies like the

IAEA. In some regions, notably Southeast Asia and the



Gulf, this project has observed discernible competition

between states to be the first to acquire such “modern”

technological artifacts. This is not a new phenomenon,

but has characterized the history of nuclear energy from

the time of the Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s and

1960s onwards (Pilat, 2007).

In compiling their aggregate global data, international

organizations, especially those whose members are

governments, have difficulty refuting national estimates,

including those derived from political ambition rather

than fact-based analysis. The IAEA’s current low

projection, for instance, is based on the assumption that

“all nuclear capacity currently under construction or in the

development pipeline gets constructed and government

policies, such as phase-outs, remain unchanged” (IAEA,

2008b). Its high scenario is based on “government and

corporate announcements about longer term plans for

nuclear investments, as well as potential new national

policies, such as responses to international environmental

agreements to combat climate change.” Essentially, these

scenarios assume “full implementation of the long-term

plans announced by governments and power utilities”

(IAEA, 2007a: 3). To its credit, the Agency’s estimates are

not prepared in-house, but are established by an expert

consultancy on Nuclear Capacity Projections (IAEA,

2008a: 6). Yet they are ultimately reliant on information

supplied by member states. Hence their projections are

often overinflated and are never exceeded by reality, as

shown in the charts on pages 13 and 14.7

Some past projections have been wrong not just because

of governments’ over-optimism about future projects, but

because of cancellations of projects already underway.

The chart on page 14 shows the additional global nuclear

electricity generating capacity planned between 1975

and 2005 that was never built due to cancellations.

Had the plans proceeded, the world would have seen

IAEA Projections of World Nuclear Power Capacity (High Estimates)

Source: IAEA (2007a: 54).

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 20300

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

GW

(e)

2005 Projections2000 Projections1995 Projections1990 Projections1985 Projectionsactual capacity



an additional 11 GWe of nuclear power commissioned

every year. Of the 165 cancelled plants, construction

had started on 62 and some were completed but never

commissioned (IEA, 2008b: 300).

A final compounding problem is that global estimates

produced by bodies like the IAEA, the IEA and the

EIA are used by others without reference to the

caveats attached to them in their original form. The

IEA, for example, in its 2008 report Energy Technology

Perspectives, uses figures from the WNA for a chart on

“Plans and proposals for new nuclear power reactors”

without mentioning how these are derived (IEA, 2008b:

298-299). The WNA naturally has a vested interest in

promoting the greatest accretion in nuclear energy

possible. Its World News Report of September 2008 thus

emphasized the IAEA’s high rather than low projections

in reporting that “Nuclear Capacity Could Double by

2030” (WNN, 2008b).

Analysis and commentary in the media begins to feed

on itself, creating hyperbole reminiscent of the nuclear

hucksterism of the Atoms for Peace era (Boyer, 1985: 133-

140). Journalistic books and academic tomes reinforce

the image of the inevitability of a revival.8

Global Nuclear Generating Capacity

Source: IAEA, 2006, cited in IEA, 2008b: 300

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Gen

erat

ing

capa

city

(GW

) Includingcancelled plantsActual

Predictions for Developing Countries

Predictions about the demand for nuclear power in the developing world are especially problematic. It is

sobering to consider a special Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries issued by the IAEA in

September 1973. It concluded that “the projected markets for nuclear plants which will [emphasis added]

be commissioned” in 14 participating developing countries would total, by the end of the 1980s, 52,200 MW

in the low estimate and 62,100 in the high (IAEA, 1973: 5). The chart below compares the predictions to

the reality. The only states that ended up with nuclear power were the ones already engaged in building a

reactor ― Argentina, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea and Yugoslavia. Of the rest only one ― the Philippines

― started to build a plant, but then stopped. Some of these states are, 30 years later, again talking about

acquiring nuclear energy.



Energy Security

A second driver of current increased interest in

nuclear energy is the perceived need of states to

ensure their energy security. Energy security ― if

taken to mean complete national self-sufficiency in

energy or “energy independence” ― is a chimera.

No country in today’s globalized world, with the

possible exception of Russia, is able to be energy

self-sufficient. Although governments and other

observers often use the quest for “energy security”

to make the case for nuclear power, what they

are really calling for is more energy security or

energy diversity. Diversity may in fact be the most

important guarantee of energy security. As the

Switkowski report on Australia’s consideration

of nuclear energy concluded, the most flexible

and efficient national energy system “is likely to

include numerous technologies, each economically

meeting the portion of the system load to which

it is best suited … a diversity of sources can also

provide greater reliability and security of electricity

supply” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006: 48).

Nuclear energy has some inherent drawbacks in

helping achieve energy security, however defined.

Nuclear also cannot currently provide energy

security to the vital transport sector ― although

a widespread switch to electric-powered vehicles

would give it a bigger role. Nuclear power is

also relatively inflexible in meeting peaks and

troughs in electricity demand and can therefore

never replace more flexible generation means

like natural gas and coal if they suddenly become

unavailable. Even France, which relies on nuclear

for 77 percent of its electricity, and which since the

1970s’ “oil shocks” has had a deliberate strategy

for achieving “energy security,” must fire up 40-

year old oil plants to meet peak demand and rely

Predicted Versus Actual Additions to Nuclear Generation Capacity, 1980-1989

Country Predicted capacity

Actual capacity

No. of reactors10

Low High

Argentina 6,000 6,000 600 1

Bangladesh 0 600 0 0

Chile 1,200 1,200 0 0

Egypt 4,200 4,200 0 0

Greece 4,200 4,200 0 0

Jamaica 0 300 0 0

Republic of Korea 8,800 8,800 6,977 7

Mexico 14,800 14,800 650 1

Pakistan 600 600 0 0

Philippines 3,800 3,800 0 0

Singapore 0 2,600 0 0

Thailand 2,600 2,600 0 0

Turkey 1,200 3,200 0 0

Yugoslavia 4,800 9,200 666 1

Total 52,200 62,100 8,893 10

Source: IAEA (1973)

While all governments are prone to

exaggerating their nuclear plans, one of the

most egregious examples is India, which has

consistently trumpeted huge increases in

nuclear power generation, only to see its plans

crumble. In 1970, India announced a 10-year

plan calling for the construction of 2,700 MW

of nuclear capacity by 1980, a level it reached

only in 2,000 (Ramana, 2009: 5). Since receiving

a waiver in 2008 from the Nuclear Suppliers

Group (NSG) to import foreign nuclear

equipment and materials, the Indian Atomic

Energy Commission has projected that by

2050 nuclear power will generate 445 GWe, 35

percent of India’s electricity generation, more

than a hundred times today’s figure (Ramana,

2009: 5-6).



on electricity exports to shed load in non-peak

periods (Schneider, 2009: 55). Nuclear electricity

is only usually suitable for baseload electrical

power and reactors must be run at full capacity to

be economic. Mycle Schneider has calculated that

France’s real energy independence, including the

nuclear sector, is just 8.5 percent of its total energy

generation capacity (Schneider, 2009: 64).

Uranium

The main argument in favour of nuclear energy

providing energy security appears to be the ready

availability and cheapness of uranium. In fact, the

relative cheapness of the fuel compared with its

energy intensity is one of the enduring advantages

of nuclear energy. As the NEA puts it,

The main advantages of nuclear

power for energy security are the

high energy density of uranium fuel

combined with the diverse and stable

geopolitical distribution of uranium

resources and fuel fabrication

facilities, as well as the ease with

which strategic stockpiles of fuel can

be maintained (NEA, 2008a: 154).

These claims are credible. One quarter of a gram

of natural uranium in a standard fission reactor

provides the same amount of energy as 16 kg of

fossil fuels (MacKay, 2009: 161). Stockpiling large

strategic reserves of uranium is easier and cheaper

than for oil, coal or gas, thereby avoiding the risk of

a sudden shutdown of supply. While there are only

a handful of major uranium suppliers (see chart),

two of those with the largest reserves, Australia

and Canada, are judged to be politically stable and

commercially reliable.

World’s Major Uranium Producers (tonnes U)

Country 2007 (est.) %

Canada 9,850 22.73%

Australia 7,600 17.54%

Kazakhstan 7,245 16.72%

Namibia 3,800 8.77%

Niger 3,633 8.38%

Russian Federation 3,381 7.80%

Uzbekistan 2,300 5.31%

United States 2,000 4.62%

Ukraine 900 2.08%

China 750 1.73%

South Africa 750 1.73%

Rest of World 1,119 2.58%

Total 43328 100%

Source: OECD/NEA (2008b: 39)

Moreover, uranium is ubiquitous. Global conventional

reserves are estimated to be 4.7 million tons, with another

22 million tons in phosphate deposits and 4,500 million

tons in seawater (currently economically unrecoverable).

If the price of uranium ore goes beyond $130 per kg,

phosphate deposits that contain low concentrations of

uranium would become economic to mine (MacKay,

2009: 162). Prices at that level would also stimulate

exploration for traditional sources, such as when the

spot market price for uranium reached a record $234 per

kg in December 2007 (they have since declined).

According to the NEA, sufficient uranium resources have

been identified, if current usage rates apply, for 100 years

of reactor supply (NEA, 2008a: 159). If the NEA’s low

scenario for expanded nuclear energy to 2030 of up to 404

GWe eventuates, the market will readily cope. However,

if the NEA’s high scenario to 2030 of 619 GWe is accurate,

it cautions that “all existing and committed production

centres, as well as a significant proportion of the planned

and prospective production centres, must be completed

on schedule and production must be maintained at or



near full capacity throughout the life of each facility”

(NEA, 2008a: 164). This seems a tall order in view of the

recent record of uranium mining development delays,

including in Australia and Canada, and may lead to

uranium price rises in the future, followed inevitably by

further bouts of exploration.

Price, not just reliability of supply, is a key consideration

in assumptions made about uranium as a source of

energy security. Most studies concur that the cost of

natural or enriched uranium will not be a barrier to

increased use of nuclear energy. From 1983 to 2003

uranium was in a 20-year price slump and thus an

energy bargain. This was partly due to over-production

in the 1970s when the price was high, but also due to

the availability of “secondary” material held in various

forms by civil industry and government, including

military material (notably highly enriched uranium

(HEU)) and recyclable material (spent fuel). Secondary

sources have supplied 40-45 percent of the market

in recent years (NEA, 2008a: 164). The surge in price

between 2003 and 2007 was partly due to speculators

in energy futures. Since most uranium sales are in the

form of long-term contracts, the spot market volatility

was misleading from an energy security perspective.

But the price rise also represented a “market correction”

based on the expectation of increased demand due to

the anticipated revival in nuclear energy production.

In addition the agreement between Russia and the

US for the down-blending of HEU from dismantled

Russian nuclear weapons for use in American reactors

will expire in 2013, making this “secondary” source

of uranium no longer available, although there is a

possibility the agreement will be extended.

Thorium

Thorium, which is about three times as abundant

as uranium, is sometimes touted as a possible fuel

for extending the future of nuclear power. Although

not fissionable in its natural state, a fissionable form,

thorium 233, can be created in a normal reactor if added

to the uranium fuel, or can be bred in a fast breeder

reactor. Experiments with a thorium fuel cycle have

been conducted in several countries during the past 30

years, including Canada, Germany, India, Russia and

the US. India, which has four times as much thorium

as uranium, is the most advanced in its plans. Norway,

which has up to one- third of the world’s thorium

deposits, commissioned a report in 2007 by the Research

Council of Norway, which concluded that “the current

knowledge of thorium based energy generation and the

geology is not solid enough to provide a final assessment

regarding the potential value for Norway of a thorium

based system for long term energy production”

(Research Council of Norway, 2008). It recommended

that the thorium option be kept open and that further

research, development and international collaboration

be pursued. According to the NEA:

Much development work is still

required before the thorium fuel cycle

can be commercialized, and the effort

required seems unlikely while (or

where) abundant uranium is available.

In this respect, recent international

moves to bring India into the ambit

of international trade might result in

the country ceasing to persist with the

thorium cycle, as it now has ready access

to traded uranium and conventional

reactor designs (WNA, 2009g).

It is clear that thorium will not be a commercially viable

option before 2030.

Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel

Some in the nuclear industry suggest that the possibility

of recycling plutonium reprocessed from spent nuclear



fuel in the form of mixed oxide fuel (MOX) is one reason

for a bright future for nuclear. MOX is composed of

reprocessed plutonium and uranium (either natural or

depleted). Thus a reprocessing capability is required.

Only three countries currently have commercial-scale

plutonium reprocessing plants, France (La Hague),

Russia (Mayak) and the UK (Sellafield).

France is the pioneer and leading producer and user of

MOX, deploying it in 20 light water reactors with up to 30

percent of MOX fuel in their cores (Schneider, 2009: 14).

Altogether, some 39 conventional light water reactors

(LWR) in Belgium, France, Germany and Switzerland

operate with some MOX fuel (NEA, 2008a: 404). MOX

has also been used to dispose of excess weapons-grade

plutonium in commercial reactors in the US. (For

reactors like the CANDU that use natural uranium it is

considered economically unattractive to reprocess spent

fuel for MOX) (NEA, 2008a: 400).

Japan has had ambitious plans for using MOX for some

time. It imported a batch from the UK in 1999, but it was

returned due to a scandal over falsified quality control

documents, while a second batch imported in 2001 went

unused after a series of accidents at Japanese nuclear

facilities (Katsuta and Suzuki, 2006: 15; WNA, 2009c).

In May 2009 Japan imported a third batch, according

to Greenpeace “the largest shipment of plutonium in

history,” for use by three small utility companies (Agence

France-Press, 2009). In October 2009 MOX was loaded

into a Japanese reactor for the first time (WNN, 2009b).

Japan has a small, underperforming pilot reprocessing

plant at Tokai. Most of its spent fuel has traditionally been

reprocessed in France and the UK and the plutonium

stored (both at home and abroad), making its stockpile

of commercial plutonium the biggest in the world. Its

full-scale Rokkasho reprocessing plant, long delayed

and over budget ($20 billion or three times the cost

estimated in 1993) (Smith, 2007), is currently undergoing

test operations. A MOX fuel fabrication plant is expected

to be built by 2012, after which time Japan plans to use

plutonium for MOX in 16-18 existing reactors and later

in its planned fast breeder reactors by 2015 (delayed

from the original date of 2010) (Oshima, 2009: 131).

The use of MOX has significant disadvantages. The

fabrication process for MOX fuel is potentially more

hazardous than for uranium fuel, requiring expensive

protective measures which increase the price (Garwin

and Charpak, 2001: 137). The 2003 MIT study concluded

from its simple fuel cycle cost model under US conditions

that “the MOX option is roughly 4 times more expensive

than once-through Uranium Oxide” (MIT, 2003: 151).

Spent fuel from MOX reactors is thermally hotter and

more radiotoxic than spent uranium fuel, as well as more

voluminous (Paviet-Hartman et al., 2009: 316),10 making

it more difficult to dispose of in a repository (Bunn et al.,

2003: 39). Unused plutonium from MOX spent fuel can

be reprocessed and “multi-recycled” but this “becomes

a burden on light water reactors because it yields less

energy per kilogram of reprocessed fuel” (Garwin and

Charpak, 2001: 138). Only the fast breeder reactor can

totally consume reprocessed plutonium and burn the

minor actinides.

Reprocessing of reactor-grade plutonium, whether

for MOX or use in fast reactors, has itself significant

drawbacks. The Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX)

process for obtaining plutonium from spent fuel, the most

common method, generates massive volumes of waste.

This has spurred efforts to develop new aqueous processes

or radically different approaches, none of which is yet

commercially proven (Paviet-Hartmann et al., 2009: 316).

In fact, “recycling” plutonium “only reduces the waste

problem minimally” (von Hippel, 2008). French used

MOX fuel, which still contains 70 percent of the plutonium

it did when it was manufactured, is returned for further

reprocessing. Thus France is, in effect, using reprocessing



to move its spent fuel problem from reactor site to

reprocessing plant and back again (von Hippel, 2008).

Reprocessing is also much more expensive than the

“once-through” method and direct disposal of spent

fuel, costing more than the new fuel is worth (von

Hippel, 2008). An official report commissioned by the

French prime minister in 2000 concluded that using

reprocessing instead of direct disposal of spent nuclear

fuel for the entire French nuclear program would be 85

percent more expensive and increase average generation

costs by about 5.5 percent or $0.4 billion per installed

GWe over a 40-year reactor life span (Charpin et al., 2000).

For countries that have sent their spent fuel to France,

the UK and Russia for reprocessing, the cost, about $1

million per ton, is 10 times the cost of dry storage (von

Hippel, 2008). The customer is, moreover, required by

contract to take back the separated plutonium and other

radioactive waste. The three commercial reprocessing

countries have thus lost virtually all of their foreign

customers, making their reprocessing plants more

uneconomical than they were before. The UK proposes

to shut Sellafield in the next few years at a cost of $92

billion, including site cleanup (von Hippel, 2008).

Finally, MOX also carries proliferation risks since, despite

earlier assumptions to the contrary, even non-weapons

grade material can be used in a crude nuclear weapon.

A 1994 report by the Committee on International

Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the US National

Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of

Excess Weapons Plutonium, claimed that it is much easier

to extract plutonium from fresh MOX fuel than from

spent fuel. Hence MOX fuel must be closely monitored

to prevent diversion (NAS, 1994). The proliferation risks

of reprocessing will be considered further in Part 2 of

this report, but the complications associated with this

technology constitute a constraint on expansive plans for

nuclear energy beyond the once-through system.

Dreams of a self-sustaining “plutonium economy,” in

which breeder reactors provide perpetual fuel without

the need for additional imports of uranium, are likely to

remain dreams. Japan, the country most determined to

achieve this, due to its reliance on imports for 80 percent

of its energy supplies, has pursued the idea for decades,

but does not now envisage deploying fast reactors until

2050 (NEA, 2008a: 68).

Nuclear Technology Dependence

Perhaps the most telling argument against the

proposition that nuclear energy can provide energy

security is the fact that the entire civilian nuclear fuel

cycle is supplied by a small number of companies and

countries. Nuclear reactor design, manufacturing and

construction, the associated techniques and skills, plus

fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment and reprocessing

are concentrated in fewer hands than ever, making

most countries more rather than less dependent on

others for this energy source. The nuclear power plant

construction industry for instance has seen significant

consolidation and retrenchment over the last 20 years.

Even the US no longer has a “national” nuclear reactor

manufacturing capability after the famed nuclear

divisions of Westinghouse were sold to British Nuclear

Fuels in 1999 and then to Toshiba of Japan in 2006

(NEA, 2008a: 317). Various takeovers and mergers have

resulted in just two large consolidated nuclear power

plant vendors, Westinghouse/Toshiba and Areva NP of

France. Even Areva only designs and makes the reactors

themselves and must partner with others, like Siemens or

Electricité de France (EDF), to build entire nuclear power

plants. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the new vertically

integrated Russian company Atomenergoprom and

Canada’s Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL) are

other players. China, and farther in the future, India,

are mooted as potential new suppliers, but have yet to

secure any sales, although a South Korean-assembled



conglomerate achieved its first overseas sale, to the

United Arab Emirates (UAE), in January 2010. As the

NEA points out, however, “There is no single company

that can build a complete nuclear power plant by itself”

(NEA, 2008a: 320).

This situation renders even the most advanced nuclear

energy states dependent on companies in other

countries. It also makes all other states mere importers

of materials, skills and technology and therefore

subject to the decisions of exporters, whether on

political, commercial or nonproliferation grounds. On

nonproliferation grounds alone there are significant

constraints on states acquiring the full nuclear fuel cycle,

whether uranium enrichment at the “front end” or

spent fuel reprocessing at the “back end.” The Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG), a group of nuclear technology

and materials exporting countries, is currently seeking

agreement among its members to further constrain the

export of sensitive enrichment technologies to additional

countries. There are also continuing attempts to establish

multilateral mechanisms, such as an IAEA “fuel bank,”

to assure states with nuclear power that they will always

be able to obtain the necessary fuel without resorting to

enrichment themselves. The vast majority of states with

nuclear reactors will therefore continue to be dependent

on importing fuel and nuclear technology. This should

be sufficient to convince policy makers that while

nuclear power can add to national energy diversity, and

may provide additional energy security in the sense

of security of fuel supply, it cannot provide the elusive

energy independence.

Climate Change

One of the arguments increasingly used to promote

nuclear power is the need to tackle climate change.

The British government in laying out the case for

“new build” in the UK has used this justification most

explicitly of any government, claiming that: “Set against

the challenges of climate change and security of supply,

the evidence in support of new nuclear power stations

is compelling” (WNN, 2008l). Some “Greens,” notably

the former founding member of Greenpeace, Patrick

Moore (Moore, 2006: BO1), and British atmospheric

scientist James Lovelock, father of the Gaia theory, have

been converted to a pro-nuclear stance on the grounds

that climate change is so potentially catastrophic that

all means to reduce greenhouse gases must be utilized

(Norris, 2000). Pro-nuclear energy non-governmental

organizations have emerged to campaign for increased

use of nuclear energy, such as Environmentalists for

Nuclear Energy and the US-based Clean and Safe Energy

Coalition.

The threat from climate change is now well established.

In its 2008 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that climate change

is a reality and that the main cause is anthropogenic

sources of greenhouse gases (GHG) (Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change, 2007). A major source of the

most damaging GHG, carbon dioxide, is the combustion

of fossil fuels ― coal, oil and natural gas ― for energy

production. Nuclear power, like hydropower and other

renewable energy sources, produces virtually no CO2

directly. Nuclear Energy Outlook notes of nuclear that

“On a life-cycle basis an extremely small amount of CO2

is produced indirectly from fossil fuel sources used in

processes such as uranium mining, construction and

transport” (NEA, 2008a: 121). The generation of nuclear

electricity does, however, in addition, emit carbon by

using electricity from the grid for fuel fabrication, the

operation of nuclear power plants themselves, and

in other aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, especially

enrichment and reprocessing.

The international climate change regime is currently

based on the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change



(UNFCCC). It mandates legally binding cuts by

developed states in their GHG emissions of a collective

average of 5.2 percent from 1990 levels in the commitment

period 2008-2012. While nuclear power may be used by

such states to help them meet their own Kyoto targets,

the treaty regime has not permitted them to build

nuclear power plants in developing countries in order

to obtain certified emission credits under the so-called

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This was due

to strong opposition to nuclear energy from influential

state parties on the grounds of sustainability, safety,

waste disposal and weapons proliferation.

Most Kyoto Protocol parties will fail to achieve their

reduction targets by 2012 as required. The emergence of

China and India, so far unconstrained by binding targets,

as growing emitters of carbon (China is now estimated

to be the largest gross carbon emitter) have created

demands for a new climate change deal. In December

2009 a meeting of the treaty parties in Copenhagen was

unable to reach such a deal, although non-binding cuts

were agreed among major emitters. Any new global

regime that eventually emerges is likely to include

deeper mandated cuts, the involvement of a broader

range of states in such cuts and, potentially, a global

carbon cap and trade system (accompanied in some

states by a carbon tax). The latter would be favourable

to nuclear energy. Nuclear energy may even find greater

official encouragement in a new climate change treaty,

due to the growing urgency of tackling climate change

with as many means as possible and resulting changes in

attitude of some key governments, like the UK, Italy and

Sweden, about nuclear power.

The IPCC has meanwhile reached the startling

conclusion that to stabilize global temperatures at 2

degrees above pre-industrial levels (widely regarded

as the only way to avoid potentially catastrophic

consequences) would require greenhouse emissions

to be cut by 50-85 percent below 2000 levels by 2050.

Scenarios devised by international agencies for doing

this all propose a significant role for nuclear on the

grounds that it is one of the few established energy

technologies with a low-carbon footprint.

A famous study by Pacala and Socolow published

in the scientific journal Science in 2004 demonstrated

how current technologies, including nuclear energy,

could help reduce carbon emissions by 7 billion tons

of carbon per year by 2050 through seven “wedges”

of 1 billion tons each (Pacala and Socolow, 2004). The

nuclear wedge, 14.5 percent of the total, would require

adding 700 GWe capacity to current capabilities,

essentially doubling it, by building about 14 new plants

per year. While this is a reasonable rate (the historical

annual high was around 33 reactors in 1985 and 1986

(NEA, 2008a: 316)), the Pacala/Socolow estimates did

not take into account that virtually all existing reactors

will have to be retired by 2050, even if their operating

lives are extended to 60 years (Squassoni, 2009b: 25).

Thus 25 new reactors in total would have to be built

each year through 2050 to account for retirements.

The IEA, in its 2008 Energy Technology Perspectives,

suggested that as part of its radical Blue Map scenario

there should be a “substantial shift” to nuclear to permit it

to contribute 6 percent of CO2 savings, considerably lower

than the 14.5 percent wedge, based on the construction of

24-43 1,000 MW nuclear power plants each year (32 GWe

of capacity) between now and 2050 (IEA, 2008b: 41). The

figures differ from the Pacala/Socolow wedge analysis

because the Blue Map envisages higher carbon levels by

2050 and more severe cuts in carbon (half of 2005 levels

rather than a return to 2005 levels). The IEA implied

that not all countries would need to choose nuclear,

noting that “considerable flexibility exists for individual

countries to choose which precise mix of carbon capture

and storage (CCS), renewables and nuclear technology



they will use” (IEA, 2008b: 42). The IEA called for nothing

less than an energy revolution, arguing that “Without

clear signals or binding policies from governments on

CO2 prices and standards, the market on its own will not

be sufficient to stimulate industry to act with the speed or

depth of commitment that is necessary” (IEA, 2008b: 127).

IEA recommendations for achieving GHG targets by 2050

are pertinent to this report because industry would need

to gear up now to sustain a substantial and steady increase

in nuclear energy. More relevant to this report, however, is

the question of what is likely to be the role of nuclear by

2030. The NEA posits two scenarios (NEA, 2008b: 134-135).

Its low estimate projects that nuclear will displace only

slightly more carbon per year by 2030 than it does now,

estimated at 2.2-2.6 Gt of coal-generated carbon (NEA,

2008b: 123). This assumes that carbon capture and storage

and renewable technologies are successful, “experience

with new nuclear technology is disappointing,” and that

there is “continuing public opposition to nuclear power.”

The high scenario for 2030, on the other hand, projecting

almost 5 Gt of carbon displacement, assumes that

“experience with new nuclear technologies is positive,”

and “there is a high degree of public acceptance of

nuclear power.” A 2003 MIT study estimated that a three-

fold expansion of nuclear generating capacity to 1,000

billion watts by 2050 would avoid about 25 percent of the

increment in carbon emissions otherwise expected in a

business-as-usual scenario (MIT, 2003: ix).

These hedged scenarios reveal that the barriers to

nuclear contributing significantly to meeting GHG

reduction targets are two-fold: technological and

political. Opinions differ as to how high these barriers

are. Members of the 2007 Keystone Nuclear Power Joint

Fact-Finding (NJFF) Dialogue ― drawn from a broad

range of “stakeholders,” including the utility and power

industry, environmental and consumer advocates, non-

governmental organizations, regulators, public policy

analysts and academics ― reached no consensus on the

likely rate of expansion of nuclear power over the next

50 years in filling a substantial portion of its assigned

carbon “wedge” (Keystone Center, 2007: 10). The MIT

study recommended “changes in government policy and

industrial practices needed in the relatively near term to

retain an option for such an outcome,” (MIT, 2003: ix) but

in a 2009 review of its earlier report despaired at the lack

of progress (MIT, 2009: 4).

On the political side, there appears to be consensus that

a “business-as-usual” approach to nuclear energy will

not increase its contribution to tackling climate change.

Nuclear’s long lead times (reactors take up to 10 years

to plan and build) and large up-front costs, compared to

other energy sources and energy conservation measures,

mean that without a determined effort by governments

to promote nuclear it would by 2030 have little impact in

reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Even replacing the

existing nuclear fleet to maintain the current contribution

of nuclear to GHG avoidance will require a major industrial

undertaking in existing nuclear energy states. Despite

the rhetoric, there is scant evidence that governments

are taking climate change seriously enough to effect the

“energy revolution” that the IEA has called for, much less

taking the policy measures that would promote nuclear

energy as a growing part of the solution.

Only China is both planning and undertaking the type of

new build program that could be described as “crash.”

The US could, in theory, mount such a program, but

its federal/state division of power, deregulated market,

mounting public debt, environmental regulations

and still strong anti-nuclear movement are likely to

slow it. France, given its past track record of building

reactors, could, in theory, despite its saturated domestic

market, mount a crash new build program to supply

its neighbours with even more nuclear electricity than

it currently does. This may be politically unacceptable



in France, since accepting the risks associated with

producing nuclear energy in return for national energy

security is quite a different proposition to doing so for

export earnings.

Even if carbon taxes or emissions trading schemes help

level the economic playing field by penalizing electricity

producers that emit more carbon, these measures are

likely to take years to establish and achieve results.

They will also benefit, probably disproportionately,

cheaper and more flexible low- or non-carbon emitting

technologies such as renewables, solar, and wind and

make conservation and efficiency measures more

attractive (see economics section below for further

analysis of the effects of carbon taxes and/or emissions

trading schemes on the economics of nuclear power).

One of the seemingly plausible arguments in favour of

using nuclear to tackle climate change is that the problem

is so potentially catastrophic that every means possible

should be used to deal with it. However, this ignores

the fact that resources for tackling climate change are

not unlimited. Already governments and publics are

balking at the estimated costs involved. Therefore, the

question becomes what are the most economical means

for reducing a given amount of carbon. One way of

answering this is to compare the cost of reducing coal-

fired carbon emissions through various alternative

means of generating electricity.

It turns out that nuclear power displaces less carbon

per dollar spent on electricity than its rivals, as the

chart on page 23 illustrates. Nuclear surpasses only

centralized, traditional gas-fired power plants burning

natural gas at relatively high prices. Large wind farms

and cogeneration are 1.5 times more cost-effective than

nuclear in displacing carbon. Efficiency measures are

Coal-Fired CO2 Emissions Displaced Per Dollar Spent on Electrical Services

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

N/A

Keystone high nuclear cost scenario

4¢

3¢

Carbon displacement atvarious efficiency costs/kWh

1¢: 93 kg CO2/$2¢: 47 kg CO2/$

kg C

O2 d

ispl

aced

per

200

7 do

llar

Source: Reprinted (with permission) from Lovins and Sheikh (2008)



about 10 times more cost effective. In sum, “every dollar

spent on nuclear power will produce 1.4-11+ times less

climate solution than spending the same dollar on its

cheaper competitors” (Lovins and Sheikh, 2008: 16). This

is where the opportunity cost argument has sway: put

simply, it is not possible to spend the same dollar on two

different things at once. Although such considerations

have not yet seeped into political consciousness in many

countries (the UK government notably keeps promoting

the idea that all alternatives to carbon must be pursued

simultaneously regardless of cost), this is increasingly

likely to happen as the price of alternatives drops and

governments focus on “big wins,” the measures that will

have the greatest impact at the lowest price.

There is a possibility that runaway global warming will

become more apparent and politically salient through

a catastrophic event like a sudden halt to the North

Atlantic sea current or the disappearance of all summer

ice from the North Pole. Since the 2008 IPCC report

was released, a growing number of climatologists has

concluded that the report underestimated both the

scale and pace of global warming, notably changes in

the Arctic ice sheet and sea levels. NASA’s Jim Hansen,

perhaps the world’s foremost climatologist, has

calculated that the situation is so dire that “the entire

world needs to be out of the business of burning coal

by 2030 and the Western world much sooner” (Hansen

et al., 2008: 217-231).11 In such circumstances massive

industrial mobilization to rapidly build nuclear power

plants, along the lines of the Manhattan Project to build

the US atomic bomb or the Marshall Plan for European

economic recovery after World War II, may be politically

and technologically feasible.

But as indicated in the Constraints section below,

nuclear would face numerous barriers in responding

to such a catastrophe that other alternatives do not. As

Sharon Squassoni notes, “If major reductions in carbon

emissions need to be made by 2015 or 2020, a large-scale

expansion of nuclear energy is not a viable option” for

that purpose (Squassoni, 2009b: 28). It is simply too

slow and too inflexible compared to the alternatives.

As the 2007 Keystone report noted: “to build enough

nuclear capacity to achieve the carbon reductions of a

Pacala/Socolow wedge would require the industry to

return immediately to the most rapid period of growth

experienced in the past (1981-99) and to sustain this rate

of growth for 50 years” (Keystone Center, 2007: 11).

The Promise of Nuclear Technology – Current and Future

While the notion of a mechanistic “technological

imperative” is now discredited, in the current case

of renewed interest in nuclear energy the promise of

improved technology is at least a partial driver. The

following section considers both the technologies

themselves and programs designed to research and

promote new technologies.

Improvements in Current Power Reactors (Generation II)

Most reactors in operation today are “second generation,”

the first generation being largely experimental and

unsuited for significant grid electricity. The global

fleet is dominated, both in numbers and generating

capacity, by light water reactors derived from US

technology originally developed for naval submarines.

These comprise two types: pressurized water reactors

(PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR). The rest are

pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWR) based on the

Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) type; gas-

cooled reactors (CCRs); or Soviet-designed light-water-

cooled, graphite-moderated reactors (LWGRs or RBMKs

― the Russian acronym for high power channel reactor).

Most current reactors operate on the “once-through”

system: the original fuel, low enriched uranium (LEU)



or natural uranium, is used in the reactor once and the

spent fuel treated as waste and stored rather than being

reprocessed for further use.

Significant improvements have been made in the past few

decades in existing reactor operations, leading to higher fuel

burn-up and improved capacity factors. According to the

NEA, these developments have resulted in savings of more

than 25 percent of natural uranium per unit of electricity

produced compared to 30 years ago, and a significant

reduction in fuel cycle costs (NEA, 2008a: 401). In addition to

higher “burn-up” rates, current nuclear reactors worldwide

are also being overhauled and receiving significant life

extensions of up to 30 years rather than being closed down.

Given that much of the initial capital investment has been

paid or written off, such reactors are highly profitable.

This improvement in the profitability of existing reactors

has been one of the drivers of renewed interest in nuclear

energy, although the assumption that new reactors would

be equally profitable is unproven.

Generation III and Generation III+ Reactors

One of the main technological arguments for a nuclear

revival rests on the emergence of so-called Generation

III and Generation III+ reactors. According to their

manufacturers, these types promise several advantages

over Generation II: lower costs through more efficient fuel

consumption and heat utilization; a bigger range of sizes;

and increased operational lifetimes to approximately

60 years. They are also reportedly able to operate more

flexibly in response to customer demand. Perhaps

most important, they are reputedly safer, incorporating

“passive” safety systems that rely on natural phenomena

― such as gravity, response to temperature or pressure

changes and convection ― to slow down or terminate

the nuclear chain reaction during an emergency. This

contrasts with the original designs, which relied on

human intervention.

The industry is also promising that economies of

scale through standardization, modular production

techniques and advanced management systems will

bring prices down after the initial first-of-a-kind (FOAK)

plants have been built. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)

President and CEO Marvin Fertel claims that “If you are

using standardized plants, everything from licensing to

construction isn’t a 10-year period anymore,” resulting

in a much greater rate of deployment in the decade 2020

to 2030 than in the decade 2010 to 2020 (Weil, 2009: 4).

This implies that the real revival is likely to emerge in

the latter decade of the period being considered by this

report. Economies of scale are also premised on the size

of the reactors: since construction cost is the biggest factor

in the price of a nuclear power plant, building a bigger

one that produces more electricity is said to reduce the

“levelized” cost of the power produced. These issues are

discussed extensively in the section on the economics of

nuclear power below.

The distinction between Generation III and Generation

III+ seems arbitrary and more a question of marketing

strategy than science. According to the US Department

of Energy (DOE), Generation III+ reactors promise

“advances in safety and economics” over Generation

III (US Department of Energy, 2009). The NEA suggests

vaguely that Generation III+ designs are “generally

extensions of the Generation III concept that include

additional improvements and passive safety features”

(NEA, 2008a: 373-374). It advises, somewhat worryingly,

that “the difference between the two should be defined

as the point where improvements to the design mean

that the potential for significant off-site releases [of

radioactivity] has been reduced to the level where an off-

site emergency plan is no longer required.”

Several companies in France, Japan and the US are

developing Generation III or Generation III+ designs

for light water reactors. Other countries, notably China,



Japan, Russia and South Korea, have plans to produce

their own Generation III or Generation III+ LWRs.

China plans to “assimilate” the Westinghouse AP1000

technology and “re-innovate” its design, but in addition

has its own second generation CPR-1000 reactor, derived

from French designs imported in the 1980s. It hopes to

build both designs en masse in China (WNN, 2009g).

Canada is developing an Advanced CANDU Reactor

(ACR), the ACR1000, based on its original pressurized

heavy water reactor, but using slightly enriched rather

than natural uranium. See table on page 27 for advanced

thermal reactors currently being marketed.

Although all of these designs are “evolutionary” rather

than “revolutionary,” their performance is to date unproven

since they are, with one exception, not yet in existence.

Areva’s Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR), formerly

known as the European Pressurized Water Reactor, is based

on the German Konvoi and the ill-fated French N4 design

(Thomas et al., 2007: 18). The N4 was the first all-French

PWR design, drawing on more than a decade of building

and operating PWRs based largely on the Westinghouse

design licensed to Framatome. Only four were built, all of

them suffering technical problems which, for the first time

in the French PWR program, extended the period from

placing the order to criticality to more than six years. Each

of the units took between six and 12 years to build. Far

from being cheaper than their predecessors, the reactors

produced more expensive electricity. Reliability was also

initially poor, although it has improved over time.

Westinghouse’s Advanced Passive (AP1000) reactor is a

scaled-up version of the AP600, which was given safety

approval by the US regulatory authorities in 1999. By then it

was clear, according to Thomas et al. that the design would

not be economic and the AP600 was never offered in tenders.

Its size was increased to about 1,150 MW in the hope that

scale economies would make the design economically

competitive, with an output increase of 80 percent and a cost

increase of only 2 percent (Thomas et al., 2007).

The only reactors marketed as “evolutionary” Generation

III+ that are presently in operation are four General Electric/

Hitachi Advanced Boiling Water Reactors (ABWRs) in Japan

that went online between 1996 and 2005. Two more are under

construction in Taiwan and one in Japan. Two additional types

are under construction. Two Areva EPRs are being built, one

in Finland and one in France. The first Westinghouse AP1000

commenced construction in China in 2009 at Sanmen in

Zheijiang province (WNN, 2009g). No new CANDUs have

commenced construction or even been ordered.

Progression of Nuclear Reactor Technologies

Source: OECD/NEA (2008a: 373)

Gen IVGen III+Gen IIIGen IIGen I

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

Generation IGeneration II

Generation IIIGeneration III+

Generation IV

RevolutionarydesignsEvolutionary

designsAdvancedLWRsCommercial power

reactorsEarly prototypereactors

- Enhanced safety- Minimisation of waste and better use of natural resources- More economical- Improved proliferation resistance and physical protection

- ABWR- ACR 1000- AP 1000- APWR- EPR- ESBWR

- CANDU6- System 80+- AP600

- PWRs- BWRs- CANDU

- Shippingport- Dresden- Magnox



It is already clear that the market for new nuclear plants to

2030 will be dominated by large (1000 MW and above) light

water reactors with both Generation III and III+ characteristics

(MIT, 2003).12 Areva’s market research apparently indicates that

about half the global demand is for large reactors between 1350

and 1700 MW and the other half is for what it calls “midsize”

reactors of 1000 to 1350 MW (MacLachlan, 2009a: 5). However

the number of new generation reactors built and their global

spread will depend, at least in market economies, on fulfilling

their promised advantages in reducing capital costs and

construction times. As the 2009 MIT study asks of the US:

Will designs truly be standardized, or

will site-specific changes defeat the effort

to drive down the cost of producing

multiple plants? Will the licensing

process function without costly delays, or

will the time to first power be extended,

adding significant financial costs: Will

construction proceed on schedule and

without large cost overruns? … The risk

premium will be eliminated only by

demonstrated performance (MIT, 2009).

Small, Medium-Sized, Miniaturized and Other Novel Reactors

Much has been made of the need for small- and

medium-sized reactors (SMRs), below the current

trend of 1000MW and above. The IAEA officially

defines small reactors as those with a power output

of less than 300 MWe, while a medium reactor is in

the range of 300-700 MWe. Although such reactors

have been investigated, developed and in some cases

deployed since the 1950s, there is currently renewed

interest. The NEA reports that some 60 different types

of SMRs are “being considered” globally, although

none has yet been commercially established (NEA,

2008a: 380). Countries involved in researching them

include Argentina, Canada, South Korea, Japan and

Russia. Currently only India has successfully utilized

such types of units with its domestically produced 200

and 480MWe heavy water reactors.

SMRs are advertised as overcoming all of the current

barriers to wider use of nuclear energy, especially by

developing countries. Such reactors are said to be ideal

The International Nuclear Industry

Areva Westinghouse-Toshiba General Electric-Hitachi Rosatom AECL

Headquarters France United States United States/Japan Russia Canada

Ownership Structure

87% French Government 13% Private Sector

67% Toshiba 20% Shaw Group 10% Kazatomprom

Hitachi owns 40% of GE and GE owns 20% of Hitachi

100% Russian Government

100% Canadian Government

Reactors, Services, and Fuel Revenue US$4,706 million US$4,116 million US$2,939 million US$2,293 million US$513 million

Reactor Type Pressurized Light Water EPR-1000

Pressurized Light Water AP-1000

Boiling Water ABWR

Pressurized Light Water VVER-1200

Pressurized Heavy Water CANDU

Reactors Operating 71 119 70 68 30

Reactors Under Construction 6 5 4 16 0

Countries that have reactor design 7 10 7 12 7

Source: Reprinted (with permission) from Bratt (forthcoming).



for countries with relatively small and undeveloped

electricity grids (as well as huge countries like Russia

with large areas unconnected to the national grid).

They promise to be cheaper and quicker to build,

installable in small increments as demand grows, and

able to be sited close to population centres, thereby

reducing the need for long transmission lines. They

can allegedly be more safely connected to smaller

grids, operate off-grid, or be used directly for heating,

desalination or hydrogen production. Some SMR

designs reportedly would have “reduced specific

power levels” that allow plant simplification, thereby

enhancing safety and reliability and making them

“especially advantageous in countries with limited

nuclear experience” (NEA, 2008a: 380). Half of the SMR

designs under consideration would have built-in fuel,

with no on-site refueling necessary or possible (NEA,

2008a: 380). SMRs are seen as “an elegant solution to

problems requiring autonomous power sources not

requiring fuel delivery in remote locations” (Statens

Strålevern, 2008: 6).

Such reactors remain, however, in the research and

development phase (NEA, 2008a: 381-382)13 and

will remain unproven for many years with respect

to their reliability, safety, security and weapons

nonproliferation potential. Their economic viability

is also unproven. Although they might be cheaper

per unit than a large reactor, they miss out on

economies of scale and may thus produce electricity

at a higher levelized cost. While the NEA predicts

that some will be available commercially between

2010 and 2030, such a 20-year lead time does not

inspire confidence. The practicalities and economics

of small reactors may be more favourable for off-

grid applications such as heating and providing

electricity in small communities or for incremental

grid additions, especially if they were built

assembly-line style (Hiruo, 2009).14

Several companies, some with decades of experience

in reactor design and construction, have already tried

unsuccessfully to develop and market small and

medium-sized reactors. For example, as previously

mentioned, the 600MW AP600 was judged to be

uneconomic at that size (Thomas et al., 2007: 19).

CANDU’s ACR was originally being developed in

two sizes, 750 MWe and 1,100-1,200 MWe, but the

smaller size was dropped after its investment partner,

US utility Dominion, withdrew on the grounds of

lack of US demand (Thomas et al., 2007: 21).

South African Pebble Bed Reactor

Since 1993 the South African electricity

utility Eskom has been collaborating with

other partners in developing the Pebble Bed

Modular Reactor (PBMR), a type of high

temperature gas reactor (HTGR) advertised as

Generation III+, with a capacity of 165 MWe.

In 1998 Eskom forecast that a demonstration

plant would be built by 2004 and at least

10 commercial orders per year placed

worldwide from then onwards. Presently, the

demonstration plant is unfinished, 10 times

over budget (most of it borne by the South

African taxpayer) and there are no customers

(Thomas, 2009: 22). Greater than anticipated

problems in completing the design, the

withdrawal of funders and uncertainties about

the commitment of other partners are among

the causes (Thomas, 2009). In February 2009

Eskom announced that the PBMR was longer

intended for electricity production, but would

be promoted for “process heat” purposes,

such as extracting oil from tar sands. Research

published in June 2008, based on the German



In April 2006 Russia commenced construction of

the world’s first floating nuclear power plant. It

will comprise two 35 MWe reactors based on the

KLT-40 PWR design used in Soviet icebreakers. Its

construction at Severodvinsk in northwest Russia

is expected to take five years. The plant, essentially

on a large barge, will have to be towed to the

deployment site, as it is not self-propelled. Every

12 years it will be towed back to its construction

site for maintenance. The reactors will reportedly

be capable of supplying a combination of electricity

and heat, some of which can be used for production

of potable water. While a “lifetime core option”

is being considered for future plants, the one

currently being built will be refuelled sequentially

every year, permitting continuous plant operation.

Although the reactor is being produced initially for

use in remote areas of northern Russia, Rosatom’s

focus on SMRs and floating reactors in particular,

“appears to be a key part of Russia’s positioning

itself as a future leader in the global nuclear energy

market” (Statens Strålevern, 2008: 55).

Notwithstanding more than 50 years of Soviet and

Russian experience with nuclear powered civilian

ships allegedly “without major incident,” non-self-

propelled floating nuclear reactors for civilian use are

unprecedented and untested (Statens Strålevern, 2008:

11). They also raise safety, security, environmental and

nonproliferation issues beyond those of stationary

reactors, which may dampen their market prospects.

Generation IV Reactors

Generation IV reactors promise revolutionary

advances on even the Generation III+ models. But

as Ian Davis puts it, Generation IV reactors are

“‘revolutionary’ only in the sense that they rely on

fuel and plants that have not yet been tested” (Davis,

2009: 19). Generation IV reactors in most cases will

seek to “close” the nuclear fuel cycle, leading to higher

energy usage per amount of uranium or recycled fuel,

less nuclear waste due to the more efficient burning

of plutonium and other highly radioactive actinides,

reduced capital costs, enhanced nuclear safety and

less weapons proliferation risk. It is envisaged that

such reactors will rely on new materials and metals

yet to be developed, including those able to resist

corrosion far in excess of today’s levels.

Research and development for such revolutionary

designs is expensive, which has led to international

cooperative efforts to share the burden. Nine

countries and Euratom formed the Generation

IV International Forum (GIF) in 2001, under the

auspices of the NEA, to develop new systems

“intended to be responsive to the needs of a broad

range of countries and users,” (Generation IV

International Forum, 2008a). Now with twelve

country members plus Euratom,15 GIF has chosen

the six most promising systems to investigate

further (see box on page 30).

experience with two experimental pebble bed

reactors in the late 1980s, suggested that the

“safety behaviour” of pebble bed reactors

is less benign than earlier assumed and that

major R&D is necessary to fix the problem

(Moormann, 2009: 16-20). According to

Professor Steve Thomas of the University of

Greenwich, such technical flaws could have

been foreseen by 2002, raising the question of

“whether decision makers continued to allow

funding for the project despite the existence of

a problem that had the potential to derail it”

(Thomas, 2009: 22).



The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors

and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), established under IAEA

auspices in 2001, aims to bring together technology

holders and users to “consider jointly the international

and national actions required for achieving desired

innovations in nuclear reactors and fuel cycles” (IAEA,

2009e). As of August 2009, 30 countries and the European

Commission had joined (IAEA, 2009d).16 In February

2006, the United States launched the Global Nuclear

Energy Partnership (GNEP), which was, inter alia,

designed to facilitate the global expansion of nuclear

energy through advanced nuclear reactors. Developing

countries’ needs were said to be of particular importance.

In addition, and more controversially, GNEP sought to

demonstrate critical technologies needed for a closed

fuel cycle, enabling “recycling and consumption of

some long-lived transuranic isotopes” (US Department

of Energy, 2006: 5). This program sought to abandon

bipartisan US policy, dating from the administration of

President Gerald Ford in the 1970s, which discouraged

on nonproliferation grounds the use of plutonium for

civilian energy production. GNEP was also controversial

because it sought to ensure the continuation of nuclear

fuel supply from existing suppliers while discouraging

new entrants into the enrichment business.

The administration of President Barack Obama cancelled

the domestic side of GNEP in 2009 and the program’s

ambitious plan for demonstration facilities was reduced

to long-term R&D. Meanwhile, the international side of

GNEP, currently with 21 members (see map in section on

political and promotional drivers below), will reportedly

seek to shift the balance away from recycling to

nonproliferation (Pomper, 2009). This will act as a brake

on the nuclear energy revival rather than an enabler.

None of the Generation IV reactors is expected to be

available before 2030 (Sub-Committee on Energy and

Environmental Security, 2009: 13, para. 12). As the World

Business Council for Sustainable Development puts

it, such technology is “promising but far from being

mature and competitive” (World Business Council for

Sustainable Development, 2008: 16).

Fast Neutron and Breeder Reactors

A fast neutron reactor differs from a traditional thermal

reactor in using for its core a composite of 90 percent natural

uranium, uranium-238, with about 10 percent plutonium,

Generation IV Reactors Being Studied By GIF

• Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor (GFR): features a fast-

neutron-spectrum, helium-cooled reactor and

closed fuel cycle;

• Very-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR): a

graphite-moderated, helium-cooled reactor

with a once-through uranium fuel cycle;

• Supercritical-Water-Cooled Reactor (SCWR):

a high-temperature, high-pressure water-

cooled reactor that operates above the

thermodynamic critical point of water;

• Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR): features

a fast-spectrum, sodium-cooled reactor and

closed fuel cycle for efficient management of

actinides and conversion of fertile uranium;

• Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor (LFR): features a

fast-spectrum lead or lead/bismuth eutectic

liquid-metal-cooled reactor and a closed fuel

cycle for efficient conversion of fertile uranium

and management of actinides;

• Molten Salt Reactor (MSR): produces fission

power in a circulating molten salt fuel mixture

with an epithermal-spectrum reactor and a full

actinide recycle fuel cycle.

Source: GIF (2008b)



or enriched uranium. Such a reactor can produce up to 60

times more energy from uranium than thermal reactors

(NEA, 2008a: 80). Fast reactors can operate in two ways. If

the amount of HEU used is limited, they operate in “burner”

mode and are able to dispose of redundant nuclear and

radioactive material. Some nuclear scientists have advocated

recycling spent fuel in fast reactors as a way of dealing with

the nuclear waste problem while also improving usage of the

energy source (Hannum et al., 2005). Since a fast reactor has

no moderator, it is compact compared to a normal reactor.

A 250 MWe prototype in the UK had a core “the size of a

large dustbin” (NEA, 2008a: 450). Such reactors are usually

cooled by liquid sodium, which is efficient at removing heat

and does not need to be pressurized.

With the addition of an extra uranium “blanket,”

normally depleted uranium, fast neutron reactors have

the remarkable quality of “breeding” more plutonium

than they use. Operated in this way they are known

as fast breeder reactors (FBR) and are the basis for the

notion that states could acquire the ultimate in energy

security and operate a “plutonium economy” that

exploited an endless supply of fuel. According to the

NEA, FBRs could thus potentially increase the available

world nuclear fuel resources 60-fold (NEA, 2008a: 450).

There is currently only one operational FBR, in Russia,

although around 20 have been built and operated in a

handful of countries at various times (NEA, 2008a: 450).

France has taken its Phénix reactor offline and is preparing

to shut it down permanently (MacLachlan, 2009d: 9).

China, India and Japan are attempting to develop FBRs.

Japan plans to operate a demonstration reactor by 2025

and a commercial model by 2050 (Oshima, 2009: 131). In

the meantime, its shutdown Monju reactor was supposed

to be restarted in 2008 after design changes and a safety

review (WNN, 2008k). But as Kenichi Oshima notes, “In

reality, however, the fast breeder reactor development [in

Fast Breeder Reactors by Status and Country, 2009

Unit Country Status Construction Date Shutdown Date Power Output (MWe)

Currently Operating

Beloyarsky-3 Russian Federation Operational 1969 560

Under Construction

PFBR India Under Construction 2004 470

Beloyarsky-4 Russian Federation Under Construction 2006 750

Shut Down

Phénix France Shut Down* 1968 2009 130

Super-Phénix France Shut Down 1976 1998 1200

Kalkar (KKW) Germany Cancelled 1973 1991 295

KNK II Germany Shut Down 1974 1991 17

Monju Japan Shut Down 1986 1995 246

BN-350 Kazakhstan Shut Down 1964 1999 52

South Urals 1 Russian Federation Suspended 1986 1993 750

South Urals 2 Russian Federation Suspended 1986 1993 750

Dounreay DFR United Kingdom Shut Down 1955 1977 11

Dounreay PFR United Kingdom Shut Down 1966 1994 250

Enrico Fermi-1 United States Shut Down 1956 1972 60

* Phénix is presently undergoing an “end-of-life” test program prior to being shut down (Nucleonics Week, 2009a). Source: IAEA (2009c)



Japan] has been delayed repeatedly and there is no chance

of it being feasible” (Oshima, 2009: 131).

The history of fast neutron and breeder reactors is

discouraging. In the 1960s and 1970s the leading

industrialized countries, including the US, put the

equivalent of more than $50 billion into efforts to

commercialize fast neutron reactors in the expectation that

they would quickly replace conventional reactors (von

Hippel, 2008). They have proved costly, unreliable and

accident-prone due to the explosive nature of sodium on

contact with air or water. Serious accidents occurred at the

Fermi reactor near Detroit in 1966 and at the Monju reactor

in 1995. The French Superphénix breeder reactor closed

in 1998 with an effective lifetime capacity factor of just 6.3

percent (Byrd Davis, 2002: 290) after 12 years of operation,

during which it intermittently delivered around 1,200 MWe

to the grid. It is the only breeder reactor that has ever been

capable of producing electricity comparable to the largest

thermal reactors commonly in operation. According to

Garwin and Charpak, “The decision to build an expensive

industrial prototype breeder in France was premature; it

was due in part to technological optimism on the part of

the participants, coupled with a lack of appreciation for

alternatives” (Garwin and Charpak, 2001: 135).

Advanced fast breeders are among the Generation

IV designs, including those being considered under

GIF, where Japan has the lead role for this type

of technology. Such reactors will not, however, be

technologically or commercially viable on a large

enough scale to make a difference to the provision of

nuclear energy to electricity grids by 2030.

Fusion Power

Barring a technological miracle, fusion reactors will also not

be available for the foreseeable future and will contribute

nothing to the current nuclear revival (US Presidential

Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, 1995).

Research and development, at enormous cost, is nonetheless

continuing. The International Thermonuclear Experimental

Reactor (ITER), financed by six countries, China, India,

Japan, South Korea, Russia and the US, and the EU,17 is

being built in Cadarache, France. The US National Ignition

Facility (NIF) in Livermore, California, began operations in

May 2009 at a cost so far of $4 billion, almost four times

the original estimate, and is more than five years behind

schedule. Its principal role is to simulate thermonuclear

explosions as part of the stockpile stewardship program

for US nuclear weapons, but it can also be used for fusion

energy experiments. In the case of both programs, full

experiments to test nuclear fusion as a power source seem

likely to be delayed until 2025 (The Economist, 2009b: 82).

Even the IEA notes that “Fusion is not likely to be deployed

for commercial electricity production until at least the

second half of the century” (IEA, 2008b: 306).

Political and Promotional Drivers

Wider considerations than those analyzed above will

always come into play for government policy makers

when considering nuclear energy. A decision to launch

or significantly expand a nuclear power program is

hugely complex, involving an array of international and

domestic political, legal, economic, financial, technical,

industrial and social considerations. Nuclear energy has

been so controversial in the past and involves so many

“stakeholders” that it is the quintessential candidate for

politicization, to the chagrin of those seeking “rational”

energy policies.

Political Drivers

The political drivers that may motivate a state to seek

nuclear energy for the first time include: the quest for

national prestige; a perceived need to demonstrate

a country’s prowess in all fields of science and

technology; a predisposition towards high-profile,



large-scale projects of the type that nuclear represents;

and the desire for modern, cutting-edge technology

no matter how suited or unsuited to an individual

country’s requirements. These considerations do

not generally apply to the acquisition of other

forms of electricity generation and may make the

difference in decision making. Intimations by such

states as Ghana, Nigeria, Venezuela and others

included in this project’s SENES database that they

are considering nuclear power probably represent

a triumph of national ambition over sound energy

policies. But in considering the likelihood of a nuclear

revival it cannot be discounted that such states may

nonetheless actually succeed in acquiring nuclear

energy. Autocratic states, partially democratic

states and/or those with command economies may

be able to politically override other considerations

weighing against nuclear energy. Venezuelan

President Hugo Chavez, for example, in nurturing

nuclear cooperation arrangements with Iran, France

and Russia, may actually lead his oil-rich country

towards acquiring an energy source that, on the face

of it, it does not need.

Nuclear Weapons “Hedging”

“Nuclear hedging,” based on a belief that a nuclear power

program will help provide the basis for a future nuclear

weapon option, may also be a critical, if unacknowledged

driver in some cases. There has been speculation that the

reason for so much interest in nuclear energy from states in

the Middle East and North Africa is that it may provide a

latent nuclear capability to match that of Iran (International

Institute of Strategic Studies, 2008). Such motivations are

likely to be confined to a tiny number of states. In any

event, it is not the easiest and fastest way to acquire nuclear

weapons (Alger, 2009). The implications for weapons

proliferation arising from an increase in nuclear energy use

will be considered in Part 4 of this report.

Nuclear Promotion Internationally

Since 2000 the nuclear industry and pro-nuclear energy

governments have sensed a second chance for nuclear

energy and have themselves become important drivers

of interest. Emphasizing all the substantive drivers

considered above, with the notable addition of climate

change as a new motivator, they have vigorously

promoted what they call a nuclear energy “renaissance.”

United States

The US, where the term “renaissance” was invented, has,

at least until recently, been one of the greatest proponents

of a nuclear revival, with strong support from industry,

the bureaucracy (notably the Department of Energy),

Congress and some state governments. President

George W. Bush’s administration, after announcing

its Nuclear Power 2010 program in 2002, was active

both domestically in supporting nuclear energy and

in promoting it internationally, especially through the

establishment of GNEP (Pomper, 2009).18 Internationally,

GNEP has stirred interest in nuclear energy where it

might otherwise not have existed, most noticeably in the

cases of Ghana and Senegal. Paradoxically, the original

GNEP principles, which implied that advanced nuclear

energy assistance would be available only if recipients

renounced enrichment and reprocessing, served to

stimulate interest on the part of some states in preserving

such options for the future. Australia, Canada and South

Africa, all with significant uranium resources that could

become “value added” if enriched prior to export, were

among the most critical of such conditions. The US

later quietly dropped these from the GNEP charter. The

Obama administration is noticeably less enthusiastic

about nuclear energy, has cancelled the domestic part of

GNEP and is likely to refocus the international program

on nonproliferation objectives (Pomper, 2009), perhaps

under a different name.



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Meanwhile, the controversial US-India nuclear

cooperation agreement, concluded in 2006, was

promoted as a lucrative commercial opportunity for US

businesses to participate in India’s ambitious nuclear

energy plans ― despite the country’s status as a nuclear-

armed non-party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

(NPT). The US has also been active in concluding nuclear

cooperation agreements with several developing states,

such as the UAE and Jordan.

France

Pinning its hopes on a global export market for Areva and

Electricité de France (EDF), France has been even more

active than the US, especially in promoting reactor sales.

President Nicholas Sarkozy has personally pursued such

benefits for his country in a series of international visits

during which bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements

have been reached, most notably in the Middle East

and North Africa. Since 2000 France has signed at

least 12 of these19 and become particularly engaged in

promoting the use of nuclear energy in Algeria, Jordan,

Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar and the UAE. Indonesia

and Turkey have also considered reactor purchases

from France. Areva has already taken advantage of the

opening up of the Indian market by signing a contract

for up to six reactors (Dow Jones Newswires, 2009a).

Sarkozy has been matched in his efforts by high-profile

Areva CEO Anne Lauvergeon, dubbed by the New York

Times’ Roger Cohen as “Atomic Anne” (Cohen, 2008).

France’s aggressive nuclear marketing tactics have

drawn criticism, including from then IAEA Director

General Mohamed ElBaradei who warned that they are

“too fast” (Smith and Ferguson, 2008). It has also been

reported that French national nuclear regulator Andre-

Claude Lacoste, who has some say in approving French

reactor exports, has suggested to President Sarkozy that

he be “a little bit more pragmatic” about signing nuclear

cooperation agreements with countries now devoid

of nuclear safety infrastructure (MacLachlan, 2008b).

Former chair of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) Dale Klein has noted that as Sarkozy “goes around

the world trying to sell the French reactor, it puts Lacoste

in a challenging position in terms of the time it will

take for such countries to develop such infrastructure”

(MacLachlan, 2008a).

The French government, to its credit, has established

an international nuclear cooperation Agency, L’Agence

France Nucléaire International (AFNI), as a unit of the

Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (Atomic Energy

Commission), to “help foreign countries prepare

the institutional, human and technical environment

necessary for installation of a civilian nuclear program

under conditions of safety, security and nonproliferation”

(MacLachlan, 2008a). In addition, France’s Nuclear

Safety Authority (ASN) issued a position paper in June

2008 saying it will impose criteria for cooperation with

countries seeking to commence or revive a nuclear

power program, since building the infrastructure to

safely operate a nuclear power plant “takes time,” and

that it would be selective in providing assistance (Inside

NRC, 2008: 14).

Russia

Russia is the third major promoter of nuclear energy

internationally, having reorganized its nuclear industry

in 2007 into a vertically integrated holding company,

Atomenergoprom, to compete with Areva and other

emerging vendors (Pomper, 2009). Russia envisages

Atomstroyexport (ASE), the nuclear export arm

of Atomenergoprom, becoming a “global player,”

capturing 20 percent of the worldwide market and

building about 60 foreign reactors within 25 years

(Pomper, 2009). Past Russian reactor exports have been

to eastern European states, India, Iran and China. Russia

has actively pursued nuclear cooperation agreements

with other countries in recent years, including some



considering nuclear energy programs, notably Algeria,

Armenia, Egypt and Myanmar (Burma) where it is

supplying a research reactor. Russia has also signed

sales agreements with China, Bulgaria, India, Myanmar

and Ukraine, although these do not necessarily relate to

reactors but to fuel services.

Having always seen spent fuel as a resource rather than

waste, Russia enthusiastically embraced GNEP, and in

May 2008 signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with

the US to further its bilateral and global nuclear energy

activities. The agreement is currently in limbo in the US

Congress allegedly due to the conflict with Georgia in

2008, although this may be a pretext for Congressional

reluctance to support civilian nuclear cooperation with

a country that has not always been helpful on the Iran

nuclear issue (McKeeby, 2008). Russia, on the other

hand, has also sought to ease US and other countries’

proliferation concerns about a nuclear energy revival ―

and seize commercial advantage ― by establishing an

International Uranium Enrichment Centre at Angarsk

in Siberia, which includes a fuel bank to help provide

assurances of supply to countries considering nuclear

power. Kazakhstan and Armenia have become partners

in this venture.

International organizations

These are also playing an international promotional role

and to that extent are prominent among the drivers of

the revival. The key multilateral players are the IAEA

and the NEA. The IAEA is constrained in promoting

nuclear energy too enthusiastically by its dual mandate,

which enjoins it to both advocate the peaceful uses of

nuclear energy and help ensure that this occurs safely,

securely and in a non-proliferating fashion. These dual

roles are reflected in its organizational stove-piping,

with separate departments for promoting nuclear

energy, safety, security and safeguards. Having learned

its lesson in over-optimistically forecasting the growth

of nuclear energy in the 1980s, the IAEA is today usually

more sober in its projections than industry or some of

its member states. It also usefully advises new entrants

to the nuclear energy business to carefully consider all

the requirements for successfully acquiring nuclear

energy, notably through its exhaustive Milestones in the

Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power

(IAEA, 2007b).

Outgoing Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has

claimed: “In fact, I never preach on behalf of nuclear

energy. The IAEA says it’s a sovereign decision, and we

provide all the information a country needs” (Bulletin

of Atomic Sciences, 2009: 7). More pointedly, in regard

to the current enthusiasm for nuclear energy, he told

the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in an interview in

September 2009 that:

In recent years, a lot of people have talked

about a nuclear renaissance, but I’ve never

used that term. Sure, about 50 countries

were telling us they wanted nuclear

power. But how many of them really

would develop a nuclear power program?

Countries such as Turkey, Indonesia and

Vietnam have been talking about building

nuclear power plants for 20 years. So it’s

one thing to talk about nuclear power: it’s

another thing to actually move forward

with a program (BAS, 2009: 7).

It remains to be seen whether the new IAEA Director

General, Yukiya Amano, will have the same attitude.

Unlike ElBaradei, an Egyptian with a long career at

the IAEA, Amano is from Japan, a country with a

longstanding interest in promoting nuclear energy,

at least domestically.

Even under ElBaradei the IAEA occasionally became

overly enthusiastic about nuclear energy, such as its



claim on its website in July 2009 that “A total of 60

countries are now considering nuclear power as part

of their future energy mix” (IAEA, 2009b), a figure

apparently derived from a list of countries that had

at any time, at any level, approached the Agency for

information on civilian nuclear energy. This project has

identified half of that number with serious intentions

of acquiring nuclear energy.

The NEA, whose 28 member states have 85 percent

of the world’s installed nuclear energy capacity, is in

theory freer to promote nuclear energy generally and

among OECD member states, since its mandate is not

complicated by safety, security and nonproliferation

considerations to the same extent as the IAEA. However,

as the NEA itself notes, the positions of its member

countries regarding nuclear energy “vary widely

from firm commitment to firm opposition to its use”

(NEA, 2008a: 2). The Agency’s role is thus supposedly

confined to providing “factual studies and balanced

analyses that give our members unbiased material on

which they can base informed policy choices” (NEA,

2008a: 2). In practice, NEA publications often read like

a paean to nuclear energy, highlighting the advantages

while playing down the disadvantages. The NEA also

competes for attention with another part of the OECD,

the IEA, which, with its broad energy mandate, has

traditionally been less enthusiastic about nuclear.

For industry’s part, it has the World Nuclear

Association (WNA) as its principal cheerleader. Since

its transformation from the fuel-oriented Uranium

Institute in 2001, the WNA has attempted to promote the

civilian nuclear power industry as a whole worldwide.

It holds conferences and specialized workshops and

engages with the multilateral bodies on the industry’s

behalf. While it performs a useful information function

through its various publications and website, it naturally

has a vested interest in promoting the rosiest view of

nuclear energy that it can (Kidd, 2008: 66). For example,

its November 2008 publication “The economics of

nuclear power,” a survey of studies by others, reaches

the tautological conclusion that “Nuclear power is cost

competitive with other forms of electricity generation,

except where there is direct access to low-cost fossil

fuels” (WNA, 2008c: 1; MIT, 2003: 7).20 The WNA faces the

challenge of representing a fragmented industry lacking

a “critical mass of strong powerful companies with good

public images to stand up for it” (Kidd, 2008: 182). The

association has been seeking to expand its membership

to research institutes and university faculties. Other

industry organizations like the World Association of

Nuclear Operators (WANO) are explicitly not devoted

to advocating nuclear energy, but promote other aspects

such as safety and security.

Nuclear Promotion Domestically

National political pressures have emerged in many

countries for revisiting nuclear energy: from public

opinion, from within government and from domestic

industry. Paradoxically, one of the domestic drivers of

a reconsideration of nuclear energy in several countries

has been a rise in public acceptance ― if not support.

This has apparently been stimulated by other drivers,

including worries about climate change, economic

growth and energy prices, availability and long-term

security of supplies (MIT, 2003: 72).21 The results of

a global public opinion poll, which surveyed 10,000

people online in 20 countries in November 2008, were

released in March 2009 by Accenture, a UK-based

management consultancy firm. While only 29 percent

supported “the use or increased use” of nuclear power

outright, another 40 percent said they would change

their minds if given more information (Accenture

Newsroom, 2009). Twenty-nine percent said they were

more supportive of their country increasing the use of

nuclear energy than they were three years ago, although



19 percent said they were less supportive. The top three

reasons for opposition were: waste disposal (cited by 91

percent), safety (90 percent) and decommissioning (80

percent). Demands for improved safety and security

have become progressively greater since the nuclear

industry emerged, sometimes to such an extent that,

according to the industry, the economics of nuclear have

been adversely affected due to delays in approvals, the

need for public hearings and constantly evolving safety

and other regulatory requirements. Yet the industry has

benefited in the past from public input (Smith, 2006: 183),

and in any case needs to keep public opinion on side by

complying fully with regulatory requirements.

In the US, a Zogby International poll in 2008 revealed

that 67 percent of Americans support the construction

of new nuclear power stations (WNN, 2008g). Public

support is also apparently rising in Britain: over half

the respondents in an April 2008 survey felt that the UK

should increase its nuclear capacity. Those living closest

to existing nuclear plants were most strongly in favour

(WNN, 2008f). A 2008 survey in Italy, the only country

ever to completely abandon an existing nuclear power

program, showed that 54 percent of respondents were

now in favour of new nuclear plants in the country

(WNN, 2008d). Support appears to run highest in Russia,

where a Levada Center poll in 2008 found that 72 percent

of Russians felt that nuclear power should be “preserved

or actively developed” (WNN, 2008i).

A European Commission opinion poll in the EU in 2007

showed opinion divided. Only 20 percent supported the

use of nuclear energy, while 36 percent had “balanced

views” and 37 percent were opposed (NEA, 2008a:

343). A Eurobarometer poll conducted in 2008 showed

opinion moving in favour of nuclear: since 2005 support

increased from 37 percent to 44 percent, while opposition

dropped from 55 percent to 45 percent (Public Opinion

Analysis Sector, European Commission, 2008). Support

was highest in countries with operating nuclear power

plants and where residents feel well-informed about

radioactive waste issues. Forty percent of opponents

would reportedly change their minds if there were a safe,

permanent solution to the radioactive waste problem.

However, large sectors of public opinion in many countries

remain skeptical about nuclear power and increased

support is often conditional and fragile. A poll for the

Nuclear Industry Association (NIA) in the UK in November

2007 indicated a falling back from previous increases, a

growth in the number of people undecided and 68 percent

of respondents admitting they knew “just a little” or

“almost nothing” about the nuclear industry (WNN, 2007).

NIA Chief Executive Keith Parker described the result as a

“reality check” for the industry. Meanwhile, an academic

study based on five years of research on how local residents

view their nearby nuclear reactors has concluded that

the “landscape of beliefs” about nuclear power does not

conform to “simple pro- and anti-nuclear opposites”

(Pidgeon et al., 2008). It concludes that even among those

accepting of a nuclear power station in their midst, support

is conditional and could easily be lost if promises about

local development of nuclear power are not kept or if there

is a major accident anywhere. One also needs to be careful

about cause and effect. Rather than representing a deep-felt

reconsideration of nuclear energy which is then reflected

in public policy, increased public support may be due to

changes in politicians’ attitudes and increased advocacy

of the nuclear alternative by governments. Public support

may thus wither with a change of government.

In general therefore, public opinion seemingly is either

mildly encouraging, a constraint or in flux rather than a

driver of nuclear energy plans, and remains especially

preoccupied with the issues of nuclear waste, nuclear safety

and security and weapons proliferation. The industry itself

is aware that it would only take another serious nuclear

reactor accident to kill public support for a nuclear revival.



Domestic support for new nuclear build in many cases may

depend crucially on the strength of the pro-nuclear lobby

compared with other energy lobbyists and the anti-nuclear

movement. American and French companies appear to be

best at promoting their industry and seeking government

subsidies and other support. Traditionally there has been

a close relationship between the US Department of Energy

(DOE) and American nuclear companies and utilities, but

this may be changing due to the rise of alternative energy

sources for dealing with climate change. DOE’s budget was

almost entirely devoted to nuclear energy until the Obama

administration’s recent addition of millions of dollars for

alternative energy. Mycle Schneider makes the case that

France’s nuclear industry has consistently advanced due to

the close relationship between government and industry,

particularly due to the virtual monopoly of Corps des Mines

graduates on key positions (Schneider, 2008b). In Japan and

Russia, too, a close relationship between the nuclear industry

and government helps drive promotion of nuclear energy.

Nonetheless, the nuclear industry’s influence should not be

exaggerated. Steve Kidd notes that a significant problem in

encouraging a more positive image of the industry is that it

“isn’t really an industry at all, but a separate set of businesses

participating in various parts of the nuclear fuel cycle” (Kidd,

2008: 66). Some vendor companies have interests in other

forms of energy, as do utility companies, making it difficult

to find strong industrial advocates for nuclear energy.

The Constraints

Multiple factors act as constraints on the expansion of

the use of nuclear energy worldwide. Their strength

and mix varies from country to country. Moreover,

what is a constraint in one country, for example, the

availability of finance, may be a driver in others.

Generally, the factors discussed below are widely

considered to hold back a nuclear revival.

Nuclear Economics

According to the NEA, “Economics is key in decision

making for the power sector” (NEA, 2008a: 173).

Promoters and critics of nuclear power are in agreement.

According to the WNA’s Steve Kidd, “Whether or not

nuclear power plants are built and whether they keep

operating for many years after commencing operation

is these days essentially an economic decision” (Kidd,

2008: 189). Nuclear energy critic Brice Smith notes that

“The near-term future of nuclear power … rests heavily

on the predictions for the cost of building and operating

the next generation of reactors compared to the cost of

competing technologies” (Smith, 2006: 29).

Stark disagreement exists regarding what the comparative

costs are. The IEA in 2008 proclaimed: “Projected costs of

generating electricity show that in many circumstances

nuclear energy is competitive against coal and gas

generation” (IEA, 2008b: 283). Mark Cooper, senior

fellow for economic analysis at the Institute for Energy

and the Environment at Vermont Law School, concludes:

“Notwithstanding their hope and hype, nuclear reactors

are not economically competitive and would require

massive subsidies to force them into the supply mix”

(Cooper, 2009b: 66). The WNA’s Director General

John Ritch says, “In most industrialized countries

today, new nuclear power offers the most economical

way to generate base-load electricity ― even without

consideration of the geopolitical and environmental

advantages that nuclear energy confers” (WNA, 2008c:

4). For Steve Thomas of the Public Services International

Research Unit at the University of Greenwich, “If nuclear

power plants are to be built in Britain, it seems clear

that extensive government guarantees and subsidies

would be required” (Thomas, 2005). According to the

Washington, DC-based lobby group, the Nuclear Energy



Institute “… nuclear power can be competitive with

other new sources of baseload power, including coal and

natural gas” (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2009a: 1).

Assessing the current and future economics of nuclear

power, whether on its own, or in comparison with other

forms of generating electricity, is complex. First, this is

due to the large number of variables and assumptions

that must be taken into account, notably the costs of

construction, financing, operations and maintenance

(O&M), fuel, waste management and decommissioning.

Second, the size and character of the industry make the

costs and benefits of government involvement significant

and often critical. Such involvement includes: direct and

indirect subsidies (sometimes amounting to bailouts);

the establishment and maintenance of a regulatory

framework to ensure safety, security and nonproliferation;

and in recent years the possible imposition of a carbon tax

and/or greenhouse gas cap and trade system. Third, is

the lack of recent experience in building nuclear power

plants, rendering the real costs of construction and likely

construction periods unknowable. According to Joscow

and Parsons, the confusion and debate about costs is largely

a consequence of “the lack of reliable contemporary data

for the actual construction of real nuclear plants” (Joskow

and Parsons, 2009). As the Nuclear Energy Agency has

noted, “These factors are likely to make the financing of

new nuclear power plants more complex than in previous

periods” (NEA, 2008a: 203).

Finally, there is an unprecedented degree of uncertainty in

the energy sector across the board, which in turn affects the

economics of nuclear power: climate change considerations

are forcing governments to consider all forms of energy

production and compare their comparative costs and other

advantages and disadvantages; recent wild fluctuations in

the price of fossil fuels and other commodities has made

predictions of future prices appear less reliable; and the

2008 global financial crisis and resulting global economic

slowdown have sharpened investor scrutiny of capital-

intensive projects like nuclear. As the May 2007 UK White

Paper on Energy put it:

In considering whether it is in the

public interest to allow private sector

companies to invest in new nuclear

power stations, we need to take account

of the wide range of uncertainties that

make it difficult to predict the future

need for and use of energy. For example,

it is difficult to predict how fossil fuel,

raw materials and carbon prices will

change in the future, all of which will

affect the relative economics of different

electricity generation capacities (UK

Department of Trade and Industry,

2007: 16).

The Effects of Deregulation of Electricity Markets

Unlike the initial boom in nuclear plant construction

in the 1970s and 1980s, many countries’ energy

markets have today been deregulated or partially

deregulated. A competitive situation now exists in

most OECD countries and several non-OECD ones

(IEA, 2008a: 155). This has made realistic assessments

of the economics of all forms of energy, including

nuclear, more important. Private investors and

electricity utilities are today much more likely than

in the past to base their decisions to invest in nuclear

power on its projected cost compared to other forms

of generating electricity and the likely rate of return

on their investment compared to the alternatives. The

IEA also claims that power companies increasingly

use portfolio investment-valuation methodologies to

take into account risks over their entire plant portfolio,

rather than focusing on the technology with the lowest

stand-alone projected generating cost. Investors may



accept different risk profiles for different technologies,

depending on project-specific circumstances (IEA,

2008a: 155).

Deregulation has changed risk assessment across the

energy sector. When markets were regulated, utilities

were not required to bear the full risk of investment in

nuclear power plants. Instead, they employed reactor

technology that had been developed by governments,

often as by-products of a nuclear weapons program,

and the costs of which had been written off. In

addition, reactor companies and utilities were directly

or indirectly subsidized by governments to build

nuclear power plants. And finally, utilities were able

to pass on costs to the consumer without fear of being

undercut by competition.

Today, as the 2003 MIT study notes, “Nuclear power

will succeed in the long run only if it has lower costs

than competing technologies, especially as electricity

markets become progressively less subject to regulation

in many parts of the world” (MIT, 2003: 7). No new

nuclear power plant has yet been built and operated

in a liberalized electricity system, although Finland

is attempting to do so (Mitchell and Woodman, 2007:

155). Even for non-competitive markets like China,

with the most grandiose plans for nuclear energy

and where it might be thought that public funding

is no barrier, the economics are important. The head

of the China Atomic Energy Authority, Sun Qin, has

explained that once China’s nuclear power plants are

operating the power is competitive, but “we must

resolve the problem of initial investment” (Nuclear

News Flashes, 2007). In Turkey, where by law the

state guarantees to pay the plant owner-operator a

fixed price for electricity, a legal challenge has erupted

and the unit price negotiated between the two sides

has been deemed “too high for the Turkish state to

guarantee” (Hibbs, 2009a: 6).

The (Rising) Cost of Nuclear Power Plants

Nuclear power plants are large construction

undertakings. In absolute terms they are dauntingly

expensive to build. The Olkiluoto-3 1600 MW EPR

currently being built in Finland had a fixed price of €3

billion ($4 billion) in 2003, but is now 50 percent more

(World Nuclear News, 2009g). The UK’s Department

of Trade and Industry (DTI) used as its central case a

reactor cost of £2.8 billion (NEA, 2008a: 180).22 In Canada,

the quote from AECL for two new CANDU reactors at

Darlington, Ontario, was reportedly CAD$26 billion,

while Areva’s bid came in at CAD$23.6 billion (Toronto

Star, 2009). In 2007, Moody’s quoted an “all-in price”

of a new 1,000 MW nuclear power reactor in the US as

ranging from $5-6 billion each.23 Lew Hay, chairman

and CEO of Florida Power and Light has noted that “If

our cost estimates are even close to being right, the cost

of a two-unit plant will be on the order of magnitude of

$13 to $14 billion” (Romm, 2008: 4). “That’s bigger,” he

quipped, “than the total market capitalization of many

companies in the U.S. utility industry and 50 percent

or more of the market capitalization of all companies

in our industry with the exception of Exelon.… This is

a huge bet for any CEO to take to his or her board”

(Romm, 2008: 4). The WNA is not sure about whether

nuclear is unique or not, asserting that “Although new

nuclear power plants require large capital investment,

they are hardly unique by the standards of the overall

energy business, where oil platforms and LNG [liquid

natural gas] liquefaction facilities also cost many billions

of dollars,” but then noting that “Nuclear projects have

unique characteristics. They are capital intensive, with

very long project schedules...” (WNA, 2009e: 6, 21).

Since 2003 construction costs for all types of large-

scale engineering projects have escalated dramatically

(MIT, 2009: 6). This has been due to increases in the

cost of materials (iron, steel, aluminum and copper),



energy costs, increased demand, tight manufacturing

capacity and increases in labour costs (IEA, 2008a:

152). Yet, not only are costs of nuclear plants large,

they have been rising disproportionately. According

to the 2009 MIT study update, the estimated cost of

constructing a nuclear power plant has increased by

15 percent per year heading into the current economic

downturn (MIT 2009: 6). The cost of coal and gas-fired

plants has also risen but not by as much. Companies

in the US planning to build nuclear power plants have

announced construction costs at least 50 percent higher

than previously expected (IEA, 2008a: 152). While some

of these costs may currently be falling due to the global

economic downturn, they are likely to rebound once

the slump reverses and demand from China, India and

Japan begins to increase once more. Some price rises are,

however, unique to nuclear, brought about by shortages

of reactor components, notably large forgings.

Cost Comparisons with Other Baseload Power Sources

The major traditional competitors with nuclear for

“baseload” power are coal, natural gas and, to a declining

extent, oil. Competitive energy markets tend to heighten

the disadvantages of nuclear. Coal and natural gas plants

are cheaper and quicker to build, they obtain regulatory

approval more easily, are more flexible electricity

generators (they can be turned on and off easily) and

can be of almost any size. The IEA projects 2-3 years for

a combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) and 1-2 years for

an open-cycle turbine (IEA, 2008a: 143-144). The MIT

and University of Chicago studies give lead times of 2-3

years for natural gas (Smith, 2006: 38). All of these factors

explain the boom in gas-fired construction in the UK, the

US and elsewhere in recent years, notwithstanding the

rising price of fuel (currently receding from its peak).

Coal-fired plants can also be built relatively quickly.

The MIT and Chicago studies agree on four years’

construction time for coal-fired plants, as does the NEA

(NEA, 2005: 36).24Nuclear plants take up to 10 years to

plan, obtain regulatory approval for and build, their up-

front costs are huge and they are inflexible generators.

Essentially, in order to be economic, nuclear power

plants need to be kept operating at full power and they

cannot readily be shut down and restarted to cope with

fluctuations in electricity demand. Light water reactors

need to be shut down periodically to refuel (although

CANDU and other heavy-water plants do not).

To calculate the total cost of nuclear energy in order

to compare it with other forms of energy production,

two concepts are commonly used. The industry

tends to use “overnight costs,” the spending on

construction materials and labour as if the plant were

to be constructed “overnight,” expressed as the cost

per kilowatt (kW). This hypothetical construct, a “form

of virtual barn raising,” does not include the cost of

financing the construction and other costs such as

escalation of expenses due to increased material and

labour costs and inflation (Cooper, 2009b: 20). The term

“all-in cost,” expressed in the same units as overnight

costs, attempts to include these and is thus useful for

determining the effects of construction delays (WNA,

2008c: 4). But as Mark Cooper points out, “facilities

are not built overnight, in a virtual world” and what

utilities and governments wish to know is the cost of

electricity that needs to be passed on to the consumer.

Hence the use by economists of the “levelized cost”

(sometimes known as the “busbar” cost). This is the

minimum price at which a particular technology can

produce electricity, generate sufficient revenue to

pay all of the costs and provide a sufficient return to

investors (Congressional Budget Office, 2008: 16).25

The levelized cost traditionally takes into account the

overnight construction cost, plus the costs of financing,

fuel, operation and maintenance (O&M), waste



disposition and decommissioning. These are calculated

for the lifetime of the plant, averaged over that lifetime

and expressed as the price of delivered electricity per

kilowatt hour (KWh) or megawatt hour (MWh).

After construction costs, the next biggest cost is the

money used for the project, whether borrowed or

drawn from savings or other funds already held.

A “discount rate” is used, denoted as a percentage

figure, to express the value of such money over the

time it is used for the project. The rate fluctuates

depending on the assessed risk of the project: the

higher the estimated risk, the higher the discount

rate. The discount rate is presumed to take into

account all known risk factors, including political,

technical and environmental.

Some caveats about levelized cost models are,

however, necessary. First, they produce widely

varying results depending on the assumptions

made in selecting the input data (particularly for

the so-called base case or starting point). Second,

the models, which are strictly economic, do not

normally take into account all the factors influencing

the choices of investors in deregulated electricity

markets, notably income taxes and financial

conditions (the level of investor confidence in all

electricity generation projects).26 Moreover, the

discount rate, although said in theory to encompass

“perfect knowledge” of all risk factors, relies on

judgement calls by financial experts about some

risks which are not necessarily quantifiable, notably

political risks. The discount rate applied to nuclear

power plants can vary enormously (in the chart on

page 44 they range from 5 percent to 12.5 percent,

although they can go higher). Finally, the sheer size,

expense and unpredictability of nuclear projects may

introduce risk factors that cannot be “internalized”

into cost estimates. As the NEA notes:

Many of the risks of a nuclear power

project are of a similar type to those

of any large infrastructure project,

differing only in proportion…

Nevertheless, experience with earlier

nuclear power plant construction

has shown that there are some risks

unique to nuclear power projects

which are outside the control of

investors and which may be difficult

or even impossible to price for the

purposes of commercial financing

(NEA, 2008a: 204).

Economist David McLellan also points out that while the

gap between the levelized costs of nuclear and gas may

appear narrow, the latter “should be more attractive to

private investors than the costs difference alone suggests,”

since it requires much less up-front investment and repays

the investment more quickly (McLellan, 2008: 6).

Fortunately, cost estimates for nuclear power are today

made by a much wider variety of stakeholders than ever

before. While in the 1970s and 1980s boom they were made

largely by nuclear vendors, utilities and governments,

today these have been joined by independent analysts,

academics and investment consultants, including Wall

Street firms like Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. These

produce an enormous range of cost estimates both for

nuclear power by itself and in terms of comparison with

other types of energy production, as illustrated in the

chart on page 44. Even accounting for currency conversion

difficulties, the ranges are enormous. The overnight cost

per kilowatt ranges from $690 to more than $3,000, while

the generating cost ranges from $15 per MWh to $78

per MWh. The variance illustrates the complexity of the

decisions facing potential investors in nuclear energy.

Several of the most prominent studies on the economics

of nuclear power are considered in the following section.



2008 NEA Study

The most recent official study on nuclear economics is

contained in Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008 released by the

NEA, on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary. A first of

its kind, the study was released in response to “renewed

interest in nuclear energy by member countries” (NEA,

2008a: 2). It bases its analysis on a 2005 NEA/IEA study

of electricity generation costs for 18 OECD member

states and three non-member states (Bulgaria, Romania

and South Africa). It concluded that at a 5 percent

discount rate the levelized cost of nuclear electricity

ranged from $21 to $31/MWh, with the exception of two

plants in the Netherlands and Japan, which had higher

costs (NEA, 2008a: 184-185). At a 10 percent discount

rate, the generation costs in all countries increased,

producing a range of $30 to $50/MWh, except again for

the Netherlands (just above $50) and Japan (approaching

$70). Comparing the levelized costs for nuclear, coal

and gas power plants in the same group of countries,

using the same discount rate for all three technologies,

the study estimated that the price range for nuclear was

narrower than for both coal and gas. The lower limit

of the range was considerably lower at the 5 percent

discount rate, although only marginally lower at the 10

percent discount rate (NEA, 2008a: 189). Hence nuclear,

it claimed, was cheaper.

There are several problems with the NEA study that call

its conclusions into question. First, it is based on four-year

old questionnaire responses from national authorities in

OECD member states. Some countries, notably the UK

among nuclear energy producers, did not respond, while

some responded only for some types of technologies but

not others, potentially producing a non-response bias.

Moreover, responding states were asked to provide data

Results of Recent Studies on the Cost of Nuclear Power

Study Year Original

Currency

Cost of Capital

Overnight Cost (per kW) Generating Cost (per MWh)

Original 2000 USD Original 2000 USD

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 2003 USD 11.5% 2000 1869 67 63

Tarjamme and Luostarinen 2003 EUR 5.0% 1900 1923 24 25

Canadian Energy Research Institute 2004 CAD 8.0% 2347 1376 53 31

General Directorate for Energy and Raw Materials, France 2004 EUR 8.0% 1280 1298 28 28

Royal Academy of Engineering 2004 GBP 7.5% 1150 725 23 15

University of Chicago 2004 USD 12.5% 1500 1362 51 46

IEA/NEA (High) 2005 USD 10.0% 3432 3006 50 41

IEA/NEA (Low) 2005 USD 10.0% 1089 954 30 25

Department of Trade and Industry, UK (DTI) 2007 GBP 10.0% 1250 565 38 18

Keystone Center (High) 2007 USD 11.5% 4000 3316 95 89

Keystone Center (Low) 2007 USD 11.5% 3600 2984 68 63

MIT Study Update 2009 USD 11.5% 4000 3228 84 78

Source: Adapted from IEA (2008b: 290). Historical exchange rates and GDP deflator figures adapted from US GPO (2009a, 2009b).



on only one or two facilities and the criteria for their

choice is opaque. They might well have nominated their

most economic plants. The US, for instance, reported

data on the cost of one new 1000 MWe Generation III

nuclear facility, which has not yet been built, using an

“ordered plant price” “based upon costs of units built in

the Far East” (NEA/IEA, 2005: 30), presumably the only

existing Generation III plants, in Japan.27 The Netherlands

apparently reported on its single nuclear power plant

built in 1969 and connected to the grid in 1973, with a

capacity of 482 MWe (but recorded incorrectly as 1,600

MWe). The survey thus includes existing old facilities as

well as projected new ones.

A further problem is that in order to remove the cost

“outliers,” the 5 percent lowest and highest values for

each of the technologies were excluded. Given that the

values for nuclear costs tend to be more spread out than

those for coal and gas and that there were only 13 nuclear

plants involved in the survey, compared with 27 coal and

23 gas-fired plants, this seems questionable. As Thomas

et al. conclude, “It is difficult to evaluate the report

because of the huge range of national assumptions, with

Eastern European countries often providing very low

costs and Japan very high” (Thomas et al., 2007: 34).

The biggest problem with the 2005 study, given the

level of risk represented by the track record of nuclear

energy, is the use of the same discount rate for all types

of power generation.28 As the NEA itself concedes coyly

in its 2008 Nuclear Energy Outlook, other studies have

not done this “because it might (sic) be argued that

some sources or technologies are perceived as more

risky than others by potential investors” (NEA, 2008:

192). When the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU)

of the UK Cabinet Office examined nuclear economics

for the British government’s 2003 energy review, it

used a range of discount rates from 8 percent to 15

percent (which it referred to as the real post-tax costs of

capital) (Thomas et al., 2007: 45). At the time 15 percent

was widely seen as the minimum rate required for

any plant operating in a competitive market, while 8

percent was the rate applied to appraisal of the Sizewell

B nuclear plant when the UK electricity industry was a

publicly owned monopoly. The 15 percent discount rate

resulted in costs per KWh about 50 percent higher than

the 8 percent rate. Thomas et al. claim that the higher

rate would be a more realistic for nuclear in the UK

given the government’s assertion that there will be no

government subsidies (Thomas et al., 2007). Steve Kidd

of the WNA says, “In general, financing needs to be

available at under 10% per annum to make new nuclear

build work economically” (Kidd, 2008: 51).

The NEA’s Nuclear Energy Outlook goes beyond the 2005

study in making further calculations that take into account

income tax imposed on generating plant revenues and

assumptions about “financial conditions” (the level of

investor confidence in all electricity generation projects).

Although, surprisingly, it assumed that financing

conditions “will be the same for nuclear, gas and coal,”

its calculations revealed that under “moderate” financial

constraints the inclusion of income tax would increase

the generation costs of nuclear by 10 percent, for coal by

7 percent and only 2 percent for gas. This would leave

nuclear cheaper than gas but more expensive than coal.

Under “tight” financial constraints, the differential increase

due to tax is greater: 22 percent for nuclear, 16 percent for

coal and only 5 percent for gas ― due to nuclear’s high

capital costs. This makes nuclear more expensive than

both coal and gas. Stating the obvious, the NEA concludes

that the impact of tax regimes on generation costs may not

be technology-neutral (NEA, 2008a: 194).

2003 MIT Study and 2009 update

In 2003 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

published what is probably the most widely cited study

on the future of nuclear power. Although having a



strong US policy emphasis, this multidisciplinary study

also produced findings that it implied were applicable

worldwide. The MIT group began from the premise that

the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to tackle

climate change was so great that re-evaluating the role of

nuclear energy was justified. In that sense the report was

predisposed towards a nuclear revival. Unlike the IEA/

NEA though, the MIT group applied a higher weighted cost

of capital (essentially the discount rate) to the construction

of a new nuclear plant (10 percent), compared to one for

coal or natural gas (7.8 percent) (MIT, 2009: 8). The result

of its calculations was that nuclear was likely to be more

expensive than coal and Combined Cycle Gas Turbine

(CCGT), even at high natural gas prices. At such prices for

nuclear and gas, it was coal rather than nuclear that would

attract new plant investment. The report bluntly declared:

“Today, nuclear power is not an economically competitive

choice” (MIT, 2003: 3).

For deregulated electricity markets, in which private

capital might be expected to invest in nuclear, it

concluded that:

The bottom line is that with current

expectations about nuclear plant

construction costs, operating cost and

regulatory uncertainties, it is extremely

unlikely that nuclear power will be the

technology of choice for merchant plant

investors in regions where suppliers have

access to natural gas or coal resources. It is

just too expensive (MIT, 2003: 40).

Merchant plants are those built by investor developers who

take on the permitting, development and construction and

operating costs, but who sell their output to distribution

companies, wholesale and retail marketers under supply

contracts (MIT, 2003: 44, fn 2). The traditional alternative

has been ownership, operation and distribution of output

by electricity utility companies.

As for states that still have regulated electricity markets,

the report noted that:

In countries that rely on state owned

enterprises that are willing and able to

shift cost risks to consumers to reduce

the cost of capital, or to subsidize

financing costs directly, and which face

high gas and coal costs, it is possible that

nuclear power could be perceived to be

an economical choice (MIT, 2003: 41).

Convinced that nuclear energy should still make

a contribution to the energy mix in tackling global

warming, the MIT researchers suggested that progressive

achievement of cost reductions in the nuclear industry (by

reducing construction costs, construction times, O&M costs

and securing financing on the same terms as gas and coal),

could make it comparable in price with coal and gas. This

assumed moderate prices for coal and gas, but not when gas

was cheap. The authors judged ― in 2003 ― that such cost

improvements by the nuclear industry, while “plausible,”

were not yet “proven.” They added that nuclear would

become more competitive if the “social cost of carbon

emissions is internalized, for example through a carbon

tax or an equivalent ‘cap and trade’ system” (MIT, 2003:

7). They also advocated government financial incentives

for a few first-of-a-kind new entrants, to “demonstrate

to the public, political leaders and investors the technical

performance, cost and environmental acceptability of the

technology” (MIT, 2009: 19).

The principal conclusions of the MIT study are broadly

consistent with those of a 2004 University of Chicago

analysis of the cost of power plants that could be put

into service by 2015. Like the MIT study, and despite

differences in their models, the Chicago researchers

concluded that electricity from new nuclear plants

would be more expensive than coal (29-115 percent

more, compared to 60 percent in the MIT study) and



more expensive than natural gas (18-103 percent more,

compared to the MIT’s 20-75 percent). The Chicago

report expressed no surprise at this outcome since:

No observers have expected the first new

nuclear plants to be competitive with

mature fossil power generation without

some sort of temporary assistance

during the new technology’s shake-

down period of the first several plants

(Tolley and Jones, 2004: 5-25).

In a 2009 update, the MIT group expressed

disappointment that six years later the economics of

nuclear remained essentially unchanged (MIT, 2009: 6).

While the price of natural gas had risen dramatically,

making nuclear more attractive (although gas has

since retreated from its peak), the construction costs

for all types of large-scale engineered projects had

also escalated dramatically ― but more so in the case

of nuclear. MIT’s estimated overnight cost of nuclear

power had doubled from $2,000/kW to $4,000/kW

in six years. The following chart illustrates the MIT

researchers’ assessment of the worsening economic

prospects of nuclear energy, at least in the US.

Costs of Electricity Generation Alternatives

Overnight Cost

Fuel Cost

Base Case

w/carbon charge $25/

ton CO2

w/same cost of capital as

coal/gas

$/kW $/m BTU ¢/kWh ¢/kWh ¢/kWh

2003 (2002 USD)

Nuclear 2,000 0.47 6.7 n/a 5.5

Coal 1,300 1.20 4.3 6.4 n/a

Gas 500 3.5 4.1 5.1 n/a

2009 (2007 USD)

Nuclear 4,000 0.67 8.4 n/a 6.6

Coal 2,300 2.60 6.2 8.3 n/a

Gas 850 7.00 6.5 7.4 n/a

Source: MIT (2009: 3)

The 2009 update noted that “While the US nuclear

industry has continued to demonstrate improved

operating performance [for existing reactors], there

remains significant uncertainty about the capital

costs, and the cost of its financing, which are the main

components of the cost of electricity from new nuclear

power plants” (MIT, 2009: 6). It suggested, unsurprisingly,

that lowering or eliminating the risk premium would

make a significant contribution to making nuclear

more competitive. This will only occur, it said, through

“‘demonstrated performance’ by ‘first movers’” which

will in turn only occur because of government subsidies

to lower the risk.

The 2005 US Energy Policy Act (EPact) ― which the

2003 MIT study may have helped inspire ― provided

such government support. Yet four years later the MIT

researchers judged that the program had not been

effective in stimulating new build. This may be in

part because, as the MIT researchers themselves had

advocated, all low-carbon technology alternatives have

been subsidized. This confirms Mark Cooper’s claim

that technology neutral subsidies do “not change the

consumer economics much” (Cooper, 2009b: 61). (See

below for further analysis of the impact of subsidies.)

Keystone Report

The 2007 Keystone Center’s Nuclear Power Joint Fact-

Finding Dialogue, involving 11 organizations, nine of

which are corporations or utilities involved in selling or

buying nuclear power plants, estimated that the life-cycle

levelized cost of future nuclear power in the US would

have a “reasonable” range of between 8 and 11 cents per

kWh delivered to the grid (Keystone Center, 2007: 11).

This is higher than MIT’s 7.7-9.1 cents per kWh (in 2007

dollars). Reportedly, at some of the sponsors’ insistence,

the report did not consider comparable costs for other

energy sources (Lovins and Sheikh, 2008: 5). The study

took into account a likely range of assumptions on the



critical cost factors, such as escalation in material costs,

length of construction period and capacity factor. It

noted that while some companies have announced their

intention to build “merchant” plants, “it will be likely be

easier to finance nuclear power in states where the costs

are included in the rate base with a regulated return on

equity” (Keystone Center, 2007: 12) (see chart on page 51).

Financial Market and Other Independent Analysts

Since it is investors, both private and public, whose

money would be at risk in investing in nuclear power,

it is instructive to consider their views. In short, private

capital remains skeptical, as do utilities being pressed

to invest in new build. Mark Cooper has calculated

the overnight cost of completed nuclear reactors

since the “great bandwagon market” of the 1970s and

1980s compared to projected future costs. He notes a

dramatic escalation in cost estimates since the current

“nuclear renaissance” was heralded, as Wall Street and

independent analysts, along with utilities, began to

examine the early estimates of vendors, governments

and academics (Cooper, 2009b: 3).

In October 2007, Moody’s Investors Service declared

that “the ultimate costs associated with building new

nuclear generation do not exist today ― and that the

current cost estimates represent best estimates, which

are subject to change” (Moody’s Corporate Finance,

2007). It estimated that the overnight cost of a new

nuclear power plant in the US could range from $5,000

to $6,000 per kW. For the new build in Ontario, Canada,

Moody’s is forecasting an overnight cost of $7,500 per

kW (compared to the Ontario Power Authority’s claim

of $2,900 per kW) (Ontario Clean Air Alliance, 2009).

As for levelized costs, according to Mark Cooper,

numerous studies by Wall Street and independent

energy analysts estimate efficiency and renewable costs

at an average of 6 cents/kWh, while nuclear electricity

is in the range of 12-20 cents/kWh (Cooper, 2009b: 1).

Cost Comparisons with Non-Baseload Alternatives: Conservation, Efficiency and Renewables

One argument used for increasing the use of nuclear

energy is that no other relatively carbon-free alternatives

exist for providing “reliable baseload power,” especially

for large urban areas. Although the term is often misused,

baseload power in the parlance of the electricity industry

means power at the lowest operating cost. This baseload

is supplemented during peak periods by costlier forms

of generation. Mark Cooper claims that utilities promote

a narrow focus on traditional central power station

options since “large base load is what they know and

they profit by increasing the base rate” (Cooper, 2009b:

43). Yet renewable energy like wind and solar could, in

theory, be run as baseload power since the operating

costs are marginal compared with large power plants.

Baseload power also does not mean “most reliable,”

since all sources of electricity are unreliable and power

grids are designed to cope with highly variable supply.

Nuclear power plants must be shut down periodically

for refueling and maintenance, prolonged heat waves

may deprive them of cooling water as occurred in

France in 2003, and they also automatically shut down

for safety reasons during electricity blackouts, at the

very time they are most needed, as occurred in the

great Northeast America blackout in August 2003 and

in Brazil in November 2009 (WNN, 2009c). In fact, a

portfolio of many smaller units is inherently more

reliable than one large unit as it is unlikely that many

units will fail simultaneously.

While most baseload power is projected to continue to

come from centralized power stations, simply because

they already exist and already supply major portions

of total electricity demand, there are many cheaper

alternatives. At the very least nuclear will find itself



competing in terms of both investment and subsidies, as

governments seek to adjust their energy mix for reasons

of climate change and energy diversity (IEA, 2008a: 45).29

Some of the alternatives, such as conservation and

efficiency measures, will reduce demand for baseload

power. In the IEA’s ACT and BLUE scenarios to 2050,

energy-efficiency improvements in buildings, appliances,

transport, industry and power generation represent the

largest and least costly savings (IEA, 2008a: 40). One

example is combined heat and power (CHP), which

by generating electricity and heat simultaneously, can

increase overall efficiency and reduce the combined

environmental footprint. For existing industrial facilities

or power stations using biomass, natural gas or coal (but

not nuclear), only a modest increase in investment costs

is required for CHP. Despite some loss of efficiency in

electricity generation (increasing heat production hurts

electricity production) (MacKay, 2009: 146, 149), CHP can

be “very profitable” according to the IEA (IEA, 2008a: 143).

Other alternatives, such as solar, wind and biofuels,

would seek to replace baseload power, in many cases

combined with greater use of “distributed generation”

from smaller plants closer to the consumer (IEA, 2008a:

143). Cost comparisons between nuclear and such

alternatives can be even more complex than comparing

baseload alternatives. Yet, as Mark Cooper points out,

compared to the diversity of nuclear cost estimates,

there is much less diversity in the cost estimates of

alternatives, so the figures tend to be more convincing. In

a comparison of six recent studies, Cooper reveals that:

New nuclear reactors are estimated to

be substantially more expensive than

a variety of alternatives, including

biomass, wind, geothermal, landfill, and

some solar and conventional fossil fuels.

The studies find that nuclear is cost

competitive with advanced coal, natural

gas and some solar (Cooper, 2009a: 43).

Levelized Cost of Low Carbon Options to Meet Electricity Needs

Source: Cooper (2009a: 30)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Landfill

Efficien

cy

Biomass c

o-firing

Cogenera

tion

Geotherm

al

Wind - onsh

ore

CC Gas

Biomass-D

irect

Gas w

CCS

Fuel Cell

Nuclear

Coal w C

CS

Wind - offs

hore

Small H

ydro

Solar - T

hermal

Solar-P

V

Average Low High

$/M

Wh

(200

8$)



Naturally, the levelized cost is only one aspect of

the choices policy makers will face in choosing their

national energy mix. As David McLellan confirms, “The

economics of nuclear plants vary from one country to

another, depending upon energy resource endowments,

government policies and other factors that are country

specific” (McLellan, 2008: 18). As indicated in the

section on climate change above, calculations of the

cost of carbon emissions avoided per dollar spent on

different types of electricity generation (as opposed to

simply considering the levelized cost of electricity of

each alternative) reveal that nuclear is among the more

expensive ways of tackling climate change.

It is beyond the scope of this report to analyze all of the

pros and cons of these technologies and the likelihood

that they could supplant significant amounts of baseload

power generation to the point of persuading policy

makers to forego new nuclear builds. Clearly, many

alternative energy sources face significant challenges,

including the intermittency of supply (wind and solar);

the need for enormous tracts of land in order to generate

sufficient amounts of energy (wind, solar, biofuels) and

energy storage capacity (battery technology). Other

technologies, such as “clean coal” and CCS are unproven

and subject to great skepticism. However, R&D is

proceeding at such a pace for some technologies that

improvements in performance and cost will arrive more

quickly than they can for nuclear technology ― which

has demonstrated long lead times, poor learning rates

and large cost-overruns.

The IEA notes that “technology learning” is an

important factor in R&D and investment decisions for

emerging energy technologies. Over time the costs of

new technology should be lowered through technology

learning as production costs decrease and technical

performance increases. The IEA has surveyed observed

historic learning rates for various electricity supply

technologies (IEA, 2008b: 205). The learning rate for

nuclear in the period 1975-1993 in the OECD area was

just 5.8 percent, the lowest except for offshore wind and

CCS. Onshore wind achieved learning rates of between

8 and 32 percent, while photovoltaics ranged from 20-

23 percent. A study by McDonald and Schrattenholzer

shows the learning rates of the nuclear industry

compared to other selected energy technologies to be

low (6 percent compared to 17 percent for wind, 32

percent for solar and 34 percent for gas turbine combined

cycle (GTCC)) (McDonald and Schrattenholzer, 2001:

355-361). Observed learning rates for various “demand-

side” technologies were all higher than for nuclear,

including selective window coatings (17 percent),

facades with insulation (17-21 percent), double-glazed

coated windows (12-17 percent) and heat pumps (24-

30 percent). While such comparisons need to be treated

with care due to the difficulty of comparing different

technologies, especially those starting from a low

base like wind, compared with more mature ones like

nuclear, they do give an indication of the competition for

investment in R&D and deployment that nuclear faces.

Construction Delays and Cost Overruns

Major one-off engineering and construction mega

projects like bridges, tunnels and Olympic stadiums

almost invariably take longer to build and cost more than

originally estimated. In the nuclear industry, however,

delays and cost overruns are legion. According to the

World Energy Council, the average construction time for

nuclear plants has increased from 66 months in the mid-

1970s to 116 months (nearly 10 years) between 1995 and

2000 (Thomas et al., 2007: 10).30 Since 2000 there has been

a decline, but average construction time remains at seven

years (Thomas et al., 2007: 10). Nuclear plant construction

projects are so capital intensive, attract such high interest

rates, are so complex and are of such duration, that

even relatively minor delays can result in significant



cost overruns. Mark Cooper notes that “Reactor design

is complex, site-specific, and non-standardized. In

extremely large, complex projects that are dependent

on sequential and complementary activities, delays

tend to turn into interruptions” (Cooper, 2009b: 41). The

challenge for the nuclear industry is that unlike other

one-off projects, like bridges and stadiums, nuclear

power plants must compete with cheaper alternatives.

Part of the rationale for Generation III+ reactors is the hope

that costs will come down with “learning experience”

from subsidized first-of-a-kind reactors, economies of

scale from multiple new builds, modularization and

assembly-line production of components (Schneider,

2009b: 32),31 as well as “advanced project management

techniques” (Boone, 2009: 8-9).32 In addition, the

industry is pinning its hopes on streamlined government

regulation, as in the UK and US. However, as we have

seen, the learning that usually lowers costs over time has

not generally occurred in the nuclear power business.

A study by Mark Cooper demonstrates that during

the “great bandwagon” era of American nuclear build

in the 1960s and 1970s “on average, the final cohort

of … market reactors cost seven times as much as the

cost projection for the first reactor” (Cooper, 2009b: 2).

Although the IEA estimates that a learning rate of just 3

percent is required to reduce the current estimated cost

of Generation III+ nuclear power plants from $2,600/kW

in 2010 to a “commercialization target” of $2,100/kW by

2025, this seems a gross underestimate, especially since

the MIT 2009 update gives a current overnight cost for

new reactors in the US of $4,000/kW (IEA, 2008b: 206).

(For Generation IV the figures are even less convincing:

a 5 percent learning rate to bring the estimated current

cost of $2,500 in 2030 to a post-2050 figure of $2,000.)

Faster construction times are currently being recorded in

Asia. Of the 18 units built in Asia between 2001 and 2007,

Overnight Cost of Completed Nuclear Reactors Compared to Projected Costs of Future Reactors

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

10000

11000

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981 83

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

Ove

rnig

ht C

osts

(200

8$/K

W)

Projected PlantsOperating Plants

Year of Operation/Projection

Early Vendors, Government & Academics

“NUCLEAR RENNAISANCE”Utilities

“GREAT BANDWAGON MARKET”

Wall Street and Independent Analysts

Source: Cooper (2009b: 3)



three were connected to the grid in 48 months or less

(IEA, 2008b: 287). The fastest was Onagawa 3, a Japanese

800 Mw boiling water reactor (BWR) connected in 2002

after a 41-month construction period (IEA, 2008b: 287).

According to AECL, its CANDU-6 reactors built in China

were delivered ahead of schedule and under budget

(Oberth, 2009). In fact, AECL claims that in the last 13

years it has contractually delivered seven reactors on

time and on budget in China, South Korea and Romania.

These may be exceptions that prove the rule, since the

current nuclear “revival” is showing “eerie” parallels

to the 1970s and 1980s. Cooper claims that “startlingly

low-cost estimates prepared between 2001 and 2004 by

vendors and academics and supported by government

officials helped create what has come to be known as the

‘nuclear renaissance’” (Cooper, 2009b: 2). David McLellan

suggests that this was inspired by “the dramatic increase

in the efficiency of [existing] US nuclear power plants”

― an exception to the nuclear industry’s poor learning

curve (McLellan, 2008: 4). Yet according to Cooper’s

research, the most recent cost projections for new nuclear

reactors are, on average, more than four times as high

as the initial “nuclear renaissance” projections (Cooper,

2009b: 1). This has not prevented nuclear boosterism of

the type that characterized the 1970s and 1980s from re-

emerging. According to Steve Kidd, “What is needed is

the courage to get over the initial period of pain of high

initial capital costs to enter the “land of milk and honey”

in subsequent years, where nuclear plants can be almost

“money machines” for their owners (Kidd, 2007: 203-204).

Such cost overruns are not restricted to the US. India’s

reactors have all been over budget, ranging between

176 and 396 percent (Thomas et al., 2007: 11). In Canada,

the Darlington facility built in the period 1981-93 so

compromised the financial position of the provincial utility,

Hydro Ontario, that its CAN$38 billion debt was orphaned

into a separate fund. Provincial electricity consumers to this

day see an amount added to their electricity bill to pay off

this debt (Ontario Clean Air Alliance, 2004).

The Olkiluoto-3 Project in Finland

The first nuclear reactor to be built in a deregulated

electricity market is currently under construction

at Olkiluoto in Finland. It is also the first order

for Areva’s Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR).

The turnkey project is being constructed for

Finnish energy company Industrial Power

Corporation (Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO)),

originally by a consortium of the French company

Areva and Germany’s Siemens, at a fixed price of

€3 billion. The contract was signed at the end of

2003, a construction licence obtained in February

2005 and construction began in mid-2005. The

1,600 MWe plant was supposed to begin operation

in 2009. By the end of 2009 the project was more

than three years behind schedule and is now

expected to open “beyond” June 2012 (TVO,

2009). The project is also more than 50 percent

(€1.7 billion) over budget (WNN, 2009i). Areva has

allowed for a €2.3 billion ($2.8 billion) loss on the

project so far (WNN, 2009e).

Since work began there have been several

complications: the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear

Safety Authority (Säteilyturvakeskus or STUK) has

expressed concerns about the safety culture at

the site; local contractors have been faulted for

poor quality work on the concrete for the reactor

“island”; a dispute between Areva-Siemens and

TVO over compensation for the cost of replacement

power has gone to international arbitration and

Siemens has left the consortium. Some of these

problems are common in so-called first-of-a-kind



projects, which is why the nuclear industry seeks

government guarantees to cover unexpected losses.

Steve Kidd, director of strategy and research at

the WNA, calls the delays in the Finnish project a

“significant blow” to demonstrating the viability of new

build in deregulated markets (Kidd, 2008: 50). Yet the

project is actually not operating in a truly deregulated

environment; it obtained export credits from French

and Swedish government agencies which enabled the

project owners to obtain a bank loan for 60 percent of

the total cost at an interest rate of 2.6 percent, which,

taking into account inflation, is an effective interest

rate of zero (Thomas et al., 2007). Areva, moreover,

in offering a turnkey project at a fixed price, appears

to have kept the price unreasonably low as a “loss

leader” to attract new orders. It was also reportedly

concerned that the regulatory approval it obtained

from the French and German authorities in 2000 for

the EPR would lapse if an order was not placed soon

and the design proven in practice (Thomas et al., 2007:

39). Finally, TVO is 60 percent owned by the not-for-

profit Nordic Power Corporation (Pohjolan Voima Oyj

(PVO)), whose shareholders are entitled to purchase

electricity at cost in proportion to their equity. This

arrangement is “effectively a life-of-plant contract for

the output of Olkiluoto-3 at prices set to fully cover

costs” (Thomas et al., 2007: 40), hardly a model of a de-

regulated environment.

Despite the long, largely positive experience of

Finland with nuclear power in the past and its

reputation as an efficient, well-governed and highly

regulated state, the Olkiluoto-3 project suggests

several lessons for the nuclear revival:

• Turnkey contracts represent a huge risk for plant

vendors, which in the future are likely to be wary

of them (this has already occurred in Ontario,

where the bids were starkly realistic and thus too

expensive for the government to contemplate).

• New nuclear build may not be economically

viable even in partially deregulated markets.

• The skills needed to successfully build a nuclear

plant to the engineering and safety standards

required are considerable and a lack of recent

experience of such construction may make the

task much more difficult.

• There are serious challenges for regulatory bodies,

even those as professional and experienced as

Finland’s, in overseeing new generation reactor

construction, especially first-of-a kind plants

(STUK had not assessed a new reactor order for

more than 30 years) (Thomas et al., 2007: 41).

The Impact of the 2008-2009 Current Financial Crisis

The 2008-2009 financial crisis and global economic

recession have added to existing investor uncertainty

about the economic fundamentals of nuclear energy.

An IEA background paper for the G8 energy ministers

meeting in May 2009 reported that energy investment

worldwide was plunging in the face of a tougher financial

environment, weakening “final” demand for energy and

falling cash flows (IEA, 2009). It estimated that global

electricity consumption could drop by as much as 3.5

percent in 2009 ― the first annual contraction since the

Second World War. The IEA expects to see a resulting

shift to coal- and gas-fired plants at the expense of more

capital-intensive options such as nuclear and renewables,

although it added that “this will depend on the policies

and support mechanisms individual countries and



regions have in place” (IEA, 2009: 4). Platts reported in

September 2009 that according to industry leaders at the

WNA annual symposium in London “the international

financial and economic crisis that began a year ago has

cast a chill over the burgeoning nuclear ‘renaissance’”

(MacLachlan, 2009: 1-3).

Meanwhile, the US Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has

dramatically scaled back its “Vision 2020” plan launched

in 2002 to foster the addition of new US plants by 2020. It

now projects only 20,000 MW compared to 50,000 MW.

Marvin Fertel, NEI president and CEO, said this was due

to the current economy and the absence of new units

demonstrating that they could be successfully built. Plans

for new build in Ontario, Canada, have been cancelled

due to both falling demand for electricity and rising costs.

It could be, however, that the global recession has mixed

effects on the fortunes of nuclear energy. While private

investors may be more reluctant to invest and utilities less

able to take out loans since the capital markets seized up,

interest rates are historically low. Moreover, governments

around the world have sought to attenuate the effects of

the recession by pumping government funds into their

economies, notably by supporting infrastructure projects.

However, nuclear vendors may have trouble arguing that

their projects have the desired “shovel-readiness” and

that they can produce instant jobs. Probably more likely

than significant outright funding would be an expansion

of existing government subsidies.

The Impact of Government Subsidies

Governments, like utilities and the nuclear industry, will

take economic and financial considerations into account

in making public policy decisions about whether or

not to permit, support, actively encourage or actually

invest in nuclear energy. Some governments, with large

reserves derived from oil or other wealth, may simply

choose to build nuclear power plants regardless of the

economics of nuclear power, but most cannot afford

this luxury. Naturally, industry will take into account

the willingness of governments to provide a favourable

investment environment for nuclear power.

The nuclear energy industry has always been the

beneficiary of government financial support, either

direct or indirect. This is attributable to several factors:

the technology emerged from nuclear weapons or other

military programs such as submarine propulsion; the

industry requires significant regulation and oversight by

governments (in terms of safety, security, nonproliferation

and waste); governments need to assume insurance

liability above certain limits in case of catastrophic

accidents; the earliest reactor projects have tended to

lack commercial viability; and construction delays and

cost overruns have often forced governments to absorb

or retire unmanageable debt incurred by utilities. States

with national reactor vendor companies also willingly

became financially involved in promoting what was seen

in the 1960s and 1970s as a revolutionary technology that

promised huge profits from exports. The most famous

example is the US Atoms for Peace Program, but other

governments joined in, as in the case of Canada’s support

of its CANDU reactor exports (Bratt, 2006).

The nuclear industry is currently schizophrenic on the

issue of subsidies, trumpeting the “new economics”

of third generation nuclear reactors, while seeking

government assistance to kick-start a revival. According

to the WNA’s Steve Kidd, “The first new nuclear units to

be built should not now need financial subsidies, as the

economics now look sound, assuming that investors can

take a long-term view” (Kidd, 2008: 79), although “Initial

plants of new designs … face substantial first-of-a-kind

engineering costs and may need some public assistance

to become economic” (Kidd, 2008: 44).

American studies all conclude that for the US, at least, the

most critical factor in the future relative cost of different



electricity generation technologies is government

financial support (along with the price of carbon) (CBO,

2008: 26).33 The US seems to offer the greatest variety

of subsidy mechanisms through its 2005 Energy Policy

Act, including loan guarantees, tax credits, regulatory

delay insurance and other subsidies for the first six

new reactors, as well as funding from the Department

of Energy (DOE) for first-of-a-kind reactors (CBO,

2008: 11, 8-9).34 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

concludes: “EPAct incentives by themselves could make

advanced nuclear reactors a competitive technology for

limited additions [emphasis added] to baseload capacity”

(CBO, 2008: 2). The 2003 MIT calculations do not support

this. Despite the magnitude of their proposed subsidies,

they still would not be large enough to fully overcome

the higher costs of nuclear compared with fossil fuels

(this would only be done through a carbon tax and by

reducing the risk premium through “demonstrated

performance”) (MIT, 2009: 8). Under the MIT proposal

the levelized cost of electricity from the 10 “first movers”

would be approximately 6.2 cents per kWh, still well

above the estimated price of electricity from coal or

natural gas (Smith, 2006: 49).

The 2009 update of the 2003 MIT study, which had

advocated “limited government assistance for ‘first

mover’” US nuclear plants concludes that this has

“not yet been effective in moving utilities to make

firm reactor construction commitments” (MIT, 2009:

9). This was due to three reasons: the Department

of Energy has not moved expeditiously enough to

issue the regulations and implement the program; the

requirement of many state governments that utilities

obtain a certain fraction of their electricity from low-

carbon sources has excluded nuclear; and increased

cost estimates are making the industry seek even more

assistance. The Nuclear Energy Institute has argued

that the current loan guarantee program of $18.5

billion is “clearly inadequate” (the industry has so far

applied for loans totalling $122 billion) (Alexander,

2009) and proposed at least $100 billion for all clean

energy technologies, including nuclear (WNN, 2009d).

The MIT group opposes increased subsidies, arguing for

a level playing field for all energy generation technologies

based on a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system (MIT,

2009: 10). According to Mark Cooper: “Seeking to

override the verdict of the marketplace, the industry’s

lobbying arm has demanded massive increases in

subsidies from taxpayers and ratepayers to underwrite

the industry,” but even with subsidies nuclear would

still be more expensive than the alternatives (Cooper,

2009a: 1). Peter Bradford, a member of the US Nuclear

Regulatory Commission from 1977 to 1982, argues that

“the US can revert to the sensible notion of limited support

for a few first mover nuclear projects or it can insist that

US taxpayers continue to underwrite a ‘revival’ that the

industry has proven unable to manage” (Bradford, 2009:

64). The Congressional Budget Office considers the risk

of default on the part of the nuclear industry to be very

high ― well above 50 percent (CBO, 2003).

The UK has said it will take active steps to “open up the

way” to construction of new nuclear power stations, but

conscious that British taxpayers have borne the costs of

past failures to achieve nuclear energy profitability (Brown,

2008: 3)35 has made clear that it is up to private enterprise

to fund, develop and build the new stations (Davis, 2009:

26). Ontario, meanwhile, has signaled it is not prepared to

subsidize nuclear by guaranteeing cost overruns.

Even for countries with generous subsidies, these may

not be enough to make the difference in favour of

nuclear power. As the CBO warns for the US, “under

some plausible assumptions … in particular those that

project higher future construction costs for nuclear

plants or lower gas prices ― nuclear technology would

be a relatively expensive source of capacity, regardless of

EPAct incentives” (CBO, 2008: 2).



Currently, many governments engaged in the “revival”

are offering “support” for new build, although not

necessarily in the form of subsidies. In most countries

undertaking or planning significant new build,

including China, India, Russia, Japan, Taiwan, South

Korea and the Ukraine, a lack of transparency about

costs and hidden subsidies makes it impossible to

ascertain the complete extent of such support. Even in

Western market economies information about costs and

subsidies may be difficult to discern. In France, the true

total cost of nuclear energy, closely linked as it is to the

nuclear weapons fuel cycle, is apparently considered a

state secret and has never been disclosed (Brown, 2008:

32).36 Some countries with oil wealth such as Nigeria,

Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, may be able to provide

the ultimate in government subsidy by simply buying a

nuclear plant outright with government funds, without

transparency and little or no legislative oversight.

The Impact of Carbon Pricing

The CBO concludes that “the longer-term competitiveness

of nuclear technology as a source of electricity is likely

to depend on policy makers’ decisions regarding carbon

dioxide constraints” (CBO, 2008: 26) that could increase

the cost of generating electricity with fossil fuels. The

2003 MIT study, too, noted that while nuclear power

was not currently economically competitive , it could

become so if future carbon dioxide emissions carried a

“significant price” (MIT, 2003: 8). The CBO notes that the

effect is most pronounced for coal, which emits nearly a

metric ton of carbon dioxide for every megawatt hour of

electricity produced (CBO, 2008: 2). Even modern coal-

and gas-fired plants designed to use fuel more efficiently

would still emit enough carbon dioxide to make nuclear

more economic under a carbon regime. Plants that use

CCS, which has not yet been proven commercially, are

likely to emit just 10 percent of the carbon dioxide of

current fossil fuel plants. Yet this still fails to compete

with the zero emissions from a nuclear generating plant

(Galbraith, 2009).

Cooper points out, however, that imposing a price

on carbon makes all low carbon options, including

efficiency and renewables, more attractive. It would

thus “not change the order in which the options enter

the mix” (Cooper, 2009b: 8). Brice Smith notes that an

increased focus on efficiency as a result of a carbon price

would result in reduced demand for electricity, throwing

into question the need for additional large power plants

(Smith, 2006: 60). The World Business Council for

Sustainable Development notes that some alternative

technologies like ultra-supercritical pulverized coal

(USSPC) and wind in optimal locations are already

“mature” and would be competitive were the value of

CO2 emissions internalized into electricity prices (World

Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2008: 3).

Crucially, carbon taxes and/or cap-and-trade systems rely

on private enterprise and investors responding to market

signals. It could be a decade before the price of carbon

stabilizes at high enough levels for confident investment

decisions to be made about using nuclear energy

instead of other sources. The EU’s pioneering system,

established in 2005, while understandably fraught with

teething problems, has still not priced carbon high

enough for nuclear to become economic (Nuclear News

Flashes, 2009b).37 In 2009 the MIT group lamented that a

carbon tax, along with other incentives for nuclear had

not yet been realized, meaning that “if more is not done,

nuclear power will diminish as a practical and timely

option for deployment at a scale that would constitute a

material contribution to climate change risk mitigation”

(MIT, 2009: 4). The system enacted by the US Congress

in June 2009 has been watered down by making early

distribution of permits largely free, ensuring that politics

rather than sound economics will govern the price, at

least in its early years.



Essentially the prospects of a global price on carbon

are so uncertain as to make it impossible for investors

today to assess the effects on the economics of nuclear

power. The whole future of the international climate

regime is itself uncertain, especially after the failure

of the Copenhagen climate change conference in

December 2009. Implementation of a global price for

carbon through either a tax or a cap-and-trade system

is years away, while investment decisions about nuclear

energy need to be made now.

Costs of Nuclear Waste Management and Decommissioning

The costs of nuclear waste management and

decommissioning of civilian power reactors should

ideally be “internalized” in the cost of electricity. Contrary

to popular perception, long-term waste management

and decommissioning are a negligible part of the overall

estimated costs of nuclear, since they are calculated in future

dollar values which, due to inflation, become progressively

cheaper. Thomas et al. note that if a 15 percent discount

rate for a new power plant is applied to decommissioning

and waste management they essentially “disappear” from

the calculations. However, they also claim that it would be

wrong to apply such a high rate of return to such long-term

liabilities since funds collected from consumers should be

placed in low-risk investments to minimize the possibility

that they will be lost. Such investments yield a low interest

rate (Thomas et al., 2007: 60).

A more pertinent question is whether future costs

of waste management and decommissioning are

adequately estimated, especially given the fact that

“no full-size nuclear power plant that has completed

a significant number of years of service has ever been

fully dismantled and disposed of” (Thomas et al.,

2007: 45). Moreover, there is no experience anywhere

in the world with long-term disposal of high-level

nuclear waste from civilian nuclear power plants

(although the US does have such experience with

high-level military waste).

Ideally, funds for nuclear waste management and

decommissioning should accumulate from revenues

obtained from the electricity generated. Such funds may

either be held and managed by the commercial operator

(as in France and Germany) or by the government (as in

Finland, Sweden and the US). Problems may arise if utilities

are unwilling or unable to set aside real funds (as opposed

to a notional, bookkeeping entry); if funds are lost through

poor investments; or if the company collapses before the

end of a plant’s expected lifetime. All of these have occurred

in the UK, where significant decommissioning costs for old

nuclear plants (estimated in 2006 at around £75 billion and

rising) will be paid by future taxpayers since real funds

were not set aside (Thomas et al., 2007: 26-27, 60). The NEA

estimates, alarmingly, that in some cases funds set aside for

decommissioning in the EU represent less than 50 percent

of the anticipated real costs, although it reports that steps

are being taken to redress this situation. In the US the

government is being sued by nuclear utilities for collecting

monies for centralized nuclear waste management, but

failing to provide it at Yucca Mountain. The NEA pleads

for decommissioning funds to be “sufficient, available and

transparently managed” (NEA, 2008a: 265), something

neither the nuclear industry nor governments have

achieved to date.

Industrial Bottlenecks

After finance, a second major constraint on rapid

expansion of nuclear energy is said to be a lack of

industrial capacity. Since the last major expansion of

nuclear energy in the 1980s, capacity specific to building

nuclear power plants has atrophied everywhere, except

in France, Japan and South Korea. Arguments have been

advanced that globally, industry would not be able to

sustain a major nuclear energy revival to 2030 because

the scale of activity required is unprecedented.



In the peak years of 1985 and 1986, 33 power reactors

were connected to the grid. In the 1980s approximately

150 reactors were under construction simultaneously

(NEA, 2008a: 318) and an average of one reactor was

added to the grid every 17 days, mostly in only three

countries: France, Japan and the US (NEA, 2008: 316).

According to the NEA, extrapolation of this historical

experience, taken together with the growth in the global

economy since that time, suggests that the capability

to construct 35-60 1,000 MWe reactors per year could

be rebuilt if necessary (NEA, 2008a: 316). There are

currently 52 reactors “under construction” worldwide —

although some have been under construction for years or

were substantially built and work is resuming to finish

them — so the construction of 60 new ones per year is

not a ludicrous notion. The NEA claims it is feasible to

replicate the rates witnessed in the 1980s to 2030. It is

only in 2030-2050, it says, that a much higher build rate

will be required, when most existing plants will need

replacing ― along with further capacity expansion.

The Keystone Center’s 2007 Nuclear Power Joint Fact-

Finding Dialogue agreed that “the most aggressive

level of historic capacity growth (20 GWe/yr) could

be achieved or exceeded in the future.” However, this

would depend on realizing the claims for advanced

reactors: larger output per plant (10-50 percent),

advanced construction methods, greater use of

modularization, advances in information management

and “a more competent global supply base”

(Keystone Center, 2007: 26). Some of these elements

are problematic. The Keystone report also provided

a useful reminder that not just nuclear plants would

need to be built, but in addition, globally:

• 11-22 additional large enrichment plants to

supplement the existing 17;

• 18 additional fuel fabrication plants to supplement

the existing 24;

• 10 nuclear waste repositories the size of the statutory

capacity of Yucca Mountain, each of which would

store approximately 70,000 tons of spent fuel.

Keystone participants reached no consensus about the

rate of expansion for nuclear power in the world or in the

US over the next 50 years. Some thought it was unlikely

that nuclear capacity would expand appreciably above

its current levels and could decline; others thought that

it could expand rapidly enough “to fill a substantial

portion of a carbon-stabilization ‘wedge’ during the next

50 years” (Keystone Center, 2007: 10).

The rate at which individual countries can ramp up

a nuclear energy program will vary. The US has a

particularly flexible economy that responds quickly

to market opportunities, but other market economies,

including some in the EU, such as Italy and former Eastern

European bloc countries, are considered less nimble.

Semi-command economies with heavy governmental

control, like those of China and Russia, may have less

difficulty in directing resources where needed.

The French Example – Exemplar or Sui Generis?

France is often cited as an example that others

should emulate in the acquisition of nuclear

electricity. It has the highest percentage of nuclear

electricity, has had the most intensive nuclear

building rate of any country and has the most

extensive recent experience of nuclear build.

Driven by energy security concerns, France added

54 reactors between the late 1970s and early

1990s, employing a highly standardized design

(NEA, 2008a: 320). Annual generation of nuclear

electricity grew by 43 percent over a 14-year period

after 1990. Today nuclear provides 77 percent of



France’s electricity, more than in any other country. It is

the second largest producer of nuclear electricity after

the US and the world’s biggest exporter of it, mainly to

Belgium, Italy and Germany (although in peak winter

periods it is forced to import fossil-fuel generated

electricity from the latter to cover its shortfall due to

overuse of electric space heating) (Schneider, 2008a: 3).

However, France may be one of a kind, in this as

in other fields. Bernard Goldschmidt, who helped

found the French Atomic Energy Commission,

Comissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA) in 1946,

says of France, “Whenever a country’s nuclear

effort has been able to profit from continuity, with

a technical and political consensus giving support

to competent technical and executive teams, it has

reaped benefits …” (Goldschmidt, 1982: 146). He

continues, “Because France is more dependent than

most other industrialized countries on imported

energy resources, her reaction to the energy crises

of the 1970s had to be more positive than that of

her neighbours: from that moment her nuclear

power program had received and retained national

priority” (Goldschmidt, 1982: 146).

France also has a uniquely centralized system for the

supply of nuclear energy (Garwin and Charpak, 2001:

128). State-owned Electricité de France (EDF) owns and

operates the reactors; the Compagnie Général des Matières

Nucléaires (COGEMA) is responsible for all aspects of

the nuclear fuel cycle; and the Agence Nationale pour

la gestion des Déchets Radioactifs (ANDRA) (National

Agency for the Management of Radioactive Waste)

― has managed radioactive wastes since 1991. The

government also has a financial stake in a second

utility, GDF Suez (a merger of former state-owned Gaz

de France (GDF) and private company Suez). The CEA

oversees the development and manufacture of nuclear

weapons, as well as much of the research and design

work on commercial nuclear reactors.

Areva, a French multinational corporation with a global

reach, describes itself a “the world leader in nuclear

power and the only company to cover all industrial

activities in this field” (Areva, 2009). In addition to the

design and construction of nuclear reactors and supply

of products and services for nuclear power plant

maintenance, upgrades and operations, it also engages

in uranium ore exploration, mining, concentration,

conversion and enrichment, nuclear fuel design and

fabrication and back-end fuel cycle activities such

as treatment and recycling of used fuel, cleanup of

nuclear facilities and “nuclear logistics.” (At the time

of writing, Areva was seeking to sell its electricity

transmission and distribution business.) Areva claims

it can capture about one-third ― slightly more than

100,000 MW ― of the global nuclear generating

capacity that its research has found could be built by

2030 (MacLachlan, 2009a: 5).

The relationship between the French trade unions,

the Confédération Français Démocratique du

Travail (CFDT), and the nuclear sector has also been

“instrumental” in the implementation of the various

phases of the nuclear program, the unions having

been “pacified” with a generous “social fund” deal

(Schneider, 2009: 58). Mycle Schneider makes the

case that “the elected representatives always had and

have a very minor influence on the development,

orientation, design and implementation of energy and

nuclear policy in France” and that undue influence

has been achieved by graduates of the elite Corps

des Mines (Schneider, 2009: 82). No other country has

such a unified structure or a national nuclear zeitgeist.



However, even France may not be able to emulate

its past success. Deregulation of the electricity

market is putting pressure on prices, which will

affect the old way of doing business. The real cost

of France’s massive nuclear construction program

has never been revealed, but the government may

not be prepared indefinitely to write the type

of blank cheque demanded by such a program.

Problems familiar to other nuclear energy states,

including lack of personnel, material shortages,

cost overruns and construction delays, may also

be affecting France’s own program. France is likely

to face a shortage of skilled workers (Schneider,

2008a). Some 40 percent of EDF’s operators and

maintenance staff will retire by 2015.

The EPR currently being built in Flamanville by

EDF, the first in France and the second in the world

after the one being built in Finland, is experiencing

difficulties. A second “quasi replica” of Flamanville-3

is proposed for Penly in southern France by 2020

(Reuters, 2009). According to EDF, the second

EPR would be more expensive, as savings on

construction costs due to the “learning curve” from

Flamanville-3 would be offset by potentially higher

site-related costs and tighter market for materials

and equipment (Nucleonics Week, 2008: 2).

Since no single company, not even Areva, can

construct a complete nuclear power plant by itself,

one challenge is to rebuild what the NEA calls global

supply chains, involving numerous contractors and

sub-contractors, each of which must achieve the high

manufacturing and construction standards required

for a nuclear plant, extending well beyond the nuclear

reactor itself.

The most commonly cited industrial bottleneck relates

to ultra-large nuclear forgings used in large nuclear

reactor vessels, essentially for units of 1,100 MWe

capacity and beyond.38 Currently the three suppliers

of heavy forgings are Japan Steel Works (JSW), China

First Heavy Industries and Russia’s OMZ Izhora

(Kidd, 2009: 10). New capacity is being built in Japan

by JSW; in South Korea by Doosan; and in France at Le

Creusot. There are plans for new capacity in the UK by

Sheffield Forgemasters and India by Larsen & Toubro.

Nothing is planned for North America. Industry is

therefore ramping up in response to demand yet, as

would be expected. However, manufacturers will only

respond as long as firm orders are in the pipeline, since

investment in major forges and steelmaking lines is

not cheap. This a classic investment catch-22.

A further difficulty faced by new large nuclear forging

entrants is the length of time it takes to gain the necessary

technical quality certification, such as that issued by the

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

(Birtles, 2009: 42). For example, because its EPRs are

being built in several countries, Areva has to satisfy

both the French manufacturing code and the ASME

code. Guillaume Dureau, head of Areva’s equipment

business unit, has warned that rather than producing

standardized, interchangeable forgings, “we will have

to know what power plant it’s for before starting to pour

the forgings” (MacLachlan, 2009b: 3-4). This would

appear to attenuate one of the advertised benefits of

Generation III+ reactors ― standardization. He noted

that a combination of larger component size, new

designs and stricter safety requirements, coupled with

the need for more forged components than previous

reactor models, had posed huge challenges for Areva’s

components plant, but “We have clearly shown we

know how to do this” (MacLachlan, 2009b: 3).



Personnel Constraints

The nuclear industry’s stagnation since the early 1980s has

led to a dramatic decline in enrolment in nuclear science

and engineering degrees worldwide, leading to what is

now referred to as the “missing generation.” The OECD/

NEA published a report in July 2000, Nuclear Education and

Training: Cause for Concern?, which quantified, for the first

time, the status of nuclear education in OECD member

countries (NEA, 2000). It confirmed that in most OECD

countries nuclear education had declined to the point that

expertise and competence in core nuclear technologies

were becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Problems

included:

• decreasing the number and dilution of nuclear courses;

• declining numbers of students taking nuclear subjects

and the significant proportion of nuclear graduates

not entering the nuclear industry;

• the lack of young faculty to replace ageing and

retiring faculty; and

• ageing research facilities, which are being closed and

not replaced (NEA, 2000: 5).

There has also been a significant long-term reduction

in government funding of nuclear research in some

countries since the mid-1980s, notably in Germany, the

UK and the US — although France and Japan have held

up comparatively well (NEA, 2008a: 322-323).

The existing nuclear workforce is also declining. The

nuclear industry, in a steady state over the last few

decades, has had relatively little turnover in employees,

leading to an ageing workforce and little recruitment.

A large portion of the existing nuclear labour force is

set to retire within the next five to ten years, including

numbers as high as 40 percent in France and the US

(Squassoni, 2009b: 46-47). A shortage of experienced

nuclear plant operators — many of the current operators

have spent their entire professional lives in the nuclear

industry, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s — is

particularly troubling. In a 2007 North American Electric

Reliability (NERC) survey, 67 percent of respondents

said it is highly likely that an ageing workforce and

lack of skilled workers could affect electricity reliability

(Schmitt, 2008: 3). The impact is likely to be more

pronounced for nuclear power because of the special

training, experience and licensing criteria required

for employment. Such experience cannot be gained

simply from training courses. In addition, new skills

and competencies will be needed in the new generation

technologies envisaged, as well as in decommissioning

and nuclear waste management. The skills shortage

has been exacerbated by deregulation of electricity

markets, which has led to cost-cutting by downsizing

the workforce, a loss of research facilities and cuts in

financial support to universities (NEA, 2004: 8).

On a global basis a rapid short-term expansion in

nuclear energy is thus likely to be limited by the shortage

of qualified personnel. As the NEA notes, “It is likely to

take several years to redevelop the capability to construct

new nuclear power plants, while maintaining the

necessary high standards and the ability to keep projects

on time and to cost” (NEA, 2008a: 316). The effects will

be felt differently from country to country. For the UK,

for example, “It is clear that the envisaged new nuclear

build programme ... will be almost like establishing a

new industry” (Kidd, 2008: 55). Argentina has had to

turn to Canada for expertise in resuming construction

on its Atucha-II reactor after 14 years since not only had

the technology changed but the personnel had moved

on (WNN, 2008c). In addition to the industry itself,

regulatory bodies and the IAEA will also be competing

for experienced personnel.

It will be especially difficult for those states, mostly

developing ones, contemplating building a nuclear

energy sector from scratch, to attract qualified

personnel to build, operate, maintain and regulate their



nascent nuclear facilities. Only the wealthiest, such as

the oil-rich states, will be able to afford to pay the high

salaries necessary in such a competitive market. The

UAE has already made a name for itself by siphoning

highly trained personnel from other companies and

organizations to oversee its nuclear development. As

a result, it is one of the more likely aspiring nuclear

states to succeed in its plans. Indonesia, Jordan and

Vietnam are unlikely to be able to compete.

Ramping up educational and training programs is a

long-term project, but a report by the NEA in 2004 noted

that steps have been taken by some governments to

ameliorate the problem. Efforts have been made in the

past decade in the US, Japan and Europe in particular

to increase university enrolment in nuclear science

and engineering (Elston, 2009). A European Nuclear

Education Network (ENEN) has been established to

foster high-level nuclear education (NEA, 2008a: 325-

327). The UK has launched a National Skills Academy for

Nuclear (NSAN) to coordinate recruitment and training

of personnel, while the universities of Manchester and

Lancaster are expanding nuclear research and education

(WNN, 2008j; Nuclear News Flashes, 2008). Canada

has a University Network of Excellence in Nuclear

Engineering. At the undergraduate level, enrolment

in nuclear engineering degrees in US universities has

increased from approximately 225 students in 1998 to

just under 350 students in 2006, although the number

of doctoral engineering degrees has steadily declined

(NEA, 2008: 36-37; Osborn, 2008: 36-37). The World

Nuclear University is a recent initiative taken by the

WNA, with participation from the IAEA, the NEA and

WANO (World Nuclear University, 2010).39 The NEA

notes that some OECD governments have not taken

any initiatives at all, perhaps because they prefer the

private sector to take the lead, because there is a national

moratorium on nuclear power or simply because they

consider that adequate programs already exist.

Ultimately, the extent of personnel shortages will be

dependent on the size and scope of the nuclear revival

as determined by its other drivers and constraints,

and by the agility of both governments and the

private sector in responding. While skills deficits may

constrain a significant nuclear revival, governments

have the capacity to overcome them if they prioritize

skills development and training ― a decision that will

be based on their own predictions about the future of

nuclear energy.

Nuclear Waste

The final major constraint on a global expansion of nuclear

energy is the abiding controversy over radioactive nuclear

waste disposal. Not only is it controversial among the

general public and among the most often cited reason for

opposing nuclear power, but industry itself is concerned.

Excelon, the largest US nuclear utility has said it has

“serious reservations” about proceeding with new nuclear

plant construction until the used fuel management issue

has been resolved (Nuclear News Flashes, 2009a).

Nuclear power generates radioactive waste containing

a variety of substances having half-lives as short as

fractions of seconds to as long as millions of years. Such

waste is classified according to the level and nature of

its radioactivity ― low-level waste (LLW), intermediate-

level waste (ILW) and high-level waste (HLW). It is also

categorized according to its half-life, whether short-lived

(SL) or long-lived (LL). Low- and intermediate-level

waste is produced at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle,

from uranium mining to decommissioning of facilities.

Although together this waste represents the greatest

volume, it contains only a small fraction of the total

radioactivity produced by the nuclear industry. Most of

the radioactivity, but the smallest amount by volume, is

in spent fuel or in high-level waste from reprocessing.

While nuclear power plants and other nuclear fuel cycle

facilities release a small amount of radioactivity directly



into the environment, increasingly tight controls,

according to the NEA, have led to a “remarkable

reduction in the amount of radioactive effluents” (NEA,

2008a: 242).

The risk to human beings from radioactivity is well

known but poorly understood by the general public. In

addition to the risk of inhalation and ingestion, radiation

can pose “external” risks to humans from simply being

in proximity to it. The key aim is therefore to concentrate

and contain nuclear wastes and isolate them from the

environment for as long as they remain hazardous.

Interim Storage

Responsibility for managing the radioactive waste

produced at a nuclear power plant initially lies with

the facility operator. The waste is usually stored onsite

in water-filled cooling ponds to allow short-lived

radioactivity to disappear and heat to dissipate. In

some countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden and

Switzerland, spent fuel is moved after several years’

storage at the reactor site to a centralized national

storage facility. If spent fuel is to be reprocessed it will

be transported, after cooling, to a reprocessing facility

where the recyclable material (95 percent of the mass)

is separated from what then becomes a high-level waste

stream. This is usually stored in vitrified form either at

the reprocessing plant or in purpose-built facilities.

Long-Term Disposition

For the purposes of disposal, low- and intermediate-

level waste is sometimes dealt with together. Short-

lived low- and intermediate-level waste is disposed of

in simple near-surface landfills or in “more elaborately

engineered” near-surface facilities. Most countries with

a major nuclear power program operate such facilities.

By far the greatest challenge is what to do with high-level

waste from nuclear reactors and long-lived intermediate

waste from reprocessing (often known as transuranic

waste). Storage of such materials at nuclear facilities is

regarded only as an interim management solution as

it relies on continued active control and maintenance.

It is vulnerable to extreme natural events such as

earthquakes or fire, and malevolent attacks by terrorists

or saboteurs or even attempts at seizure for use in nuclear

or radiological weapons. Interim storage areas in some

countries, such as Japan, are rapidly filling up, making

a permanent solution imperative. From the beginning of

the nuclear age, the nuclear industry had expected that

governments would move quickly to provide a long-

term solution to the commercial nuclear waste problem.

Almost six decades later, not a single government has

succeeded in doing so.

The principal proposed long-term solution is deep

geological burial, involving the emplacement of packaged

waste in cavities excavated in a suitable rock formation

some hundreds of metres below the surface. According

to the NEA, the safety principle is that the rock will

provide isolation and containment of the radioactivity

to allow for sufficient decay so that any eventual release

at the surface will be at levels comparable to that of

natural rock formations and “insignificant in terms of

potential effects on health and the environment” (NEA,

2008a: 249). This principle is compromised somewhat

by a demand by some in the nuclear industry that the

“waste” be retrievable if and when technology permits

the fuel in it to be used (Tucker, 2009), a concept parodied

as envisaging a “deep plutonium mine.” Retrievability

raises questions about whether illicit retrieval might be

possible, as well as the cost of burying a resource that

may be dug up and used in the future.

The world’s only operating deep geological repository for

radioactive waste, the Waste Isolation Plant at Carlsbad,

New Mexico, was developed for disposal of transuranic

waste from the US nuclear weapons program, not for



civilian nuclear waste, but it has demonstrated the

feasibility of the concept. Plans to open a site at Yucca

Mountain in Nevada for civilian nuclear waste have

run aground due to political opposition (see below).

Currently, only Finland and Sweden (NEI, 2007: 18-20) are

well advanced and could have their repositories operating

by 2020. According to the NEA, they are expected to be

followed by France and Belgium, then Germany, Japan,

Switzerland the UK in the 2030s and 2040s. Several other

countries have repositories planned, but have announced

no implementation dates before 2050. Others have

research and development programs only.

For new entrants into the nuclear power business, with

just one or a small number of reactors, establishing their

own nuclear waste repositories is likely to be completely

unrealistic on the grounds of cost and need. Yet the lack of

disposal options may spur opposition to nuclear energy

itself, as in existing nuclear energy states. International

cooperation is likely to be necessary among the smaller new

entrants, although there is great sensitivity in all countries,

with the apparent exception of Russia, about acting as a

nuclear waste dump for others.

While there is a virtual consensus among scientists that

a long-term geological repository for such nuclear waste

is a technically and environmentally sound solution,

finding a suitable location for such a repository has

proven to be a highly volatile political issue in most states,

and has been cited as a major reason for opposition to

nuclear power. As the NEA cautions: “the time necessary

from a primarily technical point of view to move from

deciding on a policy of geological disposal to the start

of waste emplacement operations could be of the order

of 30 years” (NEA, 2008a: 252). This does not take into

consideration political and economic barriers which may

often be the most daunting. The long lead times, as in the

case of Yucca Mountain, provide great opportunity for

opposition to develop.

An evolving approach, pioneered by Sweden and Canada,

is to undertake a comprehensive, national consultation

process aimed at securing agreement on a long-term nuclear

waste management strategy. In Canada’s case, a three-year

study, emphasizing “citizen engagement,” was undertaken

by a specially established Nuclear Waste Management

Organization (NWMO). It proposed a policy of “Adaptive

Phased Management” which committed “this generation

of Canadians to take the first steps now to manage the used

nuclear fuel we have created” (Dowdeswell, 2005: 5). The

policy promotes “sequential and collaborative decision

making, providing the flexibility to adapt to experience and

societal and technological change” (Dowdeswell, 2005: 45).

Ultimately, though, it envisages “centralized containment

and isolation of used nuclear fuel deep underground in

suitable rock formations, with continuous monitoring and

opportunity for retrievability” (Dowdeswell, 2005: 151).

Canada’s deliberative, democratic process, taking into

account the “ethical and social domains as well as the

technical questions” is unlikely to be easily emulated in

other states, especially those with a strong anti-nuclear

movement or those with undemocratic systems. It is not

clear, therefore, that the nuclear industry will be able to turn

public opinion around in most countries.

One difficulty is the historic link between nuclear weapons

programs and nuclear energy. The early weapons programs

produced far more nuclear waste than civilian industry

and were often undertaken as crash programs with scant

regard for public safety or the environment. The massive

cleanup of the Hanford nuclear site in Washington state

is costing American taxpayers an estimated $200 billion

and is scheduled to last for decades (Vandenbosch and

Vandenbosch, 2007: 119). High-level waste had been stored

in 177 tanks, 149 of them single-walled, 67 of which leaked

approximately 100 million gallons of radioactive waste into

the subsoil and groundwater. While it is unfair to compare

the practices of the 1940s with today’s more safety- and



environmentally conscious nuclear industry, the legacy of

the weapons linkage lingers and affects public attitudes.

A second difficulty for planned new build in existing

nuclear energy states is the existing stockpiles of civilian

nuclear waste that are a legacy of past procrastination by

governments about disposal. Industry projections of a huge

increase in the number of nuclear power plants as part of

a revival creates the impression of huge increases in the

amount of nuclear waste, even though, according to the

NEA, “historic” spent fuel will continue to dominate the

worldwide inventory to 2050, even with a significant revival

(NEA, 2008a: 260). The volume of additional nuclear waste

will also pale in comparison to waste volumes from nuclear’s

continuing biggest rival, coal. As David MacKay points out,

whereas the ash from 10 coal-fired power stations would

have a mass of 4 million tons per year, the nuclear waste

from Britain’s 10 nuclear power stations has a volume of

just 0.84 litres per year, most of which is low-level (MacKay,

2009: 169). Although there is growing disenchantment with

“dirty coal” and increasing demands that it be phased out

due to its massive contribution to global warming, this is

unlikely to particularly benefit nuclear power in the debate

over waste since nuclear’s other main competitor, natural

gas, produces no solid waste.

A third and related difficulty for the nuclear industry is

communicating the concept of relative risk to the public.

In the US, coal ash from coal-fired stations, for example,

exposes the public to more radiation than nuclear power

plants (McBride et al., 1978). Yet the public is almost

completely unaware of this fact. The WNA’s Steve Kidd

calls the nuclear industry’s handling of the waste issue

a “mess” and an “own goal,” and recommends that the

industry never admit that it produces waste “unless you

really have to,” adding another “own goal” by confessing

that “Perhaps this is morally not a completely defensible

position, but it makes sound business sense” (Kidd, 2008:

155). This illustrates a core issue for the nuclear industry

― regaining public confidence through transparent,

honest engagement over the nuclear waste issue. As

Canada’s NWMO reported of its public engagement

process in Canada:

Consistently throughout the dialogue,

concern was expressed by some

participants about the track record of

the nuclear industry and government

in terms of accountability and

transparency. Many examples were

brought forward of incidents in which

the industry and/or government have

acted in what is perceived to be a self-

interested and secretive manner. For

these participants, this is a key area

in which trust must be built before

proceeding with any approach for the

long-term management of used nuclear

fuel (Nuclear Waste Management

Organization, 2005: 75).

Yucca Mountain

A solution to long-term storage of nuclear waste

in the US has been elusive despite more than two

decades of effort in trying to open a repository at

Yucca Mountain in Nevada (Vandenbosch and

Vandenbosch, 2007).40 The 1982 Nuclear Waste

Policy Act (NWPA) required that the federal

government open a waste repository by 1998 to

store all of the waste generated by the US civilian

and military nuclear programs. A congressional

vote directed the Department of Energy to focus

on Yucca Mountain as the location of the first

repository, and the NWPA was amended in 1987

to specifically identify the Yucca site (WNN,



The “Revival” So Far

If one dates the revival of interest in nuclear energy from

2000, it is clear a decade later that progress has been slow.

The first ten years of the twenty-first century have seen the

opposite of a revival in nuclear power. There has, in fact, been

a relative decline, and, according to some indices, an actual

decline, in the contribution of nuclear power to world energy

production. Not only has the number of operating nuclear

reactors plateaued since the late 1980s, but the IAEA figure

of 436 reactors as of December 2009, with a total net installed

capacity of 370 GW(e) (IAEA, 2009c), is eight units less than

the historical peak in 2002 of 444 (Froggatt and Schneider,

2008: 4). Five nuclear power reactors remain in long-term

shutdown. Since commercial nuclear energy began in the

mid-1950s, 2008 was the first year that no new nuclear plant

was connected to the grid (Schneider et al., 2009: 5), although

two were connected in 2009.

In absolute terms, nuclear grew between 2000 and 2008

from 2,600 to 2,700 TWh, a 6 percent increase (BP, 2009).

This was dwarfed by a much greater growth in overall

electricity generation during the same period, from

15,400 to 20,200 TWh, a 31 percent increase. In the same

period, nuclear’s share of global electricity generation

fell from 16.7 percent in 2000 to 13.5 percent in 2008 (BP,

2009). Even this level was only sustained due to capacity

factor improvements in the existing fleet and extended

operating licences (mostly in the US, where reactors set a

generation record of 843 million gross MWh and averaged

an historical high of 91 percent capacity) (Ryan, 2008: 1).

Nucleonics Week described the causes of the decline as

“ranging from an earthquake in Japan to persistent aging

ills in the UK to backfitting outages in Germany” (Ryan,

2008: 1). But the decline has longer-term roots than that,

as demonstrated by the chart on page 67 showing nuclear

grid connections peaking in the 1980s.

2009h). The amendment drew fierce political

opposition from Nevada Senator Harry Reid,

who has campaigned successfully for more than

20 years to prevent the project from proceeding.

As a concession to Nevada, the Yucca Mountain

site had a statutory 70,000 tonne limit attached to

it in a 1987 NWMA amendment, but as of 2008 the

total amount of existing waste destined for Yucca

was 70,800 tonnes, with roughly an additional

2,000 tonnes being added to the total annually

(WNN, 2008a). Increasing the limit at the Yucca

site was an option, but the earliest it could

open would be 2018 ― 20 years after originally

scheduled (WNN, 2008a). After the DOE saw its

budget for the Yucca Mountain project decline

year after year during the Bush administration

(Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 2008), President Obama

fulfilled his campaign promise to scrap the

project in February 2009 (WNN, 2009h). Future

US policy awaits the recommendations of a

panel set up by the Obama administration in

January 2010 (Goldenberg, 2010).

Safety, Security and Proliferation

Among the additional constraints on the advance of

nuclear energy most commonly cited are concerns

about the safety and security of nuclear facilities

and materials, and the potential for nuclear energy

programs to advance the proliferation of nuclear

weapons. These play into public opinion as well as

being the concern of opinion leaders, policy makers,

governments and international organizations. Since

these concerns present profound implications for

global governance, they will be considered in detail

in Parts 2 to 4 of this report.



Current “New Build”

The number of nuclear power plants currently being

built appears impressive. According to the IAEA, 46

were “under construction” worldwide in November

2009 (IAEA, 2009c). Further analysis reveals, however,

that current construction activity is confined to 13

countries, all of them, except Iran, with existing

commercial nuclear power. Most of the activity ― 30

reactors ― is taking place in just four countries: China,

India, Russia and South Korea.

Global Annual Grid Connections on Five-Year Moving Average

5-year moving average

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Rea

ctor

s co

min

g on

line

per y

ear

Source: IAEA, 2006, cited in International Energy Agency (OECD/IEA), Energy Technology Perspectives 2008, p. 301.

Nuclear Reactor Numbers and Share of Global Electricity Production Since 2000

400

410

420

430

440

450

460

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Operati

ng ReactorsPerc

enta

ge o

f Glo

bal

Elec

tric

ity P

rodu

ction

Source: IAEA (2009c); BP (2009a)



Almost one-third of what seems like new construction

activity (depending on how Russian reactors are

counted) is in fact “hang-over” orders from previous

eras (Thomas et al., 2007: 11). Fourteen of the units

“under construction” have been designated by the IAEA

as “under construction” for 20 years or more (Froggatt

and Schneider, 2008: 8). Nine reactors currently on

the “under construction” list, in Argentina, Bulgaria,

Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine, were on an IAEA list

in December 2006 as “nuclear power plants on which

construction has been stopped.”41

Nuclear Power Plants Currently Under Construction by Country

Country No. of Units Total MWe

Argentina *1 692

Bulgaria *2 1906

China 16 15220

Finland 1 1600

France 1 1600

India 6 2910

Iran *1 915

Japan 2 2191

Pakistan 1 300

Russia *9 6894

Slovakia *2 810

South Korea 5 5180

Taiwan *2 2600

Ukraine *2 1900

United States *1 1165

Total: 52 45883

Source: IAEA (2009c) * Denotes construction on previously suspended projects.

The two reactors in Bulgaria previously on the “stopped”

list, Belene-1 and Belene 2, will help replace four old Soviet

RBMK reactors which Bulgaria shut down as a condition of

EU membership (NEA, 2008a: 63). Two partially finished

reactors in Ukraine, Khmelnitski-3 and Khmelnitski-4,

which were, respectively, 75 percent and 28 percent

complete when work stopped in 1990, were also on the

“construction stopped” list. As the Ukrainian government

itself has announced that work will not actually recommence

on them until an unspecified date in 2010, they should not

yet be on the “under construction” list (WNA, 2009f). As

to Russia, it is difficult to obtain information as to whether

construction work is actually occurring on some reactors

listed as “under construction” or whether site maintenance

is simply being carried out. The seemingly impressive

total of nine for Russia is distorted by the inclusion of two

small floating reactors of just 32 MW each (IAEA, 2009c:

424).42 Iran is about to bring its Bushehr reactor on line, but

only after 35 years of periodically interrupted construction

(Bahgat, 2007: 20-22).43

The resuscitation of previously defunct projects could be

described as a revival of sorts, but is probably not what

the nuclear industry has in mind; rather they are pinning

their hopes on what they call “new build.”

“New Build” by Existing Nuclear Energy States

Plans for real “new build” have been announced by 19

of the 31 countries that already have nuclear power, so

to that extent a revival is occurring. Especially extensive

are the ambitions of China, India, Japan, Russia, South

Korea, Ukraine, the UK and the US. However, close

examination of the each country’s plans ellicits caution.

All of the national case studies commissioned by this

project on the major existing nuclear energy states

(Canada, China, France, India, Russia, the UK and the

US) expressed skepticism about their ambitious plans

for expansion.44

Canada

While Canada had plans for major new nuclear build,

these were set back significantly in June 2009 with the

announcement by Ontario that it was indefinitely postponing

its decision on a new fleet of reactors (Cadham, 2009).45

Ontario has 16 of Canada’s 18 nuclear reactors, supplying

approximately 50 percent of provincial electricity. In July



2009, Bruce Power, an electricity utility, also dropped plans

to build new reactors in Ontario due to declining electricity

demand (Bruce Power, 2009; CBC, 2009). Meanwhile, the

federal government announced in December 2009 that it

would privatize the CANDU reactor supply part of Atomic

Energy of Canada Ltd (NRCan, 2009), putting into question

the future commercial prospects of the company’s new

Advanced CANDU Reactor.46 Mooted new build in Alberta

and Saskatchewan is a long way from realization, although

refurbishment of reactors in Ontario, New Brunswick and

Quebec will likely all be accomplished (Cadham, 2009).

China

China has the most ambitious program of any country.

A director of its Nuclear Energy Agency, Zhou Xian, has

said that “the golden time for China’s nuclear power

development has come,” with some projections as high as

72 GWe by 2020 (compared to 8.2 GWe today), requiring

the construction of 60 reactors in 11 years (WNN,

2009f). China is certainly moving rapidly, but from a

very low base, with only 1.5 percent of total generating

capacity currently provided by nuclear. In June 2008 it

had only 11 reactors, compared with Canada’s 18 and

the United States’ 104 (NEA, 2008a: 49). Even its most

ambitious plans will see an increase to just 5 percent by

2020. Already there are concerns about finance, labour

shortages and costs (Hibbs, 2008: 1, 10).

France

France has only a modest expansion plan since its

capacity is already substantial, and, some would argue,

saturated. Currently, only one new reactor is being built

in France, by EDF at Flamanville. Like the Areva project

in Finland, it is a 1,600 MWe EPR intended to demonstrate

the superiority of the Generation III reactor. As noted,

it is, like the Finnish reactor, experiencing construction

difficulties. A second reactor has been proposed for

Penly in Northern France for 2020.

India

According to M.V. Ramana, in a study for this project

(Ramana, 2009),47 India has had a unique nuclear

trajectory. Ever since independence, its political

leadership and technological bureaucracy have been

committed to a large future role for nuclear power in

generating much needed electricity. As of yet, these

plans have not materialized, and the program has been

marred by various accidents and poor safety practices.

As elsewhere, nuclear electricity has been expensive, a

greater problem in a developing country with multiple

requirements for scarce capital. India is also unique in

that the proposed nuclear expansion is based in part on

fast breeder reactors because of a shortage of domestic

supplies of cheap and easily mined uranium.

Even six decades after the program’s inception, hopes

of a large expansion of nuclear power still abound. In

the early 2000s, India’s Department of Atomic Energy

(DAE) projected 20 GW by 2020 and 275 GW by 2052, the

latter amounting to 20 percent of India’s total projected

electricity generation capacity. Following the September

2008 waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group permitting

India to import foreign civilian nuclear technology and

materials, these estimates have gone up. The Atomic

Energy Commission chairman has promised that nuclear

power will contribute 35 percent of Indian electricity by

2050. Since the DAE has projected that India will have an

installed electricity generation capacity of 1,300 GW (a

nine-fold increase from the current 145 GW) by that time,

the 35 percent prediction implies that installed nuclear

capacity would amount to 455 GW, more than 100 times

today’s figure. Based on past experience, such an increase

seems highly unlikely even given the sudden availability

of foreign technology and assistance. Several countries

have recently signed nuclear cooperation agreements

with India, including Canada, France, Russia and the US,

with hopes of supplying reactors. However, India has



constructed its own reactors based on the CANDU heavy

water type which it has re-engineered and proposes to

market to others.

Japan

In 2002 Japan laid out a 10-year energy plan for an

increase of 13 GWe by 2011. This will not now be met:

its 2005 Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy aims

by 2030 to simply maintain, or increase by only 10

percent, the contribution of nuclear power to electricity

generation (NEA, 2008a: 68). Japan continues to

stockpile plutonium and has the world’s most advanced

plans for operating a “plutonium economy” in the

quest for energy independence, but progress has been

slow. Operation of its existing fleet has been plagued

by earthquake-induced shutdowns and technical

problems. In 2009 it had 10 reactors supposedly in

operation that were in fact shut down, most since the

2007 earthquake (Schneider et al., 2009: 10).

Russia

Miles A. Pomper, in a study for this project, reports that

Russia is facing significant challenges: “It is far from clear

whether Russia will be able to fulfill its ambitious goals

to more than double its electrical output from nuclear

power, increase exports of nuclear reactors, and play an

even larger role in providing fuel and fuel-related services

for nuclear plants” (Pomper, 2009: 2). Russia’s 15 RBMK

Soviet reactors will need replacement despite extensive

safety improvements since the Chernobyl disaster (NEA,

2008a: 450)48 and attempted lifetime extensions (Pomper,

2009: 4). Having restructured its nuclear industry for this

purpose, Russia is planning to export nuclear reactors,

including novel types like floating ones.

South Korea

Like China, the Republic of Korea is one of the more likely

candidates to achieve its nuclear energy plans. Currently,

its 20 nuclear reactors supply 40 percent of the country’s

electricity; it is building five more and envisages bringing

as many as 60 online by 2050. It also seems determined

to establish a closed nuclear fuel cycle on the basis of

spent fuel pyroprocessing (currently being perfected by

South Korean scientists, but arousing US concerns about

its potential proliferation implications) and fast reactors

(Nuclear Fuel, 2008: 5). South Korea is also positioning itself

to export reactors. South Korean industry has launched a

drive to export PWRs to emerging nuclear power markets,

including Indonesia, Turkey and Vietnam, but because it

leases intellectual property rights from Westinghouse that

vendor must approve any such exports (Hibbs, 2008b: 5).

South Korea announced its first reactor sales, to the UAE,

in December 2009 (WNN, 2009a).

Ukraine

The Ukraine might be considered as having an especially

urgent motivation for nuclear “new build” in its desire

to escape reliance on Russian gas supplies which have

been disrupted in recent years. Currently, Ukraine

has 15 reactors, all of the Soviet-designed VVER type,

generating about half its electricity. It plans to build 11

new reactors and nine replacement units to more than

double its nuclear generating capacity by 2030. However,

the drawn-out financing and safety enhancement saga

over resuming work on Khmelnitsiki 3 & 4, involving

the European Bank for Reconstruction & Development

(ERBD) and Russia (WNA, 2009f), as well as Ukraine’s

parlous economic situation, do not inspire confidence

that this schedule is achievable.

United Kingdom

The UK currently has 19 reactors, which generated 15

percent of its electricity in 2007, down from 25 percent

in recent years due to plant closures. The government’s

January 2008 Energy White Paper, after an extensive

public consultation process, concluded that nuclear



power could be part of a low carbon energy mix needed

to meet the country’s carbon emission targets. However,

the government was careful to stress that it would be

“for energy companies to fund, develop and build new

nuclear power stations in the UK, including meeting the

full costs of decommissioning and their full share of waste

management costs” (Hutton, 2008). The UK’s plans call for

commencing construction of the first new British nuclear

power station in decades in 2013-2014, for completion by

2018. Ian Davis, again in a study for this project, notes

that “previous British experience with untried nuclear

designs suggests it could be much longer”(Davis, 2009:

30). Crucially, in the UK’s deregulated market, investment

decisions are largely being left to private sector energy

companies. The UK regulator has already expressed

safety concerns about both prime contenders for the UK’s

new reactors, the EPR and Westinghouse’s AP-1000 and

asked for design modifications. EDF, a front-runner for

the UK’s new build stakes, is purchasing land, mostly near

existing plants, for its intended nuclear power fleet.

United States

Seen as a bellwether of the purported nuclear

“renaissance” following the Bush administration’s

launch of its Nuclear Power 2010 program in 2002, the

US has added only one new reactor to the grid since then,

a shutdown plant at Browns Ferry that was refurbished

and restarted. A reactor that was previously ordered

but never completed, Watts Bar 2, is currently being

finished (MIT, 2009: 4-5). No new reactors are under

construction. As of September 2009, 17 applications for

licenses to construct and operate 26 new reactors had

been filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC), but even industry promoters predict that only

four to eight new reactors might come online by 2015,

and then only if government loan guarantees are secured

(Nuclear Regulatory Commission, US Department

of Energy, 2009). As Peter Bradford says: “Year seven

of the US nuclear renaissance seems a lot like 1978”

(Bradford, 2009: 60). The Congressional Budget Office

(CBO) concludes that it is probable that “at least a few

nuclear power plants will be built over the next decade”

in the US, most likely in states where electricity usage

and the corresponding demand for additional baseload

capacity are expected to grow significantly (CBO,

2008: 26). The 2003 MIT study argued that for nuclear

power to be resurgent in the US “a key need was to

design, build and operate a few first-of-a-kind nuclear

plants with government assistance, to demonstrate to

the public, political leaders and investors the technical

performance, cost and environmental accountability of

the technology” (MIT, 2009: 19). The 2009 update of the

report lamented that this had not happened and that the

current assistance program had not been effective (MIT,

2009: 18).

Meanwhile, prices in the US are rising dramatically

causing “sticker shock” according to NUKEM, Inc., a

company that tracks “The people, issues and events that

move the fuel market.” It reported in April 2008 that

with projects now “spiralling upwards to a dizzying

$7 billion per reactor with all-in costs in the range of

$5,000 to $7,000/kWe,” the “‘early’ nuclear renaissance

in America now looks more like 2015-2020 instead of

our originally designated 2013-2017 period” (NUKEM

Inc., 2008: 2-4). As Sharon Squassoni, in a study for this

project, concludes:

… just to maintain its share of the

electricity market, the nuclear industry

would need to build 50 reactors in the

next 20 years. Given that only four new

reactors might be operational by 2015,

significant growth could require build

rates of more than four per year. Greater

government subsidies and a carbon

pricing mechanism are not likely enough



to achieve such rates of construction.

The best outcome for the US nuclear

industry over the next five years,

particularly under an administration

that will probably offer mild rather

than aggressive support, will be to

demonstrate that it can manage each

stage of the licensing, construction and

operating processes of the first reactors

competently and efficiently. In sum, the

industry needs to demonstrate that it

has overcome the problems of the past

(Squassoni, 2009a: 18).

Other current players

Other states with existing nuclear plants have also

announced new build plans, but have not yet begun to

implement them. They include Brazil, Romania and

Lithuania (in partnership with Estonia, Latvia and

Poland). Slovakia is currently building two reactors. South

Africa has recently cancelled its expansion plans due to its

financial situation (Nucleonics Week, 2009d: 1).49

The states with existing nuclear power that are not

currently planning “new build” are Belgium, the Czech

Republic, Germany, Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands,

Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland. Of the European states

that decided to phase out nuclear power after Chernobyl

― Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and

Sweden ― only two, Italy and Sweden, have reversed their

positions. Italy is planning a whole new fleet of reactors.

In Sweden, the governing Conservative-led coalition

government has decided to halt the phase-out and plans

to replace decommissioned nuclear plants with new ones

(although not adding additional units). The opposition,

however, has reiterated its collective support for the 1980

referendum that led to the current gradual phase-out of

nuclear power in the country (Nucleonics Week, 2009c: 8;

Bergenäs, 2009). With the electorate deeply divided, the

current government in Germany plans only to extend the

existing phase-out period.

Aspiring Nuclear Energy States

This project’s Survey of Emerging Nuclear Energy States

(SENES) (CIGI, 2010) tracks progress made by states that

have declared an interest in acquiring a nuclear energy

capability ― from the first official announcement of such

an interest to the connection of the first nuclear power

plant to the country’s electricity grid.

SENES reveals that 33 states, plus the members of the

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) collectively, have

announced “consideration” or “reconsideration” of

nuclear energy at a credible ministerial level since 2000.

This is fewer than identified in other surveys. The WNA

suggests “over thirty countries” are newly interested in

nuclear energy (WNA, 2009b).

The IAEA has publicly claimed that “A total of 60

countries are now considering nuclear power as part

of their future energy mix, while 20 of them might have

a nuclear power programme in place by 2030” (IAEA,

2009b). The number 60 bears an uncanny resemblance to

the total number of states that have recently approached

the IAEA, at any level and in whatever detail, to

discuss nuclear energy. The IAEA’s Director General of

Nuclear Energy, Yury Sokolev, told representatives of

40 countries attending an Agency workshop on IAEA

Tools for Nuclear Energy System Assessment (NESA)

for Long-Term Planning and Development in July 2009

that the IAEA is expecting to assist 38 national and

six regional nuclear programs, a “three-fold increase

from the previous [unidentified] reported period”

(IAEA, 2009b). This, of course, does not mean that so

many states will decide to proceed with nuclear energy

after conducting their assessments. The number may

also include states that already have nuclear power.

Finally, the question arises as to why only 40 states,



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presumably including all of the major nuclear energy

states, attended the workshop if 60 are truly interested.

Given the IAEA’s caution that the timeframe from an

initial state policy decision (a nebulous concept itself),

to the operation of the first nuclear power plant “may

well be 10-15 years” (IAEA, 2007b: 2), a sudden surge

in nuclear energy capacity in the developing world by

2030 seems inherently unlikely.

In all of the surveys of states allegedly interested

in nuclear energy, the vast majority are developing

countries. In the case of SENES only three, Italy,

Poland and Turkey, could be considered developed.

A couple of others (Belarus and Malaysia) could be

considered developed enough to be able to afford a

nuclear power plant, although whether they have the

other prerequisites is doubtful. Several states could be

considered independently wealthy enough as result of

oil income to be able to afford a nuclear reactor on a

turnkey basis: these include Algeria, Indonesia, Libya,

Venezuela and the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia

and the UAE. But all of them lack an indigenous capacity

at present to even operate, regulate and maintain a

single nuclear reactor, much less construct one.

To track states’ progress, SENES uses some of the

key steps set out in the IAEA’s Milestones in the

Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear

Power. This document identifies three broad categories

of achievements which must be accomplished before a

state is considered ready for a nuclear power program

(IAEA, 2007b) see out in the chart on page 74.

Nuclear Infrastructure Development Programme (IAEA)

Source: Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development (No. NG-T-3.2), Nuclear Energy Series, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2008, p. 5.

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MILESTONE 3Ready to commission and

operate the first NPP

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MILESTONE 1Ready to make a

knowledgeable commitment to a nuclear programme

Bidding process

MILESTONE 2Ready to invite bidsNuclear power option

included within the national energy strategy



The vast majority of the states identified in SENES could

not, at present, legitimately claim to have reached or

gone beyond Milestone 1. Only Iran is close to starting

up a reactor (probably in 2010). Save for this one

exception, none has begun construction. The Philippines

has a partially completed reactor in Bataan, which it may

resume work on. Of the rest only Italy, which was among

the pioneers of nuclear technology and had a nuclear

power industry before scrapping it after the Chernobyl

accident, could be said to be completely knowledgeable

about nuclear power requirements. As of January 2010

only Egypt, which has aspired to nuclear power for more

than 30 years, and Turkey, are known to have invited bids

for a plant, which puts them at Milestone 2. Turkey has,

however, recently cancelled the initial bid process and

restarted it. The UAE is ahead of all the SENES states in

having accepted a bid from a South Korean consortium

for building and operating up to four new reactors.

Many of the aspiring states listed in SENES have taken

some steps, such as consulting the IAEA and establishing

an atomic energy commission and/or nuclear regulatory

authority, generically known by the IAEA as a Nuclear

Energy Programme Implementing Organization

(NEPIO). But this is less impressive than it may appear,

as these are among the easiest steps and imply nothing

about the capacities of such organizations.

Getting beyond Milestone 1 poses increasingly more

difficult challenges. While many of these may be difficult

to quantify, some indicators that can be identified almost

definitely rule out certain countries from acquiring

nuclear power over at least the next two decades.

Such countries would need to make unprecedented

progress in their economic development, infrastructure

and governance before nuclear power is feasible. The

unpreparedness of most SENES countries is revealed

by measurable indicators, including those relating to

governance, existing installed electrical capacity, gross

domestic product and credit ratings, as outlined in the

following sections.

Institutional Capacity

A country’s ability to lay the foundations for a

nuclear power program depends on its capacity to

successfully manage large and complex projects,

and its ability to attract or train qualified personnel.

It is unlikely that many developing countries

will be at this stage by 2030. Not least among the

requirements is an effective nuclear regulatory

infrastructure, and a safety and security structure

and culture (these will be considered further in

Parts 2 and 3 of this report). These are not built

overnight. The IAEA states that it can take at least

10 years for a state with no nuclear experience to

prepare itself for hosting its first nuclear power

plant (IAEA, 2007b). Such capacities must be in

place well in advance of construction of the first

nuclear power plant as part of achieving the IAEA’s

Milestone 1. Fortunately, the IAEA and responsible

vendors, for the sake of their own reputations, will

only assist with new build in states that are able

to prove they can safely and securely operate a

nuclear facility.

Many aspiring nuclear energy states have shown

that they struggle with managing any large

investment or infrastructure projects, for reasons

ranging from political corruption to terrorism.

Nigeria, for example, has a long history of

mismanaging large, complex projects (Lowbeer-

Lewis, 2010: 18), so establishing the regulatory

infrastructure and safety culture for a nuclear

power plant even over a 10-year period poses an

immense challenge.

Many SENES states struggle with governance.

Shockingly, all SENES states except Qatar, the UAE



and Oman, score five or below on the 10-point

scale of Transparency International’s Corruption

Perception Index (Transparency International,

2009). Considering that the institutional framework

for a successful nuclear energy program critically

includes an independent nuclear regulator, free

from political, commercial or other influence, that

must ensure the highest standards of safety and

security, the implications of pervasive corruption

in potential new entrant states are frightening. The

chart above indicates where SENES states fall on

indices relating to political violence, government

effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of

corruption as calculated by the World Bank. It is

notable that there is a high degree of correlation

between these indicators.

A tiny number of states can probably successfully

purchase everything necessary for a nuclear power

program, including safety and security personnel

for their institutional infrastructure. The UAE

is particularly active in paying others to manage

its future nuclear power program. According

to Philippe Pallier, director of Agence France

Nucléaire Internationale, the UAE is creating a new

management model for a national nuclear power

program, based on contractor services rather than

indigenous management expertise (MacLachlan,

2008a: 6). All of the Gulf States, like the UAE, Qatar

and Saudi Arabia, are accustomed to using foreign

contractors throughout their economy and may

indeed do so in the nuclear case. Not many SENES

states can afford to emulate them.

Governance Indicators for SENES States, 2008

Political Violence

Government Effectiveness

Regulatory Quality

Control of Corruption

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Source: World Bank (2009)



Physical Infrastructure

A major barrier to aspiring nuclear states in

the developing world is having the physical

infrastructure to support a nuclear power plant

or plants. This includes an adequate electrical

grid, roads, a transportation system and a safe

and secure site. The IAEA’s milestones document

includes a comprehensive list of hundreds of

infrastructure “targets” — including physical

infrastructure — for aspiring nuclear states to

meet before they should commission a nuclear

plant. This includes supporting power generators,

a large water supply and waste management

facilities (IAEA, 2007b). Meeting all of the targets

will be a major challenge for most SENES states,

requiring them to invest billions of dollars on

infrastructure upgrades for several years.

A significant and perhaps surprising constraining

factor in terms of infrastructure ― and a key

measurable of a country’s eligibility for nuclear

power ― is a suitably large or appropriate

electricity generating capacity. The IAEA

recommends that a single nuclear power plant

should represent no more than 5-10 percent of the

total installed generating capacity of a national

electricity grid (IAEA, 2007b: 39). The WNA claims

the number is 15 percent (WNA, 2009a). Taking the

IAEA’s high estimate of 10 percent as a median, a

state would need to already have an electrical grid

with an existing capacity of 9,000 MW in order to

to support a single 1,000 MW nuclear power plant,

or else plan to have it built well before bringing

a nuclear reactor online. Even large developed

countries with an unevenly distributed population

like Canada face such problems. (The Canadian

province of Saskatchewan, which is considering

nuclear power, has only one million people and a

total installed generating capacity of 3,878 MW.)

The main reason for this grid capacity requirement

is that if a large power plant represents too great

a proportion of grid capacity, it risks destabilizing

the system when it goes offline, either in planned

or emergency shutdowns (Schwewe, 2001: 117).

Nuclear power plants are most efficiently run as

baseload generators and thus should be used at

full capacity. They cannot be fired up and closed

down to match fluctuating grid requirements. In

addition, a reliable independent power source is

necessary for the construction and safe operation

of a nuclear power plant. An incident in Sweden

illustrates the importance of the latter. A loss of

offsite power for Sweden’s Forsmark 1 reactor

in July 2006 handicapped the control room

functions and deprived operators of information,

making it more difficult to shut down the reactor

(MacLachlan, 2007: 10). Lennart Carlsson of the

Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate said the

incident showed that “modern power supply

equipment is sensitive to grid disturbances and

they are complex” (MacLachlan, 2007: 10). The

fact that a sophisticated country like Sweden, with

decades of experience, is just discovering this fact

should give new entrants pause.

Based on installed electricity generation capacity for

2006,50 (see table on page 78) only 15 of the 33 SENES

states currently have such a capacity. These are either

developed countries like Italy or large developing states

like Indonesia and Kazakhstan. It is no coincidence that

the three countries at the top of the table ― Italy, Iran

and Turkey ― are the only SENES states which have

clearly passed Milestone 1 and are among the most likely

aspirants to succeed.



Installed Electricity Generation Capacity for SENES States, 2005

Generation capacity (GWe)

0 50 100

ItalyIran

TurkeySaudi Arabia

PolandThailand

IndonesiaMalaysia

VenezuelaEgypt

KazakhstanUAE

PhilippinesVietnam

KuwaitBelarus

SyriaAlgeriaNigeria

LibyaMorocco

BangladeshTunisiaOmanQatar

BahrainJordanAlbaniaGhana

MongoliaSenegalNamibia

Source: US Energy Information Administration (2009)

Currently, 17 of the 33 states pursuing nuclear energy

cannot support a 1,000 MW reactor without further

investment in their generating capacity. Three of these,

Belarus, Syria and Algeria, are close to the cut-off point

of 10,000 and may be able to increase their capacity

while simultaneously planning a new power reactor.

The remaining 14 states — those with less than 6,000

MW capacity — would need to increase it by more than

50 percent to bring it to the minimum 9,000 MW. Buying

smaller size Generation III reactors is not currently an

option as they are not yet technically proven, much less

commercially available.

Thus it appears that at least the following SENES

states are unlikely have one of the basic prerequisites

for successfully initiating a national nuclear energy

program within the next one to two decades:

• Albania

• Bahrain

• Bangladesh

• Ghana

• Jordan

• Libya

• Mongolia

• Morocco

• Namibia

• Oman

• Qatar

• Senegal

• Syria

• Tunisia

One possible solution for such states is to share a

nuclear reactor with regional neighbours to spread

the investment risk and to distribute the electricity

generated in a larger grid, or to sell excess electricity

from a nationally owned reactor to neighbours with a

shared grid system. However, national electricity grids

tend not to be internationally integrated, so sharing

electricity from a jointly owned nuclear power plant

would usually require additional investment in grid

extension and connection.

Some aspiring states, like Egypt, which have enough

national grid capacity now, already envisage selling

electricity to their neighbours, and may in future be

connected to the European grid (Shakir, 2008). Those

with less than 10,000 MWe, like Algeria, Libya, Morocco

and Syria, may also eventually be linked to a European/

Mediterranean grid, which would permit them to move

ahead with their nuclear plans. Yet this adds a further

layer of uncertainty to their aspirations. Jordan is already

connected to a regional grid, which means its plans for

a reactor, despite having a small national grid capacity,

make some sense. Most of the African aspirants have

small, poorly maintained and unconnected grids.



The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprising

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the

UAE, all of which are SENES states, is pursuing a jointly

owned nuclear plant that would supply electricity

to all of the partners. Alone, many of them could not

effectively and efficiently use a nuclear power plant due

to their limited national power requirements. Bahrain,

for instance, which says it is interested in its own nuclear

power plant, has a total installed capacity of only 3,000

MWe for a population of less than one million. While

collectively the GCC states could use their oil wealth to

purchase one or more reactors, there are doubts about

the seriousness of their proposal. In addition, their grids

are currently not well connected. The group has in fact

been advised by the IAEA to make unifying investments

in their electricity grids in parallel with any investment

in a common nuclear reactor (Hibbs, 2009a: 8). One of

the members, the UAE, is already proceeding on its own.

The Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania —

and Poland were considering jointly building two 1,600

MW reactors to supply electricity to all four countries

(Nuclear Energy Daily, 2007). Even combined, the three

Baltic states do not have enough generating capacity, so

new nuclear was only considered viable as a joint project

with Poland. The project has, however, at the time of

writing, been grounded, largely because of political

disagreements between Lithuania (the host country) and

Poland (Nucleonics Week, 2007b: 5). Similar problems

could arise in other projects involving joint owners.

Such joint ventures invariably add further complexity to

already complex nuclear energy plans and projects.

Financial Indicators

Another main indicator that a state may not be able to

follow through with its nuclear plans is its ability to

finance a nuclear plant. For relatively poor countries,

paying for a nuclear power plant is a massive hurdle,

even if the costs are spread out over several years.

There is no precise way to measure whether or not a

country can afford a nuclear power plant, especially

since decisions may be driven by politics, national

pride, energy security, industrialization strategy, or,

in the worst case, nuclear weapons “hedging,” rather

than sound financial analysis or a rational national

energy strategy. While stretching a national budget to

accommodate a nuclear power plant purchase may be

in theory possible, this always implies “opportunity

costs” ― what might have otherwise been purchased,

especially in the vital energy sector. The challenge of

measuring financing ability is further complicated

by the diversity of public-private economies among

aspiring nuclear energy states. Where private capital

is unable or unwilling to invest in nuclear energy

development on financial grounds, governments

may be willing to do so.

A country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is one

crude indicator of “affordability.” States with both a

low GDP and a poor credit rating are unlikely to be

able to secure a loan for nuclear energy development.

This is especially true of states with no credit

rating, indicating that there is little outside interest

in investing in them at all, much less in a major,

inherently risky, infrastructure project. The following

table displays the GDP and credit ratings for the 33

aspiring nuclear states listed in SENES. Only Italy,

Poland and the Gulf states had “A” ratings. Nine states

― Albania, Ghana, Jordan, Libya, Mongolia, Namibia,

Senegal, Syria and Tunisia ― had a GDP less than $100

billion in 2007, along with non-existent or uncertain

credit ratings (“BBB” or lower). The possibility that

a single nuclear reactor could cost up to $10 billion,

more than one-tenth of each of these states’ GDPs,

illustrates the problem. It is no coincidence that the

states identified as having insufficient grid capacity

tend to be the same ones with a low GDP and non-

existent or poor credit ratings.



The only developing countries that may be able to ignore

such constraints are, again, those with oil-based wealth,

such as Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the small Gulf states and

Venezuela. Some may be able to afford to buy reactors

outright without loans. Others, like the Gulf states, have

good credit ratings and would be able to secure commercial

loans. The recent drop in the price of oil and international

financial turmoil are likely to make even these states wary

of committing to expensive new infrastructure projects

like a nuclear power reactor. The richest emirate in the

UAE, Dubai, is reportedly $80-120 billion in debt, and has

had four of its banks downgraded by Standard and Poor’s

credit rating agency (The Economist, 2009c: 45).

Procuring loans from international lending institutions

such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank

(ADB) is not an option. These lending institutions do not

fund nuclear power plants because, in their estimation

the costs are too often underestimated, they have high

up-front capital costs and nuclear projects are too

large and inflexible electricity generators, particularly

for developing countries (World Bank Environment

Department, 1994: 83-89). According to the World Bank,

the possibility of nuclear accidents and nuclear waste

that may lead to “involuntary exposure” of civilians to

harmful radiation may have “environmental costs [that]

are high enough to rule out nuclear power even if it

were otherwise economic” (World Bank Environment

Department, 1994: 83-89). The only nuclear project it has

ever funded was in Italy in the 1950s (World Bank, 2003).

While the World Bank has recently acknowledged that

nuclear power can contribute to ameliorating climate

change, it has not altered its lending policy.

The ADB, for its part, reaffirmed in a June 2009 policy

update that it would not fund nuclear projects: “In

view of concerns related to procurement limitations,

availability of bilateral financing, proliferation risks,

fuel availability, and environmental and safety concerns,

ADB will maintain its current policy of non-involvement

in the financing of nuclear power generation”

(Asian Development Bank, 2009: 32). Other regional

lending institutions — including the Inter-American

Development Bank (IDB), the Islamic Development Bank

(IsDB) and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in

GDP and Credit Ratings for SENES States, 2007 and 2009

State 2007 GDP (billion USD) Credit Rating

Italy 1,834.00 A+

Turkey 893.10 BB-

Indonesia 863.10 BB-

Iran 790.60

Poland 636.90 A-

Saudi Arabia 553.50 AA-

Thailand 533.70 BBB+

Egypt 414.10 BB+

Malaysia 367.80

Venezuela 357.90 BB-

Nigeria 318.70 BB-

Philippines 306.50 BB-

Algeria 228.60

Vietnam 227.70 BB

Bangladesh 213.60

Kazakhstan 171.70 BBB-

United Arab Emirates 171.40 AA

Kuwait 137.40 AA-

Morocco 129.70 BB+

Belarus 104.50 B+

Syria 90.99

Libya 83.59

Tunisia 78.21 BBB

Qatar 76.75 AA-

Oman 62.97 A

Ghana 32.02 B+

Jordan 29.07 BB

Bahrain 25.17 A

Senegal 20.92 B+

Albania 20.57

Namibia 10.87

Mongolia 8.70

Sources: Central Intelligence Agency (2007); Standard and Poor’s. (August 2009)



Africa (BADEA) — do not have nearly enough financial

resources to make a meaningful contribution to a nuclear

power reactor project.

Export/import credit agencies established by

governments may assist with finance in order to boost

their domestic reactor manufacturers or governments

may provide foreign assistance to cover part of the

cost. Canada has done both in promoting CANDU

exports to developing countries (Bratt, 2006: 79).51

France and Russia may do so in the future. Of course,

states may seek multiple funding sources to spread the

risk, including a combination of government finance,

commercial loans and foreign aid.

The Most Likely New Entrants

An accurate assessment of a country’s probability of

success in acquiring a nuclear power program requires

in-depth knowledge of the internal political dynamics

of each individual state, especially how it makes its

energy decisions on and finances energy projects. The

following provides a snapshot analysis of the prospects

of some of the most likely candidates among the

SENES developing states. One of them, Jordan, would

appear to be ruled out based on the criteria discussed

above, but does appear to be particularly determined

and therefore warrants closer attention. Continuously

updated summaries of each SENES state’s progress are

available at www.cigionline.ca/senes.

Algeria

In a statement by Energy Minister Chakib Khelil, Algeria

announced its intention in 2008 to build a nuclear power

plant within 10 years (Daya, 2008). To expedite this it

has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with China,

France, Russia and the US (WNA, 2009b). As Africa’s

largest natural gas producer, the country is looking

to diversify its energy sources, including electricity

generation from wind, solar and nuclear (GulfNews.com,

2008), as well as for water desalination (Merabet, 2009).

The government established the Commissariat pour

l’énergie atomique (Comena) in 1996 to cover a range

of possible applications for nuclear energy, including

in the agriculture and health sectors. Algeria also has

an extensive nuclear research establishment, including

two research reactors, a pilot fuel fabrication plant and

various facilities at the Ain Oussera “site,” including an

isotope production plant, hot-cell laboratories and waste

storage tanks (IISS, 2008: 107-113).

Algeria was involved in controversy in the early

1990s over its nuclear weapons potential, especially

as it was not a party to the 1968 Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its facilities were not

safeguarded. Algeria acceded to the NPT in 1995

and signed a full-scope safeguards agreement in

1997. Despite its initial steps and research capacities,

Algerian nuclear energy plans are still in their

infancy, and the country’s 2018 target for a nuclear

power plant is unrealistic, not least because Algeria’s

current electrical grid capacity of 6,470 MW is not

nearly sufficient to support a nuclear power plant.

Egypt

With a longstanding interest in nuclear energy, Egypt

has managed since the 1950s to establish four research

facilities, including two research reactors, a fuel-

manufacturing plant and a pilot conversion plant.

However, after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, it put

its plans for a nuclear power program on hold (Kessler

and Windsor, 2007: 13). It has since reinvigorated its

efforts with President Hosni Mubarak’s announcement

in October 2006 that the country would once again try

for a nuclear reactor to meet its energy needs. Several

feasibility studies were conducted, leading to the

announcement in January 2008 that a 1,000 MWe reactor

would be built at El-Dabaa on the Mediterranean coast

(The Economist, 2007; Shahine, 2007; WNA, 2009b).



Egypt has since taken several concrete steps, including

preparing the site and putting out a call for bids for the

plant’s construction (Egypt News, 2008).

Once a bid is accepted, the Egyptians estimate the project

will take 10 years to complete at a cost of between $1.5 and

$1.8 billion (Global Security Newswire, 2008a). In May

2008 the government began assessing construction tenders

(Egypt News, 2008). So far no bid has been selected, no

doubt because Egypt’s price range is orders of magnitude

below the likely real cost of a 1,000 MWe nuclear plant.

Financial challenges loom large over Egyptian prospects

for a nuclear power plant, and despite the country’s

recently improved credit rating, the possibility of attracting

foreign investors remains remote (IISS, 2008: 28). As the

International Institute of Strategic Studies notes, “The

Egyptian civil nuclear programme has often been described

as ‘budding,’ meaning that it is both underdeveloped and

under development at the same time” (IISS, 2008: 24).

Indonesia

Almost since independence, Indonesia has sought to

acquire nuclear energy, sometimes envisaging up to 30

reactors spread across its sprawling archipelago, but its

lack of financial, organizational and technical resources

has always held it back. Newly democratic and developing

economically, it has revived its interest, President Susilo

Bambang announcing in 2006 the government’s decision

to pursue a nuclear energy program to meet rising energy

demand (McCawley, 2007). Presently the intention is to

build a single plant comprising two 1,000 MWe reactors

on the Muria Peninsula in Central Java by 2017 (WNA,

2009b). The project is already at least two years behind

schedule. An abiding concern is Indonesia’s high levels

of seismic activity, which has led to significant public

opposition to the construction of the plant on safety

grounds (Harisumarto, 2007). A vibrant anti-nuclear

movement has, since the advent of democracy in the

country, also been able to make its voice heard without

fear of repression. The main problem, however, is that

the central government has not yet formally approved

plans for nuclear energy, and is not expected to do so

until 2010 due to delays caused by coalition building

and electoral politics. An IAEA official stated in 2007:

“We don’t see Indonesia moving this program forward”

(Nucleonics Week, 2007c).

Jordan

In a statement by King Abdullah II, Jordan announced in

January 2007 that it would pursue a nuclear energy program.

Jordan has uranium reserves — 2 percent (112,000 tonnes)

of the world’s reasonably assured supplies (WNA, 2008a)

and is planning to mine it to provide fuel for its potential

nuclear program. It is still unclear, however, whether

Jordan intends to buy reactors fuelled by natural uranium

or LEU (World Information Service on Energy, 2010). In

April 2007 the government entered discussions with the

IAEA to assess the feasibility of building a nuclear power

plant (Reuters, 2007). Since then cooperative agreements

have been signed with China, Canada, France, South Korea

and the UK, and are being pursued with Russia and the

US (Global Security Newswire, 2008b, 2008c; Xinhua, 2008;

BBC Monitoring International Reports, 2008). Government

officials expect to put out a tender for a plant in 2010, with

construction starting in 2013 and the plant coming online

in 2017-2018 (WNA, 2009b). Reports in 2007 indicated that

a site was to be selected in 2009 (Nucleonics Week, 2007),

but this deadline has been pushed back to 2011 (Nucleonics

Week, 2007a).

Jordan’s desire for nuclear energy is partially a result of

its dependence on imports for 95 percent of its current

energy needs (Dow Jones Newswires, 2009b). With its

small 2,098 MW electrical grid, low GDP and poor credit

rating, the outlook for nuclear power in Jordan seems

grim unless it is able to export electricity, potentially

to Israel. The plant may be dedicated, at least in part,

to desalinization of water, in which case the existing



grid capacity is not as significant an issue. It is unclear,

however, where the financing will come from, although

Jordan has special characteristics that may help it obtain

favourable financial loans and/or foreign aid. Jordan’s

close relationship with the US, its friendly relationship

with all of its neighbours (unique in the Middle East)

and its international reputation for moderation and

diplomatic savvy may help it succeed in its nuclear

energy plans where others fail ― and may be the

exception that proves the rule.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan says it aims to be the world’s largest

uranium producer by 2010, a significant supplier of

nuclear fuel, to initiate a domestic power program

and eventually to sell nuclear reactors abroad

(Kassenova, 2008). Kazakhstan has 15 percent of the

world’s uranium reserves (817,000 tonnes) and claims

it has overtaken Canada as the world’s second largest

producer (Australia is currently first).

On November 21, 2007, Prime Minister Karim Masimov

announced that his government would address growing

energy demands by pursuing a domestic nuclear energy

program. Plans to develop nuclear power have always

been politically sensitive due to lingering anti-nuclear

feelings inspired by Soviet nuclear testing on Kazakh

territory at Semipalatinsk. Nonetheless, on September

24, 2008, President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced

that a 600 MWe plant will be constructed in the city of

Aktau in the Mangistau region with Russian assistance.

Although there are no firm plans for additional plants

yet, the National Nuclear Centre, Kazakhstan’s nuclear

research institution, has proposed a total of 20 small-

capacity plants. Kazakhstan has three research reactors

in operation, brought online in 1961, 1967 and 1971.

Kazakhstan also has plans to join Russia in building an

enrichment facility in Eastern Siberia. Such grandiose

ideas have been greeted with skepticism in some quarters

(Kassenova, 2008), but given the country’s vast uranium

reserves and close ties to Russia it may just succeed in at

least acquiring one or two nuclear power reactors by 2030.

Turkey

Turkey is another country that has sought nuclear

energy since the late 1960s, but its plans have always

been stymied by financial considerations. Turkey has

two research reactors, a small-scale pilot facility for

uranium purification, conversion and production of

fuel pellets and a nuclear waste storage facility for low-

level nuclear waste (IISS, 2008: 63-64). It has negotiated

nuclear cooperation agreements with several countries,

both regionally and more broadly, but a key agreement

with the US was approved by the US Congress only

in June 2008 after being delayed because of concerns

about Turkish companies’ involvement with the A.Q.

Khan nuclear smuggling network. In 2006 Turkey

announced it was planning to build several reactors

to produce 5,000MW of electricity by 2015 (IISS, 2008:

65). Construction was originally scheduled to begin on

the first reactor in 2007. However, legal and tendering

difficulties have led to continuing delays to the point

where, in November 2009, the government said it may

launch a new tendering process for a second reactor

while the courts sort out the first (Nucleonics Week,

2009d: 6). According to the International Institute of

Strategic Studies (IISS), it is unlikely that any reactor will

be built by 2015 (IISS, 2008: 65).

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE announced in March 2008 that it would

pursue nuclear energy (Salama, 2008). It hopes to have

three 1,500 MWe reactors running by 2020, accounting

for 15 percent of its energy needs (WNA, 2009b; Hamid,

2008). Although the UAE has the world’s sixth largest

proven oil reserves and fifth largest proven natural

gas reserves (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009), it has



been making a strong economic case for nuclear power

based on its rapid economic growth and a predicted

shortage in natural gas (Lawati, 2008). The UAE has an

existing electrical grid capacity of approximately 16,000

MW, but analysis has shown that by 2020 peak demand

will reach nearly 41,000 MW, a 156 percent increase in

just over a decade (Kumar, 2008). Fresh water resources

are extremely limited, prompting plans to build a

9,000 MW desalination complex in Dubai that could be

powered by nuclear energy (Kessler and Windsor, 2007:

124). By generating electricity using nuclear power, the

UAE can also export more oil and natural gas instead of

using it for domestic consumption (WNN, 2008e).

Although pundits predicted that the UAE would be

“several decades” away from generating nuclear power

because it lacks a sufficient technical and legislative

framework for a nuclear program (Kessler and Windsor,

2007: 130), the federation has moved aggressively to

court foreign reactor vendors, sign nuclear cooperation

agreements with other countries and hire foreigners,

lured by extraordinary salaries, to set up its regulatory

authority. The UAE has sought to be a model for providing

reassurances about its peaceful intentions (for further

details see Part 4 of this report on nonproliferation). While

finance is unlikely to be the obstacle that it is in other

developing countries, the financial crisis that hit Dubai in

November 2009, as well as fluctuating oil revenues, serve

as a reminder that not even oil-rich countries are immune

from the travails of nuclear economics. The country may

have difficulty meeting its projected energy demand in

2030 using nuclear power, but it is one of the more likely

countries to succeed in its long-term development of a

nuclear power industry.

Vietnam

In May 2001, the government of Vietnam instructed the

Ministry of Industry (MOI), assisted by the Ministry

of Science and Technology (MOST), to conduct a “pre-

feasibility study” examining the prospect of establishing

a nuclear power sector (Van Hong and Anh Tuan,

2004: 5). Its affirmative report led, in 2002 and 2003,

to the creation of the Nuclear Energy Programme

Implementing Organization (NEPIO) and the Agency

for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Control

(VARANSAC), respectively. The government approved

its Long-term Strategy for Peaceful Utilization of Atomic

Energy up to 2020 in January 2006, and took the decision

in June 2008 to construct two nuclear power plants, each

comprising two reactors (WNN, 2008h).

In November 2009, the National Assembly gave

its approval for the two plants, demonstrating the

government’s determination to move ahead despite

concerns about whether Vietnam can handle the

high cost and complexity of the project. Certainly,

Vietnam has a low GDP and a relatively small

electricity grid. Yet others view the country’s real

GDP growth rate of more than 7 percent in the past

two decades, its quickening industrial development

and its authoritarian government as likely to enable it

to persist with its plans (Gourley and Stulberg, 2009:

6). But as Vu Trong Khanh and Patrick Barta note, the

estimated cost of the two plants, around 200 trillion

Vietnamese dong ($11.3 billion) is “a hefty price tag”

when Vietnam has just devalued its currency and faces

rising debt payments (Khanh and Barta, 2009).



Conclusions

While there is no scientific method for weighing the

balance of the drivers and constraints detailed in this

report, it is clear that an expansion of nuclear energy

worldwide to 2030 faces considerable barriers that will

outweigh the drivers. The profoundly unfavourable

economics of nuclear power are the single most

important constraint and these are worsening rather

than improving, especially as a result of the recent global

financial and economic turmoil. Private investors are

wary of the high risk, while cash-strapped governments

are unlikely to provide sufficient subsidies to make even

the first new build economic. Developing countries will,

by and large, simply be priced out of the nuclear energy

market. The pricing of carbon through taxes and/or a

cap-and–trade mechanism will improve the economics

of new nuclear build compared with coal and gas, but

will also favour less risky alternatives like conservation,

energy efficiency, carbon sequestration efforts and

renewables. Nuclear will simply not be nimble enough

to make much of a difference in tackling climate change.

The nuclear waste issue, unresolved almost 60 years

after commercial nuclear electricity was first generated,

remains in the public consciousness as a lingering

concern. The nuclear sector also continues to face public

unease about safety and security, notwithstanding

recent increased support for nuclear. Governments must

themselves consider the implications of widespread,

increased use of nuclear energy for global governance

of nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation, as

considered in the rest of this report.

It is thus likely that the nuclear energy “revival” to 2030

will be confined to existing nuclear energy producers

in East and South Asia (China, Japan, South Korea and

India); Europe (Finland, France, Russia and the UK); and

the Americas (Brazil and the US). One or two additional

European states, such as Italy and Poland, may adopt

or return to nuclear energy. At most a handful of

developing states, those with oil wealth and command

economies, may be able to embark on a modest program

of one or two reactors. The most likely candidates in this

category appear to be Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan,

Kazakhstan, the UAE and Vietnam, although all face

significant challenges in achieving their goals.

In terms of technology, most new build in the coming

two decades is likely to be third-generation light water

reactors, using technology that is expected to be more

efficient, safer and more proliferation-resistant, but not

revolutionary. Nuclear power will continue to prove

most useful for baseload electricity in countries with

extensive, established grids. But demand for energy

efficiency is leading to a fundamental rethinking of

how electricity is generated and distributed that is

not favourable to nuclear. Large nuclear plants will

continue to be infeasible for most developing states

with small or fragile electricity systems. Generation IV

systems will not be ready in time, and nuclear fusion

is simply out of the question.

In short, despite some powerful drivers and clear

advantages, a revival of nuclear energy faces too

many barriers compared to other means of generating

electricity for it to capture a growing market share by

2030. For the vast majority of aspiring states, nuclear

energy will remain as elusive as ever.



Endnotes

1 Since the global governance implications of large-scale use

of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are the same,whatever a

particular reactor is used for, this study encompasses all production

of electricity from nuclear energy, whether for domestic or industrial

uses, as well as for dedicated purposes such as desalination, direct

home heating, process heat (such as for the production of oil from tar

sands) or hydrogen production. This report will not consider research

reactors or radioactive sources since these are not normally considered

to be part of the nuclear revival, even though interest in them may be

increasing. This study also does not cover research reactors, isotope

production reactors or experimental reactors.

2 The first use of the term “renaissance” appears to have occurred

as early as 1985 in an article entitled “A Second Nuclear Era: A Nuclear

Renaissance.” by Alvin M. Weinberg, Irving Spiewak, Doan L. Phung

and Robert S. Livingston, four physicists from the Institute for Energy

Analysis at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in the journal Energy. The first use

of the term in the new millennium appears to have been in an article

in Power, Vol. 144, No. 3, on May 1, 2000, entitled “Nuclear power

embarks on a renaissance.” This report will use the more neutral word

“revival,” except when referring to others’ characterization of the

revival as a renaissance.

3 GWe or GW(e) is a measure of electrical energy. 1 GWe = 1000 watts

of electricity (MWe) or 109 watts. GWth is a measure of thermal energy.

4 The projections were higher than in 2007 and 2008, when the

Agency predicted 691 and 748 GWe respectively by 2030.

5 The IAEA does not project reactor numbers.

6 A study by Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) found that in

the there is already enough generating capacity to replace as much as

73 percent of the US conventional fleet with electric cars if charging was

managed carefully using “smart grid” off-peak electricity in the evenings.

7 In 1974 the IAEA issued the last of its completely optimistic

forecasts of global nuclear capacity, predicting that the existing figure

of about 55,000 MWe would multiply more than ten-fold by 1985 to

almost 600,000 MWe. By 1990 there would supposedly be more than

one million and by the year 2000 almost three million. (See Pringle and

Spigelman, 1983: 331).

8 Book examples include: Gwyneth Cravens, Power to Save the

World: the Truth About Nuclear Energy, New York, Alfred A. Knopf,

2007; Alan M. Herbst and George W. Hopley, Nuclear Energy Now: Why

The Time Has Come for the World’s Most Misunderstood Energy Source,

Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2007; W.J. Nuttall, Nuclear

Renaissance: Technologies and Policies for the Future of Nuclear Power, New

York, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005; William Tucker, Terrestrial Energy:

How Nuclear power Will Lead the Green Revolution and End America’s

Energy Odyssey, Bartleby Press, Savage, MD, 2008.

9 Argentina: Embalse (600). Republic of Korea: Kori-2 (637), Kori-

3 (979), Kori-4 (977), Ulchin-1 (945), Ulchin-2 (942), Wolsong-1 (597),

Yonggwang-1 (953) and Yonggwang-2 (947). Mexico: Laguna Verde-1

(650). Yugoslavia: KRSKO (666).

10 The wastes are in the form of the minor actinides such as

americium and curium.

11 Hansen has calculated that the maximum amount of carbon

in the atmosphere consonant with the planet “on which civilization

developed and to which life is adapted” is 350 parts per million CO2.

The current level is 387.

12 The 2003 MIT study recommended a focus on such light water

reactors and “some R&D” on the high temperature gas reactor (HTGR)

because of its potential for greater safety and efficiency of operation.

13 For details of additional SMR research efforts directed at “near

term deployment,” see NEA, 2008: 381-382.

14 Sandia National Laboratory has proposed a small, “right sized”

reactor (100-300 MW(t)) ready in 5-8 years (Hiruo, 2009).



15 Currently Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Euratom, France, Japan,

China, South Korea, South Africa, Russia, Switzerland, the UK and the

US. The NEA hosts the Technical Secretariat.

16 Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,

Chile, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,

Japan, South Korea, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, Slovakia,

South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the US and the

European Commission.

17 Each country funds 10 percent, while the European Union makes

up the remaining 40 percent.

18 See GNEP Watch series from October 2007 to June 2008, http://

www.cigionline.org; and Miles Pomper, “US international nuclear

energy policy: change and continuity,” Nuclear Energy Futures Paper

No. 10, December 2009.

19 With Algeria (2007); Brazil (2002); India (2006, 2008); Jordan

(2006); Libya (2007); Morocco (2007); Qatar (2008); Russia (2000);

Tunisia (2008); United Arab Emirates (2008); United Kingdom (2008);

and Vietnam (2004).

20 It also misrepresented the predicted levelized cost of nuclear

electricity from the 2003 MIT study as being 4.2 cents per kWh, when

in fact this was the likely figure only after proposed heroic measures

by the industry (including a 25 percent reduction in construction costs

and the reduction of capital to the same as coal and gas) from the real

figure of 6.7 cents per kWh.

21 The 2003 MIT study did not find that concerns about climate

change were a factor in its US survey.

22 This included £500 million interest during construction plus on-

site waste storage costs.

23 The equivalent of an overnight cost of $5,000-$6,000/kW (Moody’s

Corporate Finance, Special Comment, “New nuclear generation in the

United States,” October 2007. Quoted in Squassoni (2009b): 30.

24 See chart showing comparisons in Smith, 2006: 38; also NEA,

2005: 36.

25 As the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) notes, “If the

levelized cost of a technology exceeded anticipated prices for electricity,

merchant generators would be unlikely to invest in new capacity based

on that technology because the expected return would not justify the

amount of risk they would have to incur. State utility commissions

commonly direct regulated utilities to meet anticipated demand for

new capacity using the technology with the lowest levelized cost.”

26 Business schools teach that a decision about the financial viability

of a project should not be confused with a decision to invest, since the

former is concerned with whether the project is likely to turn a profit,

whereas the latter is concerned with comparative risk and rates of

return on investment.

27 Despite this, its levelized cost was only around $45/MWh

compared to almost $70 for Japan.

28 By comparison, investments in breweries, for instance, typically

attract a 5 percent discount rate. Information technology (IT) projects

attract around 10 percent since around one-third of them fail.

29 As the IEA notes, however, there do not have to be uniform

incentives with the same value for all technologies. It argues for

subsidies for the more expensive alternatives.

30 The increase was due in part to changes in political and public

views of nuclear energy following the Chernobyl accident, with

subsequent alterations in the regulatory requirements.

31 While, as Mycle Schneider points out, France’s high level of reactor

standardization has multiple technical and economic advantages, it has

also led to systematic multiplication of problems in the reactor fleet.

32 For an example, see a program called the business risk

management framework (BRMF).

33 See chart in CBO, 2008: 26.



34 For details see Table 1.1, Incentives provided by the Energy Policy Act

of 2005, CBO Report: 11. The tax credit provides up to $18 in tax relief per

megawatt hour of electricity produced at qualifying power plants during

the first eight years of operation. By comparison, the average wholesale

price of electricity in the US in 2005 was about $50 per megawatt. The loan

program provides a federal guarantee on debt that covers as much as 80

percent of construction costs. The loan guarantee program also applies to

innovative fossil fuel or renewable technologies (CBO, 2008: 8-9).

35 According to Paul Brown, the UK taxpayer has already

underwritten all the debts and liabilities of British Energy so the

company can never go bankrupt (Brown, 2008: 3).

36 A Nuclear Transparency and Safety Act was passed by the National

Assembly only in 2006 (Law No. 2006-686, June 13, 2006). This apparently has

had limited effects in making financial details available (Schneider, 2008b: 6-7).

37 The 2009 delivery European Union Allowances (EUAs) closed

in trading on March 18, 2009, on the European Climate Exchange at

€12.50/metric ton (mt). According to Deutsche Bank carbon analyst

Mark Lewis, if the value reaches €35/mt between 2013 and 2020 as

some predict, nuclear power could become the cheapest form of new

electricity in the EU. At that price coal and gas would cost €86/MWh;

CSS capacity €102/MWh; and nuclear only €60/MWh.

38 While reactor vendors prefer large forgings to be in a single

piece, it is possible to use split forgings welded together, but these need

continued checking throughout the plant’s lifetime.

39 WNU is a non-profit corporation and public-private partnership,

pursuing an educational and leadership-building mission through

programs organized by the WNU Coordinating Centre in London. The

WNUCC’s multinational secretariat is composed mainly of nuclear

professionals supplied by governments; the IAEA further assists with

financial support for certain WNU activities. The nuclear industry

provides administrative, logistical and financial support (WNU, 2010).

40 For a comprehensive history of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and

proposed Yucca Mountain repository see Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007.

41 The list does not include the Philippines as no decision has yet

been taken to resume construction.

42 The 32MW reactors are the Akademik Lomonosov 1 and 2, KLT-40S

Floati. The other seven are between 750–1085MW each (NEA, 2008: 424).

43 Work originally began on the two Bushehr reactors in 1974 by the

German firms Siemens and its subsidiary Kraftwerke Union, but stopped

when the Shah was overthrown in 1979. The site was bombed during the

1980-88 Iran/Iraq war. The Russians were contracted to complete one of the

reactors in 1995 (Bahgat, 2007: 20-22).

44 Most of these have been published in the NEF Working Paper

series. Refer to list at the end of the report.

45 For a complete study of Canada’s situation see John Cadham,

“The Canadian Nuclear Industry: Status and Prospects,” Nuclear

Energy Futures Report, No. 8. Available at: http://www.cigionline.org/

publications/2009/11/canadian-nuclear-industry-status-and-prospects.

46 The Canadian Government announced in June 2009 that it intended

to take the government out of the radioisotope business, following the latest

breakdown in the world’s old nuclear reactor at Chalk River, previously the

supplier of more than 50 percent of the world’s radionuclides market, and

the cancellation in 2007 of the two intended replacement reactors, the AECL-

designed Maple 1 and 2, due to insurmountable technical difficulties.

47 This section of the report is largely adapted from Ramana, 2009.

48 For details of improvements see Uranium Institute, “Post-

accident changes,” reproduced in Steed, 2007: 271-274.

49 In December 2008, South African utility Eskom cancelled its tender for

a turnkey nuclear power station, saying the magnitude of the investment

was too great. In June 2007 Eskom had announced plans for up to 20,000

MW of new nuclear power by 2025. Areva and Westinghouse had both bid

for two new power stations. The reported estimated cost of $9 billion had

escalated to $11 billion with the devaluation of the Rand.

50 Grid capacity and electricity production are not interchangeable

since different factors are involved in calculating them. Nevertheless,

because there is a strong correlation between the two, electricity

production is a suitable proxy for the size of a country’s energy

infrastructure.

51 See Table 3.6, Federal financing of nuclear reactor exports, Bratt, 2006: 79.



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About the Author

Dr. Trevor Findlay is a CIGI senior fellow and holder of the

William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs and

a professor at the Norman Paterson School of International

Affairs at Carleton University, Ottawa, where he is also

director of the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance.

From 1998 to early 2005, Dr. Findlay was executive director

of the Verification Research, Training and Information

Centre in London, UK. As an Australian diplomat, Dr.

Findlay was a member of the Australian delegation to the

Conference on Disarmament, the UN General Assembly

and the UN Disarmament Commission. He was a senior

fellow and acting head of the Peace Research Centre at

the Australian National University before establishing

the program on peacekeeping and regional security at

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in

Sweden. He is the author of several books, including

Nuclear Dynamite: The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Fiasco

(Brassey’s Australia, 1990) and The Use of Force in UN

Peace Operations (Oxford University Press, 2002). He holds

a BA Honours in political science from the University of

Melbourne and a master’s degree and PhD in international

relations from the Australian National University.



Nuclear Energy Futures Project Publications

GNEP Watch: Developments in the Global Nuclear

Energy Partnership

Miles A. Pomper, #1 - #11

October 2007 - December 2008

The Economics of Nuclear Power: Current Debates

and Issues for Future Consideration

David McLellan, Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #1

February 2008

A Guide to Global Nuclear Governance: Safety,

Security and Nonproliferation

Justin Alger, Nuclear Energy Futures Special Publication

September 2008

The Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regimes

Aaron Shull, Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #2

November 2008

The Russian Nuclear Industry: Status and Prospects

Miles A. Pomper, Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #3

January 2009

The British Nuclear Industry: Status and Prospects

Ian Davis, Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #4

January 2009

Survey of Emerging Nuclear Energy States

Ray Froklage et al., Nuclear Energy Futures web-based document

May 2009

Uranium Enrichment in Canada

David Jackson and Kenneth Dormuth, Nuclear Energy

Futures Paper #5

May 2009

From Nuclear Energy to the Bomb: The Proliferation

Potential of New Nuclear Programs

Justin Alger, Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #6

September 2009

The US Nuclear Industry: Current Status and

Prospects under the Obama Administration

Sharon Squassoni, Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #7

November 2009

The Canadian Nuclear Industry: Status and Prospects

John Cadham, Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #8

November 2009

The Indian Nuclear Industry: Status and Prospects

M. V. Ramana, Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #9

December 2009

US International Nuclear Energy Policy: Change and

Continuity

Miles A. Pomper, Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #10

January 2010

Nigeria and Nuclear Energy: Plans and Prospects

Nathaniel Lowbeer-Lewis, Nuclear Energy Futures Paper #11

January 2010

The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030 and Its

Implications for Safety, Security and Nonproliferation

Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Energy Futures Project Report

February 2010

Overview

Part 1 – The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030

Part 2 – Nuclear Safety

Part 3 – Nuclear Security

Part 4 – Nuclear Nonproliferation

Nuclear Energy and Global Governance to 2030:

An Action Plan

Louise Fréchette (chair), Trevor Findlay (director),

Nuclear Energy Futures Project Report

February 2010



Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABACC Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control

ABWR Advanced Boiling Water ReactorACR Advanced CANDU ReactorADB Asian Development BankAECL Atomic Energy of Canada LimitedAFCI Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative

(GNEP)AFCONE African Commission on Nuclear

EnergyAFNI L’Agence France Nucléaire

International (France)AIP Advance Information Package

(OSART)ALARA as low as reasonably achievableANDRA Agence nationale pour la gestion

des déchets radioactifs/ National Agency for the Management of Radioactive Waste (France)

ANWFZ African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

AP Additional Protocol (IAEA)ASE AtomsTroyExport (Russia)ASME American Society of Mechanical

EngineersASN Nuclear Safety Authority (France)AU African UnionBADEA Arab Bank for Economic

Development in AfricaBMWG Border Monitoring Working Group

(IAEA)BNFL British Nuclear Fuels LimitedBOG Board of Governors (IAEA)BSS Basic Safety Standards (IAEA)BWR boiling water reactorCACNARE Convention on Assistance in the

Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

CANDU Canada Deuterium Uranium reactor

CBO Congressional Budget Office (US)CCGT combined cycle gas turbineCCPNM Convention on the Physical

Protection of Nuclear MaterialCCS carbon capture and storageCD Conference on Disarmament (UN)CDM clean development mechanismCEA Commissariat à l’Énergie

Atomique/ Atomic Energy Commission (France)

CEC Commission of the European Communities (now EC)

CENNA Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

CFDT Confédération Français Démocratique du Travail/ French Democratic Confederation of Workers

CHP combined heat and powerCIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)CIRUS Canada India Research US reactorCISAC Committee on International

Security and Arms ControlCNRA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory

Activities (OECD/NEA)CNS Convention on Nuclear SafetyCNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety

Commission (Canada)COGEMA Compagnie Générale des Matières

Nucléaires/ General Company for Nuclear Materials (France)

CORDEL Working Group on Cooperation in Reactor Design Evaluation and Licensing (WNA)

CSA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (IAEA)

CSS Commission on Safety Standards (IAEA)

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

CTR Cooperative Threat ReductionDBT design basis threatDOE Department of Energy (US)DTI Department of Trade and Industry (UK)DUPIC direct use of spent PWR fuel in

CANDUEC European CommissionEDF Electricité de FranceEIA Energy Information Agency (DOE)ENAC Early Notification and Assistance

ConventionsENATOM Emergency Notification and

Assistance Technical Operations Manual

ENEN European Nuclear Education NetworkENSREG European Nuclear Safety

Regulators GroupEPAct US Energy Policy Act (2005)EPR Evolutionary Power Reactor

(formerly European Power Reactor)EPREV Emergency Preparedness Review

Teams (IAEA)EPRI Electric Power Research InstituteERBD European Bank for Reconstruction

and Development (EC)ERNM Emergency Response Network

ManualEUP enriched uranium productEuratom European Atomic Energy

Community (EC)FAO Food and Agricultural Organization

of the United NationsFBR fast breeder reactorFMCT Fissile Material Cut-Off TreatyFMT Fissile Material TreatyFOAK first-of-a-kind

FP&L Florida Power and LightG8 Group of EightGAO Government Accountability Office (US)GCC Gulf Cooperation CouncilGCR gas-cooled reactorsGDF Gaz de FranceGDP gross domestic productGHG greenhouse gasesGIF Generation IV International ForumGNEP Global Nuclear Energy PartnershipGPP Global Partnership Program (G8)GTCC gas turbine combined cycleHEU highly enriched uraniumIACRNA Inter-Agency Committee on

Response to Nuclear AccidentsIAEA International Atomic Energy

AgencyIATA International Air Transport

AssociationICAO International Civil Aviation

OrganizationICJ International Court of JusticeICNND International Commission on

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament

ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection

ICSANT International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

IDB Inter-American Development BankIEA International Energy Agency

(OECD)IEC Incident and Emergency CentreILO International Labor OrganizationIMO International Maritime

OrganizationINES International Nuclear and

Radiological Event ScaleINF irradiated nuclear fuelINFA International Nuclear Fuel AgencyINIR Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure

Review (IAEA)INLEX International Expert Group on

Nuclear LiabilityINMM Institute of Nuclear Materials

ManagementINPO Institute of Nuclear Power

Operations (US)INPRO International Project on Innovative

Nuclear Reactors and Fuel CyclesINRA International Nuclear Regulators

AssociationINSAG International Nuclear Safety Group

(IAEA)INSServ International Nuclear Security

Advisory Service (IAEA)INSSP Integrated Nuclear Security

Support Plan (IAEA)INTERPOL International Criminal Police

Organization



IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials

IPPAS International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IAEA)

IRRS Integrated Regulatory Review Service

IRS Incident Reporting System (IAEA/NEA)

IsDB Islamic Development BankISIS Institute for Science and

International SecurityISSAS International SSAC Advisory

Service (IAEA)ISSC International Seismic Safety CentreITDB Illicit Trafficking Database (IAEA)ITE International Team of Experts

(IAEA)ITER International Thermonuclear

Experimental ReactorJREMPIO Joint Radiation Emergency

Management Plan of the International Organizations

JSW Japan Steel WorksKEPCO Korea Electric Power CorporationKINS Korea Institute of Nuclear SafetyLEU low enriched uraniumLIS laser-isotope separationLNG Liquid Natural GasLWGR light water-cooled graphite-

moderated reactorLWR light water reactorMCIF Major Capital Investment Fund

(IAEA)MDEP Multinational Design Evaluation

ProgramMESP Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary

ProjectMIT Massachusetts Institute of

TechnologyMOI Ministry of Industry (Vietnam)MOST Ministry of Science and Technology

(Vietnam)MOX Mixed Oxide FuelNAS National Academy of Sciences (US)NASA National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (US)NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNCACG National Competent Authorities’

Coordinating GroupNEA Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD)NEF Nuclear Energy FuturesNEI Nuclear Energy InstituteNEPIO Nuclear Energy Programme

Implementing OrganizationNERC North American Electric Reliability

CorporationNERS Network of Regulators of Countries

with Small Nuclear ProgrammesNESA Nuclear Energy System Assessment

NEWS Nuclear Events Web-based SystemNGO non-governmental organizationNGSI Next Generation Safeguards

InitiativeNIA Nuclear Industry Association (UK)NIF National Ignition Facility (US)NII Nuclear Installations Inspectorate

(UK)NJFF Nuclear Power Joint Fact Finding

(Keystone Center)NNWS non-nuclear weapon state (NPT)NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation TreatyNRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US)NRU National Research Universal reactor

(Canada)NSEL Nuclear Security Equipment

Laboratory (IAEA)NSF Nuclear Security Fund (IAEA)NSG Nuclear Suppliers GroupNSSG Nuclear Safety and Security Group

(IAEA)NTI Nuclear Threat InitiativeNTM National Technical MeansNUSS Nuclear Safety Standards (IAEA)NWFZ nuclear-weapon-free zoneNWMO Nuclear Waste Management

Organization (Canada)NWPA US Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1982)NWS nuclear weapon state (NPT)O&M operation and maintenanceOECD Organisation for Economic Co-

operation and DevelopmentOEF operating experience feedbackOER Operating Experience ReportsOSART Operational Safety Review Teams

(IAEA)PBMR Pebble Bed Modular ReactorPHWR pressurized heavy water reactorPIU Performance and Innovation Unit

(UK Cabinet Office)POC Point of ContactPRA Probabilistic Risk AssessmentPRIS Power Reactor Information SystemPROSPER Peer Review of the effectiveness of

the Operational Safety Performance Experience Review

PSI Proliferation Security InitiativePSR Periodic Safety ReviewPUREX Plutonium Uranium ExtractionPWR pressurized water reactorRADWASS Radioactive Waste Safety Standards

(IAEA)RANET Response Assistance NetworkRBMK Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosti

Kanalniy (High Power Channel-Type Reactor) (Russia)

RDD radiological dispersal deviceREPLIE Response Plan for Incidents and

Emergencies (IAEA)

RWC Radiological Weapons ConventionSAG Senior Advisory Group (IAEA)SAGSI Standing Advisory Group on

Safeguards Implementation (IAEA)SAGSTRAM Standing Advisory Group on

the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (IAEA)

SAL Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (IAEA)

SEDO Safety Evaluation During Operation of Fuel Cycle Facilities (IAEA)

SENES Survey of Emerging Nuclear Energy States

SILEX separation of isotopes by laser excitationSMR small- and medium-sized reactorSOARCA State-of-the-Art Reactor

Consequences AnalysisSOER Significant Operating Experience

ReportsSOLAS International Convention for the

Safety of Life at SeaSQP Small Quantities Protocol (IAEA)SSAC State System of Accounting and

ControlSTUK Säteilyturvakeskus (Radiation and

Nuclear Safety Authority, Finland)SWU separative work unitTCP Technical Cooperation Programme

(IAEA)TRC Technical Review Committee (IAEA)TTA Nuclear Trade and Technology

Analysis unit (IAEA)TVO Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (Finland)UAE United Arab EmiratesUNFCCC United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate ChangeUNSCEAR United Nations Scientific

Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation

URENCO Uranium Enrichment CompanyUSSPC ultra-supercritical pulverized coalVARANSAC Vietnam Agency for Radiation

Protection and Nuclear Safety Control

VERTIC Verification Research, Training and Information Centre

VVER Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactor (Russia)

WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

WENRA Western European Nuclear Regulators Association

WGRNR Working Group on Regulation of New Reactors (CNRA)

WHO World Health OrganizationWINS World Institute of Nuclear SecurityWMD weapons of mass destructionWMO World Meteorological OrganizationWNA World Nuclear AssociationWNTI World Nuclear Transport InstituteWNU World Nuclear University (WNA)



About CIGI

The Centre for International Governance Innovation is

an independent, nonpartisan think tank that addresses

international governance challenges. Led by a group

of experienced practitioners and distinguished

academics, CIGI supports research, forms networks,

advances policy debate, builds capacity, and generates

ideas for multilateral governance improvements.

Conducting an active agenda of research, events, and

publications, CIGI’s interdisciplinary work includes

collaboration with policy, business and academic

communities around the world.

CIGI conducts in-depth research and engages experts

and partners worldwide from its extensive networks

to craft policy proposals and recommendations that

promote change in international public policy. Current

research interests focus on international economic and

financial governance both for the long-term and in the

wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis; the role of the

G20 and the newly emerging powers in the evolution of

global diplomacy; Africa and climate change, and other

issues related to food and human security.

CIGI was founded in 2002 by Jim Balsillie, co-CEO of

RIM (Research In Motion) and collaborates with and

gratefully acknowledges support from a number of

strategic partners, in particular the Government of

Canada and the Government of Ontario. CIGI gratefully

acknowledges the contribution of the Government

of Canada to its endowment fund. Support from the

Government of Ontario includes a major financial

contribution to the Nuclear Energy Futures project.

Le CIGI a été fondé en 2002 par Jim Balsillie, co-chef de la

direction de RIM (Research In Motion). Il collabore avec

de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et leur exprime

toute sa reconnaissance pour leur soutien. Il remercie

tout particulièrement le gouvernement du Canada pour

sa contribution à son Fonds de dotation, de même que

le gouvernement de l’Ontario, dont l’appui comprend

une aide financière majeure au projet Perspectives de

l’énergie nucléaire.

Publications Team

Senior Director for Publications: Max Brem

Publications Coordinator: Jessica Hanson

Media Designer: Steve Cross

Copyeditors: Matthew Bunch and Tammy McCausland

Media Contact

For media enquiries, please contact:

Mary-Lou Schagena

Communications Specialist

Tel: +1.519.885.2444 x238, [email protected]

Part 1: The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030



57 Erb Street West

Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2, Canada

tel +1 519 885 2444 fax +1 519 885 5450

www.cigionline.org

Addressing International Governance Challenges

TREVOR FINDLAY

THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TO 2030 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFETY, SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION Part 1 – The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030

THE FU

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: PART 2 – THE FU

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CIG

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