The Function of Religious Belief

Journal of Psychology and Christianity

2004, Vol. 23, No. 3, 208-218

Copyright 2004 Christian Association for Psychological Studies

ISSN 0733-4273

The Function of Religious Belief:Defensive Versus Existential Religion

Richard BeckAbilene Christian University

The article is a theoretical and empirical review attempting to describe two modes of religious motivation:defensive versus existential religion. The article begins by seriously considering theoretical and empirical evi-dence that religion may function as a defense mechanism. It is argued that this description of religious beliefis coherent and cannot be ignored by psychology of religion researchers. However, the article goes on toargue for the existence of a non-defensive, existentially aware religious motivation. Theoretical and empiricalsupport for this model, defensive versus existential religion, is presented.

In The Future of an Illusion, Freud (1927/1961)offered one of his most blunt and succinct sum-maries of his theory concerning the source ofreligious belief:

Religion would thus be the universalobsessional neurosis of humanity;like the obsessional neurosis of chil-dren, it arose out of the Oedipuscomplex, out of the relation to thefather, (p. 43)

Freud's formulation of religion is widely known:God is the projected father-figure and religionfunctions as a defense mechanism, a wish-fulfill-ment, protecting the psyche from existentialrealities. For Freud, "the effect of religious con-solations may be likened to that of a narcotic"(p. 49).

Since Freud, theorists have speculated aboutthe validity of his basic argument: Is religiousbelief and consolation, at root, wishful thinking?This question is less concerned with ontology(i.e., Does God indeed exist?) than with ^Ssyc o/-ogy (i.e.. How does religious belief function inthe mind of the believer?). For example, does aperson believe in heaven primarily because itoffers existential solace?

The theoretical proposal described in this arti-cle begins with the conviction that there is sometruth to the religion-as-defense-mechanism for-mulation, but that defensiveness does not char-acterize all religious motives. Specifically, it issuggested that aspects of religion do appear tofunction largely as defensive existential buffers.For example, none of us want to die, and a

Correspondence regarding this article should beaddressed to Richard Beck, Ph.D., Associate Professorof Psychology, Abilene Christian University, ACU Box28011, Abilene, TX 79699; email: [email protected]

belief in an afterlife does provide existential com-fort. However, it is also argued that there alsoexists a religious type who is less invested insolace and who displays greater existentialawareness (what exactly is meant by this charac-terization will need to be slowly unpackedthroughout this article). Admittedly, the use ofdefensiveness is only one method by which reli-gious motives might be categorized anddescribed. However, the defensive versus non-defensive distinction is a fruitful line of inquirythat allows us to ask some specific questions:How might a defensive orientation manifest itselfin belief, practice, and religious experience? And,alternatively, how might a less defensive believerdiffer in belief, practice, and religious experience?

To provide some working terminology usedthroughout the article, religious beliefs that aremotivated primarily by the goal of providingexistential comfort and solace will be describedas "defensive religion." Alternatively, "existentialreligion" will be used to characterize a type oforientation where the believer has greaterawareness of the existential functioning of herbeliefs (again, this description will be unpackedin the following pages). This article will providetheoretical descriptions of each orientation aswell as reviewing the theoretical and empiricalliterature in support of such a distinction.Although the role of defensiveness and existen-tial awareness has been noted by scholars foryears, this article will take the extra step ofdescribing, very specifically, the phenomenolo-gy of these religious orientations. This specificitywill allow researchers to move past vague theo-retical descriptions to operational definitionsthat will support laboratory tests aimed atassessing the role of defensiveness in religiousbelief and practice.

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Religion as a defense mechanismMoving from Freudian to existential formula-

tions. Although Freud first clearly described thethesis that religious belief might function as adefensive response to the realities of the externalworld, the Oedipal thrust of his argument hasbeen largely rejected. More recent formulationsof defense mechanisms (of which religion hasbeen included) have tended to focus on existen-tial considerations. The existential formulation ofdefensiveness has been worked out by a numberof influential thinkers. Erich Fromm, RoUo May,Victor Frankl, Irvin Yalom, and Ernest Becker, toname only a few, have all used existentialinsights to significantly illuminate psychodynam-ic processes. A common theme among thesethinkers is that, contrary to what Freud's earlywork suggested, defense mechanisms are notpreoccupied with handling id impulses. Rather,defense mechanisms protect us from existentialrealizations and their accompanying terrors. Pri-mary among these realizations is the recognitionof our finiteness, a consciousness of one's even-tual death and dissolution. Religion, in this light,might function as a defense mechanism byallowing humanity to maintain a daily equanimi-ty by repressing awareness of our horrifyingexistential situation. Further, religion can alsoprovide the believer ways of achieving symbolicimmortality which imbue life with meaning andpurpose. As Becker (1973) points out:

The knowledge of death is reflectiveand conceptual, and animals arespared it ... But to live a whole life-time with the fate of death hauntingone's dreams and even the most sun-filled days—that's something else ...everything a man does in his symbol-ic world is an attempt to deny andovercome his grotesque fate. (p. 27)

Given that a person must live a lifetime withdeath looking him/her squarely in the face, itseems reasonable that a person might adoptbeliefs that "resolve" this dilemma by positingan afterlife governed by a loving caregiver. If so,then the deep motive for the adoption andmaintenance of the religious belief would beexistential defensiveness. Again, as worked outby the existential theorists, this motive need not,and probably is not, conscious. Further, as withmany defense mechanisms, the role of existen-tial defensiveness is denied by believers whenthey are confronted with the suggestion that

defensiveness might be playing a role in main-taining their faith. Because religion may providedeath-denying modes of living as well as offer-ing the promise of an eternal existence, toundermine religious belief—beliefs that serve asdeep and vital defense mechanisms—is topotentially unleash from the believer all mannerof responses ranging from anxiety to anger toviolence. As Freud (1927/1961) observed, "Thebeliever will not let his belief be torn from him,either by arguments or by prohibitions. Andeven if this did succeed with some it would becruelty" (p. 49).

Perspectives from Terror Management Theory.Theory aside, is the existential formulation ofdefense mechanisms accurate? If accurate, howlarge a role does existential defensiveness play inour psychological lives? Recently, many of theseexistential formulations, which regard culture (ofwhich religion is a large part) as an existentialbuffer, have actually been tested in the laborato-ry. Building upon the work of Ernest Becker andothers. Terror Management Theory (TMT; seeGreenburg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997, for acomprehensive theoretical and empirical reviewof TMT) suggests that culture indeed does func-tion as an existential defense mechanism. Follow-ing Becker, TMT suggests that our culturalworldviews (religion obviously playing a part)provide us with death-denying modes of achiev-ing significance and symbolic immortality. Thatis, culture and religion help us define what a"significant" and "meaningful" life should looklike. A culturally "significant" life (e.g., accom-plishments, families, legacies) is a way of achiev-ing a sort of "permanence" or "immortality" in theface of our finiteness Thus, TMT contends thatthe very fabric of our lives is fundamentallydefensive in nature and function. Clearly, TMT isan ambitious and challenging theory of psycho-logical functioning, but it has been garneringimpressive laboratory support (e.g., Greenburg,Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). For example,TMT predicts that when our mortality is broughtto mind we feel existentially vulnerable andrespond by reinvesting in, defending, andshoring up our cultural worldviews (the source ofour meaning in life). These defensive responses,collectively called "worldview defense," havebeen measured in a number of ways, from deni-grating outgroup members to harshly punishingthose who violate our cultural norms. In one par-ticular experiment (Greenburg et al., 1990), andvery relevant to the topic of this article, Christian

210 DEFENSIVE VERSUS EXISTENTIAL RELIGION

subjects who were made to reflect upon theirfuture death (the mortaUty salient condition)were more likely to denigrate a Jewish targetthan those who were not made to reflect upontheir death (the mortality nonsalient condition).This finding is challenging. Why would Chris-tians, normally reluctant to respond harshly toothers, denigrate a Jewish person when theirdeath was brought to mind? Overall, findingssuch as these suggest that the existential theoristshave identified an important dynamic in both cul-ture and religion. Perhaps religion may indeedfunction as an existential defense mechanism.

Is there a non-defensive religious motivation?Given the theoretical and empirical evidence

noted above, it seems clear that existentialdefensiveness may play a role in religious belief.But does it motivate all religious belief? Freudclearly thought it did, but many other thinkershave suggested that religious motivations thatare non-defensive in nature do exist; these arefaith stances that fully recognize our existentialsituation but which actively refuse to believe asa means to repress existential terror. Earlier, thismotivation was labeled "existential religion."Although many theorists have discussed thiskind of religious orientation, the major thinkersin this area have been Soren Kierkegaard,William James, and, more recently, Ernest Beck-er. Their formulations are discussed in turn.

Kierkegaard: The nominal Christian versus TheIndividual. The Danish philosopher S0renKierkegaard is widely considered to be a found-ing father of existential philosophy. This is some-what ironic in that Kierkegaard was largelyconcerned with religious issues, whereas laterinfluential existential thinkers followed Freudand largely ignored religion. Kierkegaard was afecund thinker, but for present purposes thefocus will be placed on only two of his ideas,the Christian as The Individual and the role ofdread in religion. The three works that primarilyelucidate these themes are his Fear and Trem-bling, the Attack upon Christendom, and TheSickness unto Death.

Observing the corruptions of state-endorsedreligion and the lack of authenticity in nominalChristians, Kierkegaard wrote extensively aboutthe Christian as The Individual. According toKierkegaard, true Christianity involves standingapart from the mass of humanity, to become a"solitary one" before God. Too often the tempta-tion is to remain a simple face in the crowd:

By seeing the multitude of peoplearound it, by being busied with allsorts of worldly affairs, by being' wiseto the ways of the world, such a per-son forgets himself, in a divine senseforgets his own name, dares not tobelieve in himself, finds being him-self too risky, finds it much easierand safer to be like others, tobecome a copy, a number, alongwith the crowd ... Yes, what we callworldliness simply consists of suchpeople who, if one may so express it,pawn themselves to the world.(Kierkegaard, 1849/1989, pp. 63-65)

This giving-into-the-crowd extends into the reli-gious sphere as well:

[H]e learns to imitate other people,how they conduct their lives, andproceeds to live as they do. In Chris-tendom he is also a Christian, goes tochurch every Sunday, listens to andunderstands the priest ...; he dies; forten dollars the priest ushers him in toeternity—but a self he neither wasnor became. (Kierkegaard, 1849/1989,p. 83)

Clearly, these descriptions parallel Freud's obser-vations. But contrary to Freud, Kierkegaard sug-gested that becoming a true Self, a "solitary one"before God, was possible. In Fear and Trem-bling, Kierkegaard calls this person the "knightof faith" who "is obligated to rely upon himselfalone" by separating from the mass of humanity.The true believer refuses to become a "culturalman" and a nominal Christian. Obviously, toaccomplish such a thorough separation involvesa great "leap of faith" conducted with much psy-chic anguish and "fear and trembling." Thus, itrequires great courage and effort on the part ofthe true believer to push through the anguish toultimately arrive as an Individual before God. Inthis quest, the believer actively pursues theangst, moving through deeper and deeper stagesof self-realization and, hence, despair. AsKierkegaard describes it, the more existentiallyself-aware we become, the greater our despair.However, this deepening of despair accomplish-es a great work within us, it strips us of all pre-tense and ultimately allows for a connection withthe Ultimate:

Finally, what we have here is...a fur-ther step forward [along the path of

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despair]. For just because [thedespair] is more intense, this despairis in a certain sense closer to salva-tion. A despair of this kind is hard toforget—it goes too deep; but anymoment the despair is held open,there is also a possibility of salvation.(Kierkegaard, 1849/1989, p. 93)

Thus, according to Kierkegaard, the act of faith,rather than repressing existential awareness,actively peels away the defensive layers until thebare existential truth is exposed. Only then istrue salvation possible.

William James: The Healthy Minded versus theSick Soul. In his seminal work in the psychologyof religion literature. The Varieties of ReligiousExperience (1958), William James sets up adichotomy between what he calls the "healthyminded" Christian and the "sick soul." AlthoughJames' description of the healthy minded believ-er was developed in response to religious move-ments popular at the turn of the last century, thehealthy minded description remains very rele-vant today. According to James, the healthyminded believer is consistently optimistic andhappy, he "looks on all things and sees that theyare good" (p. 90) and he "succeeds in ignoringevil's very existence" (p. 135). Clearly, thehealthy minded believer actively ignores orrepresses existential realities with the accompa-nying terrors. Consequently, James comments onthe "blindness" this orientation manifests. In con-trast to the healthy minded believer, James setsout the sick soul. According to James, the sicksoul is much more open to existential reality.The sick souled are convinced that "the evilaspects of our life are of its very essence" (p.125) and ruminate on the existential condition ofman's finiteness and vulnerability: "The fact thatwe can die, that we can be ill at all, is what per-plexes US; the fact that we now for a momentlive and are well is irrelevant to that perplexity"Games, 1902/1958, p. 132, italics in original).

These realizations create within the sick soul a"sadness of heart" and a "melancholy" mood.James offers his clearest contrast between thehealthy minded and the sick soul with thesefamous words: "Let sanguine healthy-minded-ness do its best with its strange power of livingin the moment and ignoring and forgetting, stillthe evil background is really there to be thoughtof, and the skull will grin in at the banquet"Games, 1902/1958, p. 132). The sick soul is con-stantly aware of the skull grinning in at the ban-

quet and pays an emotional price for refusing torepress this awareness . So, which is best?Healthy mindedness with this upbeat optimism?Or the sick soul's melancholy? James comesdown on the side of the sick soul due to the factthat the sick soul is not rooted in fantasy but isin touch with existential reality:

The method of averting one's atten-tion from evil, and living simply inthe light of good is splendid as longas it will work ... But it breaks downimpotently as soon as melancholycomes. [T]here is no doubt thathealthy mindedness is inadequate ...because the evil facts which it refusespositively to account for are a gen-uine portion of reality; and they mayafter all be the best key to life's sig-nificance, and possibly the onlyopeners of our eyes to the deepestlevels of truth. (James, 1902/1958,pp.149-150)

Thus, like Kierkegaard's Individual, James' sicksoul envisions an honest existential religiousmotivation. And, like Kierkegaard, James sug-gests that these persons reap the emotional con-sequences of an existentially aware faith stance.These individuals are believers, but, by refusingto use their beliefs to repress existential terror,they suffer.

Ernest Becker: The overlooked positive conclu-sion. In Ernest Becker's Pulitzer Prize winningwork. The Denial of Death (1973), he presents amagisterial overview and integration of psychody-namic theory and existential philosophy. Becker,as has been articulated repeatedly above, con-tends that our culture and the fabric of our per-sonality allow us to keep our daily equanimity inthe face of our existential condition by providingus with a symbolic "heroism." By "heroism" Beck-er means an avenue of achieving significance andmeaningfulness. However, most of our personaland cultural heroics are death-denying, and, thus,fantasy-based and doomed to failure. This point isillustrated by a story recounted by the existentialpsychiatrist Irvin Yalom (as cited in Greenburg,Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997, p. 63):

Not too long ago I was taking a briefvacation alone at a Caribbean beachresort. One evening I was reading,and from time to time I glanced towatch the bar boy who was doingnothing save staring languidly out to


sea—much like a lizard sunning itselfon a warm rock, I thought. The com-parison I made between him and memade me feel very snug, very cozy.He was simply doing nothing—^wast-ing time. I, on the other hand wasdoing something useful, reading,learning. I was, in short, gettingahead. All was well, until some inter-nal imp asked the terrible question:Getting ahead of what? How? And(even worse) why?

When during life we deeply reflect on thenature of our existence we see, like Yalom, ourcultural hero systems exposed for what they are,desperate attempts to deny our own death andfiniteness.

As mentioned earlier, recent work in TMT haslargely supported Becker's formulation that cul-ture and self-esteem function as existentialdefense mechanisms. However, TMT has largelyignored the positive religious conclusion Beckeroffers in the latter half of The Denial of Death:

[R]eligion solves the problem of death,which no living individuals can solve,no matter how they would supportus. Religion then gives the possibilityof heroic victory in freedom andsolves the problem of human dignityat its highest level. The two ontologi-cal motives of the human conditionare both met: The need to surrenderoneself in full to the rest of nature, tobecome a part of it by laying downone's whole existence to some highermeaning; and the need to expandoneself as an individual heroic per-sonality. Finally, religion alone giveshope, because it holds open thedimension of the unknown and theunknowable, the fantastic mystery ofcreation that the human mind cannoteven begin to approach .... (Becker,1973, p. 203-204)

This outcome is possible, according to Becker,by rejecting "cultural heroism" for what he calls"cosmic heroism," a heroism that strips itself ofdefensive, fantasy-based cultural props to con-nect with the Ultimate. Becker explicitly followsKierkegaard here. Like Kierkegaard, he suggeststhat stripping off our cultural defenses involvesgreat courage and mental anguish. "Cosmicheroism" for Becker does not repress but

demands existential honesty. "I think that takinglife seriously means something such as this: thatwhatever man does on this planet has to bedone in the lived truth of the terror of creation,of the grotesque, of the rumble of panic under-neath everything. Otherwise it is false" (Becker,1973, p. 203-204).

Summary: The reality of "existential religion." Ihave discussed the ideas of Kierkegaard, James,and Becker in some detail because each is wide-ly recognized as a profound theorist and phe-nomenologist of the human condition. What wefind in summarizing their work is a remarkableconvergence upon a phenomena that Freudappears to have overlooked: the reality of a non-defensive existential religious motivation. Thereare many other points of convergence as well.First, they agree that much of humanity uses reli-gion as a defensive existential shield. Second,this defensive orientation is in some sense"blind" in that it chooses to avoid confrontationwith existential predicaments. That is, the exis-tential problems are either repressed or distort-ed. Third, there does, however, appear to existan existentially aware religious motivation. Also,this motivation appears to be relatively rare andexceptional. And, finally, this existential orienta-tion is characterized by angst, melancholy, and"fear and trembling." Belief persists, but the exis-tential honesty exacts a significant emotional toll.

Theoretical descriptions of thedefensive versus existential orientations

Psychology of religion researchers have consis-tently sought after methods of describing andassessing "mature" versus "immature" religiousstrivings. To date, there is little consensus on thebest way to approach this problem. And yet,most feel that there is a phenomena here worthnoting and studying. Some religious individualsappear naive, simplistic, fanatical, childlike, orrigid in their faith. Others appear more honest,flexible, tolerant, curious, and complex. Thesedifferences seem worthy of understanding. Thisarticle agrees with many theorists who considerthe distinction between defensive versus existen-tial religion to be a powerful tool in describingreligious motives. However, we should leavebehind labels such as "immature" and "mature,"which imply value judgments which obfuscatethe empirical issues. Rather, this article focuseson the consequences of religious motives. Thereare consequences associated with defensivenessand consequences associated wth existential

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Table 1Contrasting the Defensive Versus the Existential Orientations

Defensive Orientation

Conviction, perhaps dogmatic

Moral outrage in response to threat

Positive affect predominates

Suspicious, perhaps intolerant of

outgroup members

Simplistic faith schema, dislikes

confronting existential problems

Specialness (protection, insight, destiny)

Reactive when mortality salient

Existential Orientation

Doubting, tentative

Contemplative in response to threat

Negative affect and angst predominate

More accepting and curious about

outgroup members

Complex faith schema, tends to wrestle

with existential problems

Suspicious of specialness

Non-reactive when mortality salient

awareness. That is, people displaying these ori-entations thrive and suffer in distinct ways.Which orientation is "best" is a question thatprobably cannot be answered definitively.

Having reviewed the theoretical evidence, it isalso important to review the existing empiricalevidence in support of the defensive versus exis-tential distinction. Again, more than simply not-ing that such a distinction exists, the goal is toprecisely describe the phenomenology of thedefensive and existential faith experiences. Con-sequently, before turning to the empirical evi-dence, it is necessary to be more precise in ourdescriptions of the defensive and existential ori-entations. A good way to do this is by making aseries of contrasts between the two orientations.As a beginning point, a concise list is offered inTable 1. These contrasts are largely borrowedfrom three sources: The phenomenological workof Kierkegaard, James, and Becker; the psycho-dynamic insights regarding the nature and func-tioning of defense mechanisms; and thetheoretical and empirical framework of TerrorManagement Theory.

Defensive religion. Religion, in this view, ischaracterized by religious beliefs whose mainfunction is to repress existential realizations andterror. Consequently, the believer reaps therewards of peaceful conviction and sanguineoptimism. However, as noted above, there arecosts involved with this orientation. First, thedefensive worldview must be believed absolutelyand protected from threat. However, an orienta-tion characterized by certainty and convictionmay lead to, in extreme cases, dogmatism andfanaticism. Further, intense moral outrage and

righteous indignation could be elicited if theworldview is threatened. Consequently, dialogueabout fundamental issues of the faith couldbecome difficult due to the negative emotiongenerated by the defensive posture. In addition,outgroup members, however they are identified,might be distrusted, castigated, or, in veryextreme cases, attacked. Mostly they are targetsof evangelism. All of this is motivated by the factthat outgroup members, who hold alternativeworldviews, raise the suspicion that worldviewadoption may be arbitrary. That is, the mere exis-tence of people who hold to alternative world-views threatens the believer's conviction that heis in sole possession of the Truth.

Continuing with Table 1, defensive beliefsmight tend to be simplistic and less interested inthe philosophical issues raised by religious doc-trines. This may be due to a hesitance to wrestlewith certain existential problems. For example,rather than wrestling with the feelings aroused bythe fact that the universe appears, at times, ran-dom, painful, and inexplicable, the defensive faithstance might quickly latch on to simplistic signs ofProvidence. Further continuing with Table 1, thedefensive believer may also assume a personalsense of cosmic "specialness." For example, thebeliever might imagine that he will have a betterlot in life due to the protective hand of God. Hemight believe that he will be more likely to suc-ceed, find a loving mate, live to old age, behealed regularly of his infirmities, and even bespared from death. God might be seen as havinga very detailed plan and destiny for the believerand might endow the believer, at times, with spe-cial knowledge and insight. Further, God is


viewed as extraordinarily responsive and solici-tous of the believer's most trivial needs andrequests. And, finally, the defensive religious ori-entation is predicted to be reactive when threatsto mortality are made conscious. Because death,the ultimate existential terror, is largely, if nottotally, repressed, when mortality is made salient(as it is in TMT experiments) the defensive believ-er is predicted to respond by protecting his/herworldview (which can happen in a variety ofways as TMT experiments have documented).

Existential religion. To start, existential religionmust be seen as distinct from mere agnosticismor atheism. Existential religion involves faith andmay be generally orthodox, although doubt is aconstant struggle. Thus, the defining feature ofexistential religion is faith, even devout ortho-doxy, in the face of the existential condition.That is, the believer may consciously and willful-ly refuse to allow her beliefs to give existentialsolace, or, at the very least, faith doesn't easilyresolve the existential predicament. For example,believing that God is "in control" doesn't easethe existential believer's deep angst in the faceof human suffering and death or attenuatedoubts that God has, perhaps, "lost control."Consequently, the phenomenological experienceof existential believers is not one of peacefulbliss. This, in contrast to the defensive believer,is their unique burden. The source of this dis-content comes from a variety of places. Mainly itstems from the fact that the existential believerrealizes that she is taking a "leap of faith." Sheadmits that there are no guarantees that her faithwill be proven justified. Thus, the terror of deathremains present and unrepressed. In a sense,existential believers "hope" rather than "believe."In either case, they either refuse or fail to experi-ence the comfort that comes so easily to otherpeople of faith.

Further, existential believers claim no protec-tive buffer (i.e., they expect the proverbialrain—or lighting—to fall equally on the just andunjust), special insight (i.e., they find the futureopaque), or cosmic destiny (i.e., they accept thatthey must make choices without clear informa-tion, guidance, or guarantee of success/blessing).All this contributes to their religious angst.

As noted, the price for this existential honestyis doubt and existential anxiety. On the positiveside, however, existential believers should beless dogmatic and more tolerant of outgroupmembers. Since they are less certain, they shouldbe more contemplative, rather than defensive, in

the face of new information or challenging dia-logue. Finally, because mortality is on averagemore salient for existential believers, they shouldbe less reactive in the face of TMT-like experi-mental manipulations.

Empirical evidence for the defensive andexistential orientations

Up to this point, the argument has been large-ly theoretical in nature. In a different vein, isthere any evidence that such a dichotomy,defensive versus existential religion, exists? Arethe characterizations described above actuallyobserved in religious populations? It is the hopeof this article, by making these descriptions spe-cific, that empirical evidence could begin to becollected in a more focused fashion. However,some pre-existing evidence, collected for differ-ent purposes, is supportive of the model offeredhere.i

Evidence for the characterization of the defen-sive mode of religion. Batson, Schoenrade, andVentis (1993) review much of the evidence con-cerning the consequences of religious belief.Their review suggests that devout religiousbeliefs do appear to shield the average believerfrom existential concerns (Osarchuk & Tatz,1973; Schoenrade, 1989). Further, religiousbeliefs are often cognitively binding. That is,believers generally are not free to critically eval-uate their own beliefs (Batson, 1975; Feather,1964; McFarland & Warren, 1992). Finally, Batsonet al. (1993), in a review of 47 studies, found apositive association between religious belief andintolerance and conclude "We seem to be pre-sented with a clear, if unsettling, conclusion: Atleast among white, middle-class Christians in theUnited States, religion is not associated withincreased love and acceptance but withincreased intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry" (p.302, italics in original). However, work done byDonahue (1985), Gorsuch (1988), and otherssuggests that this association is largely driven bya significant portion of the religious populationwho use religion for utilitarian and self-servingpurposes (often labeled "extrinsic religiosity").However, the correlation between internalizedreligious motives ("intrinsic religiosity") andintolerance is zero. Thus, the most committedmembers of a religious group are not more prej-udiced, but neither are they less prejudiced.Either way, neither religious affiliation nor reli-gious motivation (extrinsic versus intrinsic) pre-dict less intolerance generally. Yet, Batson et al.

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(1993) call even this conclusion into question bysuggesting that this lack of association may bedue to self-presentational effects. That is, reli-gious persons tend to shy away from openlyendorsing racist attitudes. Consequently, in a fewstudies (e.g., Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, &Pych, 1986; Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978) thatexamine actual behavior, rather than self-report-ed attitudes, the evidence appears to suggest thateven intrinsically motivated religious personsbehave in a racist manner (whether they admitthat fact or not is another matter entirely).Although much of the work and conclusionscited above involves Batson's work, his conclu-sions are generally acknowledged by leadingpsychology of religion researchers (e.g., see thediscussion in Hood, Spilka, Hunsburger, & Gor-such's, 1996, widely used textbook on the psy-chology of religion), yet the issue remainscontentious (see Gorsuch, 1993, and Altemeyer& Hunsberger, 1993, for an exchange betweenprominent psychology of religion researchers onthis topic).

To summarize, although many of the findingsand conclusions reported above remain contro-versial, for the present purposes of this article,the empirical evidence suggests that the charac-terizations made of the defensive religious mode(Table 1) are plausible. However, what might besaid about the existential mode of religion?

Evidence for the characterization of the exis-tential mode of religion. Perhaps the best attemptto assess a more existential mode of religious lifeagain traces back to Batson and his conceptionof religion as quest. In Batson's words. Questcaptures a religious orientation that "involveshonestly facing existential questions in all theircomplexity, while at the same time resistingclear-cut, pat answers" (Batson, Schoenrade, &Ventis, 1993, p. I66). Further, Batson considersQuest to be a "religious" motivation in thatQuest motives involve a willingness to strugglewith existential questions. However, these ques-tions may or may not involve belief in a Tran-scendent Other (i.e., God): "There may or maynot be a belief in a transcendent reality, butthere is a transcendent, religious aspect to theindividual's life. We shall call this open-ended,questioning approach religion as quesf (Batsonet al., 1993, p. 166). Overall, Quest is describedas a religious orientation that views the experi-ence of doubt as positive, displays a readiness toface existential questions, and is willing tochange and grow over time.

Quest is close to what is described here as"existential religion." The empirical research(again see Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993 foran empirical review) regarding Quest suggeststhat people high on the Quest dimension are lessdogmatic, more tolerant, and even more altruis-tic. Recent evidence from Beck and Jessup (inpress) also suggests that Quest is positively asso-ciated with measures of existential angst, com-plexity of belief, religious exploration, experienceof doubt (tentativeness), ecumenism, universality(acceptance of all world religions), and a willing-ness to change one's religious beliefs. Beck andJessup (in press) also found negative correlationsbetween Quest and existential well-being, reli-gious well-being, and Christian orthodoxy.

Thus, on the surface, it seems like many fea-tures of Quest capture the idea of "existentialreligion." However, the Quest construct remainscontroversial. For example, Donahue (1985) sug-gested that Quest might be measuring agnosti-cism or religious conflict. Batson has respondedto these concerns (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991),but the issue continues to be debated. Much ofthis debate stems from differences in workingdefinitions among researchers regarding thenature of religion. Most researchers tend toadopt the position that religious belief mustinvolve some ontological recognition of a spiritu-al or transcendent plane of existence. Batson,however, suggests that existential concerns arethe hallmark of religious strivings. According tothis view, as Batson readily acknowledges, evenatheists can be defined as "religious" if the indi-vidual struggles with existential questions (e.g..What gives life significance?). The point herehowever is not to debate the proper definition ofreligion, but to note that Batson's conceptualiza-tion of Quest is broader than the definitionoffered above for "existential religion." The dis-tinction is one of belief. The existential believeris just that—a believer, even an orthodox believ-er. The issue is how they use, or refuse to use,their beliefs to handle existential realizations.Thus, although the literature surrounding theQuest construct supports the characterizations ofexistential religion made in Table 1, moreresearch is needed. Specifically, few researchershave clearly defined and studied the exact for-mulation offered here of "existential religion."

Implications and future directionsEmpirical starting points. Obviously, the initial

place to begin to test this theory is to determine


if the characterizations of the defensive and exis-tential orientations, as summarized in Table 1,hold up under empirical scrutiny. As a startingpoint, assessment instruments aimed at quantify-ing aspects of this typology might be developedand lab tests of the TMT sort could be conduct-ed. Specifically, an assessment instrument aimedat quantifying the characterizations in Table 1might be constructed. After developing such aninstrument, correlational and experimental stud-ies could follow. Simple correlational studiesmight determine if those scoring higher on thedefensive profile are less fearful of death, moredogmatic, or less tolerant. TMT-like experimentsmight also be conducted. For example, afteridentifying "existential" and "defensive" partici-pants, these participants could be made to movethrough a TMT-like manipulation where somemembers of each group are made to reflectupon their eventual death (the morality salientcondition) and the other half made to reflect onan innocuous subject (the morality nonsalientcondition). The participants might then be askedto rate various essays, some supportive andsome less supportive, of Christianity. (This is adependen t measure strategy commonlyemployed in TMT research. Often, TMTresearchers use pro-American and anti-Americanessays to assess worldview defense amongAmerican college students.) If the theory out-lined in this article is correct, the experimentalpredictions for such a design are straightforward.First, all participants should be more favorable ofthe pro-Christian essays and viewpoints (the par-ticipants are Christians of course). However,when morality is made salient, only the "defen-sive" participants (in contrast to the "existential"participants) are predicted to dramaticallyengage in worldview defense (e.g., denigrate theauthors of the anti-Christianity essays). Simplecorrelational and experimental tests such asthese should be able to test the validity of thetheory presented in this article.

Theoretical starting points. Beyond the directtests of the theory just mentioned, a great deal oftheoretical work remains to be done. For exam-ple, how might the Quest construct be made tofit the definition of existential religious belief?Recall that, for Batson, the originator of theQuest construct, a religious quest need notinvolve theism. Consequently, the Quest con-struct remains controversial and some wonder ifQuest should even be regarded as a religiousvariable (e.g., Donahue, 1985). In short, it is an

open empirical quest ion if the distinctionbetween the existential atheist or existential the-ist is useful. This is an idea that seems wellworth exploring. As a starting point, two orthog-onal dimensions might be proposed. The firstdimension would describe a continuum rangingfrom disbelief to belief in a supernatural realm(e.g., belief in God), with atheists at one extremeand religious believers at the other. A seconddimension would describe the degree of existen-tial awareness displayed by the person rangingfrom existentially aware to existentiallyrepressed. When the dimensions are superim-posed upon each other a fourfold typologyemerges. According to the current theory, boththe defensive and existentially religious wouldscore high on religious belief. However, theywould differ in their degree of existential aware-ness. Those who do not believe and who arealso not existentially aware might be classified asKierkegaard's "cultural man," a person who doesnot believe in a spiritual existence but whoemploy's death-denying cultural heroics torepress existential awareness. Finally, those whodo not believe but are existentially aware mayembody the agnostic or atheistic search for exis-tential meaning Batson has described (althoughBatson would not restrict Quest so narrowly).Whether or not this typology has any descriptiveutility is an open question.

Most of the characterizations made about reli-gion in this article have been explicitly orimplicitly about the Judeo-Christian tradition. Itis interesting to speculate about how the defen-sive versus existential distinction might manifestitself, if at all, in other world religions. Theexpectation would be, according to Freud, thatall religions are inherently defensive. However,if the analogy with Christianity holds, thereshould be believers of all world religious whomanifest the existential honesty of the existentialreligious type. For example. Buddhism appears,on its face, to be a brutally honest existentialreligion (after all, the first of the Buddha's FourNoble Truths is the recognition that life—all oflife—is suffering). This might indicate that somereligious groups are more existentially honestthan others. However, many of the motives seenin pop-Buddhism and New Age thinking appearexistentially defensive in nature. For example,why so many reincarnated lives are reported tohave been either exotic or important is likelydue to existential defensiveness (i.e., a strivingfor significance by indulging in a fantasy-based

RICHARD BECK 217

and ego-centric belieO. In stiort, the typologyoffered here should easily extend to all worldreligions. Whether or not it does so remains tobe seen.

Finally, the definition of existential religionoffered earlier stated that the existential believ-er fails to consistently experience existentialsolace from religious belief. Clearly, most peo-ple gain deep comfort from their faith. Doesthis mark a person as defensive? Not necessari-ly, tt is doubtful that living in full existentialawareness is possible or even healthy. Clearly,human suffering beyond imagination existswor ldwide at this very moment , but wecouldn't function if we hourly dwelt upon thisfact. What is more realistic for the existentialbeliever, rather than constant existential brood-ing, is a resistance to quick theological fixes forexistential problems. And further, existentialproblems keep breaking into the believer'sconsciousness, disrupting the peaceful flow ofconviction and certainty. This surge of existen-tial awareness doesn't happen every minute ofevery hour, but the existential predicamentdoes break into consciousness more often thanfor the defensive believer. Perhaps solace cancome to the existential believer, but only tem-porarily, tn the end, is this existential experi-ence a display of faith or faithlessness? Somemight view the existential orientation as imma-ture and a display of faithlessness. Othersmight find the defensive orientation lacking infaith. These are difficult issues which may nothave a clear resolution. Who is the true personof faith, the "existentially oriented" or the"defensive"? Perhaps there are rewards andcosts to both.

Note

1. There is one assumption that is made in thisreview of literature that shouid be made explicit.Nameiy, if Freud, Kierkegaard, James, and Beckerare correct, the majority of the religious persons arecharacterized by the defensive orientation. This willbe assumed to be accurate. It may be an assumptionthat will turn out to be wrong. However, given thisassumption, whenever we see correlations aboutreligion or religiosity generally it will be assumedthat this reflects upon most common, the defensive,orientation.

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Author

Dr. Richard Beck is an Associate Professor of Psy-chology at Abilene Christian University with degreesfrom Southern Methodist University (Ph.D., Experi-mental Psychology) and Abilene Christian University(M.S., Clinical Psychology; B.S., Christian Ministry).His research specializations are the assessment andtreatment of emotional disorders and psychology ofreligion.

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The Function of Religious Belief